

AN EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF THE MORAL  
JUDGMENT OF BEHAVIOURALLY HANDICAPPED ADOLESCENT  
CLINIC SCHOOL PUPILS OF NORMAL INTELLIGENCE

ROWAN A. JOHNSON  
B.A., B.ED., U.E.D., F.D.E.

Dissertation accepted in the Faculty of  
Education of the Potchefstroomse Universiteit  
vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys in  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree Magister Educationis

SUPERVISOR: MRS. M. SCOTT  
CO-SUPERVISORS: PROF. J.L. DE K. MONTEITH  
PROF. J.L. VAN DER WALT

POTCHEFSTROOM  
1990

## **A B S T R A C T**

### **An Evaluation of the Level of Moral Judgment of Behaviourally Handicapped Adolescent Clinic School Pupils of Normal Intelligence**

This empirical study aimed at determining any significant difference in level of moral judgment between behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence (experimental group) and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils (control group). Moral judgment level was measured in terms of Global Stage Scores and Weighted Average Scores using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interviews and Standard Issue Scoring. Secondary aims were to determine whether the data obtained indicated significant sex differences in level of moral judgment and to compare the mean level of moral judgment of the experimental and control groups with existing research.

A statement and motivation of the problem and clarification of concepts were followed by an evaluation of applicable pre-Kohlbergian research, the philosophical foundations of Kohlberg's theory and the theory itself. This was followed by an examination of the methods of research and the empirical study. The data generated indicated a significant difference in mean level of moral judgment between the research groups in favour of the control group when controlling for age, gender and socio-economic status. This difference was highlighted by comparisons with existing research. No significant gender differences in moral judgment were found.

**Important conclusions reached were:**

- \* Experimental group pupils were retarded in level of moral judgment and, unlike the pupils in the control group, most had not yet reached Stage 3 moral reasoning.
- \* Sex differences in moral judgment were not found - as is predicted in Kohlbergian theory (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 130).
- \* Sub-group comparisons indicated chronological age to be an important factor in the measurement of moral judgment.

**The research findings imply that:**

- \* Attempts should be made to raise the level of moral judgment of pupils like those in the experimental group specifically, but also that of all pupils.
- \* Planned moral education programmes can ignore sex differences, but not chronological age.
- \* Varied research into moral judgment is necessary.

\*\*\*\*\*

## U I T T R E K S E L

### 'n Evaluering van die Vlak van Morele Oordeel van Gedragsgeremde Adollesent Kliniekskool Leerlinge van Normale Intelligensie

Hierdie empiriese ondersoek was daarop gerig om vas te stel of daar 'n beduidende verskil in die vlak van morele oordeel tussen gedragsgeremde adollesente kliniekskool leerlinge van normale intelligensie (eksperimentele groep) en 'n vergelykbare steekproef van nie-gedragsgeremde leerlinge (kontrole groep) is. Morele oordeel was gemeet in terme van Globale Stadium Puntetellings met die gebruik van Kohlberg se Morele Oordeel Onderhoude en Standaard Uitvloeisel Puntetelling Sisteem. Die sekondêre doelstellings was om te bepaal of die data wat verwerf is, aangedui het dat daar beduidende geslagsverskille was en ook die gemiddelde vlak van morele oordeel van die eksperimentele- en kontrole groepe met huidige navorsing te vergelyk.

'n Stelling en 'n motivering van die probleem en verduideliking van konsepte was gevolg deur 'n evaluasie van voor-Kohlbergiaanse navorsing, die filosofiese grondslag van Kohlberg se teorie en die teorie self. Hierna het 'n ondersoek van die metodes van ondersoek en die empiriese studie gevolg. Die data verkry, het 'n beduidende verskil in die gemiddelde vlak van morele oordeel tussen die navorsingsgroepe aangedui ten gunste van die kontrole groep met die kontrolering van ouderdom, geslag en sosio-ekonomiese status. Hierdie verskil

was uitgelig deur vergelykings met huidige navorsing. Geen beduidende geslagsverskille in morele oordeel was gevind nie.

**Belangrike gevolgtrekkings was:**

- \* Die eksperimentele groep leerlinge het 'n beduidende laer vlak van morele oordeel getoon en die meeste het nog nie Stadium 3 van morele oordeel bereik nie. Die meeste van die leerlinge in die kontrole groep was alreeds op Stadium 3.
- \* Geslagsverskille in morele oordeel was nie gevind nie - soos voorspel in die Kohlbergiaanse teorie (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 13).
- \* Sub-groep vergelykings het aangedui dat kronologiese ouderdom 'n belangrike faktor is in die meting van morele oordeel.

**Die bevindinge impliseer dat:**

- \* Pogings moet aangewend word om die vlak van morele oordeel van leerlinge, soos dié in die eksperimentele groep spesifiek, en leerlinge in die algemeen, te verhoog.
- \* Beplande morele opvoedingsprogramme kan geslagsverskille tot 'n groot mate ignoreer, maar nie kronologiese ouderdomsverskille nie.
- \* Gevarieerde navorsing in morele oordeel word benodig.

## A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

The most sincere thanks are due to:

- \*\* Mrs. M. Scott for her kind assistance in all aspects of this empirical study.
- \*\* Prof. J.L. de K. Monteith for his general assistance and more specifically with regard to the statistical aspects.
- \*\* Prof. J.L. van der Walt for his assistance in the philosophical aspects.
- \*\* The Transvaal Education Department for allowing the research to be done in their schools.
- \*\* My parents, Les and Margaret Johnson for their continued encouragement and support.
- \*\* Mrs. Maryna Kruger for her efficient typing and her caring attitude.

\*\*\*\*\*

# **I N D E X**

## **P A G E**

<b>CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION, STATEMENT AND MOTI=</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>VATION OF THE PROBLEM AND CLARI=</b>	
<b>FICATION OF CONCEPTS</b>	
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	1
1.2 THE AIM OF THE STUDY	3
1.3 METHOD OF STUDY	4
1.4 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS	5
1.4.1 Behaviourally Handicapped	5
1.4.2 Normal Intelligence	5
1.4.3 Moral Judgment	6
1.5 THE BEHAVIOURALLY HANDICAPPED CLINIC SCHOOL PUPIL	6
1.5.1 Introduction: Clinic schools and classification as behaviourally handicapped	6
1.5.2 Criteria for therapeutic placement at a clinic school	8
1.5.3 Types of behavioural and emotional problems which can lead to clinic school placement	11
1.6 MORAL JUDGMENT	13

<b>CHAPTER 2 : MORAL JUDGMENT AND DEVELOPMENT:</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>RESEARCH PRIOR TO THAT OF KOHLBERG</b>	
2.1 INTRODUCTION	16
2.2 RESEARCH PRIOR TO THAT OF PIAGET	16
2.3 THE RESEARCH OF JEAN PIAGET (1932)	21
2.3.1 Introduction	21
2.3.2 Piaget's stages of Moral Judgment	23
2.3.3 Important Criticism of Piaget's Theory of Moral Judgment	26
2.4 RESEARCH AFTER PIAGET AND PRIOR TO KOHLBERG	27
2.5 SUMMARY	30
 <b>CHAPTER 3 : THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF</b>	 <b>33</b>
<b>KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT</b>	
3.1 INTRODUCTION	33
3.2 MORAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE	34
3.3 THE PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES ON KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT	37



	P A G E
3.3.1	Socrates and Plato 38
3.3.2	Immanuel Kant 40
3.3.3	John Dewey 45
3.3.4	John Rawls 49
3.4	THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAURENCE KOHLBERG 51
3.5	A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF KOHLBERG'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 54
3.6	A LIMITED ACCEPTANCE OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 56
3.7	CONCLUSION 59
<b>CHAPTER 4 :</b>	<b>KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 60</b>
4.1	INTRODUCTION 60
4.2	COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL MORALIZATION THEORY 62
4.3	IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF KOHLBERG'S STAGES 63
4.3.1	Kohlberg's claim that the stages are true 63

## P A G E

4.3.2	Stages imply qualitative differences in modes of thinking	63
4.3.3	Stages are 'Structured Wholes'	64
4.3.4	Stages form an invariant sequence	64
4.3.5	Stages are hierarchical integrations	64
4.3.6	Cognitive development influences the stages	65
4.3.7	Movement through the stages	65
4.4	KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT	66
4.4.1	The Preconventional level	66
4.4.1.1	Stage 1	67
4.4.1.2	Stage 2	67
4.4.2	The Conventional level	68
4.4.2.1	Stage 3	68
4.4.2.2	Stage 4	69
4.4.3	The Postconventional level	69
4.4.3.1	Stage 5	70
4.5	THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENT AND MORAL ACTION	70
4.6	THE ACQUISITION OF HIGHER LEVELS OF MORAL JUDGMENT ACCORDING TO KOHLBERG	72
4.6.1	Introduction	72
4.6.2	Role-taking	72
4.6.3	The role of parents and family in the development of moral judgment	74
4.6.4	The role of the peer group in the development of moral judgment	76

## P A G E

4.7	CRITICISMS OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT	77
4.7.1	Criticisms of Kohlberg's neglect of the affective side of morality	78
4.7.2	Criticism of the claimed cultural universality of Kohlberg's stages	79
4.7.3	Criticisms of Kohlberg's rejection of character traits and habit	80
4.7.4	Criticism of Kohlberg's under-emphasis of the importance of Stages 3 and 4	81
4.7.5	Criticism concerning possible sex bias in Kohlberg's theory of moral development	82
4.7.6	Criticisms of Kohlberg's view that the stages cannot be taught	82
4.7.7	Conclusion concerning the criticisms of Kohlberg's theory of moral development	83
4.8	KOHLBERGIAN MORAL EDUCATION	84
4.8.1	Introduction	84
4.8.2	The nature of formal Kohlbergian Moral Education within the school context	84
4.8.2.1	Introduction	84
4.8.3	The aims of Kohlbergian Moral Education	86
4.8.3.1	Kohlbergian Planned Moral Education	88
4.9	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	90

<b>CHAPTER 5 : METHOD OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH</b>	<b>92</b>
5.1 INTRODUCTION	92
5.2 AIMS AND STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES	92
5.2.1 Aims	92
5.2.2 Research Hypotheses	93
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN	94
5.3.1 Experimental design	94
5.3.2 Experimental Group	95
5.3.3 Control Group	96
5.4 VARIABLES	98
5.4.1 Dependent variable	98
5.4.2 Independent variables	98
5.4.2.1 Experimental variable	98
5.4.2.2 Control variables	98
5.4.2.2.1 Intelligence as a variable influencing the measurement of level of moral judgment	99
5.4.2.2.2 Sex difference as a variable influencing the measurement of the level of moral judgment	102
5.4.2.2.3 Social Class (Socio-Economic Status or SES) as a variable influencing the measurement of level of moral judgment	105
5.4.2.2.4 Chronological Age as a variable influencing the measurement of moral judgment	107

# P A G E

5.5	A COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL SAMPLES REGARDING THE CONTROL VARIABLES	108
5.5.1	Chronological Age	109
5.5.2	Intelligence	109
5.5.3	Socio-Economic Status	110
5.5.4	Gender	111
5.6	PROCEDURE	111
5.6.1	Introduction	111
5.6.2	Measuring instruments	114
5.6.2.1	Introduction	114
5.6.2.2	The Old South African Individual Scale (OSAIS)	115
5.6.2.3	The Senior South African Indivi= dual Scale (SSAIS)	117
5.6.2.4	The New South African Group Test (NSAGT): Junior and Senior Series	119
5.6.2.5	The Biographical and Socio-Econo= mic Questionnaire	121
5.6.2.6	Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Inter= view: Form A	123
5.6.2.7	Kohlberg's Standardized Issue Scoring System	125
5.6.2.7.1	Interrater Reliability in Standard Issue Scoring	127
5.6.2.7.2	Reliability of Standard Issue Scoring	128
5.6.2.7.3	Validity of Standard Issue Scoring	129
5.6.2.8	Statistical Techniques used for the analysis of the data in this empiri= cal study	130

CHAPTER 6 :	THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION	132
6.1	INTRODUCTION	132
6.2	EXAMINATION OF DATA OBTAINED IN THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY	133
6.3	A COMPARISON OF THE LEVEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS TO TEST THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY	137
6.3.1	Global Stage Scores: Experimental and Control Groups	137
6.3.2	Global Stage Scores: Female Subjects	139
6.3.3	Global Stage Scores: Male Subjects	141
6.3.4	Weighted Average Scores (WAS)	145
6.3.5	A Global and WAS comparison of the experimental and control groups with the Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males	145
6.3.6	A comparison of the research samples with existing research: Weighted Average Scores (WAS): 13 and 14 year olds	148
6.4	SUMMARY OF RESULTS	150
6.4.1	A level of Moral Judgment Comparison of the experimental and control groups	150
6.4.2	Sub-group comparisons regarding level of moral judgment	151

**CHAPTER 7 : SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, 154  
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS**

7.1	SUMMARY	154
7.1.1	The introductory chapter	154
7.1.2	Relevant research and philosophical foundations	155
7.1.3	Method of research	157
7.1.4	The results of the empirical study	158
7.2	CONCLUSIONS	159
7.2.1	Conclusions in respect of the main aim of this empirical study	159
7.2.2	Conclusions in respect of sex differences	160
7.2.3	Conclusions in respect of comparisons of the results of this empirical study with existing research	161
7.3	IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY	162
7.4	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IN THE R.S.A. INTO DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT	164

P A G E

7.5	RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT THE INSTITUTION OF KOHLBERGIAN STYLE MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMMES AT THE CLINIC SCHOOLS	165
7.5.1	A suggested Moral Education Programme for Behaviourally Handicapped Adolescent Clinic School Pupils	166
7.6	LIMITATIONS OF THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY	168
7.7	CONCLUDING STATEMENT	169

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX A:

BIOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE

APPENDIX B:

KOHLBERG'S MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEWS FORM A

APPENDIX C:

KOHLBERG'S STANDARD ISSUE SCORING SYSTEM

\*\*\*\*\*



# LIST OF TABLES AND GRAPHS

	P A G E
TABLE 5.1      COMPARISON OF E AND C GROUPS IN TERMS OF THE CONTROL VARIABLES	108
TABLE 6.1      THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUP	135
TABLE 6.2      THE CONTROL GROUP	136
TABLE 6.3      GLOBAL STAGE SCORES	137
TABLE 6.4      GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: FEMALES	139
TABLE 6.5      GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: MALES	141
TABLE 6.6      A COMPARISON OF THE LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF U.S. MALES AND THE EXPE= RIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS	146
TABLE 6.7      A COMPARISON OF 13 AND 14 YEAR OLDS IN THE E AND C GROUPS WITH EXISTING RESEARCH	149
GRAPH 6.1      GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: ALL SUBJECTS	138
GRAPH 6.2      GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: FEMALE SUB= JECTS	140
GRAPH 6.3      GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: MALE SUB= JECTS	142

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION, STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION OF THE PROBLEM AND CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS**

#### **1.1 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The intention of this study is to evaluate the level of moral judgment of adolescent clinic school pupils. The level of moral judgment of all school pupils, and more particularly that of behaviourally or emotionally handicapped pupils, is of importance to the educator because, in cognitive-developmental terms (see 4.3.6), the higher one's level of moral judgment is, the more competent one is in the making of sound moral judgments which will lead to more moral behaviour. The level of moral judgment of the behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupil is particularly important because the various reasons for classification as behaviourally handicapped (see 1.5.3) are often related to an apparent inability to choose acceptable behaviour when faced with a moral dilemma. Educators with a sound knowledge of Kohlberg's stages of moral development (see 4.4) can assist their pupils, behaviourally handicapped or otherwise, to move to higher levels of moral judgment which will lead to more mature moral behaviour.

If it can be clearly shown in this study that there is a significant difference in the level of moral judgment between a sample of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils, certain decisions as

to the pedotherapeutic handling, in terms of planned moral education, of such behaviourally handicapped pupils can be made (see 4.8.3.1).

It must be noted that Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Tests (see Appendix B) used in this empirical study aim at measuring the level of moral judgment, in accordance with Kohlberg's stages of moral development, and not the actual morality of the individual. As Piaget pointed out, one cannot **"measure the moral value of a child by measuring his moral judgment"** (Piaget, 1932: 110), but he, like Kohlberg, saw a very definite connection between moral judgment and moral behaviour, that is, that a person manifesting a higher level of moral judgment is more likely to act in a morally more mature manner (see 4.5).

Although moral judgment is seen by Kohlberg as cognitive in form, that is, as an aspect of intellectual activity, the approach in this research project will not be like that of Kay (1968: 144) who wrote that **"it would be inappropriate to discuss the philosophy of morals in a psychological study"**. Moral judgment cannot be discussed without relating it to the philosophical basis of moral judgment. This aspect will be dealt with in some detail (see Chapter 3) because any future attempt to raise the level of moral judgment of pupils, behaviourally handicapped or not, by means of the practise of rational decision making, which is the basis of Kohlbergian moral education, will necessitate an attempt to place such a moral education

programme on a firm Christian philosophical foundation. Kohlbergian moral education aims at helping the emotionally and behaviourally handicapped children **"to take control of their uncontrolled lives"** (Gardner, 1983: IX) and could be fruitfully applied in Christian education in the R.S.A. if adapted to comply with Christian philosophic foundations.

The problem which this empirical study aims at examining is whether there is a difference in level of moral judgment between a sample of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils in favour of the latter sample and also whether such a difference, if it in fact exists, is a significant one.

## 1.2 THE AIM OF THE STUDY

The central aim of this empirical study is to determine whether there is a significant difference in the level of moral judgment between behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils. To achieve the matched sample, the control variables of chronological age, intelligence, socio-economic status and gender are used.

### 1.3 METHOD OF STUDY

A study of related literature will be made and discussed. Research prior to that of Kohlberg will be examined in Chapter 2 while Kohlberg's philosophical foundations and research will be examined in Chapters 3 and 4. Hereafter an empirical study of the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence will be made.

- \* The study of relevant literature will concentrate on important research in the field of moral development and more specifically research into moral judgment. The cognitive nature of moral reasoning, and the fact that it is the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped adolescent pupils which is being measured and evaluated in the empirical study, demands an emphasis on research that has indicated that moral judgment is cognitive and that clear stages of moral development can be discerned. Factors which influence moral judgment, to greater or lesser degrees, will also be examined in the literature study. These factors include the specific situation in which the individual is forced to make a moral judgment, the individual's level of moral judgment and the individual's age, gender, intelligence and socio-economic status (see 5.4.2.2).

- \* The empirical study will be done to determine whether a significant difference exists between the measured level of moral judgment of behaviourally-handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and a matched sample of non-behaviourally-handicapped pupils. The findings of the empirical study will also be used to determine whether any sex differences, regarding level of moral judgment, are to be found in the study and for comparison, to highlight any significant differences in level of moral judgment found between the experimental and control groups, with applicable existing research. An Ex Post Facto design will be used in this empirical study.

#### **1.4 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS**

##### **1.4.1 Behaviourally Handicapped**

Here we refer to pupils who have been classified as such by the Transvaal Education Department (TED) on account of serious emotional and behavioural problems which retard their progress at school and make them in need of intensive pedotherapy (see 1.5).

##### **1.4.2 Normal Intelligence**

Here we refer to pupils whose scores on the intelligence tests used (see 5.6.2.1-3) indicate a total intelligence quotient of between 85 and 115.

### **1.4.3 Moral Judgment**

Here we refer to performance on the tests of moral judgment used (see Appendix B) i.e. Moral Judgment Interviews (Form A) from "The Psychology of Moral Development" by L. Kohlberg (1984: 640-651).

- \* While the operational definition of normal intelligence (1.4.2) is self-explanatory, it is necessary to discuss in some detail both the behaviourally handicapped clinic school child and moral judgment as an aspect of morality from a cognitive-developmental viewpoint.

## **1.5 THE BEHAVIOURALLY HANDICAPPED CLINIC SCHOOL PUPIL**

### **1.5.1 Introduction: Clinic schools and classification as behaviourally handicapped**

The clinic schools of the Transvaal Education Department came into being to allow intensive pedotherapy to be given to behaviourally handicapped children of all ages and abilities in the structured environment of a boarding school. The staff of each clinic school consists not only of the regular teaching staff but also of educational psychologists and advisers who handle the pedotherapeutic aspects. The clinic school functions in all respects like a regular boarding school apart from the pedotherapeutic aspect. There are five

clinic schools in the Transvaal which cater for behaviourally handicapped pupils of varying ages and abilities.

A child is only classified as behaviourally handicapped and placed in a clinic school when local intervention, by the Educational Adviser: Educational Matters or the Educational Adviser: Counselling, has indicated that the child needs more than the therapy and counselling which is available from the Educational Aid Centre. The child who is in need of regular intensive pedotherapy over a longer period, in a structured environment away from the family home and normal school, is classified as behaviourally handicapped and placed at a clinic school.

Children who present with serious behaviour problems, which are beyond the scope of normal school discipline, are referred by the school on a TED157 to the educational aid centre in the school's circuit. Most of these behaviour problems are dealt with locally by means of counselling of the child and his parents and/or pedotherapy by the Educational Adviser: Educational Matters (EA:EM) or the Educational Adviser: Counselling (EA:C) and it is only extreme cases which lead to the child being classified as behaviourally handicapped. Such a classification usually means that the child is placed at a clinic school, but in less serious cases the behaviourally handicapped child can be therapeutically placed in a regular boarding school where the local EA:EM will give regular pedotherapy.



Classification as behaviourally handicapped takes place only after local intervention has been unsuccessful or insufficient and it has been decided by the members of staff of the educational aid centre, at a meeting, that such classification is necessary. Reports are then written regarding the orthopedagogic, sociopedagogic and orthodidactical aspects of the problematic pedagogic situation and sent with the parent's request for the placement of their child in a clinic school to TED Head Office where the child is classified as behaviourally handicapped. As soon as possible after classification, the child is therapeutically placed at the applicable clinic school by the EA:C. While the child attends the clinic school, parental counselling is given by the EA:C to assist the parents to cope more adequately when their child returns to the family home.

#### **1.5.2 Criteria for therapeutic placement at a clinic school**

The following criteria are laid down by the Transvaal Education Department in the "Handleiding vir 'n Pedagogies Verantwoordbare handelingsplan ten behoeve van die Wordingsgeremde (Gedragsgeremde) Leerling en sy Ouers" (1980: 4):

- \* A precondition for any temporary therapeutic placement is the co-operation of both the child and his parents because if this precondition is not met the chances of success in any further therapeutic action become minimal.

\* Problematic situations must exist within the family, which make temporary therapeutic placement of the child in a clinic school necessary, like:

- (a) rejection of the child by one or both parents;
- (b) overprotectiveness, where the bonding is too intense, on the part of one or both parents;
- (c) abnormal sibling rivalry leading to serious conflict within the family circle;
- (d) serious disharmony between the marriage partners where the child is either the centre point of the conflict or is seriously affected by the disharmony;
- (e) incompleteness of family, caused by death, divorce or separation, where there is pedagogic neglect and unsatisfactory control - this problem is more serious where the single parent works or there is milieu disadvantage;
- (f) a poor socio-economic situation where because of poverty and poor milieu a clinic school placement might be made in co-operation with social welfare organizations;
- (g) when specific social evils like alcoholism, immorality, poor social environment, poor choice of friends, etc., have a very negative effect on the child and where successful therapy, while the child remains in the family home, is made almost impossible;

- (h) where parents are unsatisfactory authority figures,
- (i) when the child is found in need of care by the Commissioner of the Children's Court and placed at a clinic school in co-operation with both the Department of Social Welfare and the parents; and
- (j) when the child has landed in a serious conflict situation at school and, because of unacceptable behaviour, it is impossible for the child to remain at the same school. Matters must also be too serious for the child to be placed at another school in the same area.

Other factors which must be taken into account before classification as behaviourally handicapped takes place are:

- (a) it must be necessary for the child to receive intensive pedotherapy;
- (b) the child must not be uncontrollable or have a history of such behaviour;
- (c) there must not be serious clashes of subject choice in secondary school pupils, i.e. they must not be forced to take a number of subjects that they did not do at their previous school or which might restrict their future choice of occupation in terms of aptitude and interest; and

- (d) the prognosis for successful pedotherapy should be sound enough for a one year placement at a clinic school to be sufficient.

### **1.5.3 Types of behavioural and emotional problems which can lead to clinic school placement**

The following examples of types of behavioural and emotional problems exhibited by children classified as behaviorally handicapped are taken from school referrals and educational aid centre files. It is usually a combination of such behavioural and emotional problems, while noting the criteria for therapeutic placement at a clinic school (see 1.5.2), which will lead to such a classification and placement at a clinic school:

- (a) Serious rejection of authority in the home or school situation.
- (b) Serious breakdown in communication between child and one or both parents.
- (c) Unsound family relationships with regard to trust, understanding and authority.
- (d) Sexual promiscuity and related problems like incest, perversions and prostitution.
- (e) Theft of varying degrees of seriousness.
- (f) Chronic truancy.

