POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION
RESPONSES TO INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT (IWRM): THE CASE OF THABO
MOFUTSANYANE DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

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November 2010
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that "POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION RESPONSES TO INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IWRM): THE CASE OF THABO MOFUTSANYANE DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY" is my own work. I acknowledged all sources and quotes used for the purpose of this study by means of complete references. I or any other person have not previously submitted this thesis at this or any other University for degree purposes.

Signature

SYSMAN MOTLOUNG

29 November 2010

Date
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- My thanks also to all respondents who gave me such invaluable input for this study. You allowed me a rare opportunity to see briefly into the window of your lives. Bro’ Sam, my condolences for the respondents who passed away before the research was completed.
- The best of thunderous praise and veneration to my Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ for His grace over the years of study and the strength to cope with the difficulties encountered. With an open face beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, I am changed into the same image, from glory to glory. This I have yet to comprehend fully.
Ecclesiastes 1:13

And I gave my heart to seek and search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven: this sore travail hath God given to the sons of man to be exercised therewith. (KJV)
ABSTRACT

This study looks at political culture and socialisation responses to Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). It identifies political culture and socialisation as part of a process, the development of a political culture with specific attitudes, cognitions, and feelings towards the political system. Political culture and socialisation impart the knowledge of how to act politically, i.e. how to apply values in formulating demands and making claims on the political system. They form a connecting link between micro- and macro-politics. The study maintains that political orientations are handed down from one generation to another, through the process of political socialisation. Top-down and bottom-up influences come into play to augment a discourse on the glocal nature of political socialisation and the political culture of international societies with regard to IWRM and governance ideologies. It is argued that these international ideas become relevant in the national political agenda, civil society organisations and trans-national networks.

The IWRM aspects of water as an economic good and a basic human right have become a two-edged sword in the South African context. The study reveals that politics stand at the epicentre of water problems, and that IWRM is a political-ethical issue which challenges power bases in many communities. The IWRM global norms of equitable, efficient and sustainable use of water resources have become a major problem in a water-scarce country burdened with economic inequalities and abject poverty. This is a pressing issue because there is an increasing demand for water to sustain the development necessary to redress the draconian ills of the apartheid past. This becomes evident in the fundamental legislative overhaul that has taken place since 1994, embracing a transformation culture that glorifies the norm of water not only as a fundamental human right, but also as a commodity that is necessary to sustain human dignity. It is here that water is politicised. Violent protests have erupted in reaction to perceived neo-liberal attempts to deny the poor their access to this resource. The political culture and socialisation responses as far as IWRM is concerned appear within fragmented lines, i.e.
mainly black and poor communities embrace a culture of non-payment for services and resort to violent protests as a viable method to raise their concerns. In contrast, the white and middle-class communities manifest a tendency to form parallel local government structures; they then withhold rate payments and provide services for themselves through ratepayer associations.

Finally, the study considers the South African context with regard to the manifestations of political culture, and how this influences water resources. It is evident that there is too much emphasis on politics at the expense of discussions on IWRM. Civil society organisations make very little attempt to encourage public participation in water management structures. It also appears that political elites who are disillusioned with civil society organisations tend to derail their efforts to educate the public on water management structures.
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCYL</td>
<td>African National Congress Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEC</td>
<td>Branch Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Catchment Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Congress of the People</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<tr>
<td>CuDyWat</td>
<td>Transdisciplinary research team of the Cultural Dynamics of Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPLG</td>
<td>Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWA</td>
<td>Department of Water Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWAF</td>
<td>Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
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<tr>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESCWA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
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GDP: Gross Domestic Product
ICC: International Cricket Council
ICESCR: International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IDP: Integrated Development Plan
IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party
ILA: International Law Association
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IWRM: Integrated Water Resources Management
LED: Local Economic Development
LEDF: Local Economic Development Forum
MAP Water: Maluti-A-Phofung Water (Pty) Limited
M-A-P: Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality
MAYCO: Mayoral Committee
MEC: Member of Executive Council
MSA: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
NIA: National Intelligence Agency
NWRS: National Water Resource Strategy
PEC: Provincial Executive Committee
Pers. comm.: Personal Communication

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>PUP:</td>
<td>Public-to-public Partnership</td>
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<td>SABC:</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>SAVE:</td>
<td>Save the Vaal River Environment</td>
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<td>SI:</td>
<td>Symbolic Interactionism</td>
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<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCED:</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
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<td>VEJA:</td>
<td>Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance</td>
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<td>WDM:</td>
<td>Water Demand Management</td>
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<td>WHO:</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WISA:</td>
<td>Water Institute of Southern Africa</td>
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<td>WMA:</td>
<td>Water Management Agency</td>
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<td>WSA:</td>
<td>Water Services Act 108 of 1997</td>
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<td>WSSA:</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation Services South Africa</td>
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<td>WSSD:</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>WUA:</td>
<td>Water Users Association</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

1.1 KEYWORDS
Political culture; (political) socialisation; top-down and bottom-up approach; public participation; civil society organisations; Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM).

1.2 INTRODUCTION
While part of the Cultural Dynamics of Water (CuDyWat) transdisciplinary research team, the researcher was introduced to the subject of hydropolitics and Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). This became a fascinating field for research. The much publicised water wars about water shortage and the current theories on climate change also sparked the researcher's interest. All the evidence seems to point to a scramble for water resources in the near future - a scenario also suggested in much of the literature. The researcher was thus highly motivated to investigate the political dynamics of water resources, but when it came to identifying a research theme for the purposes of this study, it became clear to him that the political and cultural dynamics of water resources are not only under-researched but are also highly controversial in the South African context.

The researcher realised it would be necessary first to investigate local perceptions towards IWRM and the political cultural elements associated with the provision of water. The IWRM aspects of water as a basic human right and a necessity for the common good were something of forbidden fruit for the researcher to taste. This is because the majority of the previously disadvantaged South Africans have embraced a culture of non-payment for water and yet they have embarked on violent protests in an effort to pressure local government authorities to provide free access to water and related services as per legislative stipulations. Meanwhile, some of their counterpart
white communities have adopted their own agendas; they withhold municipal payments but have established their own ratepayer associations to whom they make service payments to provide services, thus creating a municipality within a municipality. This persuaded the researcher to embark on a study of political culture and socialisation as far as IWRM is concerned. The focus of this investigation is the varying responses of a wide range of people exposed to similar conditions.

1.3 ORIENTATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

Maluti-A-Phofung (M-A-P) local municipality falls within the Thabo Mofutsanyane District situated in the Upper Vaal Catchment area. The following base map outlines the borders of the Upper Vaal Catchment and the water activities involved in this area.

Figure 1: The Upper Vaal Catchment Adapted from (DWAF, 2004: 19)

The Upper Vaal catchment is one of 19 Water Management Areas (WMAs) in South Africa, as identified by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) and falls within the Gauteng, Free State, North West and Mpumalanga provinces (DWAF, 2004:3). The Upper Vaal catchment is
characterised by the sprawling urban and industrial areas; the catchment generates almost 20% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (DWAF, 2004: iii). The Upper Vaal area is under pressure to maintain adequate potable water provision to support households and industrial activities within Gauteng, the country's economic hub. The Vaal River system, referred to as "South Africa's hardest working river" (Tempelhoff et al., 2007: 108) serves as the backbone.

It is evident that Water Demand Management (WDM) and conservation are necessary within the catchment. Appeals for initiatives to engage public participation in IWRM and the salient influences of political culture and socialisation in such involvement, are indispensable for the benefit of the Upper Vaal catchment.

After the 1994 elections, the government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), inherited a society encouraged not to pay for services by the liberation movements. This is because rent boycotts (against service charges) were instrumental in protest against the apartheid regime and its top-down approach to decision making and service delivery (Zybrands, 2001:227). Water resources were thus used to meet political ends. Examples are many. In the Upper Vaal catchment this became evident in the Vaal Triangle townships of Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Boipatong and Bophelong in the mid-1985. In Tumahole and later other townships in the Northern Free State, residents also embarked on rent boycotts. Townships in the Eastern Transvaal and in Mamelodi (Pretoria's largest township) followed suit in November 1985 (Chaskalson et al., 1987: 49, 54). This socio-political strategy was widely referred to as "smashing the state".

The problem is that now, in a democratic South Africa hard pressed by water pollution and severe water shortages (Kelbe, 1988: 8), the citizenry, especially in black townships, still embraces a culture of "free water for all / a right to water" and refuses to pay water bills (Tempelhoff, 2008: 36; Coles & Wallace, 2005: 36; Chaskalson et al., 1987: 51; Bond, 2003). Even now, some 16 years into democracy, the culture of non-payment and violent protest still endures,
indicating the influence of politics on culture within society; this has probably stimulated negative perceptions of IWRM. This culture is most readily transferred from generation to generation through socialisation (De Witt & Booysen, 1995: 2). This same tendency is evident in the actions of discontented citizens which led to violent protests in the Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality townships, where protest has erupted over the installation of water tricklers. These policy initiatives were implemented after a public-to-public programme (PUP) between the municipality and a water service provider. Some senior government officials did not even fully understand their roles and responsibilities in the project (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 14).

Smith (2005: 167) has observed that the project was not received very well by the poor. They felt that they were denied a reliable basic water service because of their economic standing. They were also justified in questioning the fact that they had not been afforded the stipulated public participation in a water forum and had taken no part in the decision-making processes on their specific situation (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 15). Another area (Phumelela) within the Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality followed suit in protest against poor service delivery and the quality of governance as far as water services, (among others), were concerned. While these protests were under way, 17 people were arrested, several others injured and one was shot dead by the police, putting further strain on the relationship between civil society organisations and the local government in this region (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007: 3, 10-12).

All this points to violent protest as an alternative method of activism where public protest is met by the wrath of the state police force; this will serve useful in an analysis of political culture and the nature of public participation in water resources management as seen in the M-A-P municipality in a residents' group called the Greater Harrismith Concerned Residents Association. M-A-P residents are willing to pay for water services but are unable to do so, due to their economic circumstances (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 21). The situation of local hydropolitics in Harrismith will be investigated by
looking at the nature and extent to which political culture and socialisation – augmented by top-down decisions made by government – influence IWRM.

1.3.1 Theoretical framework

In view of Butterworth et al. (2010) the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) branches from the theory and philosophy of Water Demand Management (WDM). Internationally, WDM is regarded as the most efficient way of managing basic water needs (Tyler, 2007:2). Gumbo et al. (2005) show that WDM is a key component of integrated water provision and sustainable development. WDM focuses on the methods in which water is being used, rather than simply meeting the demand for water (Mwendera et al., 2003). The goals of WDM are economic efficacy; social development; social equity; the conservation of the environment; sustainability of water supply; and political acceptability (Turton, 2002).

IWRM puts added meaning to WDM (Medema & Jeffrey, 2005) and recognises the need for different stakeholder groups to synchronise their efforts in realising the WDM's primary ideals. IWRM is a process that seeks to reach a viable equilibrium between the need to protect and sustain water resources on the one hand, and the need to develop and efficiently utilise them on the other hand (Mehta et al., 2007). It is a developing, interactive process to promote harmonised planning, improvement and management of water, and land (Taylor, 2008). This includes related resources in order to maximise the ensuing economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of ecosystems (Uys, 2003: 12).

Tansey (2000: 108) identifies political culture and socialisation as the process of induction into political culture which develops attitudes, cognitions, and feelings toward the political system. This process also includes knowledge of how to act politically, i.e. applying values which affect the inputs of demands and claims into the system and its authoritative outputs. It forms a connecting link between micro and macro politics (Grigsby, 2005: 165; Kamrava, 1993: 138-139; Kamrava, 2000: 120). This study seeks to show how such
perceptions and attitudes shape political behaviour and the consequent influence on the political system. According to Heywood (2002: 200), culture refers to the people's way of life, while political culture refers to a "pattern of orientations" to political objects such as political parties, government, or the constitution, expressed in symbols and values. Heywood (2002: 200), taking from Almond and Verba, indicates that political culture manifests in three forms:

- *Participant culture* which refers to citizens paying close attention to politics and which regards popular participation as both desirable and effective;

- *Subject culture* which refers to relative passivity among citizens, and the recognition that they have only a very limited capacity to influence government;

- *Parochial culture* refers to the absence of national citizenship, with people identifying with their locality rather than the nation, and having neither the desire nor the ability to participate in politics.

This notion will form a central part of this study to investigate political culture and responses to IWRM in the Upper Vaal catchment area.

For the purposes of this study, the above definitions of participant and subject culture(s) correspond with the situation prevalent in most South African communities (Tempelhoff, 2008: 40). For example, civil society organisations are well able to amass public participation to challenge decisions on service delivery and water resources management made by government officials in a top-down manner. However in some communities, a top-down approach is conventionally implemented because "local authority officials receive instructions [directly] from government institutions" (Tempelhoff, 2008: 37), and the public is distanced from decisions made with regard to IWRM activities.
This engenders a (political) culture of apathy, one that is eventually accepted through socialisation, as emphasised by Coles and Wallace (2005: 34), who state that:

Ordinary water users have become passive recipients of water supplies owned and controlled by small elite, under the aegis of central government and vast international companies whose social relationships with the communities they purport to serve are at best tenuous.

This study seeks to confirm that a culture of apathy occurs when people are reduced to feelings of powerlessness and denied a chance to participate in decision making by the elites. A top-down and bottom-up approach premise will support an investigation on political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM; Désolé et al. (2005:1) posits that

...a process of institutional building is taking place in the South African water sector. New organizations, namely the Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) and the Water Users Associations (WUAs) in charge of local governance of water are being established in the country. These new organizations urgently need tools, methods, processes that can help them in their difficult task of implementing locally the National Water Act by promoting the participation of local stakeholders in the process of water management and allocation.

This study will indicate that a top-down approach is likely to influence decisions made by politicians who attempt to meet the election promises outlined in their manifestos, or in a quest for private sector patronage. This is echoed by (Bond, 2003; Hall & Lobina, 2006: 32) who argue that the nature of a top-down approach in policy making and IWRM is evident in bureaucratic decisions. These decisions are made and then enforced on the citizenry without asking for their opinion (Pallet, 1997: 111). The result of this approach may well lead to violent conflict – as happened in reaction to the installation of
water tricklers that were installed after a public-to-public programme devised by the local government and the Gauteng-based bulk water utility, Rand Water, to promote water conservation in the area of Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality (Ruiters, 2005: 132). Against this background, the researcher developed the following research objective, namely, that he would ascertain, in the case of M-A-P,


In order to fulfil this objective, the researcher prepared a number of supplementary research questions and objectives to provide direction in the data collecting process.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study seeks to explore the following questions:

- What is political culture and socialisation?

- What are top-down and bottom-up approaches in decision-making and policy implementation?

- What is Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)?

- What role do political culture and socialisation play in IWRM?

- What are the political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM in the Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality?

- How can the existing political culture, which has led and may yet again lead to violent protest, be changed in the Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality?
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- To provide a theoretical discussion of political culture and socialisation
- To provide a theoretical discussion for a top-down and bottom-up approach in decision-making and policy implementation
- To provide a theoretical understanding of IWRM
- To analyse the prevailing political culture toward IWRM in Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality
- To analyse political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM with specific reference to Maluti-A-Phofung municipal area
- To determine how the existing political culture, which has, and can lead to violent protest, be changed in the Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality?

1.6 HYPOTHESIS

A two-fold theoretical argument has been developed for the purposes of this research.

Firstly, there is general dissatisfaction with service delivery in the Maluti-A-Phofung municipality as far as IWRM is concerned. Secondly, the history of below-par service delivery, aggravated by poor economic conditions, and a lack of consultation by government institutions encourages public protest against government-initiated service delivery projects or the lack thereof.

The following research methods have been identified:

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A qualitative research methodology is most appropriate for the purposes of this study because it enables the researcher to obtain first-hand knowledge of social life, unfiltered through operational definitions or rating scales (Taylor &
Bogdan, 1998: 9). This type of methodology allowed the researcher to describe the situation holistically and to reveal settings, processes, relationships, systems, and (above all) people from their own frame of reference. It allowed him to verify certain assumptions and theories and to develop theoretical perspectives on the issues at hand (Mouton & Marais, 1988: 163; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998: 7-8; Leedy & Ormrod 2005: 94). According to Mouton and Marais (1998: 164), qualitative research investigates human activities from the perspective of human actors. It is imperative to note that this research concentrates on relevant human actors in the identified study area. Furthermore, qualitative research methods enabled the researcher to document respondents' point of view reliably.

Quantitative research is concerned with counting and measuring things, producing estimates of averages and differences between groups (Anon., 2009). This method will only be used to strengthen qualitative findings. For the purposes of this study, quantitative data, such as water quality tests, average quantity of water usage per household/industry and the amount of water wasted per annum can sometimes serve to augment the study.

The snowball sampling method also comes in handy for this study. Snowball sampling is a technique to find research subjects where one subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on (Vogt, 1999). Snowball sampling relates to link-tracing methodologies as identified by (Spreen, 1992; Thompson & Collins, 2002:57) which seek to take advantage of the social networks of recognised respondents to provide a researcher with an ever-expanding set of potential contacts (Thompson, 1997). This process is based on the assumption that a "bond" or "link" exists between the initial sample and others in the same target population, allowing a series of referrals made within a circle of acquaintance (Berg, 1988).

Water consumers and stakeholders involved in household water and industrial water use will be considered together with the local government representatives and DWA officials.
1.7.1 Literature survey

A close study of political culture and socialisation was a basic requirement of addressing the general objective of this research. Reliable access to such information is found in academic journal articles, books, newspaper articles, and the internet. These formed a central part of the research. The following tools were utilised toward this end:

- Boloka: an archive of books and academic journals available from the North-West University Library
- The Nexus Database
- Electronic journals: Jstor, etc., available on the internet
- SA e-Publications

There is however, little direct academic focus on political culture and socialisation akin to IWRM in a South African context.

1.7.2 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted using a fairly open framework to encourage a focused, conversational, two-way communication. Unlike the questionnaire framework where detailed questions are formulated ahead of time, semi-structured interviews begin with more general questions or topics so that the respondent feels at ease with the researcher. Not all questions are designed and phrased ahead of time. The majority are verbalised spontaneously during the interview as a follow-up to the subject being discussed, allowing both the interviewer and the interviewee the flexibility to probe for details or discuss other relevant issues.

Semi-structured interviews provided the researcher with the necessary skills to avoid topics that were less relevant or were inconsistent with the specific research goals and questions. This type of interview also allows interviewees
to ask the interviewer questions. In this way interviews can function as an extension tool (Case, 1990).

When the research fieldwork for this study was under way, semi-structured interviews were conducted with leaders from the Greater Harrismith Concerned Residents Association (now called the Greater Harrismith Socio-development Forum), as well as with residents of Harrismith; local government leaders; ward councillors; officials from the local water services provider; and independent consultants. Their perceptions (Mouton, 1996: 127, 175) proved essential in providing a clearer picture of the political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM in the M-A-P municipal area.

1.8 CHAPTER LAYOUT

The layout of the study will be as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Theoretical overview

Chapter 3: Political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM in South Africa.

Chapter 4: An empirical study of Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality

Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusions
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This study uses sociological and psychological undertones to describe political action, and sees culture's role in behaviour as highly significant. It recognizes that political socialisation is central in the area of political science, and should not be regarded as a "soft edge" of the discipline (Hooghe, 2004: 339). It further explores prominent drivers of culture, their influence on social structures and on related political behaviour.

The literature on political science insists that understanding (political) culture provides an anchor for survival, and that perception of this is imperative in any given environment. This study is therefore grounded on Silverstone's (2004: 441) assertion that it is in the understanding of the world, and willingness and capability to act, that humanity or inhumanity is defined. To use Huntington's words (1996:20), "culture counts".

In most black South African townships, there is a general sense of pessimism towards political authority as more and more communities regard themselves as "forgotten people", with distant ward councillors and a local municipality that is unresponsive to their plight (Tadesse et al., 2009: 21; Gouws et al., 2010: 47, 50; Malefane, 2009: 11; Mogale, 2010: 9; Makhanya, 2010: 6).

This chapter attempts to explain political culture and political socialisation, and then turns its attention to the top-down and bottom-up approaches on decision making, with specific reference to Integrated Water Resources Management and how these two approaches impact on societal attitudes.

2.2 POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION

A study of political culture and socialisation looks into political practices and how these are learnt in social, economic, and political settings. Jackson and
Jackson (1997: 99) delineate these practices as salient determinants that distinguish a community's political behaviour in public life and provide an invisible overarching bond that unifies the citizens of that particular community. Political culture and socialisation interact and interconnect to shape a particular model of society and politics. It should also be recognised that past political culture is not a fixed destiny; instead it is dynamic and ever-changing (Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 118). While political culture is constantly being revised and re-negotiated; in the process, a citizenry is imbued with new expectations and beliefs about the government and their own role within society (Kamrava, 1993: 168, Erez & Gati, 2004: 583-4; Levine & Moreland, 1991: 265).

2.2.1 Political culture theory

Gumede (2009) postulates that political culture determines: a) how authority is vested in government; b) who is given authority and power within society and government; c) who is allowed to participate in policy and decision-making; and d) how citizens hold their leaders accountable. Almond (1983: 127) perceived that political culture influences political attitudes, beliefs, values, and emotions in the explanation of political, structural, and behavioural phenomena. Allison (2001) points out that political culture is vital for national cohesion, and determines patterns of political cleavages, modes of dealing with political conflict, the extent and the character of participation in politics, and compliance with authority. While Dittmer (1977: 566) submits that political culture may best be understood as a system of political symbols which nest on political communication, i.e. a semiological system. Another take on the study of political culture reveals that it is a "pattern of orientations" toward political objects (Heywood, 2002: 200).

Although Raymond Williams and Pierre Bourdieu have argued that culture should be seen as a product of human intention and action, it should not be seen as a given set of relations and ideas that structure social life (Rankin, 2004: 43). They suggest that culture has to do with conscious human intentions, not subconscious influences such as social interaction, ideology
and history. Hughes (1990:16) shows that political culture stems from historical roots, and the literature affirms that political culture can be understood as the political thought patterns and traditions that govern an individual's and/or a group's behaviour and participation within the system. Conscious human intentions are thus expressed in behaviour and participation within a political system.

Such behaviour includes shared political rules, values, and expected actions with a bearing on past, present and future contexts. It can be deduced from Mazrui (1990: 7) that political culture provides lenses of perception and cognition, motives of human behaviour, and criteria for evaluation. Political culture is both a divisive and a uniting force (Huntington, 1996: 28). Scholars consider Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba as pioneers on the subject of political culture (Eckstein, 1988: 789).

According to Wildavsky (1987: 5, 8) political culture can be accepted as the shared political values that legitimise political relations. By the acquisition of culture, groups however simple their makeup, solve the problems of group life in their own way (Odetola et al., 1983: 1). This is a common view held by academics in the discipline, who assert that political culture is one of the most powerful influences that encompasses a generation's collective sense, their social identities and their respective practices (De Prado, 2005: 1; Erez & Gati, 2004: 584). Political culture has also been described as a "connecting link between micro and macro-politics, a pattern of distinguished values, beliefs and attitudes" (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008: 578) that underlie a political system and demarcate the boundaries within which a government can legitimately act (Pye & Verba, 1965: 7; Burnell, 2008: 278; Tansey, 2000: 108; Heywood, 2002: 200; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 98-99; Kamrava, 1993: 136; Kamrava, 2000: 120).

It has thus been established that political culture is a social perception. This study puts emphasis on the fact that perception is very important and understanding culture is the essence of stability within a given polity. This bears resonance with Wilson's (1992: 97) classification of political culture as a
social construction of meaning called "compliance ideology. Its structure and content serve to reduce institutional transaction costs by restricting obligations expressed in positional and contractual terms that justify elite status and bolster group solidarity”.

Van Zyl Slabbert (2006: 41) provides a closer delineation of political culture as “the norms, values, standards and practices that have to do with the competition for abuse and use of power, which relies on stability and how stability is maintained within society”. His reference to stability and the (ab)use of power becomes more crucial at this juncture, given that levels of stability within a political system determine political efficacy within the state and further shape civic culture. These values provide a collective bond to those in authority within different institutions; it indicates to them how choices are made, how conflicts are resolved and helps them to accept particular resolutions as valid (Wilson, 1992: 11). The (ab)use of power is seen through values of a society that are instrumentally (pragmatically), or consummatory (ideologically) shaped to influence the political system. These may produce organised (where there is consensus) social groups structured around a common cause and interest, with a regulated involvement in the political system where the social capital makes democratic societies work well. Alternatively, there may be a repressed social grouping dominated by those who shape the ideology and are likely to feature a single dominating political party that defines and upholds the ideology (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008: 578; Van Zyl Slabbert 2006: 41).

It is evident in (Barry, 2001: 19; Alvarez & Bargh, 2001: 42; Melber, 2002: 5) that the (ab)use of power determines the credibility and legitimacy of the state and thus sets a conduit for benevolent, neutral or malevolent intentions between the state and the people (Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 98). Such orientations develop over time and influence the political life of the state, region, and country (Blass, 2007: 1).

These orientations appear in three categories, and transform into a higher-level, collective phenomenon (Erez & Gati, 2004: 590). Firstly, there are
manifestations of cognitive orientations, based on the knowledge about political objects – including information believed to be factual, whether the facts are correct or not. Secondly, affective orientations are based on feelings or emotions about political phenomena evoked through the national flag, national anthem, and an opportunity to vote in an election. Thirdly, evaluative orientations are based on judgements or assessments about these facts and feelings, what is deemed better or worse, moral or immoral, and are not always coherent (Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 105; Mazrui, 1990: 7).

Furthermore, this can be explained by categorising specific manifestations of political culture displayed as 1) Participant culture: related to citizens paying close attention to politics and regarding popular participation as both desirable and effective in decision making; 2) Subject culture: related to more passivity among citizens, and the recognition that they have only a very limited capacity to influence government; and 3) Parochial culture: related to the absence of citizenship, where people identify with their locality rather than the nation, and have neither the desire nor the ability to participate in politics (Heywood, 2002: 200; Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008: 578; Kamrava. 1993: 142) quoting Almond and Verba (1963).

Against this background it can be argued that participant and apathetic cultures arise when people cannot control what happens to them. They have no opinions or preferences about public policy because what they prefer may not, in any event, matter. On these grounds the seeds of fatalist feelings take root. They shrug their shoulders: what will be will be, because they are subjected to gross manipulation and proscriptions imposed on them by others (Wildavsky, 1987: 7).

This section explores cognition within a cultural context, as expressed by Resnick, (1991: 1-2). Cognition is not an individual act restricted by the physical facts of brain and body, instead people build their knowledge structures on the basis of what they are told by others, orally, in writing, in pictures, and in gestures. Political culture is closely linked with political cognition, which enables people to formulate political opinions.
John Lewis Gaddis observed that cognition is a necessary simplification that allows us to see where we are and where we are going (cited in Huntington, 1996: 30). It is mainly through the permutations of interaction within the environment that a citizen is led to reflect on political phenomena and construct political ideas and values germane to participation within the socio-political environment (Rich, 2007: 31; Barbalet, 1989: 247; Almond, 1983: 131). To use (Wilson, 1992: 44), these values are not the same as the thinking of specific individuals, but they are not unrelated to that thinking either. Hence political culture is entrenched in the intertwined tapestries of social norms and individual thinking patterns. We can thus accept that political cognitions build political culture and political culture is an expression of political cognitions within a specific polity.

Adapting from Durkin (1987: 110) political cognition refers to the knowledge of the political world or the processes within which cognition is achieved and promoted. It may include individual and group knowledge about other people, procedures, and principles whereby one constructs assumptions concerning reasons for another person's actions, thinking, emotions, and political roles (Kotze, 2001c: 235). As put by Wilson (1992: 36) a cognitive structure serving a suitable purpose is a mechanism, a schema, for reasoning about a variety of objects in different situations. Political cognition is both a conscious and unconscious activity within which people attempt to give meaning to reality (Wilson, 1992: 33) and according to Stacey (1978: 29) managing political and cultural concepts such as nation, government, law, class, race, freedom, foreigner, war, etc. Political cognition is shaped as people exchange information through debate and reason within the socio-cultural context. This is what Wertsch (1991: 86, 89) calls the "sociocultural approach to mind; the mental functioning in the individual derived from participation in the social life". Hommes et al. (2008: 6) indicate that actors continuously influence each other through their cognitions and interactions and that their interaction depends on their cognitions and vice versa. This bears more weight than individual reflection distant from the socio-cultural persuasions, given that perceptions
develop and change through the process of socialisation (Hommes et al., 2008: 7).

We can thus affirm that cognitive and evaluative political orientations are central in the process of political socialisation and legitimising the political system. The content and nature of these orientations provide the criteria for compliance ideologies to maintain social, political, economic conditions, and a facade for the general public (Goodnight, 2003). Political cognition is realised when people begin to cultivate a self-concept. They then comprehend what is due to them with regard to politically engineered values as espoused in the legislation and fundamentally, in the constitution. At this stage they commence to make inputs (demands) into the system (Bertrand, 2000). Hommes et al. (2008:7) confirm that cognitive orientations are based on the content of a process which is based on actors' knowledge about the nature, causes and effects of the problem, possible problem/solution combinations, and their consequences.

Through the medium of culture, cognition becomes more generalised (Wilson, 1992: 36), divided, distributed among individuals, and held in common by them (Cole, 1991: 400). In conclusion it is worth noting as does Wilson (1992: 33) that the content of thinking is made up of ideas, beliefs, and social orientations acquired during learning. Based on this, political cognition is shaped and embedded within political culture and socialised within a given society, because members of specific cultures share the same sorts of experiences. Their attitudes and beliefs will thus be roughly similar and this similarity will characterise them as a group (Wilson, 1992: 32).

The next section provides a discussion on the role of political socialisation in the transmission of political culture within society. As Cooley, quoted in Wilson (1992: 28) has put it: "Self and society are twin born".

2.2.2 Political socialisation theory

An analysis of political culture has been made thus far, and attention will now turn to focus on how ideologies, rituals, dominant values, norms, and beliefs
shape political culture and seep into daily life (Rankin, 2004: 49), that is, political socialisation. The literature indicates that political socialisation is the process through which people learn and acquire the (political) culture necessary to enable them to participate within the system, i.e. gain an understanding of the interplay of authoritative symbols, values, and beliefs acceptable in the political society.

Talcott Parsons and David Easton are credited as pioneers of political socialisation theory and their influence is widely acknowledged (Eckstein, 1988: 791; Dicker & Van Zyl, 1995: 2; Sabatier, 1991: 147; Pye & Verba, 1965: 10; Rosecrance, 1976: 446). Political socialisation is defined as a process by which individuals acquire the political knowledge, attitudes, values, and behaviours accepted and practised by the ongoing political system. Simply put, political socialisation is both a direct and indirect process that transmits political culture from one generation to another (Hooghe, 2004: 335; Pahl-Wostol & Hare, 2004: 194; Erez & Gati, 2004: 583, 590; Brehm & Rahn, 1997: 1000; Rosenau, 1988: 352-353; Wildavsky, 1987: 4, 6; Paglia!, 2002: 135).

Political socialisation contributes to nation building and enables people to understand and accept the political system (Blass, 2007: 1; Kamrava, 1993: 157; Kamrava, 2000: 120-121; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 104). In addition to its nation building muscle, as will be seen in the following chapters, political socialisation has equal muscle in nation smashing. It includes knowledge of how to act politically, i.e. how to balance the inputs of demands and claims into the system and how to respond to authoritative outputs (Grigsby, 2005: 165; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 99; Kamrava, 2000: 120; Pye, 1991: 494), it is a fundamental matter to observe that these in(out)puts are not always positive.

Socialisation into existing political customs involves internalisation (Gough, 2002: 407; Clemens & Cook, 1999: 445), whereby people take norms, cognitions, values, and beliefs as their own and accept them as binding (Barry, 2001: 20; Hetherington, 1998: 795; Pye & Verba, 1965: 9). These
constitute socially constructed knowledge on how to participate in the community and they also influence levels of political trust (Ferrante, 2003: 106). Political socialisation thus charts the process and outcomes of the induction of individuals into the political culture (Rosecrance, 1976: 446; Tansey, 2000: 108).

It is a lifelong process by which an individual’s attitudes and behaviour (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008: 578) are sustained and entrenched by reinforcement and punishment techniques (Strong et al., 2005: 108; Herskovits, 1966: 640; Wilson, 1992: 44). Political socialisation is in a sense a cognitive action and evaluative reaction toward political objects (Cook, 1985: 1981; Rosecrance, 1976: 448).

This further enables citizens to comprehend and evaluate the political system and the processes employed, equipping them for political maturity and the ability to interpret political phenomena (Cook, 1985: 1080) quoting Lindblom (1981). Political socialisation is that process that ensures the survival of cognitions, feelings, and schemes of evaluation that are important for (the political) cultural continuity through learning (Wilson, 1992: 12; Kotze, 2001c: 235). As elucidated by (Brehm & Rahn, 1997: 1004) our preferences and interests do not come with a birth certificate. They are learnt from various political actors and structures of association that channel citizens’ interests into organised political demands (Rich, 2007: 32) by political entrepreneurs (Kotze, 2001c: 235) and new modes of adaptations that cannot be quietly trodden down to suit political goals. In support of this view, Wildavsky (1987: 8) maintains that developing political preferences is not a difficult process because a few positive and negative associations go a long way.

As indicated earlier in this study, socio-cultural alternatives of interaction between individual and social constructions of meaning are pivotal for cultural transmission and cognitive development in the political sphere (Wilson, 1992:98, 114). This notion is confirmed by (Cook, 1985: 1082, 1084) who recognises that experiences and dialogue about the state of affairs and institutional arrangements can shape one’s cultural penchants and emerge
into group property (Wilson, 1992: 194). Contact with others will thus
determine the kind of situations and interests an individual will gravitate
towards (Vaisey, 2008: 611; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 111, 142; Kamrava,
1993: 137, 154; Davies, 1980: 24; Ferrante, 2003: 106; Reid & Hoog, 2001:
162; Pirages, 1980: 4428).

The value of interaction in the socialisation process is seen when more
members of the community are active. It is then easier to produce and deliver
good public policy to benefit that community. Constituents who communicate
their preferences enable public officials to respond appropriately (Brehm &
& Nairne, 2006: 1). It is from this setting that citizens are conscientised and
community needs reach a high enough political plane to warrant political
action. Political socialisation (as the process by which orientations are
transmitted) is also conditioned by shifts in the political, social, and economic
contexts at community, nation-state, and international levels. Complexities
that characterise the political socialisation process and its outcomes become
especially evident during periods of transition and upheaval (Owen, 2008: 2).

2.2.3 Agents of political socialisation

2.2.3.1 The family

The family is a primary socialisation agent (Strong et al., 2005: 110; Ferrante,
2003: 118; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 111, 142) where informal and overt
political indoctrination is acquired during discussion and comments about
government services (Gumede 2010). Parent and family involvement in the
socio-political milieu contribute to the child’s political socialisation and
perceptions of the political system (Stacey, 1978: 1, 6). It is in such interaction
that one is first exposed to the “rules of life”; ideas about ethics, ethnic
identification, power, morality, and responsibility (Strong et al., 2005: 44, 368,
539; Pratto & Walker, 2001: 99; Dicker & Van Zyl 1995: 8, 17). Parents have
to hold firm political convictions in order to transmit them (and many do not);
they must also communicate these convictions to their children, and again,

2.2.3.2 Peers

Strong et al. (2005: 112) indicate that peer influence is so pervasive that it can be accepted that children's friends grant or withhold approval about political choices and tell them what to think, feel, and do. It is a social milieu that allows an individual to express personal attributes, either for the common good or personal gain. The peer group develops a member's worldview about reality. Youth organisations also serve as agents of political socialisation because involvement in associations that partake in community service to advocate on behalf of disadvantaged groups encourages adult political participation (Teorell, 2003; Owen, 2008: 11). The ANC Youth League is a good example of peer socialisation as pointed out in Grobler (1988: 88), in that the league is a coordinating agency for youthful forces; it rouses popular political consciousness and is active in fighting oppression. As confirmed by Kotze (2001c: 241) it also educates the people to become congress and nation conscious.

2.2.3.3 Education

Another source of political socialisation is education, which is seen as a purposeful, planned effort to impart specific skills and modes of thought on young people (Ferrante, 2003: 448). The institution of education in any society lends itself to a two-fold function. On the one hand it can be viewed as a citadel of societal values with the main aim being to transmit traditional beliefs. Conversely, education constitutes a threat to the traditional social order. It opens up new vistas so that accepted values can be challenged, which may lead to the contemplation of fresh alternatives (Brewer, 1986: 288). The education system provides an environment where political ideas are cultivated and developed through social contact and interaction with peer groups and teachers (Snyder & Kiviniemi, 2001: 135). These groups reinforce or daunt
existing attitudes and views (Strong et al., 2005: 112; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 114).

Political orientations can also be entrenched by curricula on civic education that provide myths to justify the status-quo (Chen & Tyler, 2001: 245; Marx, 1992: 41). These myths serve to promote dominant political and cultural norms intended to produce informed participatory citizens and propagate regime stability and longevity (Dicker & Van Zyl 1995: 35; Kamrava, 1993: 157-158; Stacey, 1978: 65). It is at elementary and middle school levels that political socialisation can be blatantly manipulative. Conversely, curricula on elite political leaders, the ruling party and memorising the national anthem are essential within formal education. They provide a version of history that puts emphasis on highly selected favourable focal eras at the expense of those less laudable periods (Kamrava, 1993: 158 Ferrante, 2003: 452-453). The school becomes an agency to inculcate children with the particular skills relevant for stability within society.

2.2.3.4 The media

The agency of the media is based on the notion that communication is key in shaping the nature of governance; it determines how a community is to be understood and structured, although communication does not automatically lead to consensus (Anker, 2007: 21). Communication media (television, radio, newspapers) are particularly influential (Silverstone, 2004: 441) bringing many changes in the relational infrastructure and social life (Silverstone, 2004: 440). Huntington (1968: 47) quoted in Zimmermann, (1980: 179) indicates that increases in literacy, education, and media exposure give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations. If these are not met they galvanise individuals and groups to turn to politics. The media is thus a vital instrument to disseminate aspirations and expectations. It shapes public opinion, thinking, and expressions toward political objects because it serves as the primary source of political information (Hooghe, 2004: 339; Grobler, 1988). Through programming and coverage of political actors and government services, the media either promotes or condones political conjectures about the political
system through what is reported and what is not reported (Strong et al., 2005: 113; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 115; Zimmermann, 1980: 179; Hetherington, 1998: 792, 794).

A second look at the data shows that political knowledge, attentiveness to politics, and the preferences of both young people and adults are influenced directly by the arbitration of other agents. Mass media influences are value laden; they are often biased to pursue a certain agenda. It is through reflection on information in the media that people are persuaded to adopt a political demeanour of sorts (Owen, 2008: 12-13). Commentary by expert political analysts can sway our opinions; the media is the main source of what people know and how they view the political world, and political incumbents have learnt to manipulate the media to build a public profile (Etzioni (1961: 5) in Pirages, 1980: 442). Indeed, political campaigns are now surrounded by hype of all kinds, including citizen journalists, bloggers, and video producers (Owen, 2008: 8). Authoritarian countries have also extended their influence to exert full control of the media to legitimise the government and produce behaviour that is more predictable and controllable (Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 115; Kamrava, 1993: 157; Ferrante, 2003: 168; Kipnis, 2001:40).

2.2.4 The consequences of political culture and socialisation

Political culture and socialisation form a two-edged sword; they help to strengthen existing institutions and their links with society at large while at the same time constructing new national identity which determines the way in which people perceive their roles and relationships vis-a-vis political objects (Kamrava, 1993: 139, 164).

As a result of political socialisation, individuals acquire knowledge about the political system and how it works (Owen, 2008: 4). Through top-down processes of socialisation, people internalise society's political value system and ideology. Then, through bottom-up processes of aggregation and shared values, higher level entities of culture are formed at the group, organisational, and national level, because people become informed about the role of active
and passive membership of the polity and how to participate in political and civic life (Erez & Gati, 2004: 587).

When socialisation is incomplete and partially administered, new political values and institutions appear as evil and hostile, hence parochial loyalties assume supremacy over national ones. The central government’s credibility, infected by the likelihood of political violence, is kept at bay. It is from such cultural anomie, exacerbated by drastic changes and fundamental shifts in policy, that the seeds of mistrust in society might take root; presaging a whirlwind of political disorientation and a strong sense of distrust toward the regime which can deteriorate rapidly into political repression, manipulation, corruption, instability and insecurity (Kamrava, 1993: 139,143, 164). This is confirmed by Smith and Fakir (2003: 14) who maintain that some senior government officials do not even understand their roles and responsibilities in government projects. This, they argue, is a recipe for the eruption of violent protest.

The section that follows discusses top-down and bottom-up approaches and their significance for emerging political culture and political socialisation in various polities. It will be established that a synergy of top-down and bottom-up political interactions shapes the cultural undulation of a political system. This speaks to the nature of public consultation and participation in the South African context. Whether this participation be a system-maintaining or a system-transforming process (De Beer & Swanepoel, 1998: 20) participation processes are often undertaken in a top-down fashion.

2.3 TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP DECISION MAKING APPROACHES

This theme is inspired by a belief that advocacy for peoples' participation in development programmes remains an empty rhetoric which cannot be achieved by mere emotional exhortations. Public participation depends on socio-political arrangements and relations, otherwise, public programmes fail lamentably (Cernea, 1992: 1, 9). This notion is taken further by Lungu (1987: 13-14, quoted in De Beer & Swanepoel, 1998: 22) who argue that the poor
are reluctant to participate in government sponsored projects because the top-bottom approach to planning of participation is usually not accompanied by systematic efforts to educate citizens. Indeed, the top-down approach is associated with the failure to involve communities in their own development (COGTA, 2009: 19).

According to Wildavsky (1987: 7) this is manipulation built into hierarchies, where orders come down and obedience (hopefully) flows up. Wisner (1995: 264) provides a better understanding in the evocative language of New Guinea anthropology (the "big men" versus the "rubbish men") that conveys a sense of growing manipulation; the people cease to possess the resources to regulate their own lives. Wisner maintains that "top-down" and "bottom-up" methods are necessary because citizen participation mobilises the creativity of participants and builds local non-governmental institutions, which strengthen democracy. This study maintains that top-down and bottom-up approaches are essential for local governance to enhance conflict mediation.

Figure 2 indicates a top-down and bottom-up process of political-cultural interaction within institutional arrangements. Each sphere of influence contributes to political socialisation on the individual, national and a global plane (Wildavsky, 1987: 4, 9; 17). A phenomenon that Brecher et al. (1993) mentioned in Pillay (1996: 327) identified as globalisation from above. This is symptomatic of top-down influences on nation-states by international norms and institutions that assert the right to judge and to constrain what states do in their own territory (Huntington, 1996: 34, 35).
It goes without saying that universal political values and ideologies such as democracy, human rights, equality, freedom, peace, and fraternity, are or can be made compatible to influence the national political agenda (Hamlin, 2007: 88; Kaufman, 1999: 205-206). These consequently shape cognitive attitudes (Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 105; Grobler, 1988) endogenous to organisations, society and individuals' specific expectations from political objects and thus precipitate a change of sorts as they try to "have it all" (Simon, 1989: 194; Salzman, 2004: 20). At the national level, political culture provides rationale for judgement and action and constitutes the character and personality of a community. This determines the form of government that exists and how stable that government will be (Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 105).

Similar opinions held by other researchers confirm that once a global norm has emerged, norm cascading occurs as states adopt the global norm through a process of socialisation by external actors (Jacobs, 2007). These include organisational networks and non-governmental organisations both global and local. Jacobs (2007) relied on (Schimmelfennig 1994) to prove that states
acknowledge norms of international societies as standards of acceptable behaviour because their identities as states depend on their membership of international societies. Hence norms are accepted and internalised as directions for action by nation-states.

2.3.1 Top-down approach

A top-down approach is the “iron fist” or “velvet glove” mode of governance (Donovan, 2007a: 971) and implies a one-way flow of decisions (and potential errors) imposed from on high by elites on communities who are uninformed about the implementation processes. This means that decisions are made from sanitised executive offices, distant from the communities for which they are destined (Tempelhoff, 2008: 37; Cernea, 1992: 9, 14, 16, 20; Kamrava, 1993: 142; Donovan, 2007b: 49). Furthermore, bureaucratic decisions are made on behalf of the citizenry without asking for their opinion (Bond, 2003; Hall & Lobina, 2006: 32; Pallet, 1997: 111). This is what (COGTA, 2009: 19) calls an “unresponsive nature”, lacking accountability toward the people. A top-down approach is thus insensitive to the plight of the weak who are merely situated on the sidelines in the general scheme of things.

This study maintains that the participation process is dominated by institutions that are empowered and that public consultation is perfunctory in the execution of predetermined programmes by government agencies (Swatuk, 2005: 872; Coles & Wallace, 2005: 34; Kamrava, 1993: 142, 169; Gough, 2002: 417). A typical pattern of top-down influences leave very little room for people’s initiative and empowerment. Conformity and blind obedience to administrative directives reign supreme (De Beer (1988) quoted in De Beer & Swanepoel, 1998: 21, 22). A top-down approach can be understood as an instrument for political leaders (bureaucrats) who aim to maintain power for themselves and expect compliance from target agents (Burnell, 2008: 272; Kipnis, 2001: 7; Pirages, 1980: 446).

This theoretical overview bears close similarity with the South African political interplay, where opposing views to legislative measures are dismissed by
elites in the ruling party on the grounds that the opponents of government
decisions are insensitive to the liberal-revolutionary agenda of government.
Chapter 3 will enquire further on these issues.

2.3.2 Bottom-up approach

A bottom-up approach infers democratisation as coming from below (Burnell,
2008: 272) and recognises that participation should not be devised and
imposed from on high, with little or no concern for the people below (Cernea,
1992: 9). Cernea further puts that a bottom-up approach holds that “the public
should become social actors of planning and takes into account, their
definition of needs and knowledge of the environment as well as available
resources to implement decisions”; this should not be limited to consulting
alone (Cernea, 1992: 15, 20). A bottom-up approach is essential to salvage
development programmes in the already compromised public sector where
deteriorating service delivery is the order of the day. This is because
government programmes are often divorced from the genuine interests and
immediate needs of the public (Cernea, 1992: 2). In the same vein, Lockett
(2003: 14, 19) indicates that poor intergovernmental relations may lead to the
failure of bottom-up planning to influence top-down planning. Local
municipalities are often left out on a limb, having to plan ahead and deal with
challenges on their own. Bottom-up initiatives allow the public to have a sense
of ownership to safeguard common resources.

Having considered the above expositions on these two decision-making
techniques, this study takes a stance in favour of an integration of top-down
and bottom-up approaches, arguing that this has the best chance of creating
a culture of collaboration in the South African socio-political context. A
synergy of top-down and bottom-up approaches seeks to have government
institutions combining their efforts with those of civil society organisations. In
the same vein (COGTA, 2009 3, 5; Van Buuren & Edelenbos, 2007: 104-105)
argue for a responsive, accountable, effective, and efficient (local)
government system, grounded on the notion of a developmental state that
envisages mutual dependence between various stakeholders. The ANC
government has shown a willingness to restore the public's diminished confidence in the local sphere of government. It is this lack of confidence that has given rise to the wave of community protest throughout the country (COGTA, 2009: 3, 19; 2009b: 11).

It is argued in this work that the situation can be rescued. There must be an expression of political will to have civil society work in partnership with government. This study puts emphasis on the significance of top-down and bottom-up synergy. The citizenship campaign must be stepped up; it must enhance community involvement in governance (COGTA, 2009: 22, 23). Maphalla (2010: 9) records that one of his respondents said “They only come to us when it is time for elections and soon disappear afterwards.”

This is a serious concern, confirmed by the growing social distance between government institutions and the people. Furthermore, this tendency is exacerbated by perceptions that government is failing the poor, and is not accountable to the public it should serve (COGTA, 2009: 6; 2009b: 11). Supporting perceptions hold that the local government is not working properly and is plagued by excessive levels of corruption, political infighting, political party and personal patronage (COGTA, 2009: 18). A bottom-up approach calls for cooperation rather than command, and recognises that policy implementation and action are essential to achieve mutually beneficial goals (Donovan, 2007a: 49). An administrative culture is highly necessary at local government level to “purge negative attitudes, values and beliefs, violence, and the culture of entitlement engendered by a struggle against the exclusive doctrine of the colonial past “ (Sindane, 2009: 494, 493).

Against this background, focus will now shift to the subject of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). It is essential to note that in South Africa and many other parts of the world (Gadgil & Derby, 2003:10), most (violent) protests on the issue of poor service delivery involve access to water or water quality (Holland 2005) either as a primary or secondary concern (Kotze, 2001b: 227; Brooks, 2009; Tamas, 2003: 2). The study will then survey ingrained political attitudes toward IWRM and how these are embraced. It will
also indicate that the lack of participation by the general public in water-user associations shows the ignorance that afflicts the people with regard to the relevance of IWRM to improving their livelihoods.

2.4 INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Very cognisant of the "water stress" phenomenon, Newson (2009) asserts that "water is newsworthy: there is, or will be, a world water crisis". This study engages in the same degree with David Rothenburg's adage quoted in Newson (2009: xxix) that "water does not divide, it connects". This study further highlights a need to enhance public participation in the management of water resources, rather than placing exclusive focus on hard engineering to meet this end. This basic premise begs an understanding that rather than sheer application of technical genius at work (Swatuk, 2005: 874), initiatives on IWRM ought to embrace a notion that the "poors", i.e. the landless, rural inhabitants, civil society, and NGO's are equal participants in the IWRM process (Desai, 2006: 57, 59).

We should nevertheless consider Swatuk's indication (2005: 874, 878) that politics stand at the centre of the problems where water is concerned. Politics pervades the decision-making on resource access, allocation, and use. IWRM is profoundly a political act which challenges the very bases of power in many societies. As a point of departure, it is important to consider that IWRM is a new concept as put by Hartje (2002: 1, 6), who further maintains that IWRM has become an international policy consensus, a guiding principle of the United Nations (UN) agencies and international development agencies. IWRM is a topic being discussed by professional networks and is a prominent theme in a sequence of international conferences. It has become a concept and a strategy in the water sector, mainly directed at policy and institutional changes on a national and sub-national level.

