

**THE AU/UN HYBRID PEACE OPERATION IN  
AFRICA – A NEW APPROACH TO MAINTAIN  
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

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
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## DECLARATION

I declare that: “**The AU/UN Hybrid Peace Operation in Africa – a new approach to maintain international peace and security**”, is my own work, that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this thesis was not previously submitted by me or any other person for degree purposes at this or any other university.

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.



Signature

Date

1 October 2011

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*Soli Deo Gloria!*

## ABSTRACT

The perpetual conflict in Darfur, Sudan, which started anew in 2003, had dire humanitarian consequences and threatened international peace and security. The UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, adopted Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007 and authorised a 26 000 person-strong joint African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to take over from AMIS (the African Union peace operation in Darfur). UNAMID was established with dual command and control linked to both the African Union and the United Nations and both organisations would have an equal say in its mandate and operations. Given this unique and unprecedented arrangement between a regional organisation and the United Nations in terms of maintaining international peace and security, the aim of this research was to:

- Understand and describe the political motivations/reasons why the United Nations formed a hybrid peace operation with the African Union;
- Establish in which way the aforementioned impacted on future efforts of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, especially on the African continent; and, based on this,
- To determine whether or not hybrid operations were a viable alternative for the United Nations to maintain international peace and security.

By means of a thorough analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of international peace and security, an assessment of the peace and security architecture of the United Nations and the African Union, an investigation into the origins of the Darfur conflict, an examination of the structure and mandate of UNAMID, and through an empirical investigation, a new theoretical proposition is provided in the conclusion of the thesis. It is concluded that the UNAMID model, in practical terms, is not an optimal mechanism for the United Nations to use to maintain international peace and security because it suffers from numerous internal political inequities and operational inadequacies.

Keywords: African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations peacekeeping, hybrid peacekeeping operation, African Union, Darfur, Sudan, United Nations Resolution 1769 (2007), international peace and security

## SAMEVATTING

Die deurlopende konflik in Darfoer, Soedan, wat opnuut in 2003 begin het, het nypende humanitêre probleme tot gevolg gehad en internasionale vrede en sekuriteit bedreig. Die Verenigde Nasies se Veiligheidsraad, wat primêr daarvoor verantwoordelik is om internasionale vrede en sekuriteit te verseker, aanvaar op 31 Julie 2007 Resolusie 1769 en skep 'n hibriede operasie in Darfoer, wat gesamentlik uit 26 000 mense van die Afrika-Unie en die Verenigde Nasies bestaan (UNAMID), bemagtig om by AMIS (die Afrika-Unie se vredesoperasie in Darfur) oor te neem. UNAMID was daargestel met wedersydse bevel-en-beheer en was tot beide die Afrika-Unie en die Verenigde Nasies verbind, terwyl albei organisasies gelyke insae met betrekking tot sy mandaat en operasies gehad het. In ag genome hierdie unieke en ongehoorde ooreenkoms tussen 'n streeksorganisasie en die Verenigde Nasies in terme van die handhawing van internasionale vrede en sekuriteit, het hierdie navorsing ten doel gehad om:

- die politieke motiverings en redes te verstaan en te beskryf waarom die Verenigde Nasies 'n hibriede vredesoperasie met die Afrika-unie gevorm het;
- vas te stel in watter mate bogenoemde 'n impak op die toekomstige pogings van die Verenigde Nasies sal hê om internasionale vrede en sekuriteit te handhaaf, veral in Afrika; en, daarop gebaseer,
- te bepaal of hibriede operasies 'n lewensvatbare alternatief vir die Verenigde Nasies is om internasionale vrede en sekuriteit te handhaaf.

Deur middel van 'n deeglike analise van die teoretiese onderlegging van internasionale vrede en sekuriteit, 'n assessering van die vrede-en-sekuriteit-argitekture van die Verenigde Nasies en die Afrika-Unie, 'n ondersoek na die oorsprong van die Darfoer-konflik, en 'n beskouing van die struktuur en mandaat van UNAMID is 'n nuwe teoretiese voorstel in die slotsom van die tesis ontwikkel. Daar is egter vasgestel dat die UNAMID-model, in praktiese terme, nie 'n optimale meganisme vir die Verenigde Nasies is om internasionale vrede en sekuriteit te handhaaf nie, omdat dit deurspek is met politieke ongelykhede en operasionele ongenoegsaamhede.

