Cousins no more? The 1948 crisis in ties between the Netherlands and Afrikaner nationalists

Patrick Furlong
Alma College, USA
furlong@alma.edu

Abstract

Despite historic Dutch-Afrikaner links, the Netherlands became a leading critic of South Africa’s National Party (NP) government. Many scholars agree that while differences on involvement in World War II hurt ties, the NP’s apartheid policy caused a major rift only much later. This study examines the roots of that rift in Dutch responses to the 1948 NP victory, the ensuing controversy, and that over appointing Otto du Plessis as envoy to The Hague. Afrikaner nationalists were as baffled by their cousins’ not understanding their wartime refusal to aid the Allies as most Dutch were by many Afrikaners’ wartime actions, discounting such criticism as misinformed and not understanding how much Nazi racial ideology made their apartheid platform toxic. Such different recent histories had made them strangers to each other so that, despite efforts to paper over strained relations, the eventual rupture was significantly shaped by the earlier crisis.

Keywords: Afrikaner nationalism; Netherlands; Second World War; Apartheid; National Party; Daniel Malan; Pierneef; Otto du Plessis.

Introduction

The Netherlands was a fierce critic of the Afrikaner-led National Party (NP) government’s apartheid policy. Its government supported the Defence and Aid Fund, which helped African political detainees and their families, in 1977 suspended and in 1981 ended a 1951 cultural accord, and barred president FW de Klerk’s entry even after he unbanned the liberation movements. Yet, Afrikaner ties of ancestry, religion, and language to the Dutch stamland

(ancestral land) date to the Dutch-ruled 17th and 18th century Cape. After the Cape was conquered by Britain, its wars against the Boer republics renewed Dutch feelings of kinship.\(^5\) The Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Vereeniging (Dutch-South African Union/NZAV) subsidized Afrikaners’ study in the Netherlands and aided Dutch immigrants to South Africa;\(^6\) immigrants such as Arnoldus Pannevis and JWG van Oordt promoted Afrikaans and Afrikaner national awareness.\(^7\)

What explains this change? Although Pieter de Klerk and Bart de Graaff question the extent of the Dutch-Afrikaner connection,\(^8\) Gert Scholtz deemed it one of Afrikaners’ “precious possessions”.\(^9\) Many scholars agree that Nazi occupation in World War II altered Dutch views of race-based policies,\(^10\) but that while Afrikaner nationalist opposition to Allied efforts at first seemed to hurt ties, a real shift came much later.\(^11\) Even De Graaff, who asserts that the Dutch attitude became increasingly critical after World War II, agrees that the anti-apartheid viewpoint came ever more to the fore from the early 1960s.\(^12\) Erica Meijers argues that although right after the 1948 victory of the NP and its smaller ally, the Afrikaner Party, the Dutch experience of Nazi rule raised doubts about the apartheid model and immigration to South Africa, the


latter rose again as the Cold War helped revive Dutch sympathies, dropping noticeably only from 1960 due to growing unrest in South Africa.\(^\text{13}\) Gerrit Schutte and Otto Terblanche also admit World War II’s impact, but note improved Dutch-Afrikaner ties in the 1950s, seeing the real turning point as the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre.\(^\text{14}\)

This study re-focuses on the war’s impact on responses to the NP victory, drawing chiefly on the Dutch press, Cape Town’s *Die Burger*, and Johannesburg’s *Die Transvaler*, representing the two major regional NP factions. The Dutch reaction stunned Afrikaner nationalists, as did that to appointing as envoy to The Hague Otto du Plessis, whom many Dutch thought pro-Nazi. Some works touch on this,\(^\text{15}\) but it merits a closer look. Afrikaner nationalists were as baffled by Dutch anger at their not backing the Allies as were many Dutch by what seemed pro-Axis views; Afrikaner nationalists could not understand how much Nazi racial ideology made their apartheid policy toxic.

**Dutch-Afrikaner relations between the World Wars**

There had been tensions in the run-up to replacing Dutch with Afrikaans as an official language in 1925; the NZAV lost a third of its members from 1920 to 1931.\(^\text{16}\) Few Afrikaners joined South African branches of the Algemeen-Nederlands Verbond (pan-Netherlandic Union), which pushed Dutch-Flemish-Afrikaner ties. Yet, in 1928 South Africa chose The Hague for its first legation in continental Europe.\(^\text{17}\) In the 1930s, the Dietsche Studentenverbond (Pan-Netherlandic Student Union) and Afrikaans-Nasionale Studentebond (Afrikaans National Student Union) visited each others’ lands,\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^\text{16}\) LM CN de Jongh, “Beelaerts bij de Boeren: De betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Zuid-Afrika in de jaren dertig” (MA, University of Utrecht, 2012), pp. 28, 38, 41.

