CHAPTER 4: BACKGROUND TO THE DARFUR CONFLICT:
THE THEATRE OF PLAY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The nature of the conflict in Darfur, Sudan cannot be studied in isolation. Saule (2004), for instance, describes the Darfur crisis as a microscopic reflection of the divisions and violence that have traditionally wreaked havoc in Sudan. Johnson (2003:xi) points out that numerous civil wars are waging in Sudan which have broken the boundaries of the North-South conflict and which have spread into theatres outside of Southern Sudan and even beyond Sudan’s borders. Deng (2005:245) notes that the debate on the genesis and causes of the recurrent civil wars in Sudan is rather divisive and far from settled. Given these complexities, it is the aim of this chapter to provide a better understanding of the Darfur conflict by examining the major conflicts in both Sudan, as a whole, and Darfur, along with its politics and main actors. Consequently, the chapter has two sections: the first dealing with Sudan and the two North-South conflicts, and the second, a section on the conflict in Darfur, focusing on the beginning of and the central reasons for the conflict, and providing an overview of the main antagonists. In so doing, this chapter aims to provide background to the reasons for setting up UNAMID which will be discussed in-depth in Chapter Six. In doing so it is also aimed, in part, to provide information to answer the research question “Which political factors prompted the need for an AU/UN hybrid operation (UNAMID) to maintain peace and security in Darfur, Sudan?” The following sections will provide a general overview of the Republic of Sudan as background to some of the arguments put forward throughout this thesis.

4.2 THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN

The Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”) proclaimed independence from Great Britain and Egypt on 1 January 1956 under a provisional constitution (U.S. Department of State, 2010b). Until independence, Great Britain and Egypt shared in the settlement of the
administration and legislation of Sudan in terms of its constitutional charter, signed on 19 January 1899 (Luscombe, 2010).

4.2.1 General orientation of Sudan

Sudan is situated in the eastern part of the African continent, encompassing 2.5 million square kilometres (Rashdan, 2007; CIA, 2010). As of 2010, Sudan was divided into 25 states and followed a federal political system with Khartoum as the political capital, Omdurman as the national capital, and Khartoum North as the industrial capital (Ministry of the Cabinet Affairs, 2008). Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), as will be discussed in section 4.2.2.2.6.1 below, the territory of Southern Sudan comprises all lands and areas that constituted the former three southern provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in their boundaries as they stood on 1 January 1956 (UNHCR, 2005). These boundaries are illustrated in Map 4.1: Sudan. In 2011, more than 30 parties were registered with the Government of Sudan (GoS), including the National Congress Party (NCP) under President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir; the National Islamic Front (NIF); Popular National Congress (PNC) under Hassan al-Turabi; Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) under Osman al Mirghani; Umma Party (UP) under Sadiq al-Mahdi; and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Library of Congress, 2004).

Agriculture is the major economic activity of the Sudanese people, of whom approximately 80% are engaged in crop production (sorghum and millet, while the cash crops are cotton, groundnuts, sesame and gum) and animal husbandry (cattle, sheep, goats and camels) (Suliman, 1994). Sudan has approximately 36 million hectares of arable land, of which only one third is cultivated, owing to constraints of water availability or the heavy nature of the soil (Suliman, 1994). Oil plays a major role in the Sudanese economy. Abbas et al. (2010:27) note that although oil was discovered in Sudan in the mid-1970s, commercial extraction did not begin until 1999. The estimated oil reserves in Sudan are in the range of 4–5 billion barrels, suggesting that Sudan could continue to produce at current levels of output for some 25–30 years (Abbas et al., 2010:27). In 2008, oil represented 95% of export revenues and 60% of government revenues; for South Sudan (Juba), oil represented 98% of
total revenues for 2008 (EIA, 2010:1). In 2009, there were announcements of natural
gas discoveries in Sudan but it has yet to be determined whether these are
commercially viable (EIA, 2010:2).

Several distinctions can be made regarding the character and peoples of Sudan.
Akwani (2011) argues that Sudan can be divided into two parts based on religion or
ethnical origin. Arab groups predominate in the north of the country while Africans
are more prevalent in the south (Department of Immigration and Citizenship,
2007:14). It is estimated that Africans form approximately 50% of Sudan’s
population, Arab tribes comprise 40%, Beja (a semi-nomadic group considered
distinct from both Arabs and Africans) 6%, and others 4% (Department of
Immigration and Citizenship, 2007:14). Arab groups include the Kababish, Ja’alin
and Baggara, while some of the larger African groups include the Dinka, Nuer,
Shilluk, and Azande, and in many cases these ethnic divisions are further split into
sub-groups or tribes (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2007:14).
Furthermore, the Arab Sudanese are Sunni Muslims while the Africans in the south
are predominantly Christians and traditionalists. In terms of religion, 70% of Sudan's
population is Muslim, 15% is Christian, while traditionalists and others account for
the remaining 15% of the population (Akwani, 2011). As will be seen throughout the
chapter, these religious and ethnic divisions are generally cited as some of the causes
of the conflicts in Sudan.
Map 4.1: Sudan (Illustrating Darfur bordered in red and Southern Sudan bordered in green) (According to UN DPKO (2007a), Rashdan (2007) and OCHA (2009b))
The two North-South conflicts in Sudan will be discussed next.

4.2.2 The two North-South conflicts in Sudan

The civil war between various Khartoum governments, the Anyanya, other rebel groups and armed factions from the south have characterised the political scene since Sudan's political independence in 1956 (Saule, 2004). In concurrence, the U.S. Department of State (2010b) points out that Sudan has been at war with itself for more than three quarters of its existence and affirms that its post-independence history has been dominated by long, recurring, and bloody civil wars. The most notable are the two North-South conflicts and the Darfur conflict. Johnson (2003:xix) argues that the conflict in Darfur, as well as those in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile or eastern Sudan, are all related to the North-South conflict; and therefore an overview of the two North-South conflicts is warranted and necessary to better understand the conflict in Darfur. The discussion starts with the first of the two North-South civil wars.

4.2.2.1 An overview of the first North-South conflict in Sudan (1955-1972)

Sudan was the first African territory administered by Britain to be granted independence after World War II (Johnson, 2003:21). The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2006:4) notes that the first episode in what was to become an intractable civil war in southern Sudan, started with a mutiny by government forces in southern Sudan in 1955, following months of unrest and dissatisfaction at growing northern domination. Shaked (1981:161) elaborates that between 1953 and January 1956, in the run up to Sudan’s independence, the British, Egyptian and Sudanese nationalists lacked sensitivity to the ambition of the people of southern Sudan to become independent, which resulted in growing frustrations and unfulfilled expectations. These frustrations culminated in the ‘Torit mutiny’ which triggered the first North-South conflict, according to Johnson (2003:21). The mutiny started following orders from the government in the North to move forces situated in Torit (situated in the south of Sudan) to the North (Shaked, 1981:161).
Dissatisfaction in the south was also exacerbated by other factors. The U.S. Department of State (2010b) mentions that the new provisional constitution following independence did not address two crucial issues important to leaders in southern Sudan: a) the secular or Islamic character of the state, and b) its federal or unitary structure. Other important issues included, as mentioned by Thyne (2007:737), the Sudanese government’s attempt to enforce Arabic as the country’s official language and Islam as the official religion.

The conflict intensified in the late 1950s and 1960s when a weak democracy, which alternated with military rule, only furthered demands in southern Sudan for political expression and economic development (EIU, 2005:4). Until 1969, the succession of governments was unable to agree either on a permanent constitution, or to cope with the problems of factionalism, economic stagnation, and ethnic dissidence (US Department of State, 2010). Consequently, fighting in the south continued throughout the 1960s, as political and economic power remained in the hands of a small northern-dominated elite (EIU, 2006).

In May 1969, Colonel Jafaar Nimeiri rose to power through a coup d’état, which he justified by accusing civilian politicians of having failed to solve the country’s economic and regional problems (The Times, 2009). The coup leaders constituted themselves as the ten-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which possessed collective executive authority under Nimeiri’s chairmanship (Fadlalla, 2004:45). Fadlalla (2004:45) states that the RCC, on assuming control, proclaimed the establishment of a “democratic republic” dedicated to advancing independent “Sudanese socialism”, suspended the Transitional Constitution, abolished all government institutions, banned political parties, nationalised many industries, businesses, and banks, and ordered the arrest of 63 civilian politicians and forcibly retired senior army officers. The Times (2009) reports that tensions soon developed between the RCC and Sudanese communists, with the latter calling for a popular front government with equal communist participation while Nimeiri wanted the opposite: to keep power firmly in the hands of the council and to place the trade unions, which were dominated by the Communist Party, under state control. As will be seen next,
the first meaningful interlude in the North-South conflict came when Nimeiri changed some of his alliances.

4.2.2.1.1 The Addis Ababa peace agreement and end of the conflict

The interlude in the North-South conflict started in 1971 following a failed coup d’état by communists which left Nimeiri politically isolated (CMI, 2010). As a result, Nimeiri began to seek alliances with neighbouring countries (Ethiopia and Uganda) as well as with the southern rebels (CMI, 2010). In so doing, Nimeiri persuaded most of the main rebel leaders in southern Sudan to accept that the central Government in Khartoum would control foreign, defence and financial policy (The Times, 2009). In exchange, the central Government in Khartoum would allow English rather than Arabic to be recognised as the official language of the south, and Christianity to be acknowledged as the faith of many in the region (The Times, 2009). The talks between the GoS and the rebels of the south (the rebel movement Anyanya, according to Young (2006:9)), resulted in the signing of the Addis Ababa peace agreement on 27 February 1972. This ended a 17-year conflict and ushered in autonomy for the southern region, which would no longer be divided into three provinces (Sikainga, 2010). This agreement quelled the civil war for more than a decade (Somali Press, 2008) and also incorporated the southern political elite into national politics (EIU, 2006). As will be seen next, the peace would last for more than a decade but would be broken by Nimeiri himself.

