Discourses and practices of Political Risk Analysis in the gold mining industry of Eastern DRC: A Chaballian perspective

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**Supervisor:** Dr. G. van Riet
If more of us valued food and cheer and song above hoarded gold, it would be a merrier world.

-J.R.R. Tolkien
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

Primarily this research is concerned with political risk analyses (PRA) and how it is used by multinational actors to the advantage of profit-maximisation and exploitation in Africa. Particularly the researcher considers the possibility of renarrating PRA discourses through a Chaballian perspective. The dissertation discusses conventional understandings of political risk factors such as violence and conflict, external and regional instability, institutional governance- or polyarchy and politically connected criminality (which is most popularly known in the form of corruption). Then the researcher follows Africanist, Patrick Chabal’s conceptualization of these same factors in terms of being, belonging, striving and surviving in Africa. The aim is to understand how the creation of discourses related to PRA “is problematic since it implies a particular way of ‘explaining’ that derives from a Western tradition of rationality and scientific endeavour” (Chabal, 2009: 3).

Finally, the dissertation focuses on the DRC’s gold mining industry as a case study to show how hegemony is perpetuated in what we think is a post-colonial era. Here the research particularly draws on instances where various TNCs in the risk and mining industry use PRA to their advantage while the Congolese artisanal miners are denied their agency in the processes of defining political risk and, especially living with the consequences of identities circumscribed risk. The implication of this study will hopefully include alternative understandings of PRA and the realisation that conventional ways of understanding are decidedly Western, although we claim coloniality no longer influences our understanding of Africa.

Key terms:
PRA, risk, coloniality, relations of power, DRC, artisanal mining
OPSOMMING

Hoofsaaklik is die navorsing bemoeid met politieke risiko ontleding (PRA) en hoe dit gebruik word deur multinasionale akteurs tot voordeel van wins-maksimering en uitbuiting in Afrika. Die navorser kyk veral na die moontlikheid om PRA diskoerse te heromskryf deur 'n Chaballiese perspektief te volg. Die verhandeling bespreek vervolgens konvensionele begrippe van risiko faktore soos geweld en konflik, eksterne en plaaslike onstabiliteit, institusionele regering- ook bekend as poliargie en politics-verbonde misdadigheid (wat algemeen as korrupsie bekend is). Dan volg die bespreking Afrikanistiese konceptualiserings van dieselfde faktore in terme van Patrick Chabal se beskrywings van wees, behoort, worstel en oorleef in Afrika. Die verhandeling streef om te verstaan hoe die skepping van diskoers met betrekking tot PRA problematies is aangesien dit impliseer dat 'n bepaalde manier van 'verduidelik' wat spruit uit 'n Westerse tradisie van rasionaliteit hoër geag kan word as ander diskoerse (Chabal, 2009: 3).

Ten slotte, fokus die verhandeling op die DRK se goudmynindustrie as 'n gevallestudie om te wys hoe hegemoniese magsverhoudinge in 'n post-koloniale era voortduur. Hier gebruik die verhandeling veral gevalle waar verskeie besighede in die risiko- en mynboubedryf PRA gebruik tot hulle voordeel terwyl die Kongoiese ambachtelijke (artisanal) mynwerkers hul agentskap ontken word in die prosesse verwant aan die definisie van politieke risiko en veral by die gevolge van identiteit wat deur risiko omskryf word. Die implikasie van hierdie studie sal hopelik alternatiewe maniere om PRA te verstaan insluit asook die ontnugtering dat konvensionele maniere van verstaan oorwegend Westers is al stel ons dat kolonialisme nie meer ons perspektief van Afrika beïnvloed nie.

Sleuteltermes:

PRA, risiko, kolonialiteit, magsverhoudinge, DRK, ambachtelijke (artisanal) mynbou
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Artisanal Exploitation Card</td>
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<td>ADFL</td>
<td>Forces for the liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
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<td>AIA</td>
<td><em>Association Internationale Africaine</em></td>
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<td>ALIR</td>
<td><em>Armée de Libération du Rwanda</em></td>
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<td>ASM</td>
<td>Artisanal and Small Scale Mining</td>
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<td>BCC</td>
<td><em>Banque Centrale du Congo</em></td>
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<td>BERI</td>
<td>Business Environment Risk Intelligence</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Community Drive Reconstruction</td>
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<td>CNDP</td>
<td><em>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</em></td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economic Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td><em>Forces Armées de la République du Congo</em></td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<td>FNI</td>
<td>Nationalist Integrationist Front</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GPRSP</td>
<td>Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICRG</td>
<td>International Country Risk Guide</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LSM</td>
<td>Large Scale Mining</td>
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<td>M23</td>
<td>Mouvement du 23 Mars</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement pour le Libération du Rwanda</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Mouvement Nationale Conglais</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Majorité Presidentiale</td>
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<td>MPR</td>
<td>Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution</td>
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<td>MSR</td>
<td>Mouvement Social pour le Renouveau</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPIC</td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
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<td>PPRD</td>
<td>People’s Party for Reconstructions and Democracy</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>Political Risk Analysis</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
<td>Political Risk Index</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Political Risk Solutions</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreements</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>SOKIMO</td>
<td>Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans-National Corporations</td>
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<td>UDPS</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Progress</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>UNSSSSS</td>
<td>UN Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy</td>
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<td>WBG</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
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<td>ZEA</td>
<td>Artisanal Exploitation zones</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: DETERMINING THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS MIGHT BE REINTERPRETED ACCORDING TO A CHABALLIAN PERSPECTIVE

“Any attempt to develop a political theory to make sense of other societies is necessarily an attempt to compare the West and the non-West” (Chabal, 2009: 3).

Introduction

At the onset of this academic endeavour, the task at hand might seem simple enough: to conceptualise and compare two political theories for the purpose of reinterpreting the first from the perspective of the second. However, considering that these theories originate in, the West and the non-West, respectively, the task immediately complicates itself because theories originating in, or centring on, the non-West are immediately thought to be normative and personal, which could reduce their scientific validity in the eyes of Western theorists (Connell, 2007: 44). In no place is this truer than in the context of Africa (Chabal, 2009: 1).

As the title of this dissertation suggests, the researcher will discuss political risk analyses (PRA) as a substantive political practice that is constituted by Western perspectives. The researcher is specifically interested in how PRA - where political risk is a potential hazard that results from negative effects of governmental and societal actions - is used as a governing practice that validates itself by altering the way data is reported so that it can be used to legitimise geopolitical assumptions (Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 11 and O’Mally, 2004: 1). In effect, this has enabled political risk assessments to become organising tools that extend into governance via systems of policy interventions and organisational settings informed by specific risk indicators (Rothstein et al., 2006: 92). It is via this organising mechanism that PRA is linked with the hegemonic political and economic project aimed at the expansion of capital accumulation and the portrayal of Africa in terms of progress, rationality, positive-sum economics and the conceptual separation of politics and economics (Harvey, 2005: 154 and Taylor, 2002: 31).

Although this process of categorisation is not our main focus, it is within this specific mode of capital accumulation and the separation of the economics from the politics that PRA finds its niche (Harrison, 2001: 389). In fact, according to Moen and Lambrechts (2013: 90), the mere possibility that specific countries and their governments might pose a threat to investors in the developing world necessitates the development of strategies to manage these perceived risks. This statement is in accordance with Brink’s (2004: 21) definition of political risk as the political
and social situations that might affect business operations and the ability to maximise profit in a negative way (Dionne, 2013: 2; Doornbos, 2004: 373 and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 80). According to this notion of PRA, it is the government’s responsibility to commit itself to the expansion and protection of free economic markets and market-like governance, specifically in Africa (Ferguson, 2009:168; Leys & Panitch, 1998: 20 as quoted in Taylor, 2002: 32; Moore et al., 2011: 508 and Peck & Tickell, 2007: 27-28). In addition, Springer (2012: 134) asserts that the capital accumulation enabled by neo-liberalism is the expression or reconstitution of class power in such a way that the assessment of political economies, as well as the redefinition of ‘reality’, serves the purpose of transnational companies (TNCs)\(^1\) operating in seemingly volatile investment climates in Africa (Harrison, 2001: 389). Subsequently, the act of redefining reality, in this way, represents the notion that foreign direct investment (FDI) is the panacea for Africa’s economic under-development (Harrison, 2001: 389). If we take into account Gilbert Rist’s (2010: 19) conceptualisation of development as the description of an artificial paradise and (provisionally) accept it as a goal to be pursued by African governments; a whole set of problems arise, which includes the fact that we ultimately make ourselves guilty of reading from the centre and thereby support assumptions of Africa written in the West (Connell, 2007: 45).

While it could be true that African countries need access to foreign capital, the policy adjustments suggested by the World Bank Group (WBG) and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) well-established narratives and neo-liberal ideals have not necessarily resulted in economic growth or subsequent development (Harrison, 2001: 388). Despite the IMF recently admitting that it over-sold the idea of development via neo-liberalism (Ostry et al., 2016: 38), post-developmentalists still blame policy frameworks such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes for the prolongation of the colonial yoke (Chabal, 2009: 5 and Esteva as quoted by Watson, 2013: 6). This has resulted in the continuation of descriptions of Africans and their continent in terms of Western standards, as represented in the adjustment programmes and policy recommendations, which were arguably informed by PRA. Additionally, these prescriptions have been implemented in the political and economic spheres of governance on the continent, although they are not necessarily informed by their contextual nuance (Liasidou, 2015:1 and Mkandawire, 2005: 1 & 2). Furthermore, despite the implementation of these macroeconomic and governmental adjustments, the scepticism surrounding African economies and governments has not decreased, and it has been argued that Africa still suffers under the global matrices of

\(^1\) The term ‘transnational corporation’ should be seen as the augmented version of a ‘multinational corporation’ to address the phenomenon of regional economic markets (Belaam & Veseth, 2008: 365). Though many of the sources cited refer to MNCs, this dissertation will use the abbreviation TNC.
power established during the colonial era and is thus still dominated by the West (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48). Therefore, the consequences of neo-liberal development, as proposed by institutions like the WBG and IMF, include, but are not limited to: disparities in wealth and income distribution; resource transfers; and patrimonial class allegiance, along with unbalanced power dispensations on a global scale - all of which are themes that will be explored further in chapter four (Carroll & Jarvis, 2015: 285 and Springer, 2012: 134). Coinciding with this, is the dominant and somewhat archaic view that development is a linear evolutionary process - as exemplified by Rostow’s stages of development - according to which it is advocated that as more people join the formal economy and play by its rules, the extent of inequality should diminish (Rostow, 1990: 7, author’s emphasis). This study argues that these rules are based solely on the well-established Western developmental discourses, following Wodak’s (2002: 11) description of a discourse as a process of control operating within the elite and hegemonic project concerning the governance of countries, economies and peoples based on specific claims of universality’ (Connell, 2007: 44; Harvey, 2005: 150 and Larner, 2000: 5).

The relationship between discourses of control and PRA is that political risk awareness is shaped by an organisation’s (from here on referred to only as ‘TNCs’) conceptualisation of regulatory regimes and extended governance systems that influences the business environment within which it operates (Rothstein et al., 2006: 91). Subsequently, because the awareness of risk factors is also part of the narratives constructed by Western analysts, the understanding of the organisational and governmental deficiencies or proficiencies contributes to the perpetuation of risk perceptions. This specifically includes the likelihood that the host-government will alter policy and other regulatory arrangements that could affect the investment climate of the said country in a negative way (Harrison, 2001: 389 and Toma et al., 2009: 162). Ultimately, the formation of these discourses results in hegemonic power designs that resemble or perpetuate colonial power designs (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48).

Comparing the West with the non-West, in this instance, consequently requires that PRA’s claim of universality be critically assessed in terms of the influence it has on the regulatory regimes and governmental spheres of the so-called sovereign nations in Africa (Chabal, 2009: 3 and Rothstein et al., 2006: 92). Furthermore, while PRA supposedly provides a means of assessing the political climate in terms of investment opportunities, the danger also exists that the creation or re-narration of reality causes the subversion of agency in Africa, which results in PRA’s claim of universal relevance (Chabal, 2009: 7 and Connell, 2007: 45). Consequently, it is widely accepted that political risk assessment is a science that is designed to measure the objective
probability of an adverse effect occurring as a result of human manipulation of the socio-political environment. Ultimately, these practices are said to be characterised by fact-based and value-free interpretations, as well as measuring the likelihood that a commercial endeavour could survive the said hazard if it were to occur in the sphere of governance (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83; Slovic, 1987: 280 and Young et al., 1990: 503). The analytical reasoning and implied universality of these discourses and practices also result in the institutionalisation of risk and what Rothstein et al (2006: 90) ultimately referred to as ‘risk colonisation’ (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83).

Within this dissertation’s attempted re-evaluation of Africa’s place in the world, it is important to remain mindful of the hegemony, dominance and discrimination that have formed discourses about the continent’s so-called risk prevalence. This research explores the way in which Africa, as part of the periphery, is read from the dominant position of power in the West and the assumed universalities represented by PRA practices (Connell, 2007: 169). Comparing one country’s risk probabilities with another’s consequentially reifies the descriptions of Africa in well-established ways that are informed by political power dispensations used to describe ‘realities’ that only exist because of the specific ways in which they are described (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83). What is meant by this is that the objective scientificty and overtly economic analyses of political risks in Africa serve the description of Africa in terms of deviances from the process of control described by Wodak (2002: 11). In addition, the hegemonic political and economic project, which Taylor (2002: 31) and Wodak (2002: 11) refer to, has recently become the interest of post-colonial scholars who claim that: the ever-expanding extent and influence of capital is merely a form of recolonisation aided by descriptions of Africa in terms of its failure to achieve economic liberation without taking the West’s impairing influence into consideration (Harrison, 2011: 388 and Moore, 2001: 910). More specifically, the current emphasis on capitalist accumulation and privatisation provides a context within which various questions of the division of both political and economic power may be discussed, especially because Africa seems to be confined by descriptions of its economy and politics that are informed by Western standards (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 332). This means that political scientists and analysts who study the apparent recolonisation of Africa as part of the periphery try to recover what has been lost, while restoring what has been neglected by repairing what has been corrupted in a process of erasure. Simultaneously, there is an attempt to reissue, reconsider and reshape current forms of knowledge that inform discourses on the political risk prospects in Africa (Chabal, 2009: x and Oakshott, 1963 as cited by Dunleavy, 2003: x).
A well-formulated reconsideration needs to focus on arguments made on behalf of the importance of capitalist accumulation in Africa and the consistent reiteration of Africa’s supposed need to develop or westernise. This analytic re-narration should also address the fact that discourses that describe the continent in terms of change and the entrenchment of westernisation in African economies and politics need to be reevaluated. One way of doing this is by considering the origins of the knowledge used to form these discourses in the first place with further relevance to the other forms of knowledge that were excluded (Cornwall, 2010: 1 and Obeng-Odoom, 2013: 153). I would like to emphasise that the subjugation of certain knowledge systems signifies relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control; based on the notion that one way of doing things surpasses all others (Wodak, 2002: 11). Specifically, these ways of doing and knowing originate in the West and attempt to protect specific economic interests (Connell, 2007: 42).

**Problem Statement**

Based on the aforementioned contextualisation, it is reasonable to postulate that PRA’s subjective and ideologically loaded practices are predominantly informed by biased interpretations of Africa’s political environments. The author has chosen the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as the case study, because the country’s gold-mining industry exemplifies the tension between formal economic policy and so-called traditional extraction of the resources, as well as the interpretations of these dichotomous practices by PRA consultants. Additionally, the conflict in the eastern parts of the country has resulted in certain overt risks to TNCs who are operating in the mineral rich, but conflict prone regions. According to PRA consultants, this necessitates strategies and practices related to the production and interpretation of ‘truth’ regarding political risk in developing countries. Often the process of clearing risk knowledge contributes to the perpetuation of the risk factors they interpret and analyse (Emel & Huber, 2007: 1394 and Lupton, 2013: 113).

The problem this dissertation seeks to address is based on the possibility of a reconceptualised interpretation of the generally accepted PRA methodologies, and the way in which the resultant discourses produce and interpret truths about political risk in the DRC, as well as the hegemony these discourses represent in the practice of normalising political risk in specific ways (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81). It will thus be the researcher’s aim to investigate the prospect of reconfiguring perceptions of Africa as they manifest in PRA discourses by employing Chabal’s (2009: 16) recognition of the fact that we, as outsiders, have thought it necessary to seek in Africa confirmation of the theories we employ most readily in our own societies.
Research Questions

In order to address the possibility of reconceptualising common interpretations found in PRA methodologies in the eastern DRC’s gold-mining industry from a Chaballian perspective, this argument will be focused on the following research questions:

- What is the contemporary understanding of the elements and parameters of PRA for TNCs operating in the developing world, in general, with a specific focus on the implications for FDI and policy in Africa, particularly the DRC?
- How can African theories, specifically related to Chabal’s theory - on the politics of ‘being’, ‘belonging’, ‘striving’ and ‘surviving’ - facilitate an alternative interpretation of political risk in general?
- Why is the eastern DRC an exemplary case for the study of PRA, the policy interventions they inform and the general subjugation of African discourses?
- How is gold-mining in the DRC viewed accordingly?

Research Objectives

If the aforementioned research questions can be successfully answered, it will serve the following objectives:

- Primarily, this dissertation summarises the contemporary understanding of the elements and parameters of PRA as it is employed by TNCs operating in the developing world and Africa. Specifically, it is the objective to outline current methodologies used by PRA consultants in the case of the DRC’s gold-mining industry.
- The second objective is to outline a proposed reinterpretation of PRA from an African perspective based on Chabal’s conceptualisations of the politics of being, belonging, striving and surviving as outlined in *Africa: The Politics of Smiling and Suffering*. Ultimately, it is the aim of this study to formulate a discourse that could serve as a substitute to current PRA methodologies and interpretations of realities in the DRC.
- The third objective of this dissertation is to determine the importance of the DRC as a case study for the examination of international interference in policy formulation in the extractive industries of countries that are considered risk-prone.
- Finally, the interpretation of political risk perceptions in the DRC will be analysed according to the alternatives posited throughout the study and applied to the way the gold mining industry in the DRC is viewed accordingly.
Central Theoretical Statement

The re-narration of PRA in Africa is not an easy task, especially when one considers the power matrices at play. However, it is a task that has been deemed necessary by the account of democratic institutionalism, neo-liberal interventionism and subjugation of peripheral discourses outlined above. The project of re-evaluating the importance of generally accepted PRA discourses and the way in which these discourses produce and interpret truths about political risk in the DRC will be explored in terms of the hegemony created by the normalisation of difference as deviance in Africa (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81). It will also be an aim of this study to investigate the possibility of reconfiguring perceptions of Africa as they manifest in PRA discourses by using Chabal’s (2009: 16) recognition of the fact that, as outsiders, we have thought it necessary to seek, in Africa, confirmation of the theories we employ most readily in Western societies.

An alternative understanding of conventional frameworks of political risk methodologies proposed here is based on re-evaluations stemming from Chaballian theory. In order to do this, the dissertation should focus on the fact that the significance of theory originating in the West should be seen as problematic because it is founded in Western paradigms that advocate rationality and absolutism as the bases of truth (Chabal, 2009: 3). In addition, even though theory is constructed within a specific time and space, it is often ignorant of the fact that production and management of theories frame Africa within specific ontological premises based on the apparent validity of the Western ‘gaze’ (Chabal, 2009: 17 and Liasidou, 2015: 1). The inability to recognise the implied universality of Western theories like PRA has resulted in the concealment of structural relations between Africa and the West (Cornwall, 2010: 4 and Mengibar, 2015: 39). The successive promotion of pro-business policy reforms and the emphasis placed on the attraction of FDI for developmental purposes will be investigated in terms of how these reforms are influenced by the organisational strategies based on the political risks identified within the DRC’s gold-mining industry (Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 90 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: ix)

Problematising Current Descriptions of Africa

In order to problematise current narratives related to Africa as informed by PRA methodologies, the researcher has to outline general issues related to the discussion of the continent. Primarily, the characterisation of Africa as an aggregation of various nations that form part of the peripheral and developing countries of the globe draws on Maldonado-Torres’ (2007: 243) statement that
Africa’s post-colonial political and economic sovereignty, as well as the power of its people, are determined by other nations. Similarly, the description of a specific country as ‘risky’ signals that those who are in charge of assigning descriptions are situated within a dominant power position, and that the main function of describing it is the reproduction of power (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81 and Liasidou, 2015: 1). Despite the one-dimensional nature of political risk discourses, they do, however, question civil society, elites, political economies, ethnicity, corruption and international relations in terms of how these phenomena influence the investment- and governmental decisions (Chabal, 2009: ix and Doornbos, 2004: 372). This unilateral analysis of various social, political and economic phenomena highlight the necessity for the reinterpretation of these objects as risk indicators in African countries (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83). Finally, PRA is often used to advise policy reforms aimed at creating economies that are more investment friendly. These well-versed reforms have been described as ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ and emphasise the preoccupation of developmental discourses with economic aspects of governance and may be applied rather unfairly under specific conditionalities related to supposedly risky investment territories (Carrol & Jarvis, 2015: 282 and Doornbos, 2004: 372). Furthermore, the emphasis on the specific ways of producing knowledge related to FDI and PRA create an accepted regime of truth that constructs itself based on modelling strategies, fluctuating statistics and sovereign financial debt evaluations (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83). The implication of this is that specific forms of knowledge are used to measure the political risk, development or other socio-political or economic phenomena in such a way that it results in:

“The dismantling of national barriers to external trade and finance, deregulation of the economy, export-driven economic growth, removal of controls on the transnational mobility of finance capital, expansion of portfolio capital, privatisation and the restructuring of local and national economies to facilitate free-market capitalism” (Guttal, 2010: 70).

In most developing polities, this is done through the inclusion and exclusion of purported suitable institutions in the political realm of governance, most of them originating in the Western democracies. By including sporadic elections and debates, developing governments are able to legitimise their participation sovereignty because democracy in its institutional form alone is believed a sufficient measure against political risk (Jensen, 2008: 1041). Accordingly, Taylor (2002: 32) argues that the exertion of power via the governance of elites is best described in Dahl’s conceptual democracy or ‘polyarchy’.
In Africa, polyarchy has resulted in a situation where rulers have become, in some fundamental ways, more accountable to external agents, i.e. the WBG and Western governments, than to their own people because the social forces are contained by minimal institutionalised measures, specifically sporadic elections, which are considered to be universally applicable (Chabal, 2009: 125; Dahl, 1978: 13; Jensen, 2009: 1041 and Phillips et al., 2002: 636). The neutralisation of social forces and participation of people in debates related to the institutionalisation of specific governmental forms limit the people’s capacity to hold their governments accountable and have created a cavity in the policy-making process, which, I argue, has been filled by external institutions like the WBG, TNCs and PRA consultants (Taylor, 2002: 32). Consequentially, the association of lower risk to institutional democracies and pro-market economic reforms enable international agents to influence policy reforms that suit elitist power interests as outlined above (Doornbos, 2004: 375 and Jensen, 2008: 1042). Substantiating this point is the fact that one of the most prominent reforms in modern African history has been the adoption of multi-party democracy as ‘the only viable model of modern politics’. However, these adoptions rarely contribute to development in Africa (Chabal, 2009: 6). It is argued that the (mis)guided reliance on institutions to bring about a culture of accountability and participation actually reduces democracy to a simple quantified check-list exemplified by Dahl’s (1978) definition of polyarchy. Additionally, and as shown below, the reliance on quantified institutionalisation, rather than the quality of these democracies, informs the self-policing attributes of hegemony in African countries (Phillips et al., 2004: 637).

Coincidentally, these statements merely attempt to assimilate democratic characteristics because workable, perfect democracies are an unobtainable ideal. In fact, democratic participation is often unwanted despite popular conceptions to the contrary, because perfect democratisation and the resultant economic equality are disadvantageous to the centralisation of economic power in the hands of the political elites (Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990: 52; Peck & Tickell, 2007: 26 and Taylor, 2002: 33). Additionally, the approximation of democratic ideals - like the opportunities citizens have to formulate, signify and communicate their preferences - pose a threat to the established elite and this approximation is consequently circumscribed within the quantifiable institutions of polyarchy (Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990: 52; Dahl, 1978: 2 and Taylor, 2002: 34).

For the purpose of this dissertation, polyarchy’s efficacy as a construct and descriptor manifests most prominently in Jensen’s (2008: 1041) portrayal of popular democracy as a pacifying mechanism for political risk. He states that democracy stabilises policy in addition to increasing transparency and the likelihood that TNCs will be able to influence policy outcomes. Thus, the
institutions that are supposed to provide agency or the potential to partake in directed, meaningful, intentional and self-reflective ways only deflect power to the elites who are reinstated during procedural systems such as elections (Chabal, 2009: 7 and Taylor, 2002: 33). Using Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality, Lemke (2000: 1) argues that the adherence to the institutionalised discourses of democracy in its polyarchic form contributes to the creation of specific kinds of knowledge with the purpose of subjugating others. Chapter two of this dissertation will illustrate that PRA, similarly, focuses on the quantifiable characteristics of political environments in order to analyse the probability of hazardous political phenomena that could pose a threat to the profit-maximisation capabilities of TNCs in developing African countries, and, more specifically, the gold mining industry in the DRC.

Furthermore, this focus on the existence of institutions in Africa, rather than the efficiency of the continent’s democracies, often results in, and forms, the misapprehension that democratically elected elites will be more accountable to their constituents, and thus pose a smaller threat to TNCs operating there (Mills, 2014: 204 and Taylor, 2002: 33). Ultimately, according to these erroneous assumptions of mainstream political theory and practices that include PRA, activities in governmental and economic spheres of polyarchies become hollow, yet elaborate shells wherein political elites co-modify their relationships with other elites in order to extract rent from them (Berman, 1998: 307). This leads to the confluence of the economic and political elites into one dominant class that continues exploitative behaviour without restrictions linked to fully functioning and efficient democracies (Taylor, 2002: 33).

In addition, these institutional frameworks, according to Springer’s (2012: 136) Marxist interpretation, constitute class-based alliances, which not only reflect coercion in the global economic system, but also a form of consent between the governmental elites and economic elites represented by the TNCs. This is reminiscent of the colonial era when ‘authority without colonial endorsement meant powerlessness’ and accumulation via extraction during the colonial epoch meant that both the colonial and ‘traditional’ elite’s interests were secured (Chabal, 2009: 41).

As will become specifically clear in the fourth chapter, the exertion of power through economic accumulation is very explicit in the case of the DRC and extends from pre-colonial times until the current post-colonial epoch. The DRC provides the perfect political setting for the application of principles related to market-like governance, polyarchy and PRA as well as the reconceptualisation of the constructs of these discourses based on Chabal’s (2009) description of African life and politics. This study argues that this suitability originates in the Congo’s history,
as the first African colony, and its current political volatility (Hochschild, 1999: 2 & 3). The DRC further offers a unique example of the misuse of power by representing a continuance of colonial strategies of divide and rule, political intolerance and the violent extraction of wealth, not only from the environment, but also from the Congolese people (Isike & Abutu, 2012: 121). In other words, in the case of the DRC polyarchic governance is the result of protection given to neo-colonial economic interests by the rulers who were left behind after independence and were only able to validate their rule through institutional democracy (Weiss & Carayannis, 2004: 199). Isike & Abutu (2012: 124) refer to this phenomenon as ‘colonialism without colonies’ though the promotion of governance via market principles in a way that has constituted a destructive illusion, especially for those operating outside of the institutionalised governmental framework (Springer, 2012: 135).

Operating outside of the formal economy, which is protected by the institutionalised framework of polyarchy, has been associated with being ‘traditional’ or ‘backwards’ (Chabal, 2009: 130). However, as this dissertation will reveal, the DRC’s artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) communities, which are a part of these traditional economic practices, have the untapped ability to alleviate poverty and vulnerability if it could be protected by the policies that currently serve only international mining companies in the DRC (Jensen, 2008: 1041 and Tschakert, 2008: 24). As is the case with the development of discourses that protect the economic interests of TNCs, policies that refer to the extractive industry in the DRC reference the dichotomy between the formal and informal sectors and assign agency only to the ‘formal’ mining concessions. This enables TNCs and various other actors, including the government and militia, to exploit the informal ASM communities (Chabal, 2009: 131).

The researcher has included a map of the DRC below that will serve as a point of reference throughout this dissertation. Note that the mining activities depicted here are only formal mining activities in the DRC and do not include ASM operations, reiterating the marginalisation of an estimated 14 - 16% of the Congolese population who, directly or indirectly, depend on ASM for their livelihoods (Geenen & Radley, 2014: 59). In 2012, Geenen (2012: 324) reported that 90% of the gold-mining operations in the DRC were under ASM control, but these communities are severely under-represented in policy documents.

**Fig. 1:** Map of the DRC showing various locations of mineral exraction.

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2 Please compare this map, with that of appendix A. The provincial administration in the DRC was changed in early 2016 and no maps are available showing both mining activity and administrative divisions, consecutively. This
Even though the formal mining sector is quite small, the support of the WBG and IMF to the Congolese government aimed at the promotion of FDI in the extractive industry, brings to mind the same strategy of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ followed during the colonial domination in Africa, (Harvey, 2005:159 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 347). What is meant by the statement ‘continuation of accumulation by means of dispossession’ is that the policy interventions designed by the WBG and various other transnational agents, which supposedly offer a panacea for African economic stagnation, is, in fact, an illusionary self-reproduction of colonial methods used to create wealth by exploitation (Ferguson, 2006: 11 and Springer, 2012: 135).