- (g) School phobia.
- (h) Emotional problems leading to depression and even suicide attempts.
- (i) Inability of the child to adapt to the school environment or socialize with his peers.
- (j) Milieu disadvantage.
- (k) Abnormal sibling conflict in the home.
- (l) Drug or alcohol abuse (not addiction).
- (m) Unsound moral background in the family.
- (n) Unacceptable free-time utilization by the child.
- (o) Extreme attention seeking behaviour by the child.
- (p) Aggressive, vandalistic and almost uncontrollable behaviour at school and/or home by the child.

Should a child's problems be considered too serious for a clinic school placement because of the poor prognosis for success of pedotherapy, the child is referred to the Department of Social Welfare for placement at institutions geared to handle such children, e.g. industrial schools, reform schools, drug rehabilitation centres, mental health hospitals, etc.

## 1.6 MORAL JUDGMENT

In view of the operational definition of moral judgment (see 1.4.3) only Kohlbergian, or cognitive-developmental, moral judgment will be examined here. This is so because moral judgment in this empirical study is based on Kohlberg's Moral Dilemmas and the measurement of moral judgment in terms of these dilemmas by means of the Standard Issue Scoring System. Kohlberg's theory of moral development is more accurately a theory of moral judgment (see 4.1).

The Kohlbergian or cognitive-developmental approach to a definition and measurement of moral judgment assumes three basic concepts: phenomenism, structuralism and constructivism (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 1). A phenomenological approach assumes that moral judgments and rational argumentations are the very essence of moral psychology. Moral judgments are seen as meaningful in their own right and not as resulting from internal irrational feelings or outside forces. Moral judgments here refer to moral reality as perceived by the individual. The researcher must try to understand what the individual subject means when he makes a moral judgment and not attribute any meaning from an outside interpretation system unshared by the individual. The subject's interpretation of a situation and behaviour is important because the moral quality of the behaviour is determined by this interpretation. While it is obvious that individuals do not always do what they think is right, the Kohlbergian approach is to assume that their thinking about moral questions and interpretation of

moral right and wrong are important, if not infallible, determinants of moral behaviour (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 2). Judgment is seen then as a definite part of action and moral judgment needs **"to be assessed if moral conduct is to be understood"** (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 2).

The second concept assumed by the cognitive-developmental approach to the measurement of moral judgment is according to Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 2) that of structuralism. Like Piaget (see 2.3.1), Kohlberg clearly distinguishes between the content of moral judgment and its structure or form. Structure is the general organizing patterns of thought and not specific moral beliefs. Concepts are not seen as being learned or used independently of one another but as being bound by common structural features (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 2-4). Kohlberg's emphasis on form rather than content is because it shows developmental regularity and generalizability within and across individuals. The measurement of moral judgment consists then of an analysis of those observable patterns of thought which are revealed in the subject's responses to Kohlberg's moral judgment interviews allowing the scorer to abstract stage structure from observation (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 2-4).

The third basic concept assumed by the Kohlbergian or cognitive-developmental approach to the measurement of moral judgment is according to Kohlberg (1987: 4-5) that of constructivism. The implication here is that by

thinking about and acting on the world, human beings construct meanings for themselves. By interacting with his world, the individual constructs and reconstructs reality. All this functioning is creative in that individuals are continually inventing or constructing responses to each situation with which they are faced. The form of such a response is, however, determined by the individual's current developmental level (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 4-5).

\*\*\*\*\*



## CHAPTER 2

### MORAL JUDGMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: RESEARCH PRIOR TO THAT OF KOHLBERG

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter relevant research done into moral judgment and development prior to that of Laurence Kohlberg will be examined. This research will be examined particularly with regard to whether clear stages of moral development were discerned, that is, clear patterns of moral development, and whether or not such developmental patterns of morality, if discerned, were considered to be cognitive. The research of Jean Piaget will be examined in some detail because of (a) his emphasis on moral judgment as being cognitive, (b) his developmental scheme, and (c) his strong influence on the research of Kohlberg whose measure of the level of moral judgment is used in this research.

#### 2.2 RESEARCH PRIOR TO THAT OF PIAGET

Macaulay and Watkins (1925-6 as quoted by Kay, 1968: 35) studied the environmental influences which affect the development of moral values. They used the 'unsophisticated device' (Kay, 1968: 35) of asking their sample of 300 school pupils of all ages to list the most wicked things a person could do and also to choose a person they would most wish to be, giving reasons for this choice. Sufficient evidence for analysis was gained and the general conclusions reached implied that, though it was clear that children build up a value system through the acceptance of social

conventions, which are culturally based, in early childhood, a general pattern of moral development can be traced through childhood (Kay, 1968: 35).

Hartshorne and May (1928-30 as quoted by Duska & Whelan, 1977: 5) in their '**Character Education Inquiry**' produced research findings opposed to those of Macaulay and Watkins in that they were unable to discern any pattern of moral development from their research. This examination of the conduct of adolescent secondary school pupils by Hartshorne and May emphasized the complexity of moral behaviour. It also raised serious problems concerning existing moral education programmes in '**the homes, schools, clubs and church groups**' (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 5) because no correlation was found between character training and actual behaviour.

Hartshorne and May reached the same basic conclusions in each of a long series of studies of stealing, cheating and lying and these were that:

- (a) there is no correlation between character training and actual behaviour;
- (b) cheating is '**normally distributed around a level of moderate cheating and normally everyone cheats to a degree**' (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 6);
- (c) moral behaviour is not consistent in any one person from one situation to another; and

- (d) there is no necessary relationship between what a person says about morality and his actual actions (Kay, 1968: 35-39).

Hartshorne and May concluded from their research that the factors which produce moral actions are so complex that any generalization about moral behaviour, or any pattern of moral development, is not possible. They thus saw morality as being situation specific and discerned no patterns of moral development whether cognitive of nature or not (Kay, 1968: 35).

Kohlberg (1984: 3) noted that Hartshorne and May found that adolescents, and by extension, adults, cannot be divided into two groups, the conscientiously honest and conscientiously dishonest, because situational factors which are independent of conscience appear to be the determinants of honest or dishonest behaviour. Kohlberg is of the opinion that Hartshorne and May and other social relativists find no internally governed or conscientious behaviour because they ignore the own points of view of individual moral actors. It is for this reason that Kohlberg starts out from the moral judgment of the actor so as to avoid any problems of cultural or individual relativity because he believes in culturally universal moral values which develop through an invariant sequence of stages of moral development (Kohlberg, 1984: 3).

Hartshorne and May defined morality by what Kohlberg (1984: 227) sees as a narrow conception of justice

concentrating as they did on honesty and altruism and care as service. Hartshorne and May came to their basic virtues of morality by polling educational, community and religious leaders and ended up with honesty, service and self-control. They decided that the less a child cheated the better was that child's character (Kohlberg, 1984: 499). While Hartshorne and May, according to Kohlberg (1984: 263), assumed internal determinants of moral behaviour they were unable to **"establish the proposition that such virtues as honesty and service are empirically demonstrable habits"** (Kohlberg, 1984: 263). This was because their definition of moral acts ignored moral judgments which their experimental subjects might have made. For Kohlberg, moral action cannot be understood without reference to moral judgment which must be assessed as **'part of the definition of an action as moral'** (Kohlberg, 1984: 263). The **"judgment of whether an act is morally right or good, morally bad or wrong or morally neutral can be decided only by studying the moral judgments and motivations which inform it"** (Kohlberg, 1984: 393).

Kohlberg (1984: 507) is of the opinion that Hartshorne and May failed in their attempt to define character because of a philosophic mistake in defining their measures of moral behaviour and judgment in terms of **'a culturally relative definition of a bag of virtues'** (Kohlberg, 1984: 507) and ignoring the fact that individuals must internally organize such norms prior to making a moral choice. Kay (1968: 36) also notes this basic flaw in the approach of Hartshorne and May which was that their tests examined only moral

traits and not moral judgment or development. The methodology of Hartshorne and May, in its emphasis on the specific elements of moral behaviour, led them, according to Kay (1968: 37), to mistake the parts for the whole, to mistake moral traits for moral development.

Kay (1968: 37/38) felt that a clear pattern of moral development can clearly be traced in the growth of each individual as was held by Macaulay and Watkins but also that particular actions are influenced by specific situations as was found by Hartshorne and May. Kay thus feels that a synthesis of their findings is of value because moral behaviour is neither as specific as Hartshorne and May believed nor as general as Macaulay and Watkins believed. Kohlberg (1984: 26) notes that **"the assertion that moral judgment undergoes regular age development and that this development is in some sense cognitive has seldom been questioned since the research of Hartshorne and May and Piaget"** (Kohlberg, 1984: 26). The purely theoretical thinking of John Dewey was the first major influence on Kohlberg's theory of moral development (see 3.3.3).

Dewey (1930: 358) postulated three levels of moral development which roughly correspond to those of Kohlberg (see 4.4). Dewey's first level of moral development was the Pre-moral (or Pre-conventional) Level where behaviour is motivated by biological and social impulses with specific results for moral development. Dewey's second level of moral development was the

Conventional Level where the individual accepts group standards but does not critically reflect on them. In Dewey's third level of moral development, the Autonomous Level, the individual thinks and judges for himself whether a purpose is good or bad and this guides his future behaviour. The individual no longer blindly accepts the standards of his group. The reasoning and judging aspects of Dewey's third level clearly implies a higher level of cognitive development. Dewey postulated a developmental scheme which was cognitive (Kohlberg, 1975: 1).

Dewey assumed that while behaviour is determined by the specific situation presented, such a situation is as it is defined by the individual as a result of sensitivities developed from earlier situations, "One and the same environmental change becomes a thousand different stimuli under different conditions of ongoing or serial behaviour" (Dewey, 1930: 108). It is clear from this that Dewey felt that early experiences determine one or other sequence of moral development.

## **2.3 THE RESEARCH OF JEAN PIAGET (1932)**

### **2.3.1 Introduction**

The most important and influential earlier research in the field of moral judgment was done by Jean Piaget and recorded in his 'The Moral Judgment of the Child' (1932). In this work he recorded the mental processes

and thought structures underlying the moral judgments made by children. In the forward to 'The Moral Judgment of the Child', Piaget (1932: 7) emphasizes that **'it is moral judgment that we propose to investigate, not moral behaviour or sentiments'**. Piaget (1932: 9) saw all morality as consisting of rules and that **"the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules"** (Piaget, 1932: 9). This led Piaget to concern himself with the influence of adult constraint on the child, the effect of social co-operation on moral judgment and also the effect of cognitive development on moral thought.

According to Piaget, moral judgment is developmental because it changes with age and experience. Piaget, like Kohlberg later, sees moral judgment not as a process where the rules and virtues are simply imprinted but as **'a process involving transformation of cognitive structures'** (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 7).

Piaget accepted that moral development results from an active process which involves the development of certain cognitive capacities as well as an exposure to new social experiences. Those new social experiences are those of role-taking within the peer group which allows the movement from moral realism, so closely linked to adult restraint, to autonomy (see 2.3.2) because the child is now able to share in decision making which has a profound effect on the child's view of authority and rules. Moral autonomy **"appears when**

the mind regards as necessary an ideal that is independent of all external pressure" (Piaget, 1932: 189) and this moral autonomy appears only with reciprocity "when mutual respect is strong enough to make the individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be treated" (Piaget, 1932: 189).

### 2.3.2 Piaget's Stages of Moral Judgment

Prior to the discussion of Piaget's stages it must be noted that all the ages mentioned regarding the three stages are approximates and as, one would expect in a developmental theory of moral judgment, in no way strict. In terms of developmental theory the child is also not seen as being purely at one stage, completely unaffected by the stages above and/or below.

Piaget's Stage I is the Pre-Moral stage where no obligation to any rules exists. This stage lasts from birth to about four years of age. In this period the child engages in symbolic play and invents make-believe private games with his or her own rules. Stage I is much more a stage of play than one of morality because the games are private and individual allowing no co-operation or competition with other children (Piaget, 1932: 36/37).

Piaget's Stage II is the Heteronomous stage (also



called moral realism or the morality of constraint) where to be right one has to obey rules in a very literal way and where obligation is seen as a submission to **"power and punishment"** (Kohlberg, 1975: 1). This second stage emerges when the child is about five years of age. The child's rules are now permanent, sacred and external laws, usually laid down by adults, which must under no circumstances be transgressed. Rules cannot be modified for any reason at this stage (Damon, 1980: 40). Behaviour is seen as either completely right or completely wrong and is judged in terms of consequences, conformation to set rules and whether or not it is followed by reward or punishment (Piaget, 1932: 188).

Stage II lasts until the child is about eight years of age and is strongly affected by egocentrism, a cognitive trait, realism, and the child's heteronomous respect for adults. This egocentrism and incapacity to differentiate between reality and fantasy are characteristics of Piaget's Pre-operational cognitive stage (Richmond, 1970: 34). Only when egocentrism and realism have been discarded is the child able to move on to the next moral stage, the Autonomous Stage. Both maturation and experience play an important role in this stage transition.

The Autonomous Stage is Piaget's Stage III (also called Reciprocity or the Morality of Co-operation). At this stage the child considers the reasons for, and consequences of, following rules and obligation is

based on reciprocity (Kohlberg, 1975: 1). Rules are seen as "the outcome of a free decision and worthy of respect in measure that they have enlisted mutual consent" (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 8). Rules are no longer obeyed because they originate from superiors but are seen as requirements for group relationships. Adults are rejected to a degree as normative restraining factors. Rules can now be modified to meet individual and situational needs and wrong and right are no longer absolutes (Piaget, 1932: 187-189).

Piaget's autonomy refers to freedom from the constraint of heteronomy and must not be confused with the ultimate autonomy of Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6 (see 4.4.3) but more as a basis for social interaction which is necessary for further moral development. The heteronomous stage is only superseded when the child can see motive and intention as of prime importance. Parents are able to facilitate moral development by placing themselves at the child's own level to allow feelings of equality and by stressing their own deficiencies and obligations. The Autonomous Stage morality is that of social sanction, **"a morality of reciprocity and not obedience. This is the true morality of intention"** (Piaget, 1932: 132).

Damon (1980: 41) notes that Piaget deals very briefly also with a fourth stage which emerges when the child is about eleven years of age. This stage is associated with **"an 'ideological' mode of moral reasoning"** (Damon, 1980: 41) which allows the child to consider more complex social and political issues.

Piaget (1932: 193) claimed that the evidence of his research pointed to a sequential relationship between the stages separated by intermediate phases, **"during which rules and commands are interiorized and generalized"** (Piaget, 1932: 193). The co-operation which leads to autonomy is characterized for Piaget by justice which characterizes an advanced moral stage in children and which is not dependent on adults.

### **2.3.3 Important Criticism of Piaget's Theory of Moral Judgment**

Piaget's theory of moral judgment has been criticized as a whole or in part by many of the researchers that followed him. Certain researchers rejected the notion of a developmental scheme (Isaacs, 1934 & Harrower, 1934 as quoted by Kay, 1968: 47). Others felt Piaget was too superficial in seeing moral realism simply as adult constraint (Lerner, 1937 as quoted by Kay, 1968: 48) and ignoring such predisposing aspects as social class and varying societies (MacRae, 1950 as quoted by Kay, 1968: 48). It has been suggested that Piaget should have investigated whether the transition through the stages of morality are due simply to maturation or whether specific social, family or educational traditions also play a role (Peters, 1981: 13). Much post-Piagetian research has been with adolescents and has tended to indicate that moral judgment matures more slowly than Piaget concluded, **"adolescents arrive at Piaget's level of mature autonomous judgment between twelve and seventeen years and not between eleven and twelve as Piaget says"** (Loughran, 1967 as quoted by Kay, 1968: 179).

Kohlberg (1971: 139) postulated three stages beyond those of Piaget because of the incompleteness of the Piagetian scheme where the autonomous stage is "yet far from the morality of mutual respect and social contract which is shared both by the humanitarian liberals and bureaucratic constitutionalists" (Kohlberg, 1971: 139).

#### **2.4 RESEARCH AFTER PIAGET AND PRIOR TO KOHLBERG**

Havighurst and Taba (1949) studied morality in the context of character and personality. They saw character as something specific and moral, "It is used in the current sense of 'moral character'" (Havighurst & Taba, 1949: 3). For them, character developed through reward and punishment, unconscious imitation and reflective thinking. They postulated two levels of character, the first controlled by social expectation, the second by moral ideals. Though Havighurst and Taba (1949: 3) defined morality as an amalgamation of traits as did Hartshorne and May (see 2.2), they like Piaget (see 2.3) and later Kohlberg (see 4.4), postulated a developmental pattern of morality, thus avoiding the errors of Hartshorne and May (see 2.2).

The most important conclusions reached in the study of Havighurst and Taba were:

- (a) adolescent moral values are strongly conditioned by both family and peers;
- (b) adolescents sixteen years of age are generally incapable of applying their moral values in a complex society;
- (c) emotional adjustment is an important requirement for moral development; and
- (d) there is a self-evident influence of Christian belief on moral development (Havighurst & Taba, 1949: 3).

All the above conclusions are of importance to this research project. The influence of the peer group and the family on moral development will be discussed in some detail in a later chapter (4.6.2 and 4.6.3) while the necessity of emotional adjustment should be indicated if the research hypothesis (see 5.2) of this empirical study is shown to be valid because the subjects in the experimental group are behaviourally and emotionally handicapped adolescents. Acceptance of the conclusion that sixteen year olds are generally incapable of applying their moral values would make one question the value of moral education or therapeutic moral development for adolescents under the age of sixteen years.

Gesell, Ilg and Ames (1965) studied the total development of the child from five to sixteen years of age and

discerned a morality groundplan laid in the pre-school years which was modified during two cycles, i.e. from 6 to 10 years and from 11 to 16 years. Most important to the present study is that, like both Piaget and Kohlberg later, Gesell, et al. (1965: 465) saw moral growth as sequential, with each step only possible because of the preceding one, a clear trend from the specific to the general, from the concrete to the abstract.

Gesell, et al. (1965: 465) saw the cardinal moral virtue as a concern for fairness, **"which progresses from fairness claimed for the individual to fairness also claimed for others"** (Gesell, et al., 1965: 465). Gesell then saw egocentrism developing into altruism in accord with cognitive development. Gesell, et al. (1965: 465) saw all behaviour, including moral behaviour, as emerging from a need to adapt and such adaptation allows individual growth. The abundant evidence of Gesell's study clearly pointed, according to Kay (1968: 55), to moral development as being sequential and having a developmental pattern.

In a 1960 study of the predictability and persistence of moral conduct, Peck and Havighurst (1960: 166) came to the following important conclusions:

- (a) the evidence supported an enduring basic pattern of moral character moulded mainly by experiences of a parental or familial nature which was later reinforced by the peer group;

- (b) the empirical findings substantiated the hypothesizing of character types in terms of moral stage development;
- (c) moral development has both static and dynamic elements, dynamic in that children develop morally and pass through different sequential stages but also static because moral conduct remains basically the same; and
- (d) a tentative suggestion of moral stages, related to the 5 hypothesized character types, was made:
- Amoral - infancy,
  - Expedient - early childhood,
  - Conforming - later childhood,
  - Irrational-conscientious - late childhood, and
  - Rational-altruistic - adolescence to adulthood.

## 2.5 SUMMARY

The research examined in this chapter has aimed in the main at indicating that there exist clear sequential stages in the moral development of the individual and that this development is of a cognitive nature and influenced by environmental phenomena such as experience, the peer group, the family and specific situations. This research is relevant in its relation to the later theory of moral development of Laurence

Kohlberg whose theory and measurement of moral judgment forms the basis of this study. It is clearly easier to trace a developmental pattern of moral development than to postulate the cognitive aspect of such development but both aspects were covered in the review of research.

The contrasting early studies of Macaulay and Watkins (1925-26) and Hartshorne and May (1928-30) are relevant because if the findings of the latter pair are to be accepted then a sequential pattern of moral development, of cardinal importance to the later theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, cannot be accepted. A great weight of later research, however, indicates that Macaulay and Watkins were correct in discerning a clear developmental pattern that could be traced in moral development. Hartshorne and May erred methodologically when they examined moral traits and not morality itself. The fact that particular actions are affected by factors specific to particular situations does not imply that a pattern of moral development cannot be clearly traced in moral development.

While John Dewey's theoretical levels of moral development clearly influenced Kohlberg, it was Jean Piaget, with a clear developmental scheme and a strong emphasis on the cognitive nature of moral judgment, who most influenced Kohlberg. Piaget's scheme was found by later researchers to be incomplete, mainly because his research was limited to children up to the age of twelve years, but the influence of Piaget on later researchers cannot be overemphasized.



The other research examined also emphasized the developmental pattern of morality, i.e. Havighurst and Taba (1949), Gesell, et al. (1946-56) and Peck and Havighurst (1960).

\*\*\*\*\*

## CHAPTER 3

### THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KOHLEBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

According to Likona (1976a: 4), Kohlberg is "virtually the only contemporary psychologist to embrace philosophy as essential to defining what is moral as the first step in the study of moral development". This emphasis on the philosophical is a result of Kohlberg's belief that "the concept of morality is itself a philosophical (ethical) matter rather than a behavioural concept" (Kohlberg, 1971: 152).

Hoffman (1970: 261) discerned three major philosophical doctrines applicable to the study of moral development. The first of these was the Doctrine of Original Sin where both parental and educational intervention are seen as vital. It is this doctrine which is applicable when moral development is later (see 3.2) discussed from a Christian perspective and can also be seen in a modified form in Freudian Theory with its emphasis on guilt production when moral standards are violated.

The second important philosophical doctrine is that of *Tabula Rasa*, or the clean slate doctrine, where the child is seen as neither pure nor corrupt and parental influence and education are again emphasized. The empirical sensual systems of Lock and Hume are part of this doctrine. Moral acts are learned on a reward and punishment basis, in a behaviourist way, and reason

plays no great role in this imprinting of moral standards (Hoffman, 1970: 261).

The doctrine of Innate Purity is the third one noted by Hoffman and has as its adherents both Piaget and Kohlberg. This doctrine had its origins in the philosophy of J-J Rousseau who saw society, and more particularly adults, as corrupting forces with regard to the child's development. Here peer interaction and the development of cognitive processes for moral maturity are of the greatest importance (Hoffman, 1970: 261).

In the section on the philosophical foundations of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, an examination will first be conducted into moral development from a Christian perspective (see 3.2), then into the major philosophical influences on Kohlberg's own view of morality (see 3.3), particularly the moral philosophies of Kant and Rawls, before examining (see 3.4) and critically evaluating (see 3.5) Kohlberg's philosophy of moral development. To conclude this chapter a possible limited acceptance of Kohlberg's theory of moral development from a Christian perspective will be considered (see 3.6).

### **3.2 MORAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE**

Du Plessis (1971: 81) clearly expresses the view of the Christian philosopher when he writes that, "Die Wysbegeerte het nie 'n selfstandige oorsprong náas die ge-

loof nie" (Philosophy does not have an independent origin besides religion). As a Christian philosopher, Du Plessis cannot accept philosophical starting points like the material (Aristotle) or the reason (Kant) or other diverse starting points like existence, consciousness or values. He sees no possibility of the existence of a neutral philosophy. Du Plessis (1971: 81) sees the essential difference between Christian philosophy and all other philosophical systems as the fact that Christian philosophy is at the very beginning bound to the Absolute, to God the Creator of all things.

In accord with this view of Christian philosophy, the Calvinist Christian's view of morality is that God, as the Creator of man, gave to man, among His many gifts, his moral aptitude, one of the essential features of his being human, and also determined all moral values. The 'moral' is not an absolute then for the Christians as it is for Kant, for whom the nature of morality, the good, autonomous will, is absolute. From the Kantian perspective a dependence of the moral on the non-moral is not applicable, but in Christian morality only God is absolute and He is the absolute foundation of all He created, including the moral. God is not perceived as morally good by the Christian because He is above morality and His Goodness is beyond human understanding.

Stoker (1941: 12) while rejecting Kantian emphasis on moral freedom and autonomy, rejected also any disregard or ignoring of the importance of the moral. As a Calvinist Christian philosopher, Stoker condemns

all attempts to understand the moral in terms of that which is non-moral, for example, he claims that the moral cannot be understood psychologically because it differs from and is more than the psychic (Stoker, 1941: 12). According to Stoker (1941: 13) the moral law is different to the psychic law because it formulates that which ought to be, while the psychic law formulates that which is. For Stoker (1941: 13) the moral cannot be explained in terms of drives, needs, complexes, fear associations, emotional experiences, etc., because it is unique with its own nature and meaning. The moral is then original and dependent, determined by God and not an absolute for the Christian philosopher. The absolute foundation of the moral is God.

Duska and Whelan (1977: 8) considered the distinction between the moral point of view and the religious perspective and found that they were unable to agree with Frankena who wrote: **"One needs to distinguish the moral point of view from the religious point of view. Ethics has its own principles quite distinct from religion"** (Frankena, 1963: 5). While noting the distinction, Duska and Whelan could not accept that religious belief and God are irrelevant to ethics. The Christian philosopher sees ethics as God given principles. As Christians, **"we do not have a corner on the truth about moral issues"** (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 8), but God and religion are related to moral issues because religion consists of both a theoretical and a practical aspect, **"Theoretically it (religion) gives one a world perspective, a metaphysical view of**

man and his relation to a transcendent being. But if such a metaphysical view is religious, it will have an existential impact and will result in practical judgments and actions" (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 81). Morality can, therefore, be asserted because such practical judgments and actions are informed by religious reasons.

