The impact of a leftist ideological shift in South Africa on the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP as the governing Tripartite Alliance

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DECLARATION

I, GERBRANDT VAN HEERDEN, declare that this submission is my own work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Studies at the North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), Potchefstroom.

SIGNED. Gerbrandt van Heerden ON THIS 20 DAY OF NOVEMBER 2017
ABSTRACT

Keywords:
Political ideology, radical ideologies, neoliberalism, socialism, communism, African National Congress, Tripartite Alliance, COSATU, SACP, Freedom Charter

The ANC’s relationship with COSATU and the SACP has been volatile ever since the formation of the Tripartite Alliance in 1990. In terms of economic policy, COSATU and the SACP lean to the far left as they believe that addressing South Africa’s socioeconomic problems and the legacy of apartheid requires the creation of either a socialist or a communist society. For some time prior to South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, the ANC held a similar view, and even up until the negotiating years of the early 1990s the would-be ruling party still firmly believed in nationalisation – one of the pillars of the Freedom Charter. However, the international and domestic business community convinced the ANC, led at the time by Nelson Mandela, to embark on a more neoliberal path in order to appease the markets and attract investment.

The ANC’s quite sudden reversal in ideological direction deeply disturbed COSATU and the SACP. However, they both believed that remaining in the Tripartite Alliance would enable them to exert considerable influence over the ANC’s economic agenda. This was not the case, as evidenced in the Mbeki administration adopting the GEAR strategy, with its economically conservative policies, in 1996. COSATU and the SACP saw their influence continuing to wane under Mbeki’s presidency, which eventually prompted them to assist in the ousting of Mbeki and the election of Jacob Zuma as ANC president at the National Elective Conference in 2007.

COSATU and the SACP hoped that Zuma, installed as South Africa’s new president in 2009, would oversee a new era of reform and would champion socialist ideals. Zuma’s rise to power did increase COSATU’s and the SACP’s leverage within the Tripartite Alliance and economic policy did shift to the left, as evidenced in the introduction of the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) and the New Growth Path. However, Zuma’s presidency soon became mired in political scandals, which would eventually pave the way for major political instability in South Africa, downgrades by international credit rating agencies, the fleeing of capital and declining living standards among the general populace.
These developments have seen the ANC’s electoral support wither, while far-leftist political parties such as the EFF are growing in stature. The ANC has taken notice of this and the Zuma faction in particular has started to echo some of the ideas propagated by its far-left competitors. Yet high levels of corruption within the ANC, coupled with the fact that the ruling party is still highly accommodating of capital, have exacerbated tensions within the Tripartite Alliance, and COSATU and the SACP have officially withdrawn their support for Zuma and his faction. Should pressure continue to mount externally during the elections and internally within the Alliance, there is the possibility of yet another breakaway party from the ANC. This split could either strip the ANC of its socialist elements or alternatively, encourage the ANC to finally follow its original ideological path as set out in the Freedom Charter.
Opsomming:

Sleutelwoorde:
Politieke ideologie, radikale ideologieë, neoliberalisme, sosialisme, kommunisme, Afrika Nasionale Kongres, Drieledige Alliansie, COSATU, SAKP, Vryheidshandves

Die ANC handhaaf ’n onbestendige verhouding met COSATU en die SAKP sedert die stigting van die Drieledige Alliansie in 1990. Wat ekonomiese beleid betre, kan COSATU en die SAKP beskou word as ver-lings, aangesien hulle glo dat om Suid-Afrika se sosio-economiese probleme en die nalatenskap van apartheid aan te spreek, vereis die skepping van ’n sosialistiese of kommunistiese staat. Vir ’n geruime tyd voor Suid-Afrika se oorgang na demokrasie in 1994, het die ANC ’n soortgelyke standpunt gehad, en tot en met die onderhandelinge van die vroeë 1990’s het die regerende party steeds sterk in nasionalisering geglo - een van die pilare van die Vryheid handves. Die internasionale en binnelandse saktegemeenskap het egter die ANC, wat destyds deur Nelson Mandela geleid is, oortuig om ’n meer neoliberale pad te stap om die markte te vrede te stel en beleggings te lok.

Die ANC se skielike ommekeer in ideologiese rigting het COSATU en die SAKP diep versteur. Hulle het egter albei geglo dat om te bly in die Drieledige Alliansie hulle in staat sal stel om aansienlike invloed te hê op die ANC se ekonomiese agenda. Dit was nie die geval nie, aangesien die Mbeki administrasie voortgegaan het in 1996 om GEAR met sy konserwatiewe ekonomiese beleide aan te neem. COSATU en die SAKP se invloed het verder gekwyn onder Mbeki se presidensie, wat tot gevolg gehad het dat hulle gehelp het om Mbeki te verwyder en Jacob Zuma as die ANC president by die Nasionale Verkiesingskonferensie in 2007 te verkies.

COSATU en die SAKP het gehoop dat Zuma, wat in 2009 as Suid-Afrika se nuwe president verkies is, ’n nuwe era van hervorming sal aankondig en sosialistiese idees sal aanmoedig. Zuma se opkoms het COSATU en die SAKP meer invloedryk gemaak binne die Drieledige Alliansie en ekonomiese beleid het geskuif na links, soos gesien in die bekendstelling van die Nywerheidsbeleids Aksie Plan (IPAP) en die Nuwe Groei Plan. Zuma se presidensie het egter gou in politieke skandale ontaard, wat uiteindelik die weg gebaan het vir groot politieke onstabiliteit in Suid-Afrika, afgraderings deur internasionale
kredietwaardigheidsagentskappe, die vlug van kapitaal en dalende lewensstandaarde onder die algemene bevolking.

Hierdie ontwikkelings het gelei tot ‘n afname in die ANC se verkiesingsondersteuning, terwyl ver-lingse politieke partye soos die EFF spoedig groei. Die ANC het kennis geneem hiervan en die Zuma faksie het begin om sommige van die idees van sy ver-lingse mededingers te weerklank. Tog het hoë vlakke van korrupsie binne die ANC, tesame met die feit dat die regerende party nogsteeds akkommoderend optree teenoor kapitaal, spanning in die Drieledige Alliansie vererger, en COSATU en die SAKP het amptelik hul ondersteuning aan Zuma en sy faksie ontrek. As daar verder eksterne druk is deur middel van verkiesings asook interne druk binne die Alliansie, is daar ‘n moontlikheid dat daar nog ‘n wegwerp party van die ANC kan onstaan. Hierdie verdeling kan óf die ANC van sy sosialistiese elemente losmaak of kan die ANC aanmoedig om uiteindelik sy oorspronklike ideologiese pad te volg soos uiteengesit in die Vryheidshandves.
Preface

I completed this study in a slow but steady pace. I started my first full-time job in Johannesburg during the same year I began working on my Master’s dissertation at the Northwest University (NWU). Working full-time and studying part-time was no easy task, but I am grateful that I had the opportunity to finish my Master’s Degree at a reputable establishment that is the NWU.

Of course, I would not have had this opportunity, had it not been for my study leader, Dr Jan Venter, who saw my potential and encouraged me to study further. Dr Venter was also my study leader during my Honours year, and he is well aware of the trial and tribulations I faced during 2013. I would like to thank him for his words of encouragement, his support, for keeping me calm when I felt overwhelmed and defeated, and for providing me with a wealth of opportunities. In my 26 years on this earth, I have come across a few people who I consider to be my mentors and Dr Venter is one of them.

I would also like to thank my Mother and “Oom Peet”, for their support through my years as a Master’s student. My Mother put me through University as a single parent and sacrificed a lot to ensure that my future is secure and a bright one. She is my biggest supporter, my pillar and the best mother anyone could ask for. I love you so much! Oom Peet with his words of wisdom have also helped me to put everything in perspective and I’m glad I could share this moment with him as well. My amazing cousin Maryna, has also been pivotal in getting me through the tough times and our weekend socials have definitly given me the breaks I needed to re-energise before delving back into my dissertation.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ........................................................................................................ II  
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................... III  
OPSOMMING .................................................................................................... V  
PREFACE ........................................................................................................ VII  

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1  
1.1 Background .............................................................................................. 1  
1.2 Problem statement .................................................................................. 5  
1.3 Research questions .................................................................................. 6  
1.4 Research objectives .................................................................................. 7  
1.5 Central theoretical statement .................................................................. 7  
1.6 Methodology ............................................................................................ 8  
1.7 Literature review ..................................................................................... 10  
1.8 Chapter breakdown and coverage ......................................................... 14  
1.9 Contribution of the study ....................................................................... 15  

CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL  
AND ECONOMIC SPECTRA ........................................................................... 16  
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 16  
2.2 Different political and economic spectrum models ............................. 17  
2.2.1 Two-axis spectrum ............................................................................. 17  
2.2.2 Nolan Chart ......................................................................................... 17  
2.2.3 The economic spectrum ..................................................................... 18  
2.2.4 Cultural map ....................................................................................... 20  
2.2.5 The political spectrum ....................................................................... 21  
2.3 Radical left characterised by a focus on the economy, class and emancipation through political revolution .......................................................... 23  
2.4 How liberalism believes in the market, and free trade and enterprise .......... 26  
2.5 Centrism .................................................................................................. 29  
2.6 Conservatism ......................................................................................... 30
CHAPTER 3: THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEOLOGICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR THE ANC AND ITS ALLIANCE PARTNERS .......................................................... 34

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 34
3.2 Part 1: Historical context ........................................................................................... 34
3.2.1 The ideological points of departure for the African National Congress .............. 36
3.2.1.1 The ANC’s development as a liberation movement ........................................ 37
3.2.1.2 The Road to South African Freedom and the ANC’s interpretation of the NDR .... 40
3.2.2 South African Communist Party (SACP) ............................................................... 43
3.2.3 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) ............................................. 46
3.3 The ‘talk left, walk right’ ideological strategy ............................................................. 48
3.4 Part 2: Macroeconomic policies and strategies ............................................................. 49
3.4.1 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – 1994 .................................... 49
3.4.2 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy – 1996 ...................... 50
3.4.3 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) – 2005 ........ 51
3.4.4 National Development Plan (NDP) – 2012 ............................................................... 52
3.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 54

CHAPTER 4: THE SHIFTING IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE ANC AND THE WEAKENING OF FAULT LINES IN THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ............................................ 55

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 55
4.2 The Mandela era: the SACP and COSATU ................................................................. 58
4.3 The Mandela era and economic policy ......................................................................... 59
4.4 The Mbeki era: the SACP and COSATU ................................................................. 63
4.5 The Mbeki era and economic policy ......................................................................... 64
4.6 Zuma’s rise to power: the SACP and COSATU ......................................................... 68
4.7 Zuma and the first jump to the left ............................................................................. 69
4.8 The Zuma era and the economy ............................................................................. 70
4.9 Political uncertainty and the economic consequences ............................................. 73
4.10 COSATU and the SACP’s rejection of the Zuma administration and the second jump to the left .......................................................... 75
4.11 White monopoly capital .................................................................................................................. 77
4.12 Is the ANC currently neoliberal or socialist? .............................................................................. 77
4.13 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 80

CHAPTER 5: THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE – A FINAL ASSESSMENT ........................................ 82
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 82
5.2 Part 1: A brief summary of Chapters 1 to 4 .............................................................................. 82
5.3 Part 2: The state of the Tripartite Alliance (2017–) ................................................................. 84
5.4 Conclusion: How the shift to the left in the South Africa political milieu has impacted the Tripartite Alliance, and what the prospects are for the future ........................................ 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................. 88
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1: Linear representation of the political spectrum ........................................ 3
Figure 2-1: Nolan Chart .......................................................................................... 18
Figure 2-2: Economic spectrum ............................................................................... 20
Figure 2-3: Ingelhart’s cultural map ........................................................................ 21
Figure 2-4: The political continuum according to Diana DiNitto ......................... 23
Figure 4-1: Real GDP growth against the unemployment rate, 1994–98 ............... 60
Figure 4-2: Delivery of state-subsidised housing, 1994/95–1997/98 ..................... 61
Figure 4-3: National Senior Certificate results compared, 1994–98 ..................... 61
Figure 4-4: Direct investment as a proportion of total investment, 1994–1998 ......... 62
Figure 4-5: GDP growth rate against the unemployment rate, 1999–2007 .......... 65
Figure 4-6: Delivery of state-subsidised housing, 1999–2007 ............................. 65
Figure 4-7: National Senior Certificate results compared, 1999–2007 ................ 66
Figure 4-8: Direct investment as a proportion of total investment, 1999–2007 ....... 67
Figure 4-9: GDP growth rate against the unemployment rate, 2008–2015 .......... 71
Figure 4-10: Delivery of state-subsidised housing, 2007/08–2015/16 .................... 71
Figure 4-11: National Senior Certificate results compared, 2008–2015 ............... 72
Figure 4-12: Direct investment as a proportion of total investment, 2008–2014 ...... 73
Figure 5-1: The economic spectrum ..................................................................... 85
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Keywords:
Political ideology, radical ideologies, neoliberalism, socialism, communism, African National Congress, Tripartite Alliance, COSATU, SACP, Freedom Charter

1.1 Background

The year 2015 marked the 60th anniversary of the Freedom Charter – a document widely considered to be the foundation upon which the core values of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) were built. These core values provide a vision of a non-racial South Africa, focusing on the principles of democracy, human rights, land reform, labour rights and nationalisation. At the ANC’s birthday celebrations, President Jacob Zuma highlighted the importance of the Freedom Charter as being a "guiding light" for transformation in South Africa (Nicolson, 2015).

Yet the ANC has frequently been accused of deviating from the fundamental principles underpinning the Freedom Charter and instead, aligning itself with a neoliberal economic agenda. Members of the South African left have voiced their scepticism over the ANC’s commitment to the Charter. In 1996, the ANC’s own Alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), took issue with the ANC’s adoption of the neoliberal-inspired Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (Deonandan, Close & Prevost, 2007: 145) (see Chapter 4, section 4.2). More recently, a National Working Committee member of the United Democratic Front (UDF) said that criticism from far-left organisations, such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), has fallen on deaf ears as the ANC has continued on its neoliberal path, albeit with some modern adaptations (Nicolson, 2015).

According to the ANC’s Strategy and Tactics document of 2012 (ANC, 2012: 16): “In broad terms, the Freedom Charter, adopted by the Congress of the People in 1955, and on which the political ideology is based, includes the following principles:

• The people shall share in the country’s wealth, and the mines, banks and a number of other powerful industries should be nationalised (ANC, 2014).
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole” (ANC, 2014).

At the beginning of the 1990s, when it became apparent that the ANC would govern in the new democratic South Africa, major businesses in the country actively tried to convince the ANC to adopt market-driven policies (Lyman, 2002: 96). ANC leaders were further wooed by the idea of a market-driven economy by world business leaders at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland in 1992 (Lyman, 2002: 96). After discussions with a number of world business leaders and European socialist ministers at the WEF, the ANC (at the time led by President Nelson Mandela) realised that a socialist South African state would struggle to attract any foreign investment from the developed west (Lyman, 2002: 96). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist systems in Eastern Europe, along with the fact that many other African countries were moving away from policies of state control, provided further encouragement to Mandela and the ANC leadership to move in a more neoliberal direction (Lyman, 2002: 96).

The ANC’s approach going forward was crystallised in the words of Mandela: “either keep nationalisation and get no investment, or we modify our own attitude and get investment” (Lyman, 2002: 96). Thus, after the ANC won the 1994 national elections, a number of policies with a neoliberal ideology were adopted and implemented in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Neoliberalism emphasises classical liberalism’s faith in limited government and advocates deregulation and privatisation. It embraces the virtues of a free market system by emphasising the government’s role in creating an enabling environment for the private sector, which will enhance economic growth in the country. The ANC’s policies at the time particularly favoured the privatisation of state resources (Craven, 2010: 9).

One example of the ANC’s neoliberal-inspired policy initiatives was the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.4). Under GEAR, a series of deregulation measures were implemented and the privatisation of state assets was encouraged (Habib, 2013: 80). Habib (2013: 80) explains that GEAR was considered a neoliberal economic approach for addressing South Africa’s socioeconomic problems at the time, and was interpreted by political analysts as a fundamental departure from the ANC’s 1994 election manifesto (Habib, 2013: 80). The implementation of the GEAR strategy stoked much controversy and created friction between the ANC and the left-wing organisations of the Tripartite Alliance, COSATU and the SACP. Although the
ANC has in recent years implemented more redistributive policies, such as black economic empowerment (BEE), COSATU and the SACP have expressed the fear that this would lead to the creation of a small, black capitalistic class, while the rest of the population continues to live in poverty (Habib, 2013: 106) (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.3). As far as the left is concerned, the principles contained in the Freedom Charter have been overlooked in favour of the narrow enrichment of only a portion of the people of South Africa, at the expense of the needs of the poor (Habib, 2013: 106).