the University of Amsterdam set up an Afrikaans chair, and Dutch Prime Minister Hendrikus Colijn attended a commemoration of Transvaal President Kruger’s birthday, like Queen Wilhelmina sending a message of support to the 1938 Pretoria Great Trek centenary event. Dutch school textbooks now covered South African history and Afrikaans literature. By 1938 The Hague had set up a commission to work for a cultural accord with Pretoria; before World War II, Dutch historian Pieter Geyl had a regular column (in Dutch) in Cape Town’s “Purified” NP daily, Die Burger. As Schutte notes, Dutch belief in a “Greater Netherlands” and interest in the “kindred” Afrikaners was widespread and not limited just to “a small group of hobbyists.”

The coming of World War II

World War II changed this. When Hitler invaded Poland, Prime Minister JBM Hertzog and “Purified” NP leader Daniel Malan opposed siding with Britain against Germany. Hertzog’s United Party split: Jan Smuts, now Prime Minister, led a pro-war UP rump; Hertzog’s and Malan’s followers formed a “Reunited” NP. The latters’ stance, unlike initial Dutch neutrality, seemed more sympathetic to Germany. Hertzog likened its fate at Versailles to that of the defeated Boer republics, arguing that Hitler no longer accepted such humiliation; Malan claimed Hitler just wanted to regain lost territory and unite those of the same race and language. Some of the Dutch press noted Hertzog’s pro-German views and those of his German-born ex-defense minister, Oswald Pirow.

When Hitler invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, a Burger editorial dismissed Smuts’s claiming “Holland” “sacred ground”: Afrikaners, with ancestry as German or French as Dutch, lacked such “home” sentiment.

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19 Algemeen Handelsblad (Amsterdam), 16 May 1933, p. 4. Cited Dutch newspapers, except Elseviers Weekblad, are from the Royal Dutch Library historical newspaper database (available at www.delpher.nl/kranten, accessed between 1 May 2016 and 17 June 2017). Some prominent newspapers are not available there or only for some years. Elseviers Weekblad was accessed in the same period at archief.elsevierweekblad.nl.
20 De Tijd: Godsdienstig-staatkundig Dagblad (s-Hertogenbosch), 11 October 1936, p. 5.
22 G Schutte, Stamverwantschap onder druk..., p. 35.
26 Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 36, 4 September 1939, cols. 22-23.
27 Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 36, 4 September 1939, cols. 49-50.
28 De Maasbode (Rotterdam), 8 September 1939, p. 2; De Telegraaf (Amsterdam), 6 September 1939, p. 2.
29 Die Burger, 11 May 1940, p. 6.
Malan recalled that the Allies had violated Iceland's and Norway's neutrality and that in World War I the Dutch stayed neutral even when Belgian kin were overrun. Many Afrikaners joined the paramilitary Ossewabrandwag (Oxwagon Sentinel/ OB); the OB-linked Stormjaers (Stormtroopers) engaged in sabotage. The NP, by 1941 led by Malan, gradually parted ways with the OB, but all this had an impact after the war, especially as the German occupiers had executed Dutch dissidents, murdered Jews, and starved the Dutch people in the final winter. Schutte notes that even Afrikaners' Dutch “friends” found hard to digest what they learned of wartime Nationalist attitudes and that Malan's 1948 victory over Smuts, a heroic figure to the Dutch, showed that the NP hardly represented a small minority of Afrikaners. Even Geyl, imprisoned by the Nazis, became disenchanted by what he saw as Afrikaner indifference to the occupation. A July 1945 memorandum authorized by the Dutch envoy to Pretoria, Dr PC Visser, and co-authored by four pro-Allied South African academics, two Dutch-born, claimed that Nationalist friends of the Netherlands had been so anti-British that they criticized Queen Wilhelmina for fleeing to Britain in 1940 and had encouraged local Dutch citizens to refuse to fight for their homeland.

**Dutch responses to the 1948 Nationalist victory and Afrikaner counter-responses**

Responding to Malan's victory, the Dutch Catholic daily *De Tijd* noted not only his wartime neutrality, but alleged support by an “anti-English”, anti-Semitic and anti-African group (perhaps meaning the OB), ascribing Smuts's defeat to his very “moderate” proposals to improve Africans' position being unacceptable to the “Boers”. Some provincial Dutch papers were even harsher:

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34 G Schutte, *Nederland en de Afrikaners...,* p. 64.
the Groningen-based *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* claimed Malan honored theories familiar from fascist and national socialist doctrines, contrasting Smuts’s alleged integrationism with Malan’s wanting South African Indians to leave and Africans to move to separate areas.\(^{39}\) When an unnamed South African expatriate complained that “fascism” did not apply to South Africa, as people at different levels of civilization lived there and “racial consciousness” had developed out of self-preservation, the *Nieuwsblad* insisted that, lacking an exact word for Malan’s teachings, “neo-fascism” seemed most appropriate.\(^{40}\) Even the *Limburgsch Dagblad*, which noted that observers thought Malan, to win English-speakers’ support, would not seek an independent republic and would avoid radical reforms, in commenting on his government’s likely promoting Dutch, Scandinavian, and German immigration, asserted he had shown pro-German sympathies even before the war.\(^{41}\)

An editorial in *Die Burger*, representing Malan’s Cape NP, likened such views to those of uninformed British or American commentators, noting the old Dutch *stamland*’s role in building up the Afrikaner nation. The Nationalist-oriented population was “custodian” of this connection, yet the Dutch press seemed not just ignorant but hostile, comparable to British and American views of Dutch rule in the East Indies.\(^{42}\) Here was a notably different tone from that of 1940, then so dismissive of ties to the Netherlands.

The Dutch-born future Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, appointed a NP senator later in 1948 but until the end of that year chief editor of the more hardline northern NP organ, *Die Transvaler*,\(^{43}\) also seemed shocked that the *stamverwante* (kindred) Dutch press was so ill-informed. Editorials complained that even the well-regarded *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant* ascribed the Nationalist victory to Smuts’ s recognizing Israel, supposedly contrary to “orthodox” Afrikaners’ wishes, and blamed foreign press dependence on an “anti-Nationalist” source (likely South Africa’s “English” press) and Pretoria’s pro-Smuts envoy to the Hague, Prof Leo Fouché, for not correcting such ignorance.\(^{44}\) *Die Transvaler* printed a letter from future Nationalist historian FA van Jaarsveld, then studying in Groningen, which Verwoerd praised for exposing a Dr. Ploeger (Jan Ploeger, a Dutch-born immigrant working at the

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40 Anon., *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 4 June 1948, 1.
41 Anon., *Limburgsch Dagblad* (Heerlen), 5 June 1948, 1.
44 Anon., *Die Transvaler*, 1 June 1948, p. 4; 9 June 1948, p. 4.
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pro-Smuts Pretoria daily, *Die Volkstem*), who before the election had written a long article, published in the *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, presenting cooperation between the NP and its Afrikaner Party partner (on better terms with OB members) in a way suggesting that the NP was National Socialist. Van Jaarsveld complained in his letter that Ploeger presented NP race policy in a way which readers would connect to fascism.

*Die Transvaler* soon reprinted a letter to *Elseviers Weekblad* from 24 Afrikaner students in the Netherlands criticizing Dutch reactions to the election result, praised this action and, like them, welcomed a friendlier two-part piece in *Elseviers Weekblad* by Prof PJ van Winter, Dutch ex-NZAV secretary and editor of *Zuid-Afrika*, a monthly published by the associated Zuid-Afrikaansche Stichting Moederland (South African Motherland Foundation). Gert Scholtz, author of *Die Transvaler*’s foreign affairs column “Sake van die Dag”, grumbled that the *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant* had not changed its opinion despite its claim of numerous similar letters from South Africa.

*Die Burger*’s “Buitelandse Oorsig” (Foreign Overview) column made much of egregious errors in some Dutch commentary: Amsterdam’s *Algemeen Handelsblad* confused Malan’s early career with that of Francois Stephanus Malan and claimed that he later led the OB; a corrected later piece still had incorrect dates. The Communist *De Waarheid* described Malan as a Dutch immigrant, a Protestant minister who had left to save black souls and who wanted to drive all Africans from the cities and mines. The same piece was less implausible in noting press bureau reports that Malan planned to stop Jewish immigration and a new report that his government would not deport 218 German “war criminals” and would promote German immigration. A 1948 NP election pamphlet in fact warned against immigration of “uprooted” Jews from Europe, favoring instead “suitable and assimilable” immigrants from Western Europe.

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46 Anon., *Die Transvaler*, 21 June 1948, p. 3.
47 Anon., *Elseviers Weekblad* (Amsterdam), 10 July 1948, p. 15; *Die Transvaler*, 16 August 1948, p. 2.
51 Anon., *De Waarheid* (Amsterdam), 1 June 1948, p. 3.
52 National Archive (Cape Town), DH van Zyl Papers, 7, NP pamphlet, ’n Roekelose regerings-plan! Onbeheerde immigrasie bedreig Suid-Afrika (Cape Town, HNP Propagandakomitee, 1948), p. 3.
The Dutch press was indeed not uniformly uninformed. A front-page post-election piece in *De Tijd* showed familiarity with key details and core issues, noting that even under Smuts the vote was limited to a tenth of the population, mainly white, plus a few “coloreds” subject to special requirements, that he called an election when rising living costs had caused widespread dissatisfaction and when a serious shortage of dollars could soon endanger the currency, and that white fear of losing their monopoly dominated domestic politics. Although a piece in Rotterdam’s social democratic *Het Vrije Volk*, like *De Tijd*, described Malan as fanatical and mistook apartheid for impracticable literally total segregation, it too showed awareness of economic difficulties such as housing and food shortages or sharply rising living costs which it warned could be exploited by the NP. The author, noting that Smuts had argued that moving too rapidly with black emancipation would produce a reaction, asserted that, as in the American South, rather than great entrepreneurs, the white working and middle classes, feeling most threatened by black advancement, were Malan’s “fanatical” followers. The *Algemeen Handelsblad* foreign affairs column acknowledged that Malan had distanced himself from the fascist-oriented OB even as it pointed out that he depended on the support of the Afrikaner Party, which it correctly noted had links with the OB. The same piece accurately pointed to Malan’s insisting as late as 1943 that it would be better for Germany to win the war than for the Soviet Union to do it for Britain and the United States, as otherwise communism would spread across South Africa. Days later, this newspaper faithfully reported Malan’s first radio address as Prime Minister, in which he rejected isolationism and claimed that apartheid gave “non-Europeans” greater independence; it even asserted that his government was likely to take as favorable a stance toward the Jews as the Smuts government had done.

Although Malan was not the committed anti-Semite initially depicted in papers such as *Elseviers Weekblad* and *Algemeen Handelsblad* (one of *Die Burger*’s points of dispute), his biographer Lindie Koorts concedes that he had opportunistically used anti-Jewish sentiment for political purposes. The

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54 Anon., *Het Vrije Volk: Demokratisch-Socialistisch Dagblad* (Rotterdam), 28 May 1948, p. 3.
60 L. Koorts, *DF Malan and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism* (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2014), pp. 310-314.
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piece in Elseviers Weekblad of which Die Burger complained was wrong only on the date in stating that Malan in 1929 had introduced a bill limiting further Jewish immigration from eastern Europe. This was in 1930; the bill did not specify Jews, but they were assuredly the chief target. In 1937 Malan proposed to ban immigration of “unassimilable” groups such as Jews, close some occupations to those already present, require using original names, and end recognizing Yiddish as a European language. On the eve of war he described the “Jewish question” as a dark cloud over South Africa and “organised Jewry” as having robbed the population of its heritage. When he sought to reverse course after the war, Eric Louw, a Cape Nationalist known for his anti-Semitic stance, claimed this was just to get a few extra votes, reminding Malan that in 1939 he had actually sought to toughen an anti-Jewish Bill drafted by Louw. Even the charge in De Volkstaat that Malan was a fanatical campaigner against alcohol, which the above-noted piece in Die Burger had depicted as amusingly incorrect, had some truth, for as a young minister Malan had preached against easy licensing of canteens due to their impact on alcoholism.

Die Transvaler agreed with Van Winter that the Dutch press drew on the British press, with information from an “un-National” source (presumably local “English” papers), painting Dr. Malan and his supporters in the darkest fashion but Smuts and his followers as highly enlightened. Die Burger blamed the British and American press: Dutch journalists could read Afrikaans and formerly relied on good direct sources such as Dutch immigrant Frederik Rompel, author of Die Burger’s foreign affairs column and of a regular South African letter for the Nieuw Rotterdamse Courant (he died on the eve of the German invasion). Die Burger also blamed the “English” Opposition press,

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63 Anon., Die Burger, 7 November 1939, 1.
64 JS Gericke Library, University of Stellenbosch, DF Malan Collection, 1/1/2337, Letter: Eric Louw/DF Malan, 26 October 1947.
66 Anon., Die Transvaler, 17 August 1948, p. 4.
67 Anon., Die Transvaler, 1 July 1948, p. 4.
on which outsiders allegedly depended, for depicting the Nationalists as Nazis or their lackeys, as persecutors of Jews, and as anti-English isolationists.  