The Christian perspective provides us with a content for any formal structure identified in moral development. This is because Christianity supplies the religious reasons for our moral beliefs, for example, when one is at a stage where group relations tend to determine individual ideals, the God-chosen group of people who form the church play a paramount role in one's view of what is right or wrong as a Christian.

### 3.3 THE PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES ON KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

In his philosophical foundation to his theory of moral development, Kohlberg attempts to avoid the '**naturalistic fallacy**' because he sees concepts like justice, the rights of children, adult freedom and human dignity as the starting point of his psychological research (Kohlberg, 1984: XIV). The '**naturalistic fallacy**' is "the fallacy that the philosophic question: Why is some action really right or good? can be directly answered by social scientific statements about the causation and motivation of the action"

(Kohlberg, 1984: XIV). Kohlberg was influenced in his philosophic thought by philosophers ranging from Socrates and Aristotle to Dewey, and Rawls with a large slice of Kant in between.

In Kohlberg's **Essays on Moral Development** (1984), he concentrates on the Socratic question **'What is a virtuous man, and what is a virtuous school and society which educates virtuous men?'** In line with Socrates, Kant and Piaget, Kohlberg (1984: XV) concludes that the main virtue of a person, school or society is justice, interpreted in a democratic way as equity or equal respect for all people. Like Socrates and Dewey, Kohlberg sees virtue as **"both first and finally a question of education which is the practice of philosophy"** (Kohlberg, 1984: XV).

### 3.3.1 Socrates and Plato

The philosophic theory of Socrates, expressed by Plato in the **Dialogues**, has been called **"rational intuitionism"** by Rawls (quoted by Gardner, 1983: 1). The theory can be said to be rational because man must use his intellect to grasp the absolute and eternal truths upon which the world of the senses is modelled. The theory can be called intuitionist because these truths are intuitive knowledge in man which must be drawn out by reason to be known. Man is able to recall such basic moral concepts as the Right, the Good and the Just because he once belonged to the ideal world in

which they reside. Man's soul, according to Socrates, originated in and will return to where moral truths reside.

The **'forms'** (ideas) are the **"antecedent causes of all that is found in the physical world"** (Gardner, 1983: 1). The forms have both a logical and a metaphysical side. The term, for example, **'tree'** refers to all trees regardless of differing physical attributes, but metaphysically, there exists, for Socrates, in the **'ideal world'** an **'ideal tree'** which is unique and unchanging and it is to this that the general term refers. Particular physical trees are what they are because they partake in the reality of the **'ideal tree'**. The forms are remote from the changing world of the senses and are simple and unchanging, real and pure.

For Socrates, virtue is the greatest Good and the paramount reason for evil is ignorance. Man must have knowledge to reach the Good, so Socrates sees the Good as knowledge. This clear link between the Good and knowledge is typical of ancient Greek thought but is opposed by Christian ethics where the emphasis is on purity of heart which Bertrand Russell (1959: 52) sees as being as readily found in the ignorant. For Socrates, to know the Good is to do the Good and he sees virtue, combining order and justice, as knowledge of the Good and that which leads to happiness in man.



Kohlberg is particularly influenced by the Socratic claim that virtue is justice and rests on a knowledge of the Good, with moral education being a drawing out from within by means of the Socratic Dialectical Method (Kohlberg, 1984: XVII). For Socrates all learning, including moral learning, is a remembering (anamnesis) of things learned by the soul in the ideal world - **"education is a therapy of the soul"** (Russell, 1959: 69).

### 3.3.2 Immanuel Kant

Kohlberg has been strongly influenced by the moral theory of Kant. Kant's moral theory has as its central aspects that rational man is the end point of nature, that he exists for no other end than himself and that he, therefore, has an absolute and ultimate value. Like Plato, Kant separated man's world into the Sensible and the Intelligible. First principles are seen as '**a priori**' because they are of the Intelligible world where reason alone resides, i.e. outside man's sensible world. For Kant these principles are the bases from which we are able to make correct moral judgments. Such moral judgments can come only from the exercise of man's reason which provides **"the moral truths which guide man's actions"** (Gardner, 1983: 11).

Kant sought a fixed basis for man's knowledge in man's reason. He distinguished between theoretical and practical reason, where theoretical (or speculative) reason implies empirical experience while practical

reason, or the will, is the seat of the ethical including morality and moral judgment. In the practical reason there are commandments which arise not from experience but are grounded in the organization of our will and are **a priori, general and necessary**. Kant sees the essence of the ethical as a priori and ultimately dependent on practical reason which has the ability to determine whether a commandment should be instituted (Kant, 1964: 48).

The Kantian Intelligible world cannot be known by man because human knowledge is a combination of sense and conception which cannot be separated. As man is subject to the laws of both the Sensible and Intelligible worlds, for Kant, he is unable to enter the pure world of the Intelligible as Plato had argued. The Intelligible world is **an idea which it is not possible to know** (Kant, 1964: 118).

Kant postulates a supreme principle of morality, the Categorical Imperative, which is a self-legislated principle. According to Kant it is non-moral considerations, like self-interest, which **obscure man's desire to follow the moral law**, and man can only be sure of doing a moral act when he acts from the motive of duty (Kant, 1964: 61).

Kant's view of man is that he is by nature evil and that this evil has its origin in his reason and not in religion. If a natural law determined this evil then

man could not be said to be responsible for his actions and, for Kant, every person is alone responsible for his actions and his decision regarding good or bad character is a logical act of the reason. Man's evil, like his goodness lies, for Kant, in his ethical attitude which might be too weak to allow him to act ethically, or too impure to allow him to act out of duty, or in the rejection of the ethical by the individual (Gardner, 1983: 11).

Kant assumes that rational man has within himself, from the beginning, the ability to be a fully autonomous moral being capable of following self-legislated moral imperatives without outside interference. The state and other institutions, like church and school, cannot in Kant's view, make man moral because **"only the individual can do that for himself"** (Ladd, 1965: IX). Individual rights are vital to Kant's theory because both morality and laws are based on these rights (Ladd, 1965: IX).

'Good Will' is Kant's highest Good and it shows itself in a good and secure character whereby man is able to act from first principles. Such a character is moral in that it is determined by **"what a person intends doing and not what he manages to do"** (Kant, 1964: 62). The outcome of an act does not detract from the moral value of the act done from Good Will. The moral value of an act depends rather on the unconditional moral value of the motive of duty. A person having Good Will acts for the sake of duty.

The function of reason, for Kant, is to produce a Good Will and pure practical reason formulates the moral laws in accord with which man must act from the motive of duty. These moral laws have their roots in the supreme moral law, the Categorical Imperative, which Kant sees as absolute, universal, binding, necessary and morally good and which can be formulated, "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law" (Kant, 1964: 88).

The philosophy of Kant is, for various reasons, unacceptable to the Christian thinker. Brümmer (1971: 17-18) distinguishes four religious foundations which he considers the most influential to Western thought:

- (1) the form-material foundation of the ancient Greeks;
- (2) the Biblical foundation of Creation, the Fall and Redemption through Jesus Christ;
- (3) the attempted synthesis of the first two by the Roman Catholic Church; and
- (4) the modern humanistic foundation of nature and freedom which attempts to synthesize all three foundations.

Dooyeweerd (as quoted by Brümmer, 1971: 17-18) sees the philosophy of Kant as having a dualistically split nature because of the tension which exists between freedom and nature. Dooyeweerd sees the polarity of the

religious bases in humanism as being caused by the making absolute of temporal aspects or groups of aspects of the created reality.

Kant emphasized and made absolute both the normative and reasoning functions of man. This making absolute of temporal aspects of created reality causes a tension between the elements forming the foundation for thought. The meaning of the humanistic nature foundation cannot be understood except in terms of the freedom foundation and vice versa (Brümmer, 1971: 22). For the Christian thinker thought cannot be religiously neutral and nor can anything be seen as absolute except God. The Christian thinker opines that any dualistic starting point or foundation for thought will lead to unsound theoretical concepts because it is the religious foundation which makes all theoretical thought possible and theoretical thought cannot solve the religious conflict by means of a theoretical synthesis of the foundations. Kant's emphasis on the reasoning and normative functions of man led to ethics and religion being separated from the scientific ideal which Kant saw as being limited to the Sensible world.

Kant's inability to balance his conception of a personality ideal, which included the idea of normative autonomous freedom, with the sensual nature of man, led to Kant's pessimistic view of nature and his acceptance of man's inherent evil (Brümmer, 1971: 22).

The Christian philosopher is also unable to accept Kant's views on God and religion. Kant sees God as an idea, an ideal of the pure reason which is not knowable to man; God is a postulation of the practical reason and not knowable through the categories which are only applicable to the sensible world. Kant sees any knowledge as to the nature of God as unimportant and feels that man should concern himself only with what God means to man as an ethical being.

Religion is, for Kant, not a belief or faith in a supernatural being but rather a belief in a will towards the Good which God created in man. Religion is based on the ethical which is unique and independent of religion and does not, for Kant, depend on religion for its existence. Religion implies a practical belief in God for Kant and is thus identical to the moral. The duties determined by the ethical law are achieved in religion and morality and for Kant no specific duties exist towards God.

### 3.3.3 John Dewey

Like Dewey, Kohlberg sees the aim and purpose of a person's life as intellectual, moral and personal development (Kohlberg, 1984: XV). Dewey's philosophical thinking, which had a strong impact on that of Kohlberg, is an amalgamation of various philosophical trends.

Firstly Dewey was a follower of Darwinian Naturalism **"with its concepts of adaptation and the struggle for existence"** (Rusk, 1969: 308). Coetzee (1965: 44/45) sees Naturalism as no more than a generalization in philosophic terms of the natural sciences where all originates in and returns to nature which contains unchanging natural laws which explain all appearances. Truth and knowledge can only be obtained through sensual perception. In pure Naturalism there can be no absolute values and temporalism is stressed because nature is progressive and changing and one must adapt now to be able to adapt in the future. Ancient Greek Materialism, the Aristotelian view that the physical can explain the spiritual, Pantheism with its emphasis on the impersonal power of the natural world and pragmatism, so important to Dewey's thought, are all forms of Naturalism, as are positivism, relativism, empiricism and instrumentalism.

Secondly Dewey was also strongly influenced by Socialism where the social aspect of reality and man's social function are made absolute. All human activity is seen as flowing from society. The individual is seen as an abstraction because a person can only be said to exist in the society of other individuals. In Socialism all knowledge comes from the concrete life in society and it must be useful to society as a whole. Individual knowledge is seen as worthless. For the Socialist all values are embodied in society and a man's actions are good or bad in relation to whether or not they further the aims of society or are in accord with the laws of society. Man is seen as a social animal, a product of

the society in which he lives. All man's goals, aims, and desires are society related. The ethic of Socialism depends on the value of actions to the society (Van Wyk, 1973: 1-3).

The third important philosophical foundation of Dewey's thought was Pragmatism where working practice is made absolute. Here truth is that which is practically experienced and experience is the source of all knowledge and knowledge is that which can be applied in practice. Knowledge must be instrumental and only has value if it can be implemented. The epistemological bases of Dewey's thought are by nature pragmatistic and he states that: **"we have no right to call anything knowledge except where our activity has actually produced certain physical changes in things, which agree with and confirm the conceptions entertained"** (Dewey, 1916: 393). Dewey saw the act as coming before thought and thus a motive does not produce or predate an act. The pragmatist epistemology sees knowledge as being born in action and the truth of knowledge lies in practice. Truth is seen by Dewey as a dynamic changing incomplete thing. Truth is temporal because it is created by actions.

Dewey's moral philosophy is both pragmatic and socialistic of nature. His pragmatism makes him see that which is of value as true and should it also work in practice then he sees it as **'good'**. The Socialist influence makes him see the greatest **'good'** as that which works and is of value to the greatest number of



people. The public opinion of society then determines norms and there are no fixed or ideal values. It is Dewey's emphasis on man's civic role as related to intellectual, moral and personal growth and his desire for justice for all members of society which most influenced Kohlberg's thought. Many of Dewey's ideas find more concrete formulation in the philosophy of Rawls which will be examined later in this chapter (see 3.3.4).

Dewey "may be criticized for (his) lack of a consistent system of ethics that would bind (his) empiricism and its hidden metaphysical premises into a coherent unity" (Ulich, 1961: 37). Dewey's philosophy is unacceptable to the Christian thinker for many reasons. Dewey saw faith in the supernatural as responsibility avoidance and his pragmatism did not allow for any set norms or values outside experience. Unacceptable also is Dewey's view that the 'good' is that which is useful to the individual, and the greatest 'good' is that which is 'good' for the greatest number. This anthropocentric view concentrates on quantity above quality. The pragmatic ethic can be criticized because 'the source of values is located in the culture' (Shermis, 1967: 144) and because there can be "no stable philosophy without the guidance and wisdom of the supernatural" (Shermis, 1967: 144).

### 3.3.4 John Rawls

The Justice as Fairness Theory of John Rawls has had a strong influence on the moral philosophy of Kohlberg. Rawls, like Kant, maintains that moral laws are formulated by rational man. Rawls (1972: 3-17) argues that any conception of Justice is only justifiable in terms of its congruence with rational man's common sense which has its roots in man's total social history. Unlike Kant and Plato, Rawls does not postulate a separation of the intelligible and sensible worlds but like Kant he sees man's ordinary practical reason as the basis for the formulation of first principles.

Justice is, for Rawls, the basic structure of society which is concerned with fair distribution of basic rights and duties and with the fair settlement of contending claims. The principles of social justice are attained by collective and unanimous agreement and the individual makes his own decisions in conformity with this agreement. We have here to do with a collective sense of right and wrong.

Rawl's theory lays emphasis on those shared notions of common sense which are "explicit in the culture of a modern democratic society which form a foundation for consensus among rational moral people regarding the allocation of resources and social privileges" (Gardner, 1983: 15). These shared notions should form the bases of social institutions and "the standard by

which the claims of all citizens are justly weighed" (Gardner, 1983: 15). A basic requirement of the theory is the conception of a society of equal and free moral persons. The society has to be a well ordered one.

Rawls postulates two fair principles of Justice:

- \* The first principle is: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties with a similar system of liberty for all" (Rawls, 1972: 302).
- \* The second principle is: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
  - (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the savings principle;
  - and
  - (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under condition of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1972: 302).

Rawls sees inequalities as resulting from accidents of social position and natural endowment and the above pair of principles must first be applied to these inequalities. When the principles of Justice have been

established every individual person will be free to seek his own personal individual good if adhering to the ground rules (Rawls, 1972: 300-303).

Rawl's Theory of Fairness accepts that there will be great variation in philosophical, religious and moral beliefs and no attempt is made by Rawls to formulate universal standards in these spheres. The institutions of the well-ordered society should shape the aims and character of their members and always be open to public scrutiny. The most important primary good is self-respect, which is the individual's sense of own value (Rawls, 1972: 440).

As for Dewey, society plays a paramount role in Rawl's ethical viewpoint and the criticisms earlier with regard to Dewey from a Christian viewpoint are again applicable. The emphasis placed by Rawls on individual freedom and a collective sense of what is wrong and right cannot be accepted by the Christian thinker because he does not see either aspect as dependent on society but only on God. For the Christian, man is a creation of God and not a product of society and the same can be said of the ethical.

#### **3.4 THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAURENCE KOHLBERG**

Kohlberg's morality theory is a duties and rights ethical theory where the moral **ought**, as for Kant,

is intrinsically valuable regardless of the results obtained by acting upon it. Like both Kant and Rawls, Kohlberg claims that rational individuals can co-exist in harmony by adhering to self-determined rational standards. Kohlberg, like Rawls, does not claim that first principles originate in antecedent causes but nor does he deny this. Kohlberg sees antecedent causes "as unnecessary for objective knowledge of the material world" (Gardner, 1983: 17).

According to Gardner (1983: 18) Kohlberg's view is that morality is autonomous and formalistic and not concerned with the reasons why an individual should act morally but rather it is a procedure for arriving at "a fair distribution of rights and of social advantage for the citizens of a modern democratic society and a set of principles by which rational man is to make moral judgments" (Gardner, 1983: 18). This procedure is called 'ideal role-taking' by Kohlberg (1984: 303) and is based on Rawls's description of pure procedural justice. Ideal role-taking implies first the imagining of oneself in each person's position and considering all the claims of each. Secondly one must place oneself under a veil of ignorance so that one is unaware who will be in a situation. Thirdly, one must ask oneself if one could rationally uphold each person's claim. Finally one weighs the claims and acts in accordance with the highest claim. The set of principles is:

- (1) Respect for persons: **Treat each person as an end and never as a means**" (Kohlberg, 1971: 212), and

- (2) Justice as Equity: "Treat each man's claim impartially regardless of the man" (Kohlberg, 1971: 212).

Important to the study of morality are Kohlberg's descriptions of how ordinary individuals actually reason about rights and duties. These descriptions based on Piagetian cognitive theory, hold that reasoning originates in and is developed by interaction between the individual and his environment. An individual assimilates new material from his environment and accommodates himself in order to incorporate and to use the new material.

Kohlberg postulates a universal ontogenic trend in the development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984: 282-287). Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were used to elicit reasoning about justice issues to test this postulation. Kohlberg's cross-cultural and longitudinal research also lent support to his postulation. Kohlberg's research indicated six invariant, irreversible, universal and structured whole stages which will be discussed in detail in a later chapter (see 4.4).

Kohlberg concluded from his research and study of moral philosophy and cognitive theory that moral development is not a process of learning arbitrary cultural rules and values (Gardner, 1983: 19). He saw rather a moral structure within the individual which functions through interaction between the individual and his socio-moral

environment. The influence of Piaget can be seen in Kohlberg's acceptance of this interaction.

It is clear that Kohlberg, like Kant and Rawls, sees the endpoint of human development as the perfectly rational man who aims at serving his own rational ends. For Kohlberg there is no predetermined 'good' towards which the individual strives and which guides the individual's actions, and moral laws are formulated in terms of man's reason.

### **3.5 A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF KOHLBERG'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY**

From the Christian perspective Kohlberg's moral philosophy can be criticized for the following reasons:

- (a) Influenced by the moral philosophies of Kant and Rawls, Kohlberg sees reason as absolute and as enough to identify and formulate moral laws.
- (b) For Kohlberg there is no predetermined standard of what is 'good'. He concentrates on studying human growth in terms of moral reasoning and makes no value judgments about individuals at different stages of moral development. Kohlberg is not concerned with what is right or wrong and higher stages simply indicate greater cognitive adequacy.

(c) Kohlberg does not see religious values as causes of the development of basic moral values. In his research he found that children's moral values in the religious area seem to go through the same stages as general moral values. Kohlberg does not see religious values as being unique causes of moral value development but as **"important factors in selectively elaborating certain themes in the moral life"** (Kohlberg, 1984: 174).

(d) All the earlier criticisms levelled against Kant, Dewey and Rawls with regard to the making absolute of reason, society, freedom, etc. are applicable also to Kohlberg.

Kohlberg has also been roundly criticized for accepting Kantian morality as the only one and ignoring all other widely accepted moral philosophies. Peters (1975: 678) feels that the principle of Justice, so important to Kohlberg, is problematic in Utilitarianism and that universalizability, also important to Kohlberg, is problematic in the morality of Integrity. Kohlberg's agreement with Kant that the value of any action lies in the law leading to it and not in the action itself is opposed to Utilitarianism where the value of any action is seen as lying in **"the worthwhile consequences it produced"** (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 77). Peters (1975: 678) sees Kohlberg's approach to morality as **"sheer legislation"** when he proclaims his morality as the true one and see Kohlberg as committing **"the worst form of naturalistic fallacy"** when he



argues from how morality is ordinarily used to what morality in fact is. It must here be noted that the criticisms in this paragraph are those of philosophers of varying persuasions whose beliefs in Utilitarianism, Integritism, etc. are also not acceptable to the Christian thinker - they are quoted to show that the moral philosophy of Kohlberg has been criticized on various fronts.

### **3.6 A LIMITED ACCEPTANCE OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE**

While the philosophical foundations of Kohlberg's theory of moral development differ greatly from the Christian perspective of morality and moral development, it can be argued that Kohlberg's developmental theory might be both acceptable to and compatible with Christian thought if we concentrate only on the reasons for moral actions. Kohlberg's theory provides us with a means to determine the relative maturity of such reasons behind moral actions. Christianity supplies the religious reasons behind our moral beliefs and the Christian perspective can thus provide the content for the formal structure identified in Kohlberg's theory. While Kohlberg's theory of moral development is not acceptable to the Christian thinker, his theory and methodology can be scientifically useful.

Kohlberg's stages (see 4.4) can all be examined from a

Christian perspective to clarify the above postulation of a limited acceptance on the grounds of usefulness. In Kohlberg's Stage 1, the Punishment-Obedience orientation, reinforcement of the stage can be affected by the threatening of the child that God will punish or hate him if he behaves in such or such a way. Such reinforcement will not only retard movement to a higher stage but will also give the child a very limited view of God as simply a punisher.

In Stage 2, the good is seen as that which satisfies the needs of the individual and sometimes those of others. God is here portrayed as the Provider, Father and Saviour, who meets the needs of the child.

In Stage 3, group identification is most important to the child who now identifies with the church and other institutions which define rules and duties. This is the 'good-boy' and 'nice girl' orientation in which many adults remain fixed.

In Stage 4 the orientation is towards authority, fixed rules and the maintenance of social order. The church and other institutions now influence the child or adult with regard to what they will accept as law and order.

In Stage 5 the individual no longer uncritically accepts and obeys laws. The orientation here is towards critical knowledge and free choice, both important factors in the Christian religion.

Kohlberg found in his researches that there exist no important differences in the development of moral thought "between Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Moslems and atheists" (Kohlberg, 1971: 174). He found that "children's moral values in the religious area seem to go through the same stages as their general moral values so that a Stage 2 child is likely to say 'Be good to God and he'll be good to you'" (Kohlberg, 1971: 174).

Kohlberg does not see religious values as being unique causes of the development of basic moral values but as "important factors in selectively elaborating certain themes in the moral life" (Kohlberg, 1971: 174). Because Kohlberg concentrates on studying human growth in terms of moral reasoning, he avoids value-judgments about individuals at different stages of moral development. He is not concerned with what is morally right or wrong, that is, with the content of morality, but only with the form. One stage is higher than another on the grounds of cognitive adequacy and not moral content.

Psychological studies, including those of Kohlberg, indicate that the learning of "a list of do's and don'ts" (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 94) does not imply internalization of such rules. "If the end of Christian moral education is mature moral development, it seems that the best course is to strive to raise the person's level of reasoning about moral issues" (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 94) and Kohlberg's theory might be of assistance in this regard.

### 3.7 CONCLUSION

The theory of moral development, or more accurately the theory of moral judgment, of Kohlberg when seen purely from a moral psychological point of view presents few very controversial aspects and it is surely of great value in evaluating accurately the level of moral judgment that an individual has reached. It is the philosophical foundations of Kohlberg's theory of moral development which are more controversial and a very real problem for the Christian educator. This is particularly true where Kohlbergian moral education with its emphasis on justice, democracy and human reason is considered.

It is clear that if Kohlbergian moral education is to be adapted to suit the Christian-National Education foundation of education in the R.S.A., such adaptations might have to be of a fairly fundamental nature. Kohlbergian moral education is evaluated in some detail in the next chapter (see 4.8.3) and a suggested Kohlbergian type moral education programme appears in the recommendations section of Chapter 7 (see 7.3).

Regardless of the need to adapt Kohlberg's moral education in terms of its foundations and even method, one cannot ignore such a positive, and exciting form of moral education which has as its aim moral stage advance, that is, the raising of the individual's level of moral judgment.

\*\*\*\*\*

## CHAPTER 4

### KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Though Kohlberg's theory is generally referred to as a theory of moral development, it is in reality more a theory of the development of moral judgment, it **"is more properly a description of the development of moral judgment"** (Hersh, Paolitto & Reimer, 1979: 44). This fact is most important and should be kept in mind whenever one is dealing with Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

Kohlberg sees morality in terms of values which are acquired within the social environment upon which the individual acts. Morality is, for Kohlberg, a **"completely autonomous, formalistic domain"** (Gardner, 1983: 18). When conflicts arise between the acquired values, the individual is forced to exercise his moral judgment to be able to choose the more correct value. Moral judgment is, for Kohlberg, a cognitive process which allows the individual to reflect on his acquired values and logically order them. Moral judgment becomes an integral part of the total thinking process of the individual which is used to handle moral conflicts or dilemmas. Kohlberg concluded, from his empirical research, his study of philosophy and of cognitive theory, that **"the development of morality is not a process of learning arbitrary cultural rules and values. Instead there appears to be an implicit moral structure within the individual which is 'called out' through interaction between man and his sociomoral**

**environment"** (Gardner, 1983: 19). It is this interaction which stimulates internal cognitive reorganizations which assists the individual in attaining a more balanced and adequate level of understanding and reasoning.