Sleutelwoorde: Hibriede Afrika-Unie/Verenigde Nasies operasie in Darfur (UNAMID), Verenigde Nasies vredesoperasie, hibriede vredesoperasies, Afrika-Unie, Darfoer, Sudan, Verenigde Nasies Resolusie 1769 (2007), internasionale vrede en sekuriteit.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

In articles and other publications, acronyms are readily substituted for the full description of an entity and/or an organisation. The acronym itself becomes almost as popular as the name or description itself, and sometimes even supersedes it. For instance, the ‘United Nations’ is readily referred to as the ‘UN’; despite the fact that the United Nations requires that the words “United Nations” never be abbreviated (DGAACS, 2000:40). Throughout this thesis, the ‘United Nations’ is always written in full, as is also the case with ‘African Union’. The only times that the acronyms or abbreviations ‘UN’ or ‘AU’ are used respectively, occur when they denote association. Accordingly, the General Assembly of the United Nations is referred to as the UN General Assembly and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union is referred to as the AU PSC. Below are acronyms which are used throughout the thesis. They are always written in full when first mentioned, but this list serves as an easy reference.

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AIDS/HIV	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome/ Human Immunodeficiency Virus
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU PRC	African Union Permanent Representatives Committee
AU PSC Protocol	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
AU	African Union
AUPD	African Union High Level Panel on Darfur
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic



CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFC	Ceasefire Commission (in Darfur)
CNT	Chadian National Concord (political party in Chad)
Common Defence Pact	African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (of Sudan)
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DDDC	Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
DIF/A	Darfur Independence Front/Army (Rebel group in Darfur)
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force
DJAM	Darfur Joint Assessment Mission
DLF	Darfur Liberations Front (in Darfur)
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPAIU	DPA Implementation Unit (in Darfur)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (of Sudan)
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force (in Chad)
FUCD	United Front for Democratic Change (in Chad)
G19	Group of 19 (SLM/A splinter rebel group )
GNU	Government of National Unity (in Sudan)
GoC	Government of Chad
GoE	Government of Eritrea
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
GSLM	Great Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM/A splinter rebel group)

GUNT	National Union Transition Government (in Chad (1979))
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICSS	Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
ILC	International Law Commission
INC	Interim National Constitution (of Sudan (2005))
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JEM-CL	JEM-Collective Leadership (Rebel group in Darfur)
JEM-FRC	JEM-Field Revolutionary Command (Rebel group in Darfur)
JEM-WFP	JEM-Wing for Peace (Rebel group in Darfur)
JSCM	Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (between the African Union and the United Nations)
LAS	League of Arab States
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement (rebel group in Darfur)
MDJT	Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad
MILOBS	Military Observers (in Darfur)
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCP	National Congress Party (of Sudan)
NCRC	National Constitutional Review Commission (for Sudan)
NDA	National Democratic Alliance (of Sudan)
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NIF	National Islamic Front (of Sudan)
NMRD	National Movement for Reform and Development (Rebel group in Darfur)
NPC	National Petroleum Commission (in South Sudan)
NRF	National Redemption Front (SLM/A splinter rebel group)
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P-5	Five permanent members of the UN Security Council
PCP	Popular Congress Party (of Sudan)
PDF	People's Defence Forces (of the GoS)
PNC	Popular National Congress (of Sudan)
PSD	(African Union) Peace and Security Department
PTC	Pre-Trial Chamber (of the ICC)
RaFD	Rally of Democratic Forces (political party in Chad)
RaFD	Rally of Democratic Forces (in Chad)
RBB	Results-Based Budgeting (system)

RCC	Revolutionary Command Council (in Sudan)
RDL	Rally for Democracy and Liberty (in Chad)
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SCCED	Special Criminal Courts on the Events in Darfur
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SFDA	Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (political alliance in Darfur)
SLM/A	Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army
SLM/AS	SLM/A splinter rebel group under the leadership of Ahmed Abdel Shafie
SLM/AW	SLM/A splinter rebel group under the leadership of Abdel Wahid al-Nur
SLM/Free Will	Sudan Liberation Movement/Free Will (SLM/A splinter rebel group)
SLM/Khamis	SLM/A splinter rebel group under the leadership of Khamis Abdalla Abakar
SLM/MM	SLM/A splinter rebel group under the leadership of Mini Minnawi
SLM/Unity	Sudan Liberation Movement/Unity (SLM/A splinter rebel group)
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement (between UNAMID and the GoS)
SPLM/A	Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army
SRSR	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (of the United Nations)
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
UFDD	Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (political party in Chad)
UFDD-F	UFDD-Fundamental (political party in Chad)

UFR	Union des Forces de la Résistance/Union of the Forces of Resistance (in Chad)
UK	United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
UN Charter	(The) Charter of the United Nations
UN DPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UN DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UN Security Council	United Nations Security Council
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ	UN Headquarters
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
UP	Umma Party (of Sudan)
USA	United States of America
USG DPKO	UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction