Governance, ‘sovereignty-state-territory triad’, human population migration and xenophobia in (South) Africa

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Abstract

This article seeks to examine the association of the concept of governance of international relations and, by implication, human population migration, through the rigid practices of “sovereignty-state-territory triad” with the fomentation and exacerbation of societal stereotypes, attitudes and perceptions of xenophobia in Africa, in general, and South Africa, in particular. Ascriptions of the majority of population migration as “international” affirms the centrality of the operationalisation of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” in understanding the fragmentary constructions of societal attitudes and perceptions of people resident in distinct geopolitical entities ascribed as national territories. State and non-state governance entrapments with this triad perpetuate societal stereotypes that are in concurrence with bordered-territories where populations described as citizens are stimulated to protect endowments and resources of the land against the perceived destruction associated with the conduct of the out-groups. Unsurprisingly, the theorisation of human population migration has equally been intricately involved with environmental conservation and securitisation of biodiversity that enables land dispossess of the vulnerable sections of the population through the Western economic narratives of “Peace Parks”. Simultaneously in Southern Africa, the concept of African Renaissance, inescapably embedded with “cooperation and conflict” at all scales, has offered a buzzword to be realised through “Peace Parks” that have evidently failed to deliver reaffirmation of African cultures, continental emancipation and democratisation. The preeminence of societal stereotypes, attitudes and perceptions of xenophobia and violent abuses of African immigrants in South Africa provides vivid illustrations of the inconsistencies and non-linearity of concepts such as African Renaissance and “Peace Parks”. This article asserts that measures for repairing the landscapes of xenophobia among Africans, especially in South Africa, will remain pipedreams if they are not embedded with adaptive governance designed to undermine the rigidities of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”, prevalent in the international relations.

Keywords: migration, governance, sovereignty, state, territory, African Renaissance, xenophobia, Africa

Introduction

The character of international relations itself, based on the socio-political boundaries, is responsible for the fragmentary “bordering, ordering and othering” of the world population with attendant disputes, conflicts and nationalistic xenophobia (van Houtum & van

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Naerssen, 2002; Paasi, 2005; Moilanen & Arponen, 2011; Dallimer & Strange, 2015). The socio-political partitioning of the world has created administrative, ownership and management landscapes with fragmentary governance of habitats and change thereof, inclusive of that for human population and its migratory tendencies (Dallimer & Strange, 2015; Kark et al., 2015). Therefore, international socio-political borders influence the management of populations and their migration, which are themselves further subjected to “different governance structures, political priorities, and societal attitudes on either side of the boundary” (Dallimer & Strange, 2015: 133). These impositions of “lines of separation” are more than just “physical barriers that are demarked by legal, institutional, and social processes”; instead, they define geopolitical entities that “delineate the limits of decision-making processes” (Dallimer & Strange, 2015: 132) with realistic potential to determine human survival, security, insecurity, enjoyment of peace or sufferance of wars. In a similar manner as for all other animals, human population habitat and migration are affected by these socially constructed boundaries and geopolitical entities. For these reasons, “international migration can and should be managed” rather than being halted (Balbo & Marconi, 2006: 708) along the existing “sovereignty-state-territory” relation (Lunstrum, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015).

This article argues that the monocentric governance of population habitat and international migration along existing socio-political boundaries is fundamental to understanding the constructions of xenophobic attitudes and perceptions along national divides. Whereas it may be easier to unravel the causes of xenophobia associated with the recent and ongoing drift of Africans into Europe, the locus for the fatal versions experienced in (South) Africa is to be located in the hegemonic governance of population habitat and migration landscapes through the rigidities of the “sovereignty-state-territory” triad, as conceptualised by Lunstrum (2013, 2014). To this extent, this article seeks to place into sharp focus the contrasting “dual forces of localisation and transnationalisation” (Wittmayer & Buscher, 2010: 763) that are precipitated by the ascendancy of processes of globalisation. Human population migration is a longstanding phenomenon that cannot be halted or reversed, given the intensification of the processes of globalisation; instead, its persistent as well as the attendant challenges entail a corresponding shift from monocentric to adaptive governance. However, transition in governance is itself beset with conceptual, philosophical and ideological complexities (Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Kark et al., 2015; Tsheola & Nembambula, 2015). Given the global reverence for the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”, international relations governance continues to be embroiled in intractable contestations (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Kark et al., 2015; Tsheola & Nembambula, 2015). But governance competency (Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Kark et al., 2015), notwithstanding the potential for reinforcing the geopolitics of “bordering, ordering and othering”, is central to successful management of population migration for stability and peace without undermining territorial integrity and de jure sovereignty of states.