In contexts such as the DRC, where the perception of political risk is more prominent, neo-liberal ideology is often evident in the negotiation of pro-business PTAs. The argument is made that reforms will improve the investment climate, which will supposedly accelerate growth and development by attracting additional FDI (Medvedev, 2011:50). Moreover, it has been argued that neo-liberal ideology is evidence of the imperality of knowledge that doesn’t admit the rights of African states to negotiate their own conditions resulting in a lack of discursive control by these countries (see Slater as quoted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 347). In other words, the fact
that PRA, as a discourse, results in the same power relations that originated from this highlights its tautological nature as a discipline (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85). Inadvertently, the hegemony that results from the reformulation of political rule, in terms of the polyarchic check-list agendas described above, reiterates the prominence of economic power in the governance of African states (Carroll and Jarvis, 2015: 289). According to this argument, the main purpose of minimising state interference in policy-making is to reduce the effects of the state meddling in the economy by allowing the market forces to work to the advantage of the holders of capital, namely the TNCs. The resultant distance between the rulers and the ruled, as well as the lack of accountability, is missed because popular participation isn’t a condition in the determination of the efficacy of polyarchic democracies or PRA methodologies (Sen as quoted in Burgis, 2015: 211).

**Methodology**

Because this dissertation’s main objective is to determine whether Chabal’s *Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling* (2009) can be used as a guideline for the redefinition of PRA constructs, this paper will essentially utilise a comparative research methodology. This facilitates the identification of the different ways PRA methodologies and Chaballian theory interpret the same social and political phenomena (Sarantakos, 2005: 11). Although I do realise that other modes of risk analysis exist in terms of Eastern business interests in Africa, my focus here is on PRA as a Western practice. Accordingly practices related to reciprocity (or *guanxi*) as it is employed by Chinese businesses in Africa to mitigate supply risks will not be explored despite evidence that China is becoming a major trade partner on the continent and in the DRC in particular (Cheng *et al.*, 2012 and Du Toit, 2013). Thus, the researcher has collected a great deal of literature related to Chabal’s conceptualisation of politics in Africa as well as various PRA documents that will be analysed in a qualitative and comparative manner (Johnson & Reynolds, 2012: 29). Throughout the study, the methodology might also lean toward a practice in discourse analyses because of the fascination of the complexity of PRA and Chaballian theories that are not always evident at first, but become more apparent once we start considering why specific ways of looking at political phenomena lead to a categorisation of these phenomena as indicators of, in this instance, risk. Thus, although the study will primarily focus on literature and secondary analyses of data collected by PRA consultants, it draws on the importance of describing constructs in specific ways (Clearly *et al.*, 2014: 711).

Furthermore, this study is an attempt at finding and elucidating joint constructs in both theories and investigating the probability that Chaballian theory can be used to critically analyse the
discourse formed by PRA methodologies (Lerner & Tolan, 2016: 120). The difficulty most anticipated is the constant tension between the quantitative nature of PRA and the qualitative nature of this dissertation’s analyses of post-colonial literature (Cypress, 2015: 356).

As a matter of comparison through comprehension, the epistemological distance between empirical, hard quantitative data and the ‘ways of knowing’ reflected in qualitative data presentations is a distance not easily bridged (Clearly et al., 2015: 711). Importantly, this study seeks to show the circular and interdependent nature of the relationship between the constructs of PRA and Chaballian theory by highlighting the qualitative and heterogeneous nature of the constructs used by PRA even if these constructs are over-simplified for their purpose in the business environment. This was done in order to create a framework with which the political environment of the DRC could be understood in terms of perceptions of political risk and socio-political phenomena related to risk in the extractive industry of said African country.

**Chapter Layout**

Following the aforementioned methodological discussion, and based on the contextualisation provided above, chapter two conceptualises the elements and parameters of PRA for TNCs operating in the developing world by looking, specifically, at the methodologies used by PRA consultants. Political risk, as it is currently outlined in the extractive industries of Africa, specifically referring to the imposition of neo-liberal and pro-market guidelines and reforms, will be discussed.

The following chapter will also make use of risk reports - such as the ‘Risk Map Report’ from Control Risks (2014) and the Ernest & Young report entitled ‘Business Risks Facing Mining and Metals 2012-2013’ (2013) - in addition to the methods employed by Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) (2009), the ‘International Country Risk Guide’ (ICRG) (2014) and Brink (2004). The chapter is concluded by highlighting the Euro-centrism of PRA in its relation to the artisanal mining community and TNCs. These primarily include theoretical and practical literature, but also specific ‘determinants of risk’ in their quantified form (Brink, 2004: 121 - 146).

The literature used in the second chapter includes quantified models of risk analysis in Brink’s (2004) book, *Measuring Political Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment*, which discusses a prescriptive mould for the quantification of risk. This study also includes articles on the subject that include the titles: *A Risky Business: Mining, Rent and the Neoliberalization of `Risk*, written
by Jody Emel and Matthew Huber (2008) and *Corruption and the Extractive Industries in Africa* by Standing (2007), as a means of gaining understanding into extractive industries and the political risk TNCs think they might face when exploring opportunities in the so-called developing world. Initially, the discussion will follow decidedly ‘Western logic’ because of the nature of the information available on PRA as a discipline that is evident in the arguments made by Brewer (1985: 1-9), Diamonte *et al.* (1996: 71 - 76), Emel and Huber (2007: 1393 - 1407), Jarvis and Griffiths (2007: 5 - 21), and especially Simon (1984: 123 - 143).

Chapter three will follow Chabal’s (2009) *Africa: The Politics of Smiling and Suffering* and other theorists’ conceptualisations of post-colonial Africa within the context of recolonisation. Additionally, this study outlines the creation of theory and practice as problematic because of particular ways of ‘explaining’ from a Western tradition of rationality and scientific endeavour (Chabal, 2009: 3). Central to this understanding of the literature is the act of perceiving the significance of how discourses are produced, but also about the African continent (Cheru, 2012: 192). In addition, some elements of a possible alternative interpretation of political risk are derived and expounded on from *Deconstructing Development Discourse: Buzzwords and Fuzzwords* (Cornwall & Eade, 2010).

The work of post- and decolonial theorists, such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni, are also relied on in order to understand Africa according to theories that ‘question the universal validity’ of Western perspectives, such as neo-liberal theories that are likely influencing PRA (Chabal, 2009: 5). Finally, this research endeavours to show that risk indicators’ interpretations of political experiences in Africa that are related to the aforementioned themes are understood in a unilateral way that does not subscribe to the structural modes inherited from colonialism (Mudimbe, 1988:4).

The fourth chapter determines the importance of the DRC as an example of international interference related to both the economy and the government, especially in the context of the extractive industries and in areas prone to violence. The chapter follows a historically descriptive approach to the exploration of the Congo during the colonial era and its experience of crises related to the extractive industries of the eastern provinces. Scholarly articles, such as Geenen’s (2012) *A Dangerous Bet: The Challenges of Formalizing Artisanal Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* will be studied in conjunction with literature that includes Hall’s 2010 ‘Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ report and The New York Times article entitled, ‘Behind Gold’s Glitter: Torn Lands and Pointed Questions’ in order to determine the practicality of employing either PRA or Chaballian theory in the context.
It is noteworthy to mention that the description of the DRC’s government - as a ‘rentier state’, which is prone to corruption and characterised by the ‘resource curse’ - prevails, as well as a critical discussion of current governmental practices in this country (Geenen, 2012: 323 and Matti, 2010: 403), which is problematic. This study describes the extractive industry as a space within which complex patronage systems develop. In particular, This study draws on the Congolese Mining Law of 2002 and information on (both formal and informal) gold extraction in the eastern parts of the DRC in order to trace the development of these patronage systems and then applying Chaballian theory as a means of interpreting how these realities of Congolese politics contribute to risk perceptions in the DRC.

Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation will draw on the amalgamation of the discussions provided in chapters one to four in order to determine the feasibility of the reinterpretation of PRA in general. This will be accomplished by reviewing its applicability to the case of the eastern DRC’s gold mining industry after which concluding remarks will follow.
CHAPTER TWO: PRA AND THE PERPETUATION OF RISK IN AFRICA’S EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES.

“The centrality of risk to regulation is a further iteration of the ‘audit explosion’, representing rituals of verification and legitimation with little and sometimes dysfunctional substantive impacts.” (Rothstein et al., 2006: 98).

Introduction

Rothstein et al. (2006: 98) highlight the three most prominent problems related to risk discourses and practices. In the first instance, they emphasise how risk, and, specifically, political risk regulation is representative of a specific set of norms and values that underscore its legitimisation as a theory and practice. In the second instance, Rothstein et al. (2006: 98) allude to the dysfunctional and limited impact risk analyses have on the alteration of political, social and economic phenomena identified as part of the practice’s methodological approach to risk determination. In addition, Hardy and Maguire (2016: 81) argue that organisations should be implicated in the determination of political risk as they are the producers and managers of these perceived hazardous occurrences. Because of their concern for regulatory, reputational and operational risks connected to their various industries, TNCs often overlook the part they play in the perpetuation of political risk, furtively caused by their presence and actions.

Because of this direct and double-edged interest TNCs have in PRA practices as a regulatory tool, the task of reconceptualising PRA in Africa becomes more imperative. If we consider the fact that TNCs’ presence in the developing world could contribute to political risk in their industries, it is vital that we find ways to recognise and address the fact that PRA confirm Chabal’s (2009: 16) observation that we seek confirmation for the universality of Western theories by employing them in Africa without questioning the practice’s applicability in various contexts (Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91). Following this discussion, political risk discourses related to the continent’s extractive industries will be deliberated. This chapter also explores how the ‘audit explosion’ referred to by Rothstein et al. (2006: 98) has had implications on the imposition of neo-liberal and pro-market guidelines in the regulatory policies of the extractive industries in Africa in general. The analytic tools used will serve to show that these connections include ‘risk reports” such as the ‘Risk Map Report’ from Control Risks (2014) and the Ernest & Young report entitled ‘Business Risks Facing Mining and Metals 2012-2013’ (2013) in addition to the methods employed by BERI (2009), Political Risk Solution’s (PRS) ICRG (2014) and Brink (2004).
The literature used in this study includes analyses of PRA methodologies that are both theoretical and practical, but also specifically related to the determinants of risk in their quantified form such as the fifth chapter of Brink’s book, *Measuring Political Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment* (Brink, 2004: 121 - 146). The content of academic articles on the subject - which include titles like *A Risky Business: Mining, Rent and the Neoliberalization of ‘Risk’* written by Jody Emel and Matthew Huber (2008) and *Corruption and the Extractive Industries in Africa* by Standing (2007) – are reviewed as a means of gaining understanding into extractive industries and the political risk TNCs think they might face when exploring opportunities in the so-called developing world. The nature of these texts are all decidedly Western and will serve as the bases for the critique which will be foreshadowed later in this chapter, but really unpacked in the following chapter.

**Conceptualising PRA**

PRA is a sub-discipline of risk management and has incorporated social and political risk factors - such as government instability, corruption, anti-business sentiments and terrorism, amongst others - into corporate, management and decision-making processes (Befeki & Epstein, 2006: 5). Baldwin (2002: 35) further states that, in Africa, political risk doesn’t only include actions by the government, but also encompasses all other organisations or individuals whose actions might threaten a business venue in a particular socio-political environment. The constant potential harm, hazard or threat that could arise from specific or indeterminate events or actions means that TNCs need to determine the probability that some, if not all, of the risk factors mentioned above, could affect its business environment (Brink, 2004: 121; McKellar 2010: 3 and Rothstein *et al.*, 2006: 92). For example, the ICRG also alludes to the fact that risk is the result of actions undertaken by people who are incognisant of the effect their actions will have on the economic enterprise under consideration (Howell, 2014: 1). Furthermore, risk might refer to tolerated and unintended consequences of purposeful human actions. With regards to the extractive industries specifically, Rothstein *et al.* (2006: 92) express the importance of risk as an organising factor in the implementation of policies and the extended governmentality of regulatory regimes (Van Asselt & Renn, 2011: 437).

Thus, the negative potential of a situation is the primary notion of risk in its unaffiliated form and Brink (2004: 27-28) states that the action, inaction or failure to act by the political elite or other actors with influence over the socio-political environment, will affect the investment climate of a specific country. In turn, strategic planning, as a corporate function, has necessitated the assessment of political risk so that the TNC’s goals of profit-maximisation can be assessed
according to specific pre-determined factors that would influence the strategic position and profitability of the organisation (Befeki & Epstein, 2006: 7 and Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 71). Because this often requires systematic examination, Nath (2008: 6) states that many agencies that analyse risk often use an amalgamation of both qualitative and quantitative information into a single index or rating. It is precisely this quantified nature of PRA methodologies that this study examines and critiques, because, as Campisi (2013: 1) asserts, often the quantification of uncertainties related to political risk in Africa are more dependent on the modelling strategies as tactics of verification, than cognisant of the subjective nature and interpretive quality of political risk in Africa. The distinct processes of modelling political risk in specific ways further enables the researcher to follow Hardy and Maguire (2016: 81) in characterising a dominant discourse of PRA in terms of very specific normalisations.

Risk assessment further presupposes that institutions and individuals choose to make calculated decisions where specific uncertainties are prevalent (Zachmann, 2014: 3). Hardy and Maguire (2016: 81) also assert that this is because the prospective organisation of risk enables TNCs to identify and minimise the potential adverse effects in a precautionous manner. The act of normalising risk through the calculation of potential risk in the political arena can lead to the so-called ‘audit explosion’ mentioned by Rothstein et al. (2006: 98), in turn, causing free-market fetishism in the non-West (Ferguson, 2009: 170). This chapter, accordingly, focuses on determining how PRA is part of a regime of policies and practices associated with, or claiming fealty to, the doctrine of neo-liberal business expansion (Ferguson, 2009: 170).

According to Brewer (1981: 11), the prescriptive nature of all recommendations in Africa is related to the profit-maximisation objectives of big business, which is illustrated by the emphasis placed on the importance of FDI for the expansion of economies, which should lead to stable business environments in the non-Western world. As previously stated, the presence of private capital (most notably investments made by TNCs), draws our attention not so much, in this instance, to the ways in which Africa hasn’t developed as it does to the ways it has had to adapt to a rapidly modernising world (Chabal, 2009: 12). The policy developers in host countries are advised to adapt their economic policies to compete for FDI because it is assumed that it will positively affect local economic development (Beugelsdijk et al., 2008: 425; author’s emphasis). Also, the ways in which African states are affected by things that are outside of their control - such as the global emphasis on increased rational and quantifiable, fact-based processes - are influenced by the presence of TNCs and their need to understand (and, in fact, construct) reality in a specific way (Kebede, 2011: 99).
According to Van Alstine and Barkemeyer (2014: 5), understanding political risk in this way is necessary, because increased FDI influxes to resource rich countries in Africa may influence the way TNCs perceive the consequences of specific phenomena, including their presence in potentially volatile environments (Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91). The impression of volatility arises because developing economies, like the ones found in Africa, are not typically characterised in terms of good governance and strong rule of law in terms of what Western theorists view as contributing occurrences in terms of increased stability; however, these indicators are still useful in instances where PTAs\(^3\) are negotiated (Ferguson, 2006: 196). Consequently, the description of these economies as volatile and risk-prone effectively gives TNCs a bargaining chip in their negotiations with representatives of Africa’s emerging markets that include the political elite and actors in the informal economy (Aon Political Services as cited by Campisi, 2014: 5 and Van Alstine & Barkemeyer, 2014:5). The importance of assessing political environments in this region is that it enables TNCs to conceptualise possible actions in the event of these risks materialising. Rarely, however, are these assessments cognisant of the clearly defined bodies of knowledge that result in, and form, specific relations of power that could influence the nature of these assessments in particular ways (Foucault as cited by Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84).

As previously stated, PRA is primarily used as a decision-making tool that is considered essential to businesses acting as exogenous FDI sources, especially in the extractive industries of the developing world, particularly Africa (Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 2, Ferguson, 2006: 196 and McKellar, 2010: 4). Subsequently, Michael Power (as quoted by Rayner 2007:166) has stated that TNCs operate in an environment characterised by ‘The Risk Analysis of Everything’ which assumes that, if individuals are left to their own devices, they should become strong actors in the market and that market forces will drive development (Chabal, 2009: 107). Accordingly, it is necessary to briefly discuss the idea of development and the way it influences PRA methodologies and practices as well as their application in a way that constructs power discourses on the continent. Escobar (1988: 433) describes development as a regime of practices serving policy formation objectives aimed at solving economic difficulties, especially those experienced by the economic elite (Moore et al., 2011: 508). Furthermore, the implementation of neo-liberal policy recommendations, as per the most prevalent development prescriptions, has led to more power for the owners of private enterprise through protective, yet minimalist,

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\(^3\) Medvedev (2011: 49) describes PTAs as preferential liberalisation that affects FDI through investment and non-trade provision, trade flows via the creation of an extended market and long-term growth effects, as discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation.
interventionism. For instance, if we take into consideration Obeng-Odoom’s (2013: 155) observation that theories of development encourage capital formation, Moore et al.’s (2011: 507) claim that neo-liberal approaches to globalisation results in more power for owners of TNCs accumulated via, among others, economic policies related to innovation, trade liberalisation and decreased state restrictions on labour becomes validated.

This ultimately causes a decline in state restrictions on labour and trade in these industries, which is supposed to be a good indication that TNCs will invest in these countries (Medvedev, 2012: 49 and Moore et al., 2011: 507). In fact, the relationship between PTAs and the effect this connection has on the power TNCs have - because of their implementation of PRA recommendations - is so vivid that Watson (2013: 4) critiques economic development in Africa based on the fact that the implementation of these regimes of truth ensures the prolongation of the colonial yoke as described in the following chapter (Esteva, 2010: 4 and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85). Accordingly, the powerful are creating allies among themselves through the practice of PRA as a facilitative tool. As Rothstein et al. (2006: 92) argue:

“Risk is no longer the exclusive preserve of scientists and technocrats, but is fast becoming the lingua franca of business management and even of general public policy.” (Rothstein et al., 2006: 92)

From its inception as a technical decision-making tool, risk management, and by extension PRA, has become imperative to most decisions regarding FDI in the developing world (Luhmann as discussed by Rothstein et al., 2006: 98). According to this reasoning, the vast amounts of money invested in Africa make it imperative for TNCs to analyse the variables that influence the probability of political events that might negatively affect business projects in a notoriously volatile political environment such as Africa, whether these assumptions are based on contextually sensitive truths or not (Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 2). According to Hardy and Maguire (2016: 84), this means that the producers of knowledge, i.e. PRA practitioners, assume that the risk they identify as a reality is a reality in as far as it can be objectively determined and accurately analysed (Ghajarloo, 2011: 583). Similarly, Escobar (1988: 431) has argued that development studies became a tool for the production of truth as a way of organising and controlling specific elements of knowledge. In turn, the goals of these specific attempts in knowledge production are driven by the needs of neo-colonialists and investors in Africa to establish, implement and consolidate power relations through risk descriptions, particularly the meanings attached to these descriptions (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84 and Watson, 2013: 6).
The consolidation of political risk as an instrument of power is further dependent on the way existing data is interpreted and the consequences this could have for political volatility in a specific business area (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 73). The way in which data is interpreted subsequently influences the construction of discourses related to risk and the power relations that result in these interpretations. Thus, while the regimes of truth are supposed to be constructed from the objective and sober analyses of quantified data, Hardy and Maguire (2016: 85) argue that TNCs intervene in the development of these interpretive measures in order to guarantee specific outcomes (Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 91).

Taking this business-centred orientation of most PRA discourses into consideration and following Riles (2013: 557), it is argued that PRA and the TNCs that use it are prone to essentialism disguised as a rational attempt at solving problems caused by the decisions taken by those in control of a country or region (Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 2). This essentialism is also highlighted by PRA’s simplification and ignorance that specific preconditions, structural factors and triggers of political risk, as explained by Ampleford et al. (2001: 4), cannot be universally defined or measured (Chabal, 2009: 36 and Connell, 2007: 63).

As explained in the previous chapter, there have been attempts at measuring democracy and the effectiveness of governments in the non-West according to Dahl’s check-list conceptualisation of polyarchies as imperfect assimilations of democratic ideals (Dahl, 1978: 3). Essentially, polyarchy is reliant on the indispensable check-list of requirements for democracy, which is mainly ignorant of specific contexts. Equivalently, this study asserts that the quantification of political risk determinants, just like the measurement of institutional democracies, attempts to clarify the extent of deviation from a so-called perfect investment environment, if such a thing does exist.

Following the conceptualisation of minimum institutional requirements for democracy, this paper argues that the analyses of political risk are centred around the creation of a framework, enabling TNCs to measure the assimilation or deviation from the ideal investment environments as set out by specific, often Western, prerequisites (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1396). As a critique, Chabal (2009: 36) states that:

“The problem is not so much that such [methods] are not valid but simply that they can only be interpreted usefully when they are set within a broader socio-cultural framework.” (Chabal, 2009:36)
The fact that PRA’s socio-cultural framework is characterised by Western simplifications of realities that are not understood by the theorists who design and employ PRA methodologies means that they are often more concerned with the approach (the quantified check-list agenda) than the content or qualitative, inter-subjective understanding of the descriptions of risk offered (Chabal, 2009: 16). This enables political risk consultants to position their business not only as an optimistically situated opportunity for innovation and accumulation through the creation of knowledge, but also as a business opportunity that can be profited from (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1397).

Following this, and the aforementioned elementary discussion of the profit-maximisation goals of the TNCs, which is central to PTA discussions, and given PRA’s business orientated approach to practices, we can deduce that the economic elite use these interventions to influence the distribution of power and resources⁴. The current success of PRA might, accordingly, have been based on the fact that the current global distribution of power between the West and the non-West enables PRA to serve as an instrument of power whereby preferential treatment is organised along logic and legitimate ways that marginalise real experiences of risk for those who are not directly affected by the big-business mentality of PRA practices or discourses (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85; Harvey, 2005: 156 and McKellar, 2010: 6). The interactions between PRA consultants, TNCs and the governmental elite are also easier because the imperfect democratic assimilations or polyarchies in Africa provide the ideal political environment for the application of risk methodologies that use imperfections in the democratic design of a country as a determinant of political risk. By stating that a country’s democracy is imperfect, the TNCs are able to negotiate PTAs more easily than would have been the case if the political environment was 100% stable and democratic. Consequently, Medvedev (2012: 58) has indicated a positive correlation between PTAs and FDI inflows in Africa, related to perceptions of political risk in a specific country.

The consequence of using political risk ratings, as they are commonly known, as bargaining chips for PTAs, creates the perception of Africa as an inferior player in the arena of global power dispensations (Obeng-Odoom, 2015: 38). The resultant inferiority complex suffered by Africans creates a space where power relationships, favouring TNCs, manifest. Therefore, while TNCs invest in order to make a profit, the host countries of the developing world and Africa compete for FDI inflows in a space that is heavily affected by the determination and analyses of risk in Africa. The resultant distribution of power becomes even clearer when one reads the WBG’s

⁴ For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see chapter four of this dissertation.
promotions of FDI as a win-win’ arrangement, while the fact that FDI influxes could influence industry-specific risks and have a negative impact on political stability is ignored (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1393 and Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91).

Usually, TNCs will employ an analyst (or analysts) from other TNCs to determine the possibility and probable size of risks it might be subjected to as a result of specific social and political actions. These analysts, however, frequently only envision the flow of causal elements and circumstances related to the political and social circumstances of a specific country and are incapable of determining concrete probabilities (Brink, 2004:11, author’s emphasis). The process of envisioning possible futures by calculating the probability of specific occurrences, otherwise known as ‘scenario planning’, uses various possible futures depending on the causal relationships between subjectively chosen variables and the likelihood that these variables might influence a TNC’s project in the specific environment (Brink, 2004: 49; Harries, 2003: 799 and McKellar, 2010: 102). These subjectively chosen variables are often employed to demonstrate that PRA applies the same norms, values and theories to Africa as to the West in order to not exoticise the continent (Chabal, 2009: 16). But, in the same instance, the interpretation of Africa by these Western standards exemplifies how meaning is attached through the application of the measures used to determine what is true or false (Cornwall, 2010: 5). In addition, the attachment of meaning to specific scenarios in PRA has specific consequences for the marketability of its practices, and, as a result, these analyses are often commercialised and sold as a product that must be used by TNCs to mitigate real or perceived political risk (Bischoff, 2010: 1 and Garsten & Hasselström, 2003: 253).

Furthermore, the marketability of PRA as a product is reliant on the concretion of typically soft determinants to provide TNCs in the risk analysis industry with an analytical edge (Campisi, 2013: 2). As a result, PRA hardens political realities by measuring and quantifying the success of institutions like the constitution, election and the freedom of the press in a specific country, exactly as Dahl’s conceptualisation of polyarchy does with democracy (Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990: 54). McKellar (2010:79) reiterates this by stating that a TNC will calculate its risk, or pay another company to do so, by employing various quantifiable factors including: competitive pressure; corporate culture; liability in unstable environments; and risk management resources, each of which receives a score. The process of assigning scores to complex political environments can be considered an act of political supremacy that contributes to the effects and

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5 “Part and parcel of this shift towards quantifiable and supposedly more objective criteria was the emphasis on finding indicators of ‘success’” (Pickard, 2010: 141).
influences of global power dispensations (Campisi, 2013: 2 and Peck and Tickell, 2007: 27). In other words, the quantification of political risk is supposed to signal its authoritative and unbiased interpretation of political risk indicators; but the creation of these so-called unbiased truths, such as PRA, signals the collective virtue of hegemony and power represented in this apparent objectivity (Chabal, 2009: 47). The following section explores the creation of truth related to political risk through the politics of power.

**PRA: The Politics of Risk in Africa?**

This section explores how power relations are formed between those who employ political risk methodologies and those who are classified by them. This will be done in order to show how classification, according to standardised conscripts, creates a provisional status for PRA methodologies based on the specific ways risk-knowledge is constructed (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 101). While political risk is a separate discipline from other risk management strategies, the focus on political decisions, events or conditions in a country, including social factors that could influence business environments, are especially important for TNCs who are making investment decisions in the developing world, which confirms the power represented by PRA discourses and practices (Howell and Chaddick, 1994: 71 and Toma et al., 2009: 162). Additionally, PRA and risk governance methodologies are portrayed as ways of seeing how various interactions between individuals and institutions in the private/public or national/international environments create complex matrixes of phenomena that can directly influence industries and markets because of their social and political nature (Garsten & Hasselström, 2003: 432 and Van Asselt & Renn, 2011: 432). Often, this creates situations where the responsibility of security and risk mitigation is determined by, and sold to, other companies that are willing to navigate risk, instead of TNCs doing it in their own capacity (Garsten & Hasselström, 2003: 251 and McKellar, 2011: 64). Most often, the companies that are willing to navigate these territories are other TNCs specialising in private security looking to profit from the classification of Africa as a risk environment. McKellar (2011: 4) states that, often higher risk ratings or political instability might serve as an incentive for TNCs to invest in territories where they assume the business environment will be less competitive. In this context, PRA is a means of determining and managing the risk for investors in such a way that a maximum profit can be made through the creation of favourable power relations that use risk assessments as indicators of control in the negotiation of PTAs (Bischoff, 2010: 15).

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* Risk governance and PRA are similar in that it is the process of navigating the complexity of risk through the involvement on scientific analysts and procedures in order to make decisions regarding the future and related to markets (Van Asselt & Renn, 2011: 432)
The aforementioned observations reiterate the motivation behind this dissertation’s focus on the reinterpretation of dominant risk discourses. Because dominant discourses in PRA create specific hegemonic understandings of Africa, they enable the West to view itself as superior (Mbembe, 2001: 2 and Obeng-Odoom, 2015: 39). A Chabalian perspective consequently promotes a consideration of risk as a constitutive instrument of neo-liberal governmentality—originally conceptualised as the relationship between modes of government and knowledge production by Foucault in his 1976 lectures at the Collège de France—which leads to the remote control of governments, institutions and individuals in Africa (Chabal, 2009: 2; Mkandawire, 2010: 265 and Rothstein et al., 2006:98). Following this argument, we might safely assume that PRA acts as an extension of neo-liberal, economic and what Western scholars and actors would call ‘rational notions’ to ever-increasing domains of public and private life. It is concerned with methods that convert uncertainties into probabilities while remaining objective in its calculation of foreign investment climates in a supposedly unbiased way (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 72). The so-called ‘unbiased’ nature of analyses has enabled the employment of PRA in order to legitimate very particular and historically specific distributional arrangements between host countries and the TNCs who operate within them (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1394 and Paudyn, 2013: 790).

In the depiction of the host country as inferior, PRA consultants have successfully attached a crisis narrative to the phenomenon of doing business in Africa, and being African. Furthermore the descriptors of risks such as rent-seeking, expropriation and nationalisation characterise societies as ‘states in crisis’, because of Africa-specific predicaments (Bischoff, 2010: 1; Chabal, 2001: 110 and McKellar, 2010: 27). Where this happens, the crisis might take on a variety of forms, but whether disruptions to TNC’s business practices are “epochal moments of transition, the detonation of systemic societal contradictions, or a state of emergency”, they remain political phenomena that need to be mitigated (Milstein, 2015: 142).