4.2.2.2 An overview of the second North-South conflict in Sudan (1983-2005)

The second “North-South” conflict started in 1983 and lasted for 22 years, ending with the signing of the CPA in 2005 (Lewis, 2008). As a consequence, the second North-South conflict spanned the tenure of three of the presidents of Sudan (Jaafar Nimeiri 1969-85, Sadiq al-Mahdi 1986-89, and Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir 1989-the present (Sudan.net, 2010)). The following chronological examination of the second North-South conflict will simultaneously provide a background to the tenure of the above-mentioned three presidents.
4.2.2.1 The start of the second North-South conflict

The peace which the Addis Ababa peace agreement brought about, lasted until 1983 when Nimeiri, instituted fundamentalist Islamic law throughout Sudan. This in turn again created a rift between the GoS in the north and the South (Infoplease, 2007). The Somalipress (2008) suspects that Numeiri’s volte-face came as a result of getting no support for the Addis Ababa peace agreement from either the secularist or the Islamic parties in the northern Sudan. He knew that such a lack of support was more threatening to his regime than a lack of support from the south (Somalipress, 2008). Suliman (1994), however, alludes to another issue: the discovery of oil in the south. Suliman (1994) indicates that in April 1981 the Chevron oil company announced the discovery of commercial deposits of oil officially estimated at approximately 236 million barrels in the southwestern part of Sudan (confirmed oil reserves for the whole of Sudan were estimated at 2 000 million barrels). Suliman (1994) points out that the original plans to process the oil locally were deferred in September 1982, and instead, with Chevron's encouragement, the Nimeiri government opted for the construction of a refinery and export terminal south of Port Sudan, linked to the oil fields by a 1 400 km pipeline. One of the first acts of the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was to attack Chevron's oil field operations, forcing the company to suspend work in February 1984 (Suliman, 1994).

Apart from economic reasons, the second North-South conflict began mainly as a result of the following actions taken by Nimeiri:

a. Revoking the autonomy that had been granted to southern Sudan (Martin, 2002);

b. Splitting the South again into three administrative provinces, apparently in a bid to reduce the South’s political influence (EIU, 2000);

c. Imposing Islamic law (the Sharia) throughout Sudan (Martin, 2002);
d. Declaring Arabic the official language of the South (instead of English) (Somalipress, 2008); and

e. Transferring control of the Southern armed forces to the central government (Somalipress, 2008).

These steps taken by the GoS/Nimeiri were the final insult to the predominantly non-Muslim, non-Arab population of southern Sudan, which had long been cut off from the distribution of national resources and otherwise marginalised, according to Martin (2002). In addition, southern concerns were compounded by fears that the development of southern oil resources and construction of the Jonglei Canal project would lead to northern economic exploitation of the South (EIU, 2000). The Jonglei Canal project started in 1980 and was a comprehensive engineering and environmental venture designed to make full use of the River Nile, promote human and economic development in semi-isolated regions, and boost agricultural development in both Egypt and Sudan (Sa’oudi, 2001). Suliman (1994) confirms that most Southerners were disdainful of the way Nimeiri interpreted the Addis Ababa peace agreement. By his interpretation, Nimeiri to redrew the boundaries of the South to include the Bentiu region, where oil had been discovered, into the North (Suliman, 1994). This feeling of disdain was compounded when the central government in Khartoum ignored the concerns of local people and gave the go-ahead for the construction of the Jonglei canal through the swamps of the Sudd (Suliman, 1994). Saule (2004) concludes that the people in southern Sudan initially took up arms to attain self-determination and end their racial, cultural and religious subordination by the north. The discovery of oil, however, in 1978 and the forced removal of southerners from oil-rich areas to permit oil exploration, changed the complexities of the civil war, maintains Saule (2004). To provide more background on the rebel forces opposing the GoS, the SPLM/A will be discussed next.

4.2.2.1.1 The Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army

Sudan’s first civil war ended when the rebel movement Anyanya signed the Addis Ababa peace agreement with the GoS in 1972, but only six years later dissidents of
Anyanya took up arms in Eastern Upper Nile (Young, 2006:9). In 1983, these rebels were joined by southern soldiers from the garrison town of Bor. These soldiers fled east, where they gained the support of the Ethiopian military regime and formed the SPLM/A under the leadership of John Garang (Young, 2006:9). Rankhumise (2006) explains that the Anyanya therefore undertook a campaign of political destabilisation, including an armed struggle, to demand autonomy from the north for the south. The Anyanya transformed itself into an organised political movement and military wing: the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), which engaged the Khartoum government in fierce military offensives (Rankhumise, 2006). The SPLA, unlike the original Anyanya movement, however, announced that it was not fighting for an independent South but declared its aim to have a unified secular and democratic Sudan. The SPLA saw itself as an integral part of the struggle of all the marginalised groups in Sudan, including the Nuba and Fur (Suliman, 1994).

Schafer (2007:5) notes that in 1991, as a result of increased international pressure to resolve the regional conflict, the SPLM/A decided to rethink its structure to include all the regional political parties. Suliman (1994) clarifies that internal dissent in the SPLA reached crisis point in August 1991, when a break-away group the Nasir faction called for the overthrow of John Garang and for a separate South, thus abandoning all ambitions for a unified secular state. Suliman (1994) concludes that although they failed to unseat Garang, the Nasir faction revived the principle that ‘self-determination’ took priority over unity. According to Suliman (1994), the Nasir successfully voiced a common southern attitude that the difference between the Islamic Front regime and the opposition Umma and Democratic Unionist Party was minimal, basically that the Northerners could not be trusted.

In summary, the rebel forces in the South consisted of the SPLM (the primary southern party attempting to formulate a governing body), the Anyanya movement (a group that promoted using the precedent from the first civil war and compromise with the North to maintain southern power), and the military branches of the South represented in the SPLA (Schafer, 2007:5). The SPLA had, since its inception, fought against the governments of Nimeiri, al-Mahdi and al-Bashir. It was not only
the discovery of oil that had an impact on the history of the conflict but also other natural factors, as will be discussed next.

4.2.2.2 The drought and famine of the 1980s

Following poor rainy seasons in 1982 and 1983, a severe drought devastated the west of Sudan (Kordofan and Darfur) (Eltigani, 1995:4). By 1982, Burr and Collins (2008:190,192) highlight that the drought had spread to the Red Sea, from Senegal to Sudan, with Chad and Darfur especially hard hit. Prunier (2008a:48-49) continues that during this period the Chadian war spilled over into Darfur and drought and desertification threatened to turn the looming food scarcity into famine. Burr and Collins (2008:192) note that extra strain was put on Darfur as hundreds of Chadians were crossing daily into Darfur as a result of the war in Chad. In 1983, the Governor of Darfur brought the escalating situation in Darfur to Nimeiri’s attention, but he refused to provide emergency aid to Darfur (Prunier, 2008a:51). Nimeiri was reluctant, despite the urging of many international organisations, to declare a state of emergency and request food aid to avert the 1984 famine (Eltigani, 1995:4). Eltigani (1995:4-5) ascribes this reluctance to political considerations: he found it embarrassing to acknowledge the existence of famine in a country he was trying to project as the potential breadbasket of Africa and Arabia. By 1984, Nimeiri could, however, no longer deny the reality of famine and proclaimed Darfur a disaster zone and asked the world for 160 000 tons of food aid (Prunier, 2008a:51). The combination of the South’s re-division, the introduction of Sharia law throughout Sudan, the renewed civil war, and growing economic problems would severely impact on Nimeiri’s government and contribute to his downfall.

4.2.2.3 From Nimeiri to al-Bashir

At the beginning of 1985, serious shortages of fuel and bread, price increases on bread and other staples, a growing insurgency in the South, drought and famine, and an increasingly difficult refugee burden, resulted in massive demonstrations in Khartoum (Winslow & Ahmann, 2011). On 6 April 1985, while Nimeiri visited Cairo, General Suwar al-Dahab used the opportunity to seize power through a coup
d’état (Muzonzini, 1997; Winslow & Ahmann, 2011). A 15-member transitional military council was named and was chaired by Suwar al-Dahab (Winslow & Ahmann, 2011). In consultation with an informal conference of political parties, unions, and professional organisations known as the ‘Gathering’, the council appointed an interim civilian cabinet, headed by Prime Minister al-Gizouli Defalla (Winslow & Ahmann, 2011).

Elections were held in April 1986, and a civilian government took power (U.S. Department of State, 2010b). The civilian government, headed by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma Party, consisted of a coalition of the UP, the DUP, the NIF which was headed by Hassan al-Turabi, and several Southern parties (Winslow & Ahmann, 2011). This coalition dissolved and reformed several times over the next few years, with al-Mahdi and his Umma Party always in a central role ((Winslow & Ahmann, 2011). Al-Mahdi nevertheless proved to be incapable of governing Sudan as a result of party factionalism, corruption, personal rivalries, scandals, and political instability (Chapin-Metz, 1991). Although there were tentative moves towards negotiating peace with the South, any proposal to exempt the South from Islamic law was unacceptable to those who supported Arabic supremacy (Somali Press, 2008).

On 30 June 1989, Lieutenant-General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir led his troops in overthrowing Prime Minister al-Mahdi who was on the verge of signing a peace treaty with the SPLM (Yoo, 2010; The New York Times, 2010). The peace treaty would have allowed southern Sudan to be controlled by secular laws instead of the Sharia law which al-Bashir and other Muslim military officers demanded (Yoo, 2010). As is described in the next section, the new government’s commitment to the Islamic cause only intensified the North-South conflict.

4.2.2.2.4 Al-Bashir, al-Turabi and the newly formed political parties in Sudan

On taking power in 1989, al-Bashir dissolved parliament, banned political parties, and set up and chaired the RCC for National Salvation, which ruled through a civilian government (BBC, 2010a). The RCC was abolished in 1993 and the formation of a new council of ministers resulted in the complete take-over of the GoS by the NIF
(Lesch, 1998:118). Also in 1993, al-Bashir appointed himself as the president of Sudan and appointed Hasan al-Turabi, a radical Islamist, as his vice-president (Yoo, 2010). Al-Turabi was the secretary-general of the NIF who quickly became the “strongman” and true ruler of Sudan (Shay & Liberman, 2006:28). Together, al-Bashir and al-Turabi made Sharia law the only legal system in Sudan and intensified the military campaign to defeat the SPLM (Yoo, 2010). The NIF “purged” the government, civil service, and unions of non-Islamists and replaced them with NIF cadres in its attempt to establish an Islamic state in Sudan (Lesch, 1998:113). Consequently, al-Turabi became the eminence behind power in Sudan and a central influence on the Islamic movement throughout the Middle East (Gardels, 1997:24).