Furthermore, this article asserts that the practice of the concept of African Renaissance, which is assumed to resides on five cornerstones of “regional cooperation”, “emancipation”, “revaluation of African cultures”, “sustainable economic development” and “democratisation”, is intricately embedded with the coexistence of cooperation and conflict (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 11). The ongoing violent abuses against African immigrants in a democratic South Africa is a vivid demonstration of the depth of society’s xenophobic attitudes, which are evidently informed by the perceived understanding of the fragmentary governance based on the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015).
Hence, the popularity of African Renaissance notwithstanding, especially as peddled by South Africa’s political elite, heightened xenophobic attitudes and violent abuses of African immigrants is perpetrated by socio-economically poor, former victims of the apartheid regime, amidst constitutional multiculturalism, respect for human rights, inclusivity, emancipation and democratisation. This perpetration of violent xenophobic abuses against African immigrants is an ingrained paradox of the African Renaissance cornerstones of revaluation of African cultures, emancipation and democratisation.

The next section draws from Pereira & Ruysenaar’s (2012), Lunstrum’s (2013, 2014) and Kark et al.’s (2015) analyses of the concepts of state sovereignty and territory in order to theorise their manifestations in monocentric governance of geopolitical entities for xenophobic societal attitudes and perceptions, especially in (South) Africa. Thereafter, the article discusses the embeddedness of African Renaissance with contradictions, conflict, cooperation and dilemmas that make for coexistence of the collectivism of pan-Africanism “revaluation of African cultures” with the fragmentary modern globalist neoliberalism (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Lunstrum, 2013, 2014, Devine, 2014, Duffy, 2014).

Subsequently, the fourth section uses governance and securitisation of environmental conservation in “Peace Parks” to distil the potential for orchestrating societal xenophobic tendencies along nationally-bordered worlds. The conclusion recommends that measures for redress of xenophobic tendencies associated with international migration would remain ineffective if they are not couched with tactics to undermine the rigidities of the “sovereignty-state-territory” relations-based governance of the socio-politically bounded worlds, especially in Southern Africa.

Theorisation of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” governance for xenophobia

Following Graham, Amos & Plumptre (2003: ii), Thondhlana, Shackleton & Blignaut (2015: 122) define governance as “the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say”. To this extent, governance “processes and structures” involve institutional mechanisms such as contracts, networks, policies, cultural practices, legislation and rules as well as regulations, agreements, constitutions, values and social practices that structure socio-political interactions, mediate access to and control over natural resources through negotiated permission or prohibition, reflective of vested interests of state and non-state actors (Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Kark, Tulloch, Gordon, Mazor, Bunnefeld & Levin, 2015; Thondhlana et al., 2015). The world is territorially fragmented into socio-political boundaries, epitomising landscapes of ownership, governance and management and, in return, shaping societal attitudes and perceptions of people on either side of the border (Lunstrum, 2013; Dallimer & Strange, 2015). Iossifova (2013: 1) and Dallimer & Strange (2015: 132) concur that “socio-political boundaries pervade many aspects of society at multiple spatial scales from local … to global”. Societies have traditionally used social construction of territory into geopolitical entities to delineate governance of ownership and “the limits of decision-making processes” almost always along social, economic, political and/or cultural identities (Dallimer & Strange, 2015: 132). Territorially defined, geopolitical entities “are subject to different governance structures, political priorities, and societal attitudes on either side of the boundary” (Dallimer & Strange, 2015: 132). The net effect of international geopolitics on societal stereotypes, xenophobic attitudes and perceptions cannot be neutral because socio-political boundaries govern landscape administration, ownership, natural resources access and human population habitation. With such a fragmentation of geopolitical entities for governance of ownership, administration and management of
resources use and human habitat, the likelihood for tensions and conflict among parties sharing socio-political boundaries is realistic.

The present world is governed through an interstate system wherein legality and illegality of control over natural resources is governed through law, rules, norms and conventions that are predicated upon landscapes of multiple sovereignty and fragmentary territorial jurisdictions (Mackleworth, Holcer & Lazar, 2013; Milgroom, Giller & Leeuwis, 2014; Kark et al., 2015; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). For this reason, “border disputes between neighbouring States are a regular occurrence” with “the potential to undermine relations at national, regional, local and even individual level” (Mackleworth et al., 2013: 112). This spatial socialisation is globally prevalent and engraved into the everyday experiences of life through the socio-political boundaries, as the primary instruments of its implementation. Hence, international relations governance is intricately bound with “debates on national sovereignty” and poverty redress (Wolmer, 2003: 261). Notwithstanding its prevalence and massive impact on world population and the rest of the biodiversity, the triad of “sovereignty-state-territory” (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015) does not necessarily “build confidence, trust, and friendly relations between parties” on both sides of the socio-political boundaries (Vasilijevic & Pezold, 2011 cited in Barquet, Lujala & Rød, 2014: 3). The significance of understanding bordered-territories for nation-states in the theorisation of the causes of xenophobia resides in the conceptualisation of borders as more than just physical barriers because they “exist both in space and mind” (Chaderopa, 2013: 50). Therefore, spatial socialisation is crucial to the construction of “trust, social capital and intercultural awareness” that “encourage crossborder communities to exhibit approach rather than avoidance behavior towards each other” (Chaderopa, 2013: 50). In this context, the propensity for immigrants to remain distinctly transnational in identity, culture and language could be escaped, with the result that integration and, perhaps, assimilation presents realistic options that dampen the negative societal xenophobic stereotypes, perceptions and attitudes. However, spatial socialisation is impaired by the hegemonic governance of international migration and access to resources along the globalist modernity of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”, which is not amenable to constructions of trust and intercultural awareness.