The NP press showed little understanding of how government actions confirmed Dutch suspicions that many Afrikaner nationalists were not just ignorant of their wartime suffering, but continued to turn a blind eye to seeming pro-Axis collaboration. Thus, below the 14th June Burger editorial bemoaning declining Dutch-Afrikaner relations was one defending the early release of two militants convicted of wartime murder for throwing a bomb which killed a bystander: the editorial argued that the two young men, who it termed “political prisoners”, had been misled and their patriotism misused, but had been willing to give their lives in an act of sacrifice. Days later the government ended wartime regulations barring OB members from state service, despite the wartime NP-OB feud. H Bloem, who ran the NZAV office, complained about honoring as heroes released wartime saboteurs or Robey Leibbrandt, who had plotted to assassinate Smuts. Although Die Burger minimized the significance of such early releases, arguing that the Smuts government had granted similar ones, Malan’s actions so broke with precedent that Governor-General Brand van Zyl complained that Malan had released Leibbrandt and Eric Holm, the Afrikaans-speaking announcer for the wartime Nazi Zeesen station, before requesting his legally mandated assent.  

Many Dutch understandably viewed NP racial policy through the lens of the Nazi occupation. Even FA van Jaarsveld acknowledged that the Dutch people now mightily disapproved of National Socialism. The apartheid ideal of restricting Africans to the reserves except those needed to work for whites sounded too familiar to those exposed to wartime forced labor and Nazi schemes for resettlement in the conquered East; thus, a piece in Elseviers Weekblad, summarized with horror in Die Burger, depicted Malan’s followers as viewing Africans’ fate in the reserves as one in which, driven by hunger and poverty, the strongest would work for them “in the mines and on the veld”. Even Professor Van Winter, who in Elseviers Weekblad distinguished between Malan’s anti-

69 Compare editorials in Die Burger, 28 June, 1948, p. 4; 29 June 1948, p. 4.  
71 Anon., Die Burger, 14 June 1948, p. 4.  
73 G Schutte, Stamverwantschap onder druk..., p. 221.  
76 See his letter in Die Transvaler, 21 June 1948, p. 3.  
77 Compare Die Burger, 23 June 1948, p. 4 and Elseviers Weekblad, 5 June 1948, p. 5.
British neutrality and OB pro-National Socialist views, acknowledged there had been and still were “positively” pro-German Afrikaners hoping to benefit from an “England” defeat.\textsuperscript{78} Although Van Winter denied that Malan was an anti-Semite, he agreed that Malan’s followers included hardline anti-Semites and noted that in his 1947 visit South African Jews had pointed out that they were still barred from joining the Transvaal NP.\textsuperscript{79}

The Pierneef portrait and the Du Plessis affair

In this atmosphere minor misunderstandings caused offense. The Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organizations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kulturele Vereniginge/FAK) had asked South Africa’s representative to Queen Wilhelmina’s golden jubilee celebration, Rachel Steyn (the last Orange Free State president’s widow), to present her with a painting by Afrikaner artist Pierneef. However, court officials did not hand it over at a royal audience, allegedly since the FAK was a private group; the painting was handed over only considerably later. \textit{Die Burger} and \textit{Die Transvaler} articles and editorials blamed variously the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry, the royal court, and South Africa’s envoy to The Hague and Brussels, Smuts supporter Prof. Leo Fouché.\textsuperscript{80} Dutch chargé d’affaires in Pretoria JP van Karnebeek appeased neither newspaper by blaming a misunderstanding, read as shifting responsibility onto South Africa,\textsuperscript{81} although even the scrupulous Van Winter complained, without specifics, that South African newspapers had spread untruths about Mrs. Steyn’s reception and the refusal of the gift.\textsuperscript{82}

Afrikaner letters to the editor showed that public anger was intertwined with that over another concern: \textsuperscript{83} Dutch opposition to the Malan government’s nominating Otto du Plessis to replace Fouché,\textsuperscript{84} whose replacement \textit{Die Transvaler} thought overdue.\textsuperscript{85} Van Winter later asserted that Du Plessis had

\textsuperscript{78} Elseviers Weekblad, 19 June 1948, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{79} Elseviers Weekblad, 26 June 1948, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{80} See \textit{Die Burger}, 5 October 1948, p. 3; 6 October 1948, p. 1; 7 October 1948, p. 4; 11 October 1948, p. 6; 13 October 1948, p. 2; 21 October 1948; 23 October 1948, p. 12; \textit{Die Transvaler}, 7 October 1948, p. 4; 22 October 1948, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{85} Anon., \textit{Die Transvaler}, 7 October 1948, p. 4.
been honored for his role in the NP victory.\textsuperscript{86} Fouché had only just arrived, although even his predecessor, Leif Egeland, thought he had been appointed purely to remove him, “failing and ageing”, as chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation.\textsuperscript{87} Some letter writers read Dutch press comments on the Nationalist victory, the painting fiasco, recent Dutch immigrants’ lack of identifying with Afrikaners, and the Du Plessis affair as all showing the changed relationship with the Dutch, one disgustedly likening the fuss over recent Dutch royal festivities (Wilhelmina’s jubilee and the abdication and installation of her daughter Juliana) to that during the 1947 British royal visit during the Smuts government.\textsuperscript{88}