Had the Freedom Charter remained the core document guiding the ANC’s political principles and interests after 1994, the party would have theoretically been positioned on the far left of the political spectrum, otherwise known as the radical left. The ANC would also have been much closer to its Tripartite Alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP, today. The implications of this will be explored in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

The traditional political spectrum is an abstract model that arranges and classifies political ideologies. Communist, socialist and liberal ideologies are on the left of the spectrum; moderate ideologies form the centre of the model; and conservative and reactionary ideologies and fascism are on the right of the spectrum (Sidlow & Henschen, 2009: 16). These ideologies can also be grouped in a simpler depiction of the political spectrum, namely "radicalism and liberalism on the left, moderate in the middle, and conservatism and reactionary on the right" (Feldman, 1989: 170). This simpler version of the political spectrum is illustrated in Figure 1-1 (see Chapter 2, section 2.2).

Figure 1-1: Linear representation of the political spectrum

Source: Feldman (1989: 170)
The radical left, according to Sidlow and Henschen (2009: 16), are political entities that actively advocate radical change to the political order. The ANC’s incorporation of neoliberal elements after the fall of apartheid saw the party move away from the Freedom Charter’s left-wing communist ideals towards the centre of the spectrum.

Recent trends in South Africa point to the growth of far-left organisations and movements that criticise the ANC for rejecting its original core principles, as set out in the Freedom Charter. An example of the backlash is the formation in 2013 of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), headed by former leader of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), Julius Malema. Gernetzky (2013) writes that the EFF’s primary ideology is founded on rhetoric advocating the nationalisation of key economic sectors and the expropriation of land, which are contrary to the ideology of neoliberalism. Another example is the formation in 2012 of the Workers and Socialist Party (WASP). WASP’s manifesto states that nationalised industries should be the norm and that the working class communities must be in control of all the means of production (WASP, 2014). According to WASP, the Marikana mine massacre was an illustration of the gap between the ANC and the marginalised, black workers whom the party claims to represent (WASP, 2014). In 2014, COSATU expelled its largest member union, NUMSA, after months of dissent and widening divisions within the trade union federation (Marrian, 2013). NUMSA expressed an intention to create its own workers party, called the United Front (UF), which would follow a Leninist-Marxist ideology and would be against all forms of neoliberalism (Evans, 2015).

Today the ANC as a ruling party looks quite different from the liberation movement that it was during apartheid (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1). The ANC has evidently rejected the founding principles of the Freedom Charter in favour of a neoliberal approach which provides a stronger drawcard for foreign direct investment (FDI). Because of its neoliberal policies, it has become increasingly evident that the ANC not only has to contend with far-left organisations within the Tripartite Alliance which oppose its ideological stance, but also with radical movements on the extreme left periphery of the political spectrum.

Some years ago the general-secretary of NUMSA, Irvin Jim, stated that the ANC was using manipulation tactics (see Chapter 3, section 3.3) to appease the far-left political structures in South Africa (Marrian, 2013). Although the ANC’s policy conference in June 2012 indicated support for nationalisation (a key element of the Freedom Charter), the ruling party’s leadership subsequently rejected the notion at the 53rd National Conference
in Mangaung in December 2012. This heightened fears among the ANC’s Alliance partners that it was moving more and more in the direction of neoliberalism (Marrian, 2013).

With the ANC facing extreme criticism from far-left organisations and from within the ranks of the Tripartite Alliance, the questions that need to be posed are: Will the ANC embrace policies that will chart a course towards a neoliberal future, as suggested by the National Development Plan (NDP), or will it return to its roots – in other words, the Freedom Charter? Will it remain a moderate organisation or will it adopt a more radical-left approach in the future?

1.2 Problem statement

The SACP and COSATU have criticised the ANC for having adopted the NDP as South Africa’s economic and social development roadmap. According to Squire (2013: 201), COSATU slammed the NDP for its neoliberal tendencies and over-reliance on exports, for favouring private sector entrepreneurship, for tolerating the growing inequality between the privileged and the marginalised, for promoting the liberalisation of the financial and mining sectors, for being reliant on the private sector to regenerate underdeveloped regions, and for placing insufficient focus on the manufacturing sector, the agricultural sector and social investment. In response to the ANC’s support for the NDP, NUMSA stated that it would not campaign for the ruling party in the run-up to the 2014 elections, despite being a member of COSATU (Letsoala, 2013). NUMSA also withheld R2 million, which had been budgeted for the ANC’s election campaign (Letsoala, 2013). According to NUMSA, the NDP, with its emphasis on deregulation and privatisation, can be interpreted as neoliberal in nature, signalling a departure from the spirit of the Freedom Charter.

Despite the ANC’s consistent advocacy of neoliberal policies, the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008 boosted the popularity of neo-Keynesian economic approaches, both in South Africa and around the world (Habib, 2013: 103). The neo-Keynesian approach can be regarded as the regulation of the capitalist economy, focusing on the problems of economic dynamics and economic growth, but from a state monopoly capitalism viewpoint. In short, John Maynard Keynes did not trust a capitalist society to fully recover from a global recession and therefore argued that the government must intervene in the economy to restore it to its former healthy state (Keynes, 2008: 86). “If
fiscal policy is used as a deliberate instrument for the more equal distribution of incomes, its effect in increasing the propensity to consume is, of course, all the greater” (Keynes, 2008: 86).

It has been especially under the Zuma administration that the ANC has adopted economic policies with a “neo-Keynesian flavour” (Habib, 2013: 101). Habib (2013: 106) is of the opinion that the drift to neo-Keynesianism is an indication of support for the ideas of the leftist groups in the ANC’s Alliance (COSATU and the SACP), which could help to maintain their momentum and/or create new momentum. With its mixture of neoliberal and redistributive policy approaches, the ANC (it can be argued) occupies a centrist position on the political spectrum. However, its current ‘moderate’ approach to solving South Africa’s problems on all fronts could prove to be detrimental to the country and to the political party itself. According to Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey, unemployment in the first quarter of 2016 reached 26.7% (Stats SA, 2016: 8). Far-left groups such as NUMSA and the EFF have become more and more vocal in their criticism of the ANC, which has heightened their popularity among former supporters of the ANC and apathetic, voting-age South Africans.

A major dilemma for the ANC is how to respond to the rising threat to its dominant position. Various questions arise, such as: Will the ANC’s future policies to address the threats be accepted by its Alliance partners? Can or will the ANC return to its ideological roots in order to regain the attention of voters and its Alliance partners, or will the strength of the Alliance degenerate further over time?

From the problem statement outlined above, the main research question of this dissertation can be stated as follows:

*How will an ideological shift to the left in the South African political milieu impact the ANC, COSATU and the SACP as the governing Tripartite Alliance?*

1.3 Research questions

The research question can be broken down into the following sub-questions which need to be addressed:
1. What does a theoretical analysis of the ideological spectra reveal about both the ANC’s position on the spectra and the current radical movements and their impact on the South African political system?
2. What are the fundamental ideological points of departure for the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, and how do the ANC’s ideological viewpoints differ from those of its Alliance partners?
3. What is the impact of the different ideological viewpoints of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, respectively, and the shift to the left in South Africa’s political arena, on cohesion within the Tripartite Alliance?
4. What conclusions can be drawn from the findings in the dissertation and what are the prospects of the Tripartite Alliance remaining intact?

1.4 Research objectives

The research objectives for this dissertation are as follows:

1. To analyse the theoretical foundation of the political and economic spectra with a view to understanding the implications of the ANC’s and current radical movements’ positions on the spectra, for South Africa’s political system.
2. To analyse and compare the different ideological viewpoints of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, respectively.
3. To determine how the different ideological viewpoints of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, and the shift to the left in South Africa’s political arena, impact cohesion in the Tripartite Alliance.
4. To arrive at conclusions based on the findings in the dissertation and to suggest possible future scenarios regarding the continuation (or otherwise) of the Tripartite Alliance.

1.5 Central theoretical statement

Should ideological differences and internal divisions in the Tripartite Alliance persist, the ANC, as one member of the Alliance, could face a fundamental erosion of power. This was already evident in the 2016 municipal or local elections in South Africa. This dissertation asserts that the ANC has become a more centrist party than is allowed in its fundamental ideological doctrine, as set out in the Freedom Charter, which has led to a loss of credibility/legitimacy among some of the ANC’s traditional loyalists.
It would appear that, aside from the Tripartite Alliance’s traditional communist elements (COSATU and the SACP), a substantial portion of the ANC electorate has become more radical. When the final results of the 2016 municipal election results were tallied by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), it became clear that the country was divided across urban and rural lines. Nationally, the ANC garnered 53.91% of the votes. This was in fairly stark contrast to the ANC’s performance in the 2011 municipal elections when it took 61.95% of the votes and in the 2006 municipal elections during the Mbeki era when it took 66.30% of the votes (IEC, 2016). In 2016, the EFF, which was participating for the first time in municipal elections, became the third biggest political party in the country, with 8.19% of the votes (IEC, 2016). It should also be pointed out that the ANC’s support base had declined by 8% since the previous municipal elections. Overall, the EFF has been more successful than the Democratic Alliance (DA), which has seen only marginal growth at the national level, at chipping away at the traditional support base of the ANC.

Recent trends point to the growth of far-left, radical organisations and movements in South Africa, and many political scholars see this as a backlash against the neoliberal stance of the ANC which amounts to a rejection of the core principles set out in the Freedom Charter. It is becoming increasingly clear that the ANC, with its neoliberal policies, will not only have to contend with far-left organisations within the Tripartite Alliance that oppose it, but also with radical movements on the periphery.

At present, the ANC as a ruling party looks different from the ANC under apartheid. When former president Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, he declared that the nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industry was the undisputable policy of the ANC (Taylor, 2001: 37). A few years later, Mandela would defend the ANC’s aggressive neoliberal economic model by stating that South Africans should respect the business sector (Taylor, 2001: 37).

### 1.6 Methodology

A number of methodological tools will be used to conduct this study. First, it is necessary to clarify the term ‘methodology’. Simply stated, methodology is concerned with ‘how’ to do research – in other words, how the study should be planned, structured and executed in order to comply with the standards of science (Marais, 1996: 15). Marais (1996: 15) interprets methodology as “the logic of implementing scientific methods in the study of
reality”. This means that the researcher (i.e. the author of this dissertation) needed to decide which model or theory would be the most appropriate for the study.

One of the methodological tools that will be implemented in this research is deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning means that the one section will logically build on the knowledge discussed in the earlier sections. Sternberg (2009: 499) defines deductive reasoning as “the process of reasoning from one or more general statements regarding what is known to reach a logically certain conclusion”. This form of reasoning usually involves connecting premises to a conclusion. If it has been proven that the premises in an argument are true, and deductive reasoning is applied, then the conclusion can be accepted as the truth (Holyoak & Morrison, 2005: 169). The researcher will use deductive reasoning with a view to formulating well-structured arguments.

This study will also be qualitative in nature in order to expand the researcher’s knowledge from the point of deduction. Qualitative research recognises interpretation as being vital to the success of the research. Van Maanen (as cited in Merriam, 2009: 13) describes qualitative research as an “umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world”. With regard to the research question in this study, qualitative research will assist in describing and understanding party politics, ideologies and the dynamics of voter preferences in South Africa. It can thus be deduced that this study will be mainly a theoretical study.

Part of this study will involve descriptive research. Rubin and Babbie (as cited in Thyer, 2010: 120) explain that descriptive research entails describing the characteristics of a sample and the relationships between events, phenomena and situations as they are observed by the researcher. Basically, the goal of descriptive research is to answer the ‘who, what, when, where and how’ questions (Thyer, 2010: 120). The question of ‘why’ a phenomenon has occurred is not of importance in descriptive research. By using available resources (which are listed in the literature review), the researcher will attempt to describe events such as the persistent triple challenges in South Africa (poverty, unemployment and inequality) and the origins of the ANC. Furthermore, the research will be interpretative in nature.
The literature review will examine what has already been published on the research topic in this study. This will help the researcher to determine the current state of knowledge on various aspects linked to the topic (Healy & Mulholland, 2007: 105) and how well his own research relates to or is aligned with the current state of knowledge (Healy & Mulholland, 2007: 105). A literature review serves as an important instrument through which a theoretical enquiry takes place involving the gathering of knowledge about theories (by theorists and academics) on political systems, political spectra and ideologies.

1.7 Literature review

Having conducted a preliminary literature review, the researcher can conclude that there is a lack of research on leftist politics in South Africa. A new phenomenon is the radical, leftist movements that pose a threat to the hegemony of the ANC, and this study will add to the body of knowledge on this subject. The researcher utilised several databases, including EbscoHost, Sabinet Reference and SAePublications, for the preliminary literature review.

The following categories of literature will be consulted in this dissertation.

**Academic texts:**

These will include:

- *A developmental approach to political systems* by Gabriel A. Almond (1965)

In this work, Almond includes a thorough explanation of political systems which involve a series of inputs and outputs. The renowned political scientist, David Easton (as cited in Almond, 1965: 191), speaks of a political system as an “authoritative allocation of values”. With reference to Easton’s behavioural approach to politics, dynamism in the social environment induces demands which translate into inputs in the political system. Demand inputs, for example, can range from a call for war to the construction of recreational facilities (Almond, 1965: 192). Outputs are then generated in the system and directed towards the environment. The allocation or distribution of goods and services is an example of an output (Almond, 1965: 193). When an output, such as a specific policy, is introduced into the environment, feedback is generated which circulates back into the political system in the form of inputs. This is relevant as far as
the dissertation is concerned as it will assist the researcher in determining how functional South Africa’s political system is. Utilising this information will help to determine whether the government of the day effectively responds to the demands or ‘inputs’ from South African citizens – specifically, marginalised black voters.


In 1996, South Africa adopted a Constitution that was praised internationally for its emphasis on liberal and egalitarian values (Letseka, 2013: 68). Letseka (2013: 68) writes that whereas the ANC is less aware of the ideals of organised labour, its Tripartite Alliance partners (COSATU and the SACP) strongly support the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism is a political ideology that advocates the development of the state into a socialist society through revolutionary means. This work will provide valuable assistance to the researcher in distinguishing liberalism from Marxism-Leninism. It will also induce a greater understanding of the leftist movements in the South African political landscape.

- *Of no account? South Africa’s electoral system (non) debate* by Louise Vincent (2006)

Vincent (2006: 82) describes an electoral system as an instrument that translates votes cast during elections into seats in the legislative branch of government. This journal article deals mainly with accountability, which is synonymous with ‘answerability’ (Vincent, 2006: 81). There are several methods that can be implemented to ensure that a government remains accountable to its people. One of these methods is the electoral system (Vincent, 2006: 82). However, in the South African context, the electoral system does little to hold the ruling ANC government accountable. This is because the South African political landscape is characterised by a one party-dominant system. The ANC has continued to win more or less two-thirds of the national votes in general elections since 1994 (Vincent, 2006: 81). “The current electoral system, it is argued, not only provides for insufficient direct accountability of representatives to the electorate but helps to reinforce party dominance, which in turn further weakens the system’s capacity for building strong accountability mechanisms as well as a culture of accountability” (Vincent, 2006: 81). An increase in the number of protest actions and a decline in ANC support after the 2009 elections, compared to
the 2004 elections, indicate growing dissatisfaction with the ruling party. Also, with new opposition parties entering the political arena (such as the EFF), which are competing vigorously for the poor, black vote, the ANC may find it difficult to acquire more than 60% of the votes in future elections.

- **South Africa’s suspended revolution: Hopes and prospects** by Adam Habib (2013)

In this book, Habib neatly outlines the political and economic system of South Africa, while also delving into past events that still play and will continue to play a role in the country’s future. “In summary, the post-apartheid era has witnessed the ‘normalisation’ of South African society in a neoliberal global environment” (Habib, 2013: 157). Habib (2013: 157) writes that marginalisation and poor governance, which accompany the Washington Consensus’s approach to globalisation, have wreaked havoc in other parts of the world and are now glaring problems in South African society. Habib’s book will be particularly useful as it contributes to an understanding of the country’s political economy and its underlying dynamics and problems.

- **The fall of the ANC: What next?** by Prince Mashele and Mzukisi Qobo (2014)

This book gives a detailed critique of the ANC as a ruling party. It warns of the party’s collapse should nepotism, maladministration, incompetence and corruption remain characteristics of the ANC leadership. In the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International, which annually ranks countries according to their perceived levels of corruption, South Africa’s growing problems with corruption were highlighted (Mashele & Qobo, 2014: 96). Out of 183 countries – with the least corrupt country occupying first place and the most corrupt country occupying 183rd place – South Africa had a ranking of 72 (Mashele & Qobo, 2014: 96). This was a significant drop from 2010 when the country had a ranking of 54. This book will be useful in pinpointing exactly what the ruling party’s shortfalls are and the implications thereof for South Africa’s future.

