CHAPTER 8: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: RESULTS, DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

It was aimed in this thesis to establish, in the case of UNAMID, whether or not the particular manner in which the United Nations partnered with the African Union could be considered as an optimal mechanism or model for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. UNAMID was unique in its hybrid African Union-United Nations concept and provided an inimitable opportunity to determine whether such a hybrid partnership could enhance or limit the lead authority of the United Nations as maintainer of international peace and security, especially on the African continent. The thesis had six objectives. The first two research objectives, as explained in Chapter Seven, section 7.3.4 were met in Chapters Two and Three respectively. In Chapter Two the concept of ‘international peace and security’ was analysed and determined. In Chapter Three, the mandate that lays the foundation and sets out the principles for the United Nations and regional organisations, such as the African Union, to maintain international peace and security, was identified and analysed. The remaining four research objectives were investigated through the empirical study and literature study. The remaining four research objectives were:

- To investigate and identify the political factors which prompted the need for an African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur, Sudan.
- To identify, impart and describe the unique elements and characteristics of a hybrid operation, such as UNAMID.
- To determine whether or not a hybrid peace operation such as UNAMID is an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security.
- To identify the possible political consequences for future United Nations efforts to maintain international peace and security on the African continent following UNAMID.
In Chapter Seven, section 7.3.4, it was pointed out that the above-mentioned four remaining objectives correlated with the main themes or categories into which data or information could be grouped when analysed. In this chapter, the findings of the empirical study are provided, which include the results, the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. The results of the empirical study were triangulated with the conclusions of the literature study conducted in Chapters Two to Six. The conclusions of the results of the empirical research shed light on whether or not a hybrid operation is an optimal mechanism/alternative for the United Nations to maintain or attain international peace and security, especially in Africa. Lastly, recommendations are offered, based on the conclusions obtained from this research, for the United Nations to either continue to partner in hybrid operations or, if not, to then consider what future working arrangement/model could be followed when working alongside regional organisations to maintain international peace and security. The results of the empirical study are discussed next.

8.2 THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

The results of the empirical study reflect the outcome of the analysis of the information/data gathered through the individual focused interviews using the purposeful sampling method (explained in Chapter Seven, section 7.2.1). The methodology used to analyse the information/data was explained in Chapter Seven, section 7.3.4. Each one of the remaining objectives of the study is discussed in this section of the chapter. Each discussion, however, also contains references to the literature study conducted in the previous chapters. In this way, it is sought to provide a comprehensive and holistic discussion on each of the objectives and to identify any trends, concurrences, and disparities not only between respondents, but also between respondents and the literature. The results of the empirical findings of the first of the remaining four objectives will be discussed next.
8.2.1 Research objective: The political factors which prompted the need for an African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur

It was established in the thesis that the UN Security Council took a relatively long time to respond to the conflict in Darfur. The main reasons for taking so long to respond to the conflict were mainly attributable to the delaying tactics of the GoS and its allies among the five permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council (as explained in Chapter Six, section 6.4.4). These allies supported the GoS due to some vested interests in Sudan, such as oil, weapon sales and investment in infrastructure (as mentioned in Chapter Six, section 6.4.4). From the aforementioned it could be concluded that by the time UNAMID was established, it was no longer a response by the UN Security Council based on the basic principle and duty of maintaining international peace and security. Rather it was the conclusion of a political process which started with the failure of the intervention by the African Union through AMIS.

Why, however, was the African Union politically able and allowed to take such quick action? The answer to this question and certain other political reasons, which were highlighted in this introduction, will be discussed in the following sections. This aims to meet the research objective “The political factors which prompted the need for an African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur”. This research objective by the way that it is stated “the factors which prompted…” implies a causal effect which also by implication denotes a timeline of actions. Therefore, UNAMID followed AMIS which followed the establishment of the African Union which followed the abolishment of the OAU. Accordingly, the next section will start with the establishment of the African Union.

8.2.1.1 The establishment of the African Union

The establishment of the African Union in 2002 with its radical interventionist posture (as opposed to the OAU’s more conciliatory focus on freeing Africa from colonialism) allowed the organisation to deal with human rights abuses, genocide and various challenges of governance in its member states (Chapter Three, section 3.5). Its interventionist posture was also contrary to the principle of non-interference in
internal matters of member states which the United Nations adheres to (explained in *Chapter Three, section 3.5.2*). The renewed emphasis by the United Nations in the 2000s, however, on the involvement of regional organisations, especially the African Union, in regional matters of peace and security (*Chapter Three, section 3.4.2*) almost negated legislative discrepancies between the regional organisations and the United Nations. For that reason, the African Union took on the responsibilities for peace, security and stability in Africa which it pursued nearly independently and almost superseded the primary responsibility of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security in Africa (*Chapter Three, section 3.5.2*).

This posture and the above responsibilities prompted the African Union to take quick action in Darfur without being hampered by the same constraints as faced by the United Nations. In confirming this view and responding to the question of “which political factors prompted the need for an African Union-United Nations hybrid operation (UNAMID) to maintain peace and security in Darfur, Sudan?” Respondent A remarked that following the establishment of the African Union, a ‘new Africa’ was taking shape. Respondent A stated that this “new Africa” had a fresh focus on human rights, good governance, a renewed emphasis on accountability and transparency, which was reflected in NEPAD, and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. This “new Africa” was determined to take control of its own destiny and therefore the African Union was “very keen to have African solutions to African problems”, confirmed Respondent A. The respondent’s views coincided with *Chapter Five, section 5.2.2*, where it was determined that the African Union - with regard to Darfur - wanted to ensure that “African solutions were found for African problems” with only humanitarian aid coming from the ‘international community’.

Slightly less idealistic, Respondent C indicated that although some of the people within the African Union Secretariat and member states of the African Union saw the opportunity for Africa to assert itself with the advent of the Darfur crisis, most were cognisant of the limitations of the African Union brought on by financial constraints, and its limited ability to carry out complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Therefore, taking a more realistic view, Respondent C concluded that many of the people within the African Union Secretariat and member states of the African Union genuinely cared about what was happening in Darfur and wanted to
“apply the best instrument” which was not an African force per se, but African-in-
nature. The question is “why could the United Nations not provide such an Africa-in-
nature force itself and not get involved in the first place?” This question is just as important to ask as “what prompted the need for a hybrid mission?”, as the one related to the other. There were several factors which prevented the United Nations from taking action in Darfur which will be discussed next.

8.2.1.2 Factors which prevented the United Nations from taking action in Darfur

At least four major factors prevented a United Nations peacekeeping operation from being established in Darfur. These will be discussed and from the discussions, it will be concluded why a hybrid peacekeeping operation was at the time the only workable option in Darfur.

8.2.1.2.1 The involvement of the African Union

The ‘new Africa’ as described in section 8.2.1.1 was particularly keen to take on its responsibility for maintaining safety and security in Africa. With renewed vigour, the African Union did not initially approach the United Nations for assistance in Darfur. Respondent A put it that the African Union brought about “a new era of African effort to take direct responsibility not only for its economic development through NEPAD, but also in peace and security”. The African Union intervened in the Darfur situation following the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 28 May 2004 which included the GoS as a signatory to the agreement. The African Union managed therefore to obtain the consent of the GoS to deploy a small military observer/protection force to support unarmed military observers in Darfur. This force eventually evolved into AMIS (Chapter Five, section 5.3).

The quick reaction by the African Union, however, came as a kind of ‘victory’ over the perceived slow response time of the United Nations. According to Respondent A, the difference between the United Nations and the African Union, with regard to the response time to the Darfur conflict, was that “Africans themselves are stepping up to the plate, they are demonstrating by actions, not only words, their own commitment to
the maintenance of peace and security on the continent and that is why in Darfur you saw the African countries taking the initiative to send troops and police to Darfur ahead of everyone else”. By the time that AMIS was established, the United Nations was unable to obtain any consent from the GoS. According to Respondent F, this was due to concerns by the GoS that the United Nations would send a large European force into Darfur that would usurp their authority and decisions. Respondent F argued that only a ‘predominantly African’ peacekeeping force would have been acceptable to the GoS. Furthermore, Respondent F equated the right of the African Union to make decisions on matters of international peace and security in Africa with that of the United Nations. Therefore, according to Respondent F, the African Union did not require permission from the UN Security Council and a bilateral agreement with the GoS was enough to launch operations into Darfur. The subject of the sovereignty of Sudan and the right of the United Nations to intervene in Darfur will be discussed next as another example which prevented initial action by the United Nations.