The concept of sovereignty has multiple, inconsistent and heterogenous meanings and practices, including the following four: “the ability of states to control movement across their borders” (interdependence sovereignty); the internal state authority structures and their ability “to effectively regulate behavior” (domestic sovereignty); the “exclusion of external sources of authority” (Vattelian or Westphalian sovereignty); and, the “international legal sovereignty”, which involves “mutual recognition” (Krasner, 2001: 19-21 cited in Lunstrum, 2013: 3). In practice, sovereignty comprises of different and inconsistent “powers with different targets, ranging from excluding foreign influence to maintaining internal order” (Lunstrum, 2013: 3). For this reason, sovereignty has been overwhelmingly conceived as “territorial and exercised by central state authorities”, prescribing the “sovereignty-state-territory relation” (Agniew, 2005 cited in Lunstrum, 2013: 3). In practice, though, sovereignty does not operate along territorially tightly-bounded spaces (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015; Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014). Sovereignty is in reality “an articulation-in-motion” because it is an endlessly incomplete project, contingent upon actors’ interests, sets of laws and discourses, constant negotiations and reconsolidation as well as power inequities (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015; Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014). However, the present governance of international relations is predicated upon the hegemonic “sovereignty-state-territory triad”, framed out of a juridical conception which does not account for the reality of “messier and
less containable” state “ability to exercise power”, captured in the notion of “de facto or effective sovereignty” (Lunstrum, 2013: 3). As Lunstrum (2013: 3) puts it, “mainstream international relations literature” support “a legal concept, or de jure sovereignty” wherein the state enjoys “unlimited and indivisible rule over its territory”. The “sovereignty-state-territory triad” is accepted wisdom in the governance of international relations of the modern, ironically, “borderless” globalist world. It is this governance character of international relations that explains the predominance of fragmentary “bordering, ordering and othering” of the world population and territory.

The concept of governance involves institutions, processes, rules and norms that guide the exercise of authority and decision-making by both state and non-state actors (Termeer et al., 2010; Kok & Veldkamp, 2011; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Thondhlan et al., 2015). Literature proposes three broad approaches to governance, viz.: monocentric, multilevel and adaptive. Whilst the monocentric approach places the state at the centre of political power and authority for the exercise of control over society, economy and resources, multilevel approach prescribes for dispersion and devolution of authority as a precursor of continuous interactions among state and non-state actors at all levels of the exercise of policy and administration in pursuit of collective goals (Termeer et al., 2010; Kok & Veldkamp, 2011; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Kark et al., 2015). Multilevel governance is thought to be superior to monocentric approaches but virtually impracticable because of the predominance of international relations founded on the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”. On the assumption that the world consists of continuous and unpredictable changes, adaptive governance is portrayed as the ideal approach because of its emphasis on the improvement of policies and practices in the process of learning from ongoing implementation (Termeer et al., 2010; Kok & Veldkamp, 2011; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Kark et al., 2015). Just like multilevel governance, adaptive approach is incompatible with the matrices of the present frameworks of interstate-reliant international relations and the hegemonic “sovereignty-state-territory triad”. To this extent, monocentric governance has continued to be prevalent and predominant within globalist modernity, enforcing the endurance of transnational identities, cultures, languages, values and such other ethnic features among immigrants groups, distinct from the local societies.

Human population migration too is subjected to this heavily fragmented landscape of ownership, governance and management. At the beginning of the 21st century, over 175 to 200 million people were reported to be international migrants; and, about 16.3 million thereof occurred in Africa (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Gigaba, 2006; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014). International human population migration will persist along with consonant political, social, cultural and economic controversies of globalist modernity (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; de Haas, 2006; Gigaba, 2006; Heilmann, 2006; Neumayer, 2006; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014) wherein “technological, social, demographic and political advances” perpetuate obscene and pervasive inequalities and abuses (Moses & Letnes, 2004: 1611). There are two competing paradigms that explain the origin and evolution of migration systems: the neo-classical economics and the world-systems perspective (de Haas, 2006; Heilmann, 2006; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014). Broadly, there is agreement that global restructuring creates and reinforces “patterns of socio-economic polarisation and spatial segregation” associated with large-scale international migration (de Haas, 2006; Heilmann, 2006; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014). Evidently, migrants’ motives are dominated by “both income and non-income factors, including ownership of businesses and houses,” “superior working conditions”, “close relatives overseas” (Brown & Connell, 2004: 2193) as well as issues of
security, conflict, cooperation, insecurity and peace (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Masse & Lunstrum, 2015). Forced international migration too tends to hide undertones of frustrated development at home and the stark inequities in global distribution of opportunities (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014), closely linked to the dynamics of the socio-political and economic world order geopolitics. To this extent, international migration is embedded with the geopolitics of globalisation, identity and cultural differences that often result in discriminatory reactions, socio-economic exclusions and violent abuses within localities (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014). In (Southern) Africa, attempts were made to ensure that international migration is not met with deleterious consequences within localities through the concepts such as African Renaissance and “Peace Parks”, which have however become buzzwords with multiple and inconsistent meanings and practices (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Martin et al., 2011).

Overwhelmingly, literature on the nexus of international migration and development portrays this relationship “as transnational dynamics that both cement and complicate” global geopolitical relations (Wittmayer & Buscher, 2010: 763). Importantly, the international migration-development dynamics “articulate with, shape and are being shaped by ‘the local’”, with the effect that a variety of “conflictual situations” place the “ethnographic spotlight on the ways in which ‘local people’’ deal with the contestations of the “dual forces of localisation and transnationalisation” (Wittmayer & Buscher, 2010: 763). Whereas the imperatives of flexibility are apparent in these scenarios, the universally accepted wisdom and norms invoke pursuit of monocentric governance and rigidities of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”. The latter is reliant on socio-political boundaries, from which it has remained virtually unimaginable how governance of international migration could be extricated. By their nature, socio-political boundaries accentuate territorially defined geopolitical rigidities of identities, cultures, languages and such other ethnic features along which xenophobic stereotypes and tendencies are commonly constructed.

Indeed, international migration is “inevitable” and “a manifestly” complex dynamic phenomenon with the potential to precipitate conflict and controversies due to the multiple actors and interests at play, inclusive of those of individuals, institutions, legal, illegal, public and private entities. However, the notion that it is a “security issue” and “permanent” has encouraged adoption of “highly restrictive” national laws (Balbo & Marconi, 2006: 710, 711, 715) as well as characterisations through securitisation of in-groups against immigrant out-groups. As a result, governance of international migration is universally conceived along the rigidities of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”, rendering the denial of access to citizenship rights a perfectly acceptable practice (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Mackleworth et al., 2013; Massé & Lustrum, 2015). Thus, governance structures for international migration allow for constructions of xenophobic stereotypes, attitudes and perceptions through parameters and frameworks of the in-groups versus the out-groups (Martin et al., 2011; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014).

According to Balbo & Marconi (2006: 712), international “migration strengthens non-civic identities and reinforces both a condition and a sense of marginalisation up to the point of exclusion”. Through such “non-civic identities”, immigrants too engage in a process of self-exclusion from the local host society, because the converse, which is integration, relies heavily on “command of the local language”, affiliation to values and life styles, “legal status”, participation in civic and political affairs as well as access to socio-political and economic
services (Balbo & Marconi, 2006: 712). These challenges entail a complex process wherein immigrants become “determinational groups which owe allegiance to no single space but operate in transnational space with identities of their own” (Skeldon, 2001 cited in Balbo & Marconi, 2006: 712). This character makes possible, sustained constructions of distorted images and stereotypes about the immigrant out-groups, which feeds out of the overarching governance of international relations along the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”. African immigrants in South Africa appear to have largely opted for “strengthening their own identity”, which is unique in terms of the transnationality of behavior and cultural practices (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014). In this way, culture, language, values and such other ethnic features of immigrant groups remain distinctly different from those of the local society, without necessarily keeping the original form of the homeland country, thereby accentuating cultural diversity that impairs the necessary integration. Besides, the notion that international migration is not permanent perpetrate societal perception of plunder of their lands and resources in the context of the hegemonic universal official preoccupation with governance founded on the frameworks of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad”. Given the absence of “multicultural tradition” and assimilation as well as spatial agglomeration of African immigrants in South Africa’s marginalised economic sectors, characterisation as “out-groups” has tended to reproduce anxiety, fear and collective perception of threat among the locals (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014) amidst hyperbolic sentiments of African Renaissance and “Peace Parks”.

**African Renaissance: Embeddedness of cooperation with conflict**

Martin et al. (2011) asset that conflict can coexist with cooperation and, sometimes, with worst forms of state and/or non-state violence. Post-1990 Southern African geopolitics, container-concepts such as African Renaissance and “Peace Parks” presented convenient buzzwords for securitisation narratives to reinforce polarisation, conflict and violent rationales. Van Amerom & Buscher’s (2005) analysis of the concept of African Renaissance reveals inherent complexities and inconsistencies that highlight non-neutrality of this container-concept in the constructions of new South Africanism’s xenophobic stereotypes against African immigrants. Recent conceptions of African Renaissance, led by a democratic South Africa’s political elite, were “all-embracing”, with its hegemonic globalist interpretation founded on Western economic paradigms of “privatisation, free trade, private land ownership and the commercialisation of conservation” (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 10). Equally, the “Peace Parks” rationale has itself insinuated that ideals of African Renaissance could be realised through securitisation of conservation that enables capital accumulation (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). That is, “Peace Parks” enable capital accumulation by securitisation of profitable wildlife conservation, facilitated through the dispossession of the lands of the most vulnerable groups of the population. Rather than enforce African Renaissance, the establishment of “Peace Parks” consolidates de jure sovereignty, which promotes socio-political boundary fragmentation and geopolitics.

As a “philosophical” and “ideological umbrella”, the concept of African Renaissance was vigorously championed and promoted by South Africa’s former President Mbeki, in order to agitate for “African solutions for African problems” (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 2). However, this concept has been elusive and its pragmatic effect has been mixed and inconsistent, notwithstanding the suggestion that it was inspired by the “vision of pan-Africanism” and “the dream of a united Africa” (Landsberg & Hlophe, 1999 cited in van...
Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 3). Attempts to realise the African Renaissance vision through “Peace Parks” in Southern Africa have in practice involved “re-territorialisation of sovereignty” wherein capital accumulation, as originally conceived through Western economic philosophy, is contingent upon securitisation of wildlife conservation (Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). According to Maloka (2000 cited in van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 4), African Renaissance has, in its post-1990s conception, “become a popular buzzword, used opportunistically by many different actors in both public and private realms, especially in South Africa”. Whereas the hype has now dissipated, African Renaissance has virtually become “a container-concept, in which everything fits, effectively losing all meaning”; and, South Africa’s lead thereof is tacitly married to the “dominant Western narratives such a liberalisation, privatisation and stabilisation”, associated with modernist globalist perspectives (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 5). Hence, pursuit of the African Renaissance through “Peace Parks” enables its practice through the ironic Western economic narratives of capital accumulation and securitisation of wildlife conservation, which do not reinforce reaffirmation of African cultures, emancipation or nascent democratisation (Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). Vale & Maseko (1998 cited in van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 5) insisted that, far from the hegemonic globalist perspective, an Africanist interpretation of African Renaissance is necessary wherein emphasis is placed on “African identity and culture”, with the future of the continent in its own hands, “making use of the wealth of knowledge” possessed by Africans rather than reliance on “Western notions of progress or civilisation”. Conversely, capital accumulation through securitisation of conservation in Southern Africa has always provoked land dispossession of the most vulnerable sections of the population, thereby reinforcing an antithesis of emancipation and sustainable economic development, two of the cornerstones of African Renaissance (Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015).

Evidently, African Renaissance is an inherently politically value-laden concept and practice. As Landsberg & Hlophe (1999: 1 cited in van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 5) posit, a democratic South Africa appears to have sought to usurp ownership of a nuance conception of African Renaissance as its “foreign policy doctrine” that it would operationalise to serve elitist self-interests “in a set of political, social and economic relations”. Van Amerom & Buscher (2005: 5) argue that South Africa had “a greater edge” and “upper hand in operationalising the African Renaissance” vision, which has however created pressures for a balancing-act governance because of the discrepancies of interests of the domestic constituencies with those of other parts of Africa. Hence, framing African Renaissance through “Peace Parks” invoked depoliticisation of land dispossession of the poor people whilst simultaneously enabling capital accumulation by securitisation of wildlife conservation, thereby setting up nuance power relations that re-territorialise sovereignty (Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). Equally, “Peace Parks” is a deeply geopolitical wildlife conservation narrative and practice.

According to van Amerom & Buscher (2005: 11), African Renaissance consists of five cornerstones: “regional cooperation”; “emancipation”; “revaluation of African cultures”; “sustainable economic development”; and, “democratisation”, to which “Peace Parks” in Southern Africa are supposed to contribute. To this extent, “Peace Parks” have been variously “designated as an important vehicle to stimulate an African Renaissance” (van Amerom &
The effect of re-territorialising sovereignty through “Peace Parks” is to perpetuate the fragmentation of landscapes into geopolitical entities, rather than reinforcing regional cooperation or integration, through land dispossession of the poor in order to enable capital accumulation by securitisation. Land dispossession of the poor based on wildlife conservation security logic and enabling of capital accumulation through the usual Western economic narratives are a far cry from reaffirmation of African cultures, emancipation, democratisation and/or sustainable economic development for Africa. The next section highlights inconsistencies of “Peace Parks” as well as implications for societal xenophobic stereotypes, attitudes and perceptions, by drawing anecdotal illustrations from the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.

“Peace Parks”: Governance, securitization, environmental conservation and xenophobia