The assessment of political risk and the regulation and management of these risks have been called an ‘audit explosion’ with procedures and checklists, rituals and reports that often have little to no substantial impact on the way business is done in the developing world (Rothstein et al., 2006: 98). This is not to say that PRA methodologies are not incisive. In fact, the reflection of pro-market ideology and various institutional and policy reforms—following the prescriptions of polyarchy, have infiltrated various governmental and economic functions of state in the non-
West (Carroll and Jarvis, 2011: 289). In addition, the apparent lack in concise definitions of PRA, and what its actual function is as well as the heavy reliance on quantification, facilitate the hegemonic discourse of regulatory organisation through the depiction of Africa as an inferior business environment (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 50 and Rothstein et al., 2006: 92).

The implication of measuring development, progress, (in)stability, risk and many more buzzwords circumscribed in ‘development speak’ further confirm that theories used in the West to describe Africa reiterate the categorisation of Africa as an amalgamation of various lacks that invariably should lead to an increase in political risk (Eade, 2010: iii-viii; Garsen & Hasselström, 2003: 253 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 50). Furthermore, because PRA often relies on the quantification of these measurements, one could, and Bischoff (2010: 15) consequently did, argue that often PRA suffers from over-definition leading to confusion regarding the actual nature of political risk and its various aspects. For the purpose of this section, let us assume that as far as TNCs and FDI are concerned, the purpose of PRA is to provide a means of determining the political stability of selected countries and applying the various factors influencing political stability to the ability of certain companies to do business in these countries (Howell, 2014: 2).

Whether it is because of over-defining or under-conceptualising political risk and the variables that are measured, PRA practices tend to claim one-size-fits-all universality in its application (Connell, 2007: 43). And although Brink (2004: 57) has found that PRA consultants often include industry specificity in their analyses, the idea that Western theories are used to measure the same norms, values and methodologies in Africa we so readily use in the description of developed countries echo the idea that Western theories have the power to classify all contexts in universal ways (Chabal, 2009: 16). An example of this is the information document of BERI that states that it is very important to distinguish between risk exposure of a capital-intensive facility and risks faced by operations using leased equipment, as if the size of capital investment is the main contributing factor involved in the determination of risk (BERI, 2007: 2). As previously mentioned, Moen and Lambrechts (2013: 91) further observe that the presence of these TNCs may have an impact on the community or country to become hostile toward the TNC and this may, or may not be, influenced by the size of the company’s investment. The following section will focus on the factors identified by especially McKellar (2010) and Brink (2004), but also BERI’s Political Risk Index (PRI), the Economic Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) risk analysis (2013 & 2014) and the ICRG (Howell, 2014). These are not the only theories or models of PRA; however, these were chosen because of the number of citations these models represent in sources on the topic and their favouritism toward TNCs. Thus, these models will serve as the framework
of the dissertation on the aspects of political risk in the developing world, but also sub-Saharan Africa and the DRC’s extractive industries (especially gold, in particular) in order to establish points of departure for the discussion of a possible reorientation in the determination and PRA as it is used in these industries.

**Specific Determinants of PRA Discourses**

Increasingly, PRA methodologies have evolved so that:

“We are seeing risks that emanate from non-governmental sectors or issues around not just the drafting of mining legislation, but how countries implement it, security of tenure, corruption and poor governance.” (Cattaneo, 2006: 58)

This section will provide an exposition of models and their particular methodologies employed by PRA consultants in a selective manner. This means that selected PRA methodologies and their determinants will be examined in a way that will enable the determining of how various constructs of political risk are interpreted in similar ways and influence the conceptualisation of PRA discourses. Brink’s *Measuring Political Risk: Risk to Foreign Investment* (2004) will be discussed in coherence with the EIU risk analysis (2013 & 2014) and the International Country Risk Guide (Howell, 2014), which Erb et al. (1996: 30) state is composed of the political components that reflect a country’s willingness to pay its foreign debt and other financial or economic factors implicating specific attributes of the political climate of a particular country. With relevance to the BERI information document (2007) this paper will focus on the PRI component, although BERI also employs a Risk Index and the R-Factor (potential revenue) in its calculation. McKellar’s (2010) identification of political continuities that feature in the calculation of PRA will be addressed. These models will not be discussed sequentially; but, rather, factors that the models consider pivotal to the determination of political risk in order to critically examine how these concepts might aid the construction of knowledge that describes Africa, will be highlighted. In addition, how the definition of specific risk-factors - such as international tensions, domestic unrest, quality of governance, the possibility of contract cancellation and politically connected criminality - serves the interest of industry, because they are described in a way that creates coercive and universalistic knowledge, will be determined (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 87).

The universality of political risk knowledge is primarily represented by the incidence of ‘international tensions’. The phenomenon, also referred to as ‘bad neighbours’ by the PRI model
BERI, 2007), commonly occurs in Africa because both wars and international diplomatic and economic pressures are realities in that non-Western part of the world. According to McKellar (2010: 12), international tensions are primarily caused by territorial disputes, resulting in negative influences of regional political forces (BERI 2007: iii). These disputes are sometimes caused by conflicting ideologies are found on, including, but not exclusively, sub-national, national and international levels and often cause various actors to view others as morally deficient or culturally inferior, which, in most cases, is also linked to struggles between different ethnic groups. Brink (2004: 122) further states that border disputes, international and regional relations as well as external conflicts should be measured where relevant; stating that a score between zero and ten might be awarded to the specific country’s risk prevalence as a result of international tensions. Neighbouring countries that are at war, or involved in conflict, even if not with the country that is being analysed, will increase the political fluidity of the first country and increase the likelihood, according to this indicator, for it to regress into conflict. PRS International Country Risk Guide also includes international tension in its calculation and adds that, in addition to physical violence and war, there could also be ‘risk to the incumbent government from foreign action’ (PRS, 2013: 4). Typically, risks include pressures from diplomatic entities and the withholding of aid and trade, in the most extreme cases leading to sanctions\(^8\), but these could also tip the scale in favour of TNCs during the negotiation of PTAs. Furthermore, these elements not only render the domestic environment unwelcoming to foreign investment, but also increase the risk of the whole region because the pressures from external entities result in double standards for the leader. By implication, he/she should simultaneously adhere to local expectations of reciprocity and global perceptions of what it means to be a sufficient government (Chabal, 2009: 82-83). Finally, conflict in neighbouring countries could also result in increased exploitation in disputed areas because the conflict may have both intended and unintended economic consequences for the people who live in these disrupted areas (Cilliers, 2000: 2). These unintended economic consequences are of special importance for the case study of this dissertation, where the rent-seeking practices of government, TNCs and militia groups are extracting wealth from the eastern DRC’s informal mining communities by means of exploitation, which is ameliorated by the prevalence of international tension in this area. Additionally, because resources, such as gold and other minerals, are often geopolitically stationary, the threat of war from international and neighbouring countries can lead to an increase in risk probability, specifically those that originate in the political sphere (Katen, 2014: 37).

\(^8\) For a list of why a host-government will feel it needs to partake in PTAs see Medvedev’s (2012: 50) Table 1.
While the political risk related to international tension is derived from external actions, domestic unrest is internal governmental and non-governmental actions that typically occur within a country and could negatively affect TNCs’ profit-making capabilities. Subsequently, McKellar (2010: 15) determined that domestic unrest is often the result of ill-equipped governments who took power after rapid decolonisation, and are prone to factionalism and in-fighting. In addition, localised struggles within the regions of a national territory, as is the case in the DRC’s eastern regions, are often fuelled by the economic power available to the strongest party (Geenen, 2012: 326). In the most extreme cases, domestic unrest is characterised by:

“The use of starvation as a political weapon of the forcible displacement of people to regions of a country that are unsuited to agriculture, where they sink into poverty, despair and hunger. Or it can take the form of the social and psychological trauma endured.” (Chabal, 2009: 153)

It is thus within this context of domestic unrest that political risk, as a reality and determinant for human life, is most true. The contextualisation of this type of risk is often ignorant of the effect the TNCs have on the perpetuation of the violence felt by the people outside of the TNC. It is also these effects that are used by various factions to strengthen their position within the fight, ultimately aimed at the establishment of sub-national independence (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 82-83 and McKellar, 2010: 015). Finally, according to Bischoff (2010: 27), political tensions will, in some cases, lead to a power struggle where different groups of the population organise themselves along language, ethnic and/religious lines, which means that factionalism becomes essentially social in addition to its political nature (Howell, 2014: 6 - 7).

In turn, factions have an impact on government stability, which is the third risk determinant that will be addressed. Specifically, the following paragraphs discuss determinants that measure the stability of a government and focus on the emphasis placed on a government’s ability to design and employ policies and remaining in power while being threatened regularly by the factionalism and in-fighting described above. Government stability is especially reliant on the strength of the bureaucracy according to Busse & Hefeker (2007: 5), which means that, in developmental terms, the stability of a government is linked to the exercise of power and the management of a nation’s affairs within specific institutional parameters in accordance with the minimal governmental requirements discussed during the conceptualisation of polyarchy in the introductory chapter of this dissertation (Mkandawire, 2010: 265).
One of the main issues addressed by Brink (2004: 121) in this regard is the separation of powers, known as the *trias politica*. It is one of the highest scoring factors in Brink’s model and is related to the institutionalisation of checks and balances between the judiciary, legislature and executive. Remembering Taylor (2002), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) and Dahl’s (1978) discussion of the concept of polyarchy, the typologies of polyarchy will be considered here and discussed elsewhere, as well as investigating the way in which especially intangible governmental characteristics are quantified. Consequently, the quantification of risk determinants, such as government stability or quality of governance, loses sight of the contextual nuances that need to be taken into consideration when measuring the government’s ability to employ checks and balances in a meaningful way. While the argument is made that these stronger institutions constitute elements of good governance, it is argued that accountability to institutions alone induces a shift from collective responsibility to minimal adherence to the requirements of institutional polyarchy and the ruler’s individual capacity (Chabal, 2009: 123).

This does not mean that the concept of good governance is not important. While it is composed of eight contributing features, including: participation, consensus oriented decision-making, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, effective and efficient rule, equitable and inclusive distribution of power and the rule of law; these factors mainly measure the process of democracy in Africa, without measuring the quality (Chabal, 2009: 16 and Sheng, s.a: 2). Consequently, the focus that is placed on these elements of good governance as indicators of political risk means that PRA can be implicated in the development of policies in Africa that aid the construction of hegemony and unequal power relations, as described in the previous chapter (Taylor, 2002: 38).

Subsequently, political risk analysts consider the core threat to be the possibility of ‘expropriation and contract cancelation’ (McKellar, 2010: 27). This phenomenon is often the result of unilateral actions taken by host governments and is typically ascribed to a state’s weakness, delegitimisation or disintegration, affecting the business environment of a TNC (Aoul *et al.*, 2000: 1). In the first instance, nationalisation, or threats thereof, are blamed for the real or imagined risk a TNC could face because of the repossession of resources and commodities by a host-government or other non-affiliated organisations, such as militia groups. Additionally, policy implementation by the host-government with inference for remittances and profit transfers within the TNC, as well as taxes and bribery, which can be legally or illegally demanded, are measured by PRA methodologies in order to determine the political risk faced by the TNC (BERI as analysed by Bischoff, 2010: 27 and McKellar, 2010: 27). Furthermore, the issue of expropriation is addressed in most instances by differentiating between incremental and acute
expropriation. The first is identified by McKellar (2010: 28) as the adjustment of policy arrangements over a long period of time, eventually leading to the full ownership of certain commodities by the national government. It is supposedly harder to guard against incremental expropriation because only the TNC affected by the policy changes will be aware of its effect on the profits and costs to company (McKellar, 2010: 28). Contrary to incremental expropriation, the government could also take on a ‘Robin Hood mentality’ in which a regime takes possession of the TNC’s plants, equipment or other resources in order to run the business to the advantage of the state (Brink, 2004: 129 and McKellar, 2010: 29).

Jensen (2008: 1042) also maintains that even if expropriation is politically popular, voters are more likely to replace a leader with a tarnished reputation. Accordingly, the act of belonging to the community, or to the class of political elites, thus impacts the way in which reciprocity and belonging are employed, and how TNCs that are in the process of negotiating PTAs may use the politicians’ sense of belonging to their advantage (Medvedev, 2012: 50). This highlights the way reciprocity is used by political elites to stay in touch with their communities in order to protect their image (Chabal, 2009: 51). The reputation of either the government or the TNC is often determined by watchdog, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or other actors who could stand to gain from the government’s or TNC’s tarnished reputation, such as: hostile opposition parties, militia groups or competitors in the business environment (Jensen, 2008: 1043 and McKellar, 2010: 59). Being accountable to specific groups thus necessitates specific rules of exchange that regulate reciprocal obligations (Chabal, 2009: 51). Additionally, political elites will often be at the helm of these exercises in order to protect their own self interests or those of patrons or cronies who partake in corruptive practices (Brink, 2004: 126). This means that, because of the tarnished reputation, the TNC and the political elites might not feel the loss of business as severely as the people who were employed by either the TNC or the surrounding and supporting industries. In turn, the political risk is felt with more severity by those who cannot insure themselves against it. In the following chapter, the argument is made that PRA’s preoccupation with governments’ and TNCs’ actions, risks and reputations is based on a pseudo-dichotomy that ignores various other complexities, including the agency of Africans and the effect TNCs have on the perpetuation of risk in their industries and territories (Chabal, 2009: 163 and Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91).

It is also this dichotomy that influences the rise of bribery and corruption. Although the formal economic participants, i.e. the TNCs, are active players in the informal economic activity related to the phenomenon, this fact is often ignored by PRA (Chabal, 2009: 130). This also enables
PRA consultants to use their methodologies to describe politically connected criminality in such a way that it becomes a symptom of under-developed economies, a phenomenon which TNCs should guard themselves against because they are supposedly uninvolved in the creation of this problem (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83 and McKellar, 2010: 20).

This relates to Brink’s (2004:127) discussion of the bureaucratic quality of a country described in terms of economic underdevelopment as it is supposed to offer checks and balances that limit the occurrence of political criminality and its most common manifestation: corruption. Furthermore, McKellar (2010: 21) states that the use of violence to enforce the rule of law also creates a space where corruption, or special payments and bribes, job reservation and favour-for-favour practices take place (Howell, 2014: 4 - 5). According to the ICRG’s introduction to their qualitative approach to PRA, political corruption is a threat to FDI because it negatively influences the economic and financial environment and the reduction of governmental efficiency (Howell, 2014: 4). Moreover, the ability of a government to create or manage a monopoly with discretion, but without accountability, is one of the main attributes of a corrupt government according to Klitgaard (as quoted by Harrison, 2010: 262). It is also corruption which is most easily measured by quantitative social science methodologies because these measurements are supposed to avoid the asymmetrical interpretation of information, which influences perceptions of a government’s palatability for proponents of FDI (Carroll & Jarvis, 2008: 291). NGOs like Transparency International (TI9), who publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), use the so-called unbiased and scientific data to rank countries’ corruption based on the perceptions of business elites and US diplomatic representatives (Batchelor & Hearn, 2013: 5 - 12 and Harrison, 2010: 260, author’s emphasis).

The fact that these business elites and US diplomatic representatives are asked about the informal economy in non-Western countries, is another instance where one set of knowledge systems, in this case a quantitative measurement of perception, is seen as the truth (Foucault as interpreted by Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82). In effect, the act of describing the difference in Africa’s business environment as deviant results in the criminalisation of the state in Africa (Bayart et al., 1999: iii). Corruption and bureaucratic efficiency are considered part of a checklist that measures existence, not quality, in addition to being the prejudiced interpretation of something as biased as perception. The existence of a bureaucracy cannot provide checks and balances because if the bureaucracy lacks specific contextual and nuanced qualities, i.e.

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9 In addition there is also the ‘Publish What you Pay’ initiative, initiated by the international organisation Transparency International (TI), to try and get TNCs to increase their transparency related to the payment of bribes and their involvement in corruptive practices (www.publishwhatyoupay.org).
polyarchic institutions, the bureaucrats could see their position as an opportunity to create their own fiefdoms based on kickbacks and facilitation fees (McKellar, 2010:21). So, while corruption is seen as a criminal activity\(^{10}\), as in the absence of accountability and specifically occurring in the informal economy, it should not necessarily be seen as a symptom of African deviance (Howell, 2014: 5 and McKellar, 2010: 23). In fact, Chabal states that informal economic activity is not synonymous with either privatisation or criminalisation but instead is the process where the modern economic systems interact with the traditional and very public economy in a dynamic way (Chabal, 2009: 130). PRA narratives rarely acknowledge that when the keepers of modernity and the agents of the formal economy are also active participants in the informal economy (as will become clear in the gold-mining industry described in the following chapter), informalisation couldn’t function as a dynamic exchange between the modern and the traditional modes of accumulation in politics and the economy (Chabal, 2009: 131).

Chabal further offers some valuable insight into the phenomenon of corruption and the changing nature of accountability. He states that during the pre-colonial times, rent-seeking was attached to the position of chief or king for the purpose of redistribution of wealth for political, economic and symbolic reasons (Chabal, 2009: 123). The reason why the practice of rent-seeking, so often characterised as a problem of African tradition, is because it changed during colonial times. Detached from the moral and social matrix of collectivism, chiefs were protected by the colonial powers and thus no longer needed to face the consequences of a collective responsibility integral to the origin of this practice (Chabal, 2009: 124). This insight is central to understanding why PRA discourses should be cognisant of the colonial heritage in Africa and the way in which truths about risk perceptions, methodologies and mitigative processes have been structured.

This section highlights some of the important indicators different PRA models use to determine the probability and type of risk a TNC, which is operating in a specific setting, might face. In the following section, the researcher will single out the political instability and the risk it poses to the extractive industries in Africa. This will be done because the way in which PRA is employed in the DRC will be the main reference point for the reconceptualisation of PRA discourses in the following chapter.

**Extractive Industries and PRA in Africa**

\(^{10}\) It is important to note that what is criminal and what is not is a relative and eminently subjective concept that varies across time and societies (Bayart et al. 1999: 13).
African reality in the 21st century is a stark reminder that PRA cannot protect everyone from the effects of governmental instability, war, plague and ignorance as efficiently as it can protect TNCs. The business-centred approach of PRA, discussed above, is likely to secure a permanent position for TNCs in Africa in light of the fact that:

“Africa holds 7% of proven world reserves of oil (compared to 3% for the United States), and the continent also has vast deposits of gold, platinum, diamonds and other gems, and a variety of valuable minerals— including copper, titanium, cassiterite, coltan, uranium, zinc, manganese etc ... This wealth is extracted by more than 1000 companies (not including ‘artisanal’ mining) but the bulk of production is accounted for by a handful of non-African multi-nationals.” (McFerson, 2010: 336)

All the political risk indicators described above, in addition to the various risk indicators omitted, highlight the interest TNCs have in the profit maximising capabilities of Africa’s minerals and other resources. However, the extraction of these minerals often causes deterioration into political and violent chaos, instead of improving the quality of life for the people (Parker & Vadheim, 2014: 2). Consequently, the fact that TNCs believe they are exposed to specific political risks, could mean that FDI is not as abundant as one would expect in these resource-rich conditions. Moreover, the people who can benefit from existing FDI influxes are often marginalised despite their countries’ mineral wealth. This occurrence is popularly known as ‘the resource curse’ (Baldwin, 2002; Emel & Huber, 2007; Geenen, 2012: 324, Standing, 2007 and Gates, 2010).

As a result, the continent remains simultaneously the richest and poorest in the world and Greg Mills (2014: 204) insists that when a country suffers from the resource curse, political competition is sidetracked by patronage and unproductive rent-seeking activities as described above. Additionally, lower political sensitivity to the impact of actions on the economy or the constituencies reinforces the idea that these so-called deviances are uniquely African (Burgis, 2015: 5). This statement is reiterated by Chabal’s (2009: 127) agreement that the exploitation of minerals has not led to sustained economic growth or the improvement of living conditions for the general population in Africa. Possibly the consumption of minerals, which are mined in risk prone areas, also known as conflict-minerals, have an impact on the perpetuation of violence, rather than leading to economic growth in these regions (Parker & Vadheim, 2014: 1).
It has also been reported that the economies of resource rich countries grew two to three times slower than resource poor countries in Africa during the last four decades of the 1900s (Hatcher, 2015: 324). This retardation of economic growth is typically blamed on the insufficiency of democratic institutions, and the lack of adherence to contracts set up between host governments and TNCs (Jensen & Johnston, 2010: 3 and McFerson, 2010: 336). As previously stated, these elite are not only political elite, but also belong to the economic class that acquire their power from revenues accrued from the extractive industries of the non-Western world, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Finally, the dependency of the elite on the exploitation of natural resources for an income contributes to risk perceptions and actualisations in Africa based on the construct of the politically connected criminality (Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91; Shaxson, 2007: 1123 and Standing, 2007: 3).

In a paper written in 1995, Davis (1995: 1765) cites Auty’s statement that uncertain mineral prices and ‘imperfectly meddling governments’ add to the resource curse and will negatively affect FDI. I argue that, because this sentiment has not dissipated in the two decades since this description of resource rich countries, which are, according to Western democratic standards, poorly governed; PRA has easily perpetuated its own existence in recent times, especially because conflict minerals have become a focus in international policy designs (Parker & Vadheim, 2014: 1 - 3).

Also, Jensen and Johnston (2010: 3) argue that there is a connection between conflict within a territory, the abundance of natural resources and a government’s sensitivity to actions that might attract or scare off potential investors: this argument is in accordance with Collier’s (2010: 1109) observations that valuable resources compound the problem of political risk. More plainly, once processes and institutions related to democracy start failing, FDI is typically withdrawn. However, while the instinctive response is that TNCs will not or should not invest in a country that is characterised by bad governance practices, cronyism, patronage or violence; it appears to be the case that these incidences contribute to FDI influxes because the political elites can be more easily incentivised11 (Brink, 2004: 124; Busse & Hefeker, 2007: 1 and McKellar, 2010: 25).

Thus, where investment does take place, it is often tightly controlled so that the spill-over effects for the community are very limited and economic growth, which is supposed to be

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11 Read ‘negotiated through PTAs’ as discussed elsewhere in this dissertation.
the result of FDI, is lacking. In addition, the power of the state is often used solely to employ processes against popular participation through the rolling back of the state’s functions that were supposed to protect labourers in the extractive industry to the bare minimum requirements (Harvey, 2005: 161 and Jensen & Johnston, 2010: 5).

Following the information provided in the previous section, one could also deduce that rent-seeking is viewed by most, if not all, of the PRA models as a contributing factor in the calculation of political risk as well as a reason for the failing African state (Collier, 2010: 1105 and McFerson, 2010: 338). The failure of the state is then subsequently blamed for the increased likeliness that civil war or other kinds of conflict might occur in host countries. BERI (2007), Brink (2004), McKellar (2010) and the PRS group all include violence, or different forms or elements thereof, in their PRA methodologies. Brink (2004: 123 - 124) alone cites six different indicators related to violence, including: political terrorism, the influence of the military in government, a social revolution, and political instability characterised by social revolution, which could alter the prospects of domestic and foreign investors. However, what these methodologies do not account for, and as is argued specifically in the fourth chapter, is that the cause and effect patterns are often viewed as linear; while, in fact, there are variously converging ideals and political and economic interests that are protected by the perpetuation of violence in resource-rich countries.

Actions of violence might induce political risk by altering political decisions, events or conditions often designed to change the status quo or cause disorder through varying interests and ideals aligned with the political leaders themselves (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 71 and McKellar, 2010: 5). In a 2011 paper on political risk in the mining sector, Gharjalo (2011: 287) identifies keywords related to political risk in mining that included ‘terrorism’, ‘violence’, ‘force’, ‘security’ and eleven other indications that political risk might be of specific relevance to TNCs operating in the developing world’s extractive industry. McKellar (2010:4) also states that politics involves activities that are aimed at deciding how a society should be organised; who gets what and how, who decides on laws and which prevailing ideals should be the moral basis for social organisation. This distinctly reiterates Hardy & Maguire’s (2016: 81) characterisation of risk as a dominant discourse that is designed to shape, constrain and organise risk through the normalisation thereof; where governments, terrorist and civil rights groups, watchdogs like the United Nations (UN), and the media are all (political) actors with legitimate or illegitimate power
that is actively or inadvertently influencing the prevalence of political risk in Africa’s extractive industry (McKellar, 2010: 5).

Following the aforementioned argument, Simon (1984: 134) reiterates that PRA is only designed to inform the TNC of how its interaction with the political environment and all of the encompassing actors might provoke or undermine certain behavioural patterns in the host country’s political elite, labour forces and competing companies. The importance of quantification in this project is highlighted by Cattaneo (2006: 58) and essentially rationalises perceived threats in a bid to project Western prejudice on a reality that the West does not understand (Chabal, 2009: 178). The overarching notion is thus that Africa should learn from the development experiences of others rather than projecting itself in terms of domination and exploitation by others (Mills, 2014: 156). This will not happen unless we stop using PRA methodologies as an instrument and effect of power through the riskification of African experiences (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85).

**Concluding Thoughts on the Calculation of PRA in Africa**

This chapter has attempted to show how PRA is a necessary part of capital expansion characterised by a universal extension of the hegemonic power relations that is considered true in as far as it can be quantified and measured (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84). Additionally, the conceptualisation of PRA has shown why it should be re-examined from a Chaballian perspective as certain nuances are clearer when we deviate from the strict quantification favoured by the PRA models discussed in the chapter. How PRA aids the hegemonic development discourses has also been illuminated by emphasising the belief that free-market capitalism will somehow automatically lead to development, while remaining ignorant of the fact that free-market capitalism and formal economies might be a contributing factor to the strength of the informal sector in Africa (Chabal, 2009: 107 and 130). Although more focus was placed on the so-called negative manifestation of the informal economy - including corruption, politically connected criminality and cronyism - there will be more elaboration on this subject in the following chapter where the depiction of the ‘informal as traditional and deviant’ will be considered; while the fourth chapter will show how the informal economy is also a valuable livelihood in the war-torn regions of eastern DRC.

Furthermore, the importance of the quantification and marketability of PRA was explored as discussed by Baldwin (2002), Bischoff (2010), Howell and Chaddick (1994) and Jensen and Johnston (2010). The practice of using these quantified indicators as bargaining chips for PTAs...
in the informal agreements between various elite actors is discussed (Medvedev, 2012: 49). These PTAs include ‘satisfactory’ tax regimes that are calculated by using the supposed proportionate risk to the TNC as a result of government actions to determine how PTAs could mitigate risks faced by the TNC (IMF as quoted by Emel & Huber, 2008: 1401 and Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 72) The consequence of classifying an economic environment as risky inherently results in the ‘othering’ of said economies, leading to the prolongation of the colonial yoke as described by Esteva (2004: 4) and elaborated on in the following chapter.
CHAPTER THREE: REINTERPRETING PRA FROM A CHABALLIAN PERSPECTIVE AND CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDING FOR BEING IN AFRICA

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1869: 1)

Introduction

In accordance with Marx’s statement on history and the emphasis placed on the transmission of circumstances, a primary concern within the context of PRA and power is how circumstances come into existence, both presently, but also from the past. More specifically, who were the producers of past circumstances and what were the conditions that enabled them to transmit their circumstances to the present? One possible answer involves the subjugation of other knowledge systems in order to transmit these circumstances. Concurrently, ways of understanding that facilitated the subjugation of alternative, but equally valid constructs of history have been blamed for the reiteration of coloniality beyond colonialism (Mamdani, 1996: 6 and Mignolo, 1999: 2). Where, according to Quijano (2007: 169) coloniality is the repression of modes of knowing by the objective, supposedly valid ways knowledge is produced by the European, colonial power. What complicates the situation in Africa even further is the fact that, in addition to constructing knowledge in the past and transmitting it to the present, the dominant producers of history - i.e. TNCs and governmental institutions friendly to the colonial powers that were-still make sure that the ideals of those with power are privileged above ideals that are accused of being preoccupied with the bare necessities of tradition (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012: 115). Finally the mystified image of the colonial ways of producing knowledge have meant that even the colonised, in this case Africans, have come to favour it above their own perspectives, images and symbols which make up ways of knowing (Quijano, 2007: 169). Subsequently, this chapter is an attempt to expose the fallacious thought processes underlying the construction and transmission of truths about the past, present and future in a way that highlights PRA’s epistemological colonisation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 49).

Exploring the colonisation of thought processes and their relationship to PRA discourses necessitates extensively drawing on post-colonial theory. Accordingly, the work of Chabal (2009), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012 & 2013), Mudimbe (1988) and Mamdani (1996), and their constructivist interpretation of Africa, will be consulted in order to show how the previous
chapter’s political risk determinants could be reconsidered and applied differently. This reconsideration will primarily focus on post-colonial theory, and its specific interpretation of African experiences related to authority, being, belonging, striving and surviving. Thereafter authority and its relation to power will be expounded on. Thirdly, the definition of Africa as a ‘deviant’ continent, according to the aforementioned discussion on the act of classifying in the previous chapter and the supposed inability or unwillingness to play by the so-called rules of development, will be debated. Finally, this chapter highlights the entrenchment of Africa as a risky environment according to the determinants outlined in the previous chapter and how these can be revaluated from a post-colonial perspective that specifically draws on Chabal’s (2009) conceptualisation of being, belonging, striving and surviving. In the final instance, the aim of this thesis is to create a way of looking at the extractive industry in the DRC that is cognisant of the power relations implied by PRA as an example of Western practices that aim to describe non-Western experiences.

Post-Colonial Theory in Africa

Post-colonial theory encompasses the necessity to re-focus theory so that the ownership of the knowledge and the approaches deviate from Western social sciences so that the focus is more on African-centred approaches (Melber, 2014: vii). Coincidently, post-colonialism has typically been about comparison through the employment of development theories, Marxian theories of dependency, indigenous theories, neo-patrimonial theories (focussing on the conceptualisation of local factors) or democratic theories, all of which are typically concerned with issues related to the standardisation of Western ideals, such as polyarchy or democratic institutionalism (Chabal, 2009: 4 - 6).

This dissertation will not focus on these theories in particular, but rather on the project at large. As one scholar notes, post-colonial theory in Africa specifically draws on the creation of the continent as the point of departure for disputatious and contradiction between the position of the West and the rest of the world in such a manner that it results in hierarchies of power (Mbembe, 2001: 2). Reference will be made to elements of all the aforementioned theories accordingly, while remaining cognisant of the fact that the analyses of these theories contribute to the ambiguity and subjectivity related to the study of Africa (Chabal, 2009: 1 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 51). Additionally, the researcher acknowledges that post-colonial theory may seem ‘un-theoretical’ at times because of its fragmented interpretation of reality, but this also shows that reality is a fragmented concept that should be understood, instead of reduced to quantified checklist agendas. Various Western and non-Western theories related to anti-imperial and anti-colonial
struggles, with reference to the coloniality of knowledge production, will also be explored in an attempt to reconceptualise current understandings of African realities and the supposed impact they have on political risk (Mbembe, 2008: 1).

By recognising that dominant knowledge systems, such as PRA, are situated within Western paradigms, and related to colonial specificities, this section will be better equipped to explore ways of dealing with issues related to the reconfiguring analyses of risk in African societies (Chabal, 2009: 9). Furthermore, the privilege of those who determine how the analysis of society will occur establish unequal distributions of power that impact the way in which resources are used to subjugate knowledge systems that may oppose the dominant history transmitted to the African present (Dei, 2012: 103; Mignolo as cited by Alcoff, 2007: 83). Thus, although coloniality and post-colonial thought are theoretical traditions breaking new ground in the social sciences, the main concern remains the rethinking of society, politics and culture in Africa while revaluing the continent’s relation to the West (Mbembe, 2006: 144).

By recognising that we need to rethink African realities, a number of issues arise. The first of these is that the dominant theoretical paradigms see Western political culture as the epitome of development in addition to being the standard by which all other nations and developmental regions are measured (Chabal, 2009: 2). In reality, these practices not only create the hierarchies of power discussed in the previous chapter, but also perpetuate the myth of a post-colonial world (Alcoff, 2007: 83; Grosfuguel as cited by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 333 and Tlostanova & Mignolo, 2009: 130). What is meant by the myth of post-colonialism is that the unequal distribution of power is believed to persist in the post-colonial era, so descriptions of Africa draw on and validate each other, while, simultaneously, subjugating discourses pitted against the generally accepted canon of pre-set theories such as PRA (Chabal, 2009: xi and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82). In other words, coloniality and post-colonial studies are a reminder that the long-standing patterns of power formed during the colonial era, have not dispersed entirely and still influence the formation of historic discourses as described by the introductory quote (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243).

Following Hardy and Maguire (2016: 84) it is argued that, contemporarily, PRA discourses are contributing to the formulation of history in Africa in a particular way through the particular practices and methodologies employed. The supposed scientific interpretation and value-free descriptors create a recognised truth based on the transmitted interpretation of realities formed in colonial times that aren’t necessarily sensitive to the effects of interpretation or the presence of
those who are in charge of the interpretations (Marx, 1869: 1 and Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91).

Furthermore, because power structures reminiscent of the colonial era persist, the study of Africa as part of the post-colony is highly contentious, subjective and even emotional, but cannot be denied in the name of scientific enquiry (Chabal, 2009: 1). Our emotional response to who we are as Africans and what we represent in the global conundrum of striving and surviving is informed by the inter-subjective awareness of the coloniality we experience, although some experience it more extremely than others (Chabal, 2009: 106 & 127; Jewsiewicki, 2002: 594 and Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 253). Naturally, all analyses of Africa are clouded by the history of colonialism - even if such analyses deny the grand erasure of colonial experiences and the effect this has had on the foundation of social thought and scientific enquiry alike (Connell, 2007: 46 and Mazrui, 2013: 142).

This chapter endeavours to expose how grand erasure is facilitated by PRA’s preoccupation with the hegemonic political and economic projects that assist the expansion of private capital in Africa (Taylor, 2002: 31). Additionally, it seeks to emanate the view of post-colonial scholars: that neo-liberal practices have masqueraded as emancipatory, while perpetuating the colonial, asymmetrical power relations in the world order (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48). This asymmetry manifests in extreme material scarcity, uncertainty and inertia as part of clearly defined bodies of knowledge. In turn, the act of defining Africa as a set of warning signals that is supposed to provide guidelines for the organisation and management of political risk in the various investment territories of the African continent means that power relations are perpetuated through PRA discourses and practices (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 92 and Mkandawire, 2015: 564). Additionally, what Africans have professed about their realities and what the West have (intentionally mis-understood) has been a result of the power relations referred to above and discussed below (Chabal, 1992: 38).

**Power and PRA from a Chaballian Perspective**

Before discussing being, belonging, striving and surviving in Africa, the author will address the issue of authority and power, with specific reference to the various actors serving in the matrices of power, which have been transmitted from the continent’s colonial past and reified in PRA discourses (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b, 332). Specifically, there will be a discussion of Mignolo’s (2000: 19) notion that the colonised are subjected to exploitation and subjugation by hegemonic knowledge systems and assumed authoritative ways of organising reality, as exemplified in the
unbiased identification of political risk factors discussed in the previous chapter (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 87).

The dissertation will refer to post-colonial studies - regarding the premise that modernity, as a discourse and as a practice, would not be possible without coloniality, which has been described as the philosophical re-structuring of Western knowledge-systems in order to prioritise specific relationships within the realm of theory (Connell, 2007: ix; Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 244 and Mignolo, 1999: 2). Throughout this dissertation, the reader should keep in mind that PRA is considered the main contributing discourse with relation to the asymmetrical power relations (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 87).

Given the previous chapter’s depiction of PRA practices, which are concerned with the reification of regulatory regimes and specific governmental practices, it is posited that PRA is the mechanism used to stimulate control over the production of knowledge, not only related to political risk, but also the self-reflective social actions taken by Africans within their current contexts (Chabal, 2009: 7; Jasanoff, 1998: 92; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 49 and Rothstein et al., 2006: 92). Extrapolating from this, the act of studying Africa as the ‘other’ might draw into question the validity and legitimacy of knowledge produced here because the continent has historically been deprived of power via oppression by hegemonic discourses and the erasure of agency in the project of reassessing Africa’s historiography (Chabal, 2009: 7 & 19). The subtraction of agency has, subsequently, resulted in the conceptualisation of patterns of power outside of state structures (à lâ polyarchy) and the definition of identities without consideration for the subordination of the individual to the institution. In addition, the historical causality influencing riskification needs to be studied within the context of being and belonging in Africa and the power imbalances that result from this (Chabal, 2009: 8 & 31; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82; Jewsiewicki, 2002: 594 and Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243).

As a result, the recognition of coloniality is pertinent for the re-narration of the relationship between those who have been ‘othered’ (i.e. the African) and those who have been responsible for critiquing the validity and legitimacy of discourses originating in the West (Chabal, 2009: 2 and Watson, 2013: 8). Hopefully, the re-narration this thesis attempts to make will allow us to place PRA outside centric discourses of modernity, and neo-liberalism and help us determine a means of addressing the superiority of Western theories related to political risk and the application of such theories in terms of the so-called modernisation of Africa as observed by Chabal (2009: 18) and Makdisi (1992: 807).
Theories emanating from the West have been employed in constructing specific identities such as ‘the African being’. These approaches, however, rarely note that the construction of identity needs to be mindful of the place and role the individual fulfils in society, instead of focusing on what this ‘being’ lacks and then interpreting these lacks in terms of Western preconceptions of entity in Africa (Chabal, 2009: 25 and Connell, 2007: 61). These constructions of knowledge that are related to African identities further reiterate knowledge as a form of power that is used to solidify the relations of the self and the other, or the Western and the non-Western, in a manner that gives power to the latter by taking it from the former during descriptions of the African as the other (Foucault as interpreted by Alcoff, 2007: 79).

Those who are privileged by the power relations that result from specific descriptions, i.e. the TNCs operating in Africa, assert themselves by using their ability to define the identity of those with whom they are associated with. In Africa, this often involves binding them in relations of dependency and exercising control over what is known about labour, resources, independent commodity production and political risk; so that what is known favours those with power (Chabal, 2009: 47 and Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 244). Following this argument, one might deduce that the politics of inequality in the realm of knowledge is an indication of the relationship between power and production: in this case, specifically the production of knowledge related to the description of political risk (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83). In addition, the project of knowledge production has its genesis in the colonial expansion of economic enterprise that was, and to some extent remains, dependent on coercion through the use of power (Chabal, 1996: 151-152 and Haugaard, 2010: 1050). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b: 421) reiterates this by stating that the link between the production of discourses, or the amalgamation of various knowledge systems into one discourse, draws on and explains each other, while perpetuating African subjugation. Often this is achieved through the indigenisation of the African people in order to classify them as ‘subordinate’ and ‘risky’ (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82).

Consequentially, it serves the purpose of this chapter to distinguish between ‘power’, as described above, and ‘authority’ as it should be understood throughout this chapter and the next. While power signifies the ability to make others do what one wants (think, for instance, of the first chapter’s discussion of PTAs); authority implies trust, wisdom and persuasion, rather than coercion (Chabal, 2009: 40). The description of power as a form of coercion signifies how the various discourses related to political risk create descriptions of authority that aren’t understood in terms of Chabal’s reciprocal understanding thereof (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84). Thus, if the term ‘authority’ is used in several ways, particularly in the realms of policy and practice, and if
authority is considered to be the legitimate use of power, then the question becomes: “Who is in charge of legitimising power?”

Chabal (2009: 41) offers some insight in this instance by stating that, in Africa, authority, without the endorsement of colonialists or those who conscripted knowledge during this time, meant that African leaders were powerless. Thus, those with the ability to establish relationships with specific power dispensations are still able to legitimate power in Africa (Hurrell & Macdonald, 2012: 556). The author argues in the following chapter that the legitimate use of power by the Congolese state and the endorsement of governments and rebellions by external actors such as the WBG and TNCs, have confused the issue of authority and power in Africa. The constant threat of violence often led to the coercion of African governments into compliancy, related to PTAs and other legislative frameworks, which should mitigate political risk, but often subscribed to dichotomous agendas.

Although these agreements don’t necessarily confirm the legitimacy of those who have power, we see that external tensions, as described in the previous chapter, are not only related to neighbouring countries; but to international organisations, such as the WBG and TNCs operating within the business and PRA environments, and could, consequently, have a positive effect of FDI influxes, leading to more confidence in a specific government (Larson et al, 2015: 229). The insistence on compliance and the coercion of African government representatives via the use of threats to the legitimacy of government authority has led to symbolic violence, which is not overtly measurable (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 421). Also, the inability of political scientists to specifically say how these power relations manifest in Africa complicate the act of analysing the various ways in which Africans have been taught appropriate behaviour by various discourses of PRA, but also other theories that originate in the West (Mamdani, 2005: 3). The common misconception that Western values - such as individualism, equality and economic growth - are phenomena that remain dominant themes in many PRA documents categorising Africa and the DRC as high risk investment territories that should essentially be avoided (Chabal, 2009: 41; Coleman, 2014: 44 and Hurrell & Macdonald, 2012: 557). These statements have been used to the advantage of those who construct these descriptions as instruments of power in order to show how the application of these theories has influenced the DRC’s extractive industries as will be shown in the following chapter (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85).

Accordingly, coloniality serves the asymmetrical, and modern global power structures exemplified in the riskification of certain territories while others are not investigated (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 95 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 50). Consequentially, it is not so much the
behaviour of African individuals as the way in which behaviours can be shaped and described that promotes specific ideals. The ideals related to PRA, as previously discussed, involve the Euro-centric patterns of modernisation and how Africa should develop according to specific conscripts, such as: friendly relations with other countries, institutional democracy, accountability and economic growth; or else it may be described as a risk-prone territory. In contrast, African development is characterised by appropriation, exploitation and control of land, resources and economic wealth by TNCs, and, while these conscripts signify pre-set ideas about the continent, which are exemplified in the calculations of political risk, the influence of external actors on these practices is rarely explored (Chabal, 2009: xi and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 49). The result is that even the most contradictory policies seem to be geared towards the improvement of African economies, but rarely are (Rist, 2010: 20; author’s emphasis).

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 56), these policies result in development disparities between Africa and the West because they are characterised by deliberately constructed asymmetries. In other words, the policies employed to develop Africa serve the agenda of coloniality by perpetuating the asymmetric production of knowledge in the era of economic colonialism. This is possible because these policies often cite FDI influxes as their main objective, although the distribution of the wealth created by FDI is rarely discussed (Medvedev, 2012: 51). The consequences of these deliberately constructed power relations is that African development has been described as insufficient; while the discourses of development, both in politics and economics, have become obsessed with finding the source of these lacks as long as it isn’t in developed societies (Chabal, 2009: xi and Mbembe, 2001: 8). Furthermore, these descriptions symbolise the creation of African tradition as the most convenient channel of blame for the underdevelopment in Africa, while simultaneously implicating a need to organise and manage the inability of Africa to overcome its deviances (Chabal, 2009: 161; Liasidou, 2015: 1 and Mudimbe, 1988: 3). By developing a discourse that projects the need to use specific knowledge systems to overcome the lacks of others, Escobar (1988: 430) asserts that the production of truth has become central to the practice of politics in the developing world. Most notably, this is done through the reification of ideas, the creation of texts and the use of expert knowledge and Western theories in a way that compares the creators of these ideas and theories with those that stand apart from it, i.e. the non-West (Broad, 2010: 296; Chabal, 2009: 5 and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84).

However, the power of discourse goes even deeper. The use of theories and ideals from the West to describe African realities results in the subjugation of the latter, a phenomenon that Mamdani
(1996: 1) referred to as the ‘paralysis of perspectives’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 241). The act of paralysing other perspectives in the case of PRA is done through codifying, modifying and stabilising knowledge related to political risk so that it may be objectively analysed for the purpose of creating a truth (Escobar, 1988: 431; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 56). Finally, Spivak (1988: 69) argues that if knowledge is translated into ideology it should be inherently deceptive and create a false consciousness in the subjected individual. In this instance, the projection of the African being as an inadequate manager of political risk creates within this individual a feeling of inherent inferiority which impacts his ability to represent himself in a political arena (Doyle, 2007: 8 and Hudson & Melber, 2014: 2). The following section will unpack this incomplete being and how this impacts the realms of belonging.

**Being and Belonging**

In the previous section, the researcher tried to show how the creation of knowledge employed by PRA practitioners influences the dispensation of power. The author also differentiated between power and authority in an attempt to highlight the asymmetrical nature of relations of power and the act of legitimisation. Here, we explore how individuals organise themselves in ways that impact the distribution of power as well as the various settings in which this is done. Chaballian categorisations of African reality will be drawn on extensively, both in the instance of the individual being as an actor and the way in which the individual conceives of himself as part of multiple instances of belonging (Chabal, 2009: 23 & 41). Being in Africa will be examined in terms of origin, identity and locality in order to see how specific descriptors of risk could be reinterpreted, before moving on to the politics of belonging and how this could be described in terms of kin, reciprocity and those that are classified as strangers. In each instance, the intention is to show how international tensions and domestic unrest, government stability, contract cancellation and politically connected criminality might be reinterpreted.

In the first instance, being has distinct political implications specifically related to the place in which a person was born and the role he/she fulfils in their society (Chabal, 2009: 25). To complicate matters in the case of Africa, as hinted at above, the African being is described specifically in terms of difference and deviance in comparison to the describer (Liasidou, 2015: 2 and Mbembe, 2001: 3). In this instance then, a person’s origins have implications for the description of his or her identity, specifically in terms of how history and community relations influence the identity of that individual (Chabal, 2009: 27). It has been argued that because the being in Africa is defined in terms of his otherness, or the coloniality of his being, he suffers
from ontological obliteration and therefore cannot describe his own reality outside of ethnic conscripts (Chabal, 2009: 26; Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 258). Although this should be regarded as untrue, ethnicity does link the individual to a specific location that constitutes land, ancestors and belief systems and although these links are decidedly traditional, we argue against its description as inferior. Each one will not be distinctively described here, but instead an overview of how origin is related to the overarching theme of this dissertation (i.e. the politics of risk analyses as it is employed in the eastern DRC\textsuperscript{12}) will be provided.

Primarily, an individual’s origin constitutes the physical site to which an individual belongs, and, as such, is an important part of his/her identity. The relationship the individual subsequently has with his/her place of birth and the surrounding area has implications for the way in which he/she organises his/her life (Chabal, 2009: 28). This also means that an individual’s occupation is linked to the surrounding geography and the livelihoods of individuals — where livelihoods are to be understood as a people-centred mode of economic organisation in opposition to the profit-maximising goals of TNCS — are a result of what the surrounding land offers; for instance, farmlands, forests, minerals or water masses (Chabal, 2009: 28 & 36 and Morse & McNamara, 2013: 3). This dissertation is particularly concerned with the ways individuals organise their livelihoods within the artisanal mining sector in such a way that it forms part of their identity. As an informal economic activity, it supposedly threatens a TNC’s ease of doing business in the DRC while simultaneously providing the context within which the individual can form and describe his/her identity both in relation to the community that shares his/her occupation and the land that offers mineral deposits. The environment is also the stage upon which the local political economy is formed as will be discussed in due course. Finally, because livelihoods are linked to the creation of identity and because many TNCs have influenced the way in which jobs in the mining industry of the DRC have been rearticulated in recent times, people have dissociated themselves from the land, causing loneliness and desperation (Disasi\textsuperscript{13} as quoted in Van Reybrouck, 2015: 45; Geenen, 2014: 91 and Katen, 2014: 37).

This shows that the ways in which African identities are described, in the context of formal business practices and PRA, do not only result in the construction of identities in terms of the land, but also the relations the land allows individuals to form (González, 2014: 399). The locality of the individual, as part of a concrete world riddled with specific constructs of

\textsuperscript{12} For a full discussion of the applicability of PRA and Chaballian theory to the gold-mining industry of the eastern DRC, please refer to the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{13} Disasi is a Congolese man who, according to the author of \textit{Congo: The Epic History of a People} (Van Reybrouck, 2015), lived to be almost 120 years experiencing colonialism in the Belgian Congo first hand.
knowledge, makes an autonomous or truly liberal being nearly impossible in Africa because of the centrality of origin and the reciprocal ties implied thereby (Hickey, 2011: 30; Hudson & Melber, 2014: 2 and Mamdani, 2001: 14). The validation of our identities is thus reliant on the maintenance of certain reciprocal relationships with other individuals within an environment characterised by specific constructs of conduct (Mbembe, 2001: 17). These constructs are complex ways of being that aren’t easily quantified or described in terms of check-list agendas of concrete scientific analyses, which means that when PRA practices do address these issues, they are often inferior to knowledge, which can be organised in such a way.

Accordingly, the construction of identity also brings into question the ways in which all the encompassing issues related to identity have been subverted under the rubric of tribalism. In addition, the influence of PRA contributes to the subversion of the traditional to the Western ways Africans have instrumentalised their own identities, often favouring the last mentioned conscripts because of the superior links thereto (Chabal, 2009: 31). González (2014: 399) further asserts that the many spheres of one’s identity might even cause a duality within the self, which influences the relationship of an individual with his fellow human, and also to the structures and discourses of modernity (González, 2014: 399 and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 95). Subsequently, the way in which we view ourselves as Africans is intimately connected to how we analyse our being in relation to others, and how we identify the markers of our being within specific knowledge systems such as PRA (Chabal, 2009: 31 and Doyle, 2007: 4). The distinct consequences this has for the individual, is that he becomes subjected to constant awareness of what his identity, as an African, means in terms of the endemic specificity of knowledge on the continent: specifically so-called superior realities such as those circumscribed by political risk discourses (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 250 and Mbembe, 2001: 25). Furthermore, Chabal (2009: 36) warns against the oversimplification of the experience of being African in the post-colonial epoch where individuals are no longer traditional customary creatures, but aren’t considered to be participants in modernity either. This oversimplification enables the objectification of the African in terms of a number of PRA descriptors, including being corrupt, prone to violence, and/or inherently inferior (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243 and Mbembe, 2001: 24).

Accordingly, the characterisation of the African being as an object of animosity produces conditions within which the colonisers and the colonised exist together in the same area, but without the same amount of control over what this co-existence means (Mbembe, 2001: 27). We argue that insight into these unequal modes of existence is particularly lacked on the part of the coloniser because his characterisation of being in Africa unquestionably assumed the superiority
of Western ways of being. Consequently, this lack of insight has been transmitted to the present-day, and TNCs operating in the industry of mineral extraction on the continent are equally guilty of assessing the presence of Africans as a contributing factor to political risk (Kelly, 2014: 102). This also translates into the classification of African communities through a series of deficits or ethnic hierarchies, which, today, still validates intervention by neo-liberal institutions such as the WBG and risk mitigation practices informed by PRA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 50). Following Fanon, Maldonado-Torres (2007: 253), who explain that the coloniality of being means that the African does radiate ontological weight and his interaction with other beings is characterised by irrationality, which validates political intervention, even in the present-day.

We specifically want to refer to the aforementioned discussion on power as authority, where power supposedly originates from the ability to create and transmit knowledge. Knowledge about Africans is consequently constructed in terms of an apparent inability to formulate technical or scientific enquiry, which presupposes an ontological inferiority in the eyes of Western theorists and political analysts. Nevertheless, the supposed authoritative dismissal of the African being’s ability to escape his irrationality, is, in itself, a politicised judgement that carries weight only because the statement emanates from the scientific theories (here we draw indirectly from Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 87). The classification of the African as an irrational being devoid of all common sense leads to structures of modernity that are always productions of difference: in other words, structures of modernity form discourses that validate specific forms of knowledge by drawing on descriptive texts that reify the need for comparison (González, 2014: 399; Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 253 and Spivak, 1988: 72).

One such knowledge structure that is related to identity, but could also be applied to polyarchy is the description of oneself as a citizen; most commonly described in terms of affiliation with a specific ethnic group or nationality that signals the way in which relationships of belonging are structured in social and political contexts (Chabal, 2009: 97 and González, 2014: 400). Subsequently, because colonial rule ossified ethnicity as an instrument of social identity within arbitrarily drawn borders, the consequences for the ‘ethnicisation’ of economic and political life for the lives of Africans is still felt today. Specifically, these consequences include how the strength of borders stimulates the deployment of political power, in the polyarchic sense of the word; where the loyalty of the politician to his ethnic origins and the rivalry between different ethnic groups facilitate incidences of political risk as is currently the case in the eastern DRC (Chabal, 2009: 33 and Mamdani, 1999: 54). PRA conceptualisation of internal tension does state how ethnic identity might be related, but doesn’t recognise the brevity of this importance.
Consequently, Mbembe’s conceptualisation of borders as political structures that influence the construction of identities and distribution of power in Africa is relevant:

“The dogma of the ‘inviolability of the borders inherited from colonialism’ is being flouted — not in the sense of uncontrollable outbreaks of separatist fever leading to an irreversible break-up of the territorial framework of postcolonial states, on the model of Yugoslavia, but in the sense that identity pressures, dynamics of autonomy and differentiation, various forms of ethno-regionalism, migration pressure, a rising salience of religion, and the accelerated shift of African societies into the so-called parallel economy.” (Mbembe, 2001: 86)

Chabal (2009: 33) also argues that because Africans belong to ethnic groups within and across borders, the African politician should be favoured by the politicisation of ethnicity in the parallel economy of patrimonialism because the access this individual has to material prosperity is facilitated by connected criminality and related to his position within the matrices of power as it is described in the previous chapter. According to McKellar (2010: 20), this influences the quality of the bureaucracy and the occurrence of bribery and corruption in the parallel economy. The researcher will discuss this phenomenon in depth in the following section, but now it should be noted that current discourses of African economies cite bribery and corruption as an endemic problem of African economies because it is so closely related to the conscripts of belonging to specific, traditional matrices of power in Africa. Thus, the description of corruption or partisan economic activity as an African problem is reified because these phenomena can also be explained in terms of being and belonging. This comment does not suggest that actions of corruption and politically connected criminality should be condoned, but, simply, that it should be understood within specific contexts that may or may not be the result of colonial realities that have been transmitted from the past to the present, as well as being mutually influenced by the West and the non-West (Chabal, 2009: 39).

According to Chabal (2009: 43), the various ways in which a person can belong are conceived of as circles that overlap and occur consecutively, ultimately guiding the individual in the process of conceptualising his identity in terms of how he belongs and what these ways of belonging mean in the concrete world. Furthermore, because of the importance of belonging, relationships of honour and debt take precedence over professional or social obligations (Chabal, 2009: 45). Contemporarily, these social obligations often manifest as forms of patrimonialism and connections between rich and poor, the powerful and powerless, as well as urban and rural connections where ‘kinship’ relations represent belonging (Chabal, 2009: 46). Additionally,
belonging and patrimonialism is characterised by ‘reciprocity’, which encompasses exchange, representation and accountability in a non-Western way. These concepts are vital to the project at hand because reconceptualising PRA discourses related to: politically connected criminality and corruption, the reservation of jobs, favour-for-favour practices, and, especially, the payment of bribes between the elite classes of the government and economy; are implicated in these obligatory relationships (Howell, 2014: 4 - 5).

Berman (1998: 306) states that if we think of corruption simply as a malevolent form of patrimonialism, we become ignorant of the fact that reciprocity manifests differently in different societies. However, this largely depends on one’s understanding of exchange, representation and accountability (Fox, 2010: 245 and Pardo, 2004: 3). Corrupt economic and political practices could thus be seen as a symptom of power asymmetries within the professional and social structures of belonging, rather than viewing these phenomena as a sign of African deviance (Chabal, 2009: 93). Furthermore, reciprocity implicates the exercise of power outside the formal institutions that are characteristic of polyarchy; and is subsequently seen as a contributing risk factor related to corruption and the trias politica. Consequentially, the accountability encompassed by reciprocal relations cannot be confined to the realm of elections alone, because the complexity of representation goes beyond the simple institutionalism analysed by PRA practices (Chabal, 2001: 55 & 110). The operation of the elite outside of formal institutional restrictions such as elections, means that the manipulation of the political system occurs easily and enables the abuse of patrimonial forms of accountability between elites (Chabal, 2009: 15 & 55). Finally, we concur that the reciprocal relations, which are considered backward and traditional, have been used to serve the matrices of power identified by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 48).

Hence, the accountability of the elite is sanctioned by both national and regional reciprocal ties, in addition to the traditional and modern forms of representation. But these sanctions are categorised in such a way that those who are participants in the traditional relations of belonging are subsumed by those who are protected by politically sanctioned truths, such as those created by PRA discourses. Subsequently, representation is important for our understanding of reciprocity because the elites who govern on a national level need to embody the qualities of the community as determined by specific markers of being, in matters of material and symbolic consequence (Chabal, 2009: 52 - 53). Furthermore, the ability to determine who is included or excluded from the parameters of reciprocity and corruption might necessitate the reconceptualisation of corruption in terms of gift-giving between like-minded individuals who share the same origins (Harrison, 2010: 257). Berman (1998: 306) even goes as far as stating that
the political agendas concerned with promoting democracy and good governance in African states have failed because of Western misconceptions of patronage, corruption and tribalism - where these phenomena are modern versions of traditional reciprocity, without taking into account how these conceptualisations are informed by Western ideals of African inferiority (Chabal, 2009: 50). Finally, the multiple meanings of reciprocity, specifically related to accountability, means that the scope of elections are insufficiently correlated with political power because elections validate power of the African elites in respect to Western institutions alone (Chabal, 2009: 51 & 55 and Yuval-Davies, 2006: 203).

Following the aforementioned narrative of being and belonging, the generally accepted idea that corruption is a political risk factor is based solely on the so-called inferiority of African politics and practices of receptive generosity. Following Maldonado-Torres (2007: 260), we further argue that the status and understanding of corruption should take into account that the construction of corruption as an endemic issue in Africa fails to take into account the relationship between patronage and the colonial heritage of African industrialisation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 56).

The ossification of corruption as a traditional phenomenon by Western theorists meant that supposedly vague cultural rules of exchange could be problematised in ways that served the holders of power, which not only included colonialists but contemporarily also involves TNCs and other international organisations that are interested in political risk in Africa (Chabal, 2009: 51). As previously stated, current PRA practices seem ignorant of the fact that African traditions based on reciprocity served as a way for advocates of colonial power to connect with leaders of African communities and manipulate them into using their power in specific ways (Chabal, 2009: 91, 92 - 96). Today clientelism still occurs in the form of rent-seeking and PTAs as explained by Matti (2010: 402), who specifically studied the effect of the resource curse in Africa. According to her, the signing of mining deals, which are often characterised by PTAs, has not resulted in the vast economic growth professed by the WBG. Instead, countries with large mineral deposits, like the DRC, have shown an inverse correlation between mineral wealth and economic growth, a phenomenon Caspary (2012: 171) attributes to pervasive corruption and political risk, which might originate from reciprocal relationships within African communities, but which have been perverted by TNCs and advocates of Western power (Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91).

Consequently, it is the researcher’s argument, following Chabal (2009: 93), that colonial power has changed the practice of reciprocity to the point where it has been severed from all morality
related to representation and relies on the hegemonic idea that Africa is essentially tribal and essentially corrupt. Additionally, the coloniality of being is concerned with the elimination of some elements of belonging, such as reciprocity, because of the over-simplified descriptions of these phenomena in terms of deviance. These descriptions, however, only contribute to the idea that these phenomena amplify political risk, instead of taking into account all the complex nuances encompassed and the influences therein (Chabal, 1992: 36; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012: 115; Liasidou, 2015, 1 and Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 258).

Moreover, oversimplification negatively influences knowledge-construction where accountability and reciprocity are concerned, and specifically the role these conscripts play in PRA discourses. One important issue is the question of who holds who accountable and what the material realities of this accountability are. Concurrently, this research has already drawn attention to the fact that we need to consider the elements that enable PRA discourses to subjugate other descriptions of exchange, representation and accountability. This emanates from the descriptions of accountability discussed in the previous chapter which are not sensitive to the context within which the assessment occurs, which only focus on the so-called inefficiency of African governments to curtail the problem of corruption (Chabal, 2009: 86 & 90). Accordingly, African governments are blamed for the issue of corruption, while TNCs actively lobby PTAs. The question ultimately becomes one of responsibility and reciprocity, not among Africans alone, but within supposedly legitimate negotiations of PTA among TNCs and governmental elites.

What is meant by the aforementioned statement is that, based on the manipulation of traditional factors by the political elite; African and Western, as well as their supposed disconnection from the original moral representation, become able to classify some as political masters, while others are categorised as ‘political subjects’ (Chabal, 2009: 54). Accordingly, the distribution of power and the material well-being associated with these power dispensations is simplified to the point where you either belong to the class of political masters or suffer the material consequences (Fox, 2010: 245). In a sense then, the African elites become gatekeepers for Western business interests and draw revenue from taxes and patrimonial exchanges, from those who are supposedly prone to deviant behaviour (i.e. other Africans), but also those who are considered superior to accountability because they circumscribe the matrices of power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 53). Furthermore, the ability to apply labels related to political risk means that specific power is linked to the quantitative measures of performance or accountability. This enables Western countries to assess non-Western countries - according to structural indices of power
related to neo-liberal business practices and institutional democracy - in such a way that it has a debilitating effect on those who are labelled political subjects (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2015: 10 - 11).

The basis of this argument is thus that Africans alone are not responsible for the abuse of power and the material consequences of corruption as measured by PRA methodologies. Instead, the elites of the West and the non-West alike reify the power relations created by the labelling systems employed in dominant discourses on being and belonging (Chabal, 2009: 90 and Harrison, 2010: 257). The discussion has further shown how deliberate misguidance with regard to being and belonging in Africa has shaped corruption and accountability discourses, which ultimately influences PRA practices. Social theories have failed to sufficiently account for the lived experiences of multiplicity and complexity, beyond what Mbembe (2001: 8) refers to as the ‘lazy categories of permanence and chronology’. The researcher implores the reader to interpret the last paragraph as ‘a deliberate attempt to counter those approaches that stressed the structural features of African societies, especially neo-patrimonialism’ and that this approach is the author’s express aim and will become clearer in the following discussion of striving and surviving (Chabal, 2009: 10).

**Striving and Surviving**

Many attempts have been made to determine the reasons why the political economy in Africa has failed to develop in relation to the world economy (Chabal, 2009: 106). As the previous discussion of being and belonging has shown, there exist a myriad of Western prejudices related to tradition and PRA discourses that discuss governance in Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 332). This section argues that the politics of ‘striving’ are a result of the entrapment African economies suffers within the matrices of power established during colonial times. In addition, Chabal’s conceptualisation of striving and its composite elements - labour, trade and rent – will be drawn on. In the second instance, the focus will be on the politics of ‘surviving’, which will offer a preliminary discussion on the process of informalisation in the economy. This discussion will be expanded on in the following chapter’s analyses of ASM in the DRC.

The politics of striving and surviving is relevant for the project of re-narrating political risk, as is attempted here, because these aspects of life in Africa exemplify the aggregation of specific institutional and quantifiable characteristics used to describe imperfections in African economies (Mbembe, 2001: 24). As seen in the aforementioned section, the institutional prerequisites for democracy described by Dahl’s conceptualisation of polyarchy are similarly employed, except
that the focus here is on economic factors rather than democratic ones (Dahl, 1978: 14). Nevertheless, ideals regarding economic growth mimic the viewpoint that Africa should assimilate imported, Western ideals that are commonly found in the check-list agendas, which include, but are not limited to PRA practices. Particularly, through the creation of benchmarks that measures the success or failure of market forces in Africa by comparing them to Western markets; these practices are able to confirm the inferiority it so diligently created during the colonial epoch (Chabal, 2009: 107). Following Alcoff’s (2007: 82) interpretation of Mills (2007: 82), it should be stated that these check-lists, exemplified by polyarchy and PRA, are evidence of the epistemologies of ignorance that obscure social striving and surviving in Africa.

The power dispensations identified in the previous discussion of PRA are exemplified in the rhetoric of Africa as an entrapped continent that is unable to free itself from clientalism and practices of corruption. Concurrently, these countries are left at the mercy of those who are able to design policies that should supposedly free them from the shackles of traditionalism, based on the assumption that these countries need salvation (Chabal, 2009: 107). The adoption of various SAPs and the correct set of neo-liberal economic policies are often portrayed as the panacea for these perceived debilitating traditional economic practices (Broad, 2010: 294). These programmes are additionally designed to facilitate the adoption of technical, simplistic and shallow solutions that are advocated by the WBG and supposedly address the factors which impinge on the prospects of economic development on the continent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 59). The WBG consequentially controls, either directly or indirectly, the knowledge of economic development in a way that maintains the paradigms of neo-liberalism as the main process of development14 (Broad, 2010: 295). This way of constructing realities symbolises the systematic process whereupon the West has placed itself on a pedestal as the example and conceptual starting point for defining all others similar to the discussion of PRA practices (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 334).

Chabal (2009: 107) warns that if we reduce economic discussions to what is on the agenda of economists, Western or otherwise, the chances of overlooking the experience of Africans in the economy are great. The informalisation of the African economy, as embodied by ASM, is often portrayed as a threat to long-term economic investment and a contributing factor to political risk, instead of a way in which people can make a living (Chabal, 2009: 12). Furthermore, the prescriptive discourses of PRA and other Western theories related to development are evidence

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14 The IMF did publish a report in June of 2016, stating that the idea of neo-liberalism might have been oversold and that a more nuanced and balanced understanding of what neo-liberal policies involves in the developing world should be developed. For the full report visit www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/pdf/ostry.pdf.
of economic prophetism and political activism that is imposed on Africa through the negotiation of PTAs or the mitigation of perceived risks. This is often done without consideration of how PTAs or mitigating policies influence the informal economy, or the way in which political risk is viewed accordingly (Mbembe, 2001: 9). Additionally, PTAs are supposedly designed to facilitate a process of change and growth; however, Cornwall (2010: 3) hypothesises that developmental policies are too scientific and have moved beyond the understanding of lay people. Development policies are accordingly left to so-called experts who are supposed to be equipped with an objective understanding of what the truth is, but often these understandings are shaped through the subjugation of alternative interpretations (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84 and Obeng-Odoom, 2013: 153). These experts also draw on the knowledge that is produced and substantiated by already existing sets of knowledge often produced by institutions such as the WBG, which supposedly represent unbiased interpretations of the truth (as discussed by Broad, 2010: 295). In turn, these Western institutions are able to optimise economic opportunity for those who ascribe to their regimes of truth by redefining the economy in Africa in terms of what is expected of African governments (Brigg, 2002: 423 - 424 and Foucault as interpreted by Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85). The reality is that the material consequence of development is restricted to the accumulation of wealth in various groups of origin and largely reliant on the extraction of rent among like-minded individuals with specific obligations, according to the aforementioned discussion of reciprocity (Chabal, 2009: 83 & 110).

Since the inception of wealth extraction in Africa’s development has been used as a disguise for the economic interests of those who have a vested interest in the mineral wealth, one could argue that it has prevailed longer in Africa than in other parts of the world (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1394). This might be because of the ease with which rent is extracted, and the lack of accountability to the people with regard to its redistribution. However, as mentioned elsewhere, the link between rent, as a marker of reciprocity, and accountability has been broken due to the fact that African elites were held accountable to colonial rulers, rather than to their own constituents in that epoch (Chabal, 2009: 123). The transmittance of that reality, to our current time, is directly related to the sub-alternity of economies in Africa through the production of knowledge that supports Western economic expansion and has greatly influenced the distribution of economic wealth, which, ultimately, has political consequences that could implicate risk (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1394 and Mignolo, 1999: 2). The most viable way for Africans to ‘survive’ remains their own, direct involvement in the formal economy.
Chabal (2009: 128) defines the informal economy not as an economic arena *per sé*, but as the convolution of socio-cultural and political elements that include reciprocity in all forms in such a way that it facilitates economic survival. Additionally, the informal and traditional are not synonymous. The informal economy is comprised by those economic activities that lay outside of the formal control of the state (Chabal, 2009: 130). The prevalence of informal economic activity is further derived from the inability of polyarchic governments to regulate economic activities; so formal and informal economic activities became creatively blurred in order to facilitate the distribution of wealth among African communities. One of the main ways informal economies contribute to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Africa is due to the growing number of the urbanised poor and the survivalist instinct of the African diaspora. Therefore, surviving is the struggle against the masqueraded hegemony of coloniality and the business-centred approaches to policy design (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 52 and Potts, 2012: 171 - 172).

The informal economy is also evidence that the traditional and the modern economic activities in Africa are part of the dynamic construction of agency (Chabal, 2009: 130). While many Africanists have argued that African leaders have no control over policy interventions, the fact is that leaders often act on behalf of private factions related to their experience of belonging to specific elitist classes (Mkandawire, 2015: 567). Essentially, the apex of global coloniality, represented by institutions such as the WBG and the UN, essentially survive because of the constant reproduction of monopolies and the creation of truth related to violence, politics and epistemicides that manipulate African leaders into acting exclusively in terms of business-centred policy adjustments (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 7). Furthermore, the colonial project that persists today is evidenced by the ‘tentacles of the Wall Street octopus’ which comprises governments, individuals, and most importantly, TNCs; who pursue profit maximising opportunities at all costs, while justifying these actions by stating that it is within the formal economic framework (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 10).

Conversely, the exclusion of many populations in Africa from the enjoyment of material gains caused an increase in informal economic activities (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012: 117). When people live in economic conditions that cut them off from their interests and needs, the result is people who live in perpetual and systemic confrontation with those who are privileged by certain modes of understanding (Marx as cited by Spivak, 1988: 71). But this does not account for what Mamdani (2005: 3) calls the political legacy of colonialism defined in terms of the legal and institutional repercussions reproduced by particular political identities in present-day Africa. Coincidently, the use of informal economic activities, such as rent-seeking, in order to exploit the formal economy, is an attempt to accumulate resources that were previously unavailable to
those who didn’t belong to specific groups of being (Chabal, 2009; 131). The absence of, or proximity to, resources subsequently has an influence on the ability of the individual to act within his or her environment, regardless of specific matrices of belonging. In fact Chabal (2009: 11) states that:

“If the keepers of ‘modernity’ and the agents of the formal were not also active participants, informalisation would not function as it does.” (Chabal, 2009: 131)

Hence, because governance in Africa contains elements of patronage in the informal economic sector, the rapacious activities in the extractive industries, are more likely to occur under the control of official state structures although this is not the fault of the African governments alone (Chabal, 2009; 131 and Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012: 124). Although a large part of striving in Africa is marked by the growing power of finance capital, the flexibility of the informal economy makes for remarkably resilient opportunities related to the extraction of rent promoted by belonging within specific political ties (Chabal, 2009: 111 - 112 and Mamdani, 2005: 4). By continuing the habit of looting as a means of accumulation, the post-colonial state is prone to the suffocation of development in favour of personal patronage and reciprocal obligations to business elites (Medvedev, 2012: 51 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 62). Nevertheless, these conditions stifle the politics from surviving in the same way colonial governance did almost a century ago. The demands of Western actors, like TNCs “enclosed in the narrow horizon of ‘good governance’” have essentially been concerned with social engineering and the construction and promotion of specific knowledge-systems (read PRA) than with understanding the ways in which belonging and being are complexly inter connected with the economy, especially those elements outside of state–control, related to surviving in these troubled economies (Mbembe, 2001: 7). In fact;

“The reality for most Africans is the overwhelming dominance of what economists call the informal sector. The label itself betrays the difficulty they face in understanding the systemic nature of this economic activity, which is only informal in that it cannot be taxed. But in a place where most of the economy is informal it should be seen as the real economy.” (Chabal, 2009: 108)

Concluding Comments Related to the Subjugation of Discourses

Throughout this discussion, it has been shown that understanding the signifiers of African life - exemplified in the discussions of authority, being, belonging, striving and surviving - are of
pivotal importance in this discussion of knowledge construction in Africa. Following Chabal (2009: 87), this chapter highlighted the relationships between the powerful and the powerless, the rulers and the ruled, and the politicians and the populace. The author has also specifically honed in on the way in which discourses related to political and economic realities in Africa have been more concerned with supposed realist and objective assumptions than with the description of phenomena as they really occur in the continent (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82). This was particularly important for the discussion of authority and the legitimisation of power in Africa. The discussion of power specifically outlined the asymmetries in the distribution of power as it is facilitated by the construction of knowledge related to political risk (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b, 332). It has, accordingly, been the researcher’s focus, in this instance, to show how PRA could be considered one knowledge system that is specifically equipped to subjugate other truths. One of the alternative knowledge systems that does not support the widely shared narratives of risk and the descriptors used to analyse political risk in Africa, is the Chaballian perspective, as outlined throughout this chapter. As the section on power and authority specifically shows, the re-narration of PRA is necessary in Africa because conventional discourses reified the dominance of the West in policy discussions on the continent. Following Mbembe (2001: 12), it is evident that an authentic balance between the ‘traditional’ African experience and the experience of the African, as an alienated being, is possible if the analysis of such experiences takes into consideration how power dispensations influence the description of the experiences of a being and his/her relation to political and economic risk analyses.

Secondly, the politics of being have been described, especially in the context of Maldonado-Torres’ (2007) notion of the coloniality of being, before showing how Chabal (2009) conceptualises being and belonging with specific inference to identity formation and reciprocity. These conceptualisations are very important for the process of reconfiguring PRA because they show how the ‘traditional’ cannot always be equated with the inefficiency of government. In fact, the notion of belonging in different ways impacts the ability of constituents to hold their politicians accountable, where reciprocal ties are stronger with the elitist classes that are represented by TNCs; corruption, rent-seeking and patrimonialism often occur with more frequency While the importance of this discussion will become more applicable in the next chapter, it has been shown how the construction of identity and reciprocity, in terms of PRA descriptors, like governance and political stability, should feature in efforts to reconceptualise PRA. The point of importance here was to show how corruption could be considered in terms of obligation, without condoning or ascribing corruption and politically connected criminality as an outright endemic issue of African politics.
With regards to the extraction of rent, the chapter went on to discuss the economics of striving and surviving as discussed by Chabal (2009). Of particular interest was the informal economic sector as a signifier of the need to survive in addition to the way relationship between the formal and the informal sectors are co-dependent in Africa. In turn, the relationship between informal economic activity and the formal business activities of TNCs and the presence of the WBG in Africa support the argument that the presence of TNCs in Africa has an impact on instances of political risk (Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91). This is a pivotal point for the overarching theme of this dissertation as it distinctively points to the reason why a reconceptualisation of PRA is possible and necessary.

In the first instance, it has been outlined that what is essentially described as deviant African behaviour, which should be confined to the realm of the ‘traditional’ is an advantageous description for TNCs who generally deny their influence on political risk. Accordingly, a contextualised concept of PRA should show how TNCs not only impact political risk by being present, but, more specifically, affect the way knowledge about the factors of PRA are in favour of those who do the analyses. Finally, this chapter shows that political experiences in Africa, which are related to the aforementioned themes, are understood in a unilateral way that projects ignorance of the structural modes related to the construction of discourses that have been inherited from colonialism and are consequently being employed in PRA (Mudimbe, 1988: 4).
CHAPTER FOUR: APPLYING CHABBALLIAN THEORY AND THE NOTION OF RISKIFICATION TO THE DRC

“The central argument is that the rebels do not just concentrate on economic predation, but are actually engaged in the selling of protection, in particular to a group of capitalist transnational traders on the Congo-Ugandan border.”
(Raeymaekers, 2010: 564)

Introduction

Raeymaekers’ (2010: 564) statement is built on the presumption that the Congolese government, rebels and TNCs all benefit from trade in eastern DRC which remains embedded in the exploitative divisions of power in this post-colonial nation state. As the previous chapter revealed, these power relations have their roots in the colonial influence of the North in Africa, and the DRC specifically, and the continuation of colonial governance and manipulative practices established during this time. In addition, the influence of envy and power described by van Reybrouck (2015: 38) and Chabal (2009: 94) had repercussions for accountability and patrimonialism, as hinted at in the previous chapters, which will be discussed more exhaustively here.

As such, this chapter highlights the importance of power dispensation in Africa by specifically focussing on the lived experiences of the African people, in terms of being and belonging, within government and ASM communities, respectively, and the riskification of their livelihoods through the employment of PRA as described it in the second chapter of this dissertation. The DRC, as a case study, will be drawn on, with specific reference to the actors that are involved in the DRC’s artisanal mining industry in the Kasanga, Kasai and Kivu provinces as they were formerly known. Also, in accordance with the fourth research objective, this chapter explores the interpretation of risk perceptions as it manifests in the DRC, with particular relevance to the extraction of gold in this country and how other understandings of perceptions or risk indicators might alter the way we calculate risk in this country, specifically, but in Africa and other parts of the so-called developing world.

Importantly, the coloniality of power discussed in the previous chapter has implications for the description of risk as discussed in the second chapter and the way it is perceived in the DRC, as shown here (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 43). This research also explores the formation of various relationships based on power dispensations and influenced by
the interaction of the Congolese people, especially the elites, as compatriots in the colonial and post-colonial epochs, and the effect this has had on the DRC’s perpetual resource curse the DRC since its 1960 independence from Belgium (Burgis, 2015: 53; Hudson & Melber, 2014: 1 and Van Reybrouck, 2015: 38).

Congolese identities were, and still are, created within these exploitative power relations, which are founded on the wealth accumulated through the various extractive industries, including gold-mining (Chabal, 2009: 7; Mamdani, 1999: 54; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48 and Rayemaekers, 2010: 564). This led to the gradual reinterpretation of existing regulatory frameworks that contribute to empire building and determine power dispensation among the Congolese, as well as between the DRC and the rest of the world (Bayart, 2000: 218; Chabal, 2010: 110 and Rayemaekers, 2010: 564). The researcher argues that one such regulatory framework in the current epoch is PRA because, as argued in the second chapter, the narratives related to political risk analyses construct realities in ways that favour quantifiable, fact-based analyses, which are more relevant to TNCs than to the Congolese as African beings (Kebede, 2011:99).

These unequal relationships further represent the way in which African subjectivity is categorised as inferior and catalogued as a series of lacks, as discussed in the previous chapter’s exposition of the various ways African beings can belong and how this often leads to the coloniality of being (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 49). Contextualising these power relations will become paramount if the discussion is to take conscious stock of the impact PRA has had on the DRC, for, as Bremmer (as quoted by Campisi, 2013: 1) states: “(PRA is) more subjective than its economic counterpart and demands that leaders grapple not just with broad, easily observable trends but also with nuances of society”.

It is further argued that the labelling of particular phenomena as ‘risky’ has concealed the fact that PRA regulates and facilitates specific policy decisions formerly described as PTAs that benefit TNCs while disguising their profit-maximising intentions under the guise of investment (Rothstein et al., 2006: 92). By employing the examples of policy implementations that were designed to facilitate market expansion, such as the Congolese Mining Code (DRC, 2002) and the Dodd Frank Trade Agreement (USA, 2010), instances are explored where coercion influenced policy decisions, which resulted in the fact that certain institutions enjoyed a monopoly over specific geographic areas to manage and dispose of as they saw fit (Ferguson, 2009: 168). In addition, these pro-business policies facilitate the exclusion of artisanal mining communities from the formal Congolese economy and endanger their livelihoods, which will be illuminated in a section of this chapter (Chabal, 2009: 9; DRC, 2002 and Emel & Huber, 2008:
1394). In addition, possible re-narrations of the risk factors employed by PRA will be explored in the DRC, and the ways in which this influences policies surrounding the extractive industries in ways that protect businesses instead of ASM operatives. This will be done by drawing on the Chaballian views of post-colonial African existence explored in the previous chapter. Before such a discussion, however, it is necessary to contextualise the DRC within the global imperial designs represented by PRA discourses (Jasanoff, 1998: 91 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48).

Coloniality and how PRA Facilitates Exploitation in the DRC

The importance of a nuanced understanding of PRA narratives as they currently manifests is highlighted by Phillips et al.’s (2004: 636) description of a science as a system of statements that defines specific realities, often without consideration of alternatives, as has been argued political risk analyses do. The exclusion or inclusion of certain nuances means that PRA discourses, as well as Chaballian theory; focus on specific ways of understanding in order to construct a particular reality (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 95). Coincidentally, the ways in which political risk is determined create realities in accordance with how individuals construct their identities within particular nuances related to being and belonging (Chabal, 2009: 31). This section shows how riskification has infiltrated identity formation in ways that impact the coloniality of knowledge, not only of political risk, but also our general understanding of being and how this increases the exploitability of the Congolese (Maldonado-Torress, 2007: 242). In the case of the Congolese artisanal miners, this study asserts that the act of believing in a description of oneself as ‘risky’, or the act of being excluded from the risk-defining process, creates a situation where knowledge on risk favours specific identities while excluding others (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 95 and Tschakert, 2009: 24).

Accordingly, the exclusion of elements within identity formation processes is advantageous to those who prolong the colonisation of the being in Africa in the post-colonial context, i.e. the TNCs operating in the extractive industries as will be shown (Watson, 2013: 5). Whether this coloniality is deliberate or unconscious is not clear, but it does influence the conceptualisation of the self in terms of various overlapping identities, including identities related to risk (Chabal, 2009: 31). Reno (2006: 44) has further argued that one of the main spheres of identity formation in the current DRC relates to the remnants of a nostalgic nationalism, which is based on the colonial political community that existed before independence. However, as mentioned in the introductory quote, we are aware that this nostalgia is linked to not only exploitative divisions in the economy, but also the collusion between powerful actors in the eastern DRC, including
TNCs and the government, at the cost of those who are classified as determinants of risk by PRA methodologies (Rayemaekers, 2011: 564).

This research suggests that the riskification of artisanal miners’ belonging contributes to the construction of their identities in terms of what hegemonic actors - such as the rebels, government, PRA consultants and TNCs - need them to be in accordance with their exploitative agendas. Specifically, the riskification of their identities relies on the animation of cultural, economic and political indicators, and the so-called objective descriptions of these indicators, in ways that favour current power structures, which are secured via political risk discourses (Hardy & Macguire, 2016: 84; Mamdani, 2005: 2 and Rayner, 2007: 166). Furthermore, considering Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2013b: 332) definition of the post-colony as a place where the existing power dispensation is underpinned by greed and Eurocentrism, the forthcoming discussion of the DRC’s artisanal mining community will show how cultural, economic and political aspects of their livelihoods are used to assess and manage risk in ways that perpetuate the coloniality of power and satisfies gluttony by utilising both the formal and the informal economic sectors, as asserted by Rayemakers (2011: 565); Quijano (2000: 533); and Rayner (2007: 167).

What this implies is that, in the DRC, TNCs have an interest in the dominant perceptions of political risk, as they have been discussed in the second chapter, because it perpetuates their dominance in the extractive industry through the use of PRA narratives that categorise artisanal mining in terms of possible threats and adverse effects on their business (Jasanoff, 1998: 91 and Moen & Lambrechts, 2013; 90). In addition, the perpetuation of TNCs’ dominance as a result of PRA is consolidated through the practice of risk normalisation, which refers to the constant pathologisation of ways of being and belonging that threaten the profit-maximisation capabilities of TNCs in the gold-mining industry of the DRC (Chabal, 2009: 23 and 45 and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81).

These unequal imperial designs and inequalities of power were highlighted in Joseph Conrad’s 1899 novel, *Heart of Darkness* (Conrad, 2007). For the first time, Africa, and specifically the DRC, was described as a place of contention and contrast. With this in mind, Chabal (2009: 1) has stated that the study of the continent’s political landscape has remained trapped within this metaphor ever since. Additionally, Bayart (2000: 217) has argued that this is because Africa has been primitive and isolated, while Chabal (2009: 17) contends that the marginalisation of Africa is the direct consequence of the way not only fiction writers like Conrad, but also political theorists and political risk analysts situated in the West, look at and write about Africa, and, by implication, countries like the DRC. The entrapment of the Congolese in matrices of power has
only recently (historically speaking) been contended, while PRA consultants continue to describe business climates as difficult and lacking sufficient structural reforms (Coface, 2015: 1; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 332 and van Reybrouck, 2015: 38). The recognition of power is heavily dependent on awareness related to this production of knowledge and how it has misled scholars and investors into believing that compliance with transparency initiatives, such as the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, will lead to stable investment conditions (Coface, 2015: 2 and Mignolo, 1999: 1).

Subsequently, the DRC is as plagued by the influence of colonial powers and the extraction of resources today as it was after the Berlin Conference of 1884 – 1885, and the subsequent ‘scramble for Africa’ (Hochschild, 1999: 3 & 28) with little improvement in terms of the benefits received by the Congolese people in exchange for their labour. The ambitions that drove men like Sir Henry Morton Stanley and the King of the Belgians\footnote{For a very interesting relation of the history of the DRC, with specific relevance to these two characters, the author recommends Hochschild's (1999) \textit{King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa.}} to ‘bring light to the dark’ during that time, is reiterated in the contemporary use of PRA as an instrument of power in today’s DRC (Amodeo, 2004: 37, Boddy-Evans, 1998: 1; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85 and Hochschild, 1999: 23 & 28). This does not mean that the conscript ‘risk-prone’ should necessarily be discarded completely. The commodification of risk means that TNCs operating in industries that are more likely to face exposure to hazardous occurrences, such as the extractive industries, often have less competition from other companies (Büscher, 2010: 34). This is offset against the fact that 90% of gold production and export in the DRC is informal and undeclared, which means that, although TNCs don’t face competition from rival companies, ASM operations are still considered a threat (Geenen, 2012: 322). Finally, the economic interests of TNCs in the DRC masquerade as the liberalisation of market and the attraction of FDI as a means of development (Taylor, 2002: 32). In effect, TNCs dominate the markets in the DRC and use political risk as a means of legitimising specific distributional arrangements between this host country and TNCs (Emel & Huber, 2008:1394 and Hilson & Maconachie, 2009: 54). This is evident in the prominence of large TNCs in the extractive industries and the limited benefits visible in the communities surrounding these mines, despite large amounts of gold being mined from this site and various others like it. The communities’ involvement in the extraction of gold is described in terms of risk and this is used to validate the low reinvestment that occurs within the communities.
Subsequently, the roles TNCs are supposed to play in the development of African economies have consolidated the global matrices of power underpinned by transnational forms of governance (Ferguson, 2010: 168 and Kedebe, 2004: 100). In other words, the administrative and financial support TNCs supposedly give to the Congolese government disguise efforts to gain control over a vast part of *ce magnifique gateau africain* (‘this magnificent African cake’ as King Leopold II once called it). Meanwhile, the classification of the DRC’s economic sector as being politically risky has kept TNCs with low risk appetites out of the economy, in effect, lowering competition between TNCs in all sectors, while simultaneously lobbying for the formalisation of ASM in the interest of profitability (Geenen, 2012: 323 and McKellar, 2010: 55 - 77). In the following paragraphs, the author will argue how PRA factors manifest in the DRC and that the identification of these factors leads to the integration of ASM into the formal extractive industries (Brittian, 1999: 136; Raemayekers, 2011: 566; Van Reybrouck, 2015: 51 and Weiss & Carayannis, 2005: 115).

**The post-colonial Political Landscape**

According to the CIA Fact Book (2013:155), the DRC has suffered systemic corruption and conflict, which not only cost the lives of more than five million people during The Great African War (1996 - 2006), but also led to reduced government revenue, increased international debt and economic uncertainty (Reyntjes, 2001: 312). Additionally, it has been argued that the only incorruptible leader of the DRC was Patrice Lumumba (1925 - 1961), who was assassinated, reportedly because his anti-capitalist rhetoric was a cause of concern to the US government (Izike & Abutu, 2012:123; Naniuzeyi, 1999: 678; Reno, 2006: 47; Van Reybrouck, 2015: 281-282; Weiss & Carayannis, 2004: 117 and Weissman, 2004: 1). This example shows how descriptions of individual characteristics have been used to frame politics in a specific way, similar to the ways in which PRA narratives frame reality in ways that validate modes of understanding (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84).

Furthermore, the descriptions of uncertain legal frameworks, corruption and lack of transparency found in PRA documents have not only characterised Congolese leadership but have contributed to discourses surrounding the country’s political climate in general (CIA, 2013: 157 and Van Reybrouck, 2015: 304). Consequently, it seems to be a trend in Africa that when one leader is ousted, it is important to replace him with a leader that is willing to ‘play along with the West’ as has been the case at various times in Congolese history (Isike & Abutudu, 2012: 124). Evidence of this can be found in overviews of Joseph Desireé Mobutu’s term in office. The success of his 1965 *coup d’état* against Kasavubu’s government was facilitated by his collaboration with
secessionist regimes in Katanga and Kasai, as well as the U.S government, and resulted in regime stability, an increase in economic wealth and governmental legitimacy as long as Mobutu facilitated beneficial trade agreements with TNCs (Isike & Abutudu, 2012: 124; Dizolele, 2010: 144 and Weissman, 2004: 1). While it may seem like his primary purpose was to gain and keep control of economic and political resources in order to redistribute them to his cronies, known as the as the Binza Group, corruption during his administration spilled over into the transnational economic and political arena and has not dissipated since (Isike & Abutudu, 2012: 124 and Nzongola, 2015: 26). As Wong (2012: 67) reiterates: theoretical lenses conceive state-rulers, including Mobutu and his successors, as broker agents who establish maintain and rely on the exploitation of natural resources while impeding state building in exchange for international legitimacy through polyarchic means. The stronghold Mobutu had on the DRC during his tenure was broken by a rebel from the eastern provinces, Laurent Kabila, who, during his exile in the east became one of Zaire’s (as Mobutu had renamed the DRC) most notorious traffickers of natural resources, including precious metals, diamonds and ivory (Coleman, 2014: 12). In addition Coleman’s (2012: 11) analysis of the Congo clearly states that after the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer needed Mobutu as a foil against Soviet influence and Mobutu’s ties with the West were discarded. Chabal (2009: 51) summarises that:

“The Western goal was to have a ruler who had no social base or constituency to which he could be accountable nationally, so he could be expected to fully implement the policies dictated to him from abroad. While obedient with respect to the assassination of Lumumba and the fight against progressive liberation movements in Southern Africa, Mobutu was not so good a pupil with respect to economic management.”

In the end, Mobutu’s establishment of democratic institutions did not directly lead to government stability; instead the longevity of his government depended more on the symbolism of reciprocity among the big men of the DRC and their counter parts in international economic spheres, than the implementation of policies supported by the West (Chabal. 2009: 52; Busse & Hefeker, 2007: 5 and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1982: 672). In addition, the transfiguration of power during Laurent Kabila’s term thereafter resulted in the reprivatisation of industries in the eastern provinces of Bukavu, Goma and North and South Kivu as well as an increase in the capital investment in the formal extractive industries as will be discussed below (Kisangani, 2003: 51). These reconfigurations were purportedly in accordance with the conditionalities of US support for Laurent Kabila’s rebel campaign, against Mobutu’s government in 1997, which led to his
inauguration as second president of the DRC (Coleman, 2014: 11; Griswold, 1997: 1 and Ngolet, 2000: 70).

Following this preliminary overview of the post-colonial landscape, it is argued that, contrary to what popular and academic literature state, the elitism and kleptocracy with which Mobutu’s regime is associated does not reflect the so-called inherent deficiencies of the metaphorical African leader. Instead, it reflects a continuation of the colonial practices that were most vividly described as ‘rapacious’ (Isike & Abutu, 2012: 124 and Reno, 2006: 48). The argument has been made that the insatiable economic greed, which characterised colonialism in the DRC, continued post-independence because the relations between the elites are still based on reciprocity, as described in the previous chapter and persisted after the institutionalisation of democracy under Laurent Kabila. This enabled the puppets of imperialist interests to broker power via kleptocratic means and governmental promises without fear of accountability to the people of the DRC (Berman, 1998: 317; Chabal, 2009:50; Griswold, 1997: 1 and Naniuzeyi, 1999: 669).

The extraction of rent, corruption and bad policy implementation, are all measured by PRA methodologies and consequently characterise kleptocratic state management in the DRC (see for instance Brink, 2004 and Chabal, 2009: 151). Furthermore, the qualitative nature of government and the state’s ability to provide social, health and educational services are affected by the continuation of kleptocratic practices (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 163; Chabal, 2009: 151; Garsen & Hasselström, 2003: 253 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:50). Finally, poor governance and inadequate institutionalism are more likely if the state is controlled by a handful of bourgeois individuals who use their political power to transfer wealth generated by the extraction of natural resources, such as gold, to themselves and those who support their governments (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 162). These elites are typically driven by the economic opportunities their bureaucratic positions afford them. Subsequently:

"The economic and moral debacle of [the DRC] is a function of the embourgeoisement of the country's leadership group, its insertion in the import-export economy, its execution of the neo-colonial tasks of the post-colonial state, and its mismanagement of public resource." (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1982: 45)

The chaotic political climate and the rise of politically connected criminality in addition to self-serving political practices have contributed to the pessimism related to the DRC’s political risk ratings (see for instances Coface, 2015 and the IHS, 2014: 1). Politically connected criminality, which is described extensively in the second chapter, has implications for perceptions of the
business climate in the DRC because weakened bureaucracies, corrupt public services and the link between officials and illicit economic activities mean that PRA consultants will advise TNCs against doing business in the DRC (Rayemakers, 2010: 564).

However, contrary to this popular argument, politically connected criminality might be good for business. This is evidenced in the period following Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001, after which his son was called to take over his father’s presidency. While political criminality has an inherently negative connotation, when combined with belonging to the group involved in these illicit activities, it can result in political power (Burgis, 2015: 37; Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 2; Chabal, 2009: 52 and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2015: 30; Cattaneo, 2006: 59 Chabal, 2009: 48 - 49 and Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 72). To clarify, when Joseph Kabila came to power, it signalled the continuation of reciprocal relationships forged under his father’s rule and the safeguarding of the economic interests held, not only by TNCs, but by members of the Congolese elite as well (Dizolele, 2010: 146). Consequently, Joseph Kabila’s political party, known as the ‘People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy’ (PPRD) is centred on elitist ties\(^\text{16}\) that stem from the past as well as the present (Burgis, 2015: 48 - 51).

According to Yuval-Davis (2006: 198), Joseph Kabila’s continuation of his father’s predatory state can be interpreted as conformity to the interpersonal relationships formed by Laurent Kabila as well as a way of conceptualising his identity in relation to his father’s legacy and the complex relationships this entails (Chabal, 2009: 43 & 46). By implication, then, the assumption that politically connected criminality increases risk to TNCs without taking into consideration the complex nature of reciprocity and the underlying consequences this has for belonging to a community, lead to an oversimplification of the economic, political and social repercussions for the people of the DRC as will become clear in the following section’s discussion of artisanal miners’ place in the economy (Koddenbrock, 2014: 670). Moreover, the formation of a presidential dynasty in the DRC should be understood as an act of kinship and belonging, both within local kinship ties and international reciprocal relationships (Chabal, 2009: 37).

As indicated above, the Kabilas come from the mineral rich Katanga province in eastern DRC, which means that they have reciprocal obligations to people there, but also that these people

\(^\text{16}\) It is reported that at the centre of this elitism is a trio consisting of Joseph Kabila, who is the current president of the DRC; Katumba Mwake, who was the custodian of the shadow economy before his unexplained death in 2012; and Dan Gertler, who is an orthodox Jew and a close friend of the Kabila family. Interestingly, Gertler has been named in the recent Panama Papers, which exposed the ties between the wealthiest people on earth and the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC and the rest of the Third World (Burgis, 2015: 48 and Sergeant, 2016: 1).
have obligations toward the Kabilas and those who represent them; which might be a contributing factor to the accumulation of wealth among the Congolese elite and a small amount of other stakeholders, including rebel organisations supported by the Congolese, Ugandan and Rwandan governments (Burgis, 2015: 38 and Coleman, 2014:12). In essence, one could argue that this is why the Kabilas have been able to rule the Congo for nearly two decades: their power is founded on the economic wealth derived from the belonging and the distributional arrangements implied.

Nevertheless, Kabila legitimated his presidency in the eyes of the west by winning the DRC’s first democratic (read polyarchic) election since the 1960s in 2006\(^\text{17}\). While his term in office has come under scrutiny many times, PRA documents surveyed for this dissertation have largely focussed on the extractive industries and the resource curse rather than the bureaucratic quality of the Congolese government as a cause for concern (Koddenbrock, 2012: 552; Ngolet, 2000: 70 and Reyntjens, 2001: 314). This might change in 2016 as Berwouts (2015: 2) reported that Kabila tried to change the Congolese constitution to allow for a third term in office, while the governor of Katanga, Moïse Katumbi resigned from Kabila’s political party in September 2015, and has subsequently registered as an independent presidential candidate for the 2016 elections\(^\text{18}\). This signals a break-down of the president’s ties with the mineral rich province and means that his influence in the eastern regions is diminishing. Nevertheless, commerce has offered immense riches to political and business entrepreneurs despite these seemingly high risk occurrences during the last two years, and they will most likely continue to do so no matter what the political circumstances are. The following section explores how the continuation of exploitative economic endeavours will remain a reality in the eastern Congo.

**The Economics of Wealth and Violence in the Eastern DRC**

Chabal’s (2009: 119) description of politicians as entrepreneurs epitomises the connection between wealth and power, especially those who have connections to the mineral rich eastern provinces. Of course this is not new information, but, given the background of coloniality outlined in the previous chapter, this section concerns itself with the expansion of imperialism in post-colonial DRC, not only as a result of political action, but also as a consequence of the involvement of various international actors in the extraction of gold in the eastern DRC by

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\(^\text{17}\) His term in office following his father’s assassination is considered an ‘inner circle decision’ (BBC, 2011).

\(^\text{18}\) Although a deal was brokered by the Catholic bishops of the National Episcopal Conference of the Congo on 31 December 2016 that keeps Kabila from changing the Constitution to allow for a third term in office, no date has announced for the election of a successor and political tensions keep mounting.
drawing on both PRA and Chaballian theory to construct the argument (Moore et al., 2011: 507). As shown above, the lucrative interaction between the business and political elites in Joseph Kabila’s DRC is characterised by patrimonialism and the appointment of loyalists in strategic governmental and economic positions (Matti, 2010: 405). What follows is an exploration of what this means for economic opportunities in the elite and artisanal mining communities alike.

With massive reserves of gold and diamonds, most of the world’s reserves of columbi-tantaliste, numerous mines of silver, cadmium, copper and zinc, and rare minerals, such as, cobalt, nickel, niobium, tantalum, beryl, cassiterite and wolfram, which are mined in the eastern DRC; an abundance of wealth is extracted from the eastern DRC annually. Yet, Matti (2010: 206) reports that formal exports have still only accounted for 0.24% of the Congolese GDP in 2004 and Burgis (2015: 35) has called the DRC the richest, but also the poorest country on the continent. In addition, the rolling plains and rich soil hold the unrealised potential for the Congo to become the bread-basket of Africa (IHS, 2014: 18). Nevertheless, the continued presence of TNCs implies that economic exploitation, particularly in the extractive industries still offers lucrative opportunities despite depictions of high risk political institutions in the country and its industries. As such, the DRC provides the ideal opportunity to study Chabal’s (2009: 117-118) idea that politics is a means of redirecting commercial wealth away from those who need it most, especially through the informal or shadow economy, as discussed in the previous chapter (Koddenbrock, 2014: 671).

More recently, UN data cited in the IHS Economic Report (2014: 18) stated that the DRC’s GDP is dependent on the agriculture sector, which makes up about 40 - 45% of the GDP, and the mining sector, which is estimated to contribute roughly 30 - 35% of total production income. Importantly, the estimated contribution of the mining sector to the GDP might be very inaccurate because of the increase in mining activity and the subsequent smuggling of natural resources across the Congolese borders without it being reported formally. This means that large amounts of resources remain undeclared to formal economic and political analysts because only the wealth accumulated in the formal economy is included in the calculations (Kelly, 2014: 100). Also, while the agriculture sector’s main crops are combinations of coffee, palm oil, rubber, cotton, sugar, tea and cocoa; the income generated is insufficient to sustain them and farmers are regularly forced to turn to mining activities, whether formal or informal, in a bid to alleviate their financial desperation (Kelly, 2014: 103). The number of people experiencing financial desperation as a percentage of the population living below $1, 25 per day has been calculated at 88%. This means that, although the DRC has immense natural resource deposits, the extraction
thereof has not led to an improvement of living standards for the general population (Burgis, 2015: 4 and Chabal, 2009: 127). In fact, the average income in the DRC in 2001 was just $0.33 a day, making it one of the poorest countries in the world. Because the Congolese are separated from the wealth extracted in their country, this section analyses the various policies directed at freeing the economy in Africa from its traditional clientelistic shackles. The discussion will also show how clientelistic shackles are often less traditional than PRA documents would have us believe.

This has significant relevance to those who are dependent on the income generated in the informal sectors, such as the livelihoods19 of those operating within the artisanal mining sector (Chabal, 2009: 107 and Geenen, 2014: 92). Subsequently, conventional economic remedies for so-called traditional shackles almost always include the attraction of FDI, which presupposes that issues such as poverty can only be solved if Africans adapt formal economic methods as used in the West (Asiedu, 2002: 107, researcher’s emphasis). Although the use of formal economic measurements to remedy what is described as ‘traditional issues’ will most likely result in the perpetuation of hegemony described in this dissertation’s introductory chapter, these formal, and decidedly Western, measures of development as will now be the starting point for a discussion of the political risk and the implications for the Congolese economy (IHS, 2014: 16 and Van Reybrouck, 2014: 284).

The economy is linked to political risk in the DRC, following the 1996 - 2003 conflicts and the 2006 elections and the subsequent influx of FDI. This supposedly occurred because it was believed that peace and democratic elections would contribute to governmental transparency, which, in turn, would result in the decreased possibility that the Congolese government would favour expropriation as a policy choice (IHS, 2014: 3; Denk, 2013: 3458 and Jensen, 2008: 1041). This would enable TNCs operating in the DRC’s extractive industry to expand their business without the fear that the Congolese government would go back on their word20 and expunge the TNCs from its mineral fields in the east (Doornbos, 2004: 373; Ferguson, 2009: 168, Moore et al., 2011: 508 and Peck & Tickell, 2007: 27 - 28). These precarious arrangements between elites are characteristic of the ‘paradox of plenty’, which characterises most developing economies, in the formal sense of the word, but the DRC’s in particular (Topal & Toledano, 2013: 272).

19 For the purpose of this discussion, livelihoods should be understood as a people-centred approach to development with reference to the contexts within which people live (Chabal, 2009: 36 and Morse & McNamara, 2013: 3).

20 ‘Their word’ is a euphemism for PTAs negotiated for mutual benefits as discussed earlier in this dissertation.
The most likely explanation for the paradox of plenty, according to McFerson (2010: 336) is the absorption of wealth by unaccountable elites. Geenen and Radley (2014: 59) argue, in reiteration, that Joseph Kabila is so intent on attracting FDI from large scale mining (LSM) companies because extracting rent from a few large mining companies is much easier than extracting it from thousands of ASM operations. Accordingly, while the adoption of market-friendly policies might have been influenced by the WBG, Joseph Kabila’s government has also facilitated the political reforms characteristic of polyarchies while ignoring the fact that many people who participate in ASM are dependent on it for survival (Chabal, 2009: 10 and Geenen, 2014: 90). In other words, the adoption of market friendly policies makes Kabila’s government appear like a good government. However, while following the principles of a checklist democracy, or polyarchy, the quality of democracy, as the representation of the people, is not considered. The fact that the survival of ordinary Congolese men and women depends on their interaction with the environment and their ability to extract its resources to sell them or to pay their formal and informal (read as ‘illegal’) taxes is very often ignored by the Congolese government (Chabal, 2009: 11).

The following paragraphs will outline some of the implications for the men and women who are dependent on the extraction of gold outside of the formal economic constraints or provisions awarded to LSM operatives (Elgin & Oztunali, 2014: 145 and Geenen & Radley, 2014: 2). Additionally, artisanal mining is not only a source of economic opportunities for the miners, but also for those who provide leisure, catering and transport among other trades that surround LSM and ASM operations alike (Geenen, 2013: 90). Despite this, however, ASM often remains outside of formal economic provisions and frameworks (Geenen, 2013: 91). This is a contradiction because legislative provisions should ensure legality; however, many ASM operations occur outside the legislative provisions because they are inadequate and mainly focus on the LSM operations that are a source of FDI. In addition, the artisanal miners often get blamed for the smuggling of so-called ‘conflict minerals’ and other illicit activities associated with the informal mining activities in the DRC (Diemel & Cuvelier, 2014: 151 and Elgin & Oztunali, 2014: 145). The involvement of various elites in the undermining of tax practices and the stimulation of conflict21 surrounding the informal extractive economy further undermines the efficacy of the state and political stability. However, this is something PRA methodologies rarely take into account (Chabal, 2009: 131 and Geenen, 2013: 91). Finally, the liberalisation and privatisation trends that form part of the market-friendly approach incorporated in the mining

21 See the following section for a discussion of conflicts and the (informal) extractive industry.
codes of the DRC has meant that ASM operations are at the mercy of those in charge of assigning concessions to the ASM operatives and the industrial mines alike (Chabal, 2009: 132). Of course this leads to the question: “Who is in charge?”

Given the second chapter’s discussion of PRA and Hardy and Maguire’s (2016: 84) statement that the analysis of risk translates into the development of power; it is argued that the answer is that those who have the power to define ASM operations or any other part of the political, economic or social environments are in charge, which is ‘risky’ (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81). In the case of ASM, the fact that these operations fall outside of formal policy constraints means that the ASM operatives are unfairly grouped with corrupt political elites and armed militias who extract rent and use intimidation, fear and violence to force compliance (Parker & Vadheim, 2014: 5). While the riskification of ASM affirms the dominance of PRA methodologies and those who are in charge of defining risk, the argument has been made that recognising ASM operatives as actors in the mining sector, has done harm to these people’s ability to generate sustainable livelihoods from the informal extraction of gold and other natural resources (Chabal, 2009: 130; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81 and Larson et al., 2015: 228).

The men and women who are trying to better their social and economic circumstances through participation in ASM are at the forefront of figuring out how traditional and modern economic activities can work together in a labour intensive organic process aimed at sustaining livelihoods, but aren’t recognised for these efforts because their presence is framed in terms of deviance, and, subsequently, risk (Chabal, 2009: 130; Geenen, 2010: 326 and Parker & Vadheim, 2014: 4). Conversely, the conceptualisation of ASM as a contributor to political risk by PRA-methodologies has led to the functional pathologisation of these livelihoods; supposedly necessitating interventions by various international actors, such as the WBG, who typically act as policy advisors (Diemel & Cuvelier, 2015: 151; Koddenbrock, 2014: 670 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 332). This dissertation asserts that functional pathologisation can be extended to the categorisation of the DRC as a fragile state22. This classification enables TNCs and the WBG to become powerful actors capable of exerting considerable political influence in the design of policies that effectively place organisations in charge instead of the Congolese government (Doornbos, 2004: 373 and Nzongola-Ntalaja 2015: 20). While acknowledging the value attached to certain interventions in the DRC, it is argued that human well-being cannot necessarily be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms if these freedoms are regulated by

22 The categorisation of the DRC as a ‘fragile state’ perpetuates the very ‘matrices of power’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 332) against which this dissertation poses its critique. However, for the purpose of this discussion, it will be used in order to show how the neo-liberal institutions misuse it to their advantage.
policies that seek to replace ASM with LSM operations; irrespective of the motives (Geenen & Radley, 2014: 2 & Harvey, 2005: 2). Furthermore, the fact that the tenure of land in the ASM concessions is not guaranteed with the discovery of new deposits or the failure to comply with (often unaffordable) hygienic and safety regulations, could justify the expulsion of ASM operatives from the mine with only a 60-day period provided for the complete evacuation and commencement of LSM operations (Geenen, 2013: 93).

According to Kelly et al. (2014: 96), roughly nine million people (or 14 - 16% of the entire Congolese population) carry out labour as artisanal miners in the extractive industries in the provinces of Katanga, Kasai and North and South Kivu. These people produce an estimated 10 000kg of gold per year and an estimated 98% of this production leaves the DRC undeclared (Gatimu, 2016: 1). The loss in taxes that could have been paid to the Congolese government by the informal mining operatives have inspired various efforts to formalise and regulate the artisanal industry, but these initiatives have met with some difficulties with regard to general adherence to the regulations (Geenen, 2013: 92). While the artisanal miners have been blamed for the difficulty of implementation, the process is characterised by colonial bureaucratic procedures that require the approval of not only the local administrative branch of the Provincial Mining Ministry, but also the national administrative endorsement from Kinshasa (Geenen, 2013: 92). The result of this is that often ASM miners experience extensive exploitation by militia groups as well as the Provincial Mining Ministry and the Forces Armées de la République du Congo (FARDC) via informal taxation (Kelly et al., 2014: 97 and the WBG, as cited by Geenen & Radley, 2014: 59). In turn, this means that while the presence of ASM miners are often described as contributing risk factors, PRA methodologies use the presence of artisanal miners to consolidate their hegemony and the influence they have over the decisions of TNCs and the Congolese government alike (Riles, 2013: 557). Additionally, the minerals are illegally smuggled across the DRC’s borders into Rwanda and Uganda where they are bought by companies based in the EU, USA, South Africa, Lebanon and Asian markets; without the economic prosperity ever reaching the ASM operatives (Gatimu, 2016: 1 and Iglesias, 2014: 51).

As a means of fighting these illicit activities, the USA passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act in 2010, which advocates the regulation of minerals originating in the DRC and which could be implicated in the funding of armed groups (Burgis, 2015: 54 and USA, 2010: 838). Whether these armed forces include or exclude the FARDC is unclear: in fact, the act is very unclear about what will happen if companies use minerals that can be linked to the funding of armed forces, whether they are legitimate or militant guerrilla forces. In addition, the
2002 Mining Code was implemented to attract FDI and promote the disclosure of information pertaining to the methods of extraction as well as to the distribution of revenues that originate from the extraction of mineral resources (Matti, 2010: 406). Furthermore, even though the artisanal miners are formally protected by the DRC’s legislation, which include the Mining Code (2002) and the Mining Regulations Act (2003), these documents only ensure that the people depending on the volatile and small income of the ASM industry remain marginalised as a result of the way they are described. Subsequently, the politicians and the politically connected elites benefit more from these laws via the negotiation of favourable taxation and exemptions, despite the official 46% tax rate that should be levied on all LSM operations (Geenen, 2013: 91 and Geenen & Radley, 2014: 59). The subjugation of the ASM operations is reiterated by the legislative clauses that necessitate the annual re-application for a carte d’exploitant artisanal, which could be retracted or declined at a moment’s notice. Furthermore, it seems that the Congolese Ministry of Mining isn’t able to ensure that artisanal miners will have access to their concessions, known as ‘artisanal exploitation zones’, or ZEAs, because they might be classified as a risk to LSM operations or their ZEAs might be reclassified into commercial mining zones without determining what the impact of this will be on the livelihoods of the artisanal miners (Andre-Dumont, 2010: 64 and Geenen, 2013: 92).

This means that the limited amount of exploitable territories gets divided between various economic and political ‘big men’, which could include any stakeholder from international TNCs, like Banro, to local elites like Katumba Mwake (Geenen, 2013: 93). Additionally, although armed militias exploit ASM-miners, they are not particularly influenced by what goes on in the formal legislative spheres. The implication is that the so-called formalisation of the extractive industry in the DRC has an effect on the men and women who are dependent on the ASM industry, but the real political risk is to the ASM operative and not the companies managing LSM concessions (Kelly, 2014: 106). The resultant abuse of the patrimonial accountability and oversight on the part of the Congolese government has meant that a prominent TNC, like AngloGold, can trade with the guerrilla forces such as the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), which serves as a proxy for the Ugandan government, without their having to face repercussions described in the aforementioned legislative frameworks (Kinniburgh, 2014: 63). Arrangements like these often entail the provision of logistical and financial support to the FNI in exchange for the guarantee of personnel safety at the company’s operation in the Orientale and other eastern provinces where violence is always an eminent threat. Moreover, LSM operations are joint ventures between companies like AngloGold Ashanti (SA) and Randgold Resources (UK) where each TNC owns 45% of the Kisangani mine in the Orientale Province with the
remaining 10% belonging to *Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto* (SOKIMO)\textsuperscript{23} (Randgold, 2015). While the Orientale Province is part of the turbulent east, this LSM operation exemplifies how the government, rebel organisations and TNCs work together in the DRC to ensure a profitable business environment; and, despite the apparent political risk faced by the mine, Randgold reported that 2015 was a year that yielded above-expected returns on investment.

This example shows that, the riskification of informal economic activity works in favour of TNCs because, while the riskification of ASM operatives holds no benefit for TNCs directly, their presence can be used as part of the bargaining process when negotiating PTAs (Hilson, 2011: 1032 and Scheuerman, 2004: 103). The subjugation of ASM is consequently reinforced through power relations outside of their control as well as new relations of power based on the collusion between Congolese elites and international organisations (Kelly, 2014: 104 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48). Furthermore, ‘by placing [ASM-miners] into the narrative that focuses particularly on the international political economy of transnational mineral supply chains’, the Congolese government has reinforced the dominance of PRA as a discourse by establishing the shared descriptions of ASM as risky and informal (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82 and Kelly *et al*, 2014: 98). Consequently, the miners are not offered a platform to contribute to regulations in their industry through self-reflective social action because their opinions are subordinated to the structure as represented by the institutions and laws of the formal economy mentioned above (Chabal, 2009: 8 and Elgin & Oztunali, 2014: 145). In reality, the structural integration of informal economies into the global system as a result of various policy arrangements supported by TNCs has resulted in what Amin (as quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 12) referred to as a “liberal virus which leads to global chaos”. Admittedly, the chaos cannot wholly be blamed on the way in which the economy is defined; people, TNCs and militias have all contributed to the perpetuation of the violence in the eastern DRC, while claiming that individual politicians should be blamed for the categorisation of the DRC as an unstable country (Brenner, 2012: 550). Of course, blaming the individuals in charge is not only unfair, it is unrealistic. The exploitation and smuggling of minerals and the procurement of heavy weaponry have become part of daily life in the eastern regions, starting with the Congolese wars in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Jacquemot, 2010: 7). Furthermore, Kelly (2014: 100) notes that the conflict in the DRC has given the FARDC and non-state militant actors the opportunity

\textsuperscript{23} The researcher could not find any other information on SOKIMO, other than the fact that it is ‘state-owned’ (AngloGold Ashanti, \url{http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/en/About-Us/Regionsandoperations/DemocraticRepublicofCongo/Pages/default.aspx}).
to control more than half of the ASM sites in the eastern DRC through illegal and informal taxation practices as shown below.

**The Impact of Conflict in the Extractive Industry of the DRC**

After 32 years as the Congolese head of state, Joseph Mobutu’s relatively stable rule came under threat from US-supported Laurent Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo’s (ADFL) *coup d’état* in 1997. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2015: 20) argues that the state remained despotic and predatory (Burgis, 2015: 31). Because the ADFL was also supported by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, it was expected that their alliance with Kabila would continue after he rose to power. However, Kabila expelled the Rwandan *génocidaires* from the DRC, honouring his reciprocal ties with the Kivu-elites and the US government instead, which resulted in the rise of rebellions supported by these governments (Coleman, 2014: 12). The elites from the Kivu Province believed that the Rwandans were monopolising the mines and selling the gold and diamonds from their place of origin to stake-holders without them benefitting from these exploitative arrangements, which resulted in grievances across the eastern DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2015: 29). As a result, the Kabila dynasty has remained uneasy with its bad neighbours, and various armed militias have risen and fallen since 1997 (Fuamba *et al*, 2013: 322; Jacquemot, 2010: 7; Muraya & Ahere, 2014: 6 & Prunier, 2009: 27). The first example is the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), a Hutu militia group, which was formed by refugees hiding in the eastern DRC, in opposition to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that came to power following Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 (Mamdani as quoted by Muraya & Ahere, 2014: 12). These conflicts spilled over to the eastern DRC and made smuggling easier for those who had illicit interests in the exploitation of gold in this region because the chaos resulting from the conflict made the monitoring of exports more difficult and increased the opportunities for looting (Burgis, 2015: 36 and Coleman, 2014; 12).

Kisangani (2003: 52) also describes a mosaic of conflicts in the eastern territory involving not only the Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, Angolan and Burundian armies, but also the *Armée de Libération du Rwanda* (ALIR), the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Forces for the Defence of Democracy and Sudanese rebels. In addition, the Ugandan government initially backed the FDLR but was later involved in the formation of the *Movement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC) in 1998, which fought against the FDLR, causing an increase in the complexity of the violence and the subsequent looting of resources in the east (Patrikarakos, 2010: 26). This means that control of mining zones by Congolese ‘big men’ - who profit from resource extraction by the migrant labourers and/or who have no alternatives livelihoods or have
mutually beneficial arrangements with TNCs - is a major contributing factor to the ongoing prevalence of political risk in these regions of the DRC (Kelly, 2014: 102). Furthermore, Howell’s (2014: 6 - 7) statement that language, ethnicity and religion all contribute to domestic and international tensions surely has a ring of truth in the context of the DRC because the 1994 genocide in Rwanda also had consequences for the Hutu population in the eastern DRC with many joining militia groups in this region (Mamdani, 1999: 55).