8.2.1.2.2 The inviolability of the sovereignty of Sudan

In reality, the GoS did not want the international community, i.e. the United Nations, involved in the conflict in Darfur and propagated instead the involvement of the African Union. For instance, the GoS threatened an ‘Islamic holy war’ in Darfur if the United Nations was deployed (see Chapter Five, section 5.2.5.2.5.1). In addition, the United Nations could not send a peacekeeping force into Darfur as any such intervention taken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter required the consent of the GoS (Chapter Five, section 5.2.3.1.1 and Chapter Three, section 3.3.2.3). A peacekeeping force instituted under Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN Charter firstly required the UN Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to (international) peace or secondly, that an act of aggression had taken place which threatened international peace and security (Chapter Three, section 3.3.2.4). In Chapter Five, section 5.4: Conclusion, it was acknowledged that few facts were available to the international community on what exactly had happened during the earlier times of the conflict, especially during 2003/4. Therefore the slow response by the UN Security Council was also attributed to its UN Charter’s statutory restrictions.
That being said, by responding to the conflict in Darfur without obtaining permission from the UN Security Council, it is not clear whether the African Union was acting within the confines of international agreements. According to the conclusions arrived at in *Chapter Three, section 3.4.1*, the United Nations could delegate its power to address threats to international peace and security in the region to a regional organisation such as the African Union. The regional organisation, however, is required firstly to inform the United Nations of any action planned to be taken by the regional organisation and, secondly, to continuously update the United Nations on the unfolding situation. Respondent H made it clear that the principles of the United Nations and the African Union were at odds with the United Nations putting a lot of emphasis on the need to have the consent of the parties to a conflict whereas the African Union reserved the right from its Constitutive Act to actually intervene in a sovereign state without permission from that sovereign state. Respondent C, however, disagreed that the United Nations could not obtain permission to establish a peace mission in Darfur but believed that the North-South Sudanese conflict played a role in the decision. This provided a third reason which prevented the United Nations from taking action.

8.2.1.2.3 The North-South Sudanese conflict

Respondent C explained that, in 2004, the GoS was ready to accept the United Nations to play a peacekeeping role in the North-South Sudanese conflict but not in Darfur specifically. According to Respondent C, the GoS believed that there was not really a war in the ‘classic sense’ in Darfur. The GoS described the situation in Darfur as an insurgency/counter-insurgency and maintained that the number of casualties and claims of genocide were being exaggerated by Western propaganda. These claims made the GoS reluctant to accept the United Nations playing a similar role as they had through UNMIS in the North-South Sudanese conflict, concluded Respondent C. Indeed, as was highlighted in *Chapter Four, section 4.2.2.3: Overall impact of the North-South conflicts on the Darfur conflict*, the international focus on the North-South Sudanese conflict diverted attention away from human rights abuses in Darfur. An added concern of the international community was that intervention in the Darfur conflict could hamper the implementation of the CPA (*Chapter Four*,
section 4.2.2.3). The ‘concerns’ of the international community were also present in the decisions of the UN Security Council, as will be mentioned next.

8.2.1.2.4 Actions by some members of the P-5 of the UN Security Council

In Chapter Six, section 6.4.4, the way that the P-5 supported resolutions pertaining to Darfur and the GoS was discussed at length. It was concluded that UN Security Council decisions were ‘slowed down’ because of the inability of the P-5 to reach consensus on actions to take with regard to the Darfur conflict, the indictment of al-Bashir, protecting their own national interests in Sudan, and proposed sanctions.

Four main reasons were provided for the delay in establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur. It is proposed that a United Nations peacekeeping operation was never delayed - it was in fact never established.

8.2.1.3 Conclusion of the research objective: the political factors which prompted the need for an African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur

From the above sections, it can be construed that UNAMID was established when AMIS failed to meet the expectations of both the people of Darfur and the international community to maintain and/or facilitate peace efforts. The atrocities continued in Darfur and the African Union asked the international community for assistance. In Chapter Five, section 5.3.4, financial and human resources were cited as some of the main reason for the failure of AMIS. The question is: if AMIS had enough resources, how would it have affected the role of the United Nations in Darfur in terms of peace and security? To explore this, the respondents were asked: “Do you think the African Union would have approached the United Nations to authorise a peacekeeping mission if they had the necessary resources?” In response, not one of the respondents believed that the African Union would have actually asked the United Nations to intervene in Darfur, if the African Union had sufficient resources. Furthermore, Respondent B highlighted the view which many of the respondents shared: that AMIS could no longer function in Darfur due to “logistical challenges”
but also that the GoS did not want the United Nations or ‘the West’ to intervene and “insisted the mission must be African”.

Not asking for assistance when one has the necessary resources may seem logical, but it has inherent implications for the United Nations as the maintainer of international peace and security: it simply takes away any reliance on the United Nations. There may also be another reason. Respondent A elucidates that AMIS was only the start or the beginning of actions taken by the African Union in anticipation of United Nations support later on. The African Union thus took the lead in tackling the crisis but did so with the full understanding that there would be a partnership with the international community. Further elaboration on the involvement of the African Union came from Respondent H who suggested a parallel between AMIS and the ASF (as explained in Chapter Three, section 3.5.1.1.1). Respondent H explained that although the ASF would be the initial responder to an issue of peace and security on the African continent, as was the case with AMIS, the African Union could maintain the greatest comparative advantage in the longer term by transitioning the ASF into a hybrid African Union-United Nations peace mission. Supporting such an evolving peace operation concept, Respondent J mentioned the stabilising role which ECOWAS played in Liberia during its civil war until the United Nations-led mission (UNMIL) took over. In closing, Respondent K believed that Africa would continue to be reliant on other countries and entities, regardless of the noble drive to have ‘African solutions for African problems’ until such time as African organisations and troops were trained up to an international standard. Nevertheless, remarked Respondent H, the GoS would never have accepted a straight transition from the African Union-led force to a United Nations-led force and therefore the ‘hybrid’ model was presented as an alternative. In conclusion, the hybrid peacekeeping model was supported because:

i. AMIS failed to provide peace and security in Darfur;

ii. The United Nations could not physically access Darfur without the consent of the GoS;
iii. The African Union wanted to be involved in Darfur and its Constitutive Charter allowed it to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign member state – without the consent of the member state;

iv. The GoS demanded a primarily African peacekeeping force in Darfur and did not want to accept a perceived ‘western peacekeeping force’ from the United Nations;

v. It was a win-win situation for the United Nations giving in to the demands of the GoS for a primarily African force in Darfur as it provided greater impetus towards United Nations peace endeavours in the North-South conflict;

vi. Through a hybrid peacekeeping operation, the UN Security Council could and wanted to give more credence to the newly established African Union to maintain peace and security in Africa;

vii. Credence to the African Union could also be expanded to other regional organisations if the model worked;

viii. The African Union could develop its peacekeeping capacity and experience with the added bonus that it did not have to fund the operation itself; and

ix. The African Union could use the UNAMID experience and build its own peacekeeping and peacebuilding machinery independent from the United Nations within the framework of “African solutions for African problems”.

Thus, the only way for the United Nations to proceed in Darfur was to have the African Union involved. On the other hand, the African Union could not maintain peace and security without the support of the United Nations. Indeed, it seemed as if the United Nations had no choice other than to allow ‘Africa to solve its own problems’. Perhaps a hybrid operation would solve the problem? But what would such a hybrid force look like? The unique elements of a ‘hybrid’ peace mission will
be described in the following section (which is also the topic of the second objective of the thesis).

8.2.2 Research objective: The unique elements and characteristics of a hybrid operation, such as UNAMID

Now that the reasons for setting up UNAMID have been established, the unique elements of UNAMID as a hybrid peacekeeping operation need to be determined to meet the next objective of the study. The word ‘hybrid’ is synonymous with ‘crossbreed’, ‘mix’, or ‘modified’ (Rodale, 1986:527). It could also be defined as “something heterogeneous in origin or composition”, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary (2011). It is clear from these synonyms and definition that there are some expected elements associated with the hybrid concept. As was concluded in Chapter Six, section 6.2.3, the main characteristics of the hybrid peacekeeping mission concept were a) the unique African character of the force, and b) the perplexing command and control structure, which was required to be a dual command arrangement ‘within the single command and control structure of a regular United Nations peacekeeping practice’. At first glance, UNAMID could have been considered to be a ‘hybrid’ mission taking into account the above synonyms, definitions, and conclusions; however, it could also be argued that based on the contributions which the United Nations and the African Union made towards the operational functioning and success of the mission, it certainly was not a mission of equal proportions (see the conclusions in Chapter Six, section 6.2.3). Tellingly, in plant biology, hybridisation between species mostly results in an organism with an odd number of chromosomes rendering the organism infertile (Mader, 2007:212). Similarly, the hybridisation of the African Union and the United Nations resulted in an organism with unequal contributions although it is yet to be determined if similar hybrid missions will commence in future. Respondent F believed that the word ‘hybrid’ was the wrong word to use because when it was translated into Arabic, it meant “mongrel – like a cross breed” which has a negative connotation to it.

Respondents, indubitably as a result of all of them having a professional United Nations background, compared their views and experiences of UNAMID with their
knowledge and experiences which they had with other United Nations peacekeeping missions, or with peacekeeping missions where the United Nations partnered with other multi-national forces, such as NATO. “Unlike United Nations partnerships with other multinational forces, the hybrid concept could be considered to be a better model”, argued Respondent H. Respondent H pointed out that in the case of United Nations peacekeeping partnerships with other multinational forces there are essentially multiple chains of command going to every member of the coalition. This means each individual troop contributor nominally answers to their organisation which in turn has strong links to their own national capitals. Furthermore, there is a risk that the different components of the multinational mission potentially operate to different standards and under different rules and regulations (Respondent H). Respondent H was of the opinion that in the case of a hybrid operation, these risks should theoretically be minimised and organisational rules and regulations should be less complicated. Therefore, a hybrid mission might in theory be a more pragmatic, less complicated mission compared with a multinational force. That being said, how do the complexities of a hybrid mission compare with those of a regular United Nations peacekeeping mission? This will be explored next.