According to Martin et al. (2011: 624), citing from Sine (1997), the “underlying contention is that the institutionalisation of international resource governance cooperation can lead to the establishment or strengthening of international friendship”. Increasingly, insight into the relationship of environmental conservation and securitisation narratives suggests that the establishment of “Peace Parks” to enable capital accumulation provokes land dispossession of the vulnerable sections of the population, creating nuance geopolitical entities that re-territorialise sovereignty in ways that embed cooperation with conflict, inclusive of xenophobic violence (Martin et al., 2011; Kaszynska, Cent, Jurczak & Szymanska, 2012; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). It has also been established that securitisation of environmental conservation to enable capital accumulation can potentially obscure the actual political agendas and ambitions of economic liberalisation and commodification of wildlife that provoke deeper entrenchment of pauperisation of vulnerable sections of the population through land dispossession (Wolmer, 2003; van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Martin et al., 2011; Kark et al., 2015). Indeed, the politics of “Peace Parks” in the context of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” and the geopolitical entities, are non-linear, inconsistent and complex as they increase cooperation simultaneously as they exacerbate old conflicts and create new ones, especially among local people on either side of the borderland conservancies (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Martin et al., 2011; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). This observation is particularly relevant for South Africa “where ideologically-laden concepts such as regional integration, democratisation, the African Renaissance, and peacebuilding go hand in hand with the establishment of transboundary protected areas” (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 9; Martin et al., 2011: 623-624) as well as coexistence of constitutional and human rights culture, respect for multiculturalism and inclusivity with fatalistic xenophobia against African immigrants (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014). In essence, “Peace Parks” have become geopolitical entities for the coexistence of cooperation and conflict, sometimes with violent abuses, notwithstanding the ecological, economic, political and security narratives.

The majority of developing countries, especially in Southern Africa, have experienced political unrest and colonialism which created enduring conflicts in the governance of natural capital (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; King, 2009; Watts & Faasen, 2009; Dahlberg, Rohde & Sandell, 2010; Kark et al., 2015; Scheba & Mustalahti, 2015). Current conservation practices in Africa have remained inherently colonialis
conflicts and brewing new ones in the governance of natural capital in borderlands (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Torri, 2011; Kaszynska et al., 2012; Kark et al., 2015), thereby frustrating the potential for spatial socialisation of local communities on both sides of the socio-political boundaries. Thus, the notion of African Renaissance and the revaluation of African cultures has equally been a quest for borderless natural landscapes of biomass, creating bioregions for international security and peace (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Pool, 2006; Barquet et al., 2014; Kark et al., 2015). But acceptance of the notion of internationalisation is itself an admission of the separation imposed by geopolitical boundaries on the landscapes of habitats and migration.

Barquet et al. (2014) state that the adoption of the phrase “Peace Parks” in Africa provides evidence of the transformation intent expressed in the notion of African Renaissance, which is driven through a pan-African vision of reuniting a continent artificially divided by colonial powers. The popularity of the concept of “Peace Parks” in the mid-1990s and its enforced connection to African Renaissance gave a false impression of being African in origin (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Muzeza, Schuttle & Snyman, 2013; Kark et al., 2015; Sibanda, 2015). As Barquet et al., (2014) puts it, “Peace Parks” are commonly presented as initiatives for resolution of border disputes, alleviation of political tensions and facilitation of cooperation between neighbouring states. Whereas Southern Africa too had jumped onto the bandwagon of “Peace Parks” (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; King, 2009; Rusinga & Mapira, 2012; Barquet et al., 2014; Kark et al., 2015), persistence of conflicts and absence of spatial socialisation of parties on both sides of the geopolitical boundaries for peace and security has meant that the African Renaissance dream of revaluation of African cultures has remained unattainable.

Paradoxically, post-apartheid South Africa has championed the establishment of “Peace Parks” in Southern Africa in the endeavor to improve on relations with neighboring states and in the hope of creating foundations for spatial socialisation of local communities on both sides of the socio-political boundaries (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Pool, 2006; Rusinga & Mapira, 2012; Barquet et al., 2014; Kark et al., 2015). Indeed, the attainment of international cooperation, security and peace became primate for post-apartheid South Africa, wherein cross-border interactions would precipitate the idealised “pan-Africanism” and the African Renaissance vision (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 1). In practice, the interface of African Renaissance, through revaluation of African cultures, emancipation, democratisation, socio-economic development and regional cooperation, with peace and security in “Peace Parks” remains scarcely realistic (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Pool, 2006; Rusinga & Mapira, 2012; Schoon, 2013; Sibanda, 2015). Van Amerom & Buscher (2005: 1) argue that in reality the establishment of “Peace Parks” has hardly stimulated regional cooperation and, by implication, African Renaissance, because of the continued “domination of national interests” as well as the “sensitive border issues such as the illegal flows of goods and migrants between South Africa and neighbouring countries”.

Rather than bring peace and security, “Peace Parks” have generally marginalised local institutions and residents, undermining them as loci of decision-making and power whilst simultaneously instigating increased conflicts between local people, authorities and impairing the potential for spatial socialisation of local communities on both sides of the socio-political boundaries (Balbo & Marconi, 2006; Kark et al., 2015; Sibanda, 2015). Governance of border bioregions through the ecological and biomass logic has failed to deliver security and peace,
because wildlife poaching, involving endangered species such as rhino, has spiraled out of control over the years, inclusive of Southern Africa. Globally, responses to the scourge of poaching have included the establishment of partnerships among the private and public stakeholders wherein areas of biodiversity and biomass, which are almost exclusively along the national borders, presented governance challenges that entailed co-management. Governance of “Peace Parks” is complex (Kark et al., 2015) because it involves the exercise of power from the global to local scale in ways that allow for top-down marginalisation of local institutions, “creating imbalances of power that generate conflicts among actors” (Sibanda, 2015: 79), inclusive of residents on both sides of the socio-political boundaries.