Although this is an oversimplified exposition of the stake-holders in the analyses of political risks and conflict in the DRC, the overview does offer insight into the symbolic significance of post-colonial identities and their relation to the colonial period (Chabal, 2009: 161). In fact, ethnic diversity was overtly used by the Belgians as a means to divide and conquer and they awarded different social standings to different ethnic groups, which they later used to their advantage (Wright as quoted in Muraya & Ahere, 2014: 15). For instance, the social exclusion of the Banyamulenge, a population of Tutsis originating in the Kivus, exemplifies how these colonial tactics described difference in the DRC as ‘deviance’ (Chabal, 2009: 161). In retaliation of this continued exclusion and the 2009 peace agreement between the FARDC and the Rwandan Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP); the Banyamulenge formed the Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23) rebellion as an anti-government militia. Although the M23 was defeated in October 2013, the incapability of the government to confront the security threat for more than a year has damaged President Joseph Kabila’s reputation despite his re-election as president during the November 2011 elections24. According to Ake’s (1975: 271) definition of ‘political instability’, the fact that Kabila has struggled to address many of his government’s double standards, as well as the prevalence of patrimonial looting, means that current power dispositions are under threat (IHS, 2014: 2 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 14). Evidence of this can be found in the mid-September (2016) resurgence of anti-government protests in the capital city of Kinshasa and the eastern city of Goma, following Kabila’s attempts to delay the November 2016 elections (Burke, 2016: 1). In addition, those who control the means of destruction are more likely to have power than those who control the means of production, which necessitates the convolution of TNCs with the government’s FARDC or the militia groups. This should be carried out in a creatively lucrative business environment, despite the fact that the eastern DRC is considered a high-risk business environment (Mazrui as quoted in Cilliers and Cornwell, 1999: 20)

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24 The November 2011 elections are another example of democratic institutions that are employed in the check-list way that is characteristic of polyarchies. Additionally and characteristically, they were marred by allegations of fraud (PRS, 2012: 1).
Coincidentally, de Koning (2011: 225) argues that while mineral extraction has been used to fund sustained territorial control in the eastern DRC, the loss of the legitimate use of violence by the state signals a decline in state ownership by the post-colonial government. ‘Ideological infighting’, as discussed in the second chapter’s analyses of PRA-methodologies, becomes more likely and has been an extended influence as a risk factor related to violence25 in the DRC (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 82 - 83; McKellar, 2010: 105 and Rayner, 2007: 166). This has also seemingly been a recurring theme in Congolese politics, as mentioned above, since supporters of various political groups are turning to violence as a means of expressing their frustrations related to the misrepresentation of their political ideologies in the build-up to the 2016 elections (Burke, 2016:1).

Accordingly, just as ASM is described as an informal economic practice that contributes to political risk, the volatility of peace in the DRC contributes to the hegemonisation of PRA in the DRC (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82). However, it is argued that the definitions provided by PRA methodologies for risk and violence alike are inadequate for the analyses of the conflicts in the DRC. These definitions regularly fail to take into account that the conflicts make the unaccountable extraction of gold easier, despite legislation like the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, in addition to the inadequate attention awarded to the complexities of these conflicts (Samset, 2002: 464 and USA, 2010). Furthermore, the presence of armed militias doesn’t always pose a threat to TNCs because international companies and artisanal miners often align themselves voluntarily with these groups, who provide security from invasion by rival rebel or militia groups in return for a percentage of the revenue extracted from the eastern DRC (Burgis, 2015: 34).

This dissertation’s general disagreement with the way economic and government phenomena are reframed as risk by PRA discourses does not signify deviance from the literature about the categorisation of the eastern DRC as a region suffering from acute generalised violence. The researcher simply states that the cause of violence is not only as a result of the so-called re-traditionalisation of African institutions, as many Western methods of analyses would have us believe (Chabal, 2009: 162). One of the explanations for the international tensions that occur in the eastern DRC’s border regions is because the alteration of African identities during the colonial epoch preordained contemporary cultural explanations for the conflicts in the DRC (Chabal, 2009: 161). In addition, structural and economic explanations for violence are rarely

25Leading up to the 2016 general elections, several reports of politically motivated violence have surfaced, although this dissertation will most likely be submitted before they occur in November 2016.
taken into consideration by PRA methodologies, especially because these structures and the institutions might be described as ‘Western’ (Chabal, 2009: 162 - 163).

Subsequently, the definition of Congolese inadequacy has resulted in the epistemological colonisation of the Congolese in addition to the psychological burden already suffered as a result of the war (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82 and Tlostanova & Mignolo, 2009: 130). This is evident in Kelly’s (2014: 102) research where interviewees stated that, even after the war, power structures ruled life in eastern DRC, especially in the mining towns with a continuation of intimidation and violence, which is characteristic of the war period. Furthermore, violence has played an enormous part in the politics of the DRC with another prolonged civil war expected as a result of the failure of the Congolese state to ensure that the elections scheduled to take place in November of 2016 take place (Burke, 2016: 1).

The alteration of the lived experiences because of these psychological burdens are further complicated by the equation PRA methodologies draw between war crimes, the smuggling of conflict minerals and the informal livelihoods connected to ASM (Garret, 2014: 38). In addition, and as a central point of this dissertation’s argument, it must be reinforced that war in the DRC is often and very aptly described as a branch of the economy, and that this not only implies linkages between the formal and informal economic spheres; but also creates a pseudo-purpose for PRA as a means of calculating risk for TNCs who are not seen as stakeholders in the conflict (see Burgis, 2015: 29 - 60 and Guest, 2004: 14). For instance, while recent protests and conflicts have erupted between civilian supporters of Congolese political parties, the TNCs operating in the gold-mining industry of the DRC could, in all likelihood, experience little to no adverse effects or overt risks to their profit-maximisation capabilities (Sergeant, 2016: 1).

In other words, the violence and the so-called ‘economies of war’ - which are associated with conceptual descriptions like: illicit, parasitic, predatory and informal - serve the reinforcement of the DRC’s risk ratings as ‘high’ in both the near and foreseeable future (PRS 2012: 1). However, these ratings rarely have an impact on the agreements between TNCs and various stakeholders except if used as a bargaining chip. Coincidentally, the determination of political risk has become more popular with TNCs after Kabila started his campaign to attract LSM concessions to the relatively stable eastern DRC (Bischoff, 2010: 2; McKellar, 2010: 4 and PRS, 2012: 2). Whether these analyses will be of any help remains to be seen, but, as previously stated, it is unlikely that LSM operations will cease mining activities completely (Sergeant, 2016: 1). In addition, rising militancy in the Katanga province by the FARDC seems to be a strategic part of Kabila’s bid to remain in power and follow in the footsteps of Mobutu Sese Seko, although the
current situation surrounding the postponement of the elections might negatively impact these efforts (Berwouts, 2015: 2 and IRIN, 2006: 1). In fact, Chabal (2009: 163) argues that the lack of economic progress or opportunities is a primary cause of violence, and, in all likelihood, is fuelling the current opposition to Joseph Kabila’s government. Many of the groups mentioned in this chapter, including the CNDP and FDLR, have been tied to the looting of the Katanga and Kivu Provinces while Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda all act as hubs for the export of the conflict-minerals (Gatimu, 2016: 1). In essence, the conflict is a smokescreen behind which many informal and illicit economic activities take place; as Colonel Olivier Hamuli, a member of the FARDC, states:

“They say they are fighting against bad governance. They are just mining. Even the FDLR, they are not trying to challenge the Rwandan government—they are here to mine.” (Burgis: 2015: 41)

While the focus on conflict minerals has given birth to initiatives and legislation based on due diligence, certification and traceability; the declared weight of gold that left the DRC legally still only amounts to only 180.76 kg between 2013 and 2015 (Gatumi, 2016: 1 and Geenen & Radley, 2014: 59). The limited success of the Kimberley Process, Extractive Industries’ Transparency Initiative and the Dodd-Frank policy outlined above means that very few mines are declaring their products, while the armed militias extract gold either on their own terms or are benefitting from their cooperation with LSM operatives (Burgis, 2015: 42). Finally, it seems safe to assume that war is good for profit in the eastern DRC, despite the riskification of ASM operative and the categorisation of conflict as a contributing factor to political risk by various PRA methodologies. The following section specifically discusses riskification in the case of the eastern DRC and the consequences this has had for the limited understanding we have of current PRA narratives as they are employed there.

In line with this argument, Hardy and Maguire (2016: 84) state that the normalisation of crises, troubles and violence in the DRC facilitates power relations that arise from risk as a body of knowledge. In contrast, and following various other arguments, it is contended that the study of the various elements of the so-called ‘Congolese crisis’, which is enveloped in the study of the Congolese as ‘the other’, are most significantly circumscribed in terms of belonging to (or, more significantly, being excluded from) the network economy, which consists of powerful actors in government, militia and business (Chabal, 2009: 2; Hudson & Melber, 2014: 2 and Rayemaekers, 2011: 565).
The Process of ‘Riskification’ in the DRC

As already stated, the large deposits of natural resources - including timber, diamonds, gold, uranium, copper and almost half of the globe’s cobalt deposits - contribute to the instability of the Congolese political economy (Jacquemot, 2010: 6 and Matti, 2010: 403). According to the second chapter’s conceptualisation of PRA, the presence of these resources make the DRC more prone to risks related to extraction that influences the likelihood that ‘the resource curse’ will, and subsequently has, occurred in the DRC (Geenen, 2012: 324). Interestingly, the extraction of resources and the negative impact this has had on the Congolese people can be traced back to the extraction of rubber from the rain forests of the DRC during the colonial period (Boateng, 2010: 14; Fairhead, 2005: 195 and Van Reybrouck, 2015: 37). Similarly, most of the labour is provided by the Congolese, while the wealth generated from their labour is accumulated by the government, TNCs and rebel groups as shown below. The simplicity of the matter is that, in the DRC, greed prompts stake-holders to use conflict as a means of acquiring more resources (Caspary, 2012: 171; Chabal, 2009: 163 and Geenen, 2012: 325). As a result, resource abundance is rarely associated with democratic processes and outcomes, and, more often, with the continuation of violence (McFerson, 2010: 336).

The implication of this is the formation of relationships that are based on consent and reciprocity between the elites in business and politics pressed by consumerist appetites for industry. In this instance, the accountability of elites amongst themselves, as members who belong to the same community, leads to the exploitation of the invisible millions in the forests and slums of the DRC (as discussed by Brittian, 1999: 135; Fairhead, 2005: 195 and Gill & Law, 1989: 476, amongst others). Additionally, those who control the political interests of the elite in the DRC and those who want to control the economic resources in the eastern DRC need to adhere to specific modalities of distribution that stem from the greed of colonial expansion and post-colonial economic interests in Africa or be discarded (Chabal, 2009: 41 and Daloz, 2003: 247). One such modality is represented by the way in which PRA methodologies frame political risk in the extractive industry as a purely African/Congolese problem while ignoring the reciprocal ties between the political (Congolese) and business (international) elites, which also contribute to political risk indications, such as the tensions between these groups and rebellions; although this is seldom overtly acknowledged (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 71).

Additionally, it is maintained that the complexities related to PRA are a result of rapid decolonisation and subsequent domestic unrest that often led to in-fighting and localised violence as was the case at various instances throughout the post-colonial era (Geenen, 2012:
This happens despite Robinson’s (2013: 228) argument that the presence of transnational elites and the promotion of polyarchic governance have organised the Congo’s elites under the discourse of democracy, and ‘good governance’ while ignoring the material concerns of the Congolese people. Consequently, the concept of democracy might have administrative value, but has had little impact on governance practices. Instead, the implication of ‘good governance’ was the re-labelling of realities in terms of what couldn’t be described as ‘good’ by various documents that assert the importance of Western style/stable democracy in the DRC, including the CIA’s analyses of the Congolese political climate in 2013 (Mkandawire, 2010: 266 - 268).

As far as government stability goes, risk assessment company, Coface, has stated that one of the DRC’s weaknesses is ‘governance shortcomings’, although it fails to define what is meant by this descriptor (Coface, 2015: 1). In recognition of this, however, and if we admit that the Congolese government should adopt the values of liberal democracy in order to legitimate itself (and the researcher is not saying that it should), would that not mean that democracy is only viable if the right political leaders - meaning those who uphold democratic values - are in power? Furthermore, the characteristics of a democracy, including its values, are so vast that the DRC, as with many parts of the developing world, will be unable to secure an autonomous leadership that can overcome its shortcomings and will have to settle for an imperfect assimilation of democracy, described elsewhere as ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl, 1978: 13; Krouse, 1982: 442; Mkandawire, 2010: 267 and Taylor, 2002: 32).

Accordingly, while the politics within polyarchies is quite obvious, given the previous chapter’s discussion on the question of authority, the politics of support is more abstract. This is because it is based on the connections between political and economic elites and their communities as well as how these connections imply a series of obligations and reciprocities (Chabal, 2009: 48). This means that politics in the DRC is not exempt from polyarchic prescriptions, such as the stability of the government, and remains reliant on the description of its democracy as well as the external powers that determine the strength of technocratic measurements such as PRA (Busse & Hefeker, 2007: 5 and Mkandawire, 2010: 265).

In response to these prescriptions, the leaders of the DRC and descriptors of political risk have focussed on the basic conditions of legitimate democratic rule, such as basic political rights and fair elections, while remaining ignorant of various other determinants of democracy that cannot be observed or quantified as easily. A case in point is the fact that the current Congolese president, Joseph Kabila, has recently tried to postpone the presidential elections scheduled to
take place in November 2016 while attempting to change the Congolese constitution in order to allow for a third term in office. This has caused old tensions to flare up with political and violent protests increasing in the capital city of Kinshasa and eastern city of Goma (Bewouts, 2015: 1 and Coface, 2015: 2). While the president has been accused of serving his own interests, his term in office has seen the implementation of policy models that increased the influx of international capital to the DRC, purportedly making the country more resilient to political instability (Robinson, 2013: 229 and Scheuerman, 2004: 102).

It has been argued that these policies reinforced the coloniality of power through the hegemonisation of specific modalities of governance and the pursuit of class-specific goals (Gill & Law, 1989: 476 and Kyamusugulwa & Hilhorst, 2015: 249). The author argues that the implementation of policies in Africa in general, but the DRC specifically, that are advised by Western standards, signal a way in which democracy is done that not only maximises profit, and benefits for those who have business interests in the DRC, but also provides Joseph Kabila’s crony government with leverage in the negotiation of PTAs with TNCs who want to do business in the DRC (Bischoff, 2010: 15). In accordance with this, and the overall argument of this dissertation, the researcher reiterates that the relationship between the elites in the Congolese economy and government is reliant on the privatisation of governance and the increasing dependence on the informalised economy (Rayemaekers, 2011:566). In addition, the consolidation of these post-colonial power distributions are facilitated by the implementation of PRA as a methodology of analyses that protects the profitability to TNCs and government above all else (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1394; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48; Paudyn, 2013: 790 and Tlostanova & Mignolo, 2009: 130). The following section shows how particular political narratives have been employed to describe political risk in the DRC after its 1960 independence from Belgium.

Even though the stability in the DRC has remained questionable, the author has already mentioned that Randgold Resources reported that its Kibali operation was on track to beat its 600 000oz full year guidance in 2015 (Randgold Resources, 2015: 1). While the lucrative revenue of this public-private partnership could be seen as an anomaly, the recent increase in public-private partnerships such as this one, highlight the recent increase in what McKellar (2010: 78) called ‘risk-tolerance’. According to this principle, TNCs will be more likely to invest in high risk countries like the DRC if they are able to negotiate tax holidays and other PTAs that make it more likely that their return on investment might be larger (Kinniburgh, 2014: 62; Partikarakos, 2010: 25-26; Perks, 2011: 251 and Randgold Resources, 2015: 1). It seems logical
to deduce that the promotion of risk mitigation that flows from PRA practices via market-friendly policies, democratic institutionalism, good governance and PTAs simply serves as a diversion for the lucrative business related to extraction and looting of natural resources in countries like the DRC (Burgis, 2015: 54). In fact, Putzel et al. (2008: iii) state that:

"Standard templates of ‘good governance’ involving the devolution of power and the promotion of private and non-governmental agents of development may be, not only inadequate to the challenge of state-building, but positively counter-productive if not accompanied by singular efforts to support elite coalition formation."

Another stakeholder yet to be mentioned in this context, are the TNCs who sell security and risk mitigating services to TNCs in the extractive industry. According to their website, G4S is the largest TNC operating in the security industry as well as the largest private employer in this country. It is argued in this study, following Geenen (2014: 93), that the TNCs involved in the provision of security have an interest in the continuation of the conflict because it offers lucrative business opportunities, although they hardly state this outright (G4S, 2016 and Samset, 2002: 464). In addition, because security has been turned into a product, protection can also be bought from rebel groups - although they operate in a much more informal way than TNCs (like G4S). The accumulation of wealth is further facilitated by the market-friendly nature of the extractive industry, following the criminalisation of social protest and informal mining activities outside ZEAs despite the fragile political environment (Kinniburgh, 2014: 63). These facilitative legislations highlight how PRA discourses, along with other Western analyses, have continued to privilege the existing ways wealth is extracted and distributed by TNCs who continue to follow the so-called ‘expert advice’ provided by the same PRA methodologies that privilege their formal extraction (Hardy & Maguire and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 10).

The riskification of experiences outside of this privileged framework, for instance the subjugation of artisanal livelihoods in the eastern DRC, means that political elites are more likely to protect their ties with elites in the economy than other networks of belonging. In accordance with this, Chabal (2009: 44) explains that, although belonging entails representation of a specific community, the fact that individuals often experience conflating spheres of belonging simultaneously - like, for instance, belonging to local communities and to an elitist class - elites are prone to favour the most lucrative relationships of accountability over others. This means that those reciprocal relations promising the most wealth are invariably favoured (Chabal, 2009: 48).
Another case in point is Anvil Mining’s operations in Katanga Province. Burgis (2015: 38) reports that the LSM operatives hired a member of the Congolese elite to serve on the board in exchange for a copper concession with a 20 year tax holiday. Chabal (2009: 123) explains this phenomenon as a shift in the way an individual is held accountable, from a responsibility to the collective to an individualist quest for power. The prominence of the individual in these arrangements means that not even PTAs secured via elitist reciprocity, as is the case for Anvil Mining, are exempt from risk that could arise from political volatility. Jensen (2008: 1041) further argues that governments have the power to expropriate international companies or attempt to renegotiate contracts if it feels current arrangements are no longer beneficial. Following the second chapter’s discussion, the fact that the likelihood of expropriation remains one of the most prominent risk factors considered by PRA methodologies, it is necessary that individual interests involved in the gold-mining industry are recognised in the determination of political risk (Brewer, 1981: 5). Additionally, the weakness of bureaucratic control, which is another indicator of political risk, increases the likelihood that public officials will impose informal taxes and levies on the private sector because it is an easier source of revenue than managing official state functionalities sufficiently (Busse & Hefeker, 2007: 5 and Mkandawire, 2010: 265).

Furthermore, the negotiation of PTAs and the design of legislation - like the Mining Code (DRC, 2002) and the Dodd-Frank Consumer Act (USA, 2010) in addition to the issuing of permits, licenses and other documentation - still leave ample room for informal recommendations that privilege Western business policies (Chabal, 2009: 134). The lack of bureaucratic administration discussed above also means that expenditure on social goods is neglected (Burgis, 2015: 5; Kelly et al., 2014: 97 and Newbury, 2012: 137). The further description of political elites as ‘warlord’ politicians and brokers of predatory client-patron relationships, who are prone to rent-seeking, confirms that political elites abandon their people and that they put their interests before the interests of those whom they are supposed to serve (Chabal, 2009: 120 and Wong, 2012: 67). There are many examples of proposed interventions and of how these relationships should be addressed, but they have had little success (Kelly et al., 2014: 98). It is argued that the unsuccessful nature of these proposed interventions is not only doomed to failure or result in incomplete implementation, but are also a result of the idealised Western regulations proposed and designed by consultants who use non-expendable tools like PRA without taking local specificities in account (Brewer, 1981: 6; Hatcher, 2015: 323 and Stoychev, 2013: 2).
The supposed non-expendable value of PRA’s observations of political environments consolidates the hegemonisation of PRA as the dominant discourse of knowing and applying risk as a descriptor in order to benefit some while neglecting others (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81). Subsequently, there seems to be a double standard where some risks are described as ‘bad’ while others are described in terms of benefit to TNCs. Chabal (2009: 116) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b: 348) come to similar conclusions when they argue that because African economies were designed to serve colonial economic expansions in the post-colonial era, the imperialism established then is perpetuated through the control of knowledge, more specifically, in this case, the knowledge of political risk. Consequentially, controlling the production of risk discourses has meant that TNCs are in a favourable bargaining position when they engage with governments, even apparently (or possibly even specifically) corrupt governments like the Congolese PPRD. It seems fair to argue that TNCs have no real interest in mitigating the ‘risk’ PRA methods have highlighted because it creates relations of power between those who are defined as risk-prone and those with the ability to define what it means to be risk-prone (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82 and Muraya & Ahere, 2014: 23).

Concluding Remarks

As discussed, the implementation of the Congolese Mining Code in 2002 obligated the Congolese to also employ various good governance initiatives in addition to other PTAs that are allegedly necessary for a better investment climate in a risk-prone territory like the DRC (DRC, 2002 and André-Dumont, 2013: 65 - 71). According to the policy document, the Congolese government is supposed to reserve the right to grant, refuse or cancel mining rights (DRC, 2002), while TNCs may obtain non-artisanal permits through specific procedures (André-Dumont, 2013: 66). What these procedures are is not clear. However, this study seeks to assert that because of the dissolution of accountability to the community during the colonial period and the development of the Congolese economy as a nexus of patronage; the implementation of the Mining Code and other policies have been reduced to quantitatively measureable performance indicators easily employed in the calculation of political risk (Chabal, 2009: 126 and Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2015: 11).

Correspondingly, the measurement of corruption, most popularly by using Transparency International’s CPI, has aided the supposed determination of political risk in the DRC by framing instances of corruption in a particular way. As the discussions on the political and economic climate in post-colonial DRC have shown, the prevalence of bribes, job reservation and ‘favour for favour’ practices are a political commonality in the DRC; however, the political elites aren’t
the only ones involved in these corrupt practices (Burgis, 2015: 30 - 38 and Howell, 2014: 4 - 5). TNCs and rebel groups can also be implicated. Furthermore, the calculation of corruption as ‘monopoly + discretion – accountability’ is definitely applicable in the context of the DRC; but, as political analysts, we need to consider who owns or manages the monopoly, discretion and accountability and how these managers narrate these constructs in ways that benefit particular ways of knowing (Harrison, 2010: 262).

The ontological approach of this dissertation accordingly necessitated the critical examination of the categorisation of corruption as a factor of PRA, in its various forms, as an exclusively traditional practice as was endeavoured to illuminate in this chapter (Chabal, 2009: 126). The understanding of corruption as an indicator in PRA-methodologies is dependent on the domination of so-called ‘expert knowledge’ - based on professional language, quantification and specific analytic processes, as shown in the CPI - in order to shape common perceptions of political risk in the DRC as a result of traditional corrupt practices: like rent-seeking and other abuses of power, without acknowledging that the rent is paid by Western actors that include TNCs (Chabal, 2009: 120 and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84).

The complex arrangements between government, TNCs and militias have been discussed in the section on the Congolese conflict and the impact this has on the economy (both in the formal and informal sections). Emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that, in the instance of political risk, PRA discourses often show how governments are guilty of extracting rent as well as being implicated in embezzlement, tax fraud, extortion and stock options; while failing to acknowledge that the negotiation of PTAs and tax holidays often involve both the government and TNCs (IMF as quoted and discussed by Emel & Huber, 2008: 1401). In the DRC, negotiation of tax holidays and other forms of patronage are eased by loopholes in the fiscal policy of the Congo. For instance, the absence of estate duty or gift tax in the DRC makes it easier for TNCs and the PPRD to transfer funds between them without having to officially declare it (KPMG 2013: 2). In this instance, acknowledging that the politics of reciprocity are based on specific rules of exchange that symbolise belonging to a specific group, in this case the political and business elite is necessary if we seek contextualised insight of the power possessed by PRA proponents (Chabal, 2009: 51).

Consequently, the reciprocal relationship between TNCs, the WBG and various other figure-heads like the Kabilas is characterised by conditionalities - which are imposed, coerced, or voluntarily negotiated - and creates a volatile political situation in the post-colonial state due to the erosion of social programmes and patterns of accountability (Chabal, 2009: 51 and Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013b, 347). For instance, the replacement of accountability to the people in favour of accountability to the elites results in unequal exchanges of wealth based on the realities of power that contribute to the entrenchment of poverty suffered by the ASM operatives in the eastern DRC (Chabal, 2009: 51).

Also, the informal sector in Africa cannot simply be framed in terms of what lies outside of the formal sector (Chabal, 2009: 129). In a place like the eastern DRC, where most people depend on the informal economy for their livelihood, what is defined as the informal is, in fact, a permanent and important part of the economy (Geenen, 2013: 90). Thus, the informal sector could be a poverty alleviation industry because of the amount of individuals employed in ASM operations. In fact, the International Labour Organisation estimates that before the turn of the millennium, two million people were employed directly as ASM miners. In addition, the spill-over and trickle-down effects on the economies of these communities have an impact on the lives of a great deal more people (as cited by Banchirigah & Hilson, 2010: 158). Therefore, the classification of the informal economy as the ‘shadow economy’, however true in some cases, is not true in all cases (Chabal, 2009: 130 and Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005: 1). Instead, the informal sector signifies the interaction between the modern and the traditional in a way that gives agency to people who are looking to overcome constraints in the formal economy.

Essentially, the issue with the distribution of wealth and power in the DRC, as in other parts of the continent, is that it is framed in accordance with the agenda of economists. This influences the ways in which we judge and evaluate the political risk climate in any developing country, not just the DRC (Chabal, 2009: 106 - 108). Negative views of the informal economy are also more dominant than this interpretation of Chabal’s (2009: 106 - 108) conceptualisation of the informal economy alludes to. While institutions, like the UN Economic Commission for Africa, have stated that artisanal mining has grown because of its link to the growing number of people living in poverty and its complementary relation to traditional forms of subsistence accumulations, the criminalisation of ASM ensures that TNCs remain in a hegemonic position when it comes to the riskification of the eastern DRC through the use of privileged bodies of knowledge (Banchirigah, 2006: 166; Eade, 2010: ix and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 96). Furthermore, equating ASM with traditional practices, in this context, highlights the way PRA turns informal economic practices into a cause and effect of ‘backwardness’ defined by means of comparison to other political economies (Chabal, 2009: 85). Consecutively, PRA solidifies the influence of TNCs in countries like the DRC by labelling policies, politics and labour relations as conducive to risk because of
the backwardness not only of the economic sector, but also of the political issues discussed in this chapter (Davis, 1995: 1765 and Hatcher, 2015: 323).
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE VIABILITY OF RE- 
NARRATING PRA IN TERMS OF CHABALLIAN THEORY

“We must be true to our authentic selves as African subjects of knowing.” (Dei, 2012: 103)

Introduction

Given the evidence presented in the previous chapter, we cannot misconstrue the fact that the DRC is a high risk country. It is, however, contended that the way in which this conclusion is made needs to be reevaluated in terms of the given alternative perspectives explored above. The characterisation of Africa as an aggregation of various nations that form part of the peripheral and developing countries of the globe implies that power over Africa is not held on the continent itself (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243). This has an unmistakable effect on the manner in which categorisations of risk are applied in Africa, and are covertly linked to the dispensations of power discussed throughout this dissertation (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81 and Liasidou, 2015: 1).

Following the discussion of PRA in the DRC as well as the various risk factors attributing to the classification of the DRC as a risk prone territory, it has been argued here that the labelling of specific African phenomena in the methodologies, practices and discourses of PRA as traditional and backward tends to be problematic, and this study has endeavoured to solve the issue by looking at various alternatives related to the conceptualisation of risk factors; which include international and domestic tensions, conflict, the stability of government and the idea of polyarchic governments, as well as the threat of contract cancellation or expropriation as discussed in chapter two. Additionally, risk narratives have also been central to the conceptualisation of ASM livelihoods as an unfavourable and unfortunate hindrance to formal economic actors operating in the eastern DRC.

This study also sought to address the possibility of a reconceptualised interpretation of the generally accepted PRA practices. In addition, it considered the way in which the resultant discourses produce and interpret truths about political risk in the DRC in ways that favour specific modes of knowing. Furthermore, the author has given much attention to the hegemony represented in the practice of normalising political risk in ways that exclude certain discourses, while emphasising particularly Western interests in African and Congolese extractive industries (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81).
The first theme identified in this effort to reconceptualise common interpretations of political risk involved determining what the contemporary understanding of PRA is. A discussion on the centrality of TNCs in the risk industry and the ways in which the descriptions of risk influence policy reforms and FDI influxes then followed. Secondly, the researcher explored how African theories - specifically related to Chabal’s theory on the politics of being, belonging, striving and surviving - might facilitate an alternative interpretation of political risk in general. Thereafter, the study then explored the usefulness of the eastern DRC a case for the study of PRA, policy interventions and the general subjugation of African discourses within the global matrices of power. This chapter will highlight main conclusions and recommendations for further research.

**Debating the Issue of the Scientificity of PRA**

The assumption that PRA is a scientific practice was particularly discussed in the second chapter. A specific outline of the similarities between PRA and like political discourses, related to good governance and polyarchy, ensued to show how evidence that is essentially characterised as ‘soft scientific evidence’ is transformed into regimes of truth by applying a single risk rating to it.