Warner (2007: 2) postulates that IWRM is about decompartmentalising water resources management. Although not abandoning the sectoral approach on water management, IWRM is a framework for the sustainable development
and management of water resources for the whole society; it plays a pivotal role in socioeconomic development, environmental management, and particularly poverty alleviation, by ensuring water security (ESCWA, 2004:1).

Swatuk (2005:872, 877) adds that IWRM is about equitable, efficient and sustainable use of the water resources and signifies an emerging global norm, while Jønch-Clausen (2004: 8, 15) submits that IWRM is a cyclic and long term “process”, a political process that involves conflicts of interest that must be mediated. He argues that it is essential to recognise emphasis on water as a resource and that its development and management are specific to the geographical, historical, cultural and economic context of any country (Jønch-Clausen 2004: 9). Hence IWRM application processes will differ from country to country and for this reason water becomes politicised (Eihance, 1999: 232).

IWRM comes to the socio-political purview in recognition of the need for different stakeholder groups to synchronise their efforts to secure livelihoods. This is important to avoid setbacks, as will be seen in the course of this study, where attempts at water policy reforms made by government institutions on the nexus of conservation were met with the force of civil opposition (Tempelhoff, 2008: 40). It is on this basis that the study purports that IWRM is vital to evade socio-political bottlenecks. Throughout the world and particularly South Africa, which is burdened with economic inequalities and poverty, there is an increasing demand for development activities to redress socio-economic squalor, and water is central for their success. But this issue seems to be balanced on a knife edge due to the phenomenon of water scarcity that faces many countries (ESCWA, 2004: 4). Global water campaigns have raised the banner of water as life and this notion concurs with research that indicates water as a finite and vulnerable resource that is essential to sustain life, development and the environment (Mitchell, 2005: 1336; Gabru, 2005: 2; Holland, 2005: 11).

IWRM is crucial in community development programmes aimed at poverty alleviation (Meyer, 2007: 8) especially where land use is involved, because water problems originate from land use and related activities (Mitchell, 2005:
IWRM seeks to reduce the culture of planning in silos (Mitchell, 2005: 1341) with regard to water and land use projects where government policy implementation is fragmented to the peril of riverine communities and environmental bodies.

Thus ESCWA (2004: 4, 6) encouraged a need to prioritise the application of IWRM on local, national, and regional levels to suit local conditions in various parts of the world. This will be achieved when a continued political will is expressed at all levels of government. Agencies of civil society can then be roped in to take part in conflict resolution to enhance governance for reconstruction and development initiatives in agriculture, housing, waste water treatment and town planning. IWRM complements the recognition made by nation states that water,

is a scarce national and unevenly distributed natural resource that belongs to all people; and there remains a need to preserve water quality to ensure a sustainable use of water in the interest of all water users while enhancing public participation (RSA, 1998:1).

IWRM is very important to determine the socio-political temperament of any given country and particularly in South Africa where food security raises its ugly head. Newson (2009: 269) with reference to (Schreiner, 2006) indicates that access to water is measured as being equivalent to poverty. Furthermore, evidence is provided by scholars who point to the relationship between natural resources, poverty, and livelihoods (Snyman & Lotter, 1988: 109-110; Elhance, 1999: 9; Tamas, 2003: 10). They indicate that the poorest stratum of society is worst affected by water scarcities and that anyone without access to a reliable source of good quality water is regarded as poor. The significance of this observation should be seen in the spirit of Priscoli (1989: 33, 34) quoted in Newson (2009: 268) that institutions and organisations that supply and distribute water resources reflect society's values toward equity, freedom and justice. Especially in the context of South Africa, where millions live in conditions of water deprivation exacerbated by social hardship and economic want.
Jønch-Clausen (2004: 10) defends the significance of IWRM in the following manner: Firstly, there is pressure and competition for water, which requires improved management. This applies also to public pressure due to a lack of safe, affordable drinking water and basic sanitation. Augmented by economic pressures for development in the energy sphere, the agricultural sector and transboundary quarrels in water agreements. Secondly, water scarcity and deteriorating water quality have or will soon become critical factors limiting national economic development, expansion of food production and provision of basic health and sanitation services to the population. It becomes urgent notwithstanding that water management institutions are rooted in a centralised culture where few water managers view water holistically. There remains a need to raise awareness on a local level and to promote the political will to have the public utilise water more efficiently. Thirdly, IWRM relates to the macro-economy where poor management practices of water resources result in health hazards, environmental and economic losses on a scale that impedes development and frustrates poverty reduction efforts. The following schematic presentation, Figure 3, shows the three pillars of IWRM:
The IWRM process is in fact a question of getting the “three pillars” correct: moving towards an enabling environment of appropriate policies, strategies and legislation for sustainable water resources development and management. This refers to putting in place the institutional framework through which the policies, strategies and legislation can be implemented. Setting up the management instruments is required by these institutions to effect a cross-sectoral mechanism of securing water for people, water for food, water for nature, and water for others (Jønch-Clausen, 2004: 16, 17).

2.5 POLITICAL CULTURE, SOCIALISATION AND IWRM

This work takes the standpoint that perceptions toward IWRM are driven and entrenched into social consciousness through a transformation culture which is in large part driven by the interests and philosophies of Western states and civil societies that extol stakeholder participation in water resources management (Swatuk, 2005: 872, 873; Manzungu, 2004: 4, 15). IWRM entails
reform based on moral arguments for the equitable distribution of natural resources. In South Africa this aim is also embraced in liberal water legislative frameworks that put emphasis on water as a basic right (Meyer, 2007: 5; Swatuk, 2005: 874, 878). This study also argues that involvement in water forums is limited to the educated, those with vested interests and economic strength to profit through the manipulation of water resources and to command a monopoly in the process (Thompson 2003: 13; Manzungu, 2004: 13, 15).

To some extent, this study echoes that mainly in “black” townships people are distant from these round-tables and have less influence and affluence to control resources (Wilson, 1992: 163; Tadesse et al., 2009: 4; Warner, 2007: 8). The poor are prone to manipulation and easily drawn by the political entrepreneurs into narrow hydropolitics in the ambit of service delivery (Elhance, 1999: 168). In view of the South African context, many people are distant from water management institutions. The voice of this work maintains that socialisation into IWRM and building a culture of resource management entail maximum participation of the masses in water structures. As indicated by Wilson (1992: 163) this should be paralleled by the utmost care to reject ill-advised interventions into technical (policy) matters by the uninformed.

The absence of water user associations among the general public and the inability to participate due to the lack of information on IWRM have dealt a negative blow on governance and have left the public feeling powerless. As will be seen in the chapters that follow, a particular local municipality has become the scene of violent protests with civilians expressing their opposition (among other concerns) to water management policy (Ruiters, 2005: 132).

Many townships and rural areas remain without adequate access to drinkable water (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 44); it is here that Newson (2009: 344) relied on Bougera’s assertion that water is first and foremost a political-ethical issue. Various aspects influence the value attached to water resources, and water has become a highly contentious issue for its economic and political implications (Agarwal et al., 2000: 8). A globalisation of IWRM is crucial to
constructing political (water) culture and provides a basis for civil society organisations to make demands similar to those espoused in the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development (UNCED, 1992; Turton & Meissner, 2002: 39).

There is a fundamental necessity for capacity building where shared visions and options are created through joint interactive platforms. The literature indicates this as essential to build awareness of IWRM (ESCWA, 2004:8). An IWRM oriented civil society becomes even more urgent with the advent of increasing pressure on scarce water resources due to growing population rates (Meyer, 2007: 2). The phenomenon of urbanisation, increased dependence on food imports, and accelerated economic development have made IWRM very fashionable internationally. IWRM is widely acknowledged as the most appropriate method to tackle threats posed on water resources (ESCWA, 2004: 8).

Against this backdrop, sovereign states have gone to great lengths to develop legislation and policy frameworks that speak to the theme of IWRM. South Africa has developed a water act derived from the most progressive and comprehensive legislations in the world, especially in respect of the human rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Bentley, 2006: 21).

The South African legislation is impressive. It is in sync with the global liberal culture that glorifies the access to water as a right akin to other human rights under various international human rights instruments (Swatuk, 2005: 873; Verschuuren, 2007: 2). Such frameworks have inspired many civil society organisations to campaign for the implementation of water regulations and to hold government and private business accountable for water use (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 44). Academic institutions have also joined the campaign to raise awareness on illegal abstractions of river water and the failure of (if not poor) government policy implementation to ensure accountability by water users (Ginster et al., 2010). The debate on water as a common resource is
growing and discussion on the water rights system as being linked to land tenure or ownership of water is being challenged (Agarwal et al., 2000: 59).

2.5.1 Water as a basic human right

The International water law provides for the equitable and reasonable sharing of water use, whereby basin states are obliged to ensure a beneficial use of water resources in an international basin. Chapter 4 of the 2004 International Law Association (ILA), Berlin Conference on Water Resources Law stipulates in article 17 (where individual rights are listed) that every individual has the right of access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible, and affordable water to meet that individual’s vital human needs. The responsibility is upon states to ensure the implementation of the right of access to water on a non-discriminatory basis. Furthermore, states must progressively implement the right of access to water by: First, abstaining from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right. Second, preventing third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the right, Third, taking measures to facilitate individual access to water, by defining and enforcing appropriate legal rights of access to and use of water, Fourth, by providing water or the means for obtaining water when individuals are unable to do so, to access water through their own efforts. In addition, states must monitor and review the realisation of the human right of access to water through a participatory and transparent process (ILA, 2004).

International influences have a significant role in the water legislation culture of many sovereign states. The literature indicates that international and comparative law, embodied in organisations such as the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), insinuate a human right to have access to water in the scope of an adequate standard of living germane to access to food, housing, clothing and hygiene (Gabru, 2005: 15; Verschuuren, 2007: 3, 4; Meyer, 2007: 4; Bluemel, 2004: 960, 962). These scholars maintain that international agreements such as the Mar del

The World Health Organisation (WHO) goes a few steps further by noting that the right to water should be balanced in an integrated catchment policy with all other water needs, such as irrigation, power generation, and nature conservation (Gabru, 2005: 17). This is borne out in a call for countries to develop IWRM and efficiency plans by the year 2005 with a commitment to support developing countries at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) (Töpfer, 2004: 5; Jønch-Clausen, 2004: 8). It is on this basis that water is highly politicised. There are notions that the politicisation of water resources should not be a cause for alarm, but an invitation for intergovernmental relations to ensure the protection of access to adequate drinkable water as a right (Newson, 2009: 344). This is an imperative view, bearing in mind that top-down policy makers seem content to let donors drive the IWRM process, while actively engaging wherever they see an opportunity to enhance their political stature without threatening existing configurations of power nationally or regionally (Swatuk, 2005: 878; Warner, 2007: 3). Thompson (2003: 5) identifies cases of nominal representation, where the management of water at the local level has less to do with the empowerment of local communities and rather a lot more to do with extending the reach and legitimacy of local government.

An interesting observation with regard to water rights is recorded by Warner (2007: 9) who posits that the significance of deflating expectations is not just to prevent disappointment on the part of the stakeholders, but also on behalf of donors and sponsors. This is especially the case now that multi-stakeholder participation is well on its way to becoming a reality (Kapfudzaruwa & Sowman, 2009: 685). This suggests that governments do not objectively promote water rights; it is the politicians who vie for prestige and office. Verschuuren (2007: 3) has observed that states sometimes fear that the
rights-based approach not only forces them to change their national legislation, but that such an approach also conflicts with the current global trend of privatisation espoused by international donors and the increasing role of the market mechanism reduces government intervention.

2.5.2 Water as an economic good

International institutions and funding organisations stand unequivocal on the conviction that access to water and sanitation ought to be at an affordable price, because the past failure to acknowledge the economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging practices (UNCED, 1992: 3). One view has it that water rights should be made consistent with the availability of the resource (Hartje, 2002: 5). This has ushered in the introduction of a full cost recovery system for investments made into water resources. In response, Bluemel (2004:964) notes that treating water as an economic good without limitation, as is done under the principle of full cost recovery, can lead to injustices. Holland (2005:12) feels that the full cost recovery system permits the water service provider to recover operational costs put into water service delivery from the water user.

Holland (2004) maintained that this encourages a culture of privatisation in the water sector, a move promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This system saw water service providers cut off water supplies to users who failed to pay for water services. Activist groups believe that this is against the ethos of access to water as a human right. Bluemel (2004: 964-965) further points out that the cost recovery principle may lead to unaffordable water prices for some remote impoverished communities. Given that private companies operate for profit, privatisation entails the implementation of cost recovery principles with the attendant problems of inequity.

2.5.3 Cultivating a culture of water management

This study continues to assert that IWRM principles are basically models used by developed countries. These models evolved over the decades and have
now been summarily adopted by developing countries such as South Africa. IWRM calls for the need to fine-tune mental frameworks and to encourage best water practices and regulation. It must also take heed of the advantages of using "grey water" (water salvaged after use and re-used) (Newson, 2009: 288). This change of mental attitude to address environmental challenges (and the use of diminishing water supplies in particular) can only be achieved through meaningful social learning practices that run parallel to social change (Newson, 2009: 339). Social learning brings a grassroots community to the point when it is able to establish consensus on the following: Firstly, it constructs a shared purpose. Secondly, it provides a new paradigm to resolve social dilemmas and brings communities to articulate what is valued for the common good (Newson, 2009: 340).

This study holds the view that IWRM is a highly misunderstood resource management paradigm. The ordinary man in the street is as yet unaware of its essence. This awareness will remain elusive unless active campaigns are initiated at grassroots level to familiarise the public about IWRM and its implications for their livelihoods. Top-down IWRM efforts remain largely ineffective and irrelevant when unaccompanied by bottom-up commitments. This issue is highlighted by Agarwal et al. (2000: 9, 17) who stress the point that despite the evidence that bottom-up participation is imperative, top-down institutions of water management still remain unquestioned. A top-down and bottom-up approach to IWRM will provide access to information and mechanisms that allow individuals and communities to make astute decisions concerning water use. The Dublin principles (UNCED, 1992: 2; Agarwal et al., 2000: 33) also advocate participation at the lowest appropriate level, signalling a call for bottom-up approach toward IWRM. This stance would empower communities to raise their voices against political entrepreneurs who wish to manipulate public needs to augment their political ambitions. The next chapter will delve into the culture of careerism in more detail.
2.5.3.1 Water governance

Sunita Narain, director of the Centre for Science and Environment in New Delhi, cited in (Blackmore, 2007: 517) emphasised that the management of water, and not the scarcity of water, is the problem in many parts of the world. It is hereby realised that water governance provides a fundamental locus to cultivating a culture of water management and building perceptions toward this end (Hommes et al., 2008). Water governance recognises IWRM as a process where various stakeholders build ground rules to preserve water resources for cost effective and sustainable socio-economic development (Agarwal et al., 2000: 6).

Governance entails a process of institutional interrelation wherein role players from government and civic society can meet. The meeting of role players allows an opportunity to lessen the impact of water pollution connected with various human activities. Furthermore, discussions can be held on ensuring water security and a quality of water suitable for downstream users (Agarwal et al., 2000: 9). IWRM, within the context of catchment management agencies and water user associations, becomes indispensable for this purpose. Agarwal et al. (2000: 12) also identified the need for an expression of political will and commitment to act in decision-making as an imperative tantamount in importance to financial investment for the development of sustainable water resources management. It is encouraging to note that the South African government recognises that all spheres of government must strive to provide water and sanitation services in accordance with the principle of co-operative governance (RSA, 1997: 2).

Efforts for public participation in IWRM

The ILA (2004) article 18 provides for access to information and public participation in water resources management, while article 58 encourages basin states to consult with one another concerning shared waters. A declaration under article 19 charges states to improve education at all levels to promote understanding of issues laid down in the international water rules.
As article 72 purports, this will prove essential as far as peaceful settlement of international water disputes is concerned.

Very much in line with the international water culture to ensure sufficient future availability of water for mining developments and urban/industrial growth, Désolé *et al.* (2005: 1) show that South Africa has seen a proliferation of institutional organisations in the water sector. Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) and Water Users Associations (WUAs) for example, have been formed. Kapfudzaruwa & Sowman (2009: 683) maintain that these institutions are necessary to ensure representation of all water user interest groups in the management of water resources at a more localised level. This is validated by Warner (2007: 3) who claims that the catchment level is emerging as the natural unit for water management and that slowly but surely, this is set to revolutionise water governance regimes in Europe (under the Framework Directive), South Africa (under the 1998 Water Act) and elsewhere. But the weakness identified within CMAs and WUAs is the scenario of ordinary water users as passive recipients of water supplies owned and controlled by small elites under the aegis of central government (Coles & Wallace, 2005: 34). This has seen a South African citizenry with very little control over their water resources, and virtually disengaged from the process of how water comes to their homes and workplaces (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 41).

Swatuk (2005: 874-875, 877) indicates how CMAs run into serious difficulties because of problems ranging from a lack of funding and resources to government-identified stakeholders who refuse to participate, to a lack of knowledge on water reform processes. Participation often remains nothing more than a quick brand to legitimise changes pre-determined by central government in consultation with donors. The lack of participation and representation of the broader community — especially women — within the WUAs and CMAs, hampers the process of socialisation towards an IWRM-conscious society. Agarwal *et al.* (2000: 9; 12-13) also express concern about sectoral approaches that frequently dominate water resources management.
This tendency has led to the current situation of policy objectives being set by governing institutions without consideration for other users across institutional boundary settings.

Participation by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is essential to provide an enabling environment for communities on local level to partake in the management and development of water resources. This will necessitate frequent communication and dissemination of water-related information. Community radio and media should provide detail on how ordinary citizens can collaborate in activities devised to augment water as an economic and a social good (Agarwal et al., 2000: 67).

It goes without saying that institutional alignment is vital for the effective and efficient practice of IWRM and guidelines in a given locality. As Manzungu (2004: 18) postulates, the overall political culture of a country (or more specifically, the status of governance) plays an important role in shaping stakeholder participation, because effective stakeholder participation cannot occur without a proper governance context. Hence the NWA makes provision for stakeholder responsibilities within allocated and legally recognised structures in a given jurisdiction. These agencies have to enhance coordination of practices among water users from different backgrounds and must respect the interests and customs of the communities concerned in the interests of the stability of political configurations in the country. This is not unlike this study's emphasis on a synergy of top-down and bottom-up approach for socialisation towards a culture of water resources management. The general public is in effect afforded the prospect of gaining a sense of ownership over the water resources and infrastructure maintenance (Lodge, 2001a: 15). Agarwal et al. (2000: 46) succinctly posit:

A key tenet of IWRM is that traditional top-down approaches to management have to be supplemented by, and indeed partly replaced by, bottom-up strategies to ensure that the water sector is demand-driven and can deliver welfare gains to the whole range of end users. For bottom-up strategies to be effective new institutions
are likely to be needed. In many situations, it will be essential to create community-based organizations, which can actively participate in the development and management of water supply systems. In other situations, democratically elected and representative consultative committees and market mechanisms may be the appropriate means by which users can convey their demands for water goods and services to providers. Bottom-up strategies do not mean that the complete devolution of decision-making to the local or community level is desirable or feasible; an appropriate balance has to be struck between community-level organizations and governmental bodies.

It is here that attention is given to South African water management institutions as enacted by law. This is done in the recognition that water does not sway loyalty to provincial, national, or regional boundaries. Hence there is a need to put CMAs and WMAs in place to use the available skills to handle international and trans-boundary water resources management and to contribute to the peaceful, equitable, and negotiated management of shared waters (Agarwal et al., 2000: 49-50).

2.5.3.2 Water demand management

WDM puts emphasis on IWRM as a priority and calls for efforts to acclimatise the community about the significance of water management and the responsible use thereof. WDM becomes relevant because other communities, especially the poor in rural areas do not have a safe drinking water supply nor adequate sanitation to improve their livelihoods (Agarwal et al., 2000: 10). Water supply and sanitation for rural and urban areas will become a serious concern in years to come and this will be worsened by population growth and possible food and water scarcity within the next 25 years (Agarwal et al., 2000: 10). Fears have been expressed that serious conflicts over water may occur between the water-thirsty irrigation sector and other human and ecosystem users (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 44; Agarwal et al., 2000: 11). These might evolve into destructive conflicts if water is perceived as being
abused or degraded by some actors at the risk of others (Bildhaeuser, 2010: 1). This brings the internationally acclaimed "water wars" hypothesis to the fore (Thompson, 2003: 4). Bildhaeuser (2010: 2) asserts that conflict originates from interaction between individuals and towards the environment around them, and that (water) conflicts are rooted in the "micro" level.

Tamas (2003: 1) concurs that in considering water conflicts we should also note the importance of intra-state water tensions which are often related to inter-state conflicts. This has to some extent led to an accommodating water demand management path, consistent with developments and related water requirements posed by the economy of the country in varied sectors. The following schematic presentation in Figure 4 below attempts to summarise the South African water policy as espoused in its dominant legislative framework that is symptomatic of South Africa's culture toward IWRM. Relevant principles can be found in chapter 1 of the national water resources strategy DWAF (2004).
2.6 SUMMARY

This chapter investigated a theoretical exposition on political culture and socialisation, which have a great influence on IWRM at the local level as will be discussed in chapter 4. In the next chapter, violent protests come to the fore to illustrate political orientations toward water resources. It has been seen that a “glocal” (Thompson, 2003) culture on water resources and human rights has engendered a culture of non-payment and privatisation in response to issues on seeing water as a common good.

This is similar to influences of globalisation on local level socio-political conditions that have also been highlighted. This chapter then introduced the issue of ab(use) of power in political culture and socialisation, and it was suggested that involvement in IWRM is limited to the powerful elite and those with vested interests, while the poor remain marginalised. Gumede (2010) maintains that in South Africa, because of the high levels of inequality and
unequal access to key public forums, important opinions are easily shut out because those holding such opinions are too poor to influence party leaders or gain access to institutions such as the media or parliament. There is still more effort to be made with regard to IWRM and stakeholder participation.

This true of South Africa too, notwithstanding its noble water legislation, public participation in CMAs and WMAs is still lacking. A synergy of top-down and bottom-up approaches was then discussed as a means of enhancing public participation. Research has indicated that these types of interaction are essential to the socialisation process. As for civil society organisations, they have as yet not played a meaningful role in promoting participation by the general public in water resources management.

The next chapter confirms suggestions of government's hysteria to equate community participation with giving ammunition to society and fuelling civil disobedience. South Africa does not provide a clear-cut impression of political culture; this is because of its diverse racial and ethnic population. The historic past is arguably the reason for the irrational political behaviour exhibited by local communities, and dominant opinion makers capitalise on this reality. The following chapters will indicate that ideology, race, and class have all, at various times and in different ways, impacted on South Africa as far as political culture and socialisation are concerned, while IWRM remains on the sidelines in the scheme of things. This study maintains that public concerns are utilised to augment political ambitions by many civil society leaders, while government officials do not easily sway to their demands. Furthermore, there is government obsession and dislike of civil society organisations that are accused of being against nation building and inconsistent with the revolutionary agenda of the ruling party irrespective of the reasonableness of their arguments and their concern for the public interest.
CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION RESPONSES TO
IWRM IN SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter confirms arguments addressed in chapter 2 by discussing political culture and socialisation as it manifests in South Africa, revealing ethnically polarised and politicised tendencies and interactions in the country's political life. Some of these tendencies are subtle, not featuring prominently in the media or manifesting overtly in the public domain.

Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and South Africa’s water culture are also part of the mix because this chapter indicates how South Africa has come to accept international water norms. It stands in consort with the previous chapter’s exposition on the ‘glocal’ culture and top-down influences, or that which is referred to as globalisation from above. However, bottom-up influences in South Africa with regard to IWRM are not neglected and it is shown how civil society and community organisations attempt to engage with government authorities to influence decision-making and how their demands for improved service delivery are articulated. Political culture and socialisation responses remain a thread that runs through the discussion.

Some analysis points to the historical past as the reason for present manifestations of political culture in South Africa. This chapter provides a schematic presentation of a top-down reality to explain an ethos that moves from one epoch to another. The study also joins the political discourse by arguing that the present political culture has a significant influence for future political penchants. The discussion also reveals that violent protests have been inherited from the apartheid past, and have been embraced by the incumbent political generation.
3.2 POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

This section explores political culture and socialisation as it manifests in South Africa, the glocal ideologies receive attention to determine how political culture impacts on IWRM in the South African context. It is fitting that the historic past on political culture be addressed foremost; this allows us an opportunity to prepare our thoughts on contemporary South African realities and, where possible, future scenarios.