**Main sources**:  

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¹ For the purposes of this dissertation, the study period ended on 31 August 2017.
• The ANC’s official website

According to the ANC’s manifesto for 2014, the party has committed itself to reduce the extent of the so-called triple challenges: poverty, unemployment and inequality. On its website, the ANC writes that over the last five years it has collaborated with South African society in various initiatives to combat these challenges (ANC: 2014). The ANC also promises improved healthcare and performances in schools, land reform, a reduction in crime and corruption, and greater social cohesion. Studying the ANC’s website will provide valuable information on the party’s origins, its broad vision and specific aims, and what it has achieved thus far.

• COSATU’s official website

It was reported in 2015 that COSATU had just over 1.8 million members – less than half the four million target it had set out in its 2015 plan (Quintal, 2015). The following objectives have been prioritised by COSATU: To improve the material conditions of the working class as a whole; to ensure that its member are organised; and to uphold the principles of democracy (COSATU: 2014). In terms of its policy objectives, COSATU is committed to the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which involves the creation of a non-racial, democratic South Africa and the transformation of the economy. As a member of the Tripartite Alliance, COSATU has a significant influence on the governing party. The breakaway of COSATU’s biggest trade union, NUMSA, in 2014 could potentially lead to a major split in the Alliance. Therefore, it is important for the researcher to include this source in the literature review.

• South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR)

This organisation will be a useful source of information in that it provides detailed statistics on the South African economy, businesses, the labour sector, educational systems, demographics, living conditions, crime, security, healthcare, land reform, service delivery, politics and government affairs (SAIRR, 2017). These statistics will assist the researcher in understanding the current economic climate in South Africa and what policies the country should be implementing.

• Newspapers and other online providers of news
To ensure that the dissertation presents the latest facts and developments, newspapers will be consulted. In this regard, the *Mail & Guardian* and the *Financial Mail* are two of South Africa’s leading newspapers and excellent sources of information on the latest developments in South African politics. *News24* is an online-only news website dedicated to providing Internet users with the latest political and socioeconomic news in South Africa. This online source will provide the researcher with an accessible point of reference for current political and economic developments in the country.

### 1.8 Chapter breakdown and coverage

- **Chapter One: Introduction**

  This chapter contains background information on the theme of this dissertation. It sets out the problem statement, research questions and research objectives, describes the study’s broad methodology, and explains how the literature review contributes to a better understanding of various topics linked to the problem statement and research questions.

- **Chapter Two: Towards a theoretical understanding of the political and economic spectra**

  This chapter examines various political ideologies and leftist political movements, which provide important insights into South Africa’s changing political landscape.

- **Chapter Three: The fundamental ideological points of departure for the ANC and its Alliance partners**

  This chapter explores the ideological origins of the ANC and how the party has changed since it first came to power. In addition, the ANC’s current ideological viewpoints are compared to those of COSATU and the SACP, and similarities and differences are revealed.
• **Chapter Four: The shifting ideological position of the ANC and the widening fault lines in the Tripartite Alliance**

This chapter discusses the political and economic direction of the ANC under Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, respectively. It also explores how tensions within the Tripartite Alliance have worsened under the current ANC leadership.

• **Chapter Five: The Tripartite Alliance – a final assessment**

This chapter summarises the main findings of the earlier chapters and reflects on the future sustainability of the Tripartite Alliance.

1.9 **Contribution of the study**

After South Africa became a democracy in 1994, the ANC and its Alliance partners established and managed to sustain, for more than 20 years, a one-party dominant system. However, this political system is currently under threat, with support for opposition political parties growing. New parties with influence have entered the political arena and internal conflict is helping to unravel the once-solid Alliance. If the ANC loses its outright majority in the next few elections and a more left-affiliated group comes into power, or at least becomes more powerful and influential, political relationships in South Africa will undergo dramatic change.

As the country continues to move away from the established neoliberal policies that were implemented in 1994 to boost investor confidence and stabilise the country’s finances, major political, economic and social changes can be expected. A society dominated by Marxist-Leninist ideals looks increasingly likely. Another likely scenario is that the ANC will split as opposing factions within the party fail to compromise or find common ground. This could result in a political system where a weaker ANC competes against a breakaway ANC-like party and the DA (a party mostly for minority groups). The unfolding dynamics in such a scenario will be interesting to track.

South African academics have neglected to study the potential radicalisation of the country’s politics. Although more populist, and often unsubstantiated, information is reported in the media, it generally lacks academic weight and clarity. By delving into this topic in an academically rigorous way, this study is unique and should make a valuable contribution to both the political science and economics fields.
CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPECTRA

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide a sound theoretical basis for the rest of the dissertation by casting light on the ideological complexities of the Tripartite Alliance which will be addressed in subsequent chapters. First, a number of political spectrum models are discussed, including how each model classifies different ideological viewpoints. Secondly, the ideologies on the far left or radical left, as well as liberal, moderate, conservative and reactionary ideologies are analysed in accordance with the thinking of the philosophers who largely contributed to their development. Special attention is paid to the radical positions on the political spectrum.

Before analysing the different ideological viewpoints, it is necessary to discuss what the term 'ideology' means. Mayer (1982:15) states that 'ideology' must be distinguished from 'theory' as it is viewed in the social sciences. Ideologies are propositions that are considered valid because they constitute a set of beliefs or preferences of the people who espouse them, while a theory is a set of propositions that are considered valid because they permit the derivation of hypotheses which can be verified through observations of real events (Mayer, 1982: 15). According to Arora (2010: 8), the study of various existing definitions will reveal the following characteristics of an 'ideology': (1) An ideology is a value or belief system; (2) It pertains to the worldview of a social group which is held to be a matter of fact; (3) It explains and analyses the world according to the foundations on which a given society is built; (4) It exists to perform an inspirational function; (5) It attempts to explain the cause-effect relationship of a given society; (6) It is always action-oriented, i.e. it sets out to justify the status quo or to construct a new society.

Ideologies can be used as powerful tools to inspire mass action or to protect or change the system currently prevailing in society. Bardes, Shelley and Schmidt (2010: 18) write that the traditional way of comparing political ideologies is to arrange them on a continuum from left to right, based for example on how much power the government should exercise to promote economic equality. Section 2.2 looks at the different political spectrum models and what they have to offer.
2.2 Different political and economic spectrum models

Historically, Fuller (2012: 157) states that the origins of the ideological political spectrum, as it is known today, can be traced back to the seating arrangements of the French National Assembly after the 1789 revolution in France. Those who supported the King and the authority of the Church sat on the right side of the National Assembly’s president, while those who were in favour of institutional reform were situated on the left side (Fuller, 2012: 157). In other words, those on the left advocated change while those on the right supported the status quo.

2.2.1 Two-axis spectrum

In 1973, Milton Rokeach constructed a two-axis spectrum which pointed out political ideologies’ bearings in terms of the concepts of equality and freedom (Rokeach, 1979: 180). Rokeach’s model demonstrated that socialists regarded freedom and equality as essential for human civilisation, whereas conservatives placed great importance on freedom but paid less attention to equality (Rokeach, 1979: 180). In contrast to the views of the conservatives, the communists appreciated equality while rejecting freedom (Rokeach, 1979: 180). Equality and freedom were not afforded much importance by the fascists (Rokeach, 1979: 180). From Rokeach’s model, one can speculate that ideologies that value equality would be positioned on the left of the political spectrum, while ideologies that view freedom in a positive light would be found on the right.

2.2.2 Nolan Chart

Prior to Rokeach developing his political spectrum, David Nolan, founder of the Libertarian Party in the USA, presented what is known today as the Nolan Chart (Huebert, 2010: 22). The Nolan Chart, first developed in 1969, describes political ideologies in terms of the amount of economic and personal freedom that they allow (Huebert, 2010: 23). Pure liberals are situated at the far left of the Nolan Chart and advocate personal freedom on moral issues while downplaying economic liberty (Heubert, 2010: 23). At the far right of the Nolan Chart, the conservatives favour economic liberty but limited personal freedom (Mitchell, 2007: 6). Authoritarians are found at the bottom of the Nolan Chart and encourage control of the economy and personal freedom. The libertarians at the top of the Nolan Chart have the direct opposite approach as they support absolute freedom in both economic and personal terms (Mitchell, 2007: 6). Yet critics have stated that the Nolan Chart portrays libertarians in too simplified a manner. See Figure 2-1.
Mitchell (2007: 7) provides three reasons why the Nolan Chart should be dismissed: 1) Politics cannot always be divided so easily into a personal sphere and an economic sphere. “Immigration provides cheap labour, which can be good or bad depending on your economic perspective, but it also fuels multiculturalism, which can be good or bad depending on your personal perspective” (Mitchell, 2007: 7); 2) In some instances, liberals actually support the restriction of personal freedom – for example, liberals have been known to promote gun control (Heubert, 2010: 23); 3) Lastly, libertarians understand freedom as the absence of coercion, as opposed to others on the left of the spectrum who believe that freedom is about having the opportunity to satisfy one’s basic needs (Mitchell, 2007: 8).

2.2.3 The economic spectrum

An economic spectrum can be developed on the basis of economic policy or, more specifically, on the basis of the role of government in the economy (Fourie & Burger, 2009: 35). Fourie and Burger (2009: 35) state that the economic left and right can be defined in terms of three main positions: economic conservatives on the right, economic liberals towards the centre, and economic radicals on the left. These three positions are briefly discussed below:
Economic conservatives are champions of the free market (a view espoused mainly by classical liberals and libertarians) (Fourie & Burger: 2009: 35). Njis (2016: 3) explains classical liberalism as the favouring of civil liberties and a limited government under the rule of law, which ensures private rights such as property rights. Neoclassical liberalism, which developed in the late 19th century, stressed that government should be as small as possible to ensure individual freedom (Njis, 2016: 3). To this extent, classical liberalism as a political ideology is closely related to capitalism as an economic ideology. Harrison (2013:46) argues that capitalism propagates individual rationality in economic matters, freedom of choice when it comes to the labour market and a laissez-faire or ‘hands-off’ approach to government involvement in economic affairs. According to Njis (2016: 3), libertarianism could be considered to be a form of social Darwinism. It is of paramount importance to this group that the role of the state should be minimal – confined to the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of private property rights and contracts (Fourie & Burger, 2009: 28).

Fourie and Burger (2009:35) go on to describe economic liberals as centrists who advocate a mixed economy. Mastrianna (2013: 33) defines a mixed economy as “an economy that contains a mixture of perfect and imperfect competition and regulated and unregulated industries”. Central to economic liberals’ belief system is that while markets are very important, they contain inherent flaws which will eventually lead to distorted outcomes in terms of prices, quantities and income (Fourie & Burger, 2009: 29). Economic liberals conclude that the only agent capable of rectifying these distorted outcomes is the state (Fourie & Burger, 2009: 29). The state must thus support, oversee, regulate and complement the activities of the market and private enterprise (Fourie & Burger, 2009: 29).

Finally, Fourie and Burger (2009: 36) talk about economic radicals who are positioned at the left of the economic spectrum. According to Fourie and Burger (2009: 36), economic radicals are highly critical of free markets and draw their views from neo-Marxism. Marxism, a movement founded by Karl Marx, asserts that capitalism, because of its unsustainability, will eventually be replaced by a socialist system, which in turn precedes communism (Otteson, 2006: 46). According to Marx, socialism is a stage in which the monopoly over private property (enjoyed by the few) is removed, private property is abolished, and society is governed in a coercive manner, if need be, by a centralised
authority that makes all the decisions about production, housing, education, and so on, for all citizens (Otteson, 2006: 46).

Influenced by Marxist thinking, economic radicals reason that private enterprise, private property and the free market have led to significant inequality among people in terms of political power, economic power and economic welfare (Fourie & Burger, 2006: 29). They therefore seek radically alternative ways in which to organise economic activity, with two of these alternatives being socialism and communism (Fourie & Burger, 2006: 29).

Figure 2.2 gives a depiction of the economic spectrum, which includes the three different positions discussed above:

![Economic spectrum](image_url)

**Figure 2-2: Economic spectrum**

Source: Fourie and Burger (2009: 35)

### 2.2.4 Cultural map

Ronald Inglehart developed another way of displaying the world’s ideological/political values (Inglehart & Baker, 2001: 18). The ‘cultural map’ consists of two cross-cultural dimensions: traditional vs. secular-rational values, and survival vs. self-expression values. Cross-cultural variation is highly constrained. Inglehart and Baker (2001: 18) state that if a society stresses the importance of religion, then that society’s position in respect of several variables can be predicted – for example, “attitudes of abortion, national pride, respect for authority and childrearing”. Survival-oriented societies are materialistic in nature and value political, economic and social stability, whereas self-expression-oriented societies are post-materialistic and value freedom and the protection of minorities (Inglehart & Baker, 2001: 18).

According to Inglehart’s cultural map (see Figure 2-3 below), South Africa is positioned in the traditional-survival dimension, while wealthier countries like the United States of America (USA) are located in the traditional-self-expression dimension (Inglehart &
Baker, 2001: 19). Saulnier (1996: 7) states that in the USA, there is a tendency to believe that the political spectrum ranges between liberalism and conservatism.

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 2-3: Ingelhart’s cultural map**

Source: Inglehart and Baker (2001: 19)

2.2.5 The political spectrum

According to Baradat and Phillips (2017: 14), any society will eventually submit to change and people on either side of the political spectrum will have an attitude or idea about how to fundamentally change or modify the current political system. The approaches of different political groups are briefly discussed below:

**Radicals** favour an immediate and fundamental change to society (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 17). They are often extremely dissatisfied with the state of society and therefore propose revolutionary change (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 17). Some radicals will use unorthodox measures to change society and may even resort to violence (Baradat &
Phillips, 2017: 17). However, less extreme radicals (pacifists) do not condone violence in bringing about revolutionary change (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 17).

**Liberals** support the basic features of society but are quick to identify deficiencies in the system (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 19). While they are anxious to reform the system, they do not wish to break the law to achieve their political objectives (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 19). Instead, liberals will encourage reforms through legal measures (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 19).

Baradat and Phillips (2017: 21) describe **moderates** as being “fundamentally satisfied with the society, although they agree that there is room for improvement and recognise several specific areas in need of modification”. Baradat and Phillips (2017: 21) further state that “moderates insist that changes in the system should be made gradually and that no change should be so extreme as to disrupt the society”.

Compared to all the above-mentioned ideologies, **conservatives** are the most supportive of the status quo (Baradat & Phillips (2017: 21). Conservatives do not necessarily find the status quo desirable but they do believe it is the best that can be achieved in present circumstances (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 21). Usually, conservatives encourage slow, incremental and superficial changes to the system (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 21).

Lastly, **reactionaries** propose retrogressive change (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 29). They favour returning to a previous societal and value system (Baradat & Phillips, 2017: 29).

For the purpose of this dissertation and in order to cover all of the major political ideologies, a political spectrum has been crafted which includes radicalism on the far left, liberalism on the left, moderate political views at the centre, conservatism on the right and reactionary attitudes on the far right. In the ensuing sections, each ideological position is described to show its relevance in South Africa’s current political system and how ideological differences could exacerbate the growing conflict within the Tripartite Alliance. Special attention is paid to the radical left and revolutionary positions.
2.3 Radical left characterised by a focus on the economy, class and emancipation through political revolution

In order to understand far-left politics, also known as the radical left, one must first examine the work of Karl Heinrich Marx. In many ways, Karl Marx can be considered one of the most important writers on far-left politics. Marxist ideals are similar to those of the radical left movements. According to Martin (2011: 33), far-left ideologies regularly apply to Marxist theory.

Marx was an active proponent of a classless society in which an economic hierarchy was absent. Class conflict has sparked the divisions in society which are still visible today, thus confirming the arguments made by the economic determinists. Marx believed that in primitive societies, egalitarian values such as sharing and cooperation prevailed (Weir, 2007: 136). However, these values dissipated once the concept of private property was introduced (Weir, 2007: 136). Private property eventually led to the creation of two classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. A person’s class was determined by his or her position in the process of production (Lee & Newby, 2000: 105). In other words, the owners of the means of production (capitalists) became part of the bourgeoisie, while those who did not have access to the means of production ultimately became part of the proletariat class (Lee & Newby, 2000: 105). This difference between the two groups is the source of the class struggle. The bourgeoisie takes a part of the surplus value produced by the proletariat during the production process in which the latter is involved (Lee & Newby, 2000: 105). In order to achieve maximum profit, the capitalistic owners of production will lower wages, increase their employees’ working hours or replace them.