Kohlberg (1971: 195) sees moral development as a role-taking process and it is this role-taking which allows acceleration through the stages of moral development. Role-taking, which will later be examined in greater detail (4.6.2), is the **ability to adopt a perspective different from one's own** (Windmiller, 1980: 19).

In this chapter an examination will first be made of cognitive-developmental moralization theory (4.2), then of important characteristics of Kohlberg's stages of moral development (4.3) and then of the stages themselves (4.4). The relationship between moral judgment and moral action (4.5), the acquisition of moral judgment (4.6.1 & 4.6.2), the role of parents and family (4.6.3) in the development of moral judgments and the role of the peer group in the development of moral judgment (4.6.4) will then be examined, as well as criticisms of Kohlberg's theory of moral development (4.7). To conclude this chapter Kohlbergian moral education will be examined (4.8) as a possible part of the therapy of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils.

#### 4.2 COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL MORALIZATION THEORY

The cognitive-developmental moralization theory has been variously represented by Baldwin (1906), Piaget (1932), Dewey (1932), Mead (1934) and Kohlberg (1984). Common to all, however, is the use of some sort of stage concept, some notion of age-linked sequential reorganizations in the development of moral attitudes (Kohlberg, 1971: 48).

Cognitive-developmental theories assume that:

- (a) moral development has a moral judgmental component;
- (b) moral development is motivated by a desire for self-esteem, self-realization and general acceptance;
- (c) moral development is culturally universal because all cultures need moral integration of the common sources of social interaction, role-taking and social conflict; and
- (d) norms and principles are formed through experience and not the internalization of external rules (Kohlberg, 1971: 48).

### 4.3      IMPORTANT      CHARACTERISTICS      OF      KOHLBERG'S STAGES

#### 4.3.1      Kohlberg's claim that the stages are 'true'

In claiming that his stages are 'true', Kohlberg implies "that stage definitions are rigidly constrained by the empirical criterion of the stage concept" (Kohlberg, 1971: 47). Kohlberg (1971: 47) believes that, though one can conceptualize various possible stages, only his stages are to be empirically found when one interviews individuals about moral dilemmas and follows them longitudinally in time.

#### 4.3.2      Stages imply qualitative differences in modes of thinking

Though two individuals at different stages may share a similar value, their thinking about such a value will be qualitatively different (Kohlberg, 1984: 14). While the value might appear very similar, e.g. of friendship, the meaning to two individuals may be radically different. The young child at an egocentric stage will see friendship in terms of what he can selfishly gain from such friendship and this is worlds apart from friendship as it is seen by the individual who would risk his life for his friend (Hersh, et al., 1979: 52).



#### 4.3.3 Stages are 'Structured Wholes'

'Structured wholes' are "organized systems of thought" (Kohlberg, 1975: 1). A stage change implies that there is a restructuring of how the individual thinks about a whole series of moral issues. The implication here is that an individual is consistent across issues in level of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1984: 14).

#### 4.3.4 Stages form an invariant sequence

An individual must progress through the stages of moral development in order and a higher stage cannot be reached without first passing through the preceding one (Kohlberg, 1984: 14). Moral growth takes place according to a predetermined sequence (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 48). This sequence is defined in terms of logical complexity - the individual must first master more complex cognitive operations before moving from an earlier to a later stage (Hersh, et al., 1979: 83).

#### 4.3.5 Stages are hierarchical integrations

Each higher stage of moral thinking includes within itself lower stage thinking (Kohlberg, 1984: 14). Kohlberg (1987: 7) sees a tendency in individuals to prefer the highest stage of moral thinking available to them. A person tends to be cognitively attracted to a moral reasoning level one above his own predominant level.

#### **4.3.6 Cognitive development influences the stages**

Because Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 4-7) sees moral reasoning as a cognitive function, a person's cognitive or logical stage limits a person's possible moral stage. An individual whose logical stage is concrete operational in Piagetian terms will be limited to Kohlberg's preconventional moral level, i.e. Stages 1 and 2. An individual will be limited to the conventional level, the Stages 3 and 4 of Kohlberg's theory, if his logical stage is not fully formal operational.

While cognitive development sets limits to moral development and is necessary for such development, higher cognitive development does not necessarily imply higher levels of moral development. Most individuals are higher in logical stage than they are in moral stage, e.g. more than 50% of late adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning but only about 10% of these display principled moral reasoning, i.e. Stage 5 and 6, so-called post-conventional moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1975: 2).

#### **4.3.7 Movement through the stages**

According to Kohlberg (1984: 61/62) movement through the stages is effected due to the creation of cognitive disequilibrium. This occurs when an individual's cognitive outlook is inadequate to handle a particular moral dilemma. The individual is then forced to seek more

adequate ways to resolve the dilemma. Without this disequilibrium no moral development will take place and there will be no need to move up to a higher stage (Duska & Whelan, 1977: 49).

#### **4.4 KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT**

Kohlberg (1984: 172-176) divides his six stages of moral development into three levels:

- \* the Preconventional;
- \* the Conventional;
- \* the Postconventional.

He also propounds a Stage 0, corresponding to Piaget's Stage 1, which is a premoral stage existing prior to the levels.

##### **4.4.1 The Preconventional level**

At the Preconventional level, the child responds to cultural rules and set ideas of good and bad, right and wrong, but interprets these in terms of reward and punishment or in terms of "the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels" (Kohlberg, 1971: 164). All behaviour at this level is from the outside through controls and pressures and the motivation is to receive rewards and avoid punishment. This level is divided into Stage 1 and Stage 2.

#### 4.4.1.1 Stage 1

Stage 1 is the punishment and obedience orientation where the physical consequences of an action determine whether it is good or bad and the human value of the action is not important. The individual is here essentially egocentric in thought and actions and views events only from his own perspective. He is as yet unable to co-ordinate the viewpoint of others with his own. An outside authority defines what is right and wrong and justice is seen as being in terms of status, power and possessions (Kohlberg, 1984: 174).

#### 4.4.1.2 Stage 2

Stage 2 is the instrumental relativist orientation where correct action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and on occasion those of others. There are present here elements of fairness, of reciprocity and of equal sharing but these are interpreted in a pragmatic and physical way. Reciprocity is a matter of **"'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours', not of loyalty, gratitude or justice"** (Kohlberg, 1971: 164). The individual at this stage sees other individuals as separate and self-contained but having the same emotions, behaviours and motivations as other individuals. The individual is now aware that different people can react identically in the same situation. Punishment is no longer seen as an automatic consequence of incorrect behaviour (Kohlberg, 1984: 174).

#### **4.4.2 The Conventional level**

At the Conventional level, the individual sees as important the expectations of others regardless of consequences. The attitude now is not only of conformity to personal expectations and the social order, but an active supporting of such expectations and social order and an identification with persons and groups involved (Kohlberg, 1971: 164). Morality is here defined in terms of good acts aimed at meeting the expectations of others, and maintaining the social order. Authority and rules are less important now than at the preconventional level. The individual now adheres to group rules because of his own identification and loyalty to the group. The Conventional level, with as prerequisite the emergence of formal-operational thought, consists of Stages 3 and 4 (Kohlberg, 1984: 174).

##### **4.4.2.1 Stage 3**

Stage 3 is the good-boy morality where the individual strives to maintain good relations and gain the approval of others. The individual is now aware that when he attempts to anticipate another's thoughts or actions, the other is attempting to anticipate him. He is very sensitive as to how he appears to others and wants to be seen as a good, forgiving and understanding person. The individual is able to imagine himself in two roles and thus can make a moral judgment but cannot yet see himself in more than two roles. The emphasis is on the maintaining of a moral social system and justice

implies sound interpersonal relationships. A major limitation of this stage is the fact that dissent is seen as a threat to group cohesion and is therefore totally unacceptable (Kohlberg, 1984: 174).

#### 4.4.2.2 Stage 4

Stage 4 is the law and order orientation with emphasis on authority, set rules and the maintenance of social order (Kohlberg, 1971: 164). Here there is a strong awareness of the rights and expectations of others and a belief that virtue should be rewarded. The individual retains the ability to reverse a reciprocal orientation, but the emphasis is now on the relationship between the individual and the social system. Justice is here a principle of the social order, of laws democratically decided upon by the majority to safeguard the well-being of all. The individual feels no obligation towards those outside the society or dissenters within the society. Necessary social change is not acceptable at this stage because '**status quo**' maintenance is so important. The individual justifies laws in terms of the institution and not in terms of any '**a priori**' principles (Kohlberg, 1971: 164).

#### 4.4.3 The Postconventional level

At the Postconventional, Autonomous or Principled level there is a clear attempt to define moral principles and

values which are not dependent on outside authority. Stages 5 and 6 make up this level. Stage 6 will not be discussed here because no adolescents have tested at Stage 6 level of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1984: 175).

#### 4.4.3.1 Stage 5

Stage 5 is the social contract legalistic orientation which generally has utilitarian overtones (Kohlberg, 1971: 164). Here the law is seen as a social contract which has been constructed by rational human beings through mutual agreement to protect **"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"** (Gardner, 1983: 23). The democracy of Stage 5 aims at the maximum individual welfare for the group. Conflicting group and individual interests are seen to be resolved by the laws of Stage 5 so that Rawl's aim of a well-ordered society with a fair distribution of rights and advantages may result (see 3.3.4). At this stage laws are principles of social justice, but moral, philosophic and religious choices are ignored (Kohlberg, 1984: 175).

#### 4.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENT AND MORAL ACTION

The cognitive-developmental approach implies that moral judgment is predictive of moral behaviour under certain conditions. Rothman (1980: 108) recognized a clear relationship between moral reasoning and moral

behaviour, but noted that it was a complex one. She saw moral reasoning as influencing moral behaviour in interaction with situational and personal factors. Statements of moral judgment can improve our understanding of why people choose certain courses of action.

Kohlberg (1984: 518) sees moral judgment as being the simplest determinant, of an internal nature, of moral behaviour. He feels that not only does moral judgment cause moral action, but it is also caused by such action: new moral judgments can result from behaviour.

Kleinberger (1982 as quoted by Kohlberg, 1984: 512) is of the opinion that moral judgment is the only distinctly moral factor among all the factors, such as situation, emotional state, motivation, knowledge, intelligence, age, gender, etc., which can be said to influence moral behaviour. Kohlberg (1984: 512), however, sees moral judgment as a necessary part of a moral action, but as being insufficient to stimulate such an action, because motivation and knowledge, while not distinctly moral, would also be necessary for a good result. Kohlberg is here in agreement with Aristotle who wrote: **"... moral purpose is more than volition. There are things that are voluntary, that are not purposed. Moral purpose implies reason and thought, it implies previous deliberations"** (Kohlberg, 1984: 514 quoting from Aristotle's Ethics Book III, Chapter 4).

In order to explain a moral action we need to understand the actor's reasoning.



## 4.6 THE ACQUISITION OF HIGHER LEVELS OF MORAL JUDGMENT ACCORDING TO KOHLBERG

### 4.6.1 Introduction

Kohlberg holds that higher levels of moral development are reached by the child through the social experience of role-taking in groups or institutions in which he or she participates (Kohlberg, 1984: 75). The family, peers and secondary institutions (like law, government, work, etc.) are not seen as individually unique sources of role-taking opportunities by Kohlberg, because he sees them all as equally important sources of role-taking opportunities. After examining what Kohlberg means by role-taking (see 4.6.2), an examination will be made of the role of family (4.6.3) and peers (4.6.4) in the development of moral judgment.

### 4.6.2 Role-taking

The social experience of role-taking implies the taking on of attitudes of others and being aware of their thoughts and feelings (Kohlberg, 1984: 9). Kohlberg (1976: 49) uses the term '**role-taking**', because it lays emphasis on both cognitive and affective aspects. For Kohlberg '**role-taking**' opportunities are the same as general social experience and stimulation. Kohlberg (1976: 49) sees '**role-taking**' as emphasizing firstly the relationship between the self and others, secondly an understanding of and relating to all the roles in society and thirdly that '**role-**

**taking'** is part of all social interaction and communication.

Role-taking is, for Kohlberg, related to both communication skills and empathy. Role-taking implies the ability to engage in reciprocal interactions and communication. Such reciprocal interactions are varied and form the basis of the moral stages of development. Role-taking is the ability to react to the other as someone like the self and to react to the self's behavior in the role of the other (Herish, et al., 1979: 49).

Role-taking, as a social skill, develops gradually from about the age of 6 years and allows for moral development. The child's egocentrism before the age of 6 prevents him from being able to role-take. It is only when the child has developed new cognitive structures, which give him a new understanding of the physical and social world, that he develops beyond his egocentrism. Concrete operational thought leads to a new understanding of the physical world, but it is the development of role-taking and thence moral judgment abilities which leads to a new understanding of the social world (Herish, et al., 1979: 50). It is clear then that role-taking relates to the whole process of decentring.

Kohlberg's definition of moral judgment as the weighing of the claims of others against one's own can only be

possible if an individual has the ability to role-take, to adopt a perspective different from his own and someone else's point of view, so that he is able to see what the claims of others are and weigh his own against those (Hersh, et al., 1979: 50).

While Kohlberg sees moral judgment as implying role-taking, he does not see the ability to role-take as a sufficient condition for moral development because cognitive development is also an important factor. The individual's role-taking level is, for Kohlberg, the same as the individual's level of social cognition. Kohlberg sees parents as providing opportunities for role-taking but feels they are by no means the only, or even most important, sources of such opportunities and he sees peers, other adults and the community at large as equally important (Kohlberg, 1976: 49).

#### **4.6.3 The role of parents and family in the development of moral judgment**

Kohlberg places far less emphasis on the parental role in moral development than did Piaget and feels that socialization theories have overemphasized the importance of parents and family in this regard (Kohlberg, 1984: 75). Kohlberg (1984: 75-77) does not view family participation in the moral development of the individual as unique for moral development, because other primary groups like peers and other adults create role-taking opportunities in the very same way as parents and other family.

Kohlberg (1984: 75) asserts that though inadequate families have been shown to contribute to delinquency, which is associated with a low level of moral development, this does not imply that so-called **'good families'** are necessary for moral development. Kohlberg (1984: 75) found that the level of moral development of children is as like that of randomly selected adults, of the same socio-economic level, as it is like that of their parents. The fact that children are at different stages of moral development than their parents leads Kohlberg to reject social learning theory, where as Windmiller notes **"values are acquired through modeling and imitation"** (Windmiller, 1980: 18). Kohlberg is supported in his rejection of social learning theory by his 1976 research with Haan and Langer, which indicated that a relationship existed between husbands and wives regarding moral development but not between them and their offsprings. The important conclusions reached from this research were:

1. That while the moral reasoning of sons under 21 years of age related to a degree to that of the parents, no such relationship existed with daughters of any age.
2. That thirty percent (30%) of those above 21 years showed a higher level of moral reasoning than their parents.
3. That the moral level of the parents is not a vital aspect allowing their children to reach the principled Stages 5 and 6 of moral reasoning.

Kohlberg (1984: 75) sees parents as having an indirect effect on the child's moral development when they, in conjunction with peers and other adults, facilitate the child's interaction with his environment and provide role-taking opportunities. Kohlberg (1984: 75) regards no individual or group as particularly important for child or adolescent moral development as all interact to stimulate role-taking and **the more social stimulation the faster the rate of moral development.**

#### **4.6.4 The role of the peer group in the development of moral judgment**

Though Piaget regarded the peer group as a unique source of role-taking opportunities for the child according to Kohlberg (1984: 76), subsequent research as to the influence of the peer group on the development of moral judgment has been inconclusive and even negative in its support regarding this influence. Piaget (1932: 10) felt that the child's egocentricity and unilateral respect for adults prevented role-taking with regard to his parents, and so emphasized the role of the peer group: **"Before playing with his equals, the child is influenced by his parents. He is subjected from his cradle to a multiplicity of regulations, and even before language he becomes conscious of certain obligations"** (Piaget, 1932: 10).

Keasey (1971: quoted by Modgil 1974: 363) found, using Kohlberg's moral judgment interviews that higher stages

of moral reasoning were associated with social participation as measured by teacher and peer ratings of popularity and leadership and membership of social organizations.

Saltzstein (1976: 253-265) examined the role of the peer group in moral development in terms of Kohlberg's stages. He found that at Stage 1 (the obedience orientation) adult influence is at its strongest. With age this adult influence declines while peer influence increases and this, according to Saltzstein, can be seen in the reciprocity of Stages 2 and 3. At Stage 4 adult influence again grows when the individual conforms to legitimate authority through duty. From the above it can be noted that children in early and middle adolescence conform most to the peer group judgments.

Kohlberg (1984: 77) holds that, while peer group participation has been seen to be correlated with moral development, it does not play a unique or critical role in moral development. Kohlberg sees peer group participation as stimulating moral development by providing general role-taking opportunities. Such opportunities are also offered, however, by parents, family and all other individuals with whom the child comes into contact (Kohlberg, 1984: 77).

#### **4.7            CRITICISMS OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT**

For more than 20 years Kohlberg's theory has been the

most important cognitive-developmental view of moral development, but this does not imply that the theory has not been widely criticized for various reasons. These criticisms have mainly revolved around the ethical, normative and cross-cultural claims made by Kohlberg as well as sex bias, the usefulness and completeness of the theory, the apparent neglect of the affective, and Kohlberg's idea of moral maturity based on ideas of justice and individual rights but neglecting responsibility and care for others (Kohlberg, 1984: 209). It has been claimed that Kohlberg's theory fails to adequately describe and document a theoretically complete conception of the moral domain (Kohlberg, 1984: 207).

#### **4.7.1 Criticisms of Kohlberg's neglect of the affective side of morality**

Peters (1975: 678) feels that Kohlberg, like Piaget, is very weak on the development of the affective side of morality, particularly of such moral emotions as guilt, remorse, and concern for others.

Alston (1971: 278) notes that it is unclear what role Kohlberg assigns to affect in his theory of moral development, because while he advances some generalities concerning the relationship between affect and cognition he appears to imply that affect plays a very insignificant role in morality. Alston (1971: 280) does, however, agree with Kohlberg's view that "the quality

of affects involved in moral judgment is determined by its cognitive structural development" (Kohlberg, 1971: 189). This means that simple emotional arousal which is not backed up by concepts does not have a specific role to play in guiding an individual's behaviour. Alston (1971: 280) sees "the anticipation of guilt and the desire to avoid it ... (as playing) ... a major and perhaps an essential role in the transition from thought to action". Kohlberg's view of guilt is that, while it is generally seen as an aspect of emotion, like the other moral sentiments like fear and shame, it is not separate from cognition but arises from the individual's stage organization in the same way as does moral judgment "Guilt as a dread of self-condemnation is the final step in a series of differentiations, which, like all differentiations in development are cognitive in nature" (Kohlberg, 1971: 189). In this view of Kohlberg's, it is not possible to predict the effect of emotion on behaviour except through knowledge of the individual's moral reasoning stage.

#### **4.7.2 Criticism of the claimed cultural universality of Kohlberg's stages**

Critics have serious reservations about the cultural universality of Kohlberg's stages, because his (Kohlberg's) sample, within only nine cultures, has been very small so that Kohlberg's inference that the description of moral judgment has been found applicable for all people in all cultures is very dangerous.



Simpson (1974: 81-106) agrees that Kohlberg's stages are not culturally universal. She is of the opinion that Kohlberg has not studied a great enough number of cultures to claim cultural universality and nor has postconventional moral reasoning (that is Stages 5 and 6) been found in all those cultures studied by Kohlberg (Simpson, 1974: 99).

Kohlberg's belief that the concept of justice, which is fundamental to Kohlberg's postconventional stages, is the only defensible morality implies that Kohlberg has to accept justice as a universally accepted and appreciated concept. This is seen as a **"rather touching belief"** by Peters (1975: 678), because justice cannot be shown to be universally accepted in all cultures.

Kohlberg's belief that the stages are culturally invariant leads him to reject traits and habits (Alston, 1971: 283), which will be dealt with in (4.7.3). Kohlberg's belief that while there is a difference between cultures in the content of their morality the form is culturally invariant and this is a very difficult matter to prove.

#### **4.7.3 Criticisms of Kohlberg's rejection of character traits and habit**

Peters (1971: 246) criticizes Kohlberg's total rejection

tion of character traits and is of the opinion that justice and fairness, seen as so important to Kohlberg by Peters, are also character traits. Peters feels that Kohlberg's distinction between character traits and principles is invalid.

Alston (1971: 282) notes that Kohlberg objects to traditional concepts of virtues because they "do not divide the population into dichotomous groups and that a given individual is not consistent in his responses". Kohlberg sees no place for virtues in his theory because they are defined by cultural norms and cannot be applied to all individuals across cultures. Alston (1971: 282) see Kohlberg's view of a 'bag of virtues' as being conceptually crude.

Alston, himself, sees habit concepts, including concepts as behavioural habits, as part of moral character, while Kohlberg finds them useless because they don't allow for cross-cultural comparisons or culturally invariant descriptions (Alston, 1971: 283). Alston sees morality as a combination of form and content and one can only understand an individual's moral character if one knows both the form and content (Alston, 1971: 282).

#### **4.7.4 Criticism of Kohlberg's under-emphasis of the importance of Stages 3 and 4**

Peters (1975: 678) is of the opinion that Kohlberg does

not take seriously enough the 'good-boy, nice-girl' Stages 3 and 4, which are the highest stages that the vast majority of the population are ever likely to reach. Peters feels it is very important that all individuals not capable of Stages 5 or 6, ought at least to be at Stages 3 or 4 as a vital minimum for the sake of society.

#### **4.7.5 Criticism concerning possible sex bias in Kohlberg's theory of moral development**

Gilligan (1982, as quoted by Kohlberg, 1984: 338-370) is the main critic of Kohlbergian theory regarding sex bias. Gilligan suggests that morality consists not only of the morality of justice, stressed by Kohlberg, but also "an ethic of care and response which is more central to understanding female moral judgment and action than it is to the understanding of judgment and action in males" (Kohlberg, 1984: 339). Most of Kohlberg's research has been concerned with males, from his doctoral studies in 1958 to the Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 77-118).

#### **4.7.6 Criticisms of Kohlberg's view that the stages cannot be taught**

Peters (1971: 243) notes that a developmental theory must satisfy the condition that the progression from

stage to stage is not brought about by the teaching of adults (Peters, 1971: 243) and Kohlberg, therefore, holds that only the content of moral rules can be taught and not **the attitude to them characteristic of the various stages** (Peters, 1981: 170). This means that the form cannot be taught and Kohlberg, according to Peters (1971: 243), maintains that the progression occurs through cognitive stimulation, i.e. **"the form is something which the individual has to come to understand for himself with appropriate stimulation from others and from typical concrete situations"** (Peters, 1971: 243) (see 4.6).

Peter's (1971: 243) feels that Kohlberg's definition of teaching is far too rigid and that Kohlberg's view that stage progression cannot be brought about through teaching is unsoundly based on this rigid conception of teaching.

#### **4.7.7 Conclusion concerning the criticisms of Kohlberg's theory of moral development**

While Kohlberg's theory has been criticized for the above, and less important reasons, and many of the criticisms have not been satisfactorily answered by Kohlberg, his methodology has gained wide acceptance by researchers using his measure of moral judgment, because it is a very useful tool with which to determine level of moral judgment.

## 4.8 KOHLBERGIAN MORAL EDUCATION

### 4.8.1 Introduction

One of the implications of a finding in this empirical study that the level of moral judgment of the behaviourally handicapped clinic school pupils of average intelligence is significantly lower than that of the matched group of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils, would be that those in the behaviourally handicapped group might well gain from the application of Kohlbergian moral education. This is aimed at raising, at an accelerated rate, the level of moral judgment of these behaviourally handicapped pupils. It was for this reason, that it was considered necessary in this empirical study to evaluate Kohlbergian moral education in terms of its aims and nature as well as the main criticisms of this form of moral education. A tentative evaluation will also be made as to how Kohlbergian moral education could be positively applied in the clinic school therapeutic situation.

### 4.8.2 The nature of formal Kohlbergian Moral Education within the school context

#### 4.8.2.1 Introduction

Purpel and Ryan (1975: 659) define moral education as follows: "Moral education is the direct and indirect intervention of the school which affects both moral behavior and the capacity to think about issues of right and wrong".

The emphasis here is not only on overt efforts by the school to make the pupils more moral but also on covert efforts aimed at influencing the pupils to behave in a more moral manner. Account is also taken of the capacity of the pupils to think about moral problems and also the way the child actually behaves in situations which involve right and wrong behaviour (Purpel & Ryan, 1975: 659). It is the child's ability and capacity to reason regarding moral problems, that is, his moral judgment, which is emphasized in Kohlbergian Moral Education.