Al-Turabi was given free rein to transform Sudan into an Islamic state and Islamic law became the order of the day as Sudan was proclaimed to be the world’s second Islamic theocracy (Palmer & Palmer, 2008:134). Sudan was, however, not the focus of al-Turabi. It was merely his venue for establishing a global Islamic network capable of challenging the west (Palmer & Palmer, 2008:134). Esposito (2010) elaborates that the NIF took control of the country's Islamic banking system; enhanced domination of the building industry, transport, media, and higher educational institutions; successfully infiltrated the army due to its support for soldiers' demands for better pay and equipment, while gaining primary support from university students and graduates. Collins (2008:219) notes that the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) provided incontrovertible evidence that the NIF regime was guilty of summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, and the forced displacement of large populations in the Nuba Mountains and the South from 1994.

In March 1996, elections for a president and a new National Assembly were held (with no opposing candidates or parties), al-Bashir was elected president with 75% of the votes (Aljazeera, 2010a), and Hassan al-Turabi became the speaker of parliament (BBC, 2010a). In 1998/99, Childress (2009:66) highlights, al-Turabi reorganised the NIF into a new “political alliance” naming it the “National Congress Party (NCP)”. Al-Bashir, however, was soon locked in a power struggle with al-Turabi, whom he accused of being part of a coup plot to overthrow him (BBC, 2010a). This followed
the introduction of a bill in 1999 which was aimed at limiting the president's powers (BBC, 2009). Al-Bashir reacted by dissolving the National Assembly, declaring a state of emergency, and purging al-Turabi's supporters from the machinery of government (Plaut, 2006). The supporters who were removed consisted of the African Muslims from Darfur who went on to found the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the main rebel groups in Darfur (Plaut, 2006). Al-Bashir announced new elections to the National Assembly in December 2000 in which al-Bashir received 86% of the vote (Collins, 2008:227). Following a call from al-Turabi for the Sudanese to take to the streets to defend the Islamist revolution and free Sudan from military dictatorship, al-Turabi was banned from any political activity and removed as secretary-general of the NCP. Al-Turabi then went on to form the Popular Congress Party (PCP) on 27 June 2000 (Collins, 2008:227).

Following the declaration of a state of emergency by al-Bashir in 1999 and the creation of the PCP, representatives of the PCP signed an MOU with the SPLA in Geneva, Switzerland, on 19 February 2001, to coordinate efforts to fight against the GoS, as reported by Prunier (2008a:85). On 21 February 2001, al-Turabi was accused of “conspiracy and subversion” and arrested, although his party was allowed to continue operating (Prunier, 2008a:85). Though he was released in November 2001, al-Bashir continued with the state of emergency until June 2002 (Prunier, 2008a:86). On 15 May 2010, al-Turabi was arrested for the fifth time since 2000 by the Sudanese government, this time over his alleged links to the JEM which had clashed with government forces in the week before his arrest (Sirri, 2010). The Sudan Tribune (2010a) reports that this arrest came shortly before the 2010 elections, ensuring that al-Bashir received a comfortable majority and securing him another term. Al-Turabi was subsequently released on 30 June 2010, according to the Sudan Tribune (2010a). Al-Turabi was at the time of the arrest, still the head of the PCP (Sudan Tribune, 2010) although the PCP fielded a candidate Abdallah Deng Nial in the elections against al-Bashir (Al Arabiya, 2010).

The US Department of State (2010) believes that al-Bashir’s new government’s commitment to the Islamic cause intensified the North-South conflict and that the al-Bashir government combined internal political repression with international Islamist
activism. In summary, al-Bashir's commitment to imposing Sharia law on the non-Muslim south, seeking a military victory over the SPLM/A, and the emergence of the NIF as a political force, kept the country divided and made any compromise with the south more unlikely (Chapin Metz, 1991). In 2000, al-Bashir was re-elected after winning 90% of a popular vote in an election described as a farce by the opposition (Aljazeera, 2010a). The NIF continues to play a leading role in the Sudan and Darfur conflict and will be further discussed in section 4.3 on Darfur. The following section will provide an overview of the consequences of the conflict.

4.2.2.5 The consequences of the second North-South conflict

With regard to the North-South conflict, Sudan Medical Relief (2010) affirms that al-Bashir believed in a unified Arabic/Muslim Sudan and intensified Islamic law in the North and the on-going campaign in the South. Columbus (2000:140) states that the war in the South went on to cost the GoS between USD1 and USD4 million dollars a day. In 1999, exports of oil from Sudan began, following investment by large Chinese and Malaysian oil companies and small Canadian and European companies (Barltrop, 2008:13). Martin (2002:1) points out that the GoS secured an income from oil in the South to the extent of USD1 million dollars a day and that financially speaking, it was a “perfect war”. Furthermore, al-Bashir was using people from the SPLM or any one of many government supported militias drawn from rival tribes in the South as troops to fight the SPLM, and that even the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) consisted of large numbers of Southerners (Martin, 2002:3).

During the course of the North-South civil war, some 2 million people died and 4 million people were displaced (Wheeler, 2010). It needs to be mentioned though, that people died mostly through hunger and disease, which destabilised much of east Africa (McDoom, 2010a; Martin, 2002:3). This mostly resulted in a devastated rural economy, abandoned social infrastructure, and limited access for humanitarian groups (Martin 2002:3). The war directly and indirectly caused the death of many people: directly through the government and SPLA troops that clashed in ambushes and raids; prolonged battles and sieges which resulted in the killing of soldiers and civilians; government aircraft bombing settlements; and during the time when the SPLM/A split
and turned against itself in 1991 (as was mentioned in section 4.2.2.2.1) (Barltrop, 2008:13). Barltrop (2008:13) is of the opinion that the war also contributed to the deaths of people indirectly. Indirectly, for example, when agricultural land and livestock were destroyed or looted; when civilians fled their homes (because of actual or threatened violence, or economic need) and it thereby becoming likelier that they would die from disease or malnourishment than would have otherwise have been the case. Lastly, Barltrop (2008:13) mentions that the human cost of the war was compounded by recurrent drought and flood crises, inside and outside the war zones, to which Sudan has always been susceptible. On 14 July 2008, al-Bashir became the first national leader to be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity, and two of murder (Maweni, 2008). The indictment of al-Bashir will be discussed in Chapter Six, section 6, while the end of the North-South conflict will be discussed next.

4.2.2.2.6 The end of the second North-South conflict

According to the African Union (AU, 2010), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. In 1993, the Heads of State of the IGADD became involved in an initiative to bring the warring parties together. This was the beginning of a long process that led to the signing of the CPA (UNMIS, 2010). During 2002, the Sudan peace process, now under the auspices of IGAD, made significant progress and the parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol (UN, 2010a). Under the Machanos Protokol they reached specific agreement on a broad peace framework, which set forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan (UN, 2010a). It also addressed the state and religion, and an agreement to continue talks on the outstanding issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, human rights and a ceasefire (UN, 2010a). To intensify the peace efforts and build on the momentum of the progress made, which included the signing of the Agreement on Wealth Sharing on 7 January 2004, and the Protocol on Power Sharing on 26 May 2004 at the IGAD-led talks, the UN Security Council established on 11 June 2004
through Resolution 1547 (2004) a special political mission: the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) (UNMIS, 2010). UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace support operation (UNMIS, 2010). More details on the CPA will be provided in the following section.

4.2.2.6.1 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The CPA was signed on 9 January 2005 and formally ended the second North-South conflict (Myers, 2010:190). The CPA was signed by the ruling NCP and the SPLM/A and signalled a historic compromise: the government in Khartoum was guaranteed Sharia law in the North while the South gained the right to self-determination after an interim period of six years (HSBA, 2006:1-2; Johnson, 2007:2). The USIP (2005) explains that the CPA is a collection of agreements accepted on 31 December 2004. The United Nations (2010a) elaborates that under the mediation of IGAD, the GoS and the SPLM/A signed a series of six agreements:

i. The Protocol of Machakos: Signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002, in which the parties agreed on a broad governance framework setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion.


Notably, the agreement also allowed for the SPLM (political) and SPLA (military) to formally split and to exist as two separate entities for the first time (ICG, 2006a:12). Sudan’s main oil producing region, Abyei, sits on the North/South Border and the CPA provides for an equal sharing of oil revenues between North and South with special administrative status given to Abyei (EIA, 2010). Furthermore, the wealth-sharing section of the CPA states that all oil-related agreements signed prior to the CPA would remain. They would not be subject to review by the National Petroleum Commission (NPC), a commission set up by the CPA and composed of both Northerners and Southerners and co-chaired by both President al-Bashir of the North and President Kiir of the South (Biel, 2007). With its provisions for a permanent internationally monitored ceasefire, power-sharing and access to oil wealth, the separation of religion and state, autonomy and a separate army, the CPA addressed the key southern grievances (HSBA, 2006:1-2). The following sections will elaborate on some of the key outcomes and results of the CPA, such as the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), power-sharing and governance, the Juba Declaration, and possible independence for the South. The United Nations’ direct involvement as a result of the CPA will be mentioned in the next section.

4.2.2.6.1.1 The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

On 24 March 2005, the UN Security Council determined that the situation in Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security and issued Resolution 1590 (2005) and established UNMIS (UN, 2010b). Resolution 1590 further required that the UN Secretary-General transfer all functions performed by the special political mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) to UNMIS, together with staff and
logistics (Security Council, 2005). The mandate of UNMIS included, according to UNMIS (UN, 2010b):

- To support implementation of the CPA with certain specified tasks;
- To facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- To assist the parties to the CPA, in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination;
- To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to co-ordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS's capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organisations, and non-governmental organisations.