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2 Economic determinism is a proponent of the argument that all non-economic aspects of human society are mainly influenced by economic factors, which can be simply understood as the production and control of material resources (Casson & Godley, 2000: 183). In other words, once economic-related change occurs, the cultural, social and political spheres of society will be affected (Casson & Godley, 2000: 183).
with machinery (Weir, 2007: 137). On the other hand, the worker wants wage increases, more leisure time and better working conditions (Weir, 2007: 137).

Marx predicted that this class antagonism would result in a revolution in which the proletariat (now aware of their exploitation) would defeat the bourgeoisie and replace the capitalistic system with a system of socialism (Weir, 2007: 137). For the now ruling proletariat class to establish a classless society, the following needs to happen: 1) prevent ownership of land; 2) introduce progressive income tax; 3) scrap the right to inherit; 4) prevent immigrants from owning property; 5) instruct everyone to participate in labour; 6) nationalise the banks; 7) centralise communication and transport systems; 8) introduce state appropriation of factories; 9) gradually integrate agriculture and manufacturing industries; and 10) establish free education (Marx & Engels, 2004: 15).

Some, but not all, far-left movements identify with the above-mentioned principles. A far-left ideological perspective is described as a radical worldview which usually seeks to inform the population of perceived forces of “exploitation and repression” (Martin, 2011: 33). It is important to distinguish the far left from the fringe left. The far left do not usually resort to violence and would rather act in a democratic manner in order to get their message across (Martin, 2011: 33). In contrast, the fringe left are an “extreme interpretation of Marxist ideology” who justify the use of violence by arguing that they consider themselves at war with a system that legitimises inequality and oppression (Martin, 2011: 33). An example of far-left ideologies in practice is communism.

Communism is an ideology that gained significant traction in 19th century Europe, and formed the basis of much of the political conflict that permeated the 20th century (Farmer, 2006: 125). Simply put, communism involves people living and working collectively, with common ownership of property instead of individual ownership (Farmer, 2006: 125). “In this sense, the theory of the communists may be summed up in this single sentence: Abolition of private property” (Marx & Engels, 2005: 60).

According to Nell (2010: 3), Marxists used the terms socialism and communism interchangeably; however, the two can be distinguished from one another by recognising that the former is often a prerequisite for the latter. “More specifically, it is what Marx called ‘the first phase of communist society’ that later Marxists, including Lenin (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2), came to describe as ‘socialism’ (as opposed to ‘communism’ proper)” (Singh, 2008: 276). Marx defines socialism as an economic system in which the
means of production are owned by all in a society. Thus, once a society has been transformed into a communist state, all commodity production will be halted and all that is produced will be utilised by the people instead of being incorporated into trade (Nell, 2010: 4). Nell (2010: 3) writes that although a number of socialists and communists believed that Marx did not support centralised planning, it is clear that he recognised the fact that centralised planning would be required in order to establish and maintain the common ownership of production, at least until communism emerged from the socialist system (Nell, 2010: 3).

One group of liberalists, the classical liberalists, expressed their impatience with communism. The classical liberalists believed wholeheartedly in free markets, private property, individual enterprise and the rejection of centralised government planning (Dueck, 2010: 118). Among the classical liberalists, also known as libertarians, are Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman (Dueck, 2010: 118). In one of Hayek’s many publications, The road to serfdom (1944), he insisted that the state’s role should be limited in terms of the economy. He suggested that if the government were allowed to plan and regulate the economy, a state of totalitarianism would emerge. Karagiannis and Majd-Sadjadi (2007: 31) reiterated Hayek’s perspective by stating that the market is viewed as a collection of forces that promote individual freedom and economic productivity, while the state is regarded as an entity that restricts liberty and undermines efficiency.

Hayek’s Individualism and economic order (1972) includes an explanation of the problems encountered when trying to construct a rational economic order. Here Hayek (2009: 77) maintains that the "peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exist in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess". This puts a severe constraint on social planning.

It has been stated that central planning is a temporary necessity until communism is achieved. Once people have been fully integrated into the socialist system, they will adopt the values of socialism, which will eliminate scarcity and also spark the end of the state (Nell, 2010: 4). “Furthermore, the people would so enjoy their new freedom from want, and their shared ownership and management of the economy, that the state would wither away and the system would function without any kind of enforcement mechanism” (Nell,
What this means is that the structures of government will no longer be needed as the worker class would manage the economy in the “shared interests of all the people” (Nell, 2010: 4). This in itself is communism.

Hayek was (as were many other classical liberals) against the notion of central planning which, according to Marx, is a prelude to communism. However, it is important to note that the liberal philosophy comprises more than just the classical movement. Young (2002: 25) writes that the branches extending from the liberalism tree include: classical, egalitarian, economic, rights-based, social, welfare-state, ethical, humanist, deontological, perfectionist, democratic and institutional. These different types of liberalism could confuse the student of political theory as they are sometimes contradictory in meaning. It is this potential confusion that creates the motivation to explore the subject of liberalism in more depth.

2.4 How liberalism believes in the market, and free trade and enterprise

Although liberalism is diverse in character, Young (2002: 26) explains that there are certain beliefs and values commonly associated with, and which go to the core of, this ideological position. The beliefs and values considered to be fundamental to the liberal doctrine are the following: individual liberty and equality; individual rights; private property; limited constitutional government; as well as autonomy, consent, pluralism and toleration (Young, 2002: 26). These values and beliefs help to define liberalism, but to fully understand this philosophical perspective one must look at its historical development. The origins of liberalism can to some extent be attributed to the social contract theory by Thomas Hobbes (Bellamy & Mason, 2003: 134).

According to Hobbes (2009: 55), men must fear one another as they constantly compete for the same scarce resources. Competing for these resources would compel a man to harm the other in order to eliminate the competition. This anarchic condition Hobbes dubs the ‘state of nature’. “And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which Nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their only)” (Hobbes, 2009: 55). To prevent this constant state of conflict and war, men decided to create the state (an authority that will maintain peace and law in society).
The final Cause, End, or Design of men (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we see them live in Commonwealths) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby, that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of War, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been Shown) to the Natural Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tie them by Fear of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of these Laws of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters (Hobbes, 2009: 74).

Hobbes therefore believes that the presence of an absolute monarchy was a necessity and should be respected regardless of whether an abuse of power might ensue (Rao, 2007: 7). John Locke, an English philosopher, applauded the Glorious Revolution in England (1688) and justifies his support by referring to the violation of the social contract and popular sovereignty (Rao, 2007: 7).

Locke was in many respects the founder of classical liberalism. As a leading proponent of individual ownership of property, Locke explained that nature’s resources are of little value to people until the labourer utilises these resources and transforms them into goods. Value is then attributed to these newly created goods, which justifies the labourer’s individual ownership of the products.

It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others (Locke, 1821: 210).

Simply stated, the labour of an individual is his or her property and therefore the outcome of such labour should also be considered the labourer’s property. According to Locke, the preservation of property should be of a higher priority than the will of the government. “Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure” (Locke, 1821: 309). This statement by Locke coincides with the ideals promoted by economic liberalism. Foster (2003: 69) writes that Lockean-Smith political and economic liberalism emphasises the principles of equality, liberty, individualism,

Smith (1778: 32) maintains that it is important for the market to remain immune from full-scale government interference. If left unrestricted, individuals will pursue employment opportunities that will be in their own best interests, but unintentionally will benefit society as a whole as well. “But the study of his own advantage naturally or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society” (Smith, 1778: 32). Although Smith supported limited government, he did believe that the state should intervene where the market has failed (Mclean, 2006: 123). According to Mclean (2006: 123), Smith was of the opinion that the state’s responsibilities should include the provision of public goods, such as defence, utilities and scientific knowledge, and the provision or part-provision of education. However, the direct provision of these goods must be left in the care of the market (Mclean, 2006: 123). Social liberalism supports the notion of government intervention where necessary.

Heinberg (2011: 38) states that social liberalism was encouraged by individuals such as sociologist Lester F. Ward (1841–1913), psychologist William James (1842–1910), philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952) and physician–essayist Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809–1894), all of whom maintained that the government should be responsible for addressing social issues like unemployment, healthcare and education. Social liberals heavily criticise the existence of inequality in a society, which is the result of outright capitalism. “Their general goal was to retain the dynamism of private capital while curbing its excess” (Heinberg, 2011: 38).

Neoliberalists believe that the answer to unemployment and poverty is a heavy leaning towards privatisation. Neoliberalism emphasises classical liberalism’s faith in limited government. It advocates deregulation and privatisation. “Neoliberalism pushes liberalism’s faith in the ‘free market’ further by stressing the government’s role in promoting market-based policies that favour the privatisation of formerly public resources” (Craven, 2010: 9). Simply stated, this means transferring ownership from the state to private companies. Craven (2010: 9) further writes that these market-based polices also include the deregulation of economic markets. What this means is that the government
must lift constraints and restrictions on businesses in order to boost their competitiveness, which in turn should inspire greater productivity and efficiency.

The radical left and liberal perspectives have been discussed in detail since, for the purposes of this dissertation, they are deemed most relevant. This is because the three dominant political parties in South Africa at the moment (the ANC, DA and EFF) have most, or at least some, policies that can be placed on the left side of the political spectrum. On the western accepted political spectrum, the EFF registers as a radical left movement (Molele, 2013). Frans Cronje (2008) of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) states that the ANC leans strongly to the centre-left. With the ruling party pulling South Africa’s political spectrum to the left, the DA has come to occupy the centre-right position by default (Cronje, 2008). In the next few sections, moderate perspectives (centrism), conservatism and reactionary perspectives are briefly discussed.

2.5 Centrism

Wood (2009: 26) defines centrist theory as a desire for compromise and the suggestion of policies that reflect the middle of the political spectrum. Wood (2009: 26) states that in order for politically elected leaders to maintain popular support for their leadership and the policies they want to implement, they need to appeal to the median voter. In other words, they need to adopt a centrist approach to formulating policies (Wood, 2009: 27). Political parties with many similar policy perspectives may be following a strategy of winning votes during elections, as explained by the median voter theorem.

Taylor and Weerapana (2009: 452) define the median voter theorem as “a theorem stating that the median or middle of political preferences will be reflected in government decisions”. Political parties with apposing ideological frameworks will view and interpret a problem in society in different ways. However, the majority of voters will show an interest in a particular proposed solution. Therefore, the politician or party whose policies are similar to the solution desired by the majority of the population (median voter) will most likely win the election. In other words, the median voter theorem predicts that the politicians who focus on what the median voter wants will be elected (Taylor & Weerapana, 2009: 452). Also, the views of the people at the extremes will not be important to the median voter and therefore the representatives of the extreme groups will most likely not fare well during elections (Taylor & Weerapana, 2009: 452). Acknowledging that presidents need to garner enough support to implement certain
policies, Wood (2009: 27) believes that policies originating in the political centre will generate relatively more political support.

2.6 Conservatism

As one moves to the right of the median voter or centrist position, one is introduced to conservatism and reactionary perspectives. Basically, the conservatism movement asserts that human nature evokes negative connotations and therefore prescribes that traditional social institutions, such as the family, the church, the government and the class system, suppress people’s selfish, irrational and aggressive behaviours (Joseph, 2009: 165). Conservatives advocate a respect for traditional authority which they maintain is essential for stability in civil society (Joseph, 2009: 165).

Edmund Burke is considered by many to be the father of conservatism in view of his reaction to the French Revolution (1789–1799). Members of the Third Estate (commoners) became increasingly frustrated by the fact that most privileges were only intended to be enjoyed by the clergy (First Estate) and the aristocracy (Second Estate). The continued marginalisation of the Third Estate prompted the members of this neglected social class to start a revolution (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2013: 526). It was during the French Revolution that the assault on the Bastille, the drafting of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the march on Versailles occurred (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2013: 528).

In 1792, the first French Republic was formed. Unfortunately, the Revolution took a radical and militant turn when individuals like Maximilien Robespierre came into power. As a member of the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre, together with the Jacobin Club, initiated a period known as the Reign of Terror in which presumed enemies of the revolution (more than 40 000 people) were executed (Fremont-Barnes, 2007: 716). Burke (1790: 189) defended the monarchy by referring to it as a necessary evil.

Along with much evil, there is some good in monarchy itself; and some corrective to its evil, from religion, from laws, from manners, from opinions, the French monarchy must have received; which rendered it (though by no means free, and therefore by no means a good institution) a despotism rather in appearance than in reality (Burke, 1790: 189).
Another prominent characteristic of conservatives is that they believe that people are naturally unequal (Grigsby, 2009: 108). Burke asserts that some individuals are better suited to be rulers than others and thus, these ‘natural rulers’ should have a much greater role in decision-making than the rest (Grigsby, 2009: 109). Even though the classical liberals do agree that people are unequal in terms of abilities, they nevertheless emphasise that people are equal in terms of natural rights to life, liberty and property (Grigsby, 2009: 108). In other words, the voice of the people should be taken into account, according to the classical liberals.

In terms of economic policy, Burke, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, refers to the economic philosophy known as fiscal conservatism. Burke articulates his opposition to public debt in his arguments for fiscal conservatism (Godwin, 2009: 63). Government services funded through public debt allow for security and stability in the short term. However, if the government continues to live beyond its means, the taxpayer will come under increasing pressure to ease the national debt that is building up (Godwin, 2009: 63).

Burke, as quoted by Godwin (2009: 64), asserts: “The claim of the citizen is prior in time, paramount in title and superior in equity.” In other words, individual autonomy and economic freedom must precede government authority (Godwin, 2009: 64). Burke believes that the government does not have the right to continuously increase national debt and then expect the taxpayer to carry the burden. Godwin (2009: 65) writes that ownership of one’s labour is the most fundamental and personal property right, and therefore society owes its “first and original faith” not to the creditor of the state but to the people.

### 2.7 Reactionary

Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn was a reactionary who opposed majority rule and was adamant that a democratic system would eventually lead to tyranny. One way in which Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn believed a democracy could give way to a totalitarian state is through elections. Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1988: 175) writes that it is possible for a totalitarian party to legally and democratically come into power through popular support and success at the polls. Instead of a democratic system, Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn longed for a return to a society headed by a monarchy (Von Keuhnelt-Leddihn, 2003: 88). As a self-proclaimed monarchist, Von Keuhnelt-Leddihn heavily criticised the French
Revolution. “The First Enlightenment produced the French Revolution, the great historical revival of democracy, a sadistic orgy in which the ‘Divine Marquis’ played a leading role both intellectually and personally” (Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, 2000: 4).

From Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s views one can postulate that reactionaries want to return to a previous state and abandon the current system. Martensson, Baily, Ringrose and Dyrendal (2011: 225) state that people who consider themselves reactionaries demonstrate a strong dissatisfaction with the dominant political system and wish to resurrect an idealised system of the past.

2.8 Conclusion

In Chapter 2, different ideologies were discussed in some detail to provide a foundation for an examination, in subsequent sections, of the underlying political and economic principles embraced by the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, respectively, and what has given rise to the ongoing and worsening conflict between the ruling party and its Alliance partners. With COSATU and the SACP attempting to tug the ANC back to its ideological roots – in other words, to encourage the ruling party to finally implement the Freedom Charter – special emphasis was given in the chapter to radicalism in political and economic terms.

It should be noted that political attitudes and economic attitudes can be organised and mapped to better understand the types of societies they encourage, as well as to clarify their relations with one another. It is valuable to compare the various positions on the economic spectrum (economic conservatives, economic liberals and economic radicals) with the positions on the political spectrum (radicals, liberals, moderates, conservatives and reactionaries) in order to minimise potential confusion between the economic and political spectra and to reveal inherent similarities and differences.

Economic liberals are centrists when it comes to economic policy. They believe in a mixed economy characterised by regulated and unregulated industries, together with a state that both supports and regulates the market. Political moderates are located in the centre of the political spectrum as they are generally satisfied with the state of society and insist that if change occurs, it should be in a gradual form. Conservatives are the most supportive of the status quo and push for slow, incremental changes. Economic liberals are unwilling to side completely with either capitalism or communism and therefore opt
for a more mixed system. Similarly, moderates and conservatives are unwilling to embark on radical and immediate changes in the political, economic or social arenas and prefer to see slow, gradual shifts occurring. These positions, in other words, emphasise gradual change and moderation.

Economic radicals, in contrast, are critical of the free market, are inspired by neo-Marxism and seek radically alternative ways to organise economic activity. Political radicals are genuinely impatient with the status quo and seek immediate and fundamental change. Even though economic radicals are mainly looking to establish a socialist or communist society, they are similar to political radicals in the sense that change has to be radical – whether it is through radical means (revolution or violent protests) or the implementation of radical policies (which could be the polar opposite of the prevailing economic policies and programmes).