Kohlberg's Moral Education incorporates the Socratic Dialectical Method as a tool for stimulating the individual's understanding of the just in group discussions of moral dilemmas. The Socratic Dialectical Method aims at creating a dissatisfaction in the individual with his present knowledge of the good, his level of moral judgment, and instil a desire to raise this level (Gardner, 1983: 23-24). The group moral discussions will often elicit more than one stage of moral reasoning and this is an important ingredient in producing moral stage growth. The higher stage reasoners create conflict in the minds of the lower stage reasoners with whom they argue and higher stage responses are called out of the lower stage reasoners. The teacher now has the task of clarifying the responses of the higher stage reasoners and of providing them with a moral dilemma which will elicit a still higher stage response (Gardner, 1983: 23-24).

Moral education implies, as does all education, a philosophic basis and this is one of the reasons why

the philosophic basis of Kohlberg's theory of moral development was examined in Chapter 3 of this empirical study. According to Gardner (1983: 23-24), Kohlberg sees justice (as liberty and equity) as the major value of a democratic society and the proper content of moral education. Moral education then aims at a growth of justice in the child. Kohlberg defines moral maturity as "the principled sense of justice" (Kohlberg, 1970: 213) and the teaching of justice requires just schools which include all the members in a democratic decision making where role-taking opportunities exist and responsible decision making is fostered. The pupils learn to weigh all points of view before making decisions which will affect all members of the group (Kohlberg, 1970: 213-214). By this method, the seriousness power and responsibility of the democratic process are emphasized and the active participation stimulates moral reasoning and prepares the pupils to become more autonomous and just (Gardner, 1983: 23-24).

#### **4.8.3 The aim of Kohlbergian Moral Education**

The aim of Kohlbergian Moral Education is stage advancement because, from a moral education point of view, each higher stage is a better one because at each higher stage one is more competent to make moral judgments. Kohlberg (1975: 672) notes that while it is moral psychology which describes what moral development is, as studied empirically, it is moral philosophy which tries to direct towards what moral development ideally ought to be. Moral philosophy, then, is what

determines whether a later stage is also a better stage of moral development.

Kohlberg (1975: 672) claims that the principled stages (Stages 5 and 6) of moral reasoning are morally better than the earlier stages, because of his adherence to the moral philosophies of Kant and Rawls (see 3.3.2 and 3.3.4), which claim that an adequate morality is principled, i.e. "that it makes judgments in terms of universal principles applicable to all mankind. Principles are to be distinguished from rules. Conventional morality is grounded on rules, primarily 'thou shalt nots' such as are represented by the Ten Commandments, prescriptions of kinds of actions. Principles are, rather, universal guides to the making of a moral decision" (Kohlberg, 1975: 672).

Kohlberg (1975: 673) sees a concern for justice at each and every moral stage but at each higher stage the conception of justice is reorganized.

- \* At Stage 1, justice is seen as the punishing of bad behaviour in terms of 'an eye for an eye'.
- \* At Stage 2, justice is seen as the exchanging of goods and favours.
- \* At both Stages 3 and 4, justice is seen as the treating of others as they would be treated, this in terms of conventional rules.



- \* At Stage 5, the individual realizes that all rules and laws flow from justice aimed at equal rights for all.
- \* At Stage 6, personally chosen moral principles are also principles of justice.

Kohlberg (1975: 673) concludes that decisions based on universal principles of justice are superior ones, because they are decisions on which all moral individuals could agree.

#### **4.8.3.1 Kohlbergian Planned Moral Education**

Kohlberg (1975: 675) postulates two different methods aimed at moral stage advance,

- (a) moral discussions and communications; and
- (b) the total moral environment in which the child lives.

In terms of moral discussions and communication, the child must be exposed to the next higher stage of moral judgment and to situations which contain problems and contradictions for the child's current moral structure and which will lead the child to be dissatisfied with his current level of moral judgment. Conflicting moral views must here be compared in an open way and in an

atmosphere of interchange and dialogue (Kohlberg, 1975: 675). Using conflict-filled hypothetical moral dilemmas, Blatt and Kohlberg (1975: 675) attempted to stimulate stage advance, through moral discussions, in junior high and high school pupils. In moral discussions, the teacher at first supported and explained arguments that were one stage above the lowest stage present among the pupils. When the pupils appeared to understand the arguments, the teacher **"then challenged that stage using new situations, and clarified the arguments one stage above the previous one"** (Kohlberg, 1975: 675). By the end of one semester all the pupils were retested and showed significant upward stage change when compared to the control pupils and maintained this change a year later. Up to 50% of the pupils moved up a stage in the experimental classes (Kohlberg, 1975: 675). This empirical study showed that moral discussion could raise moral stage.

The second important factor when considering stage advance is the moral atmosphere of the home, school and society in general. This atmosphere is important in that it allows to varying degrees role-taking opportunities (see 4.6.2) as well as determines the level of justice of the individual's environment. A higher level of justice is a vital aspect for the individual to develop a higher sense of justice (Kohlberg, 1975: 676).

Gardner (1983: 33-34) used Kohlbergian Planned Moral Education in her own moral education programme for emotionally disturbed early adolescents. Her programme consisted of:

- (a) moral dilemma discussions;
- (b) democratically run class meetings, where the pupils discussed classroom issues and resolutions were proposed and voted on;
- (c) time was given to individual pupils to talk about themselves so as to foster role-taking ability - the pupils could speak about their lives outside the classroom and personal problems;
- (d) the pupils read copied and memorized famous quotations and poems reflecting positive moral approaches to living which were later discussed in class; and
- (e) a daily 'story time' was very important and "exposed the students only to books that emphasized a transcendent being, eternal values and/or objective standards of right and wrong" (Gardner, 1983: 34).

It is important to note that Gardner does not emphasize justice as the aim of moral education and does not limit herself to this concept as does Kohlberg, but she uses Kohlbergian moral education which has been adapted to suit her own neo-Platonic views (Gardner, 1983: 24-28).

#### 4.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

was examined in terms of cognitive developmental moralization theory, the important characteristics of Kohlberg's stages of moral development, the stages of moral development and the relationship between moral judgment and moral action. The acquisition of moral judgment in terms of Kohlberg's theory was examined as well as the various criticisms made of Kohlberg's theory by his critics. The chapter ended with an examination of Kohlbergian moral education. An examination of all the above was necessary, because Kohlberg's theory is the basis of the aim of this empirical study which is to evaluate the level of moral judgment, in terms of Kohlberg's theory, of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence.

\*\*\*\*\*

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **METHOD OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter the method of research of the empirical study is first outlined with regard to the statement of the main and subordinate aims and the main and subordinate hypotheses (5.2), as well as the research design, including population and sample (5.3), and variables (5.4) used. The control variables of intelligence, sex difference, social class and chronological age are then examined in some detail because of their importance to the empirical study. This is followed by a comparison of the experimental and control samples with regard to the control variables (5.5), to ensure that no significant differences exist between the groups in terms of the control variables. The testing procedure is then outlined and followed by an examination of all the measuring instruments used in this empirical study as well as the statistical techniques used to ascertain the significance of the data generated in the study (5.6).

#### **5.2 AIMS AND STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES**

##### **5.2.1 Aims**

The central aim of the empirical study was to determine whether there is a significant difference in the level of moral judgment between behaviourally handicapped clinic school adolescent pupils and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped adolescent pupils.

The following secondary aims were also set:

- (a) To determine whether significant differences in level of moral judgment exist between the male and female subjects in the experimental group (clinic school pupils) or, for reasons of comparison, in the control group. This secondary aim was set to attempt to confirm that research which has indicated that no significant differences in level of moral judgment exist between male and female adolescents when age, intelligence and social class are controlled.
- (b) To determine how the levels of moral judgment of both the experimental and control groups compare with the results of previous research into level of moral judgment done in Israel, Turkey and the United States of America. This secondary aim was set to assist in a clearer evaluation of the level of moral judgment of the experimental and control groups and to make more relevant a comparison between these two groups.

### 5.2.2 Research Hypotheses

The central research hypothesis is that there is a significant difference between the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and that of non-behaviourally handicapped adolescent pupils of normal intelligence in favour of the latter pupils.

The secondary research hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in level of moral judgment between the males and females in both the experimental and control groups in the empirical study.

### 5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

#### 5.3.1 Experimental design

The following Ex Post Facto experimental design was used:

Group	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
E	(X)	Y2
C		Y2

where

- (a) The dependent variable Y is 'level of moral judgment' in terms of WAS (Weighted Average Score) mean for each sampled group, i.e. Groups E and C.
- (b) E is the Experimental Group -  
the behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence.
- (c) C is the Control Group -  
a non-behaviourally handicapped group matched to the E Group in terms of age, intelligence, gender and socio-economic status.

- (d) (X) is the non-manipulative independent variable which occurs in the Experimental Group (E), but not in the Control Group (C), and in this design designates '**behavioural handicappedness**'.

### 5.3.2 Experimental Group

The experimental, or clinic school, group consisted of all English-speaking pupils, who qualified in terms of age and intelligence, who were classified as behaviourally handicapped and attended a clinic school of the Transvaal Education Department at the time of testing. In terms of a Transvaal Education Department ruling the names of the pupils and of the school are to remain anonymous, so the subjects were numbered from one to thirty for the purpose of this empirical study and will be referred to only by this allocated number. A 31st child was also tested but had to urgently leave the testing room and so never completed the test.

The thirty pupils who completed the moral judgment level test ranged in age from 13 years/0 months to 17 years/4 months (mean=15 years/5 months), and in I.Q. score from 85 to 115 (mean=100,2) according to group and/or individual intelligence tests used (see 5.6.2.2-5.6.2.4). Seventeen boys and thirteen girls made up the experimental group and a socio-economic status questionnaire (Appendix A) completed by all the pupils indicated that 93% of the sample belonged to the lower or lower middle classes.



### 5.3.3 Control group

In view of the fact that 90% of the E Group had previously attended urban high schools in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area of the Transvaal, two urban high schools in this area were chosen from which to draw the control sample. Two schools were carefully selected so as to, as closely as possible, match the clinic school in terms of socio-economic status so that the pupils at the two chosen high schools, from which the control sample was to be drawn, would consist mainly of those of lower socio-economic status like the pupils in the E Group.

At each high school a sample of 30 pupils was drawn to match the experimental group of pupils from the clinic school in terms of I.Q. These two samples of 30 pupils were drawn from all pupils in standards six, seven and eight at each control group high school. Only standards six, seven and eight were included because these are the only standards existing at present at the clinic school from which the experimental group was obtained.

The two samples of 30 pupils each from the chosen high schools were achieved by taking the total number of pupils, in the applicable standards (6 to 8) at each control high school, and dividing these total numbers by 30 so as to obtain the interval between selected pupils, e.g. if the total population at one school was, say, 600 then every 20th pupil would be selected. The pupils were listed in accordance with class lists and the first selected pupil was randomly decided on by the

throwing of two dice. Two dice were used so as to make the choice of the first selected pupil even more random - the first selected pupil could be alphabetically listed pupil 2 to 12.

The second, third and following pupils were then selected by using the interval previously determined, e.g. if the interval was, say, 20, as in the previous example, and the first chosen pupil was No. 7 on the alphabetical class lists, then the second selected pupil would be No. 27, the third No. 47, etc. If a subject chosen did not qualify for the sample on account of his/her I.Q. being too low or too high, then the next pupil on the alphabetical class lists who met the I.Q. criterion was chosen. In this way two samples of 30 pupils each were chosen from the two high schools. Pupils who had previously attended a clinic school or who had ever been classified as behaviourally handicapped were excluded from these two samples of 30 pupils.

The 60 subjects of these two samples were then matched with the experimental group on socio-economic status, age and sex. As the experimental group consisted of 17 boys and 13 girls, 17 boys and 13 girls were selected from the 60 subjects to match the experimental group as closely as possible on socio-economic status and age. By doing this an attempt was made to ensure that the control group (N=30) matched as closely as possible the experimental group (N=30) on age, sex, socio-economic status and I.Q. score.

## **5.4 VARIABLES**

### **5.4.1 Dependent variable**

The dependent variable is 'level of moral judgment' in terms of WAS (Weighted Average Score) mean which is obtained by means of Standard Issue Scoring (Appendix C) from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview: Form A (Appendix B).

### **5.4.2 Independent variables**

#### **5.4.2.1 Experimental variable**

This is the non-manipulated independent variable which occurs in the E Group but not in the control group and which is 'behaviourally handicappedness'. The pupils in the experimental group are all classified as behaviourally handicapped by the Transvaal Education Department (see 1.5).

#### **5.4.2.2 Control variables**

It is considered important that each of the control variables be dealt with in some detail to highlight their varied importance in the measurement of level of moral judgment. While previous research has indicated that certain variables are more significant than others, an attempt was made in this empirical study to

control for all four of the following variables to as great a degree as possible.

#### **5.4.2.2.1 Intelligence as a variable influencing the measurement of level of moral judgment**

In the evaluation of intelligence as a significant variable influencing the measurement of level of moral judgment an attempt is made to show that intelligence, as operationalized as I.Q.-scores, is an important factor both in the development of mature moral judgment and in the measurement of level of moral judgment. According to Likona (1976a: 21) intelligence relates strongly to level of moral judgment and this is confirmed by following research noted by Modgil (1974: 300-311):

- (a) Johnson (1962) found that I.Q.-score was positively and significantly correlated with level of moral judgment;
- (b) Whitemand and Kosier (1964) found that the development of moral judgment ability increased with measured intelligence at all age levels and that the F-ratio was significant at the 0,01 level.

In his research Kohlberg (1984: 65) found correlations between group I.Q.-scores and moral judgment level which he considered to indicate the cognitive base of moral maturity, in terms of level of moral judgment,

because intelligence is a cognitive factor. While intelligence is seen by Kohlberg as being necessary for mature moral judgment, he does not see it as a sufficient condition by itself.

Kohlberg's research has indicated a linear correlation between I.Q.-score and moral judgment for below average I.Q.-score children ( $r=0,59$ ), but no real relationship for above-average intelligence children ( $r=0,16$ ). The implication of this is that children with lower intelligence are below average generally in moral maturity but children with above-average intelligence are equally likely to be of high or low level of moral judgment, because intelligence is not the only determinant of level of moral judgment and such factors as socio-economic status and age also play a role. Kohlberg (1984: 65) found intelligence to be a better indicator of early rate of moral development than it is of terminal status which is determined to a greater degree by social experience. Kohlberg, in using the words moral development, is indicating here level of moral judgment.

In the 20 year 'Longitudinal Study of the Moral Judgment of U.S. Males' carried out by Kohlberg and Associates and reported in 1987 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 113-114) the cognitive basis of Kohlberg's stages of moral development, which indicates level of moral judgment, is reflected in a moderate correlation between intelligence and moral judgment. Correlations between WAS (Weighted Average Score) and I.Q.-score was

non-significant in this research in childhood and adolescence as they ranged from 0,17 to 0,27 but became much higher at the age of 24 years and above (0,37 to 0,60). From this it appears that the rate of moral development, in terms of level of moral judgment, is only slightly related to I.Q. in childhood and adolescence but is more closely related to I.Q. in adulthood. This is probably because of differential educational experiences in later life that relate to intelligence (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 107/108).

The results of the research examined above does not give conclusive evidence that intelligence can be considered an important variable when measuring level of moral judgment because the correlation between intelligence, a cognitive-developmental factor indicated by I.Q.-score, and level of moral judgment ranges from the non-significant to the highly significant. Enough evidence, however, of a strong correlation between intelligence and level of moral judgment, in the research of Johnson (1962) and Whiteman and Kosier (1964 as quoted by Modgil, 1974: 300-311) discussed above, exists to make it one of the variables of any research into level of moral judgment. Intelligence, as measured by various I.Q.-tests, was accepted in the present study as a control variable and individual and mean I.Q.-scores of the experimental and control groups were controlled as follows:

- (a) an I.Q.-score spread of 30 points, from 85 to 115, in the scores of the subjects making up each group was set, mainly due to the small number of pupils

available at the clinic school to make up the behaviourally handicapped experimental group;

- (b) the mean I.Q.-scores of the experimental and control groups were made as alike as possible by the selection matching of subjects in the control group so as to control for intelligence as a factor in the measurement of moral judgment and to make the two groups more comparable.

#### **5.4.2.2.2 Sex difference as a variable influencing the measurement of the level of moral judgment**

In the evaluation of gender as a significant variable influencing the measurement of level of moral judgment an attempt will be made to show whether or not gender is an important factor in such measurement. Modgil (1974: 295-314) notes the following research as important here:

- (a) Morris (1958) found in his research that no significant differences existed between the responses of male and female subjects to problem situations in moral judgment;
- (b) Whiteman and Kosier (1964) found the role of gender to be insignificant in the development of the ability to make mature moral judgment; and

(c) Seltzer (1969) found in his research that while level of moral judgment increased from pre-school to the 4th grade, no significant sex differences could be distinguished.

In a 1984 study by Higgins, Power and Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1984: 350) it was found that both sexes used justice and responsibility considerations in school-based dilemmas aimed at evaluation of level of moral judgment and that there were no significant sex differences.

Kohlberg (1984: 345-347) refers to the unpublished paper of L.J. Walker "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review of the Literature" presented at the Canadian Psychological Association, Montreal, June, 1982. Walker reviewed 54 studies using Kohlberg's moral judgment interview and 24 studies using Rest's (1979) measure of moral judgment. Sex differences in moral reasoning in childhood and adolescence were examined in 27 of the studies and significant differences were infrequently discernable - sex differences in moral reasoning, at a significant level, were reported in only 4 of the studies. Sex differences were also noted in studies where the samples were drawn from ethnic groups with traditionally lower status females (e.g. Moslem Arabs) but these were not found to be significant differences.

Kohlberg (1984: 347) found that adult studies have in-



licated more frequent sex differences, in favour of males, which he lays at the door of higher education and occupational differences which tend to favour males and allow greater role-taking (see 4.6.2) opportunities which in turn leads to a higher level of moral judgment.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development assumes that while there might be differences in rate of moral development, in terms of level of moral judgment, between males and females, there are no inherent sex differences because such differences if found are due to the unequal social or political status of men and women in specific societies (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 142).

In the "Longitudinal Study of the Development of Moral Reasoning among Kibbutz Adolescents" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 142) it was found that the sexes did not differ significantly in the degree to which they used any of Kohlberg's stages of moral development. No significant sex differences were discerned in the sequence or rate of development of moral judgment for all the age groups of the Kibbutz study (12 to 26 years) even when controlling for cultural background, stage usage and interview time (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 142).

The effect of sex differences, no matter how insignificant much, research has indicated such an effect to be, is controlled in the present empirical study by having

the same number of males and females in the experimental and control groups. The influence of sex difference can then be both controlled and evaluated.

#### **5.4.2.2.3 Social Class (Socio-Economic Status or SES) as a variable influencing the measurement of level of moral judgment**

Should social class be indicated in previous research as an important variable influencing moral judgment and its measurement then social class will of necessity be a control variable in the present empirical study. Early research of Lerner (1937), Peck and Havighurst (1960) and Bull (1969) (as quoted by Modgil, 1974: 282-283) indicated that socio-economic status (SES) is an important variable in the development of moral judgment and that children from higher SES homes tended to be more mature in moral judgment than those from lower SES homes (Modgil, 1974: 282-283).

Peck and Havighurst (1960: 22-26) found that the relationship between moral judgment and socio-economic status is particularly strong in urban children where the various social classes were found to have different sets of values (Peck & Havighurst, 1960: 22) and "various social classes have different ideas of what is right and wrong" (Peck & Havighurst, 1960: 26). This is of great importance to the present study because the vast majority of pupils in the experimental and control groups are urban adolescents.

Bull (1969 as quoted by Modgil, 1974: 302) found socio-economic status to be a most important variable in the development of moral judgment, less significant than intelligence but much more significant than religious class.

In the 'Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males' by Kohlberg and Associates reported in 1987 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 106) correlations between the socio-economic status of the subject's parents and the subject's moral judgment scores were moderate at every age (0,22 to 0,60) and all but two correlations were above 0,40. A comparison of working class subjects and middle class subjects indicated that Kohlberg's Stage 3 is first present in 10 year old middle class subjects but not until the age of 13 years in working class subjects and Stage 4 appears at 16 years in middle class subjects but only at 20 years in working class subjects.

It is clear from the above research that social class (socio-economic status) is an important control variable in the assessment of level of moral judgment and must be controlled for in this empirical study by means of a socio-economic questionnaire to ensure that the experimental and control groups are as alike as possible regarding social class.

#### 5.4.2.2.4 Chronological Age as a variable influencing the measurement of moral judgment

The following research indicates that age should be seen as an important variable in the study of the development of moral judgment in so far as age determines to a large degree cognitive development. Morris (1958 as quoted by Modgil, 1974: 295) researched the relationship between age and level of moral judgment during adolescence. He found a slow decline in value judgments based on self-interest with age and also that more complex moral judgments were made with increasing age. Kohlberg (1984: 43) asserted that there are **"natural culturally universal trends of age development in moral judgment with a cognitive-formal base"** (Kohlberg, 1984: 43).

In the "Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males" of Kohlberg and Associates, reported in 1987 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 77-117), the data indicated a clear relationship between age and stage of moral development. The correlation between age and weighted average score (WAS) was 0,78. The mean WAS at 10 years was 189, at 13 to 14 years 246, at 16 to 18 years 290, at 20 to 22 years 327, at 24 to 26 years 357, at 28 to 30 years 361, at 32 to 33 years 369 and at 36 years 375 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 100/101). There is here a gradual and consistent increase in mean WAS which was also found in the "Longitudinal study of Moral Reasoning among Kibbutz Adolescents" where the mean WAS gradually and consistently increased from 278 at 12 years of age to 377 at ages 24 to 26 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 140).

A regression analysis indicated that age accounted for 40% of variance in WAS in the Kibbutz study. The Kibbutz study shows a clear relationship between age and the development of moral judgment in terms of Global Stage Scores: At Stage 2/3 it was found that 61% of the subjects of 12 years were assigned to this stage and no subject aged 18 years or above was assigned to this stage; Stage 3 was the modal stage for subjects between 13 and 17 years of age and no subject in this age group scored higher than Stage 3/4. No subject in the Kibbutz study reached Stage 4 unless over the age of 18 years (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 141).

To control for the variable of age, indicated by all the above research to be of great importance in the assessment of level of moral judgment, in this empirical study the mean age of the experimental and control groups will be as alike as possible.

#### 5.5 A COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL SAMPLES REGARDING THE CONTROL VARIABLES

**TABLE 5.1: COMPARISON OF E AND C GROUPS IN TERMS OF THE CONTROL VARIABLES**

	Experimental Group	Control Group
N	30	30
I.Q.	85-115( $x=100,2$ )	85-115( $x=101,1$ )
SES	16,3	16,6
AGE	$x=15y/5m$	$x=15y/3m$
BOYS N	17	17
GIRLS N	13	13

### 5.5.1 Chronological Age

The subjects in the two groups ranged in age between 13 years and 17 years/4 months. As the average age of the subjects in the experimental group was 15 years/5 months at the time of testing and the average age of the subjects in the control group was 15 years/3 months at time of testing, the difference between the two groups regarding chronological age was not considered to be significant as there was only a two month difference between the groups in terms of average age. The two month difference in average age between the two groups made the experimental group 1,1% older on average than the control group. The female subjects in the experimental group had an average age of 15 years/7 months, while the control group's female subjects had an average age of 15 years/1 month. The male subjects in both groups had an average age of 15 years/4 months.

### 5.5.2 Intelligence

The intelligence quotient of all subjects in both groups had to be ascertained in view of the importance of intelligence as a variable in the development of moral judgment. All the subjects in the experimental group had been tested recently during their classification as behaviourally handicapped but a number of subjects in the control sample had to be tested because no scores were available on their school Ed. Lab.-cards. These untested pupils were tested by means of the Senior South African Individual Scale (SSAIS)-test by

the researcher. Regardless of which I.Q.-test was applied to a subject (whether, SSAIS, Old South African Individual Scale or New South African Group Test), only the total I.Q.-score was used for the purpose of this experimental study, the reason for this being that the OSAIS Individual Scale Test gives only a total I.Q. and not a verbal and non-verbal score and a number of subjects, particularly in the experimental group had been tested on the OSAIS.

The average total I.Q.-score of the experimental group was 100,2 while that of the control group was 101,1. This gives a difference of less than one percent in mean I.Q. total score between the groups in favour of the control group. The average total I.Q.-score of the female subjects in the experimental group was 101,3 and that of the male subjects in this group 99,5. The average total I.Q.-score of the female subjects in the control group was 99,5 and that of the males in this group 102,3.

### 5.5.3 Socio-Economic Status

As indicated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 no families involved in this empirical study could be classed as upper middle class, in terms of the system of scoring used in the socio-economic questionnaire, and only two families in each group, experimental and control, could be classed as middle class. About 93% of subjects in each sample fell into the low or lower-middle socio-

economic grouping, while the allocation of subjects into socio-economic classes on a 3 point scale over 10 questions might appear to be somewhat arbitrary, the intention of comparing the E and C Groups with regard to socio-economic status was well met by the method applied as can be seen in the following statistics. The average point score out of 30 of the clinic school group was 16,3 and that of the control group on the same 30 point scale 16,6 which indicates that the experimental and control groups were very alike, in terms of the test applied, with regard to socio-economic status.