Du Plessis’s central sin was a wartime pamphlet advocating an authoritarian “New Order”, replacing capitalism and liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{89} His pamphlet, published by the Cape NP-linked Nasionale Pers (National Press), listed him as editor of the eastern Cape NP newspaper, \textit{Die Oosterlig}. NP senator DT du Plessis Viljoen, visiting the Netherlands, argued in vain that Du Plessis had merely been pro-neutrality,\textsuperscript{90} the senator wrote to Malan of the strong feelings against Du Plessis and widespread Dutch view that “Malanites” were “Nazis” or at least “pro-German”.\textsuperscript{91} The Dutch and Belgian governments refused the nomination,\textsuperscript{92} forcing reconsideration.\textsuperscript{93}

A \textit{Transvaler} editorial blamed opposition to Du Plessis on the United Party, which in the war and election campaign decried the Nationalists as “Nazis”; now they were painted as “black as Fascists,” so that “some Hollanders” would not even accept a Nationalist envoy.\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Die Burger} also blamed the Opposition press for seeking to make Du Plessis suspect due to an anti-democratic pamphlet written long before, insisting he had expressed the opposite view two years later as NP Information Secretary, and that under such a model Smuts, the ex-Boer general who had changed his own position on Britain, would be unacceptable as envoy to London.\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Die Burger} expressed shock

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{86}{PJ van Winter, “Dr. JHO du Plessis overleden”, \textit{Zuid-Afrika}, 37, 1960, p. 66.}
\footnote{87}{L Egeland, \textit{Bridges of understanding: A personal record in teaching, law, politics and diplomacy} (Cape Town and Pretoria, Human and Rousseau, 1977), pp. 145, 204.}
\footnote{88}{See letters to \textit{Die Transvaler}, 6 October 1948, p. 7; 7 October 1948, p. 11; 16 October 1948, p. 7; \textit{Die Burger}, 19 October 1948, p. 4.}
\footnote{89}{JHO du Plessis, \textit{Die Nuwe Orde: Die revolusie van die twintigste eeu} (Port Elizabeth, Nasionale Pers, 1941), p. 7.}
\footnote{90}{Anon., \textit{De Tijd}, 29 September 1948, p. 2.}
\footnote{91}{DF Malan Collection, 1/1/2420: Letter: DT du P Viljoen/DF Malan, 30 September 1948.}
\footnote{92}{Anon., \textit{Het Vrije Volk}, 3 November 1948, p. 1.}
\footnote{93}{See \textit{Het Vrije Volk}, 17 September 1948, p. 5; \textit{De Tijd}, 4 November 1948, p. 4.}
\footnote{94}{Anon., \textit{Die Transvaler}, 20 September 1948, p. 4.}
\footnote{95}{Anon., \textit{Die Burger}, 24 September 1948, p. 4.}
\end{footnotes}
that, despite Nationalists’ promotion of Afrikaner awareness of the Dutch heritage, Dutch opposition to Du Plessis, derived from “hostile” sources in South Africa and “England”, seemed based on not wanting to weaken Dutch ties to Britain due to the new Union government’s wartime neutrality policy, making any Nationalist politician unacceptable.

_Die Burger_ reported on an anonymous piece in Van Winter’s NZAV magazine _Zuid-Afrika_ which offered a window into Dutch thinking: The Hague had stated that Du Plessis’ wartime stance made him unsuited to fostering mutual ties; Pretoria had also not followed normal procedure in making its nomination public before asking the Dutch government if it was acceptable. According to _Zuid-Afrika_, regardless of Du Plessis’s later views, having published a “little book” praising Fascism and National Socialism as the doctrines of the future, he would not be trusted by a people sensitive to anything reminding them of the propaganda associated with their recent ordeal, and who rejected everything which looked like it came from the same “poisonous source”._

Van Winter later explained official rejection of Du Plessis in a more Pretoria-friendly fashion, arguing that, given the campaign in the world press against the new Malan ministry and its supporters, the Dutch government had deemed it inadvisable to have at The Hague a target for attacks which presented South Africa as a Fascist state. Even the diplomatic Van Winter, despite accepting “a kernel of truth” in pro-Nationalist newspapers’ claim that the Dutch were too receptive to one-sided information from the “un-national” section of the South African press, had argued that the Dutch government had not acted out of “hurtful prejudice against a Nationalist”, but rather that the good relationship between the two countries would be better served when another envoy was named.

Despite claims of “England”, or at least the British press, being behind Dutch opposition to this appointment, in all of 1948 the British newspaper of record, London’s _The Times_, did not even mention Du Plessis. In any case, if information from pro-Opposition sources inside South Africa fed the perception that he had been pro-Fascist, that was due to more than a single pamphlet. CFJ Muller points out that even before war broke out, he did not

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97 PJ van Winter, “Dr. JHO du Plessis overleden...”, _Zuid-Afrika_, 37, 1960, p. 66.
99 This is borne out by a search for 1948 of _The Times Digital Archive 1785-2010_ (available at <find.galegroup.com/tda/basicSearch.do>, as accessed on 20 August 2016).
hide his sympathy with National Socialism and so openly backed Hitler’s policies in *Die Oosterlig* that potential advertisers and the Port Elizabeth city council boycotted it. By 1941 he had joined Pirow’s overtly pro-National Socialist pressure group in the NP, the New Order, and was openly pro-German in *Die Oosterlig*, which backed the OB, as did other Nasionale Pers newspapers, stopping only when Malan broke with the OB, when Du Plessis also resigned from the New Order.\(^\text{100}\)

**Explaining the changed Dutch perspective**

The basic problem was that the war had fundamentally re-shaped Dutch views of South Africa. Thus, whereas an editorial in the Catholic *De Tijd* revered Smuts for siding with Britain against Hitler, although not accusing Malan of “directly” being a German henchman, it asserted that Nazi influence had a powerful role in South Africa’s pre-war “neutrality propaganda”.\(^\text{101}\) It simply did not matter that, for instance, Malan’s feud with the OB was so bitter that the latter’s Cape leadership urged members to prevent an NP election victory,\(^\text{102}\) a point which London’s *The Times* itself noted, showing a better grasp of South African politics than the implication in pro-NP newspapers that the Dutch were misinformed in part due to their relying on the British press.\(^\text{103}\)

Even Van Winter explained Dutch admiration of the pro-British Smuts in light of his having fought against the same threat that had overwhelmed them.\(^\text{104}\) The British role in the Dutch liberation gave him a new image, no longer viewed as just a party politician.\(^\text{105}\) He received a warm welcome in a 1946 visit,\(^\text{106}\) met with his god-daughter Irene, one of Crown Princess Juliana’s daughters, and addressed a States-General joint session.\(^\text{107}\) Just as Malan’s government was being formed, the University of Leiden gave Smuts an honorary degree, when he was photographed with by then Princess-regent Juliana and her husband (Wilhelmina had just abdicated).\(^\text{108}\)
In contrast, the most pro-German Dutch admired Afrikaner nationalism. During the Trek centenary a Dutch National Socialist Movement (NSB) branch cabled Malan, praying for his struggle’s success.\(^\text{109}\) NSB leader Anton Mussert often cited Afrikaner racial views to “show” “Dutch” openness to Nazi racism.\(^\text{110}\) In mid-May 1940 editor Robert van Genechten claimed in the NSB-aligned monthly *Nieuw Nederland* that Malan was viewed as “national socialist” due to his stressing strict racial segregation; an “English” victory would mean Jewish influence and race mixing had won.\(^\text{111}\) *De Waag*, a pro-German newspaper, saw Afrikaners as paving the way in Africa for “Nordic Germanic blood”, noting Afrikaners’ *Diets* (pan-Netherlandic) ties, their suffering in the South African War and refusal in 1914 to fight against Germany, and the Malanite NP’s rejecting compromise.\(^\text{112}\) The NSB paper *Het Nationale Dagblad* was sympathetic to Malan’s NP, called Smuts a renegade,\(^\text{113}\) and ran a fictional serial promoting Afrikaner *Diets* identity, the Malanite cause, and the evils of South Africa’s British connection.\(^\text{114}\)

Even a “friend” such as the NZAV’s H Bloem was outraged over Afrikaners collecting funds to help Germans, efforts to bring German children to South Africa, synodal calls for mercy for condemned war criminals, and food packages for a land which “for six years systematically stole all food from its neighbors”.\(^\text{115}\) Letters from pro-war Afrikaners and Dutch immigrants to friends in the Netherlands such as Bloem, complaining about the lack of condemnation of the German invasion and generally pro-German sympathies among many Afrikaner nationalists, including many of those who had studied in the Netherlands with Dutch funding,\(^\text{116}\) were as likely a source of Dutch opinion as Opposition South African newspapers, and more likely than British papers.