8.2.2.1 The differences between a ‘regular’ and a ‘hybrid’ peacekeeping mission

To determine the perceived differences between a ‘regular’ and a ‘hybrid’ peacekeeping mission, all of the respondents were asked the question: “What do you perceive to be the differences between a regular peacekeeping mission and a ‘hybrid’ peacekeeping mission, such as UNAMID?” Eighty per cent of the respondents provided an answer to the question. The question prompted a range of comparable answers which a) described the features of a ‘hybrid’ mission, b) provided details of the features of the hybrid mission which differed from those of a ‘regular’ United Nations peacekeeping mission, and c) whether or not (a) and (b) generally affected regular United Nations peacekeeping in a positive or negative manner. These responses are presented in Table 8.1 below. In Table 8.1, in the column ‘Peacekeeping Feature’, those features are listed which the respondents across the board associated with both hybrid and regular United Nations peacekeeping. In the next column ‘Description of the feature provided by respondent(s)’, a general
description is given of the peacekeeping feature provided by the respondent(s). In the following column ‘**Unique to UNAMID? (yes/no)**’, it is pointed out whether or not the feature is unique to the UNAMID hybrid model. If it was unique to UNAMID, the feature was highlighted to assess whether or not it could be considered to be an improvement over regular peacekeeping practices. Therefore, in the last column ‘**Did the feature improve the success of the peacekeeping operation from the perspective of the United Nations?**’ insight is offered into whether or not the United Nations peacekeeping feature was improved through the features of the hybrid model.
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<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping Feature</th>
<th>Description of the feature provided by respondent(s)</th>
<th>Unique to UNAMID? (yes/no)</th>
<th>Did the feature improve the success of the peacekeeping operation from the perspective of the United Nations?</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Logistical arrangements</td>
<td>According to Respondent E, logistical arrangements were managed by and under the control of the United Nations.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>This feature should be seen in conjunction with point 8 of this table ‘Political relationship with the host country (Sudan)’. UNAMID had great difficulty in bringing its equipment into Darfur, getting the SOFA signed, among other things (see Chapter Five, section 5.2.6.3.2.1). Therefore, even though the feature was in no way unique to UNAMID - being in a hybrid operation also did not facilitate or ease logistical arrangements for the United Nations.</td>
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<td>2. Operational structure of the mission</td>
<td>Both Respondents C and K stated that the operational structure of UNAMID was not different from that of a regular United Nations peacekeeping mission and that it consisted of the same military, police and political types of components.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>This feature should be seen in conjunction of point 7 of this table ‘Character of the mission’. Although the operational structure was not different from that of a regular peacekeeping mission, the African character requirement made it difficult to get troop and police contributions (see also Chapter Six, section 6.2.2.1.2).</td>
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<td>3. Budget contributions</td>
<td>According to Respondent E and K, regular budget contributions to the mission were managed by and</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>It appeared as if the African Union was asking for a blank cheque and wanted</td>
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<td>4. Budget size of the mission</td>
<td>under the control of the United Nations. to dictate the terms of the mission while asking the United Nations to fund it regardless of their terms and conditions (Respondent G). Respondent G added that financial contributions from the donor community came with certain pre-conditions though s/he did not elaborate on the exact pre-conditions.</td>
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<td>5. Human resources (HR) requirements</td>
<td>No. The budget size comparison with other United Nations peacekeeping missions and yearly increase could be seen in Figure 8.1 and in Chapter Six, Table 6.1. It is evident from this table and figure that the costs associated with a hybrid mission were astronomical compared with other regular peacekeeping missions. Nonetheless, UNAMID was also the largest peacekeeping mission ever so it is difficult to relate the costs only to the ‘hybrid’ aspect. It was not established what a similar regular United Nations peacekeeping operation would cost.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No. Respondent D pointed out that the African Union insisted on being involved in the interview process but that officials from the African Union were more often than not unavailable to take part in the interview process and therefore appointments of staff for UNAMID took needlessly longer. According to Respondent D, the African Union also had to concur with the choice of the selected candidate which complicated decisions and added levels to the</td>
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<td>6. Political and administrative control of the mission</td>
<td>After the review, interviews were conducted and candidates selected according to United Nations HR rules and regulations.</td>
<td>overall bureaucracy. Respondent F clarified that the African Union insisted on jointly appointing staff with the United Nations, the senior management of UNAMID (Director level 2 and above), and wanted to provide their “input” with the appointment of staff at lower levels. Respondent G, however, added that senior management, such as the force commanders and the police commissioners, were far from being jointly appointed. Respondent G noted that they were identified and proposed by the African Union before recruitment processes started. Such practices, determined Respondent G, did not always allow the best person to be appointed for the position.</td>
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Respondent D believed decisions were taken much quicker in a regular United Nations peacekeeping mission when compared with UNAMID. In a regular peacekeeping mission, confirmed Respondent G, a clear chain of command existed to either the UN DPKO or the UN DPA. According to Respondent E, having two headquarters for the mission hampered the effective administration of the mission. As a result, commented Respondent F, major political and military decisions were dependent on the concurrence of two organisations.

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| 7. Character of the mission | African Union respectively. In an attempt to overcome the geographical expanse, Respondent F noted that a Joint Support Coordination Mechanism was established in Addis Ababa to streamline decisions. | Yes |
| 8. Political relationship with the host country (Sudan) and | Respondent C clarified that the GoS insisted on the African character of the mission but that the extent of the African-ness of UNAMID in its troop, civilian numbers and/or its leadership was never precisely established. “It was not as if 70 % of the posts were reserved for Africans”, remarked Respondent C. | Yes |
| | Respondent C pointed out that a tripartite mechanism consisting of the African Union, the United Nations and the GoS was set up to | Yes |
| | Respondent F felt this requirement to give preference to African troop contributing countries was purely a political decision. Such a political decision, according to Respondent G, meant troop contributions from the rest of the world were ignored to the detriment of the operational success of UNAMID. To undertake complex projects, UNAMID had to turn to other capable nations such as China and Pakistan but overlooked the west, concluded Respondent G. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter Six, section 6.2.1.1, the GoS used the African character as an effective deployment delaying tactic. | No. |
| | It was made clear in section 8.2.1.2, that the GoS did not want the West or the United Nations involved in the conflict in Darfur. Furthermore, the GoS insisted on the African character of the mission. The African Union was also | Yes |
peace efforts resolve operational issues such as the issuing of visas, freedom of movement, and getting equipment into Darfur. credited with leading most of the peace negotiations between the GoS and the rebels (under the auspices of the United Nations). This was highlighted in Chapter Six, section 6.3.2.1 and Chapter Six, section 6.4.1.3. Respondent B also confirmed that with regard to the political relationship with the GoS and ongoing peace efforts, the African Union was involved in Darfur to a great extent under the leadership of the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the UN Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur, Djibril Bassole, and the involvement of the African Union Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping. In addition, Respondent J believed the hybrid model enabled the mission to work better with the GoS and the rebels, mainly by providing confidence among the parties to the conflict that UNAMID was impartial. The hybrid model, according to Respondent J brought along a lot of political leverage in Sudan which neither the African Union nor the United Nations would have had on their own.

Table 8.1: Hybrid versus regular peacekeeping
The features of peacekeeping captured in Table 8.1 are by no means an exhaustive list of the features of a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Other features, which were not mentioned, would include those pertaining to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations (compare Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4.1). The eight listed features are merely those highlighted by the respondents which they used to compare UNAMID with other peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, from the above table it is evident that of the eight features, five were perceived to be unique to UNAMID or different from a regular peacekeeping mission. These five features were 1) The budget size of the mission, 2) Human resources (HR) requirements, 3) Political and administrative control of the mission, 4) The African character of the mission, and 5) The political relationship with the host country (Sudan) and peace efforts. What is captivating though, is the fact that only the last feature, “the political relationship with the host country (Sudan) and peace efforts”, was considered to be an advantage for the United Nations to partner with the African Union with regard to resolving the conflict in Darfur and ensuring mission success.

The other four features were dependent on the exchange of letters on the legal terms of their partnership in Darfur and agreements to the full application of administrative authorities and delegations in accordance and in compliance with United Nations rules, regulations and procedures (see Chapter Six, section 6.2.2). Respondent G, however, indicated that by mid-2011, these agreements were still not signed. Respondent G indicated although these letters of agreement had been written by the United Nations and submitted to the African Union several times since the inception of UNAMID, no legal agreement could be reached.