In Resolution 1590 (2005) the UN Security Council specifically requested UNMIS to liaise and coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to expeditiously reinforce efforts to foster peace in Darfur (Security Council, 2005). Koos (2010:3), however, infers that Resolution 1590 strictly excluded operations in the region of Darfur. The UN Security Council nonetheless extended the mandate of UNMIS in 2006 to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 5 May 2006 (UNSC, 2006a: 3-4) and called on AMIS to assist with the implementation of the DPA until transition to the United Nations force in Darfur was completed (UNSC, 2006a:1). Apart from the above, UNMIS has been credited with bolstering the South’s war-torn infrastructure by assisting with the demining and repairing of roads; supporting projects addressing the lack of basic services, such as water, sanitation, health care and education for thousands of returning refugees; and improving local morale (UN DPI, 2007a:11).
Koos (2010:5), however, is not so optimistic about UNMIS’ performance, and mentions that UNMIS is seen neither by the warring parties nor the civilian population as a guarantor for security, and as a result, it is difficult for the parties to disarm. In conclusion, argues Koos (2010:6), UNMIS is nothing more than a monitoring mission, even if it had a Chapter VII mandate. Chapter VII mandates are discussed in Chapter Three, section 3.3.2.4. Van der Lijn (2008:11) notes that UNMIS was hampered from the beginning by both the NCP and the SPLM/A, which intentionally restricted its movements to certain areas. Van der Lijn (2008:12) elaborates that in 2006 when UNMIS became more vocal on the situation in Darfur, the NCP started to support protests and campaigns against the United Nations, and started to frustrate UNMIS operations - even expelling the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Jan Pronk, from Sudan in October 2006. Due to the reluctance of the NCP to accept UNMIS, it was only fully deployed by the middle of 2007 (Van der Lijn, 2008:22).

As of 31 October 2010, UNMIS was composed of 10 592 uniformed personnel consisting of 9 451 troops, 486 military observers and 655 police officers, supported by 865 international civilian personnel, 2 810 local civilian staff and 422 United Nations Volunteers (UN, 2010c). On 29 April 2010, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2011, with the intention to renew it for further periods as may be required (UNSC, 2010a). In line with this, Stephen (2010) quotes the UNMIS Regional Coordinator for Southern Sudan, David Gressly, in June 2010 who gave assurances that UNMIS was working with the NCP and SPLM to provide assistance to the referendum on succession to be held in 2011, and that the United Nations would also be involved in the training of more Southern Sudan Police for the referendum. On 27 April, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1978 which extended UNMIS’ mandate until 9 July 2011 (UNSC, 2011a:1). The resolution alluded to the fact that UNMIS would cease to exist and that a new UN peace mission would be started in South Sudan, which would become an independent state in July 2011, following the 2011 referendum on succession (UNSC, 2011a:1; Copnall, 2011). The CPA also changed the government structures in the North and South, as will be discussed next.
4.2.2.6.1.2 New Governments

Jooma (2006:2) notes that the CPA paved the way for the creation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) as well as the autonomous interim Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Powers (2007) agrees that the formation of the GNU allowed for the creation of a new governing body to represent South Sudan in the national government. According to the CPA, the SPLM had to control 70% of the appointed positions in the GoSS until elections, the NCP 10%, and other southern parties the remaining 20%. At the level of the GNU, the NCP had to maintain 52% of the appointed positions, the SPLM 28%, other northern parties 14%, and other southern parties 6% (CGA, 2006:1). As a direct consequence, the SPLM/A was represented at the national level through the GoSS, while both the GNU and the GoSS governed the country as a type of coalition government, notes Powers (2007).

Rankhumise (2006) concludes that the establishment of the GNU was a major step towards operationalising the agreements encapsulated in the CPA on wealth sharing, southern regional autonomy and power sharing. Pan (2005) affirms that the CPA created a semi-autonomous region in the south headed by John Garang of the SPLM/A. As a point of clarification, Powers (2007) mentions that the GNU is recognised as the government of Sudan but the term is also used to politically differentiate northern Sudan from the southern region which is represented by the GoSS, which is headed by the SPLM/A.

As a blow to the peace process, Pan (2005) indicates that John Garang died on 31 July 2005 in a helicopter accident. Ayittey (2009) notes that the GNU fell apart after his death and that the rebel movement pulled out of the GNU, citing the ruling party's failure to honour the terms of the Kenya agreement. In this regard, Aljazeera (2010b) confirms that in 2007 the SPLM suspended its participation in the national unity government because it claimed the NCP was not implementing key aspects of the CPA. Months of high-level meetings and negotiations saw the parties agree on a series of measures which included the SPLM rejoining the government (Aljazeera, 2010b). Jooma (2007a:1) remarks that the loss of John Garang as the charismatic leader of the SPLM had two major effects: first, it deprived the SPLM of a military
and intellectual leader and, second, it gave the freshly legitimised NCP the leeway to return to the politics of security. Following Garang’s death, Salva Kiir Mayardiit was unanimously appointed by the SPLM Leadership Council as the new SPLM Chairman (and therefore President of the GoSS and 1st Vice-President of the GNU) (ICG, 2006a:12). The following section will address the Juba Declaration which aimed to bring other armed groups, which are not signatories to the CPA, to the table.

4.2.2.6.1.3 The Juba Declaration

Though the CPA brought a formal end to the state of hostilities between the GoS and the SPLM/A, it did not end the many on-going internal conflicts in South Sudan (Young, 2006:9). Furthermore, the CPA called for the SAF and the SPLA to be the only armed forces allowed in the country and that other armed groups allied to other sides must integrate within one year of signing the agreement (ICG, 2006a:12). To address this, Salva Kiir Mayardiit went on to negotiate the Juba Declaration, which called for the immediate integration of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) into the SPLA (HSBA, 2006:3).

The SSDF represents the foremost of the excluded armed entities, referred to as Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the text of the CPA, and estimated at between 10 000 and 30 000 fighters at the time of the agreement (HSBA, 2006:3). The SSDF comprised more than 30 militias that were aligned with the government and not only threatened to undermine the authority of the SPLM/A and the legitimacy of the CPA, but also severely disrupted civilian livelihoods in many parts of the South (HSBA, 2006:3). The Juba declaration was subsequently signed on 8 January 2006 by the SSDF, the umbrella of government-aligned armed forces, and the SPLM (ICG, 2006a:12). By 2009, however, neither the NCP-led government in Khartoum nor the SPLM-led GoSS in Juba had reintegrated former militia into their respective forces, nor had they disarmed and demobilised them (HRW, 2009a). The CPA also called for elections in Sudan.
In April 2010, Sudan held its first multiparty elections since 1986, fulfilling a major requirement of the CPA (Stephens, 2010). Wood (2010) reflects that the NCP’s incumbent, al-Bashir, achieved an overwhelming majority, amid ubiquitous allegations of fraud, while Salva Kiir Mayardiit of the SPLM won the presidential election for South Sudan. Observers from the EU and the Carter Centre said after the five days of polling ended on 15 April 2010 that the election had failed to reach international standards (France24, 2010). Aljazeera (2010a) and Heavens (2010) point out that al-Bashir won 68% of the presidential vote and was sworn in for another presidential term in May 2010, after winning elections that were boycotted by major opposition parties and marred by fraud allegations. McDoom (2010b) confirms that Salva Kiir Mayardiit retained his job as the president of Sudan's semi-autonomous south, with 92.99% of the vote. More details on the national Sudanese elections are given in Chapter Six, section 6.3.3.1: The 2010 Sudanese national elections. As will be discussed next, the CPA also presents the opportunity for South Sudan to become an independent state.

4.2.2.6.1.5 Secession possibility for South Sudan

As a result of the CPA, the Interim National Constitution (INC) was signed into law on 9 July 2005 (GPP, 2006). The INC is based on the provisions of the CPA and the 1998 Sudan Constitution was drafted by the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and approved by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council (Gurtong Peace Project, 2006). Following this, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS) was signed into law on 5 December 2005 (UNHCR, 2005). The ICSS was drafted by the Southern Sudan Constitutional Technical Drafting Committee and the Southern Sudan Constitutional Drafting Committee, and approved by the Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. Before being signed into law, the ICSS was certified by the National Ministry of Justice as being compatible with the INC (GPP, 2006). Regarding secession of the South, the INC states in section 222 (1) and (2) (GoS, 2005:96):
“Six months before the end of the six-year interim period, there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, for the people of Southern Sudan organized by Southern Sudan Referendum Commission in cooperation with the National Government and the Government of Southern Sudan and the people of Southern Sudan shall either:

a) confirm unity of Sudan by voting to sustain the system of government established under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and this Constitution, or

b) Vote for secession.”

As a result of the 2010 elections and the CPA, the GNU in Khartoum would continue to govern the whole of Sudan, and the GoSS situated in Juba would govern the South until the referendum in 2011 (Johnson, 2007:2). Stephen (2010) believes that southerners overwhelmingly want independence and there is a risk of a return to conflict if the north tries to delay or obstruct the vote to keep control of the South’s oil. The outcome of the referendum and the impact it has on the Darfur conflict will be discussed in Chapter Six, section 6.4.3: South Sudan’s secession. In the last section before the overview of the conflict in Darfur, the relationship and impact of the second North-South conflict on the Darfur conflict will be discussed. The following section will discuss the impact of the CPA on the conflict in Darfur.

4.2.2.6.2 The impact of the CPA on the Darfur conflict

The Committee on Foreign Affairs (2007:34) believes the CPA has provided a resolution for rural conflict in Sudan and serves as a model for addressing the issues of governance, neglect, and marginalisation. The CPA may serve as a framework for resolving other conflicts in other areas such as Darfur and Eastern Sudan. Davis (2008:28) argues in turn that, internally, the Darfur situation threatens to undermine the implementation of the CPA because it is distracting the international community and diverting important resources and pressure away from the North-South peace process. Winter and Prendergast (2007:3) believe this is in part because the GoS in Khartoum has managed to play the two conflicts off against one another. During peace negotiations with the South, the NCP bought time by pointing to problems with
Darfur, and the regime is using the CPA and tensions with the South to distract the international community and diminish external pressure on Darfur. That being said, if the CPA is not fully implemented, there will be no possibility for peace in Darfur (Davis, 2008:28).