#### **5.5.4 Gender**

In view of the secondary aim of this research study (see 5.2.1.(a)) the gender split of both the experimental and control groups was 17 boys and 13 girls. This split was determined by the chance split of the experimental group.

### **5.6 PROCEDURE**

#### **5.6.1 Introduction**

Both the Experimental and Control Groups were tested by means of:

- (a) a Socio-economic and Biographical Questionnaire (Appendix A);



(b) Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview: Form A (Appendix B).

Both the socio-economic questionnaire and Moral Judgment Interview were completed by all subjects in written form. The use of the written form of interview for Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, while not as desirable a method as an individual oral interview (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 152) was the most feasible method of collecting data because,

1. a total of 90 pupils had to be tested;
2. the pupils making up the experimental group are at a clinic school more than 300 kilometers from Johannesburg and their homes are in varied and widespread places in the Transvaal.

The only feasible method of collecting data from a large number of subjects is by means of written interviews (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 152).

After each subject had been given a copy of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview: Form A (see Appendix B) and an answer sheet with ample space to answer the questions, use was made of the suggested introductory instructions to be found in Chapter 6 of Colby and Kohlberg's 'The Measurement of Moral Judgment', Vol. I.:

"The Moral Judgment Interview consists of several stories that we believe present some challenging issues. Some of you might choose one solution to these stories, others of you may choose another. We are primarily interested in the explanations or reasons you give for your decisions. Try to justify and explain your statements as fully as possible. Very short answers are of no use to us so be sure to elaborate fully. Keep in mind that we are more interested in the 'why'-questions than the 'what'-questions. Even if you give a long description of what you think is right or what you think should be done, it is of no help if you do not explain why you think it is right or why you think it should be done" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 153).

The tester then read through each dilemma and each question with the subjects before requiring them to respond. Ample time was given for each response to be made so that each subject could respond fully, i.e. no time pressure was applied to the subjects. While 20 minutes is suggested as the approximate writing time for each story (Kohlberg, 1987: 153), considerably longer time was spent on each story, because the tester read both the story and each question, prior to a response being made, to the subjects. This reading of the stories and questions was done to make the written interview more akin to an oral interview and to ensure that the subjects understood the stories and questions fully. Both the reading and comprehension ability of the subjects was thus made less of a factor.

All subjects finally selected for either the experimental or control groups, who had not previously been tested on one of the I.Q.-tests applicable to this empirical study (see 5.6.2), were tested individually by means of the Senior South African Individual Scale (SSAIS) I.Q.-test (see 5.6.2.2).

## **5.6.2 Measuring instruments**

### **5.6.2.1 Introduction**

The measuring instruments used in this empirical study were applied to all subjects in both the experimental and control groups. The I.Q.-tests applied were the Senior South African Individual Scale (SSAIS) (see 5.6.2.3), the Old South African Individual Scale (OSAIS) (see 5.6.2.2) and the New South African Group Test (NSAGT) (see 5.6.2.4). Subjects who had not been previously or recently tested on one of the above I.Q.-tests were tested on the Senior South African Individual Scale.

The Biographical and Socio-Economic Questionnaire (see Appendix A and 5.6.2.5) was used to:

- (a) gain new and confirming data regarding the age, sex, home language, school standard and course of all subjects, and

- (b) obtain data regarding the socio-economic status of all subjects to make a comparison between the experimental and control groups on this variable possible.

The most important measuring instrument in this empirical study of the level of moral judgment was Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview: Form A (see Appendix B), which was marked by means of Standard Issue Scoring (see Appendix C). A description of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview: Form A (5.6.2.6) and an examination of Kohlberg's methodology in this regard will be followed by the Standard Issue Scoring System (see 5.6.2.7), interrater reliability (see 5.6.2.7.1), the reliability of Standard Issue Scoring (see 5.6.2.7.2), the validity of Standard Issue Scoring (5.6.2.7.3) and the statistical techniques used for the analysis of the data (see 5.6.2.8).

#### **5.6.2.2 The Old South African Individual Scale (OSAIS)**

This intelligence test is also called the Individual Scale of General Intelligence or the Fick Scale. This intelligence test is similar to both the Stanford-Binet Scale and the Merrill-Palmer Scale (H.S.R.C., 1979: 63). The OSAIS, unlike the SSAIS, is a conventional or traditional individual I.Q.-test which measures general intelligence and where I.Q. is defined as being mental age divided by chronological age multiplied by 100.

Unlike the SSAIS, the I.Q.-score on the OSAIS is a single total I.Q. and the test does not present separate verbal and non-verbal scores. The OSAIS chiefly measures the verbal ability of the individual (H.S.R.C., 1979: 67).

The OSAIS can be applied to subjects ranging in age between 3 years and 20 years and is divided into 18 year levels. At each year level there are a varying number of items, from 3 to 8. The items were chosen to be age applicable for each age level. If a subject copes with all items at a certain age level, and none at a higher level, then that age level indicates the subjects mental age. The scoring system allows the subject to fail on certain items at one age level but still attempt items at later age levels until unsuccessful in 3 items in a row. The fact that the OSAIS is a mental age scale means that the standard deviations of I.Q. based on it differ depending on age and the standard deviations of this scale are not available (H.S.R.C., 1979: 63).

While the OSAIS is a somewhat dated I.Q.-test it is still extensively used, because of its ease of application and generally accepted correlation with other measures of I.Q. at specific ages. Experience has shown that correlations between this test and the other two tests used as a measure of intelligence in this study are most sound for subjects in the age range 6 years to 12 years but that the OSAIS tends to disadvantage older subjects. Special education placement of children over

11 years of age is only done in the Transvaal Education Department in terms of SSAIS-scores, because of the above-mentioned disadvantage. If a subject in the experimental or control group had been tested both on the OSAIS and one of the other acceptable tests (SSAIS or NSAGT), then the OSAIS-score was discounted. Educational Advisers in service of the Transvaal Education Department have been instructed not to apply the OSAIS to pupils above the age of 11 years, but that the OSAIS should be used for Aid Class placement of 6 to 8 year olds.

#### **5.6.2.3      The Senior South African Individual Scale (SSAIS)**

This individual scale intelligence test makes use of a point scale rather than an age scale and consists of nine subtests each consisting of homogeneous items which are suitable for application to all age levels between 6 and 20 years. A standard deviation I.Q.-method is used and not a mental age method as used in the Old South African Individual Scale (see 5.6.2.2).

Performance in the SSAIS is indicated in terms of standard scores or normalized scale scores. Unlike with the OSAIS, the individual scores on the various tests of the SSAIS, or groups of such tests, e.g. the verbal and non-verbal, are comparable (H.S.R.C., 1979: 68-71).

The five verbal tests of the SSAIS, consist of:

1. vocabulary;
2. comprehension;
3. verbal reasoning;
4. problems; and
5. memory.

The four non-verbal tests, consist of:

1. pattern completion;
2. blocks;
3. absurdities; and
4. form board.

The types of tests contained in the SSAIS are those that have proved to be valid and reliable measures of general intelligence (H.S.R.C., 1982: 3-4).

The reliability coefficient for the SSAIS ranges between 0,88 at 7½ years and 0,83 at 17½ years with a high of 0,98 at 9½ years. The standard error of measurement is as follows at varying ages:

- \* at 7½ years it is 4,9;
- \* at 9½ years it is 2,2;
- \* at 13½ years it is 5,4;
- \* at 15½ years it is 5,2; and
- \* at 17½ years it is 5,6 (H.S.R.C., 1982: 30).

Little data exists regarding the validity of the SSAIS, but correlations of total scaled scores and average percentages at last school examinations have indicated correlations of between 0,45 and 0,69 (on power-plus-time scores) and 0,46 and 0,66 (on power scores). This indicates the predictive validity of the test in respect of school achievement. The correlation of total scaled scores and NSAGT (see 5.6.2.4) I.Q. at the age of 13 years is 0,67 (power scores) and 0,68 (power-plus-time scores). This indicates the internal validity of the SSAIS (H.S.R.C., 1982: 31/32).

#### **5.6.2.4 The New South African Group Test (NSAGT): Junior and Senior Series**

The New South African Group Test (NSAGT), both in its junior and senior forms, consists of six subtests, half of which contain non-verbal items while the other half contain verbal items. The non-verbal subtests are:

- \* Test 1: Number Series;
- \* Test 3: Figure Analogies; and
- \* Test 5: Pattern Completion.

The verbal subtests are:

- \* Test 2: Classification of pairs of words;
- \* Test 4: Verbal Reasoning; and
- \* Test 6: Analogies of Words.



According to the Manual for the New South African Group Test (National Bureau of Educational & Social Research, 1965: 2-7) the NSAGT is a deviation I.Q.-test and not a conventional or traditional I.Q.-test. In the traditional I.Q.-test, I.Q. is defined as being mental age divided by chronological age multiplied by 100, while deviation I.Q. is a standard score with an average of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The formulators of the NSAGT chose deviation I.Q. for calculation of norms, because this gives an indication of relative ability at different ages. A person's deviation I.Q., excluding errors of measurement, remains constant from one age to another unless a change in ability level occurs and this is not true of conventional I.Q. (National Bureau of Educational and Social Research, 1965: 2-7).

The reliability of the NSAGT was tested by means of the Kuder-Richardson Formula (K-R21). The reliability K-R21 was found to be 0,97 for the total I.Q.-score on the Junior Series and 0,91 for the total I.Q.-score on the Senior Series when both official language groups were taken into account. As only total I.Q.-scores from the NSAGT were used for subjects in the experimental and control groups in the present study of moral judgment, only the reliability of the total I.Q.-scores is of importance here (National Bureau of Educational and Social Research, 1965: 17-20). Robbertse (1968 as quoted by H.S.R.C., 1979: 79) in three different administrations of the NSAGT found reliability coefficients of 0,86, 0,87 and 0,83 on the total I.Q.-score.

The standard error of measurement of all age groups and both official languages on both series of the NSAGT is an average 4,6 total I.Q.-points. The standard error of measurement ranges from 3,7 total I.Q.-points at the age of 8 years to 6,0 at 19 years (National Bureau of Educational and Social Research, 1965: 17-20).

Du Toit (1970 as quoted by H.S.R.C., 1979: 78) found correlations of approximately 0,50 between NSAGT total I.Q.-scores and scholastic achievement for standard 6 to 10 pupils. Validity coefficients of 0,40 to 0,60 can be considered as satisfactory for the prediction of scholastic achievement by means of psychological tests (H.S.R.C., 1979: 26).

#### **5.6.2.5 The Biographical and Socio-Economic Questionnaire**

This questionnaire (see Appendix A) consisted of seven questions of a biographical nature to determine the following:

- \* name;
- \* school standard;
- \* school course;
- \* home language;
- \* sex;
- \* date of birth; and
- \* the marital status of the subject's parents

and a further ten questions of a socio-economic nature concerning:

- \* parents' educational status;
- \* occupations;
- \* home suburb;
- \* size and ownership of home; and
- \* make and model of motorcar.

The socio-economic questionnaire was used to ensure that the empirical study's experimental and control groups were as alike as possible in terms of mean socio-economic status. The intention was not to classify all the pupils individually as being in a specific class, e.g. lower middle class. The items used in the socio-economic status questionnaire were used because they are typical of items used in such questionnaires.

The ten socio-economic status questions were marked on a three point scale as follows:

1. the two questions on educational status were marked as follows - 1 point for completion of standard 8 or less, 2 points for standard 9 or 10 completion and 3 points for completed tertiary education;
2. the two questions on parents' occupations were marked as follows - 1 to 2 points for occupations below the professions (1 for below recognised trades, 2 for recognised trades) and 3 points for the professions;

3. between 1 and 3 points were allocated each for suburb lived in, nature of suburb, number of rooms and ownership; and
4. between 1 and 3 were allocated each regarding car ownership and type/model of motorcar.

A maximum of 30 points could thus be scored, i.e.  $10 \times 3$ .

#### **5.6.2.6 Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview: Form A**

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview: Form A consists of three hypothetical dilemmas which are numbered Dilemma 111, Dilemma 111' and Dilemma 1 (see Appendix B). The numbering of the dilemmas is in accord with their placement in the original research interview of Kohlberg and they have not been renumbered because of the prior general acceptance of these labels.

Dilemma 111 is the well known dilemma faced by Heinz who is forced to decide between allowing his wife to die of cancer or stealing a drug to save her life. This dilemma is followed by 10 questions, each with two parts, (e.g. 1 and 1a), which elicit moral judgments on the dilemma and force the subjects to choose between the aspects of life or law and explain their choices (Kohlberg, 1984: 640-644).

Dilemma 111' is a continuation of Dilemma 111 but here the subject is forced to choose between morality and conscience on one hand or punishment on the other, because Heinz has stolen the drug and dilemmas are faced by both the arresting police officer and the judge at the trial. In this dilemma there are 12 questions where all but questions 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 have two parts.

Dilemma 1 is a dilemma where a choice must be made between contract and authority. In this dilemma Joe, a fourteen year old boy, is told by his father that he can go on a camp if he earns the money himself. When the father has a chance of going on a fishing trip he asks Joe for the money, that he, Joe, has earned. There are 11 questions about this dilemma all of which have two parts except question 6.

In each of the dilemmas a character, (Heinz, the policeman and the judge, and Joe), are placed in a difficult situation where he has to make a choice between conflicting decisions. The story-dilemmas are applicable to both adults and children from about the age of 10 years upwards, because they pose problematic situations for all in this age range in all cultures. The dilemmas are clearly written and of interest to all individuals at all stages of moral development so as to stimulate the best possible thinking on moral issues (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 151).

Each dilemma is read to the subject(s) and standardized questions are then posed as to how the character in the story-dilemma should act and why. The hypothetical dilemmas as we have noted previously are formulated to cover a variety of different moral issues, like life and law, morality and conscience, and punishment and authority. The subject's stage of moral development is determined by the consistency of his reasoning across a range of moral issues.

After the subject or subjects have answered the relevant questions for each dilemma, these answers are analyzed for structures of moral judgment by means of Standard Issue Scoring which will be discussed in 5.6.2.7. The researcher looks not at the content, the morality itself, of these answers, but at the form or structure of the answers, i.e. at the reasoning used. He seeks consistent use of form across the dilemmas for each of the subjects and having identified it, establishes the stage or stages of moral judgment which characterize each subject's reasoning. The answers are analyzed and scored with Kohlberg's Standardized Issue Scoring System.

#### **5.6.2.7    Kohlberg's    Standardized    Issue    Scoring System**

The Standard Issue Scoring System (S.I.S.S.) is set out in Volume II of The Measurement of Moral Judgment (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) and is based on a standardized

interview which probes only two issues on each of the three dilemma stories (see Appendix B). The issues involved in Dilemma 111 are life and law, in Dilemma 111' morality and conscience and punishment and in Dilemma 1 contract and authority.

The Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) presents criterion concepts defining each stage on each issue for each dilemma-story. A criterion concept is that pattern of reasoning which is most distinctive of a given stage, i.e. it is used by a substantial number of subjects at that stage and not by subjects at other stages.

Kohlberg (1975: 46) is of the opinion that the S.I.S.S. is as standardized as is possible while keeping theoretical validity. Standard Issue Scoring is superior to the previous scoring system used by Kohlberg, the Sentence Scoring System, in that it has many controls not present in the Sentence Scoring System:

- (a) The problem of whether a criterion concept at a specific stage is not expressed as the subject lacks a stage structure or whether the content of the response has not been elicited is not applicable to the S.I.S.S.; and
- (b) The unit of interpretation is much larger than a sentence (Kohlberg, 1975: 45-47).

#### 5.6.2.7.1 Interrater Reliability in Standard Issue Scoring

Studies of interrater reliability conducted by Kohlberg and his collaborators have led them to conclude that **"the Standard Issue Scoring Manual can be reliably mastered by relatively inexperienced users"** (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 64). A study was done by Colby and Kohlberg (1987: 64) using 5 raters, two of whom were authors of the Standard Issue Scoring Manual, one a very experienced rater, and the other two had experience limited to some knowledge of the manual and some practice in scoring plus consultation with experienced raters which amounted to no more than a brief training workshop. Kohlberg (1987: 64) considered these last two to be **'new scorers'**. The interrater reliability figures between the two **'new scorers'** and between each of them and an experienced scorer were at least as high as reliability among the experienced scorers. The percentage agreement figures on Form A ranged between 88% and 100%, for agreement within 1/3 of a stage.

A study (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 65) of new raters, after a four day seminar at the University of California at Berkeley, indicated that percent agreement between the experienced rater and new raters was comparable to reliability figures which were achieved among experienced raters. Again scores were within 1/3 stage of each other with 83% agreement on the 9 point scale consisting of the 5 stages and the 4 transition stages (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 65).



#### 5.6.2.7.2 Reliability of Standard Issue Scoring

The correlational reliability data for Standard Issue Scoring indicates that the instrument is suitably within the limits of acceptable reliability. The test-retest reliability of Standard Issue Scoring ranged between 0,96 and 0,99 while internal consistency ranged from 0,92 to 0,96 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 68). Kohlberg does not, however, consider this high correlational reliability to be enough, because of the qualitative analysis which has been emphasized in many studies of moral development and he sees percentage of absolute agreement between global scores as equally important. Kohlberg found the percentage of absolute agreement between global scores to be between 75% and 88% (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 69).

Defining standard error of measurement as  $\sigma_{\text{meas}} = \sigma_{\text{total}} \sqrt{1 - r_{\text{xxx}}}$ , Kohlberg entered the standard deviation of the total longitudinal sample (Longitudinal Study of US Males) - 69,87 as  $\sigma$  and 0,95 as  $r_{\text{xxx}}$ , the reliability estimate of the measure. This gave a standard error of measurement of the instrument as 15,62 moral maturity points (or weighted average scores) (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 69). The implication of the standard error of measurement being 15,62 WAS-points is that a difference of less than 15,62 WAS-points between two individual scores should not be seen as a significant difference. A difference between two individual scores of over 15,62 WAS-points would be considered a significant difference. When dealing with group comparisons where the groups are fairly large, the standard error will tend to even out as an important factor.

### 5.6.2.7.3 Validity of Standard Issue Scoring

Kohlberg sees construct validity as the appropriate validity concept for a developmental measure such as the Standard Issue System and not any prediction to an external criterion (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 69). The most important empirical criteria of construct validity for a measure of moral judgment stage are invariance of stage (see 4.2.4) and structural 'wholeness' or internal consistency, which is generality of stage usage across moral issues or dilemmas (see 4.2.3).

The results of longitudinal studies like the Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in US Males (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 77-117) confirm both invariant sequence and internal consistency. The positive results of such longitudinal studies in this regard support not only the theoretical assumptions but also the validity of the measure.

Validity and reliability of a test are closely related as both refer to the generalizability of performance on a test to performance in other situations including alternate tests and retests. Structural stage construct validity demands high generalizability or test-retest and alternate form reliability. If a stage is a structured whole then the individual should be consistent over various stimuli and testing occasions and Kohlberg feels that his reliability data meets this demand very well (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 69).

### 5.6.2.8 Statistical Techniques used for the analysis of the data in this empirical study

The data collected in this study was analysed by means of tables and graphs. The significance of differences found between the experimental and control groups regarding level of moral judgment was tested by means of a t-test for the comparison of two independent group means, using a hand calculator, by using the formula:

$$t = \frac{X1 - X2}{\sqrt{\frac{S2/1}{N1} + \frac{S2/2}{N2}}}$$

where X1 = mean of Group 1;  
 X2 = mean of Group 2;  
 S2/1 = variance of Group 1;  
 S2/2 = variance of Group 2;  
 N1 = number of scores in Group 1  
 N2 = number of scores in Group 2

(Slavin, 1984: 177).

Also needed to complete such a t-Test were Degrees of Freedom (d.f.)=N1 + N2 - 2, where N1=number of scores in Group 1 and N2=number of scores in Group 2, and the variance of both Group 1 and Group 2 which is found by means of the formula:

$$S2/3 = \frac{\sum X^2 - (\sum X)^2}{N-1}$$

where EX = total of all scores;  
 EX<sup>2</sup> = total of squares of all scores  
 .N = number of scores

(Slavin, 1984: 177/178).

t-tests were also done to compare:

- (a) The mean WAS (weighted average scores) of males in the experimental and control groups.
- (b) The mean WAS of females in the experimental and control groups.
- (c) The mean WAS of males and females in the experimental group.
- (d) The mean WAS of males and females in the control group.
- (e) The mean WAS of all males in both groups with all females in both groups.

This necessitated the use of the formula:

$$t = \frac{X_1 - X_2}{\sqrt{\frac{(N_1-1)S_1^2/1 + (N_2-1)S_2^2/2}{N_1 + N_2 - 2} \left( \frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2} \right)}}$$

because the  $N_1/2$  of the two groups differ and the variancies of the groups differ (Slavin, 1984: 181).

\*\*\*\*\*

## CHAPTER 6

### THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

The intention in this chapter is to evaluate from obtained data, and comparisons with existing research results, the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence. The first comparison will be made between the experimental and control groups regarding level of moral judgment in terms of Standard Global Scores and Weighted Average Scores (WAS). A comparison will then be done with regard to possible sex differences regarding level of moral judgment which might be indicated in the empirical investigation. Comparisons of any differences between males and females within the two groups and between all males and females tested will be made. The WAS of each individual tested will be used as an indicator of level of moral judgment in these comparisons.

A comparison will then be made between both the experimental group's males and the control group's males with males tested for level of moral judgment in terms of Global Stage Scores in Kohlberg's Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males (Kohlberg, 1987: 101). This comparison will assist in the evaluation of the experimental group's level of moral judgment. The limitation of this comparison to male subjects was determined by the Kohlberg study which concerned itself only with male subjects.

A final comparison to assist in a clear evaluation of the level of moral judgment of adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence was made by comparing the WAS average scores of both the experimental and control groups of this empirical study with previous research in this regard done in Israel, the United States of America and Turkey. A feasible comparison was only possible here using the 13 and 14 year old age group.

The hypotheses examined are:

- \* The research hypothesis is that there is a significant difference between the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and that of non-behaviourally handicapped adolescent pupils of normal intelligence.
- \* The secondary research hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in level of moral judgment between males and females in both the experimental and control groups.

## **6.2 EXAMINATION OF DATA OBTAINED IN THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY**

The data, obtained by means of the various tests and questionnaires, which is of importance to this research project is tabulated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 under the following headings for the experimental and control groups:

\* **Sex**

The gender split within each sample is indicated. This split of 17 males and 13 females was determined by the split at the Clinic School.

\* **Age**

The age of each individual in each group at the time of testing is given as well as the mean age of each group at the time of testing.

\* **Socio-Economic Status (SES)**

The determined SES of each individual, in terms of their scores on the SES-questionnaire (see Appendix A), is given as well as the mean score of each group.

\* **Intelligence Quotient (I.Q.)**

The individual and/or group I.Q. total score for each subject in both groups and the mean I.Q. score of each group is given.

\* **The Standard Global Stage Score (Global)**

The Global for each individual in both groups is given.

\* **The Weighted Average Score (WAS)**

This is also the Moral Maturity Score. The WAS for each subject in both samples is given as well as the average WAS for each sample.





**TABLE 6.2: THE CONTROL GROUP**

	SEX	AGE	SES	I.Q.	GLOBAL	WAS
A.	F	16-7	13	85	2	214
B.	F	15-8	17	93	2/3	249
C.	F	14-4	15	109	3	267
D.	F	14-4	18	101	2/3	222
E.	F	14-6	19	104	3	291
F.	F	15-0	20	106	3	283
G.	F	14-5	17	92	3	283
H.	F	14-10	12	97	2	190
I.	F	16-3	24	88	3	295
J.	F	14-11	14	87	2/3	190
K.	F	14-9	10	115	3	283
L.	F	15-8	14	109	3	289
M.	F	15-6	17	108	3	299
N.	M	15-6	15	101	2	183
O.	M	15-3	12	98	3	286
P.	M	14-1	14	107	3	273
Q.	M	14-8	17	99	2/3	222
R.	M	14-6	14	87	3	276
S.	M	14-11	15	88	2/3	255
T.	M	14-11	20	97	3	267
U.	M	15-5	15	101	2/3	256
V.	M	15-9	17	112	3	267
W.	M	15-11	17	106	3	278
X.	M	15-6	20	111	2/3	256
Y.	M	16-7	24	99	3	278
Z.	M	15-8	19	114	2	205
AA.	M	15-7	16	113	3	267
BB.	M	15-0	23	106	3	283
CC.	M	16-8	14	98	3	265
DD.	M	14-11	16	104	3/4	325
-----						
MEAN:		15,3	16,6	101,1		260

### 6.3 A COMPARISON OF THE LEVEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS TO TEST THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

#### 6.3.1 Global Stage Scores: Experimental and Control Groups

As can be seen in Table 6.1, the Global Stage distribution of the subjects in the experimental group is as follows:

- \* one subject (#30) is at Stage 1/2;
- \* 3 (#15,19,22) at Stage 2;
- \* 23 at Stage 2/3; and
- \* 3 (#8,11,29) at Stage 3.