Chapter 3 will investigate the ideological history of the Tripartite Alliance as well as how the ANC’s ideological narrative has changed over time.
CHAPTER 3: THE FUNDAMENTALIDEOLOGICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR THE ANC AND ITS ALLIANCE PARTNERS

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 discussed certain political and economic spectrum models and delved into the origins of different ideologies, with a particular emphasis on the radical left. Chapter 3 comprises two sections.

The first section analyses the fundamental historical and ideological roots of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP to reveal how each Tripartite Alliance member perceives the political, economic and social environments in South Africa. The differences and similarities in their views will become particularly evident when a breakdown is given of the macroeconomic policies and economic strategies of the Tripartite Alliance government since its rise to power in 1994.

The second section discusses the succession of macroeconomic policy programmes that have been implemented since the advent of democracy. These policy programmes will give an indication as to how willing the ANC is to listen to the views of COSATU and the SACP.

3.2 Part 1: Historical context

The African National Congress (ANC) has a history of alliance politics. This was evident as early as the 1950s when the ANC led the Congress Alliance which brought together racially diverse organisations – including the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress – to adopt the Freedom Charter (Bradshaw & Ndegwa, 2000: 52).

However, before the ANC could establish itself as the dominant party in South Africa, it faced headwinds from other liberation movements. Rival movements such as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) competed with the ANC for domination of the political landscape (Spiess, 2009: 76). In addition, the ANC faced stiff opposition from parties representing the white minority, some of whom were highly experienced in exclusive parliamentary politics. According to Spiess (2009: 76), the ANC also had to come to terms
with other anti-apartheid organisations, including the SACP, COSATU and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Eventually, the ANC – having established an organisational network from the fragments of its internal and exiled wings – managed to gain control over a fairly united African electorate, and as a result established itself as the main sparring partner of the ruling National Party (NP) in the negotiations that preceded the country’s transition to democracy (Spiess, 2009: 76).

The negotiation process, which triggered difficult and uncertain times for South Africa, eventually led to the formation of the Tripartite Alliance in 1990 which would eventually become the governing alliance (Spiess, 2009:76). Forming the Alliance aided the progressive forces in their negotiations with the NP and allowed them to participate in South Africa’s first general elections as a unified force (Bradshaw & Ndegwa, 2000: 52). The ANC and SACP partnership in particular was strengthened through a common belief in the Freedom Charter which promoted a degree of equity and wealth distribution (Mulu, 2008: 137).

When it became clear that apartheid was not sustainable and that the ANC would become the governing party of South Africa, there was speculation as to what the future policy direction of the government would be. Before the collapse of the apartheid regime, the then would-be president, Nelson Mandela, still saw the Freedom Charter as a viable option to pursue (Giliomee, 2012: 50). As mentioned, the Freedom Charter proposed the breakup of monopolies in order to redistribute wealth, as well as the giving of land to those who worked on it (Giliomee, 2012: 50). Former president F. W. de Klerk, who argued for a system of free enterprise, overshadowed Mandela at the annual conference of political and business leaders in Davos, Switzerland in 1992 (Giliomee, 2012: 50). At the conference (see Chapter 1, section 1.1), leaders from the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam told Mandela that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they had abandoned the socialist approach to managing their economies. (Giliomee, 2012: 50).

After his return to South Africa, Mandela was unable to remove nationalisation from the ANC agenda. However, the ANC did accept the idea of steps being taken towards privatisation. Such a move would run contrary to the ideals of the Freedom Charter and will be explored in later sections of this dissertation.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, which some believed to be a sign of communism coming to an end\(^3\), the ANC/SACP’s economic agenda was modified (Mulu, 2008: 137). In this regard, the ANC promised to lift exchange controls, to introduce capital protection measures and anti-trust laws with a view to repatriating profits, and to postpone the nationalisation of mines and banks (as advocated in the Freedom Charter) (Mulu, 2008: 137). Although the SACP and COSATU were committed to socialist ideals, they were willing to set these aside for short-term gains and for the preservation of the unity of the Tripartite Alliance (Mulu, 2008: 137). However, this unity was soon to be tested by a number of policy programmes that were implemented by the government after 1994. These economic programmes revealed an ANC position that was far less radical and much more social democratic than a literal interpretation of the Freedom Charter would demand. Furthermore, the ANC’s economic policies, instead of being socialist, were remarkably pro-business and pro-free market.

According to Swartz (2009:26), it is widely acknowledged that the ANC has shown a preference for walking a more neoliberal path, which supports a free market economy aimed at wooing global investment, rather than a socialistic path. This phenomenon will be explored in the sections below.

### 3.2.1 The ideological points of departure for the African National Congress

The two sub-sections below delve into the ANC’s origins. Section 3.2.1.1 looks at how the party developed as a liberation movement, from its inception in the 1920s until its rise to power in 1994. Section 3.2.1.2 explores the evolution of the ANC ideology by briefly looking at both the SACP’s influence and the ruling party’s interpretation of the National Democratic Revolution. Section 3.2.1.2 concludes with the steps that the ANC will have to take to achieve its envisioned National Democratic Society.

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\(^3\) In his writings, Fukuyama concludes that the end of the Cold War signified the triumph of one ideology – liberal democracy – over all others (Behar & Cuzan, 1997: 122). “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of man’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human development” (Behar & Cuzan, 1997: 122).
3.2.1.1 The ANC’s development as a liberation movement

While resistance from the black population continued to stymie the effectiveness of the segregation laws, the rise of Afrikaner nationalism gained momentum during the early 1900s (Clark & Worger, 2013: 28). Afrikaner nationalism promoted the view that Afrikaners constituted a separate nation based on factors such as religion, race, culture and Afrikaans being the first language in the country (Kossew & Schwerdt, 2001: 121). The National Party (NP) was formed to represent the interests of Afrikaners who were small-scale farmers from the poorer, rural areas of South Africa, as well as urban working class people and professionals such as teachers and lawyers (Clark & Worger, 2013: 28). These groups of people felt discriminated against by the English-only policies of the government and were also bitter about the defeat of the Boers in the South African War (Clark & Worger, 2013: 28). The continued rise of Afrikaner nationalism eventually led to the introduction of apartheid (Clark & Worger, 2013: 37). The apartheid regime was authoritarian, violent and repressive in nature. It excluded the overall majority of the South African population and concentrated political power and the country’s wealth in the hands of a white minority (Ndegwa, 2001: 69).

The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was established in response to the increasingly repressive legislation imposed on the black population by the then white National Party government. Although SANNC was formed to counter the oppressive white minority government, it did not advocate similar discriminatory policies against the white minority (Irwin, 2012: 29). Rather, SANNC’s constitution (drafted in 1912) sought to promote “unity and mutual co-operation between the Government and the black population of South Africa” (Irwin, 2012: 29). In 1919, SANNC members demonstrated their rejection of the pass laws by refusing to carry their pass books, thus inviting arrests by the police (Clark & Worger, 2013: 25). The organisation became dormant during the early 1920s before re-emerging in 1923 under the new name of the African National Congress (ANC) (Irwin, 2012: 29).

In the 1940s, the ANC reinvigorated the liberation movement and in 1943, it adopted a more radical stance in dealing with discriminatory policies against black South Africans (Pearlman, 2011: 189). A number of young activists, including Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu, established the Youth League as a pressure group within the ANC (Pearlman, 2011: 189). The new ANC Youth League (ANCYL) criticised the ‘old
guard’ ANC leadership for being too cautious and conciliatory, and through their proposed ‘Programme of Action’ they called for strategic escalation of strikes and boycotts (Pearlman, 2011: 189).

Led by Tambo, Sisulu, Mandela and Anton Lembede, the ANC adopted the Programme of Action in 1949, which reflected Lembede’s new national emphasis on ‘Africanism’ (Benami, 2000: 188). Shafir (2017: 238) writes that the Programme of Action “reflected Lembede’s emphasis on ‘national freedom’ and ‘self-determination’ through the freeing of the African spirit from the inferiority and dependence that they had had to endure at the hands of whites, including having to accept the white paternalism of well-meaning white liberals and communists”. According to the Programme of Action, Africans were the only nation entitled to claim and rule South Africa (Shafir, 2017: 238).

Along with Mandela, Tambo and Sisulu, another important figure at the forefront of the anti-apartheid movement was Steve Biko. Stephen Bantu Biko was, according to Botha (2008: 107), a non-violent anti-apartheid activist in South Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. Biko, who became known for his attempts to empower black South Africans, is considered to be the father of black consciousness (Botha, 2008: 107). An article in The Sunday Independent described black consciousness as follows: “The philosophy of black consciousness expresses group pride and determination by blacks to rise and attain the envisaged self” (Botha, 2008: 107). Davies (2008: 182) describes black consciousness as “a movement that aimed to improve black self-esteem and to empower Africans by overcoming the psychological dependence produced by white oppression”.

Although the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in South Africa was due to the influence of the Black Power Movement in the United States (US), Biko relied on his African heritage to develop the concept further (Davies, 2008: 182). The BCM included everyone who was targeted by apartheid policies, including those of mixed decent and those of Asian origin (Davies, 2008: 182). Liberal whites, who opposed apartheid, were not allowed to be part of the BCM (Davies, 2008: 182). Attracting criticism for this, Biko stated that the BCM was a necessary step in the process of overthrowing the apartheid regime and establishing a non-racial society.

The BCM went on to flourish in the early 1970s and a number of black consciousness organisations were established, such as the Black People’s Convention which operated
in the political sphere, and the Black Community Programme which promoted health and welfare work in many black communities (Davies, 2008: 182).

Black consciousness also played a crucial role in mobilising black South Africans to rise up against the oppressive policies of the apartheid regime. The Soweto uprising of 16 June 1976 is described by Frueh (2003: 78) as a watershed moment in South Africa which precipitated the serious decline of the apartheid system. The BCM’s ideas had circulated beyond colleges and universities and encouraged high school students in Soweto to protest against Afrikaans being the enforced medium of instruction in their schools (Fredrickson, 1996: 309). The organisation that called for the demonstration on 16 June was the Soweto Student Representative Council, which had been founded by the South African Students Movement, a national organisation of black high school students clearly influenced by the concept of black consciousness (Fredrickson, 1996: 309).

The police responded to the uprising in brutal fashion and the government proceeded to ban all black consciousness groups which they suspected were behind a number of other uprisings following the events of 16 June (Fredrickson, 1996: 309). Many members of the BCM later joined the ANC (Grisham, 2014: 167). However, the government was unable to quell efforts to overthrow the apartheid regime, with the Soweto uprising and its aftermath having energised the anti-apartheid movements both locally and abroad (Fredrickson, 1996: 309). Following the Soweto uprising there was a series of attacks on symbols of state power, such as police vehicles and government buildings in black townships (Shillington, 2005: 1453). Mass marches and protests were staged throughout the country, such as in Atteridgeville near Pretoria, in the Cape Town townships of Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga, and in the city centres of Johannesburg and Cape Town. There were also acts of rebellion in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (Shillington, 2005: 1453). Within 16 months of the 16 June Soweto uprising, about 700 people had been killed in protest action, with at least half of these deaths being in Soweto alone (Shillington, 2005: 1453).

The ANC, together with the SACP and its rival, the PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress), urged a ‘people’s war’ against the white government (Gardner, 1997: 89). According to the then ANC president, Oliver Tambo, the ANC’s goal was the “seizure of power…through the terrible but cleansing fires of revolutionary war” (Gardner, 1997: 89). The number of terrorist attacks by the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (or MK for short), grew
from 44 in 1984 to 96 in 1985 and 203 in 1986 (Gardner, 1997: 89). Parcel bombs, hand grenades and land mines were used to target the South African Police (SAP), the army, government offices, courts and rented offices (Gardner, 1997: 90). Questioning the sustainability of apartheid, the NP had Mandela released from prison in February 1990, and official negotiations on what a democratic South Africa would look like, started in May of that year (Galluccio, 2015: 116). During that time, the ANC remained committed to the Freedom Charter, including the goal to nationalise the banks and monopoly industry.

Essentially, the Freedom Charter calls for nationalisation and land reform, and for human and labour rights to be respected and upheld (Botha, 2008: 65). Much of the rhetoric that the ANC propagates today is inspired by or based on the principles of the Freedom Charter, which also advocates a non-racial society in South Africa (Botha, 2008: 64). The Freedom Charter, however, is not the only struggle document to promote the empowerment of black South Africans. The next section looks briefly at the document, *The Road to South African Freedom*, which explains the term Colonialism of a Special Type and how it is linked to the ANC’s understanding of the National Democratic Revolution – which is one of the main aims of the ruling party’s *Strategy and Tactics* documents.

### 3.2.1.2 The Road to South African Freedom and the ANC’s interpretation of the NDR

In 1962, the SACP produced a document titled *The Road to South African Freedom* (Johnston, 2014: 77). In it the idea of ‘Colonialism of a Special Type’ or CST is articulated (Johnston, 2014: 77). The SACP, quoted by Johnston (2014: 77), explains the background to the CST in the following passage:

South Africa is not a colony but an independent state. Yet masses of our people enjoy neither independence nor freedom. The conceding of independence to South Africa by Britain, in 1910, was not a victory over the forces of colonialism and imperialism. It was designed in the interests of imperialism. Power was transferred not into the hands of the masses of people in South Africa, but into the hands of the white minority alone. The evils of colonialism, insofar as the non-white majority was concerned, were perpetuated and reinforced. A new type of colonialism was developed, in which the oppressing white nation occupied the same territory as the oppressed people themselves and lived side by side with them. (Johnston, 2014: 77)
Johnston (2014: 77) states that it is in the interests of all race groups, black and white, that the black African nation be liberated. It is only the national liberation of the oppressed African nation that will undo the damage of CST and ensure the implementation of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) (Johnston, 2014: 78). Ndgewe (2001: 69) writes that the transition from apartheid was both a transition from authoritarianism and the liberation from a racially and spatially defined minority rule. In the 1997 *Strategy and Tactics* document of the ANC, the party describes what they call the National Democratic Revolution (NDR):

> The strategic objective of the NDR is the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. This, in essence, means the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general from political and economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female (ANC, 2011).

In the run-up to the fall of apartheid, it became clear that South Africa would have to go through two phases of transition. Jeffrey (2015:43) says that the first transition would be political in nature and would include the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a constitutional democracy in which civil liberties reigned supreme. The second transition would involve the economic emancipation of most South Africans who were still caught in the poverty and unemployment trap (Jeffrey, 2015: 43). According to Jeffrey (2015: 43), the second phase of transition was rooted deeply in the NDR, and it was expected that the Tripartite Alliance would take advantage of the shift in the ‘balance of forces’ to push even harder for the implementation of revolutionary strategies.

Thuynsma (2012: 109) writes that it is the NDR that gives the ANC a clear understanding of what its tasks and purpose as a movement are. According to Thuynsma (2012: 109), the idea of the NDR within the ANC is largely due to its close association with the SACP as it was the latter that provided the ANC with much of its ideological direction and embedded the need for a national democratic revolution. The SACP envisioned the NDR as a tool that would drive South Africa towards a full socialist revolution (Thuynsma, 2012: 109). However, an analysis of the ANC’s primary documents, including its 2007 *Strategy and Tactics* document, makes no mention of ‘socialism’ or a ‘socialist state’ (Thuynsma, 2012: 109). In fact, different interpretations of the NDR are found among the Tripartite Alliance members, which will be examined later in this chapter.
In essence, for the ANC, the NDR would resolve the injustices committed during South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past (Thuynsma, 2012: 109). According to the ANC’s 2012 *Strategy and Tactics* document, the NDR seeks to abolish the combination of three interrelated, antagonistic contradictions, namely class, race and patriarchal relations of power (ANC, 2012: 23). These antagonisms were expressed through colonial rule and the apartheid system in which black workers were exploited and women experienced triple oppression on the basis of their race, class and gender (ANC, 2012: 23). Consequently, the NDR has national and democratic tasks, and strives to bring about: 1) a united state based on the will of the people without taking into regard race, sex, belief, language, ethnicity or geographical location; 2) an improved quality of life for all South Africans by providing equal rights and opportunities to all citizens; and 3) the restoration of the birth right of all South Africans regarding access to land and other resources (ANC, 2012: 24).

The end state envisioned by the ANC is referred to by the party as the National Democratic Society (NDS) (Thuynsma, 2012: 110). The socioeconomic character of the NDS includes the following: 1) A political and economic system that places the needs of the poor at the top of the national agenda; 2) Accelerated growth and development in a mixed economy, which includes state and private capital; 3) An active leadership role by the state in the economy and the pursuit of full employment; 4) The quest to rectify inequalities that manifested due to South Africa’s apartheid legacy; 5) Strong partnerships with the trade union movement (ANC, 2012: 4).