The peace process, since the signing of the CPA, has been seen as an exclusive agreement between elites in the south and the north and has oversimplified conflict in Sudan into North vs. South and the conflicts in the East, West, and North of Khartoum are not even not considered, argue Young et al. (2005:16). The mandate of UNMIS for example, explains Breitweiser (2008:91), refer only to the solution of the North-South tensions in Sudan and excludes the conditions in Darfur and in the East of Sudan. It could also be seen in the CPA, which is only an agreement between the SPLM/A and the GoS. The CPA failed to include other parties and armed groups. The fact that the government would only negotiate with the SPLM/A after two decades of armed rebellion, caused marginalised people elsewhere in Sudan to take up arms. This was done as a means towards power sharing otherwise denied them by what, under the NCP, has been effectively a one-party state (HRW, 2006:2). The CPA’s exclusion of other parties and formation of the GNU, also “constitutionally exclude” peoples of Eastern and Western Sudan as well as of the Central Numba Mountains from holding presidential powers at the national level (Sayed, 2006). The overall impact of the North-South conflict on the Darfur conflict will be discussed next before the overview of the Darfur conflict itself.

4.2.2.3 Overall impact of the North-South conflicts on the Darfur conflict

There are many similarities between the causal effects of the second North-South conflict and the Darfur conflict and how they are interlinked. Taking the history of the North-South conflicts into account, the following aim to describe some of these similarities, impacts and linkages. The BBC (2005) argues that although the North-South conflicts are not directly related to the Darfur conflict, there are some similarities, which include:
• Rebels groups in both areas accuse the government of favouring the ruling Arab elite.
• Rebels groups in both areas are all demanding a greater share of Sudan's power and wealth.
• Although the south is inhabited by African Christian and animist groups who oppose moves to introduce Islamic law, the Rebels in Darfur are Muslim but feel that as non-Arabs, they too suffer discrimination.

Deng (2005:245) mentions that the main root causes of the apparent conflict between the centre and rural Sudan are linked with the structural marginalisation, exclusion and neglect of the majority rural Sudanese in the public affairs of the country and decision-making. More proximate causes included increased centralisation of power with smaller elites, failure to implement and honour previous peace agreements, and the use of religion and ethnicity to monopolise power and divide the communities (Deng, 2005:245). As is described in section 4.3 Darfur, this also holds true for the Darfur conflict, or as it is put by Lanz (2008a:214): “the roots of the conflict in Darfur lies in the central (factions) elite’s greed, the concentration of power and resources in Khartoum, and the systematic exploitation of the country’s peripheral areas.”

The people of both South Sudan and Darfur have fought lengthy and deadly wars against the same regime, and are searching for an end to their chronic marginalisation (Winter and Prendergast, 2007:3). Although their grievances are similar, they have not been a part of a united political front vis-à-vis the NCP (Winter and Prendergast, 2007:3). In spite of this, the successful anti-GoS offensive by SPLM also motivated the rise of militant nationalist sentiments in Darfur (Rankhumise, 2006).

Disregarding the similar grievances and common enemy, the rebels in South Sudan and Darfur do not necessarily have each other’s interests at heart. During the negotiation of the CPA, the negotiators feared that the inclusion of Darfur’s rebels, who had not been fighting Khartoum for nearly as long, nor had lost nearly as many lives, would change the parameters of the negotiations (Winter and Prendergast, 2007:3). Additionally, Jooma (2007b:3) comments that by moving into government,
and following the death of John Garang, the SPLM is clearly focused on securing the southern constituency for the upcoming 2011 referendum. They are far less interested in championing the cause of other marginalised groups/peoples around the country, and are therefore unlikely to support a full and broadened peace process in Darfur that would impact upon the delivery of the CPA.

With this overview of the two North-South conflicts serving as background, and careful review of their impact on the Darfur conflict, the following main part of the chapter will provide background information on the present (2010/11) conflict in Darfur, including an overview of the main antagonists.

4.3 DARYUR

The present conflict in Darfur started in February 2003, when the SLA and the JEM rebel groups emerged to challenge the NIF government in Darfur (Dagne, 2004:1) which was in alliance with the Khartoum government under al-Bashir (BBC, 2010a). Belgasmi (2007:1) calculates that of the greater Darfur’s estimated population of more than six million people, 3.7 million are conflict-affected because of the ongoing volatile security situation. Many people lack access to food, water, sanitation and other basic human needs. Widespread atrocities such as the murder of civilians and the rape of women and girls still continue (UN, 2010d). As a first step to understanding how and why this conflict turned into such a calamitous situation, an overview will be provided in the following sections of the Darfur people, region and main antagonists. In so doing, this overview will be a prelude to the impetus behind, and the events leading up to, the creation of UNAMID. This part begins with a general outline of the Darfur region which will be given next.

4.3.1 General orientation of Darfur

The Darfur region lies in the west of Sudan, bordered by the North state in the north, the Northern and Southern Kardofan states in the east, by the Northern and Western Gazelle Sea states in the south, by Libya in the northwest, by Chad in the west, and
by the Central African Republic (CAR) in the southwest (as depicted in Map 4.2: Darfur) (UN DPKO, 2007b). The Darfur region consists of three states – North, South and West Darfur (UNICEF, 2005:6). Nyala is the capital of South Darfur with an estimated population of two million people (Niemeyer, 2009:3), Al-Fasher is the capital of North Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 2009c), and El-Geneina is the capital of West Darfur (Doebbler, 2001:23). Bromwich (2008) notes that Darfur's economy is founded on natural resources even though it lies on the edge of a desert, in an area that suffers both from an overall paucity of resources and from a high degree of variability in the availability of resources.
Map 4.2: Darfur (Illustrating the Principal Towns in the North, South and West Darfur) (according to UN DPKO, 2007b)
Young et al. (2005:5) put the midyear 2004 estimate for the total population in Darfur at 6,556,000 and assume an annual population growth rate of between 2.38% (for West Darfur) and 2.48% (for South Darfur) while noting that population density varies in Darfur with the state of West Darfur the most densely populated. Darfur’s people are a complex mosaic of between 40 and 90 ethnic groups, some of ‘African’ origin (mostly settled farmers), and some Arabs (Mooney, 2007). The Fur, largely peasant farmers, occupy the central belt of the Darfur region, including the Jebel Marra massif (see Map 4.3: West Darfur), the richest and most stable area in terms of soil fertility and water resources; also in this central zone are the non-Arab Masalit, Berti, Bargu, Bergid, Tama and Tunjur peoples, who are all sedentary farmers (MRG, 1995). The northernmost zone of Darfur is Dar Zaghawa, part of the Libyan Sahara, and inhabited by camel nomads: principally the Zaghawa and Bedeyat, who are non-Arab in origin, and the Arab Mahariya, Irayqat, Mahamid, Beni Hussein (MRG, 1995) and Rizeigat (Tesfamichael, 2008).

Niemeyer (2009:3) reveals that the African Muslim Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes compose the region’s largest non-Arab population, although there are also smaller African Muslim tribes in the region. In terms of skin colour, however, everyone in Darfur is black and speaks Arabic; the distinction between African and Arab is made in terms of being 1) either nomadic (Arabic) or sedentary (African), and 2) facial features: the shape of the nose and thickness of the lips (Prunier, 2008a:4-5). Akawani (2009) explains that as a result of intermarriage among the various groups physical differences have become minor and that both Arabs and Africans are Muslims. Motlafi (2007) clarifies that Arab and African communities have traded and inter-married since the 7th century which led African communities to convert to Islam and many to assume an Arab identity by adopting the Arabic language and customs. However, the peoples of Sudan and the international media continue to frame the conflict in a simplistic paradigm of Arab versus African (Motlafi, 2007). Ethnicity is therefore not in itself clear-cut, given the long history of racial mixing between indigenous "non-Arab" peoples and the "Arabs", who are distinguished by cultural-linguistic attachment rather than race (MRG, 1995). The origins of the conflict will be explored next.
Map 4.3: West Darfur (Illustrating the Jebel Marra region bordered in yellow) according to OCHA (2009a) and UN DPKO (2007b)
4.3.2 The origins of the Darfur conflict

Periodic tensions between the largely African-Muslim ethnic groups and the Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced back to the 1930s and again surfaced in the 1980s, notes Dagne (2004:1). The Arab tribes in Darfur believe that the current conflict in Darfur began as a civil war in 1987, while setting the origin at the end of the 1970s. This was before al-Bashir and the NIF came to power, during a time when the Arabs were depicted as foreigners who should be evicted from Darfur, notes Mamdani (2009:89). Leroy (2009:361) believes that one way of grasping the complexity of the Darfur issue is to disaggregate the conflict into different levels: the perennial natural resource conflicts, linked with land and water resources; the dispute between the government and the rebel groups; and the regional cross-border conflict involving neighbouring states, in particular Chad and Libya (see Map 4.1: Sudan). Each of these levels will be explored in the following sections as background to the current conflict, starting with the perennial natural resource conflicts.

4.3.2.1 The natural resource conflicts

The pattern of conflict between nomadic groups over access to pasture and water, or theft of animals changed from low-intensity, small-scale outbreaks from the 1950s to the 1970s, to high-intensity, persistent and large-scale battles in the mid-1980s (MRG, 1995). Since the mid-1980s, the severe drought and famine in Darfur (also mentioned in section 4.2.2.2.2) resulted in a more systematic drive by the nomads to occupy land in the central Jebel Marra massif (MRG, 1995). This drive to occupy land resulted in clashes on the scale of a civil war, with entire villages wiped out and thousands of lives lost on both sides (MRG, 1995). Eltigani (1995:2) states that millions of small-scale farmers and animal herders were affected and it was estimated that during 1984-85 at least 2.4 million people lived in areas affected by the famine, several thousand people died as a result thereof, and that 1.3 million people experienced severe malnutrition. Daly (2007:227, 233) reveals that in 1985, the number of people affected in Sudan as a whole was estimated at about 8.5 million, about a third of whom were in Darfur, and an estimated 120 000 Chadian refugees in Dar Masalit alone, and many others across Darfur. While drought-stricken livestock
herders attempted to survive by encroaching on the fertile central zone, the Fur fought back to retain what they saw as their land (MRG, 1995). Shinn (2009:85) indicates that the mishandling by the GoS of the severe famine that began in 1984 in Darfur underscored the marginalisation of the region and set the stage for rebellion. In this regard, the ICID (2005:22) established that tribal feuds resulting from desertification, the availability of modern weapons, feelings relating to identity, governance, and the emergence of armed rebel movements had been playing a major role in shaping the current conflict. As a result, according to Dagne (2004:1), the three African ethnic groups, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit, were pitted against nomadic Arab ethnic groups.