The Global stage distribution of the control group, shown in Table 6.2, is as follows:

- \* 4 (#A,H,N,Z) at Stage 2;
- \* 7 (#B,D,J,Q,S,U,X) at Stage 2/3;
- \* 18 at Stage 3; and
- \* 1 (#DD) at Stage 3/4.

The following table shows the number of subjects in each sample, and the percentage of subjects in each sample, who fall into each of the applicable stages:


**TABLE 6.3: GLOBAL STAGE SCORES**

Stage	Experimental Group	%	Control Group	%
1/2	1	3	-	-
2	3	10	4	14
2/3	23	77	7	23
3	3	10	18	60
3/4	-	-	1	3

The above data shows a very clear and significant difference between the two groups with regard to Global Stage Scores as indicators of level of moral judgment. While both groups have 4 subjects who have not reached Stage 2/3, most of the subjects (23 or 77%) of the experimental group are at Stage 2/3, while only 7 subjects (23%) in the control group are still at Stage 2/3. It is most significant that only 3 subjects (10%) of the experimental group are at Stage 3, while 18 subjects (60%) of the control group have already reached Stage 3 and a further subject has reached Stage 3/4.

Graph. 6.1 clearly indicates the distribution of the subjects of both the experimental and control groups in terms of Global Stage Scores.

GRAPH. 6.1: GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: ALL SUBJECTS



### 6.3.2 Global Stage Scores: Female Subjects


In the experimental group the female subjects were predominantly at Stage 2/3 (11 subjects or 85%) with only 2 subjects at Stage 3 (see Table 6.4). In the control group there were two subjects at Stage 2, 3 at Stage 2/3 and 8 (62%) at Stage 3. It is clear from this that the control group had significantly more subjects at Stage 3 than the experimental group and this becomes even more significant in view of the full six month age difference, on average, between the female subjects of the two groups in favour of the experimental group. (The average age of the experimental group females was 15 years/7 months and that of the control group females 15 years/1 month). The fact that 2 control group females were at Stage 2 is probably a factor of age.

**TABLE 6.4: GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: FEMALES**

Stage	Experimental Group	%	Control Group	%
2	-	-	2	15
2/3	11	85	3	23
3	2	15	8	62

**GRAPH. 6.2: GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: FEMALE SUBJECTS**

**NO. OF  
PUPILS**



**EXPERIMENTAL GROUP:**  
**FEMALES**



**CONTROL GROUP:**  
**FEMALES**



Graph. 6.2 clearly indicates the distribution of the female subjects of both the experimental and control groups in terms of Global Stage Scores.

### 6.3.3 Global Stage Scores: Male Subjects


In the experimental group the male subjects were predominantly at Stage 2/3 (76%), while 1 subject was at stage 1/2, 2 at Stage 2 and 1 at Stage 3 (see Table 6.5). It is significant that only one subject here had attained Stage 3. In the control group 10 subjects (59%) had reached Stage 3 and only 4 subjects (23%) were at Stage 2/3. Only 2 subjects (12%) in the control group were still at Stage 2 and 1 subject was at Stage 3/4. The average age of the males in both the experimental and the control groups was 15 years/4 months, which makes comparisons here more valid than between the females in the two groups.

Graph. 6.3 clearly indicates the distribution of the male subjects of both the experimental and control groups in terms of Global Stage Scores.

**TABLE 6.5: GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: MALES**

Stage	Experimental Group	%	Control Group	%
1/2	1	6	-	-
2	2	12	2	12
2/3	13	76	4	23
3	1	6	10	59
3/4	-	-	1	6

GRAPH. 6.3: GLOBAL STAGE SCORES: MALE SUBJECTS

NO. OF  
PUPILS

EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: MALES



CONTROL GROUP: MALES



#### 6.3.4 Weighted Average Scores (WAS)

The mean Weighted Average Score of the experimental group was 239, and that of the control sample 260. The difference in mean WAS between the groups was thus 21 points or about 9%. This difference was found to be significant in a t-test:  $t(58)=2,368.p\leq 0,05$ .

The difference in mean WAS was at its greatest when a comparison was made between the male subjects in both groups where the mean chronological age of both groups males was the same (15 years/4 months). Here the mean WAS of the experimental group males was 235 and that of the control group males 261, which gave a 26 point difference in mean WAS. This difference is statistically significant:  $t(32)=2,58.p\leq 0,05$ .

The mean WAS of the experimental group females was 244 and that of the females in the control group 258. This gives a difference of only 14 points in mean WAS and indicates the importance of age as a variable in the measurement of level of moral judgment, because the average age of the females in the experimental group was a full six months greater than that of the control group (15 years/7 months and 15 years/1 month respectively). Though the control group females were an average of six months younger than the experimental group females, the control group females still obtained a higher mean WAS. The difference between the females of the experimental group and control group in terms of WAS did not, however, prove to be significant:  $t(24)=1,1$  (which did not even meet the decision criterion of  $p\leq 0,1$  which is 1,711)  $p\geq 0,1$ .



When comparing the clinic school males with the clinic school females, in terms of mean WAS, it was found that the mean WAS of the males was 235 and that of the females 244. A t-test of this 9 WAS point difference gave the following result:  $t(28)=0,89.p\geq 0,1$ . No significant differences in mean WAS was thus found between the sexes in the experimental group.

A comparison was then done between the males and females in the control group in terms of WAS. The small difference in mean WAS here was in favour of the males who were on average 3 months older than the females. When comparing the males and females, in terms of WAS, in the experimental group in the foregoing paragraph the small difference in mean WAS was in favour of the females who were on average 3 months older than the males. The importance of age as a variable in the measurement of level of moral judgment is clearly indicated here. The t-test to ascertain the significance of the difference in mean WAS between the males and females in the control group gave the following results:  $t(28)=0,23.p\geq 0,1$ . Again no significant differences in mean WAS as a measure of level of moral judgment was found between the sexes.

A t-test was also performed to compare all the males in both the experimental and control groups with all the females in both groups. The results were as follows:  $t(58)=0,345.p\geq 0,1$ . The t-test performed in comparison of the sexes with regard to level of moral judgment, in terms of mean WAS, all indicated that no significant differences existed in this empirical study.

**6.3.5 A Global and WAS comparison of the experimental and control groups with the Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males**

The comparison was done to:

- (1) assist in a clearer evaluation of the level of moral judgment of the behaviourally handicapped pupils (i.e. experimental group);
- (2) evaluate the level of moral judgment of the non-behaviourally handicapped pupils (i.e. control group) in terms of existing research; and
- (3) to shed the light of existing research on the differences found in terms of level of moral judgment between the experimental and control groups.

The fact that there were both males and females in the experimental and control groups was not considered to be significant, because both previous research and the results of this empirical study (see 6.3.4) indicate that there is no difference of any significance between the sexes regarding level of moral judgment. The following table (Table 6.6) presents the percentage of subjects at the two tested age levels in the Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males and of the subjects in the experimental and control groups of this empirical study. Also indicated are the mean WAS and number of subjects in each group.

**TABLE 6.6: A COMPARISON OF THE LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF U.S. MALES AND THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS**

	LONGITUDINAL STUDY		CONTROL / EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS	
	13- 14 YEAR OLDS	16-18 YEAR OLDS	MEAN AGE: 15Y/3M	MEAN AGE: 15Y/5M
	% AT STAGE*	% AT STAGE*	% AT STAGE	% AT STAGE
1/2	8,1	2,2	0	3,3
2	16,2	11,1	13,3	10,0
2/3	56,8	17,8	23,3	76,6
3	16,2	44,4	60,0	10,0
3/4	2,7	24,4	3,3	0
4	0	0	0	0
Mean WAS	246	290	260	239
N	37	46	30	30

\* (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 101)

For the purpose of comparison in terms of Table 6.6, Stages 1/2 (where the percentage of subjects in any group was lower than 8,2%) and 4 (where no subjects were found in any group) will be ignored. It is clear from Table 6.6 that the control group is highly comparable with the 16 to 18 year old group in the Longitudinal Study in that at Stages 3 and 3/4 both studies have over 60% of their subjects at those Stages (68,8 of the U.S.A. 16 to 18 year old group and 63,3% of the control group). The control group and the U.S.A. 16 to 18 year old group are also

highly comparable when we look at Stages 1/2 and 2 where both groups have 13,3% of their subjects. At Stage 3 the control group has 23, 3 percent of its subjects, while the U.S.A. 16 to 18 year old group has 17,8% of its subjects. Both these samples are far in advance of the experimental group in terms of Global Stage Score of level of moral judgment and the experimental group is much more comparable with the 13 to 14 year old age group of the Longitudinal study both in terms of Global Stage Score and WAS.

The experimental group subjects range in Stage from 1/2 to 3 as do 97,3% of the 13 to 14 year olds in the U.S.A. study. In both groups the majority of the subjects are still at Stage 2/3 (76,6% of the experimental group and 56,8% of the 13 to 14 year olds in the U.S.A. study).

It is clear from the above that while the control sample with an average age of 15 years/3 months compares favourably with the 16 to 18 year old group of the Longitudinal Study, the experimental group with an average age of 15 years/5 months compares better with the 13 to 14 year old group of the U.S.A. Longitudinal Study both in terms of Global Stage Score and WAS (where the mean difference between the groups is only 7 WAS points). It is clear that the experimental group is on average at a lower level of moral judgment than the 13 to 14 U.S.A. group in terms of WAS, while the control group has a mean advantage over the 13 to 14 year old U.S.A. group of 14 WAS points.

The spread of the 16 to 18 year old group of the Longitudinal Study was greater than that of the control group and the reason for this could be that the control group was limited to subjects of normal intelligence (85 to 115) and specific economic status, i.e. mainly lower middle and lower class. The U.S.A. Longitudinal Study was not restricted in this way.

#### **6.3.6 A comparison of the research samples with existing research: Weighted Average Scores (WAS): 13 and 14 year olds**

The 13 and 14 year old age group was the one where the most feasible and meaningful comparison with the three other existing longitudinal studies could be made. The existing studies used here were the 'Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males' (see Kohlberg, 1987: 77-118), a 'Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in Turkish Males' (see Kohlberg, 1987: 119-128) and 'The Development of Moral Reasoning among Kibbutz Adolescents: A Longitudinal Study' (see Kohlberg, 1987: 129-150).

The samples in the longitudinal studies were equivalent in that they consisted of equal numbers of lower and middle class subjects, while the two samples in this study consisted mainly of lower class subjects (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The three longitudinal studies also do not limit themselves, as had to be done in this research project, to a specific I.Q.-range.

The comparison between the three longitudinal studies and the experimental and control groups is made here in terms of mean WAS. Below is a tabulated comparison (Table 6.7) of the mean WAS for the three longitudinal studies and the two groups of this empirical study for 13 and 14 year olds (the Turkish sample included 15 year olds).

**TABLE 6.7: A COMPARISON OF 13 AND 14 YEAR OLDS IN THE E AND C GROUPS WITH EXISTING RESEARCH**

STUDY	Mean WAS	No. of Subjects
Israel	288	40*
U.S.A.	249	37*
Turkey	219	23*
E Group x age = 13y/11m	246	7
C Group x age = 14y/5m	257	13

\* (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 141)

From the above table it can be noted that the mean WAS of the control group is higher than all but the Kibbutz sample, while the experimental group rated 4th of the 5 groups. The difference of only 11 WAS points between the E and C group 13 and 14 year olds in favour of the C-group is probably a factor of the small size of the E group's 13 and 14 year old group.

The comparison here is of interest in that it again shows that the control group is significantly more advanced in level of moral judgment than the U.S.A. group and the experimental group, but not too much should be read into the comparison because of the small sample sizes.

#### **6.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS**

##### **6.4.1 A level of Moral Judgment Comparison of the experimental and control groups**

A significant difference was found in the level of moral judgment between the behaviourally handicapped clinic school experimental group and the non-behaviourally handicapped control group. This difference was very clear in terms of Global Stage Score (see 6.3.1) where the experimental group subjects were predominantly at Stage 2/3 (77%), while the control group subjects were mainly at Stage 3 (60%). In terms of Weighted Average Scores (WAS) (see 6.3.4), the mean WAS of the experimental group was 239 and that of the control group 260. This gave a difference of 21 mean WAS points which proved significant in a t-test at better than  $p \leq 0,05$  ( $t(58) = 2,368, p \leq 0,05$ ). The significant difference in level of moral judgment between the behaviourally handicapped clinic school adolescent group and the non-behaviourally handicapped group confirms the research hypothesis of the empirical study (see 6.1).

#### 6.4.2 Sub-group comparisons regarding level of moral judgment

- \* No significant difference in a t-test could be found between the mean WAS of the female subjects in the experimental and control groups ( $t(24)=1,1, p \geq 0,1$ ). The reason for this is likely to have been the full six month average age difference between the groups in favour of the experimental group. What was notable here was that, though there was a WAS difference of only 14 WAS points, the majority of female subjects in the experimental group (85%) were still at Stage 2/3, while 62% of the control group female subjects were at Stage 3.
  
- \* A significant difference was found, in a t-test, between the mean WAS of the males in the experimental and control groups. The mean WAS of the male subjects in the experimental group was 235 and that of the control group male subjects 261. This gave a 26 point difference in mean WAS between the male subjects of the experimental and control groups and a t-test indicated that this was significant at  $p \leq 0,05$  ( $t(32)=2,58, p \leq 0,05$ ). A significant and clear difference in level of moral judgment was thus found between the male subjects of the experimental and control groups where the control group males had the clearly higher level of moral judgment in terms of WAS. In terms of Global Stage Score 94% of the male subjects in the



experimental group were at Stage 2/3 or lower, while 65% of the male subjects in the control group were at Stage 3 or higher.

- \* To examine the role of sex differences in level of moral judgment sub-group comparisons were made between the male and female subjects in the experimental group, the control group and between all male and female subjects tested. In terms of t-tests, no significant differences were found regarding level of moral judgment between the males and the females in this empirical study. A t-test of the difference, in terms of mean WAS, between the males and females in the experimental group gave the following result:  $t(28)=0,89.p\geq 0,1$ . A t-test of the difference, in terms of mean WAS, between the males and females in the control group gave the following result:  $t(28)=0,23.p\geq 0,1$ . When all males and all females in both the experimental groups were compared in terms of mean WAS the result was  $t(58)=0,345.p\geq 0,1$ . As no significant differences were found regarding level of moral judgment between the males and the females in this empirical study, the secondary research hypothesis was confirmed.

- \* A comparison of both the experimental and control groups with Kohlberg's (1987: 101) 'A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males' (using only the applicable age groups of 13 to 14 years and 16 to 18 years) highlighted the clear diffe=

rence between the experimental and control groups with regard to level of moral judgment. The control group with an average age of 15 years/3 months compared favourably with the 16 to 18 year olds in Kohlberg's study in terms of Global Stage Score, because 63,3% of the control group subjects were at Stage 3 or Stage 3/4 and 68,8% of Kohlberg's 16 to 18 year olds were at these stages. The control group compared much less favourably with Kohlberg's 16 to 18 year olds in terms of mean WAS than Global Stage Score and this was undoubtedly due to difference in average age. The experimental group with an average age of 15 years/5 months compared well with Kohlberg's 13 to 14 year old group both in terms of Global Stage Score, where 89,9% of the experimental group were below Stage 3 and 81,1% of Kohlberg's 13 to 14 year olds were also below Stage 3, and mean WAS, where the mean WAS of the experimental group was 239 and that of Kohlberg's 13 to 14 year olds 246.

- \* A comparison was also made between the 13 and 14 year olds in the experimental and control groups and subjects of approximately the same age in Longitudinal Studies done in Israel, Turkey and the U.S.A. The clear difference between the level of moral development of subjects in the experimental and control groups was again indicated. The control group 13 and 14 year olds had a higher mean WAS than all but the Kibbutz study, while the experimental group's mean WAS was below all but the 13 to 15 year olds in the Turkish study.

## CHAPTER 7

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

#### 7.1 SUMMARY

##### 7.1.1 The introductory chapter

The aim of the empirical study was to determine whether there is a significant difference in level of moral judgment between behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils.

The problem, motivation of the problem (1.1), aim (1.2), method of study (1.3) and operational definitions (1.4) were all examined in Chapter 1. The operational definitions of '**behaviourally handicapped**' and '**moral judgment**' required early concept clarification and this was done in the introductory chapter (1.5 & 1.6).

The operational definition '**behaviourally handicapped**' required an examination of:

- (a) the criteria laid down by the Transvaal Education Department for the therapeutic placement of the '**behaviourally handicapped**' child in a clinic school (1.5.2), and

- (b) the types of behavioural and emotional problems which can lead to classification as '**behaviourally handicapped**' (1.5.3).

The operational definition '**moral judgment**' was examined in a very limited sense because '**moral judgment**' in this research refers to performance on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interviews. The Kohlbergian or cognitive-developmental view of moral judgment was examined because in terms of the operational definition '**moral judgment**' must be seen from this point of view in this empirical study (1.6).

#### **7.1.2 Relevant research and philosophical foundations**

In Chapter 2 an examination was made of relevant research done into moral judgment and development prior to that of Kohlberg. The emphasis here was on that research which indicated clear stages of moral development, a developmental pattern of morality and whether or not such moral development was deemed cognitive of nature. The research of Jean Piaget (2.3) was emphasized because his strong emphasis on the cognitive nature of moral judgment and his belief that moral development consists of clear stages had a strong influence on Kohlberg's thinking regarding moral judgment and development.

The philosophical foundations of Kohlberg's theory of moral development formed the subject matter of Chapter 3 because these foundations are unacceptable to the Christian educator. An examination was first made into moral development from a Christian perspective (3.2) and this was followed by a detailed survey of the various influences on Kohlberg's philosophical foundations ranging from Socrates and Plato to Kant, Dewey and Rawls (3.3). Kohlberg's moral philosophy was then examined (3.4) and critically evaluated (3.5) and a limited acceptance of his theory of moral development postulated (3.6).

Kohlberg's theory of moral development, which is actually a theory of moral judgment, was examined in detail in Chapter 4 as well as Kohlbergian moral education. Cognitive developmental moralization theory was briefly examined (4.2) before the important characteristics of Kohlberg's stages of moral development (4.3). An outline was then given of cognitive development and the stages (4.3.6) before the stages themselves were examined individually in levels of moral development (4.4). The relationship between moral judgment and moral action (4.5), role-taking (4.6.2), the role of parents, family and peers in the development of moral judgment (4.6.3 & 4.6.4), and a critical evaluation of Kohlberg's theory of moral development (4.7) were followed by an examination of Kohlbergian Planned Moral Education (4.8).

### 7.1.3 Method of research

The method of research of the empirical study was outlined in Chapter 5. The statement of both the main and subordinate aims and hypothesis were made (5.2) and then the research design (5.3) and control variables (5.4) given. The sampling methods used in this empirical study were next examined to clearly indicate how both the experimental and control groups were obtained (5.3.2 & 5.3.3). The important control variables of intelligence (5.4.2.2.1), sex difference (5.4.2.2.2), socio-economic status (5.4.2.2.3) and age (5.4.2.2.4) were examined in some detail. The necessary comparison of the matched groups was then made in terms of the control variables to ensure that no significant differences existed regarding these variables (5.5). No significant differences were noted in this comparison.

The testing procedure was then outlined (5.6) and this was followed by an examination of all the measuring instruments used in this study:

- \* the intelligence tests (OSAIS) (5.6.2.2),
- \* SSAIS (5.6.2.3),
- \* NSAGT (5.6.2.5),
- \* the biographic and socio-economic questionnaire (5.6.2.5), and
- \* Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interviews: Form A (5.6.2.6).

Kohlberg's Standard Issue Scoring System was then examined (5.6.2.7) emphasizing the reliability (5.6.2.7.2), validity (5.6.2.7.3) and interrater reliability (5.6.2.7.1) of this scoring system. The statistical techniques applied to determine the significance of differences in level of moral judgment between the experimental and control groups were then described (5.6.2.8).

#### **7.1.4 The results of the empirical study**

The intention, in Chapter 6, was to present all the data generated in the empirical study and to evaluate from this data the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence by comparison with the control group and existing research results.

The data was first presented (tables 6.1 & 6.2) and then discussed (6.2 & 6.3) and then a comparison was made between the experimental and control groups regarding level of moral judgment in terms of Global Stage Scores (6.3.1) and Weighted Average Scores (6.3.4). These comparisons confirmed the central hypothesis of this study because the subjects in the experimental group were retarded in mean level of moral judgment when compared to the control group.

The secondary hypothesis of this study was confirmed by the data which indicated that no significant sex differences were to be found in this study either between all males and all females or between the males and females in the experimental and control groups (6.3.4).

A comparison was then made between the males of both the experimental and control groups and males tested for level of moral judgment, in terms of both Global Stage and Weighted Average Scores in Kohlberg's Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment in U.S. Males (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 101). This comparison was made to assist in a clear evaluation of both the experimental and control groups' mean level of moral judgment (6.3.5).

A final comparison was made, in terms of level of moral judgment, between members of the experimental and control groups of this study and longitudinal research done in Israel, Turkey and the U.S.A. This comparison was also made to highlight the level of moral judgment of the experimental and control groups of this empirical study (6.3.6).

## **7.2 CONCLUSIONS**

### **7.2.1 Conclusions in respect of the main aim of this empirical study**

The central aim of this empirical study was to deter=



mine whether or not there is a significant difference in the level of moral judgment between behaviourally handicapped adolescent, clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils. The results of this empirical study clearly indicate that a significant difference in level of moral judgment does exist between these two groups in favour of the non-behaviourally handicapped group both in terms of Global Stage Score and mean Weighted Average Score as measures of level of moral judgment. It can be concluded from this that the behaviourally and emotionally handicapped adolescents in question are retarded, because of being so handicapped, in level of moral judgment. They were found to be predominantly at Stage 2/3, while the adolescents in the control group were mainly at Stage 3. This retardation in achievement of Stage 3 moral reasoning has serious implications, because these adolescents have not reached the **'good-boy, nice girl'** morality of Kohlberg's Stages 3 and 4, which Peters (1975: 678) sees as most important, because **"our fellow citizens should be well bedded down at one or other of these stages"**. The **'good boy'** stage is crucial to avoid proliferation of criminal types and because the individual is able to follow rules that are internalized.

#### **7.2.2 Conclusions in respect of sex differences**

The first secondary aim of this empirical study was to determine whether significant differences in level of moral judgment existed between the male and female sub=

jects in the experimental group (clinic school pupils) or, for reasons of comparison, in the control group. No significant differences due to sex differences were found in this empirical study and this was confirmed by the application of t-tests. Kohlberg's theory (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 130) predicts that there will be no difference cross culturally in the sequence of stages in the moral development of males and females, there might however be differences in rate of development due to the inequality of sex roles in particular societies (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 130). The results of this empirical study are in line with Kohlbergian theory, because no significant relationship between sex and stage scores was found.

### **7.2.3 Conclusions in respect of comparisons of the results of this empirical study with existing research**

To assist in our evaluation of the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped clinic school pupils of normal intelligence (the experimental group) a comparison was made between the results of this empirical study and existing research done in the U.S.A., Israel and Turkey. Comparisons here were done in terms of Global Stage Score and mean WAS and highlighted the very clear differences between the experimental and control groups of this empirical study in level of moral judgment as well as placing this whole empirical study under the spotlight of previous research. The most important conclusion reached in these comparisons was

that the experimental group was significantly retarded in development of moral judgment not only in terms of the moral judgment level of the control sample, but also in terms of the moral judgment levels found in the longitudinal studies in the U.S.A. and Israel. The experimental group compared most favourably with the 13 and 14 year olds in the U.S. Males Study (see table 6.6) which, because of their (the experimental group's) average age of 15 years/5 months, indicated clearly a retardation in terms of level of moral judgment.

### **7.3           IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY**

The following are the most important implications of the research findings of this empirical study:

- (a) The significant difference in level of moral judgment found between the behaviourally handicapped pupils and the non-behaviourally handicapped pupils, in favour of the latter group, implies that some form of action should be taken to advance the moral stage of the behaviourally handicapped pupils, preferably to the same level of moral judgment as the non-behaviourally handicapped pupils. This implies the application of Kohlbergian moral education aimed at such stage advance, but Kohlbergian moral education will have to be adapted to suit the educational philosophy and nature of Christian education in the R.S.A (see 7.4).

- (b) Stage advance, with its implications of higher levels of moral judgment, should also be considered as important in all education in the R.S.A., at all applicable school ages, and Kohlbergian type moral education programmes should be adapted to suit the ages, intelligence and socio-economic status of all children throughout their school careers. The higher WAS scores of the Israeli children in the Kibbutz Study (see table 6.7) makes it clear that there is certainly scope for stage advance in the control group of this empirical study even if the control group compared favourably with the results in the U.S. Males Study (see table 6.7). This implication is tentatively noted because of the limitation of this study (see 7.6).
- (c) That no special note need to be taken of sex differences when setting up a programme of moral education aimed at advancing the moral stage of behaviourally handicapped pupils and only the chronological age, socio-economic status and intelligence of such pupils need be considered in such a programme.
- (d) That while Kohlberg's philosophical foundations to his theory of moral development are in part unacceptable to the Christian educator (see 3.2), much value can be attached both to his methods of determining level of moral judgment and advancing

this level through Kohlbergian moral education, which will need some adaptation to be acceptable in the Christian education of the R.S.A.