CST, according to the SACP, can be explained as follows: power handed over from the colonisers to the white minority of South Africa ensured that political and economic freedom remained out of reach for the black African majority. Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid further marginalised black South Africans and in the end became catalysts for numerous anti-apartheid initiatives and movements. An acceleration in these anti-apartheid movements, which pushed for black Africans’ political independence and freedom from white minority, took the form of the ANCYL’s Programme of Action, while the steps towards economic emancipation for the majority were laid out in the Freedom Charter. Moreover, the SACP attempted to influence the ANC’s ideological direction by instilling the need for a national democratic revolution which it (the SACP) envisaged as a socialist revolution. However, the ANC’s primary documents not only exclude any mention of establishing a socialist state but also point to achieving a national democratic
society through a mixed-economy approach. Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 below will explore the origins of the ANC’s Alliance partners.

3.2.2 South African Communist Party (SACP)

The SACP was founded in 1921 and was originally called the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) (Johnson, Walker & Gray, 2014: 403). The CPSA was affiliated to the Third International, otherwise known as the Comintern, which was an international organisation that promoted world communism (Davidson, Filatova, Gorodnov & Johns, 2003: 3). Lenin formulated the communist ideology by taking some of Marx's ideas and adding them to his own. Lenin went on to become the Soviet Union’s first leader, and he worked towards socialism by implementing policies to ensure extensive state control of industry and by creating the political framework for a one-party government (Grigsby, 2005: 115).

Initially only catering to the interests of the white working class, the CPSA was reformed in 1928 to include the black working class and peasantry (Dubow, 1989: 42). In the wake of this change, the CPSA became increasingly concerned about consolidating its alliances with the forces of African nationalism, as represented by the ANC (Dubow, 1989: 43). In 1950, the NP forced the CPSA underground with the passing of legislation known as the Suppression of Communism Act (Johnson et al., 2014: 403). The CPSA was relaunched in 1953 as the SACP, and the party set out to forge ties with the ANC with a view to creating a South Africa underpinned by equality between all ethnic groups (Johnson et al., 2014: 403). Under its leader, Joe Slovo, the SACP, along with the ANC, managed to form Umkhonto we Sizwe (UWS), a group dedicated to spreading propaganda and engaging in economic sabotage in order to bring the apartheid government to its knees (Johnson et al., 2014: 403). Some SACP members helped to draft the Freedom Charter in 1955, which demonstrates the party’s role in influencing the ANC’s ideological direction (Bottaro & Stanley, 2015: 203).

The SACP describes itself as a vanguard of the working class and is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The first aim in the party’s constitution reads as follows: “The SACP strives to be the leading political force of the South African working class whose interest it promotes in the struggle to advance, deepen and defend the national democratic revolution and to achieve socialism” (SACP, 2012: 2). More significantly, the SACP’s main objective is the formation of a communist society in which all forms of
exploitation of person by person will end and in which all products of human endeavour will be redistributed according to need (SACP, 2012: 3).

Marxism-Leninism is the guiding light of the SACP, with Marx considering socialism to be the pathway to communism. Grigsby (2005: 115) writes that Marxism-Leninism is a form of socialism articulated by the Russian theorist and revolutionary, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924). Marxist-Leninist ideology argues that socialists must unite against and overthrow capitalism through revolutionary tactics (Grigsby, 2005: 115). Marxism-Leninism also sees imperialism as being a stage of capitalism. According to Lenin, capitalists export capital and build industries abroad on the back of cheap labour (Grigsby, 2005: 116). In these foreign industries, the capitalists make huge profits which they funnel back into their home country (Grigsby, 2005: 116). Living standards in the capitalists’ home country rise dramatically, with even the proletariat experiencing some of these benefits (Grigsby, 2005: 116). This helps the capitalists to delay a revolution in their home country. However, the proletariat in the exploited colony suffers immensely with low wages and poor working conditions (Grigsby, 2005: 116). Lenin thus believes that the proletariat in the exploited country harbours revolutionary potential.

Lenin’s theory is appealing to socialists who are intent on starting socialist movements in developing countries. It is therefore safe to deduce that supporters of the Marxist-Leninist ideology would treat western and industrialised countries with hostility and suspicion. Lenin further argues that socialists would organise and create a vanguard party to lead the revolution (Grigsby, 2005: 115). Once the revolution is over, the vanguard party would suppress opposition forces, manage the economy and manage society in the interests of the workers (Grigsby, 2005: 115).

The SACP views the NDR as a direct route to socialism (SACP, 2006). The SACP summarises its understanding of the NDR as follows:

The concept of a 'national democratic revolution' emerged from within Marxism-Leninism in its analysis of the unfolding national liberation struggles in the 20th century. The NDR has historically been understood as a revolution led by progressive motive forces (mainly oppressed and exploited) to defeat repressive and colonial regimes and build people's democracies, as both an objective in itself, but in circumstances also where, due to domestic or global balance of forces, such a revolution is unable to immediately proceed to socialism. This could be because
the motive forces are either not strong or conscious enough to drive the revolution towards socialism or other objective factors pose a limitation to a transition to socialism." (SACP, 2006)

The SACP also understands that the liberation of black South Africans and the creation of a non-racial and non-sexist society are important objectives, and that national and gender contradictions can only be fully resolved under the NDR if the revolution proceeds to socialism (SACP, 2006). The ANC, too, shares the view that the NDR is aimed at the achievement of a non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society (SACP, 2006). Yet the SACP (2006) detects emerging differences within the Tripartite Alliance, especially when one takes into account the ANC’s National Working Committee response to the SACP’s discussion document (SACP, 2006). In its response, the ANC argues two points with which the SACP disagrees. First, the ANC believes that the NDR seeks to deal with the political and socioeconomic manifestations of apartheid colonialism (SACP, 2006). The SACP counters this by stating that, in its view, the NDR was never meant to simply “deal with political and socioeconomic manifestations of apartheid colonialism”, but also (by virtue of it being a radical programme) to transform the very structural foundations of these apartheid “manifestations” (SACP, 2006). Secondly, the ANC states that: “while the motive forces strive to change elements of the capitalist system in the interests of the NDR, they have to manage the capitalist system in line with the main elements of its own logic” (SACP, 2006). Again, the SACP disagrees by stating that the NDR was never meant to “manage the capitalist system in line with the main elements of its own logic” and, in their view, such a statement argues for an NDR that totally embraces capitalism (SACP, 2006).

The SACP’s main objective is to end all exploitation by embarking on a socialist path that will eventually lead to the creation of a communist society. According to the SACP, the concept of the NDR originated in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism – a concept that the SACP has in turn embedded in the ANC. However, this is one of the main points of ideological conflict between the SACP and the ANC. The SACP views the NDR as a direct path to socialism. On the other hand, the ANC believes that the NDR should be accomplished by working together with capitalism to address the legacies of apartheid. With the ANC holding this view, the SACP fears that it might leave the door open to a full acceptance of capitalism by the Tripartite Alliance. COSATU is another entity in the
Tripartite Alliance that is highly suspicious of capitalism. In the next section, COSATU’s origins, role in history, views on the NDR and relationship with the ANC will be explored.

### 3.2.3 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

COSATU’s origins can be traced back to 1979, when the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) was founded (Van der Velden, Dribbusch, Lyddon & Vandaele, 2007: 41). FOSATU’s establishment was a sign of growing confidence among the black unions (Van der Velden et al., 2007: 41). By 1982, FOSATU had indicated that it was willing to disband in favour of a new federation. In November 1985, COSATU was launched in Durban at the height of political unrest in the province (Van der Velden et al., 2007: 42). At the time COSATU comprised 33 unions, including old FOSATU affiliates and a large group of independent unions (Van der Velden et al., 2007: 42). In 1987, COSATU launched its Living Wage Campaign to agitate for wage increases above inflation, especially for workers in the lower-wage categories (Gerhart & Glaser, 2010: 106). The campaign continued until 1989 and inspired strikes and disputes throughout the country in most sectors of the economy (Gerhart & Glaser, 2010: 106).

After the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP in 1990, COSATU entered into negotiations with the two parties in order to cement a strategic alliance which culminated in the formation of the Tripartite Alliance in May 1990 (Van der Velden et al., 2007: 43). Before the 1994 elections, COSATU managed to persuade the ANC to adopt its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in return for the federation’s support in the elections (Van der Velden et al., 2007: 43). Thus, COSATU was able to influence the agenda guiding South Africa’s transition by having the RDP (a programme of socioeconomic redress for the poor, black majority) form the basis of the ANC’s election manifesto (Van der Velden et al., 2007: 43).

At its Eight National Congress in September 2003, COSATU provided an analysis of the state of the NDR and the Tripartite Alliance (Buhlungu, 2006: 116). According to the federation’s analysis, some elements argued that the NDR required only the creation of a black capitalist class (Buhlungu, 2006: 116). “For these strata, the NDR means a non-racial democracy where the educated and the well-off can take high positions in business and government, guided by the motto of ‘each for themselves, and the market takes the weakest’ (Buhlungu, 2006: 116).” COSATU went on to say that the “job-loss bloodbath, casualisation and informalisation” could potentially weaken the working class (Buhlungu,
In terms of COSATU’s analysis, the NDR was brought about to liberate black people from national oppression and to promote a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa (Buhlungu, 2006: 116). Although COSATU admits that the ANC was never a socialist movement, the party was committed to enact fundamental transformation based on the principles of broader ownership and control of the economy and the need to discipline private capital (Buhlungu, 2006: 116).

COSATU paints a picture of two worlds that have come to the fore since 1994. On the one hand, the democratisation process has allowed for the extension of human, civil and labour rights and improved access to government services. On the other hand, the economy remains largely in white hands, dominated by the mining–finance complex in alliance with foreign capital, while the working class has faced rising unemployment and a shift towards low-paying, informal jobs (Buhlungu, 2006: 117). The NDR, COSATU believes, has been replaced with a small group of high-level black business people, with monopoly capital wielding a disproportionate amount of influence over government policy-making processes (Buhlungu, 2006: 117). COSATU recognises that the ANC will not be bound to any prior agreements, but the federation still deems it necessary to remain within the Tripartite Alliance to prevent the ANC from being fully captured by the bourgeoisie (Buhlungu, 2006: 117).

Much like the SACP, COSATU represents the economic left wing of the Alliance and has been highly sceptical of the ANC’s continued neoliberal orientation and endeavours (explained in Chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 1.2, and in Chapter 4, sections 4.2 and 4.4). COSATU was and remains an independent umbrella organisation which in 1996 represented half of South Africa’s unionised workers (Spiess, 2009: 76). COSATU’s main goal is to fight for workers’ rights by doing the following: 1) Securing social and economic justice for all workers; 2) Understanding how the economy of the country affects workers and formulating clear policies for restructuring the economy in the interests of the working class; 3) Restructuring the economy to allow the creation of wealth to be democratically controlled and shared among the working class; and 4) Striving for just standards of living, social security and fair conditions for all (COSATU, 2006: 2).

COSATU draws inspiration for its objectives from the ANC’s Freedom Charter which the trade union federation adopted prior to 1994 (Spiess, 2009: 76). Since its inception, COSATU has used the Freedom Charter as a guide to mobilising, organising and
servicing workers across all sectors (COSATU, 2015). COSATU describes post-apartheid South Africa as a country in which political freedom has been achieved, yet economic freedom remains elusive. In other words, the second phase of transition is yet to be realised.

Like the ANC and the SACP, COSATU views the NDR as the pathway to a non-racial and non-sexist society. However, COSATU has identified major discrepancies in the NDR, especially its interpretation by the ANC. According to COSATU, the NDR allows for the creation of only a small, African capitalist class. It goes on to say that all the ANC has achieved thus far is to reinforce the economic disparity between rich and poor – except for changing the face of the upper echelons of society by including a few black businessmen and politicians in its ranks. Notwithstanding this, COSATU has chosen to remain in the Tripartite Alliance in an attempt to steer the ruling party in a more socialist direction. The acceptance of the NDP is a source of contention within the ruling Alliance as the NDP’s seemingly neoliberal policy solutions fly in the face of the more socialist-inspired Freedom Charter. This creates an ideological juxtaposition within the Alliance which sometimes manifests in the ANC’s ‘talk left, walk right’ approach.

3.3 The ‘talk left, walk right’ ideological strategy

The ANC government has often been accused by the media and some in organised labour of following a ‘talk left, walk right’ strategy. Both the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) have pointed to the ruling party’s tendency to criticise the market in the media, yet rely on the market to remedy South Africa’s economic woes (Harber & Renn, 2010: 14).

Susan Booysen (2014) writes that the ANC ministerial policy voices often talk about the ‘radical’ approaches that will be taken to lift the many South Africans out of absolute poverty. President Jacob Zuma said in his February 2014 State of the Nation address that South Africa would enter “a new radical phase in which we (the government) shall implement the second transition policies and programmes that will meaningfully address poverty, unemployment and inequality” (Booysen, 2014). The Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, has also emphasised the need for more radical policy initiatives. Motshekga was quoted as saying that the time had come for the radical transformation of the South African economy, and that both the NDP (National Development Plan) and the ANC’s manifesto would guide the party’s programmes.
Booysen, 2014). This statement, however, runs contrary to what is actually reflected in the NDP. The NDP has been criticised for reinforcing neoliberal policy initiatives rather than introducing new measures that are more in line with the principles of the Freedom Charter. One faction in the ANC has referred to the NDP as “irredeemably neoliberal” (Beresford, 2016: 146).

According to Daniel, Habib and Southall (2003: 235), the growing leverage of multinational corporations and the domestic business community has pushed the government to adopt more neoliberal economic policies. This has placed the government at odds with its own ideological roots and a large swathe of the electorate, as evidenced in the results of the 2016 local government elections and in the growing frequency of service delivery protests in many urban areas.

To summarise Part I: The government often expresses quite radical economic sentiments (drawing from neo-Marxist arguments), criticising the markets and calling for the development of a socialist system that will eventually lead to a communist society. In practice, however, the government policies that are actually implemented reflect the desires and goals of economic liberals (who favour a mixed economy of regulated and unregulated industries) and economic conservatives (who favour a small government and a market-driven economy).

3.4 Part 2: Macroeconomic policies and strategies

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the ANC has implemented a number of macroeconomic policies and strategies. The next section puts these under the spotlight to ascertain their ideological and economic orientation, especially whether they are neoliberal or more socialist in nature.

3.4.1 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – 1994

When the ANC took power in 1994, the party introduced the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) in a bid to address South Africa’s many socioeconomic problems flowing from the apartheid government’s policies of racial segregation. Two of the main objectives of the RDP were to alleviate poverty and to reconstruct the economy (Beck, 2000: 194). DeRouen and Bellamy (2008: 709) state that the RDP contained both neoliberal and socialist elements in that it advocated bolstering fundamental
macroeconomic indicators while also providing basic services and economic opportunities to those left disadvantaged by apartheid (DeRouen & Bellamy, 2008: 709).

In the first year of the RDP, several programmes were implemented, such as free healthcare for children and pregnant mothers, the provision of school meals, land reform, clean water and electrification projects, and housing projects (Beck, 2000: 194). RDP housing projects are to this day still being undertaken by the government. In 1996, 64% of households occupied formal housing (SAIRR, 2017: 696). By 2016, the figure had increased to 79% of households (SAIRR, 2017: 696). The rollout of RDP housing for the poor has undoubtedly led to an improvement in living standards in various parts of the country. Yet as time passed it became clear that most of the RDP’s optimistic goals would not be reached and that unemployment levels would remain high (Beck, 2000: 194).

The RDP was abandoned in 1996 to make way for the government’s new Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (DeRouen & Bellamy, 2008: 709).

3.4.2 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy – 1996

From 1990 onwards, the ANC began to move away from its core values, as enshrined mainly in the Freedom Charter, and, through sometimes convoluted policy reversals, started to adopt positions that were more in line with neoliberal orthodoxy.

In 1996, the ANC adopted the GEAR strategy, which emphasised the attainment of economic growth through fiscal restraint, the gradual relaxation of exchange controls, import tariff reductions, tax reductions to encourage investment and stimulate business activity, and privatisation (Southall, 2013: 261). In brief, GEAR advocated free enterprise, free markets and a smaller role for the government in the economy. The ANC at the time was in favour of the neoliberal elements in the GEAR strategy and accepted the principles of neoliberal economics, namely that public debt jeopardised growth, that poverty is solved with a high economic growth rate, and that growth is boosted when opportunities to invest are created (MacDonald, 2006: 143). With the GEAR strategy, the ANC was able to soothe national and international capital markets (MacDonald, 2006: 143).