The fight over land and resources continued into the 2000s. To make matters worse, Bromwich (2008) points out that continued tribal conflicts, combined with reduced rainfall (a 20% reduction projected between 2000 and 2020), loss of traditional environmental governance, massive displacement of people, and the almost doubling of the Darfur population in 20 years (from 3.50 million in 1983 to 6.48 million in 2003), escalated environmental degradation eventuating in localised resource depletion, and adding to pressures on sustainable livelihoods. When boreholes run dry, people move into Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, which are generally located on the outskirts of market towns where they further destroy shelter belts, forestry and farmland, asserts Bromwich (2008). Bromwich, (2008) adds that in addition to displacement, the following are intensifying severe environmental degradation:

- Uncontrolled deforestation, in the context of a breakdown of governance, driven by the need for timber and fuel wood in the war and crisis economy.
- Natural and physical assets are being destroyed as a feature of the conflict: farmers’ crops are grazed by pastoralists’ livestock; rangeland is burnt to prevent grazing; and water pumps are destroyed.
- Crisis livelihood strategies have short-term horizons which undermines the natural resource base.
- Migration routes are blocked, leading to overgrazing in areas where livestock are concentrated.
In conclusion, Leroy (2009:364) confirms that failure of governance and environmental degradation form an important part of the Darfur conflict. Leroy (2009:364) explains that there is an absence of strong institutions to manage natural resources and contain conflicts over access to resources, thus accelerating environmental degradation. Leroy (2009:364) further notes that strong institutions and leadership can limit the consequences of conflict, drought and famine, and conversely, improved environmental conditions will not lead to greater stability unless governance improves. Moreover, Leroy (2009:364) states that conflicting legal systems and institutions, as well as increased centralisation of decision-making has removed authority from local communities, making it more difficult to manage local resources in an equitable manner. Instead of development shortcomings, Shinn (2009:85) argues, too much attention has been directed to so-called differences between the “African” and “Arab” inhabitants of Darfur, such as religion, and points out that both sides of the conflict are Sunni Muslim. No party to the conflict has cited religion as a reason for the conflict. Next an overview of the antagonists in the Darfur conflict will be given, thereby exploring the second level in the complexities in the Darfur conflict, which according to Leroy (2009:361) is: “the dispute between the GoS and the rebel groups”.

4.3.2.2 The opposing forces in the Darfur conflict

The main rebel groups in Darfur include the SLM/A, which has a broad base of support across Sudan’s major ethnic groups (although the SLMA/A is principally non-Arab, the movement does include some Arabs) and the JEM, whose leaders have links with the NIF (De Waal, 2007:1040). The main government proxy is the Janjaweed, from a segment of Darfur’s camel-herding Arab tribes, and Arab immigrants from Chad, who had their own territorial ambitions in Darfur. (De Waal, 2007:1040). The Darfur rebels are either self-financed (in the case of JEM) or receive moderate amounts from regional sponsors, such as Chad and Eritrea. The fairly large Fur diaspora in the Gulf countries contributes money to the Abdel Wahid al-Nur component of SLM (Prunier, 2008b:6). The United Nations (UNSC 2006:3) adds that the rebel groups received financial, political and other material support from neighbouring countries including Libya, Chad and Eritrea, and highlights that the Government of Eritrea (GoE) had provided arms, logistical support, military training
and political support to both JEM and the SLA at a number of camps in Eritrea on the Eritrea-Sudan border. Furthermore, the SPLM/A had provided training and supplied arms and ammunition to SLM/A until at least August/September 2004 (Security Council, 2006:4).

Apart from JEM, SLM and the numerous splits in the SLM, additional movements are active in Darfur, some of which are JEM splinter groups (according to Prunier, 2008b:5). These include:

- **The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD)**: Founded in June 2004 by Jibril Abdel Karim Bari.
- **The JEM-Field Revolutionary Command (JEM-FRC)**: Led by Mohamed Saleh Harba and established at the beginning of 2005, it merged with the NMRD at the end of the same year.
- **JEM-Wing for Peace (JEM-WFP)**: Split from JEM in May 2006 during the peace negotiations in Abuja under the lead of Abdelrahim Abu-Risha.
- **Darfur Independence Front/Army (DIF/A)**: The group was founded by Mohamed Idris Azraq in August 2007. The DIF/A was the first movement which claimed independence for Darfur.
- **JEM-Collective Leadership (JEM-CL)**: Lead by Abdallah Banda and Bahar Abugarda, and founded in October 2007.

A more detailed description of the Janjaweed, JEM and the SLM/A will be given in the following sections.

### 4.3.2.2.1 The Janjaweed

The Janjaweed (or ‘hordes’) originated in 1987 during the conflicts in Darfur over scarce water and land resources. Twenty-seven Arab tribes formed an alliance against the Fur militias (Stepanova, 2008:57). The ensuing conflicts between Arabs and non-Arabs/Africans remained largely related to the scarcity of resources but the Janjaweed became more aggressive after two non-Arab groups, the SLA and JEM, took up arms
against the Sudanese government in 2003 (Koerner, 2005). Prunier (2008a:97-98) describes the Janjaweed’s membership as having six origins:

i. Former bandits who had been fighting in conflicts since the 1980s (such as the Masalit counter-insurgency war of 1994 against the SPLA (Davis, 2008:20));

ii. Demobilised soldiers from the regular army;

iii. Young members of the Arab tribes having a running land conflict with a neighbouring African group;

iv. Common criminals who were pardoned and released from jail if they joined the militia;

v. Fanatical members of the Tajammu al-Arabi; and

vi. Other generally young Arab men.

Ibrahim (2006:42) disagrees with the above description that the Janjaweed are gangs of bandits, and argues that they rather are warriors who act on directives from their tribal chiefs and are under a unified command. The Janjaweed, according to Ibrahim (2006:42) are the warriors of the Arab pastoral groups whose traditional task was to protect the tribes’ livestock against thieves, follow such thieves, retrieve the animals and punish the thieves, and if necessary, kill them. The Africa Confidential (AC, 2006a:6) estimates the Janjaweed number at least 20,000 and consist of militias from some Darfur Arab tribes, mainly northern camel-herders, Chadians and Mauritanians. The leader of the Janjaweed is Sheikh Musa Hilal Musa, and other leaders include Mohamed Adam Saliko (Saada), Mustafa Abu Nouba (Southern Rizeigat), Mohamed Yagoub (Terjem), and Ali Kwoshib (AC, 2006a:6). The following section will explain the relationship between the Janjaweed and the GoS.
4.3.2.1.1 The Janjaweed and the GoS

The present conflict in Darfur started with the attack on the small town of Golu on 26 February 2003; in response, the GoS gave the rebels 10 days to surrender or “to suffer the consequences” (clearly indicating that the GoS had already decided on a military solution to the crisis in Darfur), according to Prunier (2008a:92,97) and Dagne (2004:1). The GoS, however, did not trust the army it had in Darfur, which was made up of local Darfurians and during May 2003 the GoS began to form a relationship with the already established Janjaweed militias (Prunier, 2008a:97). De Waal (2007:1040) believes that the Sudan government made a deal with these Arab groups whereby they were allowed to pursue their own agenda with impunity, in return for suppressing the rebellion. In addition, Borger (2007a) points out that Sudan's army was exhausted from more than 20 years of war in the south, and rather than embark on a separate power-sharing venture with the people of Darfur, Khartoum opted for a cut-price means of suppressing the rebellion by subcontracting it to the Janjaweed, and that the GoS armed the militia, reinforced them with Arab convicts, and propagated Arab supremacist ideology.

Although the Janjaweed has been Khartoum’s main weapon against the Darfur rebels, the Sudanese Army and Air Force have also been active in the conflict and have on many occasions participated in the attacks with gunships and bombers (Davis, 2008:20). In this regard, Collins (2006:12) mentions that the attacks throughout 2003 were supported by helicopter gunships and Antanov bombers from the SAF. Davis (2008:20) believes, however, the role of the regular Sudanese army has been to provide transport and ammunition, and they have only rarely participated directly in the conflict. Nonetheless, the Janjaweed have been accused of killing many thousands of non-Arab groups, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and pursuing a systematic campaign of rape, intended to humiliate and punish non-Arab groups such as the Fur, Massaleet and Zagawa ethnic groups (BBC, 2004). Incidentally, Collins (2006:11) refers to the attacks by the Janjaweed as “ethnic cleansing” which started as early as October 2002 from their base camps in South Darfur where they were equipped and trained by the SAF. As a result of this campaign of ethnic cleansing, Collins (2006:12) continues that the Fur’s villages were
burnt, their livestock seized, the fields torched, and the infrastructure, such as wells, irrigation works, schools and clinics, were methodologically destroyed in a systematic scheme to drive the African population from their ancestral holdings. Furthermore, highlights Collins (2006:12), it was not only the Fur who were targeted but also the Massalit and Zaghawa. The second rebel group, the JEM will be discussed next.

4.3.2.2.2 The JEM

The history of the JEM should be understood against the split in the NIF in 2000 when al-Turabi was ousted by al-Bashir (as discussed in section 4.2.2.2.4. To recap, the split made al-Turabi create the PCP while al-Bashir continued to rule through the NCP, which is the political arm of the NIF. Following the split, the al-Turabi wing retained control of most of the money and used it, *inter alia*, to finance the JEM (Prunier, 2008b:1). The JEM remains solely financially supported by the PCP and the resultant financial dependence has ensured that the JEM has remained largely intact with few splinter groups (Prunier, 2008b:1). The JEM is a Zaghawa-led group that espouses an Islamist ideology, consists of non-Arab former backers of al-Turabi who were removed from power in 2000, and accuse the GoS of discriminating in favour of Arabs (Rabasa, 2009:17). The rebel movement is a direct outcome of the “Black Book” which was published in May 2000, a polemic purporting to reveal decades of Darfur’s neglect and underdevelopment by successive Khartoum regimes dominated by a few Arab tribes (Daly, 2007:275). The Black Book will be discussed next.