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\(^{109}\) DF Malan Collection, 1/1/1335: Telegram from “Kringleider”, Kring Soerabaja Nationaal Socialistichse Beweging, received 16 December 1938.


\(^{112}\) *De Waag: Algemeen Cultureel, Politiek en Economisch Weekblad voor Nederland* (Haarlem), 7 August 1942, p. 1.


\(^{114}\) *Het Nationale Dagblad*, 28 May 1940, p. 2; 4 June 1940, p. 2.

\(^{115}\) G Schutte, *Stamverwantschap onder druk...*, p. 83.

Epilogue and conclusion: The continued impact of World War II

The Cold War environment, South African support over Indonesia, and South Africa’s attractions for Dutch emigrants allowed a short-term improvement in relations in the 1950s, notably during the tercentenary of Jan Van Riebeeck’s 1652 landing at the Cape. The new Malan government, however, dragged its heels for months on pursuing the cultural accord first envisaged before the war. Van Karnebeek asked Malan to attend to this matter as early as June 1948, but the accord was signed only in May 1951. Jan van den Berg, new Dutch minister to Pretoria, also had to wait unduly long to submit his credentials to fill the slot which Van Karnebeek temporarily held. The Du Plessis affair and the generally awkward diplomatic environment following the 1948 election, linked to the effects of the war, surely had much to do with this.

Although the next decade saw many efforts to look past recent events, by 1960, when South Africa’s ambassador expressed his government’s displeasure at the Dutch foreign minister’s public criticism of apartheid, the two countries were clearly growing apart. Schutte notes this was not only due to Dutch sensitivity to the use of the concept of race in the German occupation, but also the trauma of decolonizing Indonesia, completed in the 1960s, when the Netherlands became a far less traditional society. Even students at Kuyper’s historically sympathetic Free University wanted to take firm action against apartheid; in fact, even in the 1950s, visitors from the Free University such as rector H Dooyeweerd and theologian JH Bavinck had criticized apartheid, which the Dutch delegate to the UN had regularly denounced on principle since 1952. As far back as 1949, when Malan visited the Netherlands, Queen Juliana had told him that as long as apartheid existed in South Africa, she would never go there.

By the 1960s, the apartheid policies and authoritarian methods needed to sustain the NP regime against now widely publicized growing resistance resonated far more concretely with Dutch memories of their wartime experience than limited knowledge in 1948 of apartheid as a still theoretical program. After Sharpeville, a piece in Het Vrije Volk on Prime Minister Verwoerd’s policies addressed his supposedly Nazi sympathies before and during the

118 G Schutte, Stamverwantschap onder druk..., pp. 221-223.
119 J Barber, South Africa’s foreign policy 1945-1970..., pp. 146-147.
120 G Schutte, A family feud..., pp. 123-135.
war. At a mass anti-apartheid protest in the Hague that April, the actor Otto Sterman compared the anti-apartheid struggle to that against Nazism and Fascism. A 1963 *Leeuwarder Courant* editorial described apartheid-era Afrikaner nationalism as Fascist and anti-democratic. In June 1988, at the largest Dutch anti-apartheid demonstration yet, held in Amsterdam, representing churches, trade unions, and mainstream political parties, then-mayor Ed van Thijn used the same analogy, comparing apartheid with the German occupation and persecution of the Jews.

It did not matter whether this analogy was over-simplified or that even the worst features of apartheid fell far short of physical genocide. The Dutch people may have taken some time for the great majority to agree on much stronger actions against South Africa, beyond just intermittent statements of condemnation: the Cold War, the awkwardness of attacking the apartheid regime as long as the Netherlands was facing criticism for its own colonial policies, and the usefulness of an outlet for emigrants who sought opportunities beyond those available in the difficult conditions of the postwar Netherlands all might give the impression that the war had not truly ruptured the old ties.

Yet, these factors only masked the fundamental shift in the way many Dutch, even many old friends, viewed the Afrikaner-led white regime after the war years, especially as the apartheid model moved from theory to the grim business of creating, elaborating, preserving, and defending a system hated by the great majority, and which thus required ever harsher means to sustain. In a world in which colonialism of any type, much less a system seemingly built so overtly on “racial” differences, was no longer acceptable, the lens through which Dutch critics came to view apartheid and all of the accompanying measures required to preserve NP rule always seemed to return to the nature of the response back in 1948 when the party had first come to power, and thus always to the impact of the World War II experience on Dutch society.

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