3.2.1 The historic view of political culture in South Africa

The historic past provides a top-down reality where the white minority was positioned at the top reality stratum and enjoyed the fruits of the land, with access to social, economic, and political prestige (Marx, 1992: 5). Vilakazi (1994: 151) purports that they committed a crime against humanity. The black majority were in the down reality stratum, reduced to "semi-animal" status and disenfranchised from socioeconomic and political benefits (Vilakazi, 1994: 151). According to Vilakazi (1994: 151) the "wounded psyche" of African humanity called for majority rule in South Africa. The primary reaction to events initiated by the dominant social groups in South Africa was articulated through a process of negotiation, petitions, news media, and debate between the ruling party and liberal democratic movements, who by and large refused strategies of protest that promoted civil disobedience (Dhlomo, 1994: 252; Grobler, 1988; Marx, 1992: 33; Switzer, 1990: 91). When the government in power refused to budge, anger and frustration at their "semi-animal" condition boiled over. The only method remaining to communicate the exigency of change was violent protest and armed struggle (Skweyiya, 1994: 280; Grobler, 1988: 2, 3).

A post-1994 democratic South Africa underwent transition into the present–future, where majority rule was achieved. At the top of the reality stratum is a majority government and political power is in the hands of the previously disenfranchised (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 44). Down the reality stratum is a diverse South African populace. The South African government is based on
the constitutional foundation of non-racism, non-sexism and freedom of religious affiliation, thus providing a basis on which to build a better life for all (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 50). Nevertheless, the democratic social order and government institutions remain haunted by nightmares from the historic past (Rhodie, 1988: 204). This is evident in a scenario where people from different communities of the country are faced with socioeconomic squalor, having little influence on local government decisions.

The perception exists that while the political elites in government enjoy the fruits of the land, the people are subject to poverty and poor service delivery (Skweyiya, 1994: 285; Rhodie, 1988: 183). It is now common in contemporary South Africa to hear talk of “we have been wounded in the mind” (Gouws et al., 2010: 51), or reference to a “forgotten people” (Gouws et al., 2010:47, 50; Malefane, 2009:11; Mogale, 2010:9; Makhanya, 2010:6). 

Figure 5 provides a schematic view of South Africa’s political culture, socialised through top-down influences, inevitably leading to a culture of violent protest embraced in the present-future context.

Figure 5: A schematic view of South Africa’s political culture
3.2.1.1 The post-1994 context

South Africa has experienced a seismic change in its political life; it has shifted from the apartheid order to a constitutional democracy that gave a face-lift to the country’s entire political culture (Hadland, 2007: 18). South Africa, through its legislative overhaul, has followed a fundamental transformation agenda to a more inclusive, non-racial, non-sexist society that enshrines freedom of religion and political expression (Hadland, 2007: 19; Turton & Meissner 2002: 51).

In his paper on military and strategic studies, with a focus on the emergent South African strategic culture, Vreý (2007: 7) has identified 1) a liberal strategic culture which either maintains, breaks, or forms coalitions, reforms institutions and establishes rules to defend societies from breaking down. And 2) a revolutionary strategic culture which targets, in a forceful way, those actors and institutions that uphold order in the system in order to create a new system based on different principles. Appropriately indicated by (Booth & Trodd: 1991:11) quoted in Vreý (2009:67), the strategic culture as a military appurtenance of political culture is equivalent to mental reservations exhibited in political discourse taking a condisending shape. It is like a deep seated emotional ‘cold war’ of mistrust and derision within society and politicians.

These cultural demeanours find resonance with this study’s focus on South African political culture, to argue that the apartheid and post-apartheid realities have left present-day South Africa with some manifestations of restrained, competing fragments of revolutionary–liberal culture. These may surface in the political, economic or social sphere, as is argued by Ostheimer (2006: iii). Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998: 812) prove that qualities of revolutionary–liberal culture confirm South Africa’s ethnically polarised and politicised tendencies and interactions in political life. Some of these are subtle and seldom articulated. For example, white people perceive government as incompetent and expect the black government to fail, while black government and communities are keen to prove otherwise. It is only recently that South African parliamentarians confirm these ethnically polarised tenets evident in the use
of the concept ‘darkies’ (referring to the ANC led, black majority government) in political discourse by Dr. Blade Nzimande- his argument that in either case, the arrogant, sneering tone of this discourse, which is often racist, frankly, is aimed at undermining the confidence of our people in both our education system and government – and they’ll not succeed in that’ further proves the revolutionary-liberal culture in South Africa (Davis, 2011: 3).

Hadland (2007:56) shows that the ANC argues that allegations of one-party domination are inherently conservative accusations that seek to cover for white interests that tend to distrust black governance. Vreý (2007:24) agrees and maintains that such tendencies are manifestations of a revolutionary culture inspired by armed liberation movements to redress the draconian realities of the past. Vreý further cements his position by showing that when challenged, the governing party tends to sway toward resistance politics and to invoke racism as the cause of problems and racial solidarity as the answer. This unveils South Africa’s idiosyncratic political culture redolent with racially polarised identities entrenched by pre-revolutionary propensities (Almond, 1983: 135).

The South African present-future scenario resembles Huntington’s (1996: 125, 137) exposition of politics reconfigured along cultural lines. He writes of “fault lines between civilisations becoming the central lines of conflict”. Such fault lines conflate race with culture and prioritise loyalty along with trust to a demographic majority, replacing all other qualities (Ostheimer 2006: iii; Bentley, 2006: 19). They lament that such loyalty networks bear the risk of easily transmuting into networks of patronage and a political context marked with dichotomous perceptions of “we and they” as seen in Nzimande’s argument. These perceptions are exacerbated by a continued competition for scarce resources amplified by convictions that if one is not with the liberator one is against it (Bentley, 2006: 19).

Contemporary South Africa is on the slippery path of transition from a culture of white minority domination toward a democratic profile of governance directed by moral and humanitarian normative beliefs regulated by the 1996
constitution. This is evidence that a liberal-democratic culture exists in South Africa (van Zyl Slabbert, 2006: 41; Vrey 2007: 12, 24; Chikwanha, 2006). The tenets of a liberal-democratic culture are further espoused by norm entrepreneurs who play their role through close access to decision makers who promote new ideas to build impetus that generates an inclusive identity within a diverse South African citizenry (Vrey 2007: 8).

While clearly embracing a need to reallocate from a culture of coercion towards one of pluralism (Vrey 2007: 13), South Africa still has a leprous identity crisis under the latest political leadership (Bentley 2006: 27-28). Despite efforts to build consensus on a common South African identity, meagre success has been achieved in capitalising on pseudo-nationalist identities centred on major sporting events. Examples are, winning the 1995 rugby World Cup; the 1996 African Cup of Nations; South Africa's entry into the 1998 FIFA soccer World Cup tournament; its hosting of the 2002/3 ICC cricket World Cup; and hosting the recent 2010 FIFA soccer World Cup tournament. South Africans seem to revel in euphoria that overlooks evidence of racial, social, political and ethnic problems as well as deep-seated feelings of acrimony and misgiving toward one another. But lo and behold, once the high-profile sporting events ebb, South Africans quickly relapse into their erstwhile sombre (and more realistic) orientations.

South African political culture is endowed with a wide variety of political symbols, but there appears to be some difference of opinion among the elite on how appropriate these are. There is even some dispute about the metaphors associated with political symbols and name-calling. For example: 1) orientations on issues of land reform and nationalisation of state resources; 2) disparities about struggle songs such as "Kill the Boer"; 3) an ever-growing culture of careerism/corruption with the emergence of "tenderpreneurs" and so-called "political hyenas"; 4) queries about the protection afforded by the bill of rights, and the South African constitution; 5) the media and freedom of speech; and finally, 6) socio-economic attempts at South Africanisation through the proudly South African campaign (Politicsweb, 2010).
This becomes a quandary for the present day South African political leadership, as Van Zyl Slabbert (2006: 42) points out:

Based on my own exposure to the ANC, the movement did not want a liberal democracy for the country. This is because liberal democracy is not about majoritarianism; its distinctive feature, rather, is constraint on the abuse of power ... chapter 9 of our Constitution deals with, for example, the Constitutional Court, the Human Rights Commission, the Traditional Review Service Commission – all institutions within the context of a bill of rights that constrain the freedom of decision making of the majority. It is precisely when the majority become irritated with those constraints that we can anticipate a shift in the political culture.

In this case Ostheimer's comment (2006: iii) should be noted. He posits that a democratic political culture begins with the individual and particularly with the political leaders.

Furthermore, the ANC's political hegemony, where differentiation between state/administrative functions and political party is not always evident (Carrim, 2009), deserves attention. Many scholars are piqued by the realities of this political hegemony and express the view that South Africa is in danger of developing the pathologies of a one-party state that might lead to a facade democracy harbouring concealed authoritarianism (Hadland, 2007: 55). Desai (2006: 50) maintains that within the ANC there is the perception that, the state and the party blurs into one, and the president becomes the “keeper of the national interest”. By implication, those who challenge the wisdom of the state or the president, challenge the people. Political elites believe that civil society must not simply be demobilised; it must become a conduit for the decisions of the party in order to counteract those opposed to change. A similar view is that just as the ANC dominates political life, so it becomes increasingly resilient against the demands of civil society (Hadland, 2007: 56, 57).
Despite South Africa’s large and diverse network of civil society organisations, very few succeed when it comes to exerting any authority on state policy processes. Most of the time, the executive simply ignores them through structures of bureaucracy that are hostile to public pressure and consultations. Elite culture and influence on the general public become crucial if there is any truth at all in the observation that the survival of any political system depends on the support of both the political elite and the population at large (Ostheimer, 2006: iv).

An agreement needs to be reached between elites and the broader society that a democratic system is the best, albeit imperfect, form of government. These observations are enhanced by what Van Zyl Slabbert (2006:43) called “electoral obscenity”, by which he means proportional representation on a closed-list system with the now-abolished floor crossing, given that historically speaking, floor crossing has habitually followed the gravy train, where there are lucrative jobs and opportunities.

3.2.2 Manifestations of political culture in South Africa today

It is a trying endeavour to identify a dominant political culture in South Africa, yet it is possible to point to several indicators of political culture for the purposes of this study.

3.2.2.1 Contemporary “statist” political culture

The South African government has positioned itself in society as the main actor for service delivery. Several government institutions have a monopoly on access and distribution of basic services, with the private sector and civil society associations accorded little influence in the allocation of these resources.

The water service sector is highly centralised due to its political appeal within society (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 55). It is thus hardly surprising that South African society looks to the state for salvation when their ever-rising expectations for a better life remain unmet. Frustration and anger from the
masses is growing, given that there is little response from government officials. This propensity has socialising effects and inculcates a culture of mass dependency on the state and violent protest against the state. To throw more light on this, it is worth quoting Kamens (1986: 569):

This ideological expansion of state responsibility sets the stage for the development of politically oriented discontent in societies. The problem is that state organization increases in strength in both rich and poor countries, but state responsibility for social progress of all kinds increases even faster in a world system that defines states as the major, legitimate collective actors. The diffusion of the ideology of statism simultaneously legitimates all sorts of claims for services by citizens and ensures that their expectations will remain unmet by the organizational capacities and resources of states – particularly in the periphery. High expectations for regime performance are generated by the normative structure of the state itself. National political ideology and its agents may be potent socializing forces engendering expectations that lead to protest.

Huntington (1996: 33) ascribes to the realist theory of international relations when he asserts that states are the primary, indeed the only important actors. This veracity is however jeopardised by progressive civil society organisations that inhabit the social vacuum left by the state and other political organisations. Internationalisation also occurs because intercontinental institutions assume important functions previously performed by sovereign states (Huntington, 1996: 35). Globally, there has been a trend towards nation-states losing power by devolution of this power to sub-state, regional, provincial, and local entities.
3.2.2.2 The culture of careerism and entitlement

a) Careerism

South Africa has seen the advent of individuals in search of instant wealth who align themselves to powerful politicians for a share of control over resources, thus providing fertile ground for the growth of social oligarchy – an oligarchy that grows increasingly distant from the masses (Mangcu, 2005: 2). This sentiment is further entrenched by Hutamo (2006: 113) who posits that with the advent of democracy, the ANC is failing to mobilise the masses on current issues of relevance. Instead of mobilising the people to address the issue of poor service delivery, job creation and other aspects that the masses were promised in pre-election manifestos, there is a culture on the ground of careerism. This tendency manifests itself when people in disadvantaged communities begin to question, for instance, the lack of jobs. They gather together and appoint a leader, a poor leader among the poor people. He or she is often singled out by the ruling party and elevated to a position as a councillor, at which stage this person is granted tenders or given other such lucrative opportunities. Sivanandan (1990: 61) has shown that grassroots protest often provides a venue for a class of professionals and a platform for middle-class aspirants to parliament. Black struggle and black issues were taken up not so much for the betterment of the community but for individuals to improve their career prospects. The following chapter will confirm this tendency.

b) Entitlement

Hutamo (2006: 114) points to the culture of entitlement that exists in the ranks of the ANC Youth League, who demand some type of remuneration for their participation in the tripartite Alliance. Perceptions still exist that political leaders are self-serving and enjoy a lavish lifestyle at the expense of others who endure squalid living conditions, poor service delivery, minimal facilities as far as health and education are concerned, and growing unemployment. Lodge (2001a: 22) provides evidence of this when he makes reference to the then ANC chief whip, Tony Yengeni, who is quoted as saying:
“I’m a Mercedes Benz man. I bought a 4x4 not because I want to drive in the bundus, but because it’s the in thing and I’m part of the trend”.

Mfundisi (2006: 101) concurs with this observation. He tells of a senior member of the ruling party who on being questioned how he had accumulated so much wealth in so short a time, replied that he did not join the struggle to be poor. This gives the distinct impression that he feels he is fully entitled to wealth, by hook or by crook. A culture of entitlement has been cultivated among those who hold high office in politics and people in government service. This culture extends throughout the general public and ties in with the culture of statism where communities expect government to provide them with services on request – with little consideration of the cost involved. Communities feel entitled to these services because the constitution “promises” them certain basic services. Water and sanitation are high on their list of priorities.

The use of remunerative power and a culture of patronage by the ruling party has angered many of the current political activists who regard this as the local government’s “divide and rule attitude” tactics to silence the leaders by dangling lucrative carrots before them (Makhanya, 2010: 6; COGTA, 2009: 11; Etzioni (1961: 5) in Pirages, 1980: 442). This is seen as a deliberate ploy to weaken civic organisations while activists would have preferred normative relations for the common good. Gumede (2010) confirms that soon after the 1994 elections, many members of the civil society intelligentsia were offered employment in government on condition that they did not speak out against the party or the government.

3.2.2.3 Elite culture of unilateralism

With regard to international relations, Vreý (2007: 23) points to some unilateralism and coercion in South African efforts to promote peace in Lesotho (1998) and Burundi (2002) as well as the South African stance on human rights – a matter (according to some analysts) that does not go unnoticed by
other African leaders on the continent. On the national level, however, Van Zyl Slabbert (2006: 44) called for a modicum of indulgence:

How do you deal with the fact that a movement which is deeply committed to democratic centralism and a national democratic evolution now has to adjust to the realities of a liberal democracy, a market economy and globalisation?

Van Zyl Slabbert further maintained: "Thabo Mbeki will have to try deal with it", while Desai, (2006: 49) referred to Mbeki as the "all knowing" father because, according to him, government and social policy formulation happened in the executive; provincial premiers were appointed from the Union Buildings; and parliament was "emasculated" from the same locus of political power. Indeed, under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki the South African political stage epitomised a culture of centralised authority, and took many pressing decisions behind the walls of denial (Kotze, 2001a: 169). In contrast, Hadland (2007: 114) saw this centralisation as evidence of the state's executive anxiety to direct the polity.

Furthermore, the state was lacking feedback from civil society, similar to Margaret Thatcher's government in Britain in the 1980s, where the intention was to create a safe generation for the Tories by putting a limit on the potential influence of civil societies (Sivanandan, 1990: 42). Scholars refer to this phenomenon as "vanguardism", or power shifts from society to state; from provincial to national level; from the legislature to the executive; and from the cabinet to the presidency (Hadland, 2007: 114; Gumede, 2005). This was certainly evident in the Mbeki presidency and in turn, enabled the state to become more interventionist in its attitude – and also more resistant to the urgent demands from civil society to withdraw offensive legislation (Hadland, 2007: 116).

Thatcher's election into office set in place policies and practices that breathed life into the key tenets of neoliberalism (Rankin, 2004: 17). And similarly, it was the ANC government, under the leadership of Mbeki that saw the
introduction of neoliberal policies to privatise public enterprises that weighed down heavily on the poor who could simply not afford the service charges on resources such as water. Hence civic organisations took to the streets against privatisation and payment for services. Above all, it was payment for water services that was the cruelest body blow, when poor people were temporarily denied access to water. Meter taps were introduced and the poorest of the poor had to make do with water trickles on community stands. The anti-privatisation campaign and the protests that flared up in communities such as Phiri, in Soweto caused something of a stir. Desai (2006: 54-55) suggests that tentatively at first, these movements surfaced to challenge the water and electricity cut-offs, evictions, and the lack of land redistribution. Nor were they merely the natural result of poverty or marginality; instead they were a direct response to state policy through mass mobilisation. Mass mobilisation, as it had been before, was the prime source of social sanction.

Community movements saw the emergence of the family as a fighting unit. It is here that the brutality of the ANC’s neo-liberal offensive is experienced and it is here that it was (and still is) being fought. Upon the eruption of violent protests over service delivery, the government said it was the work of a “third force” of political agitators rather than legitimate complaints from people on the ground (Mangcu, 2005: 1, 2). The paranoia that afflicts the local municipality is such that civic organisations are without adequate political support to propagate relevant development issues.

Downs (2006: 99) laments that the attack by President Mbeki on civil society organisations and NGOs was extremely distressing because in a parliamentary system civil society should provide the necessary checks and balances on government. This view is supported by Gumede (2010) who posits that civil society is important not only in helping the government to deliver social services, but in providing criticism to ensure that it is held accountable. He confirms the socialisation role of civic organisations by pointing out that an independent, critical civil society can provide alternative information to enlighten citizens (to make their participation in the democratic
process more effective) and should be empowered to influence the agenda of the government.

3.2.2.4 A culture of protests

This study maintains that violent protests have been inherited from the apartheid past, and are currently being embraced by the present political generation. Mullard (1985: 3) observes that black liberation fuelled the struggles of previous generations and provided the political, ideological, and tactical foundations for the continuation of ongoing struggles today. South African struggles ensued over institutionalised racism until the vision of equality for all eventually triumphed; this culture of violent protest now finds its way into demands for adequate provision of basic services (Kotze, 2001c: 233; Wilson, 1992: 195; Sivanandan, 1990: 65, 78).

Grobler (1988) provides a backdrop of the South African playing field and gives evidence of efforts made by the disenfranchised black community to negotiate for the recognition of their civil and economic rights. This proved a fruitless exercise until the efforts of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) in the 1940s when all faith in the good graces of the white majority was lost and the tide turned into a self-conscious political ideology of resistance (Grobler, 1988: 88-89; Marx, 1992:34; Sivanandan, 1990: 82-83; Hughes, 1990: 5). The youth refused to be subjected any longer under the contemptible social and institutional measures their parents had tolerated for decades.

History teaches that the apartheid government used coercive and bureaucratic tools to restrain subordinately stratified communities under a racially conceived dictatorial system and denied access to political and economic benefits (Tadesse et al., 2009: 12; Mullard, 1985: 2; Rhoodie, 1988: 173, 178; Zimmermann, 1980: 168; Marx, 1992: 38, 152; De Kock & Schutter 1998: 67). Repression bred militancy (Kane-Berman 1993: 11; Kotze, 2001b: 232) and the armed struggle was elevated to the notion of a "people's war" (Tadesse et al., 2009: 12; Kane-Berman, 1993: 41). Currently, a culture of
political violence is driven by township residents in opposition to the exclusion they experience and in compliance with calls to action made by civil society organisations and concerned group associations (Minnaar et al., 1998: 13, 15).

Protests had become a hallmark of defiance against authority and in the mid-1980s the call went out to make local municipalities ungovernable (Roberts, 2001: 98; Marx, 1992: 34; Simon 1989: 189, 199; Hough, 2008: 7; Mfundisi, 2006: 101). Although brutal enforcement of a state of emergency brought superficial calm, mass rent boycotts and other forms of defiance persisted (Lodge, 2001a:14). In the post-1994 political arena, especially when people campaign against inadequate service delivery and poor governance (Tadesse et al., 2009:4), ideological arguments go back and forth on whether the protesters are exercising their democratic right or whether democracy has descended into anarchy. Whereas violent protest is recognised as a resource of political participation (often the only one available) on the part of civilians, they are criticised and labelled as anarchists, receiving minimal appreciation from bureaucratic political role players supposedly grounded in revolutionary democratic ideals.

a) Protest(s) as the last option of engagement

On the international level, (Vreÿ 2007: 13) refers to the South African Department of Defence to discuss the morality of the use of force if this remains the very last option. On the local level, according to Rhoodie (1988: 181) and Hughes (1990: 17) there is a historicist epistemological assumption that violence pays (De Kock & Schutter 1998: 74). This is exacerbated by the escalation of coercion in the exercise of power from top to bottom, and the institutionalisation of the values of violence at community level. This has been internalised in the personality of individuals, whereas the culture of political negotiation has been eroded (De Kock & Schutter 1998:74, 75; Stewart, 2002: 343). This is clearly seen in verbal political engagements between South African civil society organisations and the political leadership, where name calling has become the norm.
Political violence in South Africa forms part of the discourse set by this work. A top-down approach is visited both in decision making and policy implementation to identify why South Africans embrace protest action so readily. It is shown that violent protest as an expression of political action is by no means a new fixation in the post-1994 era. It has been a political ploy for generations and has been passed down over the years.

For the purposes of this study, the focus will fall on Harrismith/Intabazwe, where residents are seen as having a 'culture of vigilance' (pers. comm., Tshabalala. 20100326) and seem to turn to protests as the last resort of engagement when other methods of communication have been exhausted (pers. comm., De Beer & Van Tonder. 20100323). One respondent commented:

After getting grievances from the people we called them and said to them let’s sit down and talk, and they said “niks” and we said “ok, let’s march”. We went for a march – we followed all correct channels (pers. comm., Cebekulu. 20100323).

More details on Harrismith/Intabazwe will be discussed in the following chapter. Mfundisi (2006: 101) maintains that South African politics is characterised by violence, intimidation and, in some instances, arrogance. He claims that there are those who say that if they cannot have their way peacefully, they will simply resort to anarchy, marches and strikes.

There are various formative factors that lead to violent protests in the context of South African communities. These include ideology, economy, social justice and politics. Hamber (1998: 352, 354) avers that the impact and manipulation of socio-cultural and ideological frameworks can shape the nature of political violence. This study agrees to a significant extent with the work of (Tadesse et al., 2009: 3; Minnaar et al., 1998:16; Marx, 1992: 163; Mauer et al., 1988: 216) when it posits that political violence is not undertaken simply to hamper the democratic process and stall the existing service delivery in the communities concerned. This is confirmed by the different responses of black
communities and white people to dissatisfaction over poor service delivery. Violent protest has erupted in black communities, while white people have threatened to withhold payment for service delivery and have opted instead to place these monies into a holding account until their demands have been met (Minnaar et al., 1998: 33; Lodge, 2001a: 15).

3.2.3 Political socialisation in South Africa

Bearing in mind that political socialisation is transmitted through social interaction and discussion with others on political matters (Cook, 1985: 1082, 1084), citizens are enlightened and community needs reach a point that warrants political action. In the context of South Africa, a culture of violent protest is perpetuated and socialized into society (Eckstein, 1980: 160).

In their usual scant, rhetorical responses political actors condemn the violent protests as “treason” or dismiss them as “counter-revolutionary activities inspired by a third force” (Malefane, 2009: 11; Desai, 2006: 51; Melber, 2002: 5). Other tags are also used, such as “hooligans”, “regressive unpatriotic racists” who have scant regard for the government agenda of nation building (Tadesse et al., 2009: 22; Buthelezi, 2005). However, nothing very concrete is done to restrain such behaviour within the broader community (Rosecrance, 1976: 448). The culture of name calling is a socialisation factor because people usually shy away from vociferous standpoints against the status quo to avoid being labelled as unpatriotic and the like. Some people even join the “in-group” or support the ruling party’s national agenda because they are afraid breaking away from the “norm” and facing possible stigmatisation.

It is equally essential to recognise that satisfactory political socialisation is not merely achieved in the negative sense because political culture is not inducted through coercion but is rather the outcome of reinforcement and rewards for responsible civic (political) behaviour (Rosecrance, 1976: 452). Various agents in society see to it that political norms are enforced, rewarded, or challenged. Individual participation in these structures is indispensable to socialisation.
3.2.4 Agents of political socialisation in South Africa

The day to day political relationships between government institutions, civil society organisations, and the general public has a socialising influence since people tend to base their perceptions, orientations, and evaluative frameworks on what they experience in these interactions, and thus construct a political culture. We now understand that political socialisation transmits political culture from one person to another through several agents of interaction (Soule & Nairne, 2006: 1; Vaisey, 2008: 611; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 111, 142; Kamrava, 1993: 137, 154; Davies, 1980: 24; Cook, 1985: 1082, 1084). In this case, the study will focus on relevant institutions within South Africa where citizens are conscientised and when community needs transcend to a political plane that warrants political action.

3.2.4.1 The family

A child’s upbringing that includes discussion on politics begins the process of political socialisation (Finkel & Ernst, 2005: 344). At this level families seldom play a conscious role to inculcate political beliefs in their children. Nevertheless, a child models itself on adults and parents bear a great influence on children’s political tendencies (Finkel & Ernst, 2005: 349). Parents serve as agents of political culture, for example on violent protest. They are likely to encourage violence through claims that unless people take to the street, no government action is ever taken. Children learn the value of protests when parents participate in protest action and other political behaviour (Finkel & Ernst, 2005: 351). Cornelissen (2005: 48) agrees that children are socialised in a political culture when orientations and political behaviour are introduced to them in a subtle process of interaction. Cultural values and awareness of racial differences are also entrenched by the family when a child is told not to trust people from other racial groups (Cornelissen, 2006: 49). In the black community, children are often told not to trust a white person, irrespective of how kind s/he might appear to be. Stereotypes take such a hold in a black family that white people will forever be “segregators”. Afrikaans-speaking groups are often seen as unrepentant racists even in the
new democratic dispensation. Similarly, there are negative stereotypes of black people – that they are lazy, incompetent criminals. Some parents even enrol their children at schools that promote racial superiority.

The aspects of water conservation are also introduced to the child by family members. A child is often taught not to waste water, to use a bucket, and not to leave the tap running. A child who grows up in a rural area or a farming community will probably value water far more than those living in well-watered suburbs in the urban areas. If a family exhibits a culture of watering pavements, or leaving water to run from the garden into the street due to over saturation, a child is most likely to adopt the same attitude to the careless use of water. Given that not many parents are involved in water user agencies or water forums, coupled with the South African tendency of free basic water, many children are simply not taught to conserve water.

3.2.4.2 Business

This study sees the business as a peer group in line with (Strong et al., 2005: 112) who assert that peer influence is so pervasive that it can be accepted that colleagues grant or withhold approval about political choices and tell them what to think, feel, and do. As can be seen in Simon (1989: 199), non-governmental organizations and corporate funding play a role in either vigorously promoting or discouraging government policy initiatives. It is within this social milieu than an individual expresses personal opinions either for a common good or personal gain.

Van Vuuren (2006: 88) confirms that since the end of the nineteenth century individuals and families have become fabulously wealthy. Largely with the assistance of the state, they have dominated the South African economy due to assistance provided by the state through labour practices such as migrant labour that allowed a small group of industrialists to become exceptionally wealthy at the cost of a poorly-paid working class South Africans. Examples include the likes of Cecil John Rhodes (mining), the Oppenheimer family (De Beers and Anglo American) and later, under the rise of Afrikaner nationalism,
the Ruperts (tobacco, etc.). The families of these individuals remain wealthy and their fortunes continue to grow.

In the post-apartheid dispensation, we see a repetition of the historical past confirming that there is really “nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1: 9). Van Vuuren (2006: 89) points to a concern at present that a few politically well-connected individuals are in a position to clinch many deals linked to efforts to ensure black empowerment and broader ownership of the economy. Many of the leading black business people are those with ‘struggle credentials,’ having fought for South Africa’s freedom, and many were incarcerated to ensure the end of apartheid. However, there is a growing perception among ordinary South Africans that it is always the same names that are heard when a new major empowerment deal is announced, and many of these individuals are well connected to the leadership of the ruling party.

On the other hand, Van Vuuren argues that this is not necessarily symptomatic of the corrupt nature of the ANC but he points towards a tendency for leaders of traditional (“white”) business to seek out well-connected individuals as partners. Van Vuuren (2006: 90) further posits that unless policy reforms are introduced to expand BEE beneficiaries, perception both locally and internationally will persist that South Africa which has achieved so much in terms of setting standards to combat corruption somehow continues to favour a form of crony capitalism.

3.2.4.3 Education

Mauer et al. (1988: 221) purport that education is a mechanism through which the culture of a society may be passed to the younger generation and thus contribute to the preservation and advancement of the culture. Education has engendered a culture of violent protests as post-apartheid South African learners and students exhibit symptoms of violence to object to sub-standard educational practices (Stotler, 1971: 20). There are reported cases of high school learners who marched to the school for matric results; and university students inflicting damage to property in protests over increased tuition and
residence fees. Schools also serve as vital instruments for environmental education where learners are encouraged to use water more efficiently. The school is not only a platform to entrench perceived negative habits; association with peers and teachers provide a learner with valuable opportunities to test, challenge, and rebut ideas (Stotler, 1971: 19; Finkel & Ernst, 2005: 335). In this context, education is a socialisation factor in the sense that norms are shared, assimilated and held in common by society. South Africa’s historic past has left a vacuum in the aspect of language policy on the medium of instruction, a matter of contention in the South African education system. African languages still trail English and Afrikaans as official languages in teaching and learning in both public schools and tertiary institutions.

The next chapter will demonstrate how learners are encouraged to utilise grey water and cultivate vegetables for consumption at home. Community members are also allowed to use the school premises for gardening in an attempt to address food security. Schools take learners to enjoy water programmes such as the water wise educational outing offered by Rand Water. Water service providers are even invited to provide more information on efficient water use and conservation. There is however very little research in South Africa that proves the success of water campaigns offered by water boards or celebrations during national Water Week. Education programmes on water conservation and efficient use of this precious resource are still limited in South African school curricula.

3.2.4.4 The media

It was established in the previous chapter that mass media shapes public opinion and expression toward political objects, and serves as the primary source of political information which then either promotes or condones negative sentiments about the political system (Strong et al., 2005: 113; Jackson & Jackson, 1997: 115; Zimmermann, 1980: 179).
Gumede (2010) points to the South African government's tendency to exclude political commentators who are deemed to be critical of the government, from expressing their opinions via the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). This not only demonstrates the intolerance of the broader political culture, but also shows just how much criticism has been devalued. The media frenzy to eliminate negative opinions of the ruling party have been the norm since the period leading to the Polokwane conference under the then leadership of President Thabo Mbeki and is now entrenched by the government of President Jacob Zuma. In the media policy changes are said to be initiatives to curb media freedom and to encourage a culture of fear and secrecy – allegedly to silence criticism and veil corruption. Gumede (2010) borrows from Joseph Stiglitz to argue that secrecy elevate the value of information and allows special interest groups or those with money to dominate politics.

The South African media has also taken the lead to branch into environmental journalism in an attempt to raise awareness of the dire plight of natural resources that are slowly being depleted. These articles include reports on water pollution caused by mining corporations and big industries. However there is still insufficient research to evaluate media influence on political culture and socialisation except perhaps to influence public opinion on a particular controversial issue. Even then, the effect of such inserts are fleeting and the media soon shifts to address another matter. Political journalists have also reported on political elites and their entanglement in corrupt activities, a tendency regarded by the ruling party and those in power, as extremely insensitive. Recently there has been talk of the introduction of legislative measures to prevent such "untoward" criticism.

3.2.4.5 Civil society institutions

The theoretical exposition in the previous chapter did not recognise social institutions as agents of socialisation; this is largely due to limited research evidence on this issue (Finkel & Ernst, 2005: 335). However, this chapter argues that social institutions play a pivotal role in the socialisation process in
South Africa. These include, for example, civil society organisations, trade unions, churches, catchment agencies, water user’s associations, youth organisations and the like.

These organisations continually engage in interaction with the general public. They educate the people about constitutional rights and encourage government institutions to deliver on their promises. People who participate in these organisations are said to be politically conscious, a verity yet to be confirmed in the following chapter. It is certainly true that social institutions play a crucial role in raising issues of water resources and the right of access for the many underprivileged people in South Africa. But the ruling party takes great exception to the efforts and intentions of social institutions and politicians tend to believe that community organisations fuel civic disobedience under the guise of service delivery demands. Gumede (2010) holds the view that it is important that opposition voices outside parliament, such as civil groups, community groups and local leaders should not be ignored or intimidated by the state. But instead, many civil society groups in South Africa have been demonised.

This issue is closely linked to the discussion that will follow in the next chapter. Political elites need to realise that South Africa has a rich civil capital that can be usefully employed to buffer violent protests and ensure that revolutionary energy is diverted towards meaningful and competitive relationships that can be accommodated by the broader South African community (Rhodie, 1988: 182). Political will should be expressed to cultivate a culture of responsibility to contribute to the general welfare of the people. Cherry (2000) quoted in Lodge (2001a: 4) indicates that the most stable and disciplined forms of political organisation are located in African communities. As radical societies, they play a significant role in shifting the playing field to a wider setting, turning issues into causes and causes into movements. In the process they build a new political culture and engage with other communities of resistance. This tendency was evident throughout South African townships in the pre-election period (Sivanandan, 1990: 58). Trends of
violent protest will be discussed in the following chapter since the study area affords an interesting pattern of political protest that occurs prior to an election. One needs those who are critical of grassroots political expression: Does this confirm the ruling party's blanket allegations that violent protests are fuelled by a third force or by those who aspire for political office?

3.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The manifestations of political culture and socialisation become evident in a culture of violent protest in many South African communities. This is because violent protest is seen as "people's war" (Kane-Berman, 1993: 12; 41). This is an effective method for the poor to vent their frustrations; they are conscious of themselves as agents with power to act and thus directly influence economic or political outcomes (Van der Merwe & Meyer, 1994: 275, 277; Ajambo, 2006: 2; Desai, 2006: 54; Eckstein, 1980: 143; Paglia!, 2002:1 52). Such political behaviour is apparently deemed effective thus far – probably because it was the *modus operandi* during the apartheid era (Ajambo, 2006: 6, 7, 21; Hutamo, 2006: 113; Simon, 1988: 189; Makhanya, 2010: 6).

Research indicates that dissatisfaction (often due to government's inability to provide better services), concern for the future, and low levels of trust in government are key factors in political involvement (Ajambo, 2006: 1) as is the government's failure to deliver on its election manifesto. People often prefer not to exercise their vote if there is no worthy opposition party with loyalty to their specific racial category (Ajambo, 2006: 5, 17; Kotze, 2001b: 230). This is indicative of political estrangement within the South African political landscape (Kotze, 2001b: 228). Voter turn-out in the past national and local government elections confirms that many people seem to stay away from the polls because they see no real benefit in casting their vote.

Effective political socialisation will translate into a scenario where there is a synthesis of bottom-up and top-down approaches in decision making. A synthesis based on the premise that interaction between political actors in
local government and civil society institutions will be mutually beneficial and maintain stability and community participation in the society. Furthermore, it will bolster legitimacy and curb the seeds of dissent against socio-political institutions. Wilson (1992: 202) proves that revolutionary activity without prior evolution of individual and social opinions and values, merely leads to the imposition of strong positional controls and the eruption of further social and political turbulence.

South Africa already has a rich social capital structure, which can be better developed to encourage and support initiatives aimed at democratisation. These public interest organisations must monitor those who have positions of power in bureaucratic organisations, including government officials, if democracy is not to be eroded (Wilson, 1992: 202). Wilson (1992: 204) deftly puts it that as control is decentralised from the top, permitting pluralistic endeavour in political, economic, and social areas, smaller groups are organised from the bottom to plan in detail how to implement decisions agreed upon democratically within the larger community.

This will enable the acclaimed notion of the ANC government to bring local government closer to the people and have them influence government decisions. At the same time it will eliminate the top-down process that short-circuits community involvement (Lodge, 2001a: 6). Furthermore, it will encourage public trust in government based on the expectation that government will do what is right for the people (Kotze 2001c: 235). It is important to bear in mind that beliefs and attitudes about government and environmental conditions have an effect on political conditions within a polity.

3.4 TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP INFLUENCES IN SOUTH AFRICA

This section points out that the top-down tendencies by government institutions in the decision making process has a direct bearing on people’s frustration and anger. Perceived top-down decisions by government, such as the installation of meter taps in Soweto, and the installation of water tricklers in the Maluti-A-Phofung municipal area certainly had this effect on the
communities concerned. On both occasions people resorted to violent protest to voice their objection to these decisions. This shows that there was poor consultation with the general public when these policy decisions were made and again when they were implemented. It has to be said that this style of governance bears a clear similarity to that of the apartheid regime. This study thus takes a firm stand in suggesting that a synthesis of top-down and bottom-up approaches will go some way towards solving the challenge of violent protests in the South African present-future political milieu.

3.4.1 Top-down approach

South Africa's top-down influences can be observed in the process of consultation and public participation. Attention is briefly given to Karl Deutsch’s communication theory, whose basic notion is that integration within a given network will proceed in direct relation to the frequency of communications within that network (Dittmer, 1977: 563). Public consultation in the context of South Africa claims to sustain the frequency of communication between government and the general public. The reality on the ground, at local government level, leads one to beg to differ. Infrequent consultation meetings held in the community are said to provide insufficient and unclear information to the residents. More significantly, community inputs are not taken to consideration (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 7, 9). As Tadesse et al. (2009: 6) have observed, demonstrations over inadequate service delivery stem from a conviction that mass action is the only way to get a response from government on their grievances.

Romantic-sounding activities such as public meetings, service improvements, promises, and acts of charity to the less privileged within the community (Lodge, 2001a: 5) by political actors in the immediate aftermath of local and national elections seem to be the only consolation for the general public to meet and converse with their leaders. Thereafter, these initiatives fizzle out and the communities remain marginalised and “forgotten people”. One respondent confirms failed consultative methods with the authorities in the following manner:
“N3 is one important road linking the interior of the country to the coast, so you can imagine when you close it; everybody is going to pay attention” (pers. comm., Cebekulu et al., 20100323.).

Tadesse et al. (2009: 4) highlight a concern about one of the inherent limitations of a representative democracy, namely the acknowledgment of public concerns and responding effectively to peoples’ needs. Under such conditions, participation in democratic processes is very restricted except for well educated and affluent households who understand how the political system operates (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 7, 9, 11, 24). Rhoodie (1988: 202) has made similar observations of black alienation due to lack of access to the mainstream of decision-making power. It is incumbent on political office bearers not to limit their evaluation of people’s decision-making power to that which is barely exercised during local elections. There is no doubt that violent protests in various South African communities have been triggered by top-down decision making. Decisions to privatise water resources were also initiated without prior consultation with the general public.

Conversely, some argue that top-down decision making is in the best interests of attending to “bread and butter” issues. They claim that if the municipality neither offers nor discusses tangible benefits the community is less drawn to participate in local affairs. They see protests as an instrument of the opposition, a way of using the community to promote anarchy. Many analysts and political leaders are quick to dismiss and ignore the validity of people’s demands on the premise that political engagement has been reduced to bread and butter politics. These myopic opinions have a great deal to reconsider on the need to balance policy and socio-economic conditions in the light of South African political struggles.

3.4.2. Bottom-up approach

Bottom-up influences in the South African context are seen in civil society efforts to engage government authorities. The ruling party is experiencing increased pressure from social movements and communities, especially at
local government level in reaction to poor service delivery by government institutions. These movements are polarised on racial lines with white protagonists withholding service payments to local municipalities and then forming ratepayers’ associations to provide services for themselves (COGTA, 2009: 19). In contrast, black communities perpetuate violent protests and embrace a culture of non-payment (COGTA, 2009: 19). It has been seen that empowered institutions dominate the participation and decision making process (Swatuk, 2005: 872). Scholars also maintain that consultation and participation processes are typically perfunctory and that programmes, if discussed by government agencies, are usually pre-determined. A typical example of top-down influences leaves very little room for people’s initiative and empowerment; conformity and blind obedience to administrative directives still reign supreme (Coles & Wallace, 2005: 34; Kamrava, 1993: 142, 169; De Beer & Swanepoel, 1998: 21, 22; Hough, 2008: 8).

This can be understood as an instrument for political leaders (bureaucrats) who aim to maintain power for themselves and expect compliance from target agents (Burnell, 2008: 272; Kipnis, 2001: 7; Pirages, 1980: 446). Hence, despite constant attempts to communicate their concerns with government institutions such as local municipalities, people receive inadequate responses (or no response at all) to their requests. Recourse then takes the form of service protests by concerned residents through group association as an attempt to coerce political actors to respond to their plight.

Other means of bottom-up influences are exercised through environmental activists and NGOs that go as far as taking government to court in an attempt to have government agencies account for cases of environmental pollution and poor service delivery. This shows how parochial cultures can influence political behaviour, i.e. better educated and wealthier communities are able to resort to judicial recourse while the poor take to the streets. This study would like to believe that intensive participation and public consultation activities would give ammunition to the people to target the government to make improvements to their livelihoods. Giving participation (and thus “ammunition”)
to the people essentially refers to a transformation process. Participation, coupled with political education transforms a people’s consciousness and leads to a process of self-actualisation. Roodt (1996: 315) maintains that this will enable oppressed people to take control of their lives, simultaneously challenging the dominating classes and their regime. Gumede (2010) observed that during the first years of democracy in South Africa, criticism of the ANC by its supporters was muted due to fear that criticising the government would provide brickbats to powerful opponents – but this has proved to be a grave mistake.

The wanton idea that participation and consultation in matters of (local) governance is associated with giving undue empowerment to the people is evident in the state of disillusionment, helplessness, anger and frustration experienced by many South African communities and the ANC branch membership (Lodge, 2001a: 6; Kotze, 2001c: 239; Hadland, 2007: 49). Conversely, it confirms Huntington’s view that violence, rioting and other forms of political instability are more likely to occur in political systems without strong opposition parties than in systems with them (quoted in Rhoodie, 1988: 201).

3.5 INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Southern African countries have come to accept the priorities of equitable and sustainable water management as laid down by international donor communities (Lankford & Hepworth, 2010: 82; Swatuk, 2005: 872). In response to these ideals, South Africa has put several institutional and legislative implements in place to achieve the reforms underpinned in the Dublin principles. IWRM in South Africa has to ensure that adequate water resources are secured for human day-to-day activities, sanitation and health, economic activities, and ecological bio-diversity. The South African government’s attitude toward IWRM is largely in compliance with international norms such as those held by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that promotes water as a limited natural resource
and a public good fundamental for life and health (Newson, 2009: 270). The South African government has undergone a radical water resources management shift and maintains that water is the origin of all (good) things (Stein, 2002: 116). The government maintains that water is a basic human right and that the entire population is entitled to have access to sufficient water to cherish as “affirming unto human dignity and nourishing to humanity” (DWAF, 1997). These water policy changes are inspired by what Gabru (2005: 1) sees as the South African historical domination of water supplies by those with access to land and economic power. As a result of this, the majority of rural South Africans have struggled to secure their basic right to water and therefore, this policy shift is inspired by past experiences.

3.5.1 Political culture, socialisation and IWRM in South Africa

This section indicates that South Africa's water culture and legislative frameworks concerning water are in compliance with the values of the international community.

The following statutory frameworks on South African water resources indicate how society has become socialised on IWRM. Participants in the water sector, base their evaluative orientations and demands on these legislative frameworks. Most often, community protests that have ensued over water resources have been inspired by the IWRM culture of water as an economic right. These arguments were also fuelled by the same IWRM culture of health, sanitation, and a right to access.

3.5.1.1 Water as a basic Human right

The South African National Water Act (1998: 9) lays down that national government is the custodian of the nation's water resources to ensure protection, development, conservation, management, control and use of water resources in a sustainable and equitable manner for the benefit of all persons in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Government has to ensure that South Africans have access to adequate potable water. This access to “adequate potable water” is the very same contention of many civic
organisations. They demand that government meets this specific obligation, notwithstanding the huge financial costs associated with water infrastructure and the supply of water to households.

The South African government is reluctant to openly urge the general public to pay for water services, but those in suburbia are expected to pay for water and other municipal services. Furthermore, leaning on the archetypal rationalisation that the majority are under-privileged and economically deprived (indigent), the government has refrained from embarking on an active campaign to have people use water with circumspection. A study by Mukheli et al. (2002), quoted in (Swatuk, 2005: 876) hears resonance when it maintains that where historical class and race differences continue to determine resource access, any attempts to impose user-pay fees on poorer people will elicit a confrontational political response. This is the bottom line in the local government amphitheatre that is currently congested with ratepayer associations and service protests.

3.5.1.2 Water as an economic good

South Africa is ranked among the 20 most water-deficient countries in the world. Its semi-arid climate with relatively low and inconsistent rainfall patterns coupled with limited underground water, puts high priority on the supply and demand of water resources (Meyer, 2007: 19, 18). Water demand management (WDM) seeks to address the water supply dilemma exacerbated by rainfall variations in time and space (Agarwal et al., 2000:11). Meyer (2007: 19) indicates that the complex South African bulk water supply ranks as one of the most sophisticated in the world, where about R20 billion-worth of water resource infrastructure has been built by the state for users, many of who do not contribute in any way to the operational management cost incurred.

Chapter 2 of the National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) shows that for many years, the tendency has been to resort to constructing additional infrastructure where the demand for water has exceeded the supply. The strategy sees the management of the demand for water as a palpable option.
for reconciling imbalances between requirement and availability, and has been applied with great success by some users in the global community (DWAF, 2004b). Hence a need for cost recovery is highly necessary. The South African government did initiate an attempt to have private sector companies provide water and sanitation services – at a price – for the community. This decision was highly disputed by social institutions that saw attempts at privatisation of a common resource as discriminating against the poor and marginalised who would be the worst affected. The culture of non-payment for water has drawn the following comment from Holland (2005: 102) who points out:

People think they do not have to pay for water, because water is a gift from God. But God did not build treatment plants and networks or install the connections, so someone must pay for all of this.

Chapter 3 of the NWRS puts emphasis on water conservation and water demand management for efficient and effective use of water and the minimisation of loss and wastage of water (DWAF, 2004b). Therefore, it is necessary to charge for water services given that people tend to waste it if water is provided free of charge. This becomes pressing as population growth, rapid urbanisation, economic development and increasing household water demands will see water resources being fully allocated (Meyer, 2007: 18). To alleviate water shortages, trans-boundary and inter-catchment water transfers will become highly necessary (Kriel, 1976: 236; Potgieter, 2010: 5, 6). This is an imperative realised as early as in the 1960s with the establishment of the of water boards such as the Phalaborwa Water Board and the Rand Water Board. These initiatives were deemed necessary to ensure the survival of sprawling urban and industrial areas within the upper-Vaal catchment area, which generates almost 20% of the country's GDP (DWAF, 2004b: iii).

3.5.2 Cultivating a culture of water management in South Africa

Raising public awareness of water conditions in the country will cultivate a culture of water resources management. Swatuk (2005: 876) uses Jewi ë
(2002) to highlight the fact that South Africa’s water reform programme with its "command and control" approach to water resources management is by no means satisfactory when judged from a holistic ecosystem perspective, no matter how viable.

This view can be interpreted with due consideration of the apartheid era, when South African non-governmental organisations took an apolitical stance because they were not allowed to play an influential role in environmental issues (van Wyk et al., 2009: 2). As a result, South African civil society groups were not afforded enough space to cultivate a national environmental consciousness because most environmental decisions were the responsibility of government institutions. Hence van Wyk et al. (2009: 3) affirm that South African civil society has to rebuild an effective civic tradition and action-oriented approach to natural resource management. Thus far, there is still a long way to go to attain this IWRM ideal within the broader society.

3.5.2.1 Water governance in South Africa

The previous chapter indicated that water governance entails institutional interrelations in which role players from government and civic society can meet. These institutions ensure that environmental law is enforced; they also ensure that government fulfils its obligation to provide a healthy and a secure environment for livelihoods. The involvement of all these bodies in IWRM within a context of catchment management agencies and water user associations is indispensable. Through commitment to secure water security for the country, the South African government has put central legislative frameworks in place to direct the terrain of water governance. These include water management institutions, CMAs, WUAs, and water forums that keep industries in check. They ensure compliance with water legislation concerning water abstractions and the quality of effluent released into the catchment with due regard for multi-stakeholder interests. However, water users in agriculture, mining, heavy industry and learned activists still control these water institutions.

The South African government demonstrates its political will toward IWRM through a noble piece of legislation in the form of the National Water Act (NWA), No. 36 of 1998 (Stein, 2002: 114; Meyer, 2007: 21). The act is based on three key principles, i.e. equity of access; sustainability of use; and optimal utilisation (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 51).

The NWA also purports to enhance integration and participative decision-making by rural communities who have for so long been on the sidelines of decision-making. The act gives effect to the constitutional right of access to humans and ecosystems to have adequate water to sustain their health and ecological integrity. The national government is assigned the role of custodian of the national water resources (Postel, 2003:92; Gabru, 1995: 21). The foreword of the National Water Resource Strategy (DWAF, 2004b) states that the NWA has transformed the way water is controlled, moving away from a system of rights based on land ownership (the riparian system) to a system designed to allocate water equitably in the public interest.

The NWA further embraces an essential ethos of community participation in the various norms, procedures, and measures providing for community involvement and gender representation in water management institutions such as Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs). Furthermore, the NWA shifts the emphasis from the traditional approach of “supply management” concerned primarily with managing the supply of water through the building of dams, towards “demand management” which seeks to conserve the nation’s water resources by lessening demand through pricing mechanisms and other innovative means (Gabru, 1995: 22).


This act predominantly prioritises the rights of equitable, sustainable, and efficient access to basic potable water supply and sanitation necessary to ensure a healthy lifestyle (RSA, 1997: 10). The Water Services Act (WSA) gives municipalities the authority to take reasonable measures to administer
water services and sanitation, and further extends the responsibility to all spheres of government to work toward this goal within the confines of feasibility (RSA, 1997: 2, 12). In this stipulation, Gabru (1995: 23, 26) pinpointed the government’s intention to secure the right to access a basic water supply when people cannot pay. Every South African household is allocated 6,000 litres of water per month without charge.

c) The Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000

This legislation, within the South African IWRM process, embraces core principles, mechanisms and processes that bestow merit to the developing local government and empowers municipalities to move progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of communities and the provision of basic services to all people, specifically the poor and the previously disadvantaged (RSA, 2000: 2). The act makes provision for local municipalities to collect tariffs for service provision. It is evident that water and sanitation services are the responsibility of local government institutions as seen in section 73(1) which summons municipalities to guarantee that all members of the local community have access to at least the minimum level of basic municipal services (Gabru, 1995: 24). The credence of water as an economic good is thus visible in the Municipal Systems Act (MSA) while the authority to collect service tariffs for water harks back to a political tenet inherited from South Africa’s colonial past. It is this legislated authority to collect tariffs for the provision of water that has placed the greatest burden on the shoulders of the severely challenged local government system (Carrim, 2009).

3.5.2.2 Efforts for public participation in IWRM

Institutional development is already in place in terms of the water legislation discussed above. These institutions ought to ensure that broader public participation takes place within these establishments. In the South African present–future context, there is still a huge gap on environmentalism in the wider public. Civil society organisations, water service providers and WMAs do not seem to have a progressive and sustained national campaign to raise
consciousness on IWRM. Environmental interest groups and NGOs such as the Green Scorpions; Save the Vaal River Environment (SAVE); Water Institute of Southern Africa (WISA); Mvula Trust; and Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance (VEJA), have a pivotal role to play in the socialisation process. It would be a great advantage if these NGOs were to reach out to the black communities and raise awareness on water management and conservation, especially to inculcate a culture of responsible water use and sanitation. The CMAs and WUAs have been put in place by government and could fulfil government’s mandate by effecting a fundamental transformation in the water sector to heal transgressions of the past. These water management institutions are thus very sympathetic to government.

Cultural and racial cleavages are rife in water forums and are tilted towards dominant participation by prominent water users and land owners. Ideological battles between black and white farmer unions hamper efforts for a collective attempt to foster cordial working relationships and joint participation in water forums. The Department of Water Affairs and water service providers only give symbolic recognition to water conservation during the national water week, a public discourse on water that soon fades from society’s collective memory. There is therefore a lack if dialogue to develop a fundamental water culture in the broader South African society. Except few campaigns such as masibambane; working for water; Gcin’ amanzi, and water wise under the aegis of the Department of Water Affairs and water service providers, there is little research work to prove their success or otherwise in improving community dialogue on IWRM. Van Wyk et al. (2009: 1) observe that this failure in dialogue limits shared understanding among resource user groups. They maintain that information is not commonly shared and is sometimes deliberately hidden as users strive to gain the competitive edge in water allocations. It should be publicised that this tendency blocks an excellent opportunity for developing a fundamental change in the water culture in the present–future South African context. It has been established that failure to utilise this golden opportunity erodes the likelihood of a truly bottom-up
arrangement in society that reflects democratic participation and the creative resolution of water resource issues at the local level (van Wyk et al., 2009: 1).

3.5.3 Water demand management in South Africa

The National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) outlines substantial measures that are to be put in place under the direction of the minister in the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) to ensure efficient water resources management (RSA, 1998: 5). The NWA provides for five-yearly reviews of the NWRS to provide the opportunity to re-evaluate developments in the socio-economic sphere and to adopt approaches to water resources management in response to changing circumstances and needs. The development of the NWRS brings South Africa into full compliance with one of the first targets of the Johannesburg plan of action, adopted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, namely to develop a national water resources management plan (DWAF, 2004). The NWRS is an elaborate policy framework which sets out (to mention but a few), to:

- make provision for the establishment of water management areas and determine their borders;
- make estimates of present and future water requirements;
- devise principles relevant to water conservation and water demand management and;

The department of water affairs and forestry gives prominent recognition to environmental factors associated with IWRM. It posits that in addition, the management of water as a renewable natural resource must be carried out in a manner fully consistent with the broad environmental policy of government and within the framework of environmental legislation. In other words it must be implemented with reference to the National Environmental Management
Act, No. 107 of 1998, and those parts of the Environment Conservation Act, No. 73 of 1989, which have not yet been repealed by the more recent legislation (DWAF, 2004). The South African government should be commended for its attempts to adhere fully with the IWRM thus far. There is also evidence of institutional alignment to complement legislative changes made to implement IWRM, which seems to indicate that South Africa is prepared to allow more political space to citizens by establishing (at least) nineteen water management agencies (Warner, 2007: 13, 14).

The upper Vaal catchment area and the over-worked Vaal River system are ostensibly under pressure to maintain adequate potable water provision to support households and industrial activities (Midgley, 1976: 252) within the country’s economic hub (Gauteng), which relies heavily on what Tempelhoff et al. (2007: 108) refer to as “South Africa’s hardest working river”. South Africa provides an opportunity for private sector companies to play a role in the long-term viability of WDM through water boards such as Rand Water (Turton & Meissner, 2002: 41). This is a case of charging for a water supply service which ensures the sustainability of the resource (Agarwal et al., 2000: 41). There are also cases of the importation of water over long distances and trans-boundary water schemes throughout the country (Kriel, 1976: 238).

**Figure 6** below indicates present trans-boundary and catchment water transfers to areas that are prone to water scarcity.
Figure 6:  Water transfers in South Africa  http://soer.deat.gov.za/1517x3huVeJBOcl.img

The South African water policy (DWAF, 2004) views WDM in a broader sense, beyond reducing water use and wastage. It links socio-economic and environmental advantages to be gained from programmes designed to achieve sustained reductions in water use. These include firstly, cultivating a responsible attitude toward water as a scarce resource; secondly, empowering water users to understand the value of water; and thirdly, allocating water for competing economic uses and for the reserve; and fourthly, improving financial security for water institutions by reducing non-revenue demand linked to water wasted by non-paying consumers and unaccounted water leaks from supply and demand.

3.6 SUMMARY

This chapter provides an exposition on political cultural manifestations in the context of South Africa. As already seen, South Africa provides a variety of
political orientations notwithstanding that the historical past has a significant influence on these perceptions. South Africa shows a polarised political culture where class, race, and ethnicity feature prominently. IWRM efforts have been at institutional level where participation by the public, except those with vested interests in land and water, wield the most influence. As yet there is very little effort to attract the wider public to be aware of water resources management and conservation by civil society organisations and government institutions.

It has been highlighted that there is a distinct tendency towards government paranoia of the motives of civil society organisations. This is so rife that any efforts to enhance IWRM ideals at the local level have been utterly thwarted. Ethnic and racial cleavages also have a deep influence on the relationship between prominent institutions and NGOs in their efforts to promote environmentalism and water conservation. The language of water conservation is almost foreign in black communities; very few black communities in South Africa enjoy the luxury of water forums or participate in catchment management agencies.
CHAPTER FOUR
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MALUTI-A-PHOFUNG LOCAL MUNICIPALITY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Lategan (2008:81) indicates that scientific writing is not only a challenging part of one's research but is also a science in its own right. Joubert (2008: 66) similarly observed that the relevance of the research questions and instruments is as important as the scientific rigour of research design and method. It is against this background that this research attempts to follow a scientific pattern by citing academic evidence on the subject matter. An interview schedule was then compiled to address a selected list of appropriate questions. This chapter discusses the research methods implemented to gain information for analysis. The focus was to establish the extent of political culture and socialisation responses to integrated water resources management (IWRM) in Maluti-A-Phofung (M-A-P) local municipality, situated within the Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality.

Preceding chapters have drawn attention to political culture and socialisation, providing both a theoretical exposition of these concepts and a discussion of their relevance in the South African context. By investigating top-down and bottom-up glocal pressures, the researcher analysed political culture and socialisation responses. A historic view of political culture was visited to establish socio-political realities in a present–future perspective. The study highlights the global culture of IWRM that has been adopted by many developing countries, including South Africa.

The role of civic society organisations and other agents of political socialisation were explored and it was established that the public is on the sidelines of the decision-making process in public (political) and water management issues. This has fuelled anger as communities ravage local municipalities throughout the country in protest against poor service delivery.
Top-down influences linked to perceived neo-liberal policy frameworks also play a role in inflaming these protests. Political elites continue to harp on quixotic allegations of a "third force" driven by people opposed to governments' agenda of nation building.

South Africa is still suffering from a leprous identity crisis, with parochial political tendencies based on ethnic and racial loyalties. The white communities are better educated and resourced to pursue judicial channels to bring government institutions to account on poor service delivery. The black communities on the other hand, still see political protest as the best option. This chapter focuses on the Maluti-A-Phofung municipal area to test the arguments raised in previous chapters. It is proved that residents in this municipality have embraced a political culture of vigilance. This supposedly lethargic township was among the first in the eastern Free State to erupt in violent protest as a last resort of engagement with government institutions.

4.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN

Qualitative research methodology is the most relevant for the purposes of this study, principally because this method provides a well-rounded description of situations, settings, processes, relationships, systems, and people from their own frame of reference (Mouton & Marais, 1988: 163). It allows the researcher to verify certain assumptions or theories and develop theoretical perspectives about phenomena (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998: 7-8; Leedy & Ormrod 2005: 94). Furthermore, qualitative research methods enable the researcher to obtain first-hand knowledge of social life, unfiltered through operational definitions or rating scales (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998: 9).

Qualitative research methods are relevant to address the main assumptions and questions raised by this particular project. Joubert (2008: 66) maintained that the researcher must be concerned about the motivation of the client or research subject to provide valid data and to act on the conclusions of the research. This forms part of the reason for selecting this methodology. Another reason was the researcher's previous involvement in projects where
qualitative methods proved vital in providing a descriptive reality of phenomena within the selected theme.

4.2.1 Steps associated with the research design

The research process unfolds in the following order:

1) The research problem was finalised after a process of internal conference organised by the School of Basic Sciences where post-graduate students presented proposed research topics.

2) A review was made of relevant conceptual underpinnings, problem statement, research objectives, research questions, and the hypothesis, and research methodologies. The researcher finally came to a theme of choice for the research. 3) Throughout this peer review process the researcher was still exploring a scientific framework. The choice fell on an investigation of political-culture and socialisation theory. 4) The process of literature review confirmed the researcher's scientific paradigm for the proposed study. 5) Adequate academic materials enabled the researcher to evaluate the hypothesis and build a reference list to support arguments. 6) The research supervisor played a crucial role in ensuring ethical considerations were on track for the approval of the study.

The following schematic presentation Figure 7 shows a systematic flow of the research process in completion of the study.
4.2.2 Research methodology

This section highlights different research methods that were implemented to obtain information for the research questions and arguments that arose in this study.

4.2.2.1 Literature survey

In the process of compiling this research work, an in-depth review of literature was undertaken. Lategan (200: 82) has emphasised that identification of the best and most suitable literature on the topic is an important initial step. Access to such literature has been through research journals, books, institutional reports, newspaper articles, and internet sources. Literature for this research has been critically analysed in an attempt to satisfy the demands of the main research problem.
4.2.2.2 Semi-structured interviews

The researcher identified respondents within the study area who agreed to conduct interviews with the research team. The respondents were asked to react to questions posed in a semi-structured interview process and questionnaires comprised both open-ended and direct questions. Probing and posing questions became essential to reflect on earlier observations and theoretical orientations raised by the study (Frey & Fontana, 1991). The reason for using semi-structured interviews rests on the conviction that respondents' subjective reactions such as non-verbal communication, emotions, and tone of voice cannot be entirely captured through numerical variables. Judging these subtle reactions provided subject knowledge and insight and were a valuable aid to interpretation (Joubert, 2008: 67). Interviews were essential since they allowed the researcher to devise follow-up questions for greater clarity on some issues and to establish a credible representation of respondents' opinions and their conceptualisation of political culture, socialisation and integrated water resources management.

This study boasts interviews conducted with local government officials, ward councillors, community development workers, ordinary residents, business forums, and community activists to confirm the research questions and objectives. Criteria for choosing respondents depended on their involvement in the community. For the purposes of the research, a fieldwork excursion took place over a five-day period. In order to secure the commitment of the interviewees a number of steps were taken. Firstly, the researcher presented a brief explanation of the background and purpose of the study. Secondly, a previously compiled interview schedule provided direction. Thirdly, interviews were conducted with considerable success, the respondents were forthcoming and the interviews were conducted in a cordial manner. Fourthly, the researcher transcribed and validated the available material before making an analysis to compile the research report.

While on the excursion at least 20 interview sessions were held; i.e. 4 group interviews and 16 one-on-one interviews. It was possible for the researcher to
observe environmental conditions and to build an impression of the driving forces behind political behaviour. A friendly yet thoughtful rapport developed between the researcher and respondents. This allowed the researcher to understand their views rather than merely recording them. This research context typifies the qualitative scientific framework of symbolic interactionism (SI) made popular by Dewey and Mead. The SI technique links thinking with conversation; it maintains that people create their own social worlds through interaction (Huber, 1973: 275).

4.2.2.3 Group interviews

Frey and Fontana (1991) maintained that the group interview technique dates back to 1926 when it was used in research conducted by Emory Bogardus. Group interviews enable the researcher to explore the respondents' opinions and attitudes at another level in order to validate evidence gathered previously in one-on-one interviews. Group interviews are often a more efficient tool in the interpretation of a social or behavioural event. They also allow the researcher to act as a participant observer as events unfold and members interact with one another in a familiar setting - in this case the local shebeen which is a convivial meeting place for the Harrismith socio-economic forum. Group interviews also served a phenomenological and exploratory purpose in that the researcher became less involved, allowing respondents themselves to generate new ideas about their reactions, opinions and attitudes.

The researcher returned for a feedback session with the respondents to confirm the validity and presentation of their views after collecting, transcribing, and analysing the data. Their responses are featured in chapter 5 of this study. The researcher informed all respondents well ahead of time about the meeting via telephone communication and on request, invitations were then forwarded by e-mail stipulating the date, time, and venue. Nevertheless, the local government representative did not attend.
4.2.2.4 Questionnaire contents

Respondents were asked the following selected questions in a semi-structured interview process. This is a fraction of the questions that were drawn up to meet research goals and provide answers to the research questions raised in chapter one. These can be categorised in the following manner:

**Political dynamics:**

- How do you rate your local municipality?
- What is the nature of public participation and consultation?
- What informed the community to opt for protest rather than other forms of involvement?
- How is the relationship between local government and civil society?
- What type of political culture do you think exists in M-A-P?
- What was the nature of concerns raised in the petitions?
- What do you think are the reasons for violent protests?
- Informal settlements do not receive municipal services, why is this the case?
- Do the ward committee members know and execute their responsibilities?
  - Did ward committees receive any training?
- Why has the municipality failed to respond positively to community concerns?
- Are there any plans to relocate squatter settlements?
Sanitation and water service:

- How many systems are currently operating?
- How is the waste water system holding up?
- Are there plans to improve the capacity of the water plants?
- How many people are required to run the water plants?
- What is the quality of effluent released into the river system?
- How is the drinking water quality in the area?
- Do you know of any drinking water contamination reports in the area?
- Do you pay for your water services?
- How was water allocation from the previous government to the present?
- What is the state of water infrastructure?
- Where does M-A-P receive its water?
- Are there community water programmes in the area?
- Who provides the household water supply for the community?
- How is the state of the water treatment plant and reservoirs in the area?
- Is there a water forum in the area?
- Does the water service provider inform you before water shutdown?
- How do you survive during water shutdowns?
- How is the quality of sanitation in the area?
4.2.2.5 Biographical description of respondents

The following biographical balance was used for the research fieldwork excursion and provides an understanding of the spread of respondents.

Table 1: Biographical description of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BIOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community activists</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community development forums</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organisations (ANC)</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Forum</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials in the water services</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward councillors</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent water consultants</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The School</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researcher made use of the snowball sampling method to contact other respondents whose input in the study was invaluable. This method is described as a “technique for finding research respondents. One respondent gives the researcher the name of another respondent, who in turn provides the name of a third and so on” (Vogt, 2005) cited in (Kowald et al., 2009: 9). It is based on the fact that respondent networks connect to each other and allows the researcher to gain a better picture of their social topology (Kowald, et al., 2009: 8). It is the ideal method for use when conducting qualitative
research because it offers real benefits for studies that want to access difficult-to-reach or hidden populations (Atkinson & Flint, 2001).

4.2.2.6 Limitations of the study

It needs to be placed on record that the researcher did encounter some difficulties with regard to the cooperation of the local government authorities. They were somewhat reluctant to participate, notwithstanding, telephone and e-mail communication to arrange interviews. The researcher initially gained the impression that the municipal mayor and other officials would make themselves available for interviews, but several telephone calls prior to the mutually agreed day for the interview, it became clear that the well-laid plans had fallen through. It was only on the last day of the fieldwork, when the research team drove to Maluti-A-Phofung municipal offices that it was agreed to “find someone” to interview. After thirty minutes delay, a local councillor, the MMC responsible for municipal infrastructures agreed to meet the research team at the nearby Afri-Classic Guesthouse.

4.2.2.7 Data analysis

The process of data analysis involved working with recoded transcripts and listening to audio files to gain a well-rounded impression of the respondents’ views. Data analysis is integral to qualitative data analysis (Rothmann, 2009: 134). The researcher was fully committed to present an accurate account of the study area and respondents’ views on political culture and socialisation. Unfounded generalisations were avoided by listening (and taking into account) “both sides of the story” if differences of opinion arose. Central themes of the study were political culture, political socialisation, and Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and these foci guided discussions with the respondents. The research theme certainly proved to be relevant in the Maluti-A-Phofung municipal area. Top-down and bottom-up decision making approaches, as highlighted in earlier chapters, were also given adequate coverage and international influences in this regard were identified as impacting on South Africa’s political culture.
4.2.2.8 Ethical considerations

The researcher had been introduced to the principle of voluntary consent while serving in fieldwork projects for the university’s niche area of the Cultural Dynamics of Water (CuDyWat). It has been an inalienable ethos for this research work. Respondents were asked whether they would be prepared to give their consent to participate in the study. They were neither ambushed nor pressurised to take part. The researcher carefully explained the rationale of the study to each respondent before an interview. He also informed his respondents about the possible longer-term benefits of the research and explained that a copy of the final report would be made available in the community library for residents to peruse. Confidentiality also received careful attention, but given that respondents regard this study as a matter of public interest, some gave permission for their names to be featured.

4.3 MALUTI-A-PHOFUNG MUNICIPAL AREA

Maluti-A-Phofung municipality is a local municipal jurisdiction situated in the eastern part of the Free State province, South Africa, and is in the Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality. The former homeland of QwaQwa and an exclusively white residential area of Harrismith (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 5) were integrated into one municipal district during a fundamental legislative overhaul. Smith and Fakir observed that this created a situation where notions of a responsible administration and the demands of delivering on the principle of the “right to water” for all are still novel concepts. Hence, local authorities have chosen to collaborate with external operators in order to avoid the virtual collapse of the delivery of essential services.

This process of post-1994 transition on municipal level began with the introduction of Local Government Transition Act of 1993; followed by the 1998 developmental local government white paper, which provided a code of conduct for councillors. Integrated development plans (IDPs) and a variety of other measures were then put in place. The last stroke of legislative innovations was a new round of re-demarcations of municipal boundaries.
This done, the first fully democratic local government elections were held in the year 2000 (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 4-5).

This particular municipal area came to mind when the researcher sought to understand the culture behind IWRM and public perceptions toward government decisions on the allocation of water resources and service delivery. The town of Harrismith, together with a township called Intabazwe, both fall in Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality where local authorities experimented with a public/public partnership (PUP) under the provisions of section 19(2) of the Water Services Act as the country’s second case study. Local authorities decided to contract water services to a water board, namely, Rand Water and the transitional representative councils of Mabopane, Garankuwa, and Winterfeldt (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 4).

Maluti-A-Phofung (FS, 194) is one of the largest local municipalities in the Thabo Mofutsanyane District, and was labelled the “poorest municipality in the Free State” by the then President Thabo Mbeki in 2001 (DPLG, 2007: 7). The municipality has thus been identified as a presidential rural node earmarked for special attention. M-A-P municipality boasts an estimated population of 360,787 people, and covers an area of 4,421 km². More than 82.5% of the population lives below the poverty line, earning less than R19 200 per annum (DPLG 2005: 4). It was decided to consolidate the municipality when it was established that there was a dire lack of managerial and business skills in both the public and private sectors (DPLG, 2005: 6).

The extent of the Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality, located in the Eastern Free State province, South Africa, is shown in the map below.
4.4 RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS AND FINDINGS

Respondents’ views have been categorised into groups that correspond roughly to the role they play in society represent. This allows comparative observation on similarities and considerable differences in perceptions. The focus of this chapter (as discussed above) is to present the empirical research findings of an examination carried out to determine the political culture and socialisation responses to integrated water resources management in the Maluti-A-Phofung municipal area.
4.4.1 Response from community activists

4.4.1.1 Political culture and socialisation

The South African elite political culture, as indicated in chapter 2, applies in the Harrismith/Intabazwe area. Community activists maintain that since the year 2004, one cannot separate the municipal official from the ANC member. As one of the respondents put it: “This is what still prevails and while the protest, among others, was to raise attention on such things, protests seem an effective strategy and will remain such” (pers. comm., Cebekulu. 20100323). As for a culture of careerism, political activists in the Harrismith/Intabazwe area regard this as the local government's “divide and rule attitude” to silence the leaders by dangling carrots before them. Local authorities, they said, dealt with leadership and did not address issues as such. Community activists lament that many of the comrades were absorbed into waste removal and the traffic services. This is seen as a deliberate intention to weaken the activist group rather than communicate in good faith (pers. comm., Cebekulu, Radebe & Mashiloane. 20100323).

Previous chapters showed that government’s attitude of using force and repression against dissent fuels more violent reactions from the masses. Confirmation of this standpoint leads to Harrismith/Intabazwe where the socialisation of violent protest occurred when the state deployed the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to act against community activists. Preceding chapters gave evidence of civil society organisations using local and global media to put pressure on the system. Similarly, Harrismith/Intabazwe activists capitalised on these media agents when taking part in protest marches in 2009, when a German media channel, ARD, was invited to the area.

4.4.1.2 Top-down approach and violent protests

The government’s perceived failure to respond to civil society organisations remains evident in comments made by respondents. Some refer to attempts to engage government through negotiations from as early as 2003. They also invited the ANC and the local municipal officials but they declined to attend.
Although the ANC and other political parties did indeed attend, the meeting was not a success. Despite several protest marches to inform local government officials about development issues in the Harrismith area, the municipality did not respond; all they did was to make empty promises. The respondent said: “The municipality until today, still holds an attitude of not responding to our concerns, hence N3 part 1 (2004) and N3 part 2 (2009) took place” (pers. comm., Cebekeulu. 20100323). “N3 part 1 and N3 part 2” refer to violent protest marches staged along the national highway (the N3) in an attempt to secure the attention of provincial and national government structures. The culmination of unfulfilled grievances and empty promises fuelled mass protest action in the area. Respondents indicate the negative influence of top-down approaches on violent protests in the municipal area: “N3 is one important road linking the interior of the country to the coast, so you can imagine when you close it: everybody is going to pay attention” (pers. comm., Cebekeulu, Radebe, & Mashiloane. 20100323).

A respondent who pointed to top-down influences by government, indicates “we will still be around to ensure that socio economic developments do come to our area and that it does not come by helicopter [initiated by people from somewhere other than Harrismith]. Government is trying to suppress us as activists but we are doing this in good faith. They do not want to see eye to eye with us” (pers. comm., Cebekeulu. 20100323).

Let us now observe a point made by community activists who took to the streets in protest against the government’s top-down penchants (pers. comm., Greater Harrismith Socio-economic Development Forum (previously known as Greater Harrismith Concerned Group. 20100323).

Their 2004 grievances/demands were identified as follows (N3 part 1):

- De-link from the Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality

This is due to stagnant service delivery process in our area; economic developments are mainly centered on QwaQwa. A petition on this was signed by a majority of Intabazwe residents.
• Recalling of all serving councillors

• Abolition of the DBSA N3 bypass route

This will have negative impacts on the economic livelihoods of our area and leave Harrismith as a ghost town.

• Review the job selection criteria in M-A-P local municipality polluted by the culture of political appointments

• Review tender selection which is biased in favour of QwaQwa and political cronies

• Report on projects implemented by the M-A-P local municipality

Timeline leading up to 16 October 2009 protests (N3 part 2)

On 17 January 2009 we re-visited the 2004 issues that were still outstanding, we invited the ANC branch executive committee structures, only one come to the meeting, since they were not in good standing [only the secretary attended our meeting].

On 18 January 2009 we had the first public roadshow where we discussed issues affecting the community and living conditions in Harrismith (Intabazwe), Tshiame A & B.

Then on 22 February 2009 one ANC provincial executive committee member (Joyce) was assigned to deal with the political dilemma in Harrismith. She interrogated us with intent to establish whether we were ANC, DA, IFP, or COPE members.

On 28 February 2009 we had Ace Makgashule, and Tate Makgwe in a meeting at Naledi Hall (Harrismith). We discussed and explained that the meeting on the 22nd was a talk show where nothing fruitful was achieved.