4.3.2.2.2.1 The Black Book

The Black Book was the work of dissident members of the NIF who wanted to bring about political change in Sudan and it served to inform the masses in Darfur that disparities were not as a result of Darfur’s remoteness and climate but a direct result of Khartoum’s policies keeping them poor (Daly, 2007:275-276). The Black Book showed that members of the Nile Valley elite had dominated Sudan’s government since independence and that three groups (the Jaaliyyin, the Shayqiyya, and the Danaqla) representing only 5.4% of the population of Sudan, had supplied its presidents, generals, judges, parliamentary leaders, and the heads of government
banks and development schemes (Childress, 2009:70). This publication helped to unite disparate elements of Darfur’s resistance and allowed the activists behind the Black Book to transform their quiescent cellular groups into a political and military organisation; thus, the JEM was formally established in August 2001 (Daly, 2007:276-277). In 2005, the JEM announced that they are not seeking an independent Darfur but rather to remove religion from Sudanese politics and called for Sudan to be a non-theocratic federal republican state (JEM, 2008:4-5). The marginalisation of the African/non-Arab people spurred on the creation of their own rebel movements as will be seen next.

4.3.2.2.3 The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

Racial prejudice (Arab vs. African) became enflamed with the formation of the Janjaweed and their declaration of war in 1987 against the "Zurug" (black) and non-Arab groups of Darfur (MRG, 1995). In response to this, the Fur formed their own militias for local self-defence (MRG, 1995). Daly (2007:278) explains how, in July 2001, Fur and Zaghawa resistance leaders forged an alliance against the Janjaweed-NIF programme (and swore to work together to foil Arab supremacist policies in Darfur (Flint and De Waal, 2005:76). Resistance leaders for the Fur included Abdel al-Wahid Muhammad al-Nur and Abduh Abdallah Ismail and for the Zaghawa, included Khatir Tur al-Khalla, Khamis Abdalla Abakar, and Muhammad Hagar (Daly, 2007:278). Military training of this new rebel group, the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) began in February 2002 and the first offensive operation took place when a government post in Golo (the district headquarters of Jebel Mara) near Nyala was attacked in the same year (Daly, 2007:278). The SLM/A emerged from the DLF following the attack and by 2004 had established a loose alliance with the SPLM/A, although the SLM/A denies any links to the SPLM/A except perhaps ideological similarities (Davis, 2008:20). The government responded to the formation of these groups by letting paramilitaries (the Janjaweed) conduct campaigns of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, resulting in the displacement of tens of thousands of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa residents (Davis, 2008:20). The SLM/A did not retain focus and internal struggles started. The subsequent splits in the SLM/A will be discussed next.
4.3.2.3.1 The splits in the SLM/A

In 2005, the SLM/A split into two factions, with Mini Minnawi becoming the president of one faction, and Abdel Wahid al-Nur the president of the other faction (Childress, 2009:139). It should be noted that during the peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, three rebel groups represented Darfur: The SLM/A-Minnawi, SLM/A-Wahid and JEM, but only the SLM/A-Minnawi signed the DPA in May 2006 (Childress, 2009:139). From the time when the DPA was signed, the SLM/A fragmented into approximately a dozen shifting factions, including, according to Prunier (2008b:2-3):

i. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Mini Minnawi (SLM/MM): The faction was formed in May 2006 and revolves around the former rebel leader in the SPLM/A, Mini Minnawi.

ii. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM/AW): This is an extension of the original movement created by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, but was founded under this name in July 2006. The SLM/WA rejects the DPA and therefore counts on the broad support of the population and is politically one of the most important factions.

iii. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Khamees (SLM/Khamis): Established in June 2006 by a former vice-president of the SLM Khamis Abdalla Abakar (Masalit).

iv. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Ahmed Shafie (SLM/AS); also known as SLM/Classic or The ‘32 Commanders’ (AC, 2006a:6): Exists since July 2006 and is led by Ahmed Abdel Shafie, a former founding member of the SLM. The SLM/AS rejects the DPA.

v. The Group of 19 (G19): Established at the end of 2005 by 19 commanders of SLM/AW which reject the DPA. In June 2006, the G19 began cooperating again with the SLM/AW.
vi. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Unity (SLM/Unity): Founded in autumn 2006 under the command of former G19-members. In September 2007 several commanders of the SLM/MM joined the SLM/Unity after Mini Minnawi’s signature of the DPA. The SLM/Unity showed the highest military presence in Darfur in late 2007; it has even extended its operations into Kordofan, central Sudan, and attacked the Chinese-operated oil wells in December 2007.

vii. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Free Will (SLM/Free Will): Led by Abdel Rahman Musa who became a government minister in February 2007; they have a relatively weak military presence, cooperate with JEM and are almost exclusively Tunjur in recruitment.

viii. The Great Sudan Liberation Movement (GSLM): Founded in January 2007 to protest against deficient support of the DPA.

ix. The Group for Development and Grievances as well as the Mother of all SLAs are both splinter groups of the SLM/MM.

In addition, the Africa Confidential (AC, 2006a:6; 2006b:5) names the splinter group the National Redemption Front (NRF), which was founded in Asmara, Eritrea, on 30 June 2006 in rejection of the DPA, by Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed, the leader of JEM, former Darfur Governor Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance and Khamis Abdalla Abakar, former deputy Chairman of Abdel Wahid’s faction (AC, 2006b:5). Amnesty International (2006a:3) confirms that the non-signatory groups to the DPA formed an umbrella alliance and its membership included the G19, the JEM, and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). The SFDA sees itself as a political movement and not an army fighting on the ground (Sebastian, 2004). To complicate things further, on 27 December 2006, members from the three non-signatory parties announced their merger into one movement simply known as the SLM, notes Kagwanja and Mutahi (2007:2). They also announced a ‘cessation of hostilities unless attacked’ and their commitment to the N’djamena ceasefire agreement, emphasise Kagwanja and Mutahi (2007:2).
The rebel groups and their splits are depicted in Figure 4.1: *The splits in the rebels groups in Darfur by the end of 2007 and signatories in the DPA.* The final section reflecting the dispute between GoS and the different rebel groups in Darfur, provides an explanation for the weak coordination and cooperation among the non-Arab/African rebels.
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) est. 2003/4
- SLM/ AS est. July 2006
- SLM/ Khamis est. June 2006
- SLM/ AW est. July 2006*
- Group of 19 est. end of 2005
- SLM/ Unity est. April 2006

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) est. 2000/1
- SLM/Free Will
- GGLM est. Jan 2007
- National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) est. June 2004
- JEM-FRC est. beginning of 2005
- JEM-WFP est. May 2006
- Darfur Independence Army (DIF/A) est. August 2007
- JEM-CL est. October 2007

Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance

Figure 4.1: The splits in the rebel groups in Darfur by end 2007 and signatories to the DPA (according to Prunier (2008b:2-3), and AC (2006a:6; 2006b:5), and Security Council (2006:65) (Nathan, 2008:14). * extension of the original SLM movement partly created by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, but was founded under this name in July 2006 (Prunier, 2008b:2-3)).
4.3.2.4 Cooperation among the rebels

The JEM has publicly embraced a more moderate form of political Islam than al-Turabi (NIF), but at the same time, it is Islamist, and it does differentiate itself from the main rebel group in Darfur, the SLM/A, which is firmly secular (Wallis, 2004). For this reason, Prunier (2008a:94) notes that it was easier for the SLM/A to recruit members given their broad tribal base than it was for the JEM, and cooperation between the two rebel movements were more financial and logistical (where the SLM was the weakest). De Waal (2007:1040) acknowledges that the main infrastructure for armed resistance was tribal, and the largest segments, the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit, rarely coordinated their activities, and rivalry between the two SLA leaders, Abdel Wahid al-Nur (Fur, with a following among diverse ethnic groups) and Minni Minawi (Zaghawa) became intense and bitter, and differences between these two and the leader of JEM, Khalil Ibrahim, were also significant. These divergences prevented the Darfur resistance from forming a united political front (De Waal, 2007:1040). The Africa Confidential (AC, 2006c:4), however, notes that on the ground, there seems to be cooperation between SLA factions and between SLA and JEM, which try to use the NRF to present themselves as a united front and boost their bargaining power. The NRF announced its formation with an attack on the town of Hamarat Sheikh in the Kordofan region on 3 July 2006 (AC, 2006b:5). To finalise the argument posed by Leroy (2009:361) to disaggregate the conflict into different levels, the regional cross-border conflict involving neighbouring states, in particular Chad and Libya, will be discussed next.

4.3.2.3 Regional cross-border conflicts, involving Chad and Libya

In the 1980s Libya’s Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi began planning to establish a large Arab state across Sahelian Africa and one of his first steps was to gain control of Chad (Heleta, 2008:3-4). At the time, al-Gaddafi’s foreign policy included: 1) a desire to make Libya the world’s pre-eminent Arab power and concomitantly to make sure that he is primus inter pares among Arab Leaders; 2) an intention to expand Libya’s population base to be used militarily; and 3) a consistent strategy aimed at moving south-eastward into the horn of Africa to obtain control of the western bank.
of the Red Sea and the sources of the Nile river (Butterfield, 1981:2). In line with his policies, al-Gaddafi expressed on several occasions his intentions to overthrow Nimeiri in Sudan; in addition, in November 1980, al-Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion entered the Chadian capital, Ndjama (Butterfield, 1981:1). Ironically, as it will be explained in the following section, certain factions in Chad started to involve and use Libya in the internal conflicts in Chad for their own reasons. It will also be explained how the military campaigns in Libya and Chad are related to Darfur.

4.3.2.3.1 The start of the conflict in Chad and Libya’s involvement

During the 1980s, Chad was enveloped in a civil war which began as a tax revolt in 1965 which set the Muslim north and east against the southern-led government (U.S. Department of State, 2010a). At the time, the government under President François Tombalbaye was unable to quell the insurgency and in 1975 it resulted in a coup d’état which installed General Felix Malloum, a southerner, as head of state (U.S. Department of State, 2010a). In February 1979, internal dissent within Malloum's government led to the northern Prime Minister, Hissène Habré, sending his forces against the national army in the capital city of N’Djamena (U.S. Department of State, 2010a). Attempting to bring the Chadian factions together, a series of four international conferences were held, first under Nigerian and then under OAU sponsorship (U.S. Department of State, 2010a). In August 1979, at the fourth conference held in Lagos, Nigeria, the Lagos Accord was signed resulting in the creation of the National Union Transition Government (GUNT) in November 1979 (U.S. Department of State, 2010a). The GUNT included Goukouni Oueddei, a northerner, as President; Colonel Kamougue, a southerner, as Vice-President; and Hissène Habré, as Minister of Defence (Bureau of African Affairs, 2008:4). This coalition proved fragile and in January 1980, fighting broke out again between Oueddei's and Habre's forces (U.S. Department of State, 2010a).