In Table 8.1 under “4. Budget size of the mission”, reference is made to Figure 8.1, which compares the budget of UNAMID with those of other United Nations peacekeeping missions. It should be pointed out that although UNAMID was the most expensive peacekeeping mission ever, it was also the largest in size ever for the United Nations. Furthermore it operated in extremely difficult terrain which inflated its budget. As a result, UNAMID was not necessarily the most expensive ever as a result of being a hybrid operation.
Parenthetically, the entire structure and budget of UNAMID needed to be approved by the UN General Assembly which also included all of the member states of the African Union. As determined in Chapter Three, section 3.3.2.1.3, police and troop contributing countries are equally reimbursed by the financial contributions of all of the member states represented in the UN General Assembly. As the UN Secretary-General (GA/SC: 2010:11) pointed out: “The issue of securing sustainable, predictable and flexible financing, however, remains a key challenge. To date, African Union peace support operations authorised by the Security Council continue to be funded primarily through voluntary contributions from international partners, in particular through the European Union’s African Peace Facility, and through United Nations assessed contributions.” Figure 8.1 is provided below:
Figure 8.1: Portion of the total United Nations peacekeeping operations budget used by UNAMID (UNGA, 2008b:5; UNGA, 2007e:2; UNGA, 2008d:2-3; UNGA, 2009c:2-3; UNGA, 2009d:2-3; UNGA, 2009e:2-3; UNGA, 2010d:2-3)
Another issue that has not been explored is whether the people in Darfur understood that UNAMID was not a regular United Nations peacekeeping mission but in fact a hybrid operation. This is a significant issue because it was vital for the GoS that Western influence was limited and it was essential for the African Union to portray their involvement to the Sudanese in resolving the conflict in Darfur, and a hybrid operation was aimed to address these concerns. If the African Union’s role was not evident to the people in Darfur, both the aforementioned concerns of the GoS and the African Union would have been realised. This will be discussed next.

8.2.2.2 The perceived distinctiveness of the hybrid operation in Darfur

All of the respondents were asked the question: “In Darfur, is the common person on the ground aware it is a 'hybrid' mission?” Eighty per cent answered the question. Respondent G noted that the Public Information element in the mission was responsible for ensuring that the people in Darfur understood the hybrid concept. The hybrid concept was physically visible to the people in Darfur in the uniform of the forces and their equipment. Respondent G explained that the troops and police forces wore the standard, regular blue United Nations peacekeeping helmets or berets together with a green armband depicting the involvement of the African Union. Respondent K pointed out that at the beginning of the mission, the GoS wanted the forces to wear green helmets and berets but that instead, a green armband for the African Union and blue helmets/berets were agreed upon. Regardless of the green armband, Respondent G felt that the blue helmets or berets made people in Darfur believe UNAMID was first and foremost a United Nations mission. This perception was confirmed by Respondents A, B, C, D, E, J, and K. Respondent B indicated that the branding of the mission was further in favour of the identity of the United Nations through the usage of the typical white-painted vehicles with “UNAMID” written on their sides. Respondents C and E confirmed the view of Respondent B with regard to the vehicles. Respondent A explained, however, that the average man on the street in Darfur would not understand or be interested in the difference but only cared whether or not the force made a positive impact on their lives in Darfur. Respondent J concurred and said that the identity of the mission was more important to politicians than to the average person in Darfur.
With regard to making a difference, Respondent C pointed out that the average person in Darfur did believe a positive difference was being made by UNAMID: hundreds of patrols were going out every day, wells were being dug for the communities, security was being provided around the IDP camps, and it was assisting in creating civil society structures. The main difference, highlighted Responded C, was the fact that the large scale killings of people in Darfur which were apparent in 2003/4, had ended. Respondent D expressed no surprise that people in Darfur perceived UNAMID to be a United Nations peacekeeping mission because it came directly after the (failed) intervention by the African Union through AMIS, which had made UNAMID “more pronounced on the ground”. Lastly, Respondent J interestingly paid attention to the fact that the United Nations remunerated most of the salaries of the troops and police forces which came predominantly from African nations. This fact made the troops and police believe that they themselves were employees of the United Nations.

8.2.2.3 Conclusion of the research objective: the unique elements and characteristics of a hybrid operation

UNAMID was established as a true ‘hybrid’ peacekeeping mission. First and foremost this was evident in the equal power of political and administrative decision-making, which was shared between the African Union and the United Nations. For instance, in UNAMID the Special Representative of the mission, as well as other senior Mission leaders, had to be jointly appointed by the UN Secretary-General and Chairperson of the African Union. In regular United Nations peacekeeping missions this was the sole prerogative of the UN Secretary-General. Furthermore, the strategic directives to UNAMID had to be issued by both the USG DPKO and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. As a result, with UNAMID, strategic decisions had to be taken in consultation with the African Union. This was pointed out at the meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 30 November 2006, where the African Union decided that “the size of UNAMID shall be determined by the African Union and the United Nations, taking into account all relevant factors and the situation on the ground, as well as the requirements for it to effectively discharge its mandate” (UNSC, 2007j:4). United Nations processes, staff rules and regulations needed to be followed with regard to the appointments of human
resources for UNAMID, but the African Union insisted on being consulted before appointments were made. Such consultations, however, allegedly contaminated the purity of the United Nations appointment process which should be fair, unbiased and devoid of any external influences. The appointment of staff was further complicated by the involvement of the GoS which insisted on a predominantly African character for the mission, especially for the forces on the ground.

In some respects, UNAMID was no different from a regular United Nations peacekeeping mission; notably, the logistical arrangements, operational structure of the mission, and the budget contributions to the mission, were all the same. It may be argued that the African Union contributed military and police personnel as part of its ‘deal’ in the hybrid Mission. Unfortunately, it was clear that they struggled to get troops and police officers, and when they did manage to get the human resources, the United Nations still paid for them.

The ‘hybrid’ identity of the mission, however, fell short of expectations to portray the involvement of the African Union. In this regard, 80% of respondents indicated that for the average person in Darfur, UNAMID was a United Nations peacekeeping mission even though it was required that all uniformed peacekeepers wear a green African Union armband. Nonetheless, it was clear that the hybrid model was theoretically less complex than United Nations partnerships with other multinational operations, such as NATO, where there were more differences in standards, procedures and rules. This special political relationship between the United Nations and the African Union in the hybrid context was particularly effective in relations and peace efforts with the GoS and rebels. The effectiveness, however, fell short when it came to operational matters, such as visa issuances, custom clearances of equipment or access to certain areas in Darfur. The ‘hybrid’ part of UNAMID, thus in essence, denoted the special political relationship between the African Union and the United Nations. It had little practical operational influence on the structure or operations compared with the regular United Nations peacekeeping model apart from the appointment of staff. With the extent of the hybrid aspect of UNAMID explained, it will be determined whether UNAMID is an optimal mechanism for the United
Nations to use to maintain international peace and security. The outcomes of this research objective will be discussed next section.

8.2.3 **Research objective: UNAMID as an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security**

From the previous sections it has already become apparent that UNAMID was an expensive, complex operation. There were many aspects unique to UNAMID which hampered its deployment, effectiveness and successes (compare Table 8.1). It should be noted, however, that this particular objective of the study which was aimed at determining if UNAMID was an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, does not only relate to the operational structure of UNAMID or its character, but also extends to whether UNAMID was effective with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The issues clustered around this research objective, therefore, go beyond the obvious facts, such as that UNAMID took several years to muster up enough resources to actually commence successful operations. The issues encompass questions on whether or not UNAMID met its mandate, and therefore managed to curb the violence in Darfur, engaged in peace negotiations, enforced the DPA; and also, whether it is a viable peacekeeping model for the United Nations to embrace in the future. Accordingly, these issues relating to this objective of the study are explored according to the following structure: a) did UNAMID meet its mandate; b) is UNAMID a viable peacekeeping model for the United Nations to embrace in the future? The first question is answered next.

**8.2.3.1 Did UNAMID meet its mandate?**

To begin answering this question, it needs to be considered that the mandate of UNAMID (and any UN peace operation for that matter) was based on a political decision taken by the UN Security Council. It was determined in *Chapter Three, section 3.3.2.4.2*, that owing to its political origins, the concept of the rule of law is noticeably absent from the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council does not necessarily act in response to a violation of international law. Nonetheless, political
decisions taken by the UN Security Council which are not based on international law, and which may even be in some instances deemed illegal, may still be considered legitimate if such a decision is taken within the confines of the UN Charter and enjoys the support of member states. In this regard, Wolfrum and Röben (2008:191) explained that legitimacy includes legality, morality or a sense of justice. Although ideally these properties should coincide, in practice they may clash and in such cases, something might be deemed illegal but legitimate, or vice versa (Wolfrum and Röben, 2008:191). If it is accepted that the mandate of UNAMID was politically influenced, then there is also a question about its legality and legitimacy. This will be discussed next.

### 8.2.3.1.1 The legality and legitimacy of the mandate of UNAMID

The simplest way to establish if the mandate of UNAMID was legal and legitimate, is to determine the extent of the political influences on the mandate. When these political influences are compared with the normative model of how international peace and security is maintained, any serious deviation from the model would point to possible legal and legitimate infractions. In this regard, it has been established in Chapters Two and Three that the UN Security Council is primarily responsible for maintaining peace and security. This duty and responsibility had been given to the UN Security Council by its member states through the ratification of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council issues resolutions in response to threats to international peace and security after deliberations and reaching consensus among its members. In *Chapter Three, section 3.3.2.4*, it was pointed out that resolutions taken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are advisory rather than binding; subsequently, military missions under Chapter VI would rest on consent by the state in question. Under Chapter VII, however, the UN Security Council may impose measures on states carrying obligatory legal force and therefore does need not to depend on the consent of the states involved. The UN Security Council can also take decisions which are a mixture of the two Chapters, informally referred to as “Chapter VI ½”-resolutions (advisory but with the threat of enforcement). On the basis of the resolution adopted, the mandate of a peace operation is determined. Based on the above, the researcher proposes a normative model which can be depicted as follows (*Figure 8.2*). The
researcher proposes this as the standard normative model which will be brought into line with what happened in the case of UNAMID.

**Figure 8.2:** The normative model for maintaining international peace and security

In comparison, the mandate of UNAMID was set by the UN Security Council through its Resolution 1769 (2007). With regards to the scope of the mandate, Resolution 1769 (2007) referred to agreements between the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (UNSC, 2007a:3). In Chapter Three, section 3.5.2.1, the legal difference with regard to the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state is highlighted. In section 3.5.2.1, it is pointed out that Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act provides unprecedented powers for the African Union to intervene in the internal matters of a member state. By contrast, the United Nations cannot. Stunningly, the mandate of UNAMID incorporated not only
the views of the UN Security Council but also the prior-mediated agreements of both the United Nations and the African Union, which led to the interference by the United Nations in the internal matters of a state.

Furthermore, Resolution 1769 (2007) was issued under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (UNSC, 2007a:5) but in “full respect of the sovereignty” of the GoS (UNSC, 2007a:1). This might appear to be a “Chapter VI ½”-resolution if it was not for the clear contradiction between the wording of the resolution and the fact that the GoS was (an adversarial) party to the conflict. It appears almost as if the UN Security Council was at odds with itself: on the one hand it provided a strongly worded mandate and a clear decision taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to: “protect personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of personnel and humanitarian workers; and support the early and effective implementation of the DPA...”; but on the other hand it added: “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan” (UNSC, 2007a:5). Though Cohen (2007:3) pointed out that this wording weakened the mandate of UNAMID for several reasons (as discussed in Chapter Six, section 6.3.5.2), it also needs to be acknowledged that it impacted on the legitimacy of the mandate. A Chapter VII mandate is straightforward: it is enforceable and carries legal obligations for the state(s) involved. Resolution 1769 (2007) is, however, centred on the consent of the state involved in the conflict in Darfur, which was clearly trying to delay and obstruct the operations of UNAMID in any way it could. This was clearly pointed out in Chapters Four, Five and Six, and also by almost all of the respondents. Respondent F highlighted another contradiction with the mandate of UNAMID. Respondent F pointed out that UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), which set up UNMIS under a Chapter VII mandate, also sanctioned the SRSG of UNMIS to coordinate all activities in Sudan, including Darfur. This is in direct confrontation with the authority and mandate of UNAMID, concluded Respondent F. This seems to be yet another example of the UN Security Council being at odds with itself.

Based on the previous paragraphs, the mandate of UNAMID could be considered to be legal. Its legitimacy, however, comes into question due to the resolution’s reliance
on consent from the GoS. It does not take much to imagine a scenario where the GoS asked UNAMID to leave Darfur just because it did not agree with its approach to ‘protect civilian populations’. A precedent to this had already occurred with the withdrawal of MINURCAT (as discussed in Chapter Six, section 6.4.2). The aforesaid can be illustrated as follows in Figure 8.3 when shown in comparison with the Figure 8.2:

![Figure 8.3: UNAMID: the political influences on the normative model](image)

Furthermore, to contain the situation in Darfur, UNAMID would have had to employ all the peace tools of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ as identified in Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.3, as these aspects are integral to the UN Charter. In Chapter Two, section 2.5, the relationship between violence and peace was brought to light as well as the concept of ‘human security’. In short, in Chapter Two, section 2.5, it was explained
that the absence of violence does not necessarily bring about peace, and that the
tainment of ‘human security’ is not restricted to military matters but also
incorporates political, social, economic and environmental stability and sustainability.
Accordingly, the mandate of UNAMID needed not only to be legal and legitimate but
also effective, incorporating a holistic approach to addressing the conflict in Darfur.

8.2.3.1.2 The effectiveness of the mandate of UNAMID

As discussed in Chapter Six, section 6.3.5, the mandate of UNAMID was combined
into four benchmarks by the UN Secretary-General. These four benchmarks are
discussed in Table 8.2. The discussions in Table 8.2 also incorporate the views of the
respondents where available, show which peace tools (explained in Chapter Two,
section 2.3.2.4) the United Nations used, and indicate if the benchmark was met.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Attributable ‘United Nations Practice’</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining a comprehensive political solution</td>
<td>Achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict, through the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and/or the conclusion of a subsequent comprehensive peace agreement that will ensure that Darfur is adequately represented and participating in the national political process.</td>
<td>To achieve this benchmark, UNAMID conducted peace-support operations such as preventive deployments and diplomatic activities, which focused on peace-making and peace-building (<em>Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4.1</em>).</td>
<td>In <em>Chapter Six, section 6.3.5.1</em>, the UN Secretary-General confidently indicated that there was a breakthrough in negotiations among the different role-players, and that there was a broad agreement between the GoS, LJM and JEM on elements of a comprehensive peace consensus as they pertain to wealth-sharing, compensation and returns, justice and reconciliation, human rights and security arrangements. The UN Secretary-General also acknowledged the role that the people in Darfur (civil society) had to play in the peace process. Peace negotiations were all still ongoing by mid-2011. Respondent C strongly pointed out that the DPA, however, was a failure. Respondent C clarified that it was supposed to have been signed by two rebel movements and the GoS, and in the end it was signed by “half a rebel movement and the GoS”, and therefore its applicability was always very limited. As a result, maintained Respondent C, none of the parties that signed it honoured their commitments. Certainly, continued Respondent C, the GoS did not make the financial and...</td>
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developmental pledges and it certainly did not maintain the moral commitment to stop fighting. As a result, concluded Respondent C, the overwhelming population of Darfur and certainly those in the IDP camps never accepted the DPA as “the credible instrument of change”. Respondent D, J, and K concurred the biggest challenge UNAMID faced was the lack of a comprehensive peace agreement. This affected the implementation of this part of the mandate of UNAMID, believed Respondent J, because there is no peace agreement to implement. Taking the aforementioned opinions into account, it is clear that the DPA was a failure and a new peace agreement was necessary. Limited progress, but some indeed, had been made towards a new peace agreement by at least getting the conflict parties into talks.

| Ensuring a secure and stable environment | UNAMID to contribute to the restoration and upholding of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur, in which civilians, in particular vulnerable | To achieve this benchmark, UNAMID conducted peace-support operations such as preventative deployments and peacekeeping | In Chapter Six, section 6.3.5.2, it was highlighted that UNAMID must implement the DPA as well as protect its personnel and civilians ‘without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan’. The UN Secretary-General felt that progress against this benchmark was “mixed”: on the one hand, regional conflicts stopped (Chad/Sudan), but on the other hand no new ceasefires were reached and fighting between the GoS and | In progress |
groups, are protected and the displaced populations may choose to return to places of origin.

Other peace-support actions included diplomatic activities, such as preventative diplomacy, as well as humanitarian assistance, including electoral assistance (*Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4.1*).

Rebel forces continued to the detriment of the civilian population. Respondent B added that UN staff members were targeted in Darfur and subject to carjacking. Respondent B also indicated, however, that in Darfur businesses were going up, development was taking place, and people felt more secure with UNAMID deployed. Both Respondents D and E felt that the mere presence of (having armed people in uniform) UNAMID in Darfur, curbed the violence. Respondent J emphasised that the role of UNAMID was not to curb the conflict but to protect civilians and diminish the effect of the conflict on civilians. According to Respondent J, the process of implementing the DPA was supposed to curb the conflict in Darfur. Taking the aforementioned opinions into account, it can be deduced that the presence of UNAMID did contribute towards a more secure and stable environment in Darfur and was an ongoing process.

| Enhanced rule of law, governance and human rights in | UNAMID to contribute to the functioning of effective and efficient State institutions, including national and local | To achieve this benchmark, UNAMID conducted peace-support operations such as peacekeeping and | In *Chapter Six, section 6.3.5.3*, it was shown that the human rights situation in Darfur remained a cause for concern, with an increase in alleged arbitrary arrests and detention and several reported incidents involving violations of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression. Furthermore, a state of emergency remained in | No |
Darfur authorities and security and justice institutions, to enforce and maintain the rule of law and govern on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international human rights standards and principles of good governance throughout Darfur.

Diplomatic activities, which included preventative diplomacy (*Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4.1*).