COSATU and SACP, however, expressed outrage when GEAR was released – not only because of the economic strategy’s content but because of the ANC’s firm stance that it was non-negotiable. Sam Shilowa, general-secretary of COSATU at the time, publicly criticised GEAR and stated that the policies promoted by GEAR could never have
emerged from the ANC before the 1994 elections (Southall, 2013: 261). The tensions over GEAR also created divisions between and within Tripartite Alliance members. Some members of COSATU felt that the policy should be given a chance and that the government should not be attacked during a crisis, whereas other members openly opposed it (Southall, 2013: 261).

GEAR’s eventual failure to spur economic growth and job creation only exacerbated tensions between the ANC and COSATU. In 1998, Nelson Mandela, who was president at the time, along with deputy-president Thabo Mbeki, used high-profile speeches to condemn both COSATU and the SACP for questioning the government’s economic policies (Southall, 2013: 261).

3.4.3 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) – 2005

Former president Thabo Mbeki often remarked that South Africa had a dual economy. Nowhere was this more evident than in one of Mbeki’s speeches in 1998 when he referred to South Africa as a country of two nations – one that was white and wealthy and one that was black and poor (Asmal & James, 2002: 149). Mbeki pointed out that the white nation was prosperous, regardless of gender and geographical location, with access to proper infrastructure, whereas the black nation was severely marginalised, with limited resources and opportunities (Asmal & James, 2002: 149).

As the new democratic government was proving unable to reduce inequality along racial lines and to improve the employment rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new growth strategy was considered. In July 2005, Mbeki launched the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), which formed part of Mbeki’s drive to transform South Africa into a developmental state (Erasmus & Schenk, 2008: 77). AsgiSA’s main aim was to halve the unemployment and poverty rate by 2014 (Erasmus & Schenk, 2008: 77). An essential underlying principle of this policy development was that economic growth should not be attained at the expense of the poor (Erasmus & Schenk, 2008: 77). Therefore, during the development of AsgiSA, it was concluded that interventions to accelerate growth should be sustainable and shared among all South Africans (Erasmus & Schenk, 2008: 77).

The switch from GEAR to AsgiSA pointed to the evolution of the state into a strong developmental advocate (Kabner, 2014: 321). Through AsgiSA, the state took the lead in
social transformation by applying the power of parastatals and by creating big infrastructure projects (Kabner, 2014: 321). AsgiSA was given a budget of R370 million and its proposals included an increase in public sector capital investment from 6% to 10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as massive capital expenditure by parastatals Transnet and Eskom (Bendix, 2010: 542). With GEAR, the state played a minor role, whereas in AsgiSA, the state assumed a more proactive role as the major player in social transformation (Kabner, 2014: 321).

The ANC’s failure to boost economic growth and to achieve the desired redistribution of wealth in the few years after 1994 was heavily criticised by COSATU (Bendix, 2010: 542). The federation, which has always been vigorously opposed to the privatisation of state enterprises, viewed GEAR as more pro-capitalist than the RDP (Bendix, 2010: 542). AsgiSA was introduced in 2006 as a response to GEAR’s ineffectiveness, and was at the time described by Mbeki as “a limited set of interventions intended to serve as catalysts to accelerate shared growth and development” (Bendix, 2010: 542). Relatively short-lived, AsgiSA also failed to gain significant traction.

3.4.4 National Development Plan (NDP) – 2012

In a nutshell, the National Development Plan (NDP) aims to eliminate poverty and significantly reduce inequality by the year 2030 (Kolasa, 2016: 106). Although the NDP, adopted by the Cabinet in 2012, puts the onus on the government to find solutions to many of South Africa’s most pressing socioeconomic problems, it also recognises the crucial role played by the private sector (Kolasa, 2016: 108).

Jeremy Cronin, a member of the SACP, maintains that although many of the NDP’s proposals are helpful, he does not agree with the plan’s neoliberal approach (Kolasa, 2016: 108). Among the proposals with a neoliberal inclination are the following: 1) Build partnerships between the public sector, business and labour to facilitate, direct and promote investment in labour-intensive areas; 2) Reduce the cost of regulatory compliance, especially for small and medium-sized firms; 3) Provide support for small businesses through better coordination of relevant agencies, development finance institutions, and public and private incubators; 4) Commit to public and private procurement approaches that stimulate domestic industry and job creation; 5) Stimulate a higher rate of investment, with public sector investment crowding in private investment (National Planning Commission, 2012).
Former general-secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, commented a couple of years ago that the NDP represented another version of the Washington Consensus and, furthermore, that it resembled GEAR in several ways (Davie, 2015: 290). Other labour leaders have similarly stated that the NDP is an economically right-wing plan as it ignores the Freedom Charter which many economically leftist groups in South Africa have adopted as their core document. Irvin Jim of NUMSA has said that the document represents neoliberal interests and that the workers had been outnumbered in the vote to adopt the plan at the ANC meeting in December 2012 (Davie, 2015: 290). The SACP has accused the National Planning Commission (NPC) of playing a “factionalist game” and has called for its disbandment (Davie, 2015: 290). SACP president Blade Nzimande has been more conciliatory, saying that the NDP should not be treated like something etched in stone (Davie, 2015: 290). “We should rather seek to build unity in action around the ANC’s key resolution on the need to be provided to what is actually meant by such a phase…and a useful proposal within the NDP can, certainly, form part of such a strategic platform” (Davie, 2015: 290).

To summarise Part 2: A number of macroeconomic policies and strategies have been introduced and put to the test since the Tripartite Alliance’s rise to power. The RDP, introduced in 1994, was a compromise between the views of the ANC (which was convinced it should embark on a neoliberal path to attract foreign capital to South Africa) and those of one of its leftist Alliance partners, COSATU (which believed that the needs of black Africans marginalised during apartheid had to be at the top of the ANC’s policy agenda). COSATU, however, felt betrayed by the ANC’s adoption of the GEAR strategy just two years after the implementation of the RDP. The ANC at the time, with Mandela as president and Mbeki as deputy president, was wooed by the idea popularised by rich western countries and other emerging markets that conservative economic policies would stimulate accelerated growth rates. It was hoped that the anticipated high growth rates flowing from increased investment, fiscal prudence and a freer market would create the jobs needed to absorb the poor and unskilled into the labour force. This, though, did not happen, which eventually prompted Mbeki to transform South Africa into a developmental state through the adoption of AsgiSA.

AsgiSA, in contrast to GEAR, made provision for a bigger role for the state in the economy. This undoubtedly will have pleased the SACP, an organisation inspired by Marxism and strongly of the view that socialism, which advocates increased centralised
planning, is the pathway to communism. With the government adopting a more socialist approach to dealing with South Africa’s socioeconomic problems, COSATU and the SACP (both supporters of the nationalisation-friendly Freedom Charter) hoped that this would further entrench centralised planning and public ownership in South Africa.

In 2012, however, the NDP was adopted which supports a neo-Keynesian economic model (see Chapter 1, section 1.2) or a mixed economic model as it advocates public and private partnerships, along with other market-friendly initiatives. COSATU and the SACP were particularly dismayed to see how the NDP portrayed the role of the private sector which, by all accounts, had not diminished but had rather been extended.

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter 3 explored the origins of each of the Tripartite Alliance partners and explained how domestic factors, such as the advent of apartheid and its lingering legacy, and international factors, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the growing influence of emerging markets, played a role in their evolution. The democratisation process in South Africa triggered changes in the ANC’s ideological principles, which have been vividly played out in the succession of macroeconomic policies and strategies that the party has chosen to pursue, despite its Alliance partners’ objections.

GEAR has been the ANC’s most economically conservative strategy, while the RDP, AsgiSA and the NDP have all, to a greater or lesser extent, displayed a preference for a mixed economic model. The growing distance between the ANC, on the one hand, and COSATU and the SACP, on the other, is evident in their different interpretations of the NDR and how it should be implemented. In the ANC’s Strategy and Tactics documents, the main goals of the NDR are to create a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society and to establish an NDS in collaboration with the private sector. The SACP, in turn, views the NDR as a direct route to a socialist society, while COSATU is suspicious of the NDR for being too supportive of the capitalist elite.

Chapter 4 will explore the factors contributing to the deterioration in the relationship between the members of the Tripartite Alliance.
CHAPTER 4: THE SHIFTING IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE ANC AND THE WEAKENING OF FAULT LINES IN THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 discussed the members of the Tripartite Alliance in terms of their ideological roots and how this has influenced their views on the economic trajectory that South Africa should be taking. Chapter 4 sheds more light on the different ideological viewpoints of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, and examines how the shift to the left in the country’s political arena will affect the cohesion of the Tripartite Alliance. In light of the issues raised in earlier chapters, the researcher expects tensions within the Tripartite Alliance to continue and even worsen as the ANC’s National Elective Conference in December 2017 approaches and the 2019 national elections appear on the not-too-distant horizon. This chapter sets out to provide some substance to the key areas of contention.

From 16–20 December 2007, the ANC held its 52nd National Elective Conference at the University of Limpopo in Polokwane (ANC, 2017). Known as the highest decision-making body of the ANC, the National Elective Conference is held every five years. It is at this event that the president of the party is elected (ANC, 2017). Electing a president is not only important on a structural level for the ANC; it also has nation-wide implications as the leader of the ANC is highly likely to become the president of the country (Notholt, 2008: 55). The National Elective Conference is also the event at which the policies and programmes of the ANC are articulated and decided, where constitutional amendments are adopted, and where the National Executive Committee (NEC) or top six4 of the party are elected (ANC, 2017). The National Executive Committee (NEC), which is subject to the South African Constitution, is the highest organ of the ANC operating between National Elective Conferences and has the authority to lead the organisation (ANC, 2017).

At the National Elective Conference in 2007, Jacob Zuma was elected president of the ANC (Mailovich, 2017). Zuma’s allies included the then ANCYL president, Julius Malema,

4 The NEC consists of six members, also known as the ‘top six’ and currently comprises Jacob Zuma (president), Cyril Ramaphosa (deputy president), Zweli Mkhize (treasurer-general), Baleka Mbete (chairperson), Gwede Mantashe (secretary-general), Jessie Duarte (deputy secretary-general) (Vecchiatto & Cohen, 2017)
general-secretary of the SACP, Blade Nzimande, and general-secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi (Mailovich, 2017). The province of KwaZulu-Natal played a particularly important role in Zuma’s rise to power (Cohen & Mkokeli, 2017).

However, in 2017, the picture has changed completely. Malema is now the leader of the EFF, a radical leftist party that has adopted a heavy anti-Zuma stance (Mailovich, 2017). COSATU and the SACP, once staunch Zuma allies, are demanding that the president steps down (Mailovich, 2017). The deputy president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, who is seen as a front runner in the ANC’s presidential race, has been officially endorsed by COSATU (Whittles, 2017). The SACP, too, has withdrawn support for Zuma and has thrown its weight behind Ramaphosa, with the SACP second deputy-general secretary, Solly Mapaila, stating: “To expect that we can turn the tide and convince people that we will stop corruption and corporate capture under the president’s leadership is unreasonable” (Modjadji, 2017). SACP North West provincial secretary, Madoda Sambatha, also criticised Zuma by commenting: “…if the president’s choice is Nkosazana, our choice is Ramaphosa” (Modjadji, 2017). Zuma’s unceremonious axing of Blade Nzimande, SACP director-general, from the Cabinet in October 2017 could be the last straw that broke the camel’s back in the rapidly deteriorating relationship between Zuma and the SACP.

Zuma has tactically and publicly endorsed his ex-wife, Dlamini-Zuma, to replace him as ANC president, which would place her in pole position to become president of South Africa (Mthethwa, 2017). Regarding her previous position as chairperson of the African Union (AU), Zuma said: “She turned the AU into what we wanted it to be. She is very respected in Africa and it would be surprising why she would not be respected in South Africa” (Mthethwa, 2017). Dlamini-Zuma has also been endorsed by the ANCYL, the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL) as well as the Premier League (a lobby group led by the premiers of North West, Free State and Mpumalanga (Modjadji, 2017).

However, fighting between ANC factions in KwaZulu-Natal threatens to derail Zuma’s plan to have Dlamini-Zuma succeed him (Cohen & Mkokeli, 2017). The eastern KwaZulu-Natal region accounts for more than a fifth of ANC members (the most out of the nine provinces), which makes the province a key player in the presidential race (Cohen & Mkokeli, 2017). Even though Dlamini-Zuma has a Zulu background and originally comes from KwaZulu-Natal, the feud in the province has weakened Zuma’s grip on power, with
former speaker of the Pietermaritzburg municipality, Babu Baijoo, stating: “In all my years in the ANC, I’ve never seen things as bad as this when it comes to unity. The branches have been captured by individuals. It’s a fight for resources and positions” (Cohen & Mkokeli, 2017).

While the much-anticipated National Elective Conference will take place in December 2017, another important event occurred earlier in the year, known as the National Policy Conference. The ANC’s 5th National Policy Conference, staged from 30 June to 5 July 2017, attracted 3 500 delegates from party branches across the country to discuss and debate the party’s policies (Chabalala, 2017). During the Conference, it became clear that there was little consensus on how to deal with challenges such as land redistribution and free higher education, and what exactly is meant by ‘white monopoly capital’ (Gallens, Madia & Tandwa, 2017a).

Zuma was elected as party president at the National Elective Conference in 2007 with the help of Julius Malema and the ANCYL, COSATU, the SACP and the ANC KwaZulu-Natal branch. However, today Zuma finds himself in a much more vulnerable position. Not only has he been abandoned by COSATU and SACP, which have thrown their weight behind Ramaphosa, but the new leftist parties such as the EFF, headed by former Zuma ally, Julius Malema, are chipping away at the ANC’s support base. There are clear signs of disunity, not just between the ANC and its Alliance partners but also within the ruling party itself, if the disagreements on a variety of issues at the National Policy Conference are anything to go by.

This chapter looks at the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma administrations, the state of the economy during their tenure, and their relationship with COSATU and the SACP. This will indicate not only the level of cohesion within the Alliance but also how much influence the Alliance partners have had on the ANC. This, in turn, should reveal the ideological direction in which the Tripartite Alliance is moving in practical terms.

The state of the economy is described according to the following indicators: 1) GDP growth rate; 2) Number of houses constructed by the government; 3) Unemployment rate; 4) Investment into South Africa; 5) Matric pass rate. The GDP growth rate was chosen as it measures the output of a nation and is therefore a good indicator of a country’s economic health (Samuelson, 2010: 469). Subsidised housing formed an important part of the RDP, which was vigorously promoted by COSATU. Therefore, the building of
houses by government is a good indicator of the ANC’s commitment to its Alliance partners. Employment, or the lack thereof, is strongly linked to people’s level of education. According to Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey, people with a tertiary qualification to their credit have an absorption rate into the labour force of 75.6% compared to 33.0% among people who have only completed high school (SAIRR, 2017: 282). Thus, employment and education levels are useful in judging how skilled a country’s population is and how the state has fared in providing opportunities to its citizens. Lastly, investment was also included as an indicator since global and domestic investors have been biased in favour of a market economy (see Chapter 1, section 1.1).

4.2 The Mandela era: The SACP and COSATU

Nelson Mandela was South Africa’s first post-apartheid president, with his term lasting from 1994 to 1998 (Udeze, 2009: 341). Although Mandela was considered an anti-communist during his youth, he later become more sympathetic to the SACP’s cause and worked closely with the Alliance partners and uMkhonto we Sizwe (Kolasa, 2016: 89). His working closely with both the SACP and COSATU post 1994 ensured that the ANC followed a mild leftist-to-centrist public policy approach at the time (Kolasa, 2016: 90). However, Mandela entrusted the housing ministry to Joe Slovo, a famous communist, while other SACP members were also given posts in his government (Kolasa, 2016: 90).

In his first couple of years as president, Mandela pushed through social reforms such as the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.3). With the ANC constituting a multi-class constituency, the final version of the RDP was seen as a ‘class compromise’ (Jones & Stokke, 2005: 58). To some extent, the RDP represented a general consensus of the liberation movement as it proposed a state-led, market-assisted transformation process and promised to accommodate capital but not to be subordinate to it (Jones & Stokke, 2005: 58). The ANC adopted the RDP as its manifesto for the 1994 elections and COSATU, in turn, backed the ANC during the elections and deployed key leaders into the ANC government to oversee the implementation of the RDP (Jones & Stokke, 2005: 58).