In June 1980 Oueddei, representing the People's Armed Forces faction in Chad, signed a military cooperation treaty with Libya (On War, 2003). In October 1980, Oueddei requested direct military assistance from al-Gaddafi who proceeded to send 15 000 troops into Chad and by December 1980, Libyan forces had firm control of
N'Djamena and most other urban centres outside the south (On War, 2003). Hissène Habré, representing the Northern Armed Forces faction in Chad, fled to Sudan, but vowed to resume the struggle (On War, 2003). On resuming the struggle in June 1982, Habré and his forces deposed by force Oueddei from N'Djamena and by October 1982, Habré was officially proclaimed as the President of Chad (Silva et al., 2010:9). Further clashes ensued with the direct support of Libya but in 1987, Habré’s forces inflicted a series of military defeats on the Libyans and their Chadian allies, at Fada, Ouadi Doum, and Faya Largeau in northern Chad (Global Security, 2005) and forced Libya out of the entire northern region apart from the Aouzou strip and parts of Tibesti (BBC, 2010b). Habré’s administration, however, was known for its use of unlawful arrests, detentions and mass killings of political opponents of his government and their supporters (Silva et al., 2010:9) and in 1990, Hissène Habré was replaced by Idriss Déby as President of Chad (Silva et al., 2010:10). The UN Secretary-General (2006:2) mentioned to the UN General Assembly that, after taking power from Habré in December 1990, Déby won three successive presidential elections in 1996, 2001 and 2006. During that period, Chad was not able, despite some progress, to achieve fully inclusive governance (Secretary-General, 2006:2). The ICG (2006b:2), concludes that armed opposition to Déby is deeply divided by leadership clashes, not over objectives, and consists of the following three most significant groups:

- the United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD), headed by Mahamat Nouri, which receives strong Sudanese support;
- the Zaghawa dissident groups, under the Rally of Democratic Forces (RaFD) umbrella and chaired by Timan Erdimi, a former director of Déby’s cabinet; and
- the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT), established in 1998 and operating in the extreme north along the Libyan border under the command of Mahmat Choua Dazi.

Déby’s involvement in Darfur will be discussed next. The following section will also give an account of how Darfur was affected by Libya’s involvement in Chad.
4.3.2.3.2 President Idriss Déby’s involvement in Darfur

Throughout the 1990s Déby was a loyal ally of the GoS and consistently refused to supply aid to Sudanese rebels - whether from Darfur or South Sudan - despite requests to do so since the early 1990s (HSBA, 2008:2). From 2003, however, Déby was unable to stop the two rebel movements in Darfur, the SLA and JEM, from using Chad as a rear base, recruiting combatants even among the Chadian Republican Guard (a pillar of his regime) and garnering support among the Chadian Beri, including those close to the government (HSBA, 2008:2). In March and April 2003, Déby sent Chadian troops to fight the SLA and the JEM inside Darfur but Beri soldiers from Chad showed little inclination to fight against other Beri from Darfur and gave the Darfurian rebels advance warning (HSBA, 2008:2). In March 2004, Déby helped the GoS by creating a dissident group, the NMRD, within the JEM and secured a short-lived ceasefire agreement in Darfur in December 2004 (HSBA, 2008:2).

Déby, who is a member of the Bideyat clan of the Zaghawa, appointed trusted members of his Zaghawa tribe to positions in all levels of government, but he infuriated many within his circle by refusing to provide direct support for Sudanese Zaghawa rebels against the GoS in Darfur (HRW, 2006b:5). This refusal was one reason for a failed coup attempt (not the first) in May 2004 by members of his own clan within the palace and the military (HRW, 2006:5). As Déby yielded to pressure from within the Zaghawa to strengthen his ties with the Darfur rebels, relations between Sudan and Chad degenerated into proxy war (Prendergast, 2007:3) which will be elaborated on in Chapters Five and Six when the chronology of the conflict in Darfur is discussed in greater detail. The influence of these regional cross-border conflicts on the origin of the Darfur conflict will be described next.

4.3.2.3.3 An analysis of the impact of the regional cross-border conflicts on the Darfur conflict

Between 1987 and 1989, Chadian rebels backed by Libya, used Darfur as a base from where they attacked Chad (Heleta, 2008:3-4). Libyans, “with their notions of Arab
supremacy,” organised ‘Arab’ tribes in the region, including Darfur, into an ‘Islamic Legion’ and gave its members military training and weapons (Heleta, 2008:3-4). Burr and Collins (2008:286) note al-Gaddafi began to arm the Mahamid, who were the largest section of the Arab Rizayqat in North Darfur and Chad, that he used during the 1980s when the drought forced the Arabs to go into Fur territory in Darfur. This culminated in violent assaults particularly in Jabal Marra from March 1988 to May 1989 (Burr and Collins, 2008:286). Stepanova (2008:57) and Ibrahim (2006:43) elaborate that the resulting inter-tribal tensions were exacerbated by policies of the al-Mahdi government (1986-89) to arm Arab nomads from Darfur and use them against the SPLMA when al-Mahdi failed to defeat them. Stepanova (2008:57) further notes al-Mahdi mobilised members of the Zaghawa tribe to support their kin in the civil war in Chad and, in response, the Chadian government armed the Fur in Darfur. This developed into the Darfur region being deeply affected by the proliferation of small arms, which have been smuggled not only from war-torn Chad, but also from Libya, southern Sudan, and Central Africa (Amnesty International, 2004:2). In the 2000s, the same Mahamid ethnic “Janjaweed” militias that committed systematic abuses in Darfur, staged cross-border raids into Chad, attacking Darfurian refugees and Chadian villagers alike, seizing their livestock and killing those who resisted (HRW, 2006b:2).

Regional destabilisation is an on-going phenomenon associated with the Darfur conflict. The GoS currently continues to actively export the Darfur crisis to Chad by providing material support to Janjaweed militias; failing to disarm or control the Janjaweed; backing Chadian rebel groups that it allowed to operate from bases in Darfur; and by deploying its own armed forces across the border into Chad (HRW, 2006b:2). In addition, Chadian rebel groups have rear bases in Darfur and launch attacks against the Chadian government, whereas many Darfur rebel groups have the support of Chad and are being armed and sheltered on its territory, destabilising the entire Darfur region (FRIDE, 2008a:3). Darfur has de facto become the base for a proxy war between the GoS and Chad (FRIDE, 2008a:3). As a result, since 2003, more than 240 000 Sudanese refugees have fled from the conflict in Darfur to eastern Chad, joined by approximately 45 000 refugees from CAR (UN, 2010e). The approximately 180 000 Chadians displaced by the civil war in eastern Chad have
generated increased tensions among the region's communities (UN, 2010e). This concludes the overview of the impact of the regional conflicts on Darfur, and the argument by Leroy (2009:361) to disaggregate the origin of Darfur conflict into different levels. In the following two chapters, chronologies are given of the key events pertaining to the Darfur conflict from the start in 2003 to the present, in which, *inter alia*, more details are given of the on-going, yet to be resolved conflict between Chad and the GoS.

### 4.4 CONCLUSION

The theatre of play for the current Darfur conflict is not restricted to the Darfur region, and its nature is more complex than to reduce it to a specific event, such as the commonly cited 2003 beginning of the conflict, a specific antagonist such as al-Bashir, or to describe it as a Muslim vs. Christian war. Instead, it involves countries throughout much of East Africa, and has its origins more accurately ascribed to a culmination of decades of events, the loss and search for a common Sudanese identity, personal ambition, and religious fundamentalism. It could be argued that personal ambition is the root of all the aforementioned factors which triggered the Darfur conflict. To explain: it was personal ambition that made Nimeiri rescind the Addis Ababa peace agreement when he fought for political survival, and which started the second North-South civil war; it was personal ambition which made al-Gaddafi attempt to create a large Arab states across Sahelian Africa, which led to Libya’s involvement in the Darfur conflict, including arming and training dissidents and flooding the Darfur region with weapons, while destabilising Chad; it was personal ambition that made al-Turabi try to transform Sudan into an Islamic state and institute Sharia law which was one of the main triggers for rebellion in the South; and it was personal ambition that made al-Bashir ‘purge’ the GoS of all those opposing his government leading to the alienation of most of the people in Sudan, including the South and Darfur.

The Darfur conflict is nonetheless first and foremost a failure of governance: self-centred and fundamentalist policies pursued by the GoS ignore the principles of the holistic concept of human security and, instead, follow a militarised concept of
security which is pursued to the impairment of human security. As a result, the politics of belligerence, social tussles over dwindling resources, guerrilla strategies and crime prevail. Better, more inclusive governance, would have built a national Sudanese identity countering any superficial distinguishing aspects used among Arabs and Africans - even though it is clear that both of these groups actually have the same appearances; it would have ensured that ethnically diverse groups have a platform to raise their grievances and participate in decision-making processes; and most importantly, it would have ensured that natural resources would have been managed better, taking a lot of strain off ethnic groups fighting for day-to-day survival. In fact, quite the opposite happened: the diverse ethnic identities clumped together into rebel groups representing their own idea of Arab, African, and Southerner identity. These self-proclaimed identities were not enough to keep the groups together and they continuously split and formed shaky alliances with other rebel groups. Within this framework of chaos, the GoS is left almost unhindered to interfere in Chad, Darfur and the South, and sell most of the oil wealth to foreign countries and companies. It also allows the GoS the opportunity to play the one conflict off against the other, thereby prolonging the peace processes. It leaves little to the imagination to understand a third party, not involved in all of this political wrangling could mediate peace and if necessary, enforce it. This third party, as will be explained in the following two chapters would first be the African Union and second the United Nations, but ultimately a combination of the two would be needed for any progress towards peace in Darfur to be made.