Universally, it is hoped that the Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) would encourage inter-governmental collaboration and co-operation that fosters peace and security by, among other things, ameliorating political and cultural tensions associated with disputed borderlands where there may be competition for shared resources (Foggin, 2012; Rusinga & Mapira, 2012; Kothari, Camill & Brown, 2013; Kark et al., 2015; Sibanda, 2015). In theory, governance of “Peace Parks” involves decentralisation of power that would allow for democratic and equitable administration, management and regulation of borderlands by stakeholders on both sides of the socio-political boundary (Kothari et al., 2013). Such governance is expected to precipitate greater exchanges between stakeholders on both sides of the boundary, creating multiple learning interactions (Kothari et al., 2013; Sibanda, 2015), in the process of which hostilities, animosities and antagonisms would be repaired through conflict resolution mechanisms, protection of human and civil rights, increased trust as well as shared decision-making processes (De Koning 2010; Zhou, Wang, Lassoie, Wang & Sun, 2014; Kark et al., 2015).

In practice, though, it has been difficult for states to ignore the hegemonic international relations that are governed through the fragmentary socio-political “bordering, ordering and othering” and the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” of bounded-spaces and populations (Paasi, 2005; van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Rusinga & Mapira, 2012; Dallimmer & Strange, 2015; Sibanda, 2015). Hence, “Peace Parks” have not uniformly necessarily facilitated peace and security for local populations on both sides of the socio-political border (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Rusinga & Mapira, 2012; Dallimmer & Strange, 2015; Sibanda, 2015). More often than not, “Peace Parks” in Southern Africa recreated societal perceptions that could be described as “Afrophobic”, largely due to the public sentiments that insinuate wrong doing of one form or the other against populations fragmented by the socio-political boundaries and geopolitical entities.

Whereas the establishment of national parks along apartheid South Africa’s borders was initially suspected of being a security strategy against infiltration from neighboring states such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the democratic era witnessed changes in the logic of existence of protected natural capital along the borders under the notion and practice of TFCAs (Lunstrum, 2013, 2014; Muzeza et al., 2013; Barquet et al., 2014). This article argues that the sharp rise in poaching in the TFCAs among South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique dispels the idea of attaining national security and peace through state-monocentric governance of borderland bioregions as mythology. It insinuates that the propensity to scapegoat the escalation of poaching as well as the absence of peace and security in the TFCAs through illegal migration and cutting of fences is a typical example of the expression of Afrophobia because only Africans are thought to be involved in the wildlife scourge. Responding to uses of environmental arguments against immigration, Neumayer (2006: 204) confirms the optimism that “if managed competently and fairly, international
migration and other forms of globalisation present a promise, not a threat, to a more sustainable world.” However, large-scale immigration could precipitate perceptions of collective threat among the locals because resource scarcity is likely to exacerbate conflict among self-identifying “tribal” groups within multi-cultural societies.

Whereas there are twenty-two “Peace Parks” in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), this article draws anecdotal illustrations from the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park, which was established in 2000 through the merger of the Kruger National Park (South Africa), the Gonarezhou National Park (Zimbabwe) and the Limpopo National Park (Mozambique), as well as several private game reserves and state-owned “communal” agricultural lands (Wolmer, 2003; King, 2009; Rusinga & Mapira, 2012; Schoon, 2013; Barquet et al., 2014; Sibanda, 2015). The hope was that this “Peace Park” would make for peace and security in the region, following Mozambique’s 1992 Peace Accord and South Africa’s 1994 democratic elections (Barquet et al., 2014). In practice, the three states have continued with their self-interested state-centric governance (Pelser, Redelinhuys & Velelo, 2011; Andrade & Rhodes, 2012; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Mariki, 2013; Kark et al., 2015). Also, the rigid adherence to the ideals of state sovereignty through territorial jurisdiction implies that the hegemonic political culture is inconsistent with “Peace Parks” (Pool, 2006). Apparently, poaching syndicates have increased in the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park (Rusinga & Mapira, 2012), and it has tacitly been blamed on the 27 000 Mozambicans who reside on the park, fuelling cross-border stereotypes, xenophobic perceptions and conflicts. Indeed, there is evidence that the removal of boundary fences was accompanied by intensification of poaching and such other illegal activities in the park (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005; Pool, 2006; Kark et al., 2015; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015; Sibanda, 2015). Unsurprisingly, sentiments of Mozambicans being portrayed as illegal, poachers and so on cannot be dissociated from the senseless violent abuses they suffered in 2008 and 2015 in a democratic South Africa. Notwithstanding the collapse of fences in the establishment of the parks, the loss of animals to poaching continues to be presented in a fragmented manner that suggests, for example, that South Africa through the Kruger National Park, which shares a long porous border with Mozambique, is a victim because it has lost a total stock of 1 200 in 2014 at the hands of Mozambicans (Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). Evidently, sentiments such as these are “Afrophobic” because poaching in the Kruger National Park is complex and far much wider in scope than the geographic confines of Mozambique’s borderlands (Lunstrum, 2013; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015).