On 5 March 2009 the district mayor, the local manager, and regional branches requested an audience with us to discuss our concerns and there a request
was made to make him premier. We then did as requested and suspended all our campaigns.

Then 26 May 2009 saw the new administration in office – we were invited to Thabo Mofutsanyane District offices by the department of provincial and local government (DPLG), the mayoral committee (Mayco), and heads of departments of cooperative governance. The meeting was a response to threats that we were going to have a march on 29 May 2009 and this was not just a threat! It was going to happen as a matter of fact, given their overdue silence to our requests. Resolutions were made based on a time line as follows:

- Abolishment of the DBSA N3 bypass and update on the logistic hub [it was declared a long-term issue]
- Feedback from the demarcation board within 14 days
- Feedback from the tender board within 14 days

On 26 May 2009 we called an urgent public meeting to stop and cancel the march. We were hopeful that the resolutions were binding. We did not march on 29 May, but none of the resolutions materialised as well.

Then on 7 August 2009 we organised a march, and applied as per legal requirements. A notice was sent to the authorities but declined. We then went to the magistrate court to overrule the decision because ours was a peaceful protest with intent.

On 17 August 2009 we marched under police supervision to the Harrismith chambers and for two hours no one came to receive our memorandum. Until some junior official came to receive it and gave a (7) seven day period for the response.

Then 19 August 2009 saw a delegation from Bloemfontein come on a factfinding mission and to discuss the memorandum.
On 29 August 2009 the MEC came to meet the top five of the forum, perhaps on the personal fact finding mission. But nothing materialised after this meeting.

Hence on 7 October 2009 we served another notice to march given that no one was willing to respond to our concerns. The response later came from the M-A-P municipal manager that the notice has been forwarded to the premiers' office.

On 10 October 2009 we received a telephone call from an official at the municipal offices calling us for a meeting on 13 October 2009. But the agenda was not made known to us. After several attempts, we failed to receive any response.

Then on 15 October 2009 we sent invitation letters to different stakeholders to partake in the march, they tried to stop us and sent the police to negotiate with us. We agreed on a peaceful march, where the national highways N3 and N5 were targeted. Prior to the march, we established communication with the provincial offices and we indicated that we were willing to stop the protest, only if something could “magically happen”. But all attempts had failed since we have been negotiating for so long.

On 16 October 2009 at 6am in the morning while going to the gathering point, we found roads barricaded with burning tyres – we do not know where they came from. Then the police came and the policeman (Mr Lekoleana) gave us three minutes to disperse. The German media channel ARD was present at the scene, while we were trying to address people to disperse, the policeman gave permission for the cops to shoot. They used live ammunition. We did not intend for the situation to get out of hand, but the police due to their carelessness exacerbated the situation.

4.4.1.3 IWRM

The researcher did not find much discussion on IWRM from this group. However, he was sent to a local primary school to observe initiatives on water
resources. Projects aimed at removing invasive plants at the river appear to be the only insights on IWRM in the municipal area.

4.4.2 Response from community development organisations

4.4.2.1 Political culture and socialisation

Community development organisations are exasperated about the current tendency of the elite culture being negative towards community development organisations and their endeavours. Several respondents indicated that the paranoia that afflicts the local municipality is so bad that organisations in the M-A-P municipal area are without political support to propagate relevant developmental issues. On the contrary, the elite hold that these initiatives put wind to the fires of protest against the municipality. Instead of cooperation from political actors, these development organisations were warned not to step on the toes of the municipality (pers. comm., Rhudzani & Mosikili, 20100326). The culture of name-calling was discussed in chapter 2. M-A-P local municipality exhibits this trend too. Organisations that take an active role to educate people are labelled meddlesome “trouble makers” (pers. comm., Cebekulu, Radebe, & Mashiloane, 20100323). Youth organisations are included in this negative criticism despite their valiant efforts to improve lives in the community. They point out that it is rather sad that politicians tend to visit on the eve of the elections – afterwards they are virtually inaccessible (pers. comm., Ndaba, 20100326).

4.4.2.2 Top-down approach and violent protests

The municipality is a “hard nut to crack” and allegedly withholds useful information from the people. One organisation arranged a training workshop jointly with the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) for councillors and ward committees in 2006. According to Rudzani and Mosikili the project was successful. The problem appears to be the paranoia of the M-A-P authorities who declared that such information evokes civil disobedience. Furthermore, another respondent claimed that M-A-P did not submit the final budget for 2009/2010 and that planning for the IDP is very
general, ignoring details about projects and their implementation. The Qholaqhwe Advice Centre as a community-based organisation was not included in the planning for the IDP (pers. comm., Rhudzani & Mosikili. 20100326).

Moloi, Mosikili & Moloi (pers. comm., 20100325) indicate that activists raised the issue of lack of infrastructure in Harrismith, a justifiable grievance. However, when they demanded that councillors resign on allegations that they were siphoning off funds from government coffers, their unfounded claims merely indicated that they did not understand the implications of the budget nor the fact that councillors do not manage municipal finances.

4.4.2.3 IWRM

In 1973, the region experienced a water scarcity due to its situation in a rocky terrain. This was despite there being many nearby dams (Sterkfontein, Fikapatso and Metsimatsho dams). Where water shortage became a problem, for example in the year 2003, the municipality had the water company run a campaign on water education and people were encouraged to use water more efficiently (pers. comm., Moloi, Mosikili, & Moloi. 20100325). The water supply cut affected home-based services negatively. For example terminally ill patients and those with chronic illnesses rely on water to take medication. Furthermore, respondents indicated that the municipality does not generate much revenue on water services because many residents are indigent. But the municipality does not make any effort to recover money from those who can indeed afford to pay for water, such as teachers.

IWRM and politicisation appear to reign supreme in the M-A-P municipal area. Respondents from community development organisations feel that IWRM is simply not happening. The local municipality is always planning for immediate concerns in an effort to win votes. It is alleged that M-A-P political actors even encouraged people to make their own water connections to the main water systems! (pers. comm., Rhudzani & Mosikili. 20100326). The agricultural sector and traditional leaders are virtually excluded from water resource
planning. In order to reduce the impact of water scarcity, Qholaqhwe Advice Centre attempts to engage with the municipality, especially about water issues in the informal and rural settlements of the municipality.

Water leaks are left unattended and the perception that water is free makes people careless in its use. MAP Water (Pty) Ltd, a water company set up in M-A-P municipality 2005/6 (see below) did hold a radio campaign the week before the interviews were held. This was probably because of the water week (pers. comm., Ndaba, 20100326). The advice centre conducted its own base land survey on water problems and the availability of ground water. The DWA and M-A-P municipality were sent the findings of the survey in February 2010 but is still waiting for feedback from the DWA. Another goal of this survey is to help the municipality adhere to the Millennium Goals set by the UN to provide all households with potable water by 2015.

Rhudzani and Mosikili (pers. comm., 20100326) confirm that Qholaqhwe Advice Centre established a water committee in 2003. However, there is a minimal platform for the water committee because ward councillors insist on playing the major role. The municipality never really took ownership of this project, however, so their participation in this committee is also minimal. The water committee is supposed to monitor water management and provide public training to fix water leaks in the community.

As far as sanitation goes, community organisations believe that water services are generally good. They feel that families dealing with rampant illness need more water than other households so argue for exemptions on water bills for these households.

4.4.3 Response from political organisations

4.4.3.1 Political culture and socialisation

Harrismith/Intabazwe political culture presents itself along parochial lines as discussed in chapter 2. The local print media, the Harrismith Chronicle, serves the interests of white communities, and there is a vast communication gap
between them and the M-A-P municipality (pers. comm., Motaung. 20100325). Motaung's evaluative orientations suggest that community activists are people with business interests who use community needs for own benefit. He says: "They sit at business meetings with white people and attract financial investments to the township under the guise of the DA" (pers. comm., Motaung. 20100325).

A culture of careerism is similarly confirmed by Motaung (pers. comm., 20100325). He argues that that QwaQwa receives better services provision than Harrismith and Intabazwe. Even job opportunities are skewed in favour of those in QwaQwa which is perceived as a nodal point. These matters were raised with the ANC at regional level but ended as a debate issue – and no response has since been received. The ANC used the recruiter pack method whereby if one was found to be a menace, s/he would be denied the expected job opportunity, hence many people remained silent on development issues. Motaung postulates that in light of activists' intentions, the ANCYL decided not to associate with them. Many of these are people who left the M-A-P area to seek greener pastures elsewhere. When they returned they expected to be provided with jobs and when these were not forthcoming, despite appeals to the ANC, BEC and the PEC, they joined the ranks of community activists.

4.4.3.2 Top-down approach and violent protests

Motaung (pers. comm., 20100325) posits that people do not attend public meetings. If their particular matters of interest are not raised or discussed, they do not attend further meetings. Those who are unemployed do not by and large attend such meetings, even if employment opportunities are made available there. Motaung also indicates that people in the community have not been educated on IDP processes and there is no clarity at all on the nature of participation.

When consultation meetings are convened, people confuse these with an opportunity to raise complaints rather than to make contributions to the IDP or budget issues. With regard to the 2004 protests, Motaung was among the
people who orchestrated the entire show, together with a group of activists. He maintains that the local municipality will not be established in the Harrismith area (i.e. there will be de-linking) to fulfill a political agenda rather than the interests of the people.

4.4.3.3 IWRM

Motaung (pers. comm., 20100325) provides insight on community awareness of water resources management in the area. He avers that various groups in the municipal area did not receive their water allocation. Many people felt that they were being denied access to water. The MAP Water project to install tricklers was not properly communicated to the community. Amanziwethu cut off the water supply when people used more than 6 kiloliters and had not paid for the rest. Motaung further indicates that communication was very poor and the community was not adequately engaged with the water service provider. The executive mayor did not respond to public demands for clarity on water issues.

There are again clear indications of a deficient political will as far as MAP Water resources management and development are concerned. Motaung points out that requests were made to the water service provider to host a community campaign to educate the community on water meter readings. The plan was to include many unemployed youth in the programme but nothing was done. It seems therefore that political will is absent in terms of IWRM and developments in the area.

4.4.4 Response from the Business Forum

The Harrismith Business Forum is non-political and solely dedicated to improving the economic environment for business to grow, and to help the community. A chairperson of a socio-economic development forum at Intabazwe serves on their committee. This is ostensibly to indicate the forum's interest in the welfare of previously disadvantaged communities.
4.4.4.1 Political culture and socialisation

Residents in the M-A-P municipal area resort to making their voices heard through protests, because they see these as being the last avenue of engagement after all other methods of communication with the local authorities have been exhausted (pers. comm., De Beer & Van Tonder. 20100323). De Beer and Van Tonder maintain that a decision to protest finds justification because of poor living conditions that township residents continue to endure, including bad management of infrastructure and increasing unemployment. People expect government to bring business opportunities to the area, but by now, poor management of infrastructure, the shoddy condition of roads and the lack of aesthetic beauty in the city centre flout business interests (pers. comm., De Beer & Van Tonder. 20100323). These two respondents sympathise with residents in the informal settlements: “If you consider the water and housing infrastructure in that area, conditions are purely frustrating. I get frustrated over a bust water pipe that gets fixed within hours, now if I had to live in hardship as those people do, I would also fight.”

4.4.4.2 Top-down approach and violent protests

The available body of literature and arguments raised in chapter 2 about unmet promises and their influence on eliciting a violent reaction find resonance in the Harrismith/Intabazwe area. Evaluations by De Beer and Van Tonder on the dealings of the ANC Free State premier, Ace Makgashule, led them to maintain that the situation in Intabazwe is shocking. Many promises have been made but there has been no satisfactory output thus far (pers. comm., De Beer & Van Tonder. 20100323). The Business Forum has been through “negotiation upon negotiation to no avail from the system”. Members of the business community even financed an initiative to put rubbish bins in the township but the municipality would not play its part, complaining: “We even have to empty those bins again!” The premier is aware of such efforts in the area but the communication lines are now closed between the municipality and the business forum. De Beer and Van Tonder (pers. comm., 2010323) are growing impatient, saying “We have been through enough negotiations
and now we may decide to take the gloves off”. They confirm that mass protest has become a way of speaking, and admit that frustration is the major cause of these conflicts. The business forum is adamant that during violent protest activities such as those that include blocking the N3 highway, business is not compromised.

4.4.4.3 IWRM

As to the effect of water on business, it is confirmed that water supply cuts affect business negatively. A factory in the township of Tshiame had to manage for 13 days without water with buses ferrying water to the factory. But the water quality is reportedly good: “We are better than other areas in the country.” The business forum is aware that people in the informal parts of Intabazwe are living under difficult circumstances. They have to walk 100 meters to collect water and the taps are too low for comfort. The new municipal manager lives in Harrismith and at least he understands the challenges the residents are facing (pers. comm., De Beer & Van Tonder. 20100323).

The forum hosted a river cleanup campaign but the M-A-P municipality lacked supervision capacity and structures to take the initiative any further. Political will from government is noticeably lacking and is highly necessary to educate the community about water challenges. But there has to be support from the top to entrench a culture of responsibility (pers. comm., De Beer & Van Tonder. 20100323).

From the business forum we realise that service payment is not a matter of major concern, but that the shockingly bad management is unacceptable. De Beer and Van Tonder (pers. comm., 20100323) indicate that management of fees for water and electricity are a shambles, prices and units are inflated and communication with the officials does not assist at all. Such ineffective management affects the entire town but no one seems interested in complaining. The respondents claim to have toyed with the idea of creating a rate payers forum but have refrained from doing so because “we want to
remain as apolitical as possible”. They go on to say: “We do not want to create a parallel municipality nor oppose the M-A-P local municipality, on the contrary we would like to work with them to fight the challenges that impede business in the area.”

4.4.5 Response from government officials in the water sector

4.4.5.1 Top-down approach and violent protests

Political influences are prominent in MAP Water dealings and it seems that the municipality will absorb MAP Water into its fold although MAP Water officials are uncertain whether this will happen, or if it will remain a separate entity. Since 2009 political influences have limited MAP Water managers from exercising autonomy over projects that amount to more than R120 000 per annum (pers. comm., Emmenes & Gamede. 20100325). For major projects, the municipality handles procurement processes on their behalf through its procurement procedures where the approval for all transactions must first go to the municipal council, adding to the bureaucratic red tape (pers. comm., Emmenes & Gamede. 20100325). This delay hampers MAP Water’s plans and delays the completion of their projects. Mayher et al. (2009: 13, 22-23) confirm this political intervention in MAP Water’s management processes.

MAP Water runs few strategies that promote public education but they do have a customer care service that educates people about water. The most important focus area is to teach the public how to use the sewage system because blockages have increased recently. Education projects have slowed down due to extensive budget limitations imposed and MAP Water does not have enough service vehicles for public education.

4.4.5.2 IWRM

After 1994, the old QwaQwa homeland disappeared and was integrated into the Free State province. The then Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) became the custodian of the water resources in the area until the
municipality had the capacity to control its water (pers. comm., Emmenes & Gamede. 20100325).

These Institutional changes in the M-A-P municipal area are ample proof of South Africa's culture of transformation. From the year 1999 two water boards (Rand Water and Sedibeng Water) were operating within a single jurisdiction area. This, to put it bluntly, was a mess; they had to manage water and sanitation services for M-A-P municipal area. In 2005/6 water and sanitation services were transferred once again when MAP Water (Pty) Ltd was established (pers. comm., Emmenes & Gamede. 20100325). This followed a tender process to establish a company (a water management entity) with M-A-P municipality as the major shareholder. A French-based company, Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (WSSA) received the mandate to provide training for MAP Water's management team. WSSA also had the responsibility of seeing to the revenue collection for water and sanitation (pers. comm., Emmenes & Gamede. 20100325).

Other contractors took meter readings and compiled water cut-off lists for MAP Water. WSSA brought commercial managers, a CEO and an operations manager to oversee the transfer period because the contract with the M-A-P municipality was due to expire. Within a period of three years, they were supposed to identify and train people to take over from them. The municipality then stated that it would appoint these people on a permanent basis. The three years have not yet expired but the municipality and WSSA must now clarify the new terms of their relationship in the near future. Currently, no indication has been given of what is to happen when the contract expires (pers. comm., Emmenes & Gamede. 20100325).

Cooperative governance is a plague. MAP Water remains out of the loop. Respondents believe that development plans will have an impact on water related services. It is frustrating and worrisome situations to have MAP Water remain poorly informed about plans made by other departments.
4.4.6 Response from ward councillors

4.4.6.1 Political culture and socialisation

The role of the media as an opinion shaper finds resonance in Harrismith. Tshabalala (pers. comm., 20100326) maintains that the local newspaper (Harrismith Chronicle) has ulterior motives and is not committed to publish important and positive news about government: "We invited them once on a tour to see the developments and where government money had been spent – but they did not publish this, although other newspapers from outside Harrismith did."

According to Tshabalala (pers. comm., 20100326), Harrismith/Intabazwe residents have a culture of vigilance; Intabazwe was the first township in the country to eradicate the bucket system in about 1998. This culture of political vigilance (vibrancy) has existed ever since. Kleynhans (pers. comm., 20100323) maintains that the municipality is closely aligned to the ruling party, and this is borne out in the appointments right from the executive to the man on the street – all are political. Furthermore, capacity is very deficient within the municipality. At first glance, elements of socialisation in the IWRM aspect of water culture and the chances of achieving cost recovery seem highly inadequate in the M-A-P municipal area.

The concerned group is just a group of people demanding the attention of the government. They bypassed the M-A-P council and went straight to the province. In addition, they abused the good intentions of the provincial government. These people had previously left Harrismith to seek employment elsewhere in the country. Now they expect the municipality to provide them with employment. The fact that there has been such a long period of quiet since the 2004 protests indicates that there was nothing much to protest about. It seems suspicious that protests erupted in the lead-up to elections (pers. comm., Tshabalala. 20100326).
The Harrismith Business Forum is a noble idea but according to Mr Tshabalala, seems to have gone awry. He questions their motives and their bypassing of the municipality to meet the provincial government:

This was to serve their business interests. They want to bypass the local government to later dictate to the local government with the backing of the provincial offices. And the concerned residents are used by this forum supported by the DA without any respect to honour government protocol (pers. comm., Tshabalala. 20100326).

He concludes with an assertion that to change such a culture will require the ANC and other role players through education and feels that political parties should do these themselves. He thinks that the president should visit places like M-A-P more often, not only responding when tyres are burning, saying: “Government will not respond immediately as tyres burn; we will come on our own terms” (pers. comm., Tshabalala. 20100326).

4.4.6.2 Top-down approach and violent protests

Public education on proper channels of consultation is unlikely; this would allegedly be giving people “ammunition”. The argument is that it is unwise to allow people to be too informed – you will then not be able to control them. You do not want to give “ammunition” to the people (pers. comm., Kleynhans. 20100323). Alternatively, Tshabalala (pers. comm., 20100326) avers that the feeling is if the municipality does not offer job opportunities nor discuss tangible benefits the community is less inclined to participate in public meetings. Consultations with the public for participation in the IDP process are imperative for the municipality, and the municipality must provide an adequate platform for the public to partake. This notion that protests are an instrument of the opposition using the community to promote anarchy must be eradicated.
4.4.6.3 IWRM

While there are no visible water pollution challenges in the M-A-P municipal area, the researcher identified that there are many holes in the relationship between the political actors, officials, and the public at large. Indeed, IWRM is not given much consideration. As far as the government is concerned as long as the public has potable water the leadership is satisfied. Aspects of water demand management seem to deserve priority on local council agenda only when there are developments in the pipeline (pers. comm., Kleynhans. 20100323). Smith and Fakir (2003:27) confirm this. This indicates that IWRM does not generally feature as an item of discussion in local chambers.

But concerns are expressed about surrendering MAP Water services to the municipality. The feeling is that service delivery will deteriorate and the municipality will not pursue cost recovery because failure to do so will secure votes in the election. According to Kleynhans; “Rate payments are unlikely to be encouraged in the townships, this will compromise the votes gained during elections” (pers. comm., Kleynhans. 20100323). She further maintains that prospects of MAP Water’s incorporation into M-A-P local municipality will not be a positive move. The municipality’s desire to maintain control over resources has more disadvantages than advantages. Smith and Fakir (2003:27-28) allude to political interferences in the water resources management in MA-A-P that engender political patronage with alliances and loyalties awarded compensation at the expense of improving performance to upgrade services to the poor. Respondents indicate that MAP Water has reached “blue drop” Drinking water quality) status; they should now aspire for “green drop” (Waste water quality) status.

4.4.7 Response from the independent consultants

4.4.7.1 Top-down approach and violent protests

As a self-governing water entity, MAP Water has provided satisfactory services to the community despite shortage in capacity. The contract with WSSA might, however, see the entity integrated into the M-A-P local
municipality. This raises concerns on whether MAP Water will continue with its good service delivery without hindrance by political interference and delayed procurement processes. MAP Water is now hanging on by a thin thread (pers. comm., Van Reenen & Burger. 20100323). Burger and Van Reenen further argue that DWA is acting as the watchdog on water standards given its existing capacity. If the few long-serving officials resign, things will be in chaos and especially the Vaal Catchment. On local level, M-A-P local municipality does not have strong institutional capacity and relies on consultants to manage water resources. It frankly does not have the ability to review consultants’ suggested plans and strategies on the implementation of projects.

4.4.7.2 IWRM

The sewage works is maintained by MAP Water, but does not have enough capacity to do so itself so the services of an engineering consultant company are employed. Burger indicates that the sewage network needs a technological upgrade and the size of the plant should be extended to be able to cope with the growing population. The sewage works capacity is already working at 100 per cent capacity to service the present numbers. Increased population will definitely compromise its ability to maintain the required water standards on effluent quality released back into the river systems. It is on record that Harrismith does not currently experience significant water quality problems —for now. It seems that because there are relatively few industries in the M-A-P local area, the water quality is very good and people receive better water services compared to other areas in the country. The only challenge is sewage blockages in the townships due to population growth that overload the system.

4.4.8 Response from residents

4.4.8.1 Political culture and socialisation

One respondent indicates that white residents in Harrismith are desperate and feel helpless at the run-down sight and general decay in the town and
surroundings. So much so, that they are not motivated to do anything linked with local governance. He says: "I was asked to become a member of the Harrismith forum, but I declined" (pers. comm., Nel. 20100323). This respondent sympathises with township residents who have no other choice but to protest against service delivery and agreed that if he had to live in similar conditions, he would fight as well, because contacting municipal officials is virtually useless and they are hard to reach (pers. comm., Nel. 20100323; Eckard & Du Plessis. 20100325).

4.4.8.2 Top-down approach and violent protests

A respondent argued that the centralising move to incorporate MAP Water into the municipality illustrates the power-mongering nature of the management of the municipality (pers. comm., van Niekerk.20100323). Van Niekerk is equally concerned about the relationship between the Harrismith business forum and the premier of the Free State, Mr Ace Makgashule. The politicisation of the forum clouds the initial purpose for its establishment, i.e. to create a platform to voice concerns about the management of the town. Whenever such concerns are voiced, the management of the forum pacifies the people and asks them to "look at the bigger picture". Van Niekerk avers that this prevents members from taking ownership of the forum. He also feels that lack of agreement on certain forum practices often means that decisive action is not taken.

4.4.8.3 IWRM

As a point of departure we need to affirm that residents are generally satisfied with the quality of drinking water. The water is very clean and there have thus far, not been any complaints of an outbreak of disease or other side-effects that can be traced objectively to human water intake (pers. comm., Eckard, & du Plessis, 20100325; Radebe, & Mashiloane. 20100323). There was, however, an occasion when water quality was rather suspicious and a rumour made the rounds in the community that a human body had been thrown into the reservoir, but this allegation remains unconfirmed (pers. comm., Radebe,
& Mashiloane. 20100323). Residents are concerned about water leaks, but although there is a hotline number to report these cases but very few people make use of this (pers. comm., Ndaba. 20100326).

One respondent believes that the most significant change in water provision in Harrismith was the agreement to provide free water to inhabitants of the town and surrounding townships (pers. comm., Van Niekerk. 20100323). He points out that since the decentralisation of the QwaQwa homeland and the area being placed under Sedibeng Water, major changes have occurred in the water sector. Since then, few attempts have been made to upgrade water infrastructure despite the growing population. Van Niekerk took great exception to the fact that when there is a water scarcity in Gauteng, government authorities impose restrictions on towns located on the outskirts of the catchment. MAP Water is strict with collection of payments for water and people who do not pay have their water cut-off. This practice is setting a good precedent and cultivates a culture of payment. However, the municipality will not uphold this practice. On the contrary, they raise water prices for those who are paying in order to subsidise townships where the residents are not expected to pay for water as long as they vote for the ANC. The integration of MAP Water with the M-A-P municipality would, in his view be a mistake because it is too early for that to meet with any success.

Another respondent confirms that water quality in Harrismith is good, although there is a bit too much chlorine in the water from time to time. Access to water is absolutely imperative because it supports household purposes (drinking, bathing, laundry, cooking, and sanitation) and businesses of all kinds (pers. comm., Nel. 20100323).