Existence which provided discretionary powers of arrest and detention to the State governors of Darfur without any effective judicial review. The UN Secretary-General believed that progress against this benchmark was “limited”. Respondent K warned that in Darfur, unlike in the usual ‘failed states’ where the United Nations operated, there was a strong government and functional state, with adequate structures in Darfur, Sudan. According to Respondent K, “people often are inclined to forget this aspect of affairs…[its easier in a failed state]…than in a country where you have to seek permission from a government.” In this case, there exists in Darfur, Sudan “a strong government who sometimes does not want you to be there or does not want you to see things”, stated Respondent K. Taking the aforementioned opinions into account and the fact that the GoS was one of the parties to the conflict and accused of being one of the worst human rights abusers, it is unlikely that UNAMID would be able to make a difference and ensure enhanced rule of law, governance and human rights in Darfur as long as the GoS was in power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stabilising the humanitarian</th>
<th>UNAMID to contribute to a stabilised humanitarian</th>
<th>To achieve this benchmark, UNAMID</th>
<th>In <em>Chapter Six, section 6.3.5.4</em>, the UN Secretary-General mentioned that neither major advancement nor regression had</th>
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In progress
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<th>situation</th>
<th>situation in which the humanitarian community has free and unhindered access to populations in need of assistance, and which enables the people in Darfur to live in dignity, gradually reducing their reliance on humanitarian aid through gradually increasing engagement in sustainable livelihood activities; UNAMID to support the lead Agencies with respect to internally displaced persons to allow them to integrate fully into a community of their choice, including through voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return.</th>
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<tr>
<td>conducted peace-support operations such as preventative deployments as part of their peacekeeping operations. Other peace-support actions included diplomatic activities, such as preventative diplomacy, and humanitarian assistance (Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4.1).</td>
<td>been made with regard to this benchmark. On the one hand, IDPs remained displaced, but on the other hand UNAMID and humanitarian workers were able to access most areas affected by fighting. Respondent B did not agree that UNAMID had access to all areas and mentioned that there were a lot of movement restrictions instituted by the GoS which stopped UNAMID from going into certain areas and carrying out its mandate. Furthermore, the GoS insisted that the tactical helicopters could not fly at night, and restricted the issuing of visas to people from certain member countries, argued Respondent B. Respondent F believed UNAMID placed an overwhelming amount of emphasis on this benchmark. Respondent F explained that UNAMID was at its core ‘a police mission’, because they were not monitoring a real ceasefire and failed to provide security. The huge number of IDPs meant that the major impact that UNAMID could have was in helping the humanitarian aid go in and also providing some level of security in IDP camps, established Respondent F. Curiously, stated Respondent F, UNAMID focused so much in its first few years on deployment of resources that deployment itself had been a benchmark for success. This had resulted in the deployment process streaking ahead of the political process,</td>
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concluded Respondent F. Taking the aforementioned opinions into account, it is clear that while obstruction was still experienced from the GoS, UNAMID had made great strides in ensuring access to people in need as well as providing support and security to humanitarian operations. UNAMID has, nonetheless, a long way to go to ‘reduce reliance on humanitarian aid through gradually increasing engagement in sustainable livelihood activities’, or ensuring that IDPs could return to their places of origin.

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<tr>
<th>Table 8.2: The benchmarks of the mandate of UNAMID</th>
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Considering the information in Table 8.2, it can be seen that UNAMID was on its way to meet three of the four benchmarks. One benchmark, ‘Enhanced rule of law, governance and human rights in Darfur’, was not considered to have been met nor as being ‘in progress’. Considered overall, UNAMID was not meeting its mandate. This conclusion matches with the views of the correspondents D, J, and K who in essence stated that a new comprehensive peace agreement was needed to provide a new mandate to UNAMID, especially as the affected parties have changed (the rebel groups were constantly splitting and/or forming new alliances and the incorporation of civil society).

From Table 8.2 under the column headed “Attributable ‘United Nations Practice’”, the different types of United Nations peace tools which UNAMID employed, are listed. Comparing these with all of the peace tools which UNAMID could have used (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4), three things become clear:

i. Firstly, not one of the tools employed was related to ‘peace-enforcement’. This is understandable due to the fact that Resolution 1769 (2007) never prescribed the type of actions (under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter) which UNAMID was allowed to take. Without a clear Chapter VII mandate, UNAMID gravitated towards becoming a peace operation largely focusing on preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance. UNAMID could therefore not enforce any peace. This point should furthermore be seen in conjunction with the second point;

ii. Secondly, the timing of peacebuilding was wrong. In this regard, the DPA was a failure and without a functional, enforceable DPA, UNAMID could not engage in peacebuilding activities to put in place support measures and structures to solidify peace, build trust and facilitate interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4.1). In fact, the conflict was still going on while UNAMID was already engaging in peacebuilding activities which usually only start in the aftermath of a conflict. Another anomaly was apparent one of the parties to the conflict was the very same Government which, under a Chapter VI peace operation,
had to provide permission to UNAMID before any action could be taken. It would be strange to believe that a party to the conflict would allow any actions to be taken that would hamper its own interests in the conflict. As such, UNAMID had great difficulty in making progress with meeting the benchmarks of its mandate; and

iii. Thirdly, the other applicable peace tools which were not used by UNAMID: economic development, international economic equity, and restoring ecological balance (*Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.4*). Economic development of Darfur and the peoples of Darfur, and obtaining international economic equity for Darfur were understandably difficult. Darfur was not an independent state but, of course, part of Sudan. As was highlighted before, the GoS would need to give UNAMID permission to become economically involved. This seems to be unlikely since the GoS was party to the conflict and used all means in its arsenal in fighting the Darfur conflict, including economic austerity in Darfur. Restoring the ecological balance, including environmental sustainability, is simply an omission with no good excuse. Perhaps this showed the lack of planning or the shallow depth thereof, which coincided with the setting of the mandate of UNAMID. In this regard, Respondent G confirmed that UNAMID should build trust among the people in Darfur through not only successfully protecting them, granting humanitarian access, or even extending the security umbrella, but also through ‘recovery and assistance’ programmes which include infrastructure development which in a humanitarian context entails water projects, quick impact projects, road building, railway rehabilitation, and working with financial institutions such as the World Bank to facilitate development in Darfur.

It can be concluded that the mandate of UNAMID was legal, though not legitimate and less than effective. The last section exploring whether UNAMID was an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, reflects the results of the Respondents when asked: “Do you think a hybrid peacekeeping model, involving an equal command structure between the United
Nations and regional organisations, is a viable peacekeeping model for the United Nations to embrace in future?” The results are provided next.

### 8.2.3.2 Is UNAMID a viable peacekeeping model for the United Nations to embrace in the future?

It was decided to replace the word ‘optimal’ in the research objective with the word ‘viable’ in the question posed to the respondents. The reason was that the relational value of ‘optimal’ vis-à-vis ‘viable’ is higher in degree of comparison. When used in the research objective the word ‘optimal’ equates to assessing the hybrid-concept as the best or top degree of peacekeeping model available. To assess how the respondents would rate the hybrid-model, it was decided to first see whether the respondents would consider UNAMID as a workable or ‘viable’ model, and then through some probing questions, assess the responses through their relational values relative to one another. Table 8.3 provides an interpretation of the ratings of the respondents following the interviews. One respondent did not provide an answer to the question. The following ‘scale’ was used to assess the relational values of ‘viable’ and ‘optimal’:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relational value</td>
<td>Least</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Optimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of respondents (n=11)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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**Table 8.3:** The viability and optimality of the hybrid-model

From Table 8.3 it can be seen that eight out of eleven respondents believed the hybrid-model is a viable model though it was by implication considered to be a slightly less than optimal model to be used all the time. This is best described by
Respondent E who stated: “financially the United Nations doesn’t make out from this [UNAMID], there’s nothing saved in this sense; it's still the same costs. As far as in looking at purely on a security level there is not too much gained because it's all our [the United Nations] resources and assets and even with information, so the only thing we [the United Nations] gain is goodwill politically. Now, is the maintenance of good relations, improved relations with regional organisations important? If it is, then it is a model...where the United Nations goes in with a regional partner and then the United Nations withdraws and the regional partner stays – the reverse AMIS.”

Respondent C, however, was less optimistic that the hybrid-model should be repeated and emphasised that UNAMID was a unique model born out of its history and of the ‘sensitivity of the GoS’ towards the United Nations. Respondent C underscored that a regular United Nations peace operation should have been in Darfur from the start but the United Nations had to accept the need for a hybrid operation and had to make the best of the situation. So, taking into account the results of UNAMID (meeting its mandate) and incorporating the views of the respondents in this section - could UNAMID be considered an optimal mechanism to maintain international peace and security for the United Nations?

**8.2.3.3 Conclusion of the research objective: UNAMID as an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security**

It was concluded that the mandate of UNAMID needs to be adjusted or changed, mainly because it was based on a failed peace agreement and political pressure from member states. Therefore, a new comprehensive peace agreement is needed which will provide a new mandate for UNAMID. It was also pointed out that the ‘deployment of UNAMID’ became an overall benchmark which overshadowed the real benchmarks of the mandate of UNAMID. So much emphasis was put on the deployment efforts that the political processes only started to catch up later. The new mandate of UNAMID would have to be a truly Chapter VII-sanctioned mandate independent of any authorisation needed from the GoS. Under such a new mandate, UNAMID should consider using the full range of peace tools at its disposal.
Even though it was clear that UNAMID was not considered to be meeting its mandate fully, respondents were still of the opinion that it is a viable model which should be employed again by the United Nations. Taking into account that in section 8.2.2.3, the hybrid-model was largely restricted to the special political relationship between the African Union and the United Nations, it can be gathered that the United Nations should continue to pursue peace operations with greater involvement from regional organisations, especially the African Union. To determine whether UNAMID as a hybrid model is more effective than a regular United Nations peacekeeping mission, the results are inconclusive as UNAMID is unique. To assess such effectiveness, for instance, it needs to be determined whether a regular peacekeeping mission would have met the benchmarks of a similar mandate where UNAMID had failed or struggled to do so. In such a case, there are many variables which should be taken into account. To successfully answer this question, a similar regular peacekeeping mission operating under similar circumstances would need to be studied. This could be explored in future studies. UNAMID, as it is, is thus not an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to use to maintain international peace and security. As it is, UNAMID comes across as a mid-way model, a politically-correct model aimed to build bridges between the (allegedly) Western-led United Nations and a sceptical, more cohesive Africa. It is a viable model though, with a lot of potential, and with the lessons learnt incorporated in later models, UNAMID could become the pioneering mission which will change United Nations peacekeeping forever. It should be kept in mind, however, as Respondent J concluded, that the highest authority on issues of international peace and security remains the UN Security Council, and even when it is a hybrid operation, it will still have to be under the authority of the UN Security Council. It should be added that it is best to have both a legal and legitimate mandate as well.