The contestations of ordinary citizens on both sides of the border arising out of the governance of the park itself, enforce societal perceptions that are counter to the African Renaissance cornerstones of regional cooperation, emancipation, revaluation of African cultures, sustainable economic development and democratisation. To complicate matters, the collapse of fences has been blamed for fuelling illegal immigration and goods smuggling, which are levelled against both Zimbabweans and Mozambicans (Pool, 2006; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). The reportage that illegal immigration and traversing of evidently dangerous park areas where Mozambicans and Zimbabweans are said to have been killed by wild animals, make those who survived the treacherous journey to appear less than human, in the eyes of most South Africans. To this extent, the popularity of the “Peace Park” has ironically been associated with heightened perception of collective threat and fear amongst South Africans against Mozambicans and Zimbabweans, largely due to sentiments and public stunts that are inherently “Afrophobic”. To this extent, this article asserts that the
The prominence of “Peace Parks” in Southern Africa has ironically reduced cornerstones of African Renaissance into pipedreams that evaporated into thin air.

The establishment of “Peace Parks” for conservation practices through securitisation rationales to enable capital accumulation along with land dispossession of the most vulnerable sections of the population (Massé & Lunstrum, 2015), has allowed for the construction of perceptions that those who endanger the natural capital are equally the enemies of the local society. Perhaps, it is the securitisation narratives of conservation that explain the xenophobic anger that pervades South Africa’s poor masses against equally vulnerable African immigrants. Uniformly, local residents and specifically those on the Mozambican side of the socio-political boundary, are characterised as “environmentally destructive security threats” and as dangerous heavily armed rhino poachers, jeopardising national security and peace of the local society (Devine, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). This security logic reinforces stereotypes among South Africans, wherein societal attitudes and perceptions about Mozambicans are couched through distrust and disrespect. Where securitisation of wildlife conservation takes place, it also invokes land dispossession of the most vulnerable and poor people in order to enable accumulation economics (Massé & Lunstrum, 2015). Hence, where poachers are cast as “the enemy of the nation-state and its natural resources” (Lunstrum, 2014), negative societal stereotypes against African immigrants are reinforced, precipitating violent abuses (Duffy, 2014; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014). Caution has to be made that African Renaissance and “Peace Parks” perpetuate, rather than cause, societal stereotypes; instead, international relations governance is primarily responsible for fragmentation of the world into geopolitical entities through socio-political boundaries and the triad of “sovereignty-state-territory” along social, language, cultural, economic, racial and such other ethnic characters for administration and management. The article asserts that the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” impairs the capacity for spatial socialisation of populations along the borderlands, thereby creative narratives for distrust, disrespect and devaluation of African cultures. That, describes the locus of the fundamental causes of societal stereotypes and xenophobic tendencies in (South) Africa.

Conclusion

The institutional mechanism for governance of international relations provoke notions and practices of sovereignty. This article has argued that governance of international relations is preoccupied with the re-enforcement of the socio-political “bordering, ordering and othering” of the world into bounded territorial landscapes and geopolitical entities. Adherence to de jure conception of sovereignty, associated with the exercise of power over territory, has allowed for prominence of the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” in the governance of international relations. This article has, therefore, established that the thinking that “Peace Parks serve the basic ideals of the African Renaissance” is flawed in many respects because these borderland conservancies “hardly stimulate and possibly even undermine the realisation” of regional cooperation, emancipation, cultural reaffirmation, sustainable economic development and democratisation in Africa (van Amerom & Buscher, 2005: 1). “Peace Parks” provoke securitisation of wildlife conservation to enable capital accumulation along traditional Western economic narratives through land dispossession of the vulnerable sections of the population. Also, the attendant security rationales have been used to “re-territorialise sovereignty”, creating borderland geopolitical entities, and portraying people on one side of the borderland as dangerously armed poachers and enemies of the nation-state, with xenophobic undertones.
Additionally, the institutional landscape for governance, administration and management of international relations is indeed complex and inconsistent, with inequities of geopolitics of power and sovereignty. Further, this article has argued that re-territorialisation of sovereignty through wildlife conservancies has not reaffirmed African cultures; instead, it has undermined continental emancipation and reinforced societal stereotypes associated with xenophobic hatred and violent abuses against African immigrants in South Africa. The specificity with which xenophobia violence and attacks are directed at African immigrants in South Africa cannot be tenably divorced from the Western economic narratives of securitisation of wildlife conservation that enables capital accumulation by dispossessing the vulnerable rural communities of their lands. To redress the matrices through which xenophobic stereotypes, attitudes and perceptions are fomented and reproduced, this article recommends that sets of social, economic and political narratives as well as governance processes and structures should be emancipated from the geopolitical entities constructed through the “sovereignty-state-territory triad” rationales.

References