The researcher found that people, even those in the township, expressed a willingness to pay for their water services, even though this might prove difficult due to the high proportion of indigent people living in the municipal area. A number of respondents confirmed that MAP Water responded quickly to repair reported water leaks – usually the same day or at most a day or two. However, the researcher found a tap in Phuthaditjhaba, next to QwaQwa
Youth Club, where leaking water has been running for about a month. The water service provider did not respond despite several reports being lodged.

There is very poor evidence of water awareness campaigns in the area, apart from the dedicated observation of the national water week when the water service provider visited local radio stations to discuss water issues (pers. comm., Ndaba. 20100326). There also was a *Batjha le metsi* campaign, i.e. youth and water campaign to remove invasive plants form the river bank a few years ago. With this exception, nothing more has been done and the community is completely ignorant of environmental conservation and wetlands.

With regard to maintenance, there is timely notice to residents about water shutdowns. Such an occurrence is usually when there is a burst water pipe. The municipality then ferries water into the township with a water tank. There is however concern with regard to the efficiency of these trucks. One of the four trucks owned by the municipality carries water to each community in the M-A-P municipal area (pers. comm., Moloi, Mosikili & Moloi. 20100325). This procedure has seen water conflicts because people rush to collect their share of the water when the tractor arrives. The maximum length of water cut-offs was five (5) days early in February 2010. The worse affected were farmers because water shortage on farms curtails production. They complained that they were unable to hire workers because the water provided was not even sufficient for household use.

4.4.9 Response from the school

4.4.9.1 Socialisation and IWRM

Vulindlela Primary School believes that when learners participate in water conservation activities at school level, it is possible to influence parents' attitudes on water because children share their experiences at home. Teachers at the school maintain that water is the integral part of life; “If we do not water our plants they die”. Learners are taught to realise this truth. Teachers report that they have conducted an experiment with one plant
watered while the other was left dry. Eventually the dry plant died and the learners now understand the significance of water in the cycle of life (pers. comm., Tshabalala & Mokoena. 20100324).

The school has an eco-club and is one of two eco-conscious schools in the area. The eco-club encourages water conservation and creates an eco-friendly environment around the school. Learners are encouraged to use grey water to irrigate their plants. Each group of learners is allocated a specific plot of flowers and vegetables to nurture. They are also encouraged to collect grey water from home and use it to water the plants at school. This makes them aware of water conservation and its practice at home. Indigenous trees are planted on the school premises because they do not consume a great deal of water.

Celebration of Water Week, 2010

At this event, MAP Water and other environmental stakeholders came to raise awareness on (or celebrate) water. Learners were told that the water week celebration began in year 1992 at the United Nations in the United States and has been celebrated in South Africa since 1993. Mr. Phaiphai Richard of the NDABA environmental development made a presentation on working for wetlands and the rehabilitation of the wetlands to situations similar to the original conditions. He discussed the benefits of wetlands on reducing floods and their ability to clean water and reduce erosion. He also discussed their programme on removing alien trees from the rivers. MAP Water also discussed how they clean water and encouraged children to know the significance of paying for the water services.

Learners presented poems on water

The following poems were presented by learners to have their views on water and its value in life.

Veronica Mosinga presented a poem with emphasis on

- the quantity of water one has to drink each day
• the essential needs and uses of water

• saving water

Mnikelo Dladla presented a personification of water

• water emphasising her significance and value in life

• water making her plight to be conserved; this is her need

Sfiso Mtambo indicated in his poem

• the water service provider of the town (MAP Water)

• the status of water availability in the area is pleasant

• Free State does not have a water problem

Portia Culling seemed to be speaking to water

• That mankind need her (water) to survive

• She is central to human health conditions

• Ask her how can mankind better preserve and protect water?

• Accuses water for causing sickness like cholera, but later retracts her accusation by taking responsibility and says that mankind caused the state of affairs by polluting water.

4.5 SUMMARY

This chapter explained the research design as observed for the purpose of this study. The rationale behind the research theme and adequate presentation on the evolutionary stages of the research work is now clear. A qualitative research design gave leeway, primarily with semi-structured interviews based on a selected set of questions that anchored the research methods.
Biographical descriptions of the respondents, the limitations of the study, and the nature of data analysis also received due attention in the chapter. Ethical considerations were not taken for granted either, these ensured that the researcher represented findings and the views of his respondents in the most accurate and truthful manner possible. Chapter 5 will provide reliable findings to confirm the research questions and objectives presented in chapter 1. It will also present considerations for further discourse in the body of knowledge on the political culture and socialisation responses to integrated water resources and management both in South Africa and internationally. This subject begs more attention with regard to IWRM especially in South Africa.

Political elites need to realise that Harrismith/Intabazwe has a rich civil capital that can be employed to buffer violent protests. But to utilise this, there has to be political will in order to cultivate a culture of responsibility. This will in turn contribute to the general welfare of the people. For the first time in Harrismith/Intabazwe, members of the ANC, IFP, and people from all religious affiliations sat together in a meeting with a common purpose of what needed doing to improve their livelihoods. Eventually they took to the streets (pers. comm., Cebekulu et al., 20100323). A study by Smith & Fakir (2003) suggests the opposite with regard to the outcome of consultations between the water service provider and the public. What was different in this case? A water forum set in place by a water service provider (Amanziwethu) to enhance public participation and involvement in decision-making did not have the expected result. Was this merely a smokescreen attempt by the water board to enhance public participation? On the other hand, is it that a fixation on politics and politicisation of water resources thwart these community platforms? Is it possible to restore a water forum to operate in this community once again? Comments such as: “One has to avoid interfering in the politicians’ business – just a piece of advice!” indicate a tendency among MAP Water officials to be wary of stepping on the toes of the municipality.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter 1, the researcher points out an obligation to investigate political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM. He then provides an inductive argument following a theoretical framework on the study of political culture. The researcher’s argument rests on a hypothesis categorised as follows. a) There is general dissatisfaction with service delivery within the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality as far as IWRM in concerned. b) A history of poor service delivery, aggravated by poor economic conditions and a lack of consultation by government institutions encourages violent protests against government-initiated service delivery projects or the lack thereof.

The epistemological and ontological persuasions of interpretivism and constructionism gave impetus to providing a discussion on political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM within the identified municipal area. The South African context was also given attention. An array of responses from different role-players presents a glimpse into the nature of orientations and discourse on IWRM within the M-A-P municipal area. This was invaluable to validate the research project and to ensure that the researcher avoided vague generalisations on the research and its relevance in the M-A-P municipal area.

Chapter 2

The researcher focused on the first three objectives in chapter 2. The chapter succinctly presents theoretical expositions on political culture; socialisation; top-down and bottom-up decision-making approaches; and integrated water resources Management (IWRM). Political culture theory presents a discussion on power and authority within a political system, i.e. how power is utilised, and
shared. The ab(use) of power determines perceptions and orientations toward political symbols and their legitimacy within society. Chapter 2 also provides insight into political culture as a pattern of cognitive or evaluative orientations, values, and beliefs that structure a political culture and serve as an overarching bond in society. Although other scholars have argued that political culture is a product of human intention and action rather than a given set of relations and ideas structuring social life, the researcher argued that since political culture stems from historical roots it involves thought patterns that govern individual and group behaviour.

Political socialisation theory espouses the process by which people learn political culture, i.e. ideologies, rituals, dominant values, norms and beliefs that shape political culture and seep into daily life. These orientations transmit through agents of socialisation, some of which are discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 indicates that political socialisation contributes to nation building and enables people to understand and accept the political system. As a bolster to political culture and socialisation, top-down and bottom-up, influences reflect the link between political culture and political socialisation. The work posits a glocal concept parallel to bottom-up and top-down approaches in reference to the political-cultural interaction within institutional arrangements whereby each sphere of influence contributes to political socialisation on the individual, national and even the global plane.

Chapter 2 wraps up with a discussion on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). Based on the impression that IWRM is a concept that encourages efficient management and equal distribution of water resources, it indicates that IWRM is profoundly a political act that challenges the very bases of power in many societies. It is accepted that politics stand at the epicentre of water problems. Politics is fundamentally involved in decision making on resource access, allocation and use. There are international ideologies on water as a basic human right and an economic good that have been embodied in legislation. These have also received attention in this work. The study indicates that IWRM is a foreign concept adopted by developing
countries that are mesmerised by neo-liberal Western ideologies. A premise that the powerful elites have the most clout and dominate decision making in water resources affirms that water is a highly political issue, a verity that also applies at the municipal level of governance. This chapter builds a groundwork for the following chapter, especially to demonstrate the relevance of international political culture and the implementation of IWRM in a South African context.

Chapter 3

This chapter focused on the third stated objective, namely to analyse the prevailing political culture in South Africa and responses to IWRM in South Africa. Building on a theoretical framework already introduced in chapter 2, this chapter investigated South Africa's historical past which is beleaguered with top-down influences, and then turned to the post-1994 reality. From this, a culture of non-partisan politics, augmented by the historic past and with an emotionally wounded people, places the present-future South African society in a leprous identity crisis. This crisis in effect means that the ideal of a united South Africa remains an illusion. Parochial cultures with racial and ethnic loyalties predicate a culture where reflective voices remain tight-lipped. Name-calling and stigmatisation are new-fangled instruments that echo the tactics of South Africa's historic past under the apartheid regime.

The influence of South Africa's political culture on IWRM is evident in the fundamental legislative and institutional transformation undertaken in the water sector. The culture of non-payment is prevalent in many communities, although there is also an indication that the public is willing to pay for the water services. Extreme poverty in many South African communities renders cost recovery attempts hopeless. Political entrepreneurs take advantage of this to oppose cost recovery initiatives, stressing the right of access to water. Other civil society groupings perceive this as neo-liberal attempts to alienate the poor from their access to common resources (Macdonald & Papa, 2002). Catchment management agencies and water user associations remain a terrain of the powerful, comprising largely of elites with stakes in water
resources and allocation. The poor and the landless remain on the sidelines of IWRM initiatives.

**Chapter 4**

This chapter tracks the theoretical exposition and analysis of research in a South African context. The researcher presents a qualitative research design as he attempts to collate information to test the research theory and validate the research theme. The chapter explains the steps taken as the research project evolves. The logic behind the research methodology is also covered. Semi-structured interviews and group interviews have been indispensable sources for the researcher to explore the relevance of the theme in the M-A-P municipal area. Data was collected in 20 interviews and steps were taken to verify the views in follow-up discussions. The chapter includes a biographical description of the respondents and the reasons for their selection. A discussion on relevant ethical consideration concludes the chapter.

Responses from relevant role-players in Maluti-A-Phofung Municipal area provide insight on the fifth objective, namely to analyse political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM with specific reference to Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality. The study deduced that municipal authorities, together with the water service provider, interpreted the legislation pertaining cost recovery without consulting the public. The implementation of such decisions fuelled anger, as residents perceived these as neo-liberal attempts to deny the poor access to their rightful water resources (Smith, 2005: 167). On the other hand, it appears that these community groups have been socialised into the national legislative stipulations on water resources, i.e. the South African Constitution; NWA; and the Municipal Systems Act. Hence their ability to contest and challenge government decisions. It appears that the issue was not entirely a matter of limited socialisation into the IWRM culture per se. Instead, top-down decisions were made without sufficient consultation with the community (Smith & Fakir, 2003: 15).
This, according to the researcher, gives leeway to antagonistic elements in the community, allowing them to politicise water resources. This “third force” theory was considered invalid. In other respects, civil society organisations took a crucial step to conscientise the community about their human rights (another influence of a glocal political culture adopted by the state and civil society organisations) thus “giving ammunition” to the people, much to the dislike of local government authorities (pers. comm., Kleynhans. 20100323).

The theory on political culture and socialisation alludes to similar consequences that arise from a poorly administered socialisation process as seen through a symbolic interactionism.

Chapter 5

The chapter presents a discussion on the last objective, 6) to provide a response to a question on how the existing political culture, which has, and can lead to violent protest, be changed in the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality? Answers to this question are presented in the previous chapters as well but are collated and emphasised here. It is underscored that the windscreen to a future of effective governance and participation in IWRM initiatives is blurred by top-down influences that engender a culture of violent protests and withholding service payments. Hence, it is recognised that a synergy of bottom-up and top-down decision making remains vital in a responsible local government. Public responsibility is indispensible. Bearing in mind that there is virtually no separation of the political party and government, the study deduces that political parties ignore the responsibility of encouraging public participation, accountability, and transparency.

The relevant literature posits a multi-stakeholder platform and calls for opposing views to have representation in the municipal context. This applies both to IWRM and consultation in general on local governance. Civil society organisations must be given an opportunity to voice their views for consideration by government institutions. Tshabalala (pers. comm., 20100326) insists that to change such the culture of top-down dominance will require education of all role players. He maintains that political parties, notably
the ANC, should be the prime movers in this process. The researcher would like to differ with the view that the full responsibility should fall on political parties. He feels that civil society organizations must be equally represented in these initiatives. It is shown that the government's disillusionment with civil society organisations has led to the outbreak of violent protests in many South African communities. The multi-stakeholder platform will go a long way to ensuring that different voices find representation in water and governance discourse.

5.2 FINDINGS

It is evident that South African legislation is on target concerning local governance and public participation and CMAs and WUAs are already in place. But the implementation of legislative stipulations is failing. Government remains in charge of water resources and the public is marginalised when it comes to decision-making processes. The politicisation of common resources deprives some South Africans solely on the basis that they are not loyal to the governing party. This is a culture that breeds dissatisfaction among the masses.

5.2.1 Research objectives

The study proposed objectives to provide a deductive premise on political culture to test the research hypothesis. The research objectives are as follows. 1) To provide a theoretical discussion of political culture and socialisation. 2) To provide a theoretical discussion on a top-down and bottom-up approach in decision-making and policy implementation. 3) To provide a theoretical understanding of IWRM. 4) To analyse the prevailing political culture and responses to IWRM in South Africa. 5) To analyse political culture and socialisation responses to IWRM with specific reference to Maluti-A-Phofung Municipal area. And 6) to provide a response to the question of how the existing political culture, which has and can lead to violent protest, be changed in the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality.
5.2.2 Hypothesis

This section serves to test the hypothesis of the research as stated earlier in this chapter. The hypothesis reads as follows:

a) There is general dissatisfaction with service delivery within the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality concerning IWRM.

b) The history of poor service delivery, aggravated by poor economic conditions and a lack of consultation by government institutions encourages violent protests against government-initiated service delivery projects or the lack thereof.

The hypothesis was proven in part by the following:

a) There is general dissatisfaction about municipal failure to observe Batho­pele principles (Service delivery principles). Respondents believe that government must give priority to human needs. This involves upgrading water infrastructure to ensure equitable access to water by those in rural areas. b) Public consultation is currently lacking. Politicians only come to address the public during mayoral imbizo and presidential visits. Many promises are made to the public and thereafter, very little output is seen. Research conducted by Mayher et al. (2009: 25-26) proves that the water service provider was supposed to convene meetings with the coordinating committee to discuss water challenges and other related issues. But this is no longer happening. c) Economic squalor is a common sight and community concerns are said to be bread and butter issues. Finally, d) Top-down influences by local authorities influenced the public to embark on protest action. Additional information on this issue is provided in chapter 3.

On the other hand, the hypothesis fell short in the sense that great dissatisfaction does not emanate directly from poor water quality as was initially assumed. On the contrary, MAP Water is acclaimed for its response record to public reports made on water leaks. This observation might apply in the town since it has been noted in chapter 4 that there are instances where
MAP Water did not respond. Mayher et al. (2009: 29) confirms this. It is however on record that MAP Water notifies the public before water shutdowns. Measures are taken to ferry water into the community during the water shutdown. Discrepancies in water meter readings have been another cause for complaint.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

This section suggests practical public initiatives that could be adopted going forward. Some recommendations are also made for further studies in the field.

5.3.1 Recommendations for practical society initiatives

After feedback meetings with the respondents, the following recommendations were unanimously agreed upon with the researcher:

Firstly, it was agreed to promote a shift from Local Economic Development (LED) to the more inclusive context of Local Economic Development Forum (LEDF). This notion emanates from respondents' deliberation on the significance of LED and came to the conclusion that with reference to M-A-P municipal area, LED should rather be expressed as Local Economic Development Forum (LEDF). The rationale behind such reasoning is that this forum will include representatives from non-governmental organisations of civil society to complement local municipal authorities on water resources, agricultural development, sanitation, and social and economic development in Harrismith and Phuthaditjhaba. The LED committee must communicate with the municipal infrastructure about the funds to promote developments in the community.

Secondly, respondents agreed that there has to be an internal network between civil society organisations. This is aimed at promoting dialogue to "discourage a culture of burning down public amenities". (pers. comm., Group Session. 20101008). Thirdly, there was a suggestion for academic institutions and research institutions to adopt a local school to promote environmental conservation programmes. Vulindlela Primary School can benefit from
assistance and expertise offered by such institutions. These programmes can be extended into the public domain and to encourage grey water use in households. **Fourthly,** a group of fishermen can benefit from support by local government through funding to establish a self-help project, for example a fish farm. This would promote economic development and food security. Furthermore, it would enable the people to appreciate the value of water. The researcher would like to add a **fifth** recommendation, namely re-visiting the idea of a water forum. It appears that such a forum did exist in the past, but is now dormant. The water forum could work as a link between the public and the DWA to undertake public education with regard to IWRM and promote projects aimed at poverty alleviation.

5.3.2 Recommendations for further study

Based on the content of this study, there remains a need to investigate other, related issues on political culture and socialisation in South Africa. **Firstly,** an action research oriented comparative study to investigate the role of civil society organisations and their extent in creating a fundamental water culture within South African societies is a viable topic. This study could focus on the following: i) Measuring public knowledge of water legislations. ii) Participation in grassroots institutions such as CMAs and WUAs and determining how perceptions on the value of water are affected. iii) Investigating the implementation of IWRM tenets in rural areas and how access to water affects their livelihoods and restores human dignity. This study would be valuable considering that many rural residents still go a day without access to adequate water for basic needs.

**Secondly,** the study of political culture remains an emotive endeavour in South Africa. More research is needed on political socialisation in institutions of basic education. This would provide the voice of the South African youth on the theme. This study could look into the influence of role-modelling in political socialisation and civic culture. **Thirdly,** a study on political ideology and political culture would be another useful undertaking to provide clarity on the difference between these two terms. **Fourthly,** a study dealing with methods
to alleviate the culture of anger and hopelessness in South African society could explore the influences of (political) culture, economy, and ideology. A comparative study based on research into youth development in the South African context might also yield some interesting results. Finally, this present study has made some reference to the issue of the so-called “wounded psyche of the African soul”. This begs more research into the as yet veiled phenomenology of the African wounded mind.

5.4 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the foregoing discussion on the research objectives raised in this study indicates the significance of the research undertaken. The study of political culture and socialisation juxtaposing IWRM is an addition into the body of knowledge and the researcher anticipates this study will stimulate more discussion.

It is an inevitable realism of life that many opinion shapers began their involvement in local structures. Some instigated and rode on the waves of violent protests and civil dissent to secure a position of advantage to have employment in the council. Some within the community have seen this trend and seek to pursue it. It is crucial to clarify the role of civil society organisations in a political system. There is a need to chart the nature of the relationship between the ruling political party, civil society organisations and government institutions. As for now, there appears to be major disillusionment between these actors. Civil society organisations need to discuss their views on community development. Violent protest should not be the only option; nor should development issues have to take the back seat because of politicisation of resources or party loyalty.
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APPENDIX A

A LETTER TO M-A-P MUNICIPALITY REQUESTING PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH
Dear Mr. Kau,


The research niche area of the Cultural Dynamics of Water (CuDyWat) of North West University was established in 2006, with a purpose to conduct research on the interaction between mankind and the natural (water) environment. We have previously worked in several municipal areas, together with ordinary community residents, the business community, and government officials while conducting research on water use.

We are currently conducting research on influences of political culture and socialization on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) within the Maluti A Phofung Municipal area. This research project is most relevant with our research focus objectives on people’s attitudes concerning water use (households, sewage, and irrigation).

Our research is strictly independent, not in favor of any political organization whatsoever; the research output is purely for the benefit of the community, and relevant role players.

Between 22 and 28 March 2010, a group of six (6) researchers will be conducting a fieldwork excursion in your area (Harrismith). Our goal is to conduct research and hopefully collaborate with participants in generating recommendations (solutions) to the challenges derived from our findings. It goes without saying that cooperation and authorization from your office (institution) will be highly appreciated in this regard.

For further inquiries, please contact me on (cell) 078 325 0472 (e-mail) 20109695@student.nwu.ac.za or contact Ina Gouws whose contacts are indicated above.

Kind Regards,

Sysman Motloung
Researcher
APPENDIX B

LETTER TO M-A-P MUNICIPALITY REQUESTING PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH
Dear Mr. /Ms Mpho Mabena


The research niche area of the Cultural Dynamics of Water (CuDyWat) of North West University was established in 2006, with a purpose to conduct research on the interaction between mankind and the natural (water) environment. We have previously worked in several municipal areas, together with ordinary community residents, the business community, and government officials while conducting research on water use.

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For further inquiries, please contact me on (cell) 078 325 0472 (e-mail) 20109695@student.nwu.ac.za or contact Ina Gouws whose contacts are indicated above.

Kind Regards,

Sysman Motloung
Researcher
FOR A FEEDBACK MEETING

INVITATION LETTER TO RESPONDENTS

APPENDIX C
Appendix C: Invitation letter to respondents for a feedback meeting

To: Research respondents

Re: Invitation to a report-back meeting

The Research Group for the Cultural Dynamics of Water (CuDyWat) of the North West University Vaal Triangle campus invites you to a report-back meeting to be held on the following date and time:

Date: 08 October 2010
Time: 11:00 am
Venue: Intabazwe community Library [Harrismith Township]

The meeting is per obligation for CuDyWat to include all participants and the community to partake in the research report compilation as authors in their own right. This process attempts to ensure a balanced representation of all views collated in the report. This serves as an opportunity for respondents to listen to the findings of the report thus far and provide their analysis before the final research report is written. A copy of this final report will then be sent to each participant.

Your presence at this meeting will be greatly appreciated.

For further information contact,

Sysman Motloung 0783250472 20109695@student.nwu.ac.za [Researcher]

Dr. Ina Gouws 0169103459 ina.gouws@nwu.ac.za [Research supervisor]
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<td>Wednesday 24</td>
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<td>Mr. Sipho Cebekhulu</td>
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<td>Thursday 25</td>
<td>09:00</td>
<td>Mr. Neo Motaung</td>
<td>ANC Youth League</td>
<td>0586890774 0846647121</td>
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<td>Mr. Thabo Moloi</td>
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<td>14:00</td>
<td>Mr. Abel Ndaba Makoena Bosman</td>
<td>QwaQwa association of youth clubs</td>
<td>0731683786 0587131907 0725506389</td>
<td>QwaQwa</td>
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<td>16:00</td>
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Appendix E

Research Questionnaire Example
Research Questionnaire Sample

Governance related:

- How do you rate your local municipality?
- Are there any plans to relocate squatter settlements?
- What is the nature of public consultation in the area?
  - How is public participation in local governance?
- Does the Municipality have the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) document?
  - Did the community endorse the document through public participation meetings?
- How is the relationship between local government and civil society?
- What other options remain for the community to raise their concerns without taking to the streets?
- Do the ward committee members know and execute their responsibilities?
  - Did ward committees receive any training?
- Why has the municipality failed to respond positively to community concerns?
- What informed the community to opt for protest rather than other forms of involvement?
  - Do you believe that service protests are justified?
- What type of political culture do you think exists in M-A-P?
- What was the nature of concerns raised in the petitions?
Appendix E: Cont.

Sanitation and water related:

- Are there community water programmes in the area?
- Are there public programmes aimed at water education in the area?
- Are there plans to improve the capacity of the water operation plants?
- Is there a possibility for water shortages in Maluti a Phofung in the near future?
- Do people pay for water services?
  - What do you think about paying for water services?
- Do you have adequate water in the area?
- For what purposes do you use water?
- How do you access water in the area?
- How is the drinking water quality in the area?
- Do you know of any drinking water contamination reports in the area?
- Does the water service provider inform you before water shutdown?
  - How do you survive during water shutdowns?
- How is the state of the water treatment plant and reservoirs in the area?
- How many people are required to run the water plants?
- How many systems are currently operating?
- Is there a water forum in the area?
- What is the quality of effluent released into the river system?

School

- Which water conservation methods does the school utilise?
- Does the school have water education programs (subjects)?
- Is water education covered in the official curriculum?
## Appendix F: Interview cover sheet

Research Fieldwork, CuDyWat: Maluti A Phofung local Municipality 22 March-26 March 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of interview</td>
<td>: _</td>
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<tr>
<td>Place of interview</td>
<td>: _</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of respondent</td>
<td>: _</td>
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<tr>
<td>Address of respondent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Email address</td>
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<td>: (W_____)(H____)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>: _</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age at the time of the interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender: Male or female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summary of subjects discussed:</td>
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To whom it may concern:

This is to certify that I have edited the Master’s dissertation compiled by Sysman Motloung, entitled: Political Culture and Socialisation responses to Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM): The case of the Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipal area.

I am satisfied that in terms of language and source referencing, the dissertation is sound and fully acceptable.

Regards

Dr Bridget Theron-Bushell