The final research objective relates to the lasting effect which the hybrid-model could have on future peace and security efforts of the United Nations in Africa, as well as on the general political support the United Nations may expect to get from the African Union. This will be discussed next.
8.2.4 Research objective: The possible political consequences for future United Nations efforts to maintain international peace and security on the African continent following UNAMID

In Chapter Three, section 3.4.2, it was pointed out that since the 2000s, the United Nations has envisioned a (re-)new(-ed) relationship with regional organisations. It was also pointed out that in Article 52 of the UN Charter, the United Nations intended to utilise regional organisations in support of international peace and security (Chapter Three, section 3.4.1). In this regard, following the creation of the African Union, the UN Secretary-General aimed by means of ‘a ten-year plan’ to enhance its various activities in Africa and its cooperation with the African Union. This renewed attempt by the United Nations to connect with the African Union was favourably met and relations were steadily growing, confirmed Respondent A. Respondent F described the resulting relationship between the two organisations as a “strategic partnership”. In this section, it will be explored whether this strategic relationship provided the United Nations with a better chance to maintain international peace and security in Africa and perhaps to secure political support for other peace operations around the world. The ‘political consequences’ as mentioned in this research objective are thus analysed by identifying (following UNAMID) any anticipated impact on the primary mandate of the UN Security Council to maintain peace and security on the African continent, in-/decreased cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations in terms of maintaining international peace and security.

8.2.4.1 UNAMID: enhancing the role of the United Nations in Africa

According to Respondent A, the African Union had a relatively positive view of the United Nations and experienced the organisation as an important, strategic partner in their efforts to deal with peace and security in Africa, to build African institutions across the board, and in the social and economic aspects of the work of the African Union. According to Respondent F, the most challenging factor in this strategic partnership for the United Nations was on the technical side of the operations. In relation to UNAMID, this included difficulties experienced with the African Union to
keep a timeline on its commitments and the wide range (anywhere from low to high) of skills, qualifications, and experiences found among staff and troops from the African Union, explained Respondent F. This wide range of skills, qualifications, and experiences sometimes strained the relationship between the two organisations as they were not always up to the standard of the requirements set by the United Nations, argued Respondent F. The African Union had, however, “embraced” the processes and procedures of the United Nations which may provide an added advantage in the event that an African Union mission should “transition” into a United Nations operation, underscored Respondent H. Respondent D mentioned that the United Nations was also concerned about the way in which the African Union managed funds, but did not elaborate on exactly what the concerns were.

On the other side, Respondent D and G stated that UNAMID undoubtedly helped towards communication, consultation and cooperation between the two organisations on a practical level. Respondent D clarified the desk officers at the United Nations and the African Union were in daily contact with one another on operational issues which were further facilitated by the establishment of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) based in Addis Ababa (this was also highlighted in Chapter Six, section 6.2.2). Respondent H confirmed that the African Union had learnt a lot of lessons from AMIS and therefore a good and strong operational relationship had been fostered with the United Nations as a result of UNAMID. A few examples of enhanced cooperation between the two organisations were provided by Respondent F:

- Day-to-day conversations were taking place between the United Nations and the African Union on operational issues;
- Mechanisms were set up for joint hiring and for getting troops and police in Darfur; and the
- The United Nations provided support towards the initiatives of the African Union regarding the “Mbeki panel” (officially named the African Union High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki as mentioned in Chapter Six, section 6.3.2.1).
With regard to cooperation on peace and security in Africa, Respondent G mentioned the tripartite meetings which were held every three months involving the African Union, the United Nations and the GoS. These types of meetings had resulted, according to Respondent G, in the exchange of high level dignitaries and new structures in the United Nations designed to deal with the affairs of the African Union, such as the African Union Peace Support Team embedded in the ‘Africa One Division in UN DPKO’ that assisted with liaison with the ASF and “across a broad front” of political activities. Respondent G mentioned that taking into account the variety of issues which the African Union is pursuing and the ambitions of the African Union, UNAMID was paving the way for cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations for AMISOM. In a similar fashion to UNAMID, the United Nations is supporting AMISOM logistically and financially with offices in Nairobi, Kenya; a large contingent in Nairobi; and staff in New York in support of its political operations in Somalia. In the case of AMISOM though, Respondent J accentuated that the African Union had the lead but it was operating under a UN Security Council resolution. Furthermore, no country outside of Africa proposed any troops, confirmed Respondent J. In future studies, AMISOM, although a political mission as opposed to a peacekeeping mission, could be operationally compared with UNAMID to assess the impact on the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security in Africa.

Respondent H pointed to another issue worth mentioning: the fact that a perception existed due to the operation’s overwhelming support coming from the United Nations, that UNAMID was a sole United Nations mission. Respondent J also highlighted this issue and confirmed that most of the operational guidance also came from the United Nations. This was owed, according to Respondent J, to the lack of corresponding supporting structures which the African Union had compared with the United Nations. For instance, the African Union had no judiciary unit, or a unit specialising in security sector reform, and had limited capacity to monitor human rights in Darfur. As a result, maintained Respondent J, the African Union had no choice but to take guidance from the United Nations. This did not result in any exploitation of either organisation, concluded Respondent K, because the African Union used the United Nations for its resources and the United Nations in turn, used
the African Union to be politically accepted by the GoS. When respondents were asked “In your view, has UNAMID increased or decreased cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations?” seven out of the total of 11 respondents confirmed that UNAMID led to improved relations between the two organisations. Improved relations between the two organisations undoubtedly enhanced the role of the United Nations to maintain peace and security on the African continent and UNAMID is a prime example of where the United Nations would have struggled without the support of the African Union.

8.2.4.2 UNAMID: fostering the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations in the international arena

In the second part of this section, it needs to be determined if UNAMID fostered political relations and cooperation in a positive or a negative way between the two organisations in terms of peace and security in general terms, i.e. is the African Union as a result of UNAMID more likely to support, in general, the UN Security Council in terms of the maintenance of international peace and security? Respondent A thought UNAMID did not make much of a difference in this regard. Respondent A confirmed that separately from UNAMID, the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations was already steadily growing and the UN Security Council and its counterpart, the AU PSC, had a yearly dialogue and consulted regularly. Respondent B indicated that the African Union wanted to be affiliated to the United Nations although Respondent A maintained that both organisations should acknowledge that they belong to two different “communities”, and in working together there must be a mutual understanding and greater understanding of another in order for the relationship to work. From Respondent A’s perspective, this was the single main challenge between the two organisations.

Learning how to work together in the political arena and support each other may still need some improvement. For example, Respondent E noted that the issue which caused major differences in opinion between the African Union and the United Nations during the initial stages of UNAMID was the indictment of Al-Bashir by the ICC. Respondent D mentioned that the African Union sent a delegation to discuss the
indictment of Al-Bashir but it did not alter the decision or view of the UN Security Council with regards to the indictment. In chapter six, section 6.3.1.1.1, it was explained that the African Union PSC requested to the UN Security Council to suspend the warrant of arrest by invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute. The UN Security Council refused to do so. Despite different opinions on the indictment, Respondent E indicated that the operations of UNAMID were not affected. Other indications of the African Union’s involvement in international affairs were taking place in Mauritania, Madagascar, and Guinea, where the African Union took a clear position that unconstitutional regime change is unacceptable to the African Union, stated Respondent A. These involvements, however, showed an “evolution in Africa’s political culture” of “moving away from non-interference towards non-indifference” and where “Africa is not waiting for anything from the UN Security Council”, maintained Respondent A. Although it is certain that the African Union would later approach the UN Security Council to get endorsement for their actions, Respondent A indicated that it is inconceivable that “Africa can today simply sit and wait for the UN Security Council” to take action. Respondent A stressed that Africa is determined “to take responsibility for its own destiny, its own problems, and they are just moving ahead, they are not waiting for anybody”. In the same obdurate fashion, Respondent D stated that the United Nations would have intervened in Darfur regardless of the African Union’s support. Considering these responses, perhaps for future political preservation between the two organisations, Respondent A may have hit the nail on the head when s/he stated that mutual understanding and greater understanding of one another is needed for the relationship to (continue to) work. Respondent E emphasised that the principal focus should always be whether the UN Security Council had provided authority for any intervention regardless who holds the power on the ground. For example, operations in Afghanistan in the 2000s were authorised by the UN Security Council but the United Nations never deployed a peace operation themselves.