Additionally, the study illuminated how the business centred conceptualisation of PRA employs methods in such a way that specific outcomes can be achieved (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 85 and Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 91). These outcomes are always related to the Western dominance in the non-West; protecting the best interests of TNCs, along with a few political elites, who are protected via PTAs. Factors that are identified as contributors to risk are invariably defined in manners that are unrelated to the African collectives. Similar to the minimum institutional descriptions of democracy, following Dahl’s (1978: 8) conceptualisation of polyarchy, then the contributing factors of political risk are viewed in terms of their existence, or likelihood of occurrence, instead of what the cause and effect will be for the TNC. The study also advocated that one of the consequences of these a-contextual risk factors is the problematisation of being African, which shows how PRA aids the construction of power in terms of those who are described by PRA discourses and those who are in the position to do the description (Chabal, 2009: 2; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82 and Ferguson, 2006: 7).

Taking this into consideration, the process of conceptualising PRA is somewhat more complex than the simple primary classification of PRA as a sub-discipline of risk management that focuses on factors specifically related to government stability, corruption, anti-business sentiments and terrorism (Befeki & Epstein, 2006: 5). The link between PRA and business is emphasised by the attention paid to FDI as a panacea for Africa’s economic and political ills.
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2008: 425). The constant threat to business is further reiterated by PRA’s insistence that potential harm, hazard or threat may arise from the actions of actors, which cannot be controlled by the TNC; but fails to acknowledge that these actors could experience the consequences of violence, corruption and terror in much worse ways than the potential loss of profit faced by the TNC (Brink, 2004: 121; McKellar 2010: 3 and Rothstein et al., 2006: 92).

What this implies is that the regimes of truth identified above are the result of power, where assessments of risk, as structured by PRA methodologies, not only inform power relations, but are constructed by power too (Foucault as cited by Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84). This is exemplified by Cornwall’s (2015: 5) observation that the interpretation of African phenomena pertaining to political risk, by Western standards, shows how meanings are attached to a phenomenon in a biased way that results in determinations of probability and truth. Ultimately, risk knowledge is constructed in ways that underscore the status quo and create a discourse that is used to shape and organise risk through the normalisation thereof (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81 and McKellar, 2010: 5). As a result, PRA hardens political realities by measuring and quantifying the success of democratic institutions, which are remnants of Western dominance in Africa (Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990: 54). Subsequently, African political risk is measured according to the management of state structures that aren’t African in their origin or design, but need to be employed in this context nonetheless.

Accordingly the study shows that a Chabalian approach to political risk discourses will promote the revaluation of risk as an instrument of neo-liberal governmentality (Chabal, 2009: 2; Mkandawire, 2010: 265 and Rothstein et al., 2006: 98). What the second chapter further highlighted is the fact that PRA discourses are often more concerned with approaches (i.e. the quantified check-list agenda) than the content or qualitative, inter-subjective understanding and descriptions of the political risk factors used by companies like the ICRG, Control Risks and BERI (Chabal, 2009: 16). In addition, the epistemological distance between empirical, hard quantitative data found in PRA practices and the ‘ways of knowing’ reflected in by the Chaballian approach to risk indicators is a distance that is not easily overcome (Clearly et al., 2015: 711).

Based on the aforementioned information, it is reasonable to postulate that PRA is more subjective and ideologically loaded than its practitioners are likely to admit. Evidence of this is found in the biased interpretations of Africa’s political environments. This case study has revealed that the DRC’s gold-mining industry exemplifies the tension between formal economic policy and so-called traditional extraction of the resources, as well as the interpretations of these
dichotomous practices by PRA consultants. Additionally, the conflict in the eastern parts of the country has resulted in certain overt risks to TNCs who are operating in the mineral rich, but conflict prone regions. According to PRA consultants, this necessitates strategies and practices related to the production and interpretation of truth, although the definition of that truth is arguably more centred on Western ideological interpretations, than the realities of artisanal miners (Emel & Huber, 2007: 1394 and Lupton, 2013: 113).

Subsequently, the politics of risk in Africa showed how this biased nature of PRA’s truth influences various ideals regarding laissez-faire governance and the protection of the owners of capital through minimalist intervention that affects policies associated with various industries; ultimately causing a decline in state restrictions on labour and trade in these industries and favouring large scale business, such as the LSM industry in the DRC (Moore et al., 2011: 507). The section related to the extractive industry in Africa also emphasised the impact of PRA on the perpetuation of the resource curse, which is defined as the lack of trickle down benefits to the people who are not in positions of power. While a common misconception exists that the resource curse is a lack of economic growth caused by the inability of a government to attract FDI, this study proposes that the lack of redistribution of FDI to people outside of the matrices of power has contributed greatly to this curse.

Finally, while it is widely accepted that PRA is an exact science, which is constructed on the existence of an objective truth; this study illuminated the fact that while the discourses in PRA may be dominant; this is not because of international tensions, domestic unrest, corruption, government instability, expropriation and violence alone. Rather, the reiteration of current power matrices and the consequences this has for policy design and PTAs are central to the relevance of PRA as it is currently circumscribed. Ultimately, these practices are characterised by fact-based and value-free interpretations, as well as measuring the likelihood that a commercial endeavour could survive, which makes it a legitimate regime of truth (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 83; Slovic, 1987: 280 and Young et al., 1990: 503).

Chaballian Reinterpretations of PRA

The third chapter specifically endeavoured to reinterpret PRA discourses from a Chaballian perspective and question the applicability of check-list agendas, PRA and polyarchy in the context of various epistemologies and social conditions in Africa (Alcoff, 2007: 82). This study also touched on the ways in which understandings of African life contribute to perceptions of risk prevalence and the resultant power relationships this causes. The discussion was structured
along four themes related to Chaballian theory and grouped together into ‘being’ and ‘belonging’ as well as ‘striving’ and ‘surviving’.

The difficulty with using ‘being’ as a descriptor of Africans, and, in turn, trying to reconceptualise specific political risk factors in terms thereof, stems from the fact that ‘being’ is a personal, complex and extremely subjective topic, not only in Africa but across different societies in the West and the non-West. Subsequently, the definition of one’s identity in Africa remains an endeavour that is closely linked to the subordination of individuals to institutions that have been imported to these geographic locations during the colonial epoch. The idea that the African being should subject him/herself to the skeletal remnants of political institutionalism in order to solidify the governance of a ruler who has distanced him/herself from their communal ties (traditional forms of belonging) is unfair. With respect to this, the researcher suggests that resistance to these structures should not lead to the riskification of identities, as discussed in the second and third chapters (Chabal, 2009: 8 & 31; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82; Jewsiewicki, 2002: 594 and Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243). These instances of riskification are evidence of the seemingly intentional oversight by Western and political risk theorists alike to the influence they have on the perpetuation of risk on the continent. Furthermore, when these individuals make a living outside of the formal constraints of the economic prerequisites posited by Western business lobbyists, they are categorised in terms of deviance. It was further stated that the categorisation of ASM livelihoods as ‘unfavourable’ created particular relations of power that benefit from the normalisation of crises and risk and reify the necessity to study the African as an inferior being (Chabal, 2009: 2 and Hudson & Melber, 2014: 2).

Following this discussion, the author continued with an exposition of how traditional forms of ‘belonging’ - which include belonging to specific geographic locations, kinship ties and communities - have been subjugated to modern forms of belonging. Most commonly, these modern ties are marked by class allegiance among the African political elite and the Western business elites. However, just because these ties are not easily identified as traditional does not mean that they do not possess characteristics of traditional forms of belonging. Most notably, Chabal (2009: 124) argues that a consequence of colonialism for Africa is the creation of the state as a means by which to confer rent-seeking possibilities that were unsanctioned by local forms of accountability, but still based on traditional reciprocity. The instinctive negativity related to rent-seeking, patronage and corruption often overlooks the fact that while these practices are based on reciprocity, the colonial governments and, currently TNCs, are equal stake-holders in the uneven distribution of wealth in underdeveloped African economies (Reno,
Kolstad and Wiig (2013: 370) have consequently reported that not all corruption is extortion: in fact, having reciprocal ties with local government might have a positive effect on the ease of doing business in the extractive industries instead of being a contributing factor to political risk. In the DRC, this meant that securing neo-colonial interests was as easy as using the concept of reciprocity and matrices of belonging with the Congolese, through which rent became both the object and the source of political power (Chabal, 2009: 126 and Naniuzeyi, 1999: 672).

Following this discovery, the influence of PRA discourses in the creation of knowledge and the resulting abuse of power has been discussed. In particular, the focus was on the act of labelling specific countries in terms of political risk and the fact that these labels were based on check-list agendas and polyarchic prerequisites that are, in many cases, inapplicable to the political context of Africa (Chabal, 2009: 90 and Harrison, 2010: 257). It seems that the act of classification consolidates the hegemonic position and dominant influence of PRA in policy design (Asiedu, 2002: 107; Chabal, 2009: 107 and Ferguson, 2009: 170).

Subsequently, this dissertation stated that PRA’s preoccupation with governments’ and TNCs’ actions, risks and reputations is based on a pseudo-dichotomy that ignores various other complexities, including the agency of Africans and the effect TNCs have on the perpetuation of political risk (Chabal, 2009: 163 and Moen & Lambrechts, 2013: 91). Essentially, the argument is that these preoccupations cause a continuance of coloniality in the post-colonial era and a preoccupation with the reproduction of specific knowledge systems.

Here, the author outlined how the creation and reproduction of Western knowledge systems often led to epistemicides, where conceptualisations of truth, which don’t support business centred approaches, are essentially erased (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 7). Another description of this phenomenon put forth by Mamdani (1996: 1) is called the ‘paralysis of perspectives’, which not only involves the erasure of contrary epistemic truths, but also the subversion of experiences that were described by those epistemologies. This is done through codification, modification and stabilisation of Western descriptions related to government and economies and that supposedly provide objective analyses of political risk in the various locations (Escobar, 1988: 431; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 56).

The creation of so-called ‘objective analyses’ and the resulting knowledge and ideology that stems from this further influences the way in which the individual experiences his being and it is put forward, following Maldonado-Torres (2007), that the ‘being’ in Africa translates this into
inferior political abilities, which might be real or imagined, but definitely create unequal power dispensations (Doyle, 2007: 8; Escobar, 1988: 430 and Hudson & Melber, 2014: 2).

Finally, a major aim of this dissertation has been to demonstrate that PRA practices and discourses are central to the creation of power dispensations by showing how the regulatory regimes and policy recommendations that flow from this stimulate specific knowledge production. Furthermore, although the discussion in the third chapter showed the necessity to postulate alternative PRA interpretations, it must be reiterated that the un-reflexive nature of current PRA methodologies and a general ignorance of current contexts exists within Africa (Chabal, 2009: 7; Jasanoff, 1998: 92; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 49 and Rothstein et al., 2006: 92). This failure to reflect on the process of definition and discussion common within PRA practices contributes to the subjugation and exploitation of Africans at the hand of hegemonic knowledge systems, which ultimately relates to the coloniality of the being in Africa, although we are supposedly in a post-colonial epoch (Mignolo, 2000: 19). In other words, coloniality and post-colonial theory reminds us that the long-standing patterns of power formed during the colonial era have not dispersed and are, in fact, perpetuating coloniality in modern ways (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243). Finally, the classification of Africans as irrational beings devoid of all common sense leads to structures of modernity, which are always productions of difference. In other words, structures of modernity form discourses that validate specific forms of knowledge by drawing on descriptive texts that reify the need for comparison in an unequal way (González, 2014: 399; Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 253 and Spivak, 1988: 72).

In a sense, the issue at hand changes accordingly from a reconceptualisation of PRA discourses into finding alternative means of understanding current PRA discourses as they are commonly used. If companies like BERI, IEU and other political risk analysts become more cognisant of the ways their presence, as well as the presence of their clients, influences the occurrence or perceptions of political risk, many of these arguments could become irrelevant. Additionally, while corruption, ‘bad governance’, national and international tensions, as well as institutional functionality, are, and will arguably remain, relevant to the calculation of political risk, it is the framing of these phenomena as ‘traditional drawbacks’ that need to change if PRA is ever going to acknowledge its position within the global matrices of power. Of course, this is the less profitable option and will likely not be considered because current reciprocal ties do not obligate political risk analysts or TNCs to alter their truth in order to consider risk factors from a Chaballian perspective. This is very clear in the case of the DRC and its past, present and future political climates.
Arguing for the Relevance of the DRC’s Gold-mining Industry as a Case Study

The DRC has recently remerged onto the international radar following violent protests in the capital city of Kinshasa, as well as the eastern city of Goma, in mid-September 2016, opposing the postponement of presidential elections, which were due to take place in November 2016 to at least late 2017 (Burke, 2016: 1). This is not to say that the DRC ever left the international scrutiny of news agents, journalists, international governments or NGOs. The socio-economic circumstances in the DRC, where 88% of the population lives on less than $1.25 per day, have called much attention to the governance of the the country (Burgis, 2015: 4 and Chabal, 2009: 127). In addition, national identities have been based on the dispensation of power in the DRC, where your position in terms of influence and economic wealth determine how much or how little your life will matter in times of violence, such as now (Chabal, 2009: 7; Mamdani, 1999: 54 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012a: 48). Finally, the marginalisation of Africa and the consequences of discourses framing countries like the DRC, in terms of Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, have had a great influence on how political risk is narrated on the continent (Bayart, 2000: 217 and Chabal, 2009: 17).

Bremmer (as quoted by Campisi, 2013:1) asserts that PRA is a subjective analysis that needs the consideration of various nuances in society. The primary consideration in terms of the DRC was thus framing the country in the context of the post-colony, which should be understood as a part of the world where existing power relations are underpinned by colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 332). This study has also shown, in the preceding chapter, how these post-colonial power dispensations influence the livelihoods of artisanal miners and other economic activities that are considered to be informal and thus automatically linked to political risk (Quijano, 2000: 533 and Rayner, 2007: 167).

The reason for this, according to Chabal (2009: 23 & 45) and Hardy and Maguire (2016: 81), is the pathologisation of the ways these artisanal miners define their being in terms of belonging to the communities and how TNCs perceive these narratives as a threat to their profit-making capabilities. This study outlined how this contributes to the framing of ‘being’ in the DRC in terms of the ‘other’ (Chabal, 2009: 2 and Hudson & Melber, 2014: 2) where ‘othering’ occurred in terms of how these people operate outside of that which is considered formal or institutional when it came to the economy and the political democracy.

Consequently, these practices of ‘othering’ have led to the categorisation of the DRC as a high risk environment (IHS, 2015). As previously stated, in some instances, the classification of the
DRC is warranted, however, given the influence PRA consultants, TNCs and other external actors have on the volatility of its government policies and political environment - as a whole, the classification of failure or risk as a purely traditional or African occurrence - is not fair in all instances. In addition, the expectation of international organisations and businesses is that the Congolese government should design policies in terms of Western ideals in order to legitimise itself (Dahl, 1978: 13; Krouse, 1982: 442; Mkandawire, 2010: 267 and Taylor, 2002: 32). In essence, where the economic or political institutions of the DRC are inconsistent with these ideals, the country is described as a ‘high risk’ environment. The most observable way of seeing this is in terms of the check-list agenda of democratic institutionalism or polyarchy. According to this principle, the DRC should hold free, fair and regular elections while no evaluation of the quality of governance is awarded after the fact. Similarly, the fact that Joseph Kabila was democratically elected is a positive sign, but it is the frustration with his governance that is fuelling current political protests in the country (Burke, 2016: 1). Additionally, because the DRC is such an enormous geographic territory, inhabited by various ethnic groups, the consolidation of even the most basic statehood (i.e. polyarchy) remains difficult (Larson et al, 2015: 236 and Muraya & Ahere, 2014: 20). This means that politics in the DRC is not exempt from polyarchic prescriptions, such as the stability of the government, and remains reliant on the description of its democracy, which is a Western governmental ideal, as well as the external powers that determine the strength of technocratic measurements such as PRA (Busse & Hefeker, 2007: 5 and Mkandawire, 2010: 265).

The ways in which this most commonly manifest is via the development of policies related to the extractive industry and other areas where international stakeholders are concerned. This dissertation included two prominent examples related to the extractive industry. The first is the Congolese Mining Code of 2002, which controls the issuing of mining rights to large scale mining (LSM) operations as well as Congolese small-scale mining operatives (Andre-Dumont, 2013: 66). However, as this discussion has shown, privilege is always given to the LSM operations. In explanation of this preference, the researcher has discussed the reciprocal relations formed between the TNCs operating in terms of the Mining Code and the political elite of the DRC and the fact that taxation is easier to control if a small number of large companies are taxed in comparison to various small operations that are informally organised (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1394; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012a: 48; Paudyn, 2013: 790 and Tlostanova & Mignolo, 2009: 130). The fact that these taxes are very rarely redistributed is not something that was discussed in detail, but the socio-economic circumstances highlighted in the introductory paragraph of this section, show that very little redistribution does occur. Unfortunately, the easiest explanation for
this is looting, although categorising this as an exclusively African problem is based on incorrect and biased assumptions on the part of PRA discourses and practices (Chabal, 2009: 175 and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2015: 23).

The second is the Dodd-Frank Trade Agreement of 2010 (USA, 2010), which aims to regulate the trade in conflict minerals that originate in the DRC. Although the initiative might initially be seen as a good one, the fact that this places more restriction on an already volatile livelihood requires further attention. It is conceded that all of the conflicts in the DRC have reached a point where ideology was replaced by greed. The breakdown in social order not only damaged the reputation of TNCs operating in the extractive industries, but also implicated the way in which traditional economic and political practices had to modernise according to Western ideals (Chabal, 2009: 157). Accordingly, while the adoption of market-friendly policies might have been influenced by the WBG, Joseph Kabila’s government has also facilitated the political reforms characteristic of polyarchies, while ignoring the fact that many people who participate in ASM are dependent on it for survival; despite the fact that ASM is described in terms of what is informal and thus, risky (Chabal, 2009: 10 and Geenen, 2014: 90).

Given the discussion of PRA in the second chapter, the author posited that those who have the power to define ASM operations in terms of informality - or any other part of the political, economic or social environments - as risky have control over the avenues available to ASM operatives to improve their livelihoods (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81). While the riskification of ASM affirms the dominance of PRA practices and those who are in charge of defining risk, it has been argued that recognising ASM operatives as actors in the mining sector has done harm to these people’s ability to generate sustainable livelihoods from the informal extraction of gold and other natural resources (Chabal, 2009: 130; Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 81 and Larson et al., 2015: 228). This is because the conceptualisation of ASM as a contributor to political risk by PRA methodologies - based on the premise that it is part of the informal economy, and often equated with conflict minerals and corruption - has led to the functional pathologisation of these livelihoods. Furthermore, these pathologisations have been used to validate the interventions by various international actors such as the WBG, who typically act as policy advisors in instances such as the Congolese Mining Code (Diemel & Cuvelier, 2015: 151; Koddenbrock, 2014: 670 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 332). By placing ASM miners within narratives that focus on the international political economy of transnational mineral supply chains, the Congolese government has reinforced the dominance of PRA as a discourse, describing it in terms of

Coincidentally, de Koning (2012: 225) argues that while mineral extraction has been used to fund sustained territorial control in the eastern DRC during the various conflicts, the loss of legitimate control over the use of violence by the state signals a rupture in post-colonial state ownership. A symptom of this is ‘ideological in-fighting’, which is most likely to lead to violence as it has done before periodically and during independence from colonialism (Chaddick, 1994: 82-83; McKellar, 2010: 105 and Rayner, 2007: 166). But, contrary to PRA discourse, the continued reoccurrence of violence has not impeded the profit-making capabilities in the eastern DRC. Despite the riskification of ASM operations and the categorisation of conflict within various PRA methodologies, many of the LSM operatives have not been deterred about their investments. While international tensions are caused by territorial disputes in the eastern DRC, the negative regional political and economic forces have not discouraged investment in the DRC. In addition, because security has been turned into a product, protection can also be bought from rebel groups although they operate in a much more informal way than G4S. The accumulation of wealth is further facilitated by the market-friendly nature of the extractive industry, following the criminalisation of social protest and informal mining activities outside ZEAs, despite the fragile political environment (Kinniburgh, 2014: 63). While the business of political risk analyses has boiled down to a somewhat inexact science riddled with double standards, focussed on the potential threats TNCs face with regards to loss of investment (Boshoff & Lambrechts, 2011: 2), this study has shown that the DRC needs to be understood in a way that values the lives of the artisanal miners of the DRC in ways that acknowledge the influence hegemonic discourses of democracy and risk have had on the insolvency of social norms (Chabal, 2009: 158). Ultimately, the situation in the Congo, along with many other African countries is summarised by Burgis (2015: 8) in his declaration that:

“Where once treaties were signed at gunpoint and dispossessed Africa’s inhabitants of their land, gold and diamonds, today phalanxes of lawyers representing oil and mineral companies with average annual revenues in the hundreds of billions of dollars impose miserly terms on African governments and employ tax dodges from destitute nations ... They are aligned to no nation and belong instead to the transnational elites that have flourished in the era of globalisation”.

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The aforementioned quote shows how power relations that were forged in the time of colonisation are still present today. But instead of treaties between the colonised and the coloniser, TNCs operate in ways that ensure they will flourish in the new era of globalisation. Peck and Tickell (2007: 43) further state that the dynamics of this unidirectional way of doing business, often informed by risk discourses, as discussed throughout this dissertation, will continue to shape between elites and countries. The ultimate result will be that perceptions of risk will persist, but as has been shown in the fourth chapter, this won’t likely deter TNCs from operating in risk prone countries.

Additionally, the supposed necessity of PRA for TNCs rests on the likelihood that hazards will occur in its business environment. Resultantly, the political and social actions taken by the host government are negotiated measurements influenced by pro-business policy design and most likely instituted via polyarchic measures. In the case of the DRC, as illustrated, PRA discourses only have value when PTAs are negotiated, and very rarely do TNCs or the government want governance to extend beyond the check-list polyarchy described in the introductory chapter. This means that the transnational elites, which include members of state such as Joseph Kabila and members of the business elite, are rarely interested in altering the dynamics of global power, despite popular political rhetoric. It is the author’s argument that this entrenches the colonial relations of exploitation through the construction of ‘truth’ in the post-colonial epoch, specifically related to the determination of political risk in Africa generally, but the DRC more specifically (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 48).

This dissertation has presented the theory that the preconditions to development, such as free-market economics and polyarchic governance, have allowed so-called ‘experts’ from the West to assert themselves as authorities on matters concerning African development (Chabal, 2009: 51 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 56). Mamdani (2005: 2) also asserts that the foremost reasons Africa believes these experts’ interpretations of life in Africa is the animation of African culture as if it was ahistoric, which enables them to promote ‘commodification, marketization and pervasive managerialism’ of development in ways that ensure the ahistoric narratives concerning power and benefit in Africa continue (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 59). This leads to the confluence of the economic and political elites into one dominant class, which continues exploitative behaviour without restrictions, linked to fully functioning and efficient government; while placing the blame on the ineffective description of African states highlighted by PRA practices (Taylor, 2002: 33).
Implications of the Analysis and Recommendations for Further Research

While the ability of this dissertation to find alternative ways of understanding PRA discourses might be considered ineffective by some, it is suggested here that new research on political risk discourses should acknowledge the fact that belonging to African communities, and the reciprocity that this implies, should have an impact on the way in which we understand political risk factors, such as corruption and conflict. In addition, measuring political risk based on the stability of governance and international tension, without acknowledging the impact of colonialism on these occurrences, means that the so-called ‘experts’ only take into consideration the surface imperfections without delving deeper into the effect the global matrices of power have on these occurrences. The fact that coloniality has further increased market forces to shape societies in the developing world is not acknowledged in most literature related to PRA (Campisi, 2013: 2). In fact, this study is one of only a few that considers the importance of alternative narrations for PRA. By implying that PRA is imperfect in its understanding of risk and political indicators in Africa and by using Chaballian perspectives to do so, this research has shown how political discourses in Africa and other parts of the Third World can be re-narrated to consider particular nuances. Additionally, this study and others like it should have an impact on how future risk analyses are approached and the ways in which data is reported in order to avoid the linear, hegemonic descriptions of ‘risky’ destinations like the ones analysed throughout this dissertation. Without considering the impact colonialism, and coloniality, has on these PRA practices, we will never be able to make our own history as Marx (1869: 1) once proclaimed we should do.

This means that further attention needs to be given to the ways in which political interventions are structured. While the author is pessimistic about the likelihood that TNCs, governments or multinational organisations, such as the WBG or IMF, will change their approach; it is acknowledged that more academic research needs to be done on the matter. In the DRC, for instance, policies related to risk mitigation are used in the negotiation of PTAs, which, in turn, benefits TNCs and their profit in the gold-mining industry despite the supposed risk of operating in an environment characterised by increased volatility and informality (Emel & Huber, 2008: 1397).

Finally, although many post-colonial and anti-coloniality scholars have addressed the way in which difference in the global South is framed as deviance, there is still a void where PRA discourses are concerned. The researcher read extensive literature and analyses for this dissertation, but came across very little academic work recognising the skewed way analyses are
done. The fact that PRA methodologies also use Western ideals, such as good governance or development as measurement, seems a bit unfair, considering how bad governance and underdevelopment have benefitted the elite as evidenced in the recent release of the Panama Papers (Sergeant, 2016: 1).

**Conclusions**

Interventions and reforms influenced by Western ideals of political and economic institutionalism should be seen as an abusive of power relations where experts and theorists facilitate the increased exploitation of Africa through the extraction of resources (Chabal, 2009: 151). This abuse is disturbingly clear in the case of the ASM operatives in the DRC who suffer not only the loss of their livelihood, but their being because they are unable to control the exploitation of resources in their place of origin (Hall, 2010: 1 and Baldwin, 2002: 35). This lack of control is then worsened by development and PRA discourses that describe the ASM operatives in terms of impediments and the deviances related to the politics of belonging and surviving in a context, which is hard, but made worse by the presence of TNCs and militia groups alike (Mamdani, 1999: 55).

Furthermore, the paradox of plenty, or the ‘resource curse’, means that the power relations between the ASM miners and the transnational elite will only become more skewed. The majority of Congolese will remain poor, while they are blamed for the high risk situations TNCs are allegedly forced to operate in (Standing, 2007: 3 and Mazrui, 2013: 143). Because these paradoxes are entrenched in dominance and discrimination, ASM miners will never be in a negotiating position. The use of PRA consultants - such as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), The Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) model and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) - means that these people might be from that locality, but through the riskification of their being, they are unlikely to fully belong while the power dispensations are as they are (Batchelor & Hearn, 2013: 5 and Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 82). Moreover, PTAs that are ‘established under the guidance of the World Bank’ and based on PRA consultancies’ recommendations, as in the case of the DRC’s Mining Law of 2002 (Geenen, 2012: 325 and André-Dumont, 2013: 65), rarely take into account what African people experience in their daily existences. Subsequently, many of these agreements serve to entrap Africa ‘within the existing global matrices of power underpinned by Eurocentrism and coloniality’, which causes ‘othering’ and subjugation (Cheri, 2012: 193; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a, 29; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b, 332 and Spivak, 1988: 69).
Analysing the subjugation of Africa is not a simple task because Africa cannot be amalgamated into single trends or cycles. Although the PRA consultancies do their analyses on individual countries, the evidence suggests that the agglomeration of ideas and traditions are universal and decidedly pessimistic in all instances (Mbembe as quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 29). The misapprehension of social formations in the various contexts of the continent is further exemplified in the use of violence and corruption, among others, as indicators of political risk, without understanding the role of international interference and the presence of TNCs in the perpetuation of these occurrences (Bischoff, 2010: 27, Brink, 2004: 123 - 126, Chabal. 2009: 150 and Howell, 2014). This study concedes that these phenomena could contribute to the likelihood that political risk is present; but it simply posits that the imposed meaning of African social occurrences and the equation thereof to risk do not serve Africans.

Illustratively, some of the indicators used by PRA, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), view corruption as a traditional impediment to the process of modernisation. According to this index, the comprising elements, patronage and bad governance are indicative of African states’ incapability to govern adequately. This description fails to account for the fact that reciprocal relations are a necessary part of the politics of belonging in Africa and that its metamorphosis into a negative economic occurrence is a result of Western interference during the colonial period (Chabal, 2009: 51).

This is not to say that contemporary relationships between elites from the West and those in Africa are not tainted with money-making schemes. Burgis’ (2015) book, entitled *The Looting Machine: Warlords, Tycoons, Smugglers and the Systematic Theft of Africa’s Wealth* tells the story of Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a militia group masquerading as a political party in the DRC. While the movement’s rhetoric is that it is a vessel of peace and freedom, in reality, and like many of its rival organisations, it only serves as a front for the accumulation of economic wealth through the extraction of natural resources.

Finally, and in conclusion, if this dissertation only showed how the perception of Africa generally, but the DRC specifically, as a place where political risk does not influence investment as much as we are led to believe, then this study has been a success. By taking into account Chabballian interpretations of phenomena such as bad governance and conflict, and applying these to the prominent example of the DRC, it is shown that alternative interpretations are possible. While no viable substitute to PRA exists, based on the evidence, it can be concluded that, while the transnational elite (including companies that sell PRA) benefit from the
riskification of Africa and African experiences, no alternative will be considered. This is because there is a circular and interdependent relationship between the constructs of PRA and the global matrices of power, which means that we are at this moment in history where we are still unable to be true to our authentic selves as African subjects of knowing, because we are still subjected to Western ways of knowing that claim universality and applicability in all instances, even the DRC (Dei, 2012: 103).
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