#### **7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IN THE R.S.A. INTO DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT**

The intention of this empirical study was to evaluate the level of moral judgment of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils and determine whether this level of moral judgment was retarded or not in comparison with that of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils. The findings of this empirical study indicate that such retardation does in fact exist and this implies that much further research into moral judgment is necessary. The following future research is indicated:

- (a) Further research into the level of moral judgment with pupils of different age, intelligence, language, race and cultural groups who are behaviourally or emotionally handicapped.
- (b) Research into the effectiveness of Kohlbergian Moral Education when applied to behaviourally handicapped pupils at clinic schools.
- (c) Research into the adaptation of Kohlbergian moral education to suit the philosophical foundations of education adhered to in the R.S.A.

- (d) Research into the application of Kohlbergian moral education generally in the schools to ascertain from what age, how and when this moral education should be applied, if indeed it should be applied. This would imply the drawing up of moral education programmes including Kohlbergian planned moral education.
- (e) Research into the part played by level of moral judgment in crimes committed in the R.S.A. This would clarify whether the reaching of Stages 3 and 4 is as important as has been postulated by Peters (1975: 678).
- (f) Research into other forms of moral education which could be effectively used in conjunction with Kohlbergian moral education in its aim of stage advancement in terms of moral judgment.

#### **7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT THE INSTITUTION OF KOHLBERGIAN STYLE MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMMES AT THE CLINIC SCHOOLS**

The following recommendations, as to a Kohlbergian style moral education programme aimed at moral stage advance at the clinic schools of the Transvaal Education Department, should be seen as tentative, because as already noted further research into such programmes is necessary. Much of such research should take the form of pilot programmes where the various aspects of Kohlbergian moral education are adapted, applied and

evaluated. The following suggested programme, which will cause the schools no great curriculum or timetable changes, could be applied to the advantage of the behaviourally handicapped clinic school pupils from about the age of 12 years (the advent of adolescence).

#### **7.5.1 A suggested Moral Education Programme for Behaviourally Handicapped Adolescent Clinic School Pupils**

This programme consists of five main aspects, all of which will be important in any attempt to raise the level of moral judgment of the pupils.

- (a) During at least one 30 minute period a week, the children will memorize and discuss in detail, under the guidance of the teacher, sound moral quotations from the Bible and other sources. These quotations should be pertinent, practical and aimed at making the children think more deeply about moral questions, particularly those of right and wrong.
- (b) Weekly group sessions should be held by the Educational Psychologist (or Educational Adviser: Educational Matters) where Kohlbergian type moral dilemmas are discussed in detail. The educational psychologist will have to determine the Global Stage Score of each pupil before beginning such sessions and will then adopt the following approach during moral dilemma discussions:

- \* discussions of the dilemma and support for arguments one stage above the lowest stage found in the group, (i.e. if pupils are at stages 2, 2/3 and 3 then 2/3 will be the chosen stage); and when all the pupils appear to understand these arguments then
  - \* the psychologist will challenge these arguments with arguments at a higher stage.
- (c) Weekly group sessions should also be held by the educational psychologist where all pupils are allowed to talk about themselves and their own problems. These problems should then be open for discussion and this will allow for role-taking opportunities which Kohlberg sees as so important for stage advancement (see 4.8.3.2).
- (d) A class meeting should be held once a week under the guidance of the class teacher, standard tutor or Head of Department: Educational Guidance at which classroom (and even school) matters are discussed and voted on in a very democratic way. A different pupil chairman should be chosen for each of these meetings where the pupils should learn to make responsible decisions, fully aware not only of the needs of others but also of the great responsibility that decision makers have to bear.
- (e) In both English and Afrikaans (first languages) a



very careful selection of setwork books should be made to ensure that the books read and discussed emphasize sound morality and eternal values. The teacher should at all times emphasize these aspects.

#### **7.6 LIMITATIONS OF THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY**

- \* The experimental group of behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils was limited in size, age, race, language, socio-economic status and intelligence. These limitations were necessary for scientific reasons, so that a matched control sample could be obtained, and because of the size and nature of the clinic school population. The limited nature of the experimental group makes difficult extension of the findings of this study to behaviourally handicapped pupils of different age, race, language, socio-economic status and intelligence. As noted in 7.4 further research, with groups of behaviourally handicapped pupils differing from those of this study, is necessary.
- \* The limited size of the experimental group made sub-group comparisons with existing research more interesting than scientifically convincing.

## 7.7 CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The results of this empirical study clearly indicate a significant difference in level of moral judgment between behaviourally handicapped adolescent clinic school pupils of normal intelligence and a matched sample of non-behaviourally handicapped pupils. The matching was done with regard to chronological age, intelligence, gender split and socio-economic status. The behaviourally handicapped pupils were retarded in level of moral judgment in terms of both Global Stage Scores and Weighted Average Scores.

The need for stage advancement in level of moral judgment of the behaviourally handicapped clinic school pupils was confirmed in this empirical study. Such stage advancement could be effected by the application of Kohlbergian planned moral education, which could become an important factor in the pedotherapeutic programme of clinic schools. Pupils whose level of moral judgment is advanced are more likely to behave in a morally more mature manner, which is certainly what we need to happen with behaviourally handicapped pupils.

\*\*\*\*\*

## B I B L I O G R A P H Y

ALLPORT, G.W. 1959. Personality. London: Constable.  
588p.

ALSTON, W.P. 1968. Moral attitudes and moral judgments.  
Noûs. 2: 1-23.

ALSTON, W.P. 1971. Comments on Kohlberg's "From is to  
ought". (In Mischel, T., ed.: Cognitive development  
and epistemology. New York: Academic. p.269-284).

ANNE, B. 1979. Kant's theory of morals. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press. 216p.

ARY, D., JACOBS, L.C. & RAZAVIEH, A. 1972. Introduction  
to research in education. New York: Holt, Rinehart  
and Winston. 378p.

AUSUBEL, D.P. 1957. Theory and problems of child deve=  
lopment. New York: Grune and Stratton. 650p.

BARROW, R. 1975. Moral philosophy for education.  
London: Allen and Unwin. 214p.

- BAR-YAM, M., KOHLBERG, L. & NAAME, A. 1980. Moral reasoning of students in different cultural, social and educational settings. American journal of education, 88 : 345-362.
- BLASI, A. 1980. Bridging moral cognition and moral action. Psychological Bulletin, 88: 1-45.
- BLATT, M. & KOHLBERG, L. 1975. The effects of classroom moral discussions upon children's moral judgment. Journal of moral education, 4: 129-161.
- BRONFENBRENNER, U. 1962. The role of age, sex, class and culture in studies of moral development. Religious education, 57: 3-17.
- BRÜMMER, V. 1971. Is die transendentale kritiek religieus bepaald. (In Committee, ed.: Truth and reality. Braamfontein: De Jong. 15-25p.).
- BULL, N.J. 1969. Moral education. London: Routledge and Paul. 183p.
- COETZEE, J.C. 1965. Inleiding tot die algemene teoretiese opvoedkunde. Pretoria: Van Schaik. 325p.

COLBY, A. 1975. Two approaches to moral education. Harvard educational review, 45(1): 134-143p., Feb.

COLBY, A., KOHLBERG, L. & COLLABORATORS. 1987. The measurement of moral judgment; Two Volumes. Boston, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, Vol. 1: 397p; Vol. 2: 977p.

CRITTENDEN, B. 1975. A comment on cognitive moral education. Phi delta kappan, 56(10): 695-697p., June.

DAMON, W. 1980. Structural-developmental theory and the study of moral development. (In Windmiller, M., Lambert, N. & Turich, E., ed.: Moral development and socialization. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon. 35-68p.).

DE PALMA, D.J. & FOLEY, J.M. 1975. Moral development - current theory and research. Hillside, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. 206p.

DEWEY, J. 1916. Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan. 434p.

DEWEY, J. 1930. Experience and conduct. (In Murchison, C., ed.: Psychologies of 1930. Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press. 409-422p.).

DU PLESSIS, P.G.W. 1971. Beginsels en antwoorde in die wysbegeerte. (In Committee, ed.: Truth and reality. Braamfontein: De Jong. 74-85p.).

DUSKA, R. & WHELAN, M. 1977. Moral development: a guide to Piaget and Kohlberg. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. 128p.

DUVENHAGE, B. 1971. Christelike wetenskap. (In Committee, ed.: Truth and reality. Braamfontein: De Jong. 95-108p.).

EYSENCK, H.J. 1970. The structures of human personality. London: Methuen. 476p.

FLAVELL, J.H. 1963. The developmental psychology of J. Piaget. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. 472p.

FLAVELL, J.H. 1977. Cognitive development. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 286p.

FLEMING, C.M. 1963. Adolescence: its social psychology. London: Routledge and Paul. 262p.

FRANKENA, W.K. 1963. Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 560p.

FULLER, E. ed. 1960. The Christian idea of education. New Haven: Yale University Press. 265p.

GARDNER, E.M. 1983. Moral education for the emotionally disturbed early adolescent. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 191p.

GARRISON, K.C. & FORCE, D.G. 1965. The psychology of exeptional children; Fourth edition. New York: Ronald. 586p.

GESELL, A., ILG, F.L. & AMES, L.B. 1965. Youth: the years from ten to sixteen. London: Hamish Hamilton. 542p.

GIBBS, J.C. 1977. Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment: a constructive critique. Harvard educational review, 47: 43-61p.

GUILFORD, J.P. 1954. Psychometric methods. New York: McGraw-Hill. 597p.

HAVIGHURST, J. & TABA, H. 1949. Adolescent character and personality. New York: J. Wiley. 315p.

HERSH, R.H., PAOLITTO, D.P. & REIMER, J. 1979. Promoting moral growth from Piaget to Kohlberg. New York: Longman. 270p.

HOFFMAN, M.L. & HOFFMAN, L.W. 1964. Review of child development research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Vol. 1: 527p.

HOFFMAN, M.L. 1970. Moral development (In Mussen, P., ed.: Carmichael's manual of child psychology. New York: Wiley. 261-359p.).

HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1979. Manual for the use of psychological and scholastic tests as aids in school guidance. Report No. P-19 of the Institute for Psychometric Research. Pretoria. 219p.

HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1982. Manual for the Senior South African Individual Scale (SSAIS) Part 1: Background and Standardization. Pretoria. 45p.

KAY, W. 1968. Moral development. London: Allen and Unwin. 270p.



KANT, I. 1917. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated from the original German by B. Michaeljohn. London: Bell and Sons. 517p.

KANT, I. 1964. Groundwork of the metaphysics of Morals. Translated from the original German by H.J. Patton. New York: Harper and Row. 284p.

KOHLBERG, L. 1970. The moral atmosphere of the school. (In Overley, H. ed.: The unstudied curriculum. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 196-219p.).

KOHLBERG, L. 1971. From is to ought. (In Mischel, T., ed.: Cognitive development and epistemology. New York: Academic Press. 151-212p.).

KOHLBERG, L. 1975. The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. Phi Delta Kappan, 56(10): 670-675p., June.

KOHLBERG, L. 1976. Moral stages and moralization: the cognitive-developmental approach. (In Likona, T., ed.: Moral development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 31-53p.).

KOHLBERG, L. 1984. Essays on moral development, Vol. II: The psychology of moral development. San Francisco: Harper and Row. 729p.

KURTINES, W. & GRIEF, E.B. 1974. The development of moral thought: review and evaluation of Kohlberg's approach. Psychological bulletin, 81: 453-470.

LADD, J. 1965. Introduction to the metaphysical elements of justice. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 312p.

LAYCOCK, S.R. & MUNRO, B.C. 1966. Educational psychology. Vancouver: Copp Clark. 470p.

LIKONA, T. 1976a. Critical issues in the study of moral development and behaviour. (In Likona, T., ed.: Moral development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 3-26p.).

LIKONA, T. ed. 1976b. Moral development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 430p.

LIKONA, T. 1976c. Research on Piaget's theory of moral development. (In Likona, T., ed.: Moral development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 219-240p.).

MCKINNEY, J.P. 1980. Moral development and the concept of values. (In Windmiller, M., Lambert, N. & Turiel, E., ed.: Moral development and socialization. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon. 201-218p.).

MISCHEL, T. ed. 1971. Cognitive development and epistemology. New York: Academic Press. 423p.

MODGIL, S. 1974. Piagetian research: a handbook of recent studies. Windsor: N.F.R. 476p.

MURCHISON, C. ed. 1931. Psychologies of 1930. Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press. 497p.

MUSSEN, P.H., CONGER, J.J. & KAGAN, J. 1963. Child development and personality. New York: Harper Row. 631p.

MUSSEN, P.H., ed. 1970. Carmichael's manual of child psychology. New York: Wiley. Vol. 1: 1519p.; Vol. 2: 872p.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, 1965. Manual for the New South African Group Test. 40p.

PECK, R.F. & HAVIGHURST, R.J. 1960. The psychology of character development. New York: Wiley. 315p.

PETERS, R.S. 1971. Moral development: a plea for pluralism. (In Mischel, T., ed.: Cognitive development and epistemology. New York: Academic Press. 237-267p.).

PETERS, R.S. 1975. A reply to Kohlberg. Phi Delta Kappan, 56(10): 678p., June.

PETERS, R.S. 1981. Moral development and moral education. London: Allen and Unwin. 187p.

PIAGET, J. 1932. The moral judgment of the child. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. 399p.

PURPEL, D. & RYAN, K. 1975. Moral education: where sages fear to tread. Phi Delta Kappan, 56(10): 659-662p., June.

RAWLS, J. 1972. A theory in justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 607p.

REST, J.R. 1976. New approaches to the assessment of moral judgment. (In Likona, T., ed.: Moral development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 198-217p.).

RICHMOND, P.G. 1970. An introduction to Piaget. London: Routledge and Paul. 120p.

ROTHMAN, G.R. 1980. The relationship between moral judgment and moral behaviour. (In Windmiller, M., Lambert, N. & Turiel, E., ed.: Moral development and socialization. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon: 107-127p.).

RUSK, R.R. 1969. Doctrines of the great educators. London: Macmillan. 310p.

RUSSEL, B. 1959. Wisdom of the west. London: Macdonald. 320p.

SALTZSTEIN, H.D. 1976. Social influence and moral development: perspective on the role of parents and peers. (In Likona, T., ed.: Moral development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 253-265p.).

SCRIVEN, M. 1975. Cognitive moral education. Phi Delta Kappan, June, 56(10): 689-694.

SHERMIS, S.S. 1967. Philosophic foundations of education. New York: American Book. 292p.

SIEGEL, S. 1956. Nonparametric statistics for the behavioural sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill. 312p.

SIMPSON, E.L. 1974. Moral development research. a case study of scientific cultural bias. Human development, 17: 81-106.

SLAVIN, R.E. 1984. Research methods in education: a practical guide. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 300p.

STOKER, H.G. 1941. Die grond van die sedelike. Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia. 98p.

TAYLOR, A.E. 1966. Plato: the man and his work. London: Methuen. 562p.

T.E.D. See Transvaal Education Department.

TERMAN, L.M. & MERRILL, M.A. 1953. Measuring intelligence. London: Harrap. 460p.

TRANSVAAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, 1980. Handleiding vir die pedagogiese verantwoordbare handelingsplan ten behoeve van die wordingsgeremde (gedragsgeremde) leerling en sy ouers. Pretoria. 14p.

TRAVERS, R.M. ed. 1973. Second handbook of research on teaching. Chicago: Rand McNally. 1400p.

ULICH, R. 1961. Philosophy of education. New York: American Book. 286p.

VAN DEN BROCK, P. 1989. Causal reasoning and inference making in judging the importance of story statements. Child development, 60: 286-297.

VAN WYK, J.H. 1973. Sosialisme en opvoeding. Potchefstroom: Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys. 13p.

VAN DER WALT, S.P. 1971. Etiek - wetenskap van relaties. (In Committee, ed.: Truth and reality. Braamfontein: De Jong. 222-233p.).

VERNON, P.E. 1953. Personality and assessments. London: Methuen. 220p.

WILLIAMS, N.W. & WILLIAMS, S. 1970. The moral development of children. London: Mcmillan. 122p.

WINDMILLER, M. 1980. Introduction. (In Windmiller, M., Lambert, N. & Turiel, E., ed.: Moral development and socialization. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon. 1-33p.).

WINDMILLER, M., LAMBERT, N. & TURIEL, E., ed. 1980.  
Moral development and socialization. Boston, Mass.:  
Allyn and Bacon. 264p.

WONDERLEY, D.M. & KUFFERSMID, J.H. 1980. Promoting  
postconventional morality - the adequacy of Kohl=  
berg's aim. Adolescence, 15(59): 609-629.

\*\*\*\*\*



## BIOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

## QUESTIONNAIRE

1. FULL NAME: \_\_\_\_\_
2. STANDARD: \_\_\_\_\_
3. COURSE: \_\_\_\_\_
4. HOME LANGUAGE: \_\_\_\_\_
5. SEX: \_\_\_\_\_
6. DATE OF BIRTH: \_\_\_\_\_
7. DO YOUR PARENTS LIVE TOGETHER (CROSS OUT CORRECT NUMBER)?
  - A. YES: .....(1)
  - B. DIVORCED OR SEPARATED: .....(2)
  - C. FATHER DEAD: .....(3)
  - D. MOTHER DEAD: .....(4)
  - E. BOTH PARENTS DEAD: .....(5)
8. HOW FAR DID YOUR FATHER STUDY (CROSS OUT CORRECT NUMBER)?
  - A. STD. 6 OR LOWER: .....(1)
  - B. STD. 7: .....(2)
  - C. STD. 8: .....(3)
  - D. STD. 9: .....(4)
  - E. STD. 10: .....(5)
  - F. UNIVERSITY OR COLLEGE QUALIFICATIONS .....(6)
9. HOW FAR DID YOUR MOTHER STUDY (CROSS OUT CORRECT NUMBER)?
  - A. STD. 6 OR LOWER: .....(1)
  - B. STD. 7: .....(2)
  - C. STD. 8: .....(3)
  - D. STD. 9: .....(4)

E. STD. 10: .....(5)

F. STD. 10 PLUS UNIVERSITY OR COLLEGE QUALIFI=

CATIONS: .....(6)

10. WHAT SORT OF WORK DOES YOUR FATHER DO NOW OR  
BEFORE HE DIED?

---

11. WHAT SORT OF WORK DOES YOUR MOTHER DO NOW OR  
BEFORE SHE BECAME A HOUSEWIFE OR DIED?

---

12. WHERE DO YOU LIVE (ADDRESS AND SUBURB OR TOWN)?

---

13. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE SUBURB IN WHICH YOU  
LIVE?

---

14. HOW MANY ROOMS ARE THERE IN YOUR HOUSE (COUNT  
BATHROOMS AND TOILETS, BUT NOT OUTSIDE ROOMS)?

---

15. HOW MANY MOTOR CARS DOES YOUR FAMILY OWN?

---

16. WHAT MAKE OR MODEL IS YOUR MOST EXPENSIVE OR ONLY  
CAR?

---

17. DO YOUR PARENTS OWN OR RENT YOUR HOME?

---

\*\*\*\*\*

## Appendix B: The Nine Hypothetical Dilemmas\*

ASTERISKED QUESTIONS may be eliminated if time for interviewing is limited.

### Moral Judgment Interview

#### *Form A*

Dilemma III: In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid \$400 for the radium and charged \$4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about \$2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz steal the drug?
- 1a. Why or why not?
- \*2. [*The following question is designed to elicit the subject's moral type and should be considered optional.*] Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the drug?
- \*2a. [*The following question is designed to elicit the subject's moral type and should be considered optional.*] Why is it right or wrong?

---

\*The numbering of the dilemmas reflects their placement in the original research interview (Kohlberg, 1958). Since the numbers quickly became labels denoting the particular dilemmas, they were not changed when the forms were created rearranging their order.

3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?
- 3a. Why or why not?
4. If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? (*If subject favors not stealing ask: Does it make a difference in what Heinz should do whether or not he loves his wife?*)
- 4a. Why or why not?
5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger?
- 5a. Why or why not?
- \*6. (*If subject favors stealing the drug for a stranger*) Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal?
- \*6a. Why or why not?
7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life?
- 7a. Why or why not?
- \*8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong?
- \*8a. Why or why not?
9. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law?
- 9a. Why or why not?
- 9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do?
- \*10. [*The following question is designed to elicit the subject's orientation and should be considered optional.*] In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do?
- \*10a. Why?

[*Questions 1 and 2 of Dilemma III' are optional. If you do not choose to use them, read Dilemma III' and its continuation and begin with question 3.*]

Dilemma III': Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day there was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that it was Heinz who stole the drug.

- \*1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing?
- \*1a. Why or why not?

\*2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, should he then report him?

\*2a. Why or why not?

Continuation: Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and brought to court. A jury was selected. The jury's job is to find whether a person is innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the sentence.

3. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or should he suspend the sentence and let Heinz go free?

3a. Why is that best?

4. Thinking in terms of society, should people who break the law be punished?

4a. Why or why not?

4b. How does this apply to how the judge should decide?

5. Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when he stole the drug. Should a lawbreaker be punished if he is acting out of conscience?

5a. Why or why not?

\*6. [*The following question is designed to elicit the subject's orientation and should be considered optional.*] Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for the judge to do?

\*6a. Why?

*Questions 7–12 are designed to elicit the subject's theory of ethics and should be considered optional. They should not be scored for moral stage.*

\*7. What does the word *conscience* mean to you, anyhow? If you were Heinz, how would your conscience enter into the decision?

\*8. Heinz has to make a moral decision. Should a moral decision be based on one's feelings, or on one's thinking and reasoning about right and wrong?

\*9. Is Heinz's problem a moral problem? Why or why not?

\*9a. In general, what makes something a moral problem or what does the word *morality* mean to you?

\*10. If Heinz is going to decide what to do by thinking about what's really right, there must be some answer, some right solution. Is there really some correct solution to moral prob-

lems like Heinz's, or when people disagree, is everybody's opinion equally right? Why?

- \*11. How do you know when you've come up with a good moral decision? Is there a way of thinking or a method by which one can reach a good or adequate decision?
- \*12. Most people believe that thinking and reasoning in science can lead to a correct answer. Is the same thing true in moral decisions or are they different?

Dilemma 1: Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the forty dollars it cost to go to camp, and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money.

- 1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money?
- 1a. Why or why not?

*[Questions 2 and 3 are designed to elicit the subject's moral type and should be considered optional.]*

- \*2. Does the father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?
- \*2a. Why or why not?
- \*3. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?
- \*3a. Why or why not?
- \*4. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this situation?
- \*4a. Why or why not?
- 5. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money. Is the fact that the father promised the most important thing in the situation?
- 5a. Why or why not?
- 6. In general, why should a promise be kept?
- 7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and probably won't see again?

- 7a. Why or why not?
- 8. What do you think is the most important thing a father should be concerned about in his relationship to his son?
- 8a. Why is that the most important thing?
- 9. In general, what should be the authority of a father over his son?
- 9a. Why?
- 10. What do you think is the most important thing a son should be concerned about in his relationship to his father?
- 10a. Why is that the most important thing?
- \*11. [*The following question is designed to elicit the subject's orientation and should be considered optional*]. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Joe to do in this situation?
- \*11a. Why?

# Appendix C: Standard Scoring Sheet

## APPENDIX C: STANDARD SCORING SHEET

### STANDARD SCORING SHEET

DATE:  
INTERVIEW No./S name:  
SCORED BY:

FORM A/FORM B/ FORM C (circle one)

(Circle Chosen Issue)

DILEMMA III (FORM A) OR IV (FORM B) OR  
V (FORM C)

LIFE (FORM A) or LIFE-QUALITY  
(Forms B & C) ISSUE

LAW (FORM A) or LAW/LIFE-PRESERV.  
(Forms B & C) ISSUE

Q#	CJ#/Norm & Element	Stage (Notes)	Q#	CJ#/Norm & Element	Stage (Notes)

ISSUE SCORE:

ISSUE SCORE:

(Circle Chosen Issue)

DILEMMA III' (FORM A) OR IV' (FORM B) OR  
VIII (FORM C)

MORALITY & CONSCIENCE ISSUE

PUNISHMENT ISSUE

Q#	CJ#/Norm & Element	Stage (Notes)	Q#	CJ#/Norm & Element	Stage (Notes)

ISSUE SCORE:

ISSUE SCORE:

(Circle Chosen Issue)

DILEMMA I (FORM A) OR II (FORM B) OR  
VII (FORM C)

CONTRACT ISSUE

AUTHORITY ISSUE

Q#	CJ#/Norm & Element	Stage (Notes)	Q#	CJ#/Norm & Element	Stage (Notes)

ISSUE SCORE:

ISSUE SCORE:

Summated 1 \_\_\_\_\_  
Weightings 2 \_\_\_\_\_  
From Issues: 3 \_\_\_\_\_  
4 \_\_\_\_\_  
5 \_\_\_\_\_

OVERALL PROTOCOL SCORE

GLOBAL: \_\_\_\_\_

WAS: \_\_\_\_\_