The final points are made by Respondent H, J and K. They all agree that regional forces may be better placed than the United Nations to respond to an issue affecting international peace and security and that the United Nations should realise the potential of such a “comparative advantage”. By making use of such a “comparative
“advantage”, the United Nations would be in a better position to respond effectively, and this would not “remove anything from the authority or the responsibilities of the United Nations from being the primary institution for maintaining peace and security in the world”, affirmed Respondent J.

Considering the above, it is clear that the United Nations cannot expect unconditional support from or go unchallenged by the African Union. The African Union has a vision for Africa to which the United Nations would have to adapt its strategies. In the international political arena, the African Union is there to stay and the United Nations would need to acknowledge that the African Union represents a shift in the international political power continuum. At its core, it is a “democratic” shift representing the voices of 53 of the 193 member states of the United Nations as well as those of an entire continent. Though the 53 states may be among the ‘weakest’ in the world, together they are stronger. The United Nations would need to use the ‘comparative advantage’ of working with the African Union to realise its primary mandate to maintain international peace and security. This encapsulates the long term effect of UNAMID on the United Nations on its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

8.2.4.3 Conclusion of the research objective: the possible political consequences for future United Nations efforts to maintain international peace and security on the African continent following UNAMID

Given the previous sections, the United Nations could be considered successful in its renewed attempt to foster relations with the African Union in the pursuit of maintaining international peace and security. The African Union has learnt many lessons, both politically and operationally, since its first peacekeeping mission, AMIS. The African Union acknowledged that it did not have the experience and workable institutions (yet) to undertake the maintenance of international peace and security themselves and (still) needed the United Nations in this regard. UNAMID provided the opportunity for the African Union to politically address a problem in their region on the shoulders of the United Nations. UNAMID did indeed bring the two organisations closer together, and required new structures to be set up within the
United Nations to specifically liaise with the African Union. These were all new and positive developments which could not have been foreseen by African states or even by the idealists of the African Union when it was set up.

The United Nations has also benefitted from its relationship with the African Union through UNAMID. The relationship opened daily and structured dialogue with member states in Africa on larger political issues than just those limited to the African continent, such as the pursuit to secure international justice through the ICC. As many member states of the United Nations, such as the United States of America, had not ratified the Rome Statute themselves, the pursuit of the ICC on the African continent also forces all member states belonging to the United Nations to do introspect. The strong stance which the African Union took opposing the indictment of al-Bashir is indicative of the feelings shared among member states of the African Union that international justice needs to be pursued in a fair manner and applicable equally to all.

AMIS showed that the African Union was striving to ensure that it can help itself without waiting for the deeply politically influenced UN Security Council to take action. In the case of Darfur, however, the shortcomings of both the UN Security Council and the African Union became evident. In the 21st century, however, no organisation is powerful enough and no law is comprehensive enough to solve all of the problems of the world. In Darfur, both organisations were confronted with a problem so complex which included so many role-players and implications on their statutes, that neither one of them could solve it alone. The result was UNAMID. (Perhaps inadvertently UNAMID was the greatest contribution to both organisations: a new approach to maintain international peace and security.)

This is the legacy of UNAMID and the impact on the mandate of the United Nations to be the primary maintainer of international peace and security: the United Nations, especially the UN Security Council, will need to transform or else it might become obsolete. It either has to transform to adhere and consistently take both legal and legitimate decisions within the realms of international law, or it needs to accept that member states may look for an alternative source of legality, legitimacy and power to
protect their interests. In the case of the African Union, it was clear that 53-cohesive (though less-powerful) states can become an influential and prevailing entity over 193 less-cohesive states. As the cohesiveness of the member states of the African Union grows and it becomes more politically and operationally effective, it will be less reliant on the international community for solving their problems. UNAMID may be an indication of that future.

8.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study had some methodological limitations, the most notable of which was the relative small number of unique ‘elite’ respondents (N=11), some of whom were interviewed more than once, and/or follow-up electronic correspondence were conducted. Successive interviews allowed deeper perspectives into issues and chances to ask for clarifications where it was needed. The limitation of the relatively small number of interviews are often experienced when dealing with ‘elite’ respondents and was explained in Chapter Seven, section 7.3.3.1. Though this limitation was expected, the researcher was nonetheless confident that a satisfying degree of information saturation was attained. In this regard, the researcher noticed that information obtained from respondents was starting to repeat which allowed him to make certain deductions and inductions relevant to the objectives of the study.

Another limitation was the restricted access of the researcher to the range of ‘elite’ respondents. To explain: the respondents in this thesis were all employees of the United Nations and while they were experts in their fields, including the areas of peacekeeping, UNAMID, African politics, AMIS, the workings of the International as well as National NGOs, and the African Union, it would have added value to the study if respondents working for the African Union were also interviewed. This would have added value not only in terms of a broader range of opinion and information on the topic of the thesis, but also because the researcher came across an abundant amount of frustration among the respondents expressed towards the management of UNAMID. It is not known if officials from the African Union were equally frustrated or in which way the frustration of the respondents influenced the perceptions of the accomplishments of UNAMID. The researcher tried to overcome
this limitation through official and unofficial communication channels but could not confirm an appointment with an African Union official who was involved with UNAMID. There were at least two reasons for this: firstly, the researcher was at the time a United Nations official and the African Union officials might have perceived such efforts as attempts by the researcher to obtain unsolicited information; and secondly, a high African Union staff turnover existed in New York, USA. One United Nations official who liaised with the African Union acknowledged that some African Union staff rotations occur every six months. This made it difficult for the researcher to foster a trusting relationship with African Union officials outside of diplomatic channels. Despite these obstacles, the researcher did manage to interview someone from the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa. This particular office acts as a catalyst and provides support to the UN Secretary-General for development in Africa, especially African Union programmes such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

The third limitation was the researcher’s inability to visit the JSCM based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from where the UNAMID operations were being run or to go to Darfur, Sudan. These visits were not allowed due to the researcher’s work at the time with the United Nations. The fourth and final limitation of the study concerns the scope of the focus of the study. The study focused on UNAMID as a new approach by the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. Though UNAMID was the first truly ‘hybrid’ United Nations peacekeeping endeavour, there were other missions, such as the political mission in Somalia, where the African Union and the United Nations have been working together. It would contribute to the political science field if UNAMID could be compared to such ‘inter-organisational’ peacekeeping operations. This particular limitation of the study was deliberately done so by design, to analyse, describe and evaluate UNAMID from a United Nations perspective. Further studies could thus compare UNAMID with similar peacekeeping models or study it, for instance, from an African Union perspective; some other recommendations for further study are given next.
8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A number of implications for future research are pointed out:

- It is inconclusive whether or not UNAMID as a hybrid model is more effective than a regular United Nations peacekeeping mission, as UNAMID was unique and there was no precedent to compare it to. To assess such effectiveness, for instance, it needs to be determined whether a regular peacekeeping mission would have met the benchmarks of a similar mandate where UNAMID had failed or struggled to do so. Future studies in this regard are expected.

- Research could be conducted into the feasibility of whether or not the United Nations should continue the hybrid-model in the same fashion as UNAMID with an African Union mission or another regional mission developing into a United Nations operation, or conceivably the other way around: a United Nations stabilisation mission developing into a regional organisation-led peace operation.

- A comparison should be made between UNAMID (peacekeeping) and AMISOM (political peace operation) which are in essence both operational partnerships between the United Nations and the African Union; however, AMISOM is not considered to be a ‘hybrid’ mission. Research into the reasons is expected.

- The exact legal requirements for the United Nations to institutionalise hybrid missions have not been established and should be further explored. It could also be explored what the mandatory agreements should be between the United Nations and the regional organisation, in terms of contributions (human and financial), power-sharing, and command and control.

- The legality of the United Nations to support humanitarian operations as Chapter VII-operations through a hybrid model should be further explored. A legislative change may point towards a paradigm shift within the UN Security Council and may require an amendment to the UN Charter.
8.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the results of the empirical study were given. It was determined that the approach of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security through hybrid partnerships with regional organisations (such as the African Union) in peace operations (such as UNAMID), came as a result of the attempt by the UN Security Council to manage an extremely complicated political and humanitarian situation. To manage the situation the UN Security Council took into consideration the demands of both the GoS and the African Union, while it was further subjected to the pressures of the P-5. The end result was a new operational partnership with the African Union which brought about increased peace and security in Darfur.

Holistically speaking, UNAMID did change the approach of the United Nations to maintaining international peace and security but it is uncertain as to whether or not its authority as the primary entity responsible for maintaining international peace and security has diminished as a result. In fact its authority on the African continent had probably increased by showing a willingness to work with the African Union. It is proposed that the UNAMID model, however viable as it stood, was not an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to use to maintain international peace and security because it suffered from numerous internal political inequities and operational inadequacies. The UNAMID model is, nonetheless, an effective political model as it essentially pitted the African Union together with the United Nations against a hostile government. With this kind of support together, even with the weak mandate that it had, UNAMID could politically progress peace efforts effectively. With the lessons learnt, however, it could become a very effective model for the United Nations to use to maintain international peace and security. However, the fundamental lesson of UNAMID is that the approach to maintain international peace and security by the UN Security Council should remain inclusive in order to continue to be relevant, legitimate and effective. If it is not, member states will look for other ways to solve their problems and may create alternative centres of power.