With the adoption of GEAR in 1996, general economic liberation under Mandela became a contentious issue for the SACP (Kolasa, 2016: 90). The decision to adopt GEAR was made with little input from COSATU, and both COSATU and the SACP vigorously attacked GEAR as its measures would move South Africa closer to a neoliberal orthodoxy.
The ANC, led by Mandela himself, reacted harshly to COSATU’s and the SACP’s complaints about GEAR (Deonandan et al., 2007: 145). However, serious tensions between the SACP and the ANC did not develop until Thabo Mbeki’s time in office as Mandela was seen as a highly stabilising force around whom many (on all sides) could at least rally to some extent (Kolasa, 2016: 89). According to Gumede (2008: 160), the SACP conceded that Mandela used his iconic authority to push through GEAR, but he later redeemed himself in the eyes of the communists when he expressed regret at the way it had been done.

4.3 The Mandela era and economic policy

The South Africa that the ANC inherited from the National Party (NP) in 1994 was a country crippled economically and consumed by a plethora of social problems. Unemployment, poverty, crime, corruption and intercommunal violence threatened to plunge the country into civil war (Beresford, 2016: 3). International sanctions and boycotts against the apartheid regime had brought economic growth from the 1970s and onwards to a near standstill (Beresford, 2016: 3). The state had amassed huge debts thanks to the apartheid regime’s military endeavours across the Southern African region (Beresford, 2016: 3). The new ANC government was also faced with a ‘junk bond’ credit rating which complicated and limited the state’s capacity to deal with South Africa’s debt problems at the time (Beresford, 2016: 3). It was therefore essential for the ANC to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) which would be used to boost the country’s economic growth rate and, in turn, generate higher employment and increase state revenues (Beresford, 2016: 3).

The 1980s were turbulent years for South Africa, particularly in terms of GDP growth, with the economy shrinking in 1982, 1983 and 1985 and then experiencing 0% growth in 1986 (SAIRR, 2017: 82). During Mandela’s term, the economy grew by an average annual rate of 2.7% (SAIRR, 2017:82). The proportion of pupils in public schools who passed the National Senior Certificate examinations in 1998 was 49%, down from 58% in 1994 (SAIRR, 2017: 520). Unemployment increased from 20% in 1994 to 25.2% in 1998 (SAIRR, 2017: 286). However, on the positive side, the proportion of households with no access to electricity declined from 49.1% in 1994/95 to 38.8% in 1998/99 (SAIRR, 2017: 732). In addition, investment increased from R217.5 billion in 1994 to R290.8 billion in 1998 (SAIRR, 2017: 127).
Below are a number of charts illustrating the state of the South African economy under Mandela.

Figure 4-1: Real GDP growth against the unemployment rate, 1994–98

Source: SAIRR (2017: 82–286)

Figure 4-1 indicates that there is a close relationship between the GDP growth rate and the general unemployment rate. That relationship is especially evident when one looks at the period 1996–1998. GDP growth declined every year and slowed to a trickle in 1998. During the period, unemployment gradually increased, reaching more than 25% for the first time since South Africa’s democratic transition to democracy in 1994.
Figure 4-2: Delivery of state-subsidised housing, 1994/95–1997/98

Source: SAIRR (2017: 713)

Figure 4-2 illustrates the total number of housing opportunities available during Mandela’s term. Applicants for government housing had to satisfy the following criteria: Married or with financial dependents; Citizenship or residence; Competent to contract; A monthly household income of below R3 500 (SAIRR, 2017: 714). As can be seen from Figure 4-2, the number of state-subsidised housing opportunities increased dramatically from 60 820 in 1994/95 to 209 000 in 1997/98 (SAIRR, 2017: 713).

Figure 4-3: National Senior Certificate results compared, 1994–98

Source: SAIRR (2017: 520)
Figure 4-3 indicates the proportion of pupils who passed the National Senior Certificate examinations between 1994 and 1998. There was a gradual decline in the number of successful examination candidates, which points to severe shortcomings in the country’s education policy. This would help to perpetuate South Africa’s high unemployment rate.

![Figure 4-4: Direct investment as a proportion of total investment, 1994–98](image)

**Figure 4-4: Direct investment as a proportion of total investment, 1994–1998**

Source: SAIRR (2017: 138)

Figure 4-4 shows the level of direct investment as a proportion of total investment between 1994 and 1998. Direct investment is investment by foreigners in undertakings in South Africa which allows them to have (individually or collectively) 10% of the voting rights. Direct investment in South Africa remained at relatively low levels during Mandela’s tenure and even declined slightly in 1998. It should be noted, however, that investment during this period was relatively stable, in contrast to the more pronounced decline witnessed in the 1980s, i.e. from 46.9% in 1980 to 24.0% in 1989 (SAIRR, 2017: 138).

At first, COSATU and the SACP assumed highly influential roles in Mandela’s administration. A number of SACP members were appointed to Mandela’s government after the 1994 elections, which meant that the Alliance partner had considerable influence over government policy. COSATU, too, had a strong political voice within the Alliance, as demonstrated by the trade union federation convincing the ANC to implement the RDP macro policy after 1994. The RDP included the rollout of housing to the poor (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.1) – which is evident in the strong growth in subsidised housing in Figure 4-2. However, the RDP was quickly put aside to allow the introduction of GEAR (an early
indication that the ANC would start to disregard its Alliance partners’ input in the coming years).

GEAR required cuts in state expenditure which meant a reduction in the number of state employees (Habib, 2013: 65). Driven to cut costs, the education department encouraged severance packages for teachers (Habib, 2013: 66). Consequently, the best teachers in the system took the offer – stripping the education system of its most experienced staff (Habib, 2013: 66). GEAR, with its conservative economic policies, signalled the strength of the domestic business sector and corporate elites rather than the labour movement represented by left-leaning organisations like COSATU (Habib, 2013: 120).

4.4 The Mbeki era: the SACP and COSATU

Thabo Mbeki succeeded Mandela in 1999 and was later re-elected in 2004 with nearly 70% of the votes (Findley & Rothney, 2011: 458). With his re-election, Mbeki shifted the policy emphasis from revolution and racial reconciliation to economic growth and administration – much to the dismay of the ANC’s Alliance partners (Findley & Rothney, 2011: 458).

Both COSATU and the SACP felt increasingly alienated by the neoliberal shift on the part of government, the dissolution of the RDP as a ministry and the adoption and continuation of GEAR (Lester, Nel & Binns, 2014: 268). COSATU, committed to fostering socialism, opposed Mbeki’s support for GEAR and in late 2001, the trade union federation embarked on a general strike for the purpose of halting the government’s neoliberal macroeconomic policies (Nel & Van der Westhuizen, 2004: 25). According to COSATU’s then general-secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, the ANC leadership had betrayed the liberation movement and only capital, a growing but small black elite and the mostly white official opposition supported GEAR (Nel & Van der Westhuizen, 2004: 25).

With relations between COSATU and the ANC deteriorating under Mbeki, the trade union federation started to move closer to the SACP and openly supported Jacob Zuma who was facing charges of corruption (Bendix, 2010: 230). In July 2007, Mbeki warned the SACP and COSATU at the ANC Policy Conference that they should not tell the government what it should and should not do (Bendix, 2010: 230). Mbeki went on to say that the ANC was not a socialist party and suggested that the SACP toe the line or leave the Alliance (Bendix, 2010: 230). The growing divisions within the Tripartite Alliance
prompted COSATU and the SACP to campaign vigorously for the removal of Mbeki and for Zuma to become party president (Bendix, 2010: 231). In the run-up to the ANC’s 2007 National Elective Conference in Polokwane, Vavi criticised the ANC’s draft policy documents, saying that the documents implied: “…there was nothing wrong with market-driven capitalism so long as capitalists are encouraged to behave ethically and not seek selfish advantages” (Bendix, 2010: 231). According to Vavi, the documents trivialised the class struggle, ignored workers’ contributions to economic wellbeing, and gave the ANC no proactive role in strategy and policy development (Bendix, 2010: 231). Mbeki’s turn to neoliberalism ultimately led to his forced retirement at the 2007 National Elective Conference and the election of Zuma (Buhlungu & Tshoaedi, 2013: 272).

4.5 The Mbeki era and economic policy

During Mbeki’s term, from 1999 to 2007, the economy grew by an average annual rate of 4.1% (SAIRR, 2017: 82). The proportion of pupils in public schools who passed the National Senior Certificate examinations in 2007 was 65%, which was a significant improvement from 49% in 1999 (SAIRR, 2017: 520). Unemployment increased slightly from 23.3% in 1999 to 23.6% in 2007 (SAIRR, 2017: 286). However, between 2004 and 2007, South Africa’s economy grew by 5.2% while unemployment showed a small but consistent decline each year, from a high of 26.4% to 23.6% (SAIRR, 2017: 286). This demonstrates that the South African economy has to grow by at least 5% for employment to decline consistently. Households with no access to electricity declined from 38.9% in 1999/2000 to 18% in 2007/08 (SAIRR, 2017: 732), while investment increased from R268.7 billion in 1999 to R523.3 billion in 2007 (SAIRR, 2017: 127).

A number of charts are provided below to demonstrate how the South African economy performed during Mbeki’s tenure.
Figure 4-5: Real GDP growth rate against the unemployment rate, 1999‒2007

Source: SAIRR (2017: 82–286)

Figure 4-5 demonstrates a near mirror image of economic and employment trends in the country between 1999 and 2007. GDP growth was reaching levels above 5% before the global financial crisis struck in 2008. After 2003, unemployment showed a general decline.

Figure 4-6: Delivery of state-subsidised housing, 1999–2007

Source: SAIRR (2017: 713)
Figure 4-6 illustrates that under Mbeki, the number of housing opportunities declined in the period 1999/2000 to 2003/04, from a high of nearly 250,000 in 1998/99. However, the number of opportunities increased again from 2004/05 onwards.

Figure 4-7: National Senior Certificate results compared, 1999–2007

Source: SAIRR (2017: 713)

Figure 4-7 illustrates the matric pass rates for pupils in public schools during Mbeki’s tenure. The matric pass rate rose steadily from 1999 to reach a high of over 70% in 2003 before steadily declining again to 66% in 2007.
Figure 4-8 shows the level of direct investment (investment by foreigners) as a proportion of total investment during Mbeki’s tenure. Compared with investment performance when Mandela was in office, Mbeki’s administration oversaw a considerable increase in investment after 1999. According to the SA Reserve Bank, the large increase in South Africa’s foreign liabilities in 1999 and 2000 was due to the transfer of the primary listing of certain companies from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to the London Stock Exchange (SAIRR, 2017: 139). It should be noted that direct investment levels were relatively stable under Mbeki, in contrast to the decline in investment that has been witnessed during Zuma’s tenure (as revealed in section 4.8 of this chapter).

It is worth noting that COSATU’s and the SACP’s endorsement of Zuma emphasised their declining influence under the Mbeki administration. Mbeki and other members of the state elite were confronted by two opposing sets of interests: on the one side, the needs of the broader citizenry who were represented by COSATU and the SACP, and who demanded poverty alleviation and transformation (Habib, 2013: 84); and on the other side, foreign investors and the domestic business community who advocated for policies that would ensure privatisation, deregulation, financial and trade liberalisation, and low budget deficits (Habib, 2013: 84).
GEAR, under Mbeki’s watch, broadly catered for the investment and business communities’ requirements (as seen in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2). Another macroeconomic strategy, launched in 2005 during Mbeki’s tenure, was AsgiSA, under whose guidance the state would utilise parastatals to drive social transformation.

The years following the introduction of AsgiSA saw economic policy drift further to the left, with a focus on a state-led infrastructure development drive (Habib, 2013: 108). Yet fiscal and monetary policy under the Mbeki administration remained conservative, with an emphasis on small national deficits and inflation targeting (Habib, 2013: 108). Both GEAR and AsgiSA went against the nationalisation of the economy as propagated by the Freedom Charter – a document endorsed by both COSATU and the SACP. Although the influence of COSATU and the SACP was reduced during Mbeki’s term, the Alliance partners did play a significant role in ousting Mbeki by supporting Zuma.

4.6 Zuma’s rise to power: the SACP and COSATU

Mbeki’s failure to finish his term and have his preferred presidential candidate succeed him ultimately stemmed from his having increased the powers of central government over the provinces and the executive branch over Parliament, while essentially dismissing the ANC’s Alliance partners and their demand for a more radical policy approach (Ferree, 2011: 205). Mbeki’s actions stifled debate and competition within the party and increasingly bulldozed provincial, parliamentary and branch-level decisions and activities, which led to growing discontent (Ferree, 2011: 205). Furthermore, Mbeki’s goal of keeping the deficit and inflation rate low, along with his pro-business stance, were particularly disconcerting to COSATU and the SACP (Ferree, 2011: 205). Because of Mbeki’s autocratic style of leadership, provincial and branch leaders rallied around Zuma, with his home province – KwaZulu-Natal – leading the pro-Zuma faction (Ferree, 2011: 206).

COSATU and the SACP, along with the ANCYL, committed to support Zuma as they believed he was the “champion of the poor and the dispossessed” and thus a proponent of socialism (Ferree, 2011: 206). According to Kabner (2014: 138), the marginalised Alliance partners saw Zuma “as a unifying symbol of the downtrodden, the oppressed and the excluded”. Tensions within the Alliance came to a head when Mbeki dismissed Zuma from his position as deputy president in the face of allegations of corruption (Kabner, 2014: 138). Zuma’s supporters believed that the act of dismissing Zuma had
little to do with the corruption allegations and was rather an attempt by Mbeki to prevent him from becoming the next president (Kabner, 2014: 138). With the backing of COSATU and the SACP, Zuma won the leadership battle at Polokwane in 2007 which led to Mbeki resigning from his position in September 2008 (Utting, Razavi & Buchholz, 2012: 243). Following his election to the position of president of South Africa in 2009, Zuma awarded government positions to COSATU and the SACP, which included appointing Ebrahim Patel, the general-secretary of the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU), as Minister of Economic Development (Utting et al., 2012: 243).

4.7 Zuma and the first jump to the left

According to Langford et al. (2014: 148), economic policy under the Zuma administration has seen a gradual shift to the left. Such a shift is reflected in the following:

- Ebrahim Patel’s release of the New Growth Path, an economic plan that envisages a greater role for the state in managing the economy (Langford et al., 2014: 148). The New Growth Path identifies key sectors for job creation, such as infrastructure, the agriculture value chain, the mining value chain, the green economy, the manufacturing sector, tourism, and various other, high-level services (IMF, 2014: 50). Based on the opportunities presented by these sectors, the plan analyses and makes recommendations in respect of the policies and institutional arrangements needed to take advantage of said opportunities (IMF, 2014: 50).
- Blade Nzimande’s expressed concerns about affordable tertiary education and the need to rebuild the post-secondary training and college sector to absorb millions of unemployed young people who are not in university (Langford et al., 2014: 148).
- The approval by the Cabinet of the National Health Insurance (NHI) White Paper. In essence, the NHI is a proposed health financing system that will pool funds in order to provide access for all South Africans (irrespective of their socioeconomic status) to quality, affordable personal health services (South Africa, 2017: 8). One of the features of the NHI is that it will be established as a single fund which will be publicly administered and publicly owned (South Africa, 2017: 9).
The number of social grants paid out since 2010 having surpassed the number of people who are employed (SAIRR, 2017: 664).

The release of the Expropriation Bill which Zuma referred back to Parliament in February 2017 for public consultation (Phakathi, 2017). The bill makes provision for property (both fixed and movable) to be expropriated for a public interest and for a public purpose (Phakathi, 2017). There is uncertainty, though, over the capacity of the new office of the valuer-general, which is key to the passing of the Expropriation Act. Looking ahead, there are fears that large-scale expropriation could be used to accelerate land reform (Phakathi, 2017).

Clearly, the left-leaning Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), New Growth Path and other initiatives are aimed at creating an environment where small and medium-sized enterprises can grow (thus reducing inequality) and primary industries such as agriculture and mining (where most of the semi-skilled and low-skilled workers are found) can become sources of more value-added and better paid work for those who have been marginalised (Habib, 2013: 108). In all of this, the government has a central role to play, from identifying economic sectors with job creation and export potential, to assuming more control over the land use and distribution process.

4.8 The Zuma era and the economy

Zuma became president during the global financial crisis and although the South African economy recovered somewhat in 2009, low growth became the norm from 2013 onwards (SAIRR, 2017: 83). Between 2008 and 2015, the South African economy grew by an average annual rate of 1.9% (SAIRR, 2017: 83). The proportion of pupils in public schools who passed the National Senior Certificate examinations in 2015 was 71%, an improvement from 63% in 2008 (SAIRR, 2017: 520). The proportion of households with no access to electricity declined from 17.4% in 2008/09 to 13.9% in 2013/14 (SAIRR, 2017: 732). In addition, investment increased from R590.4 billion in 2008 to R638.4 billion in 2015 (SAIRR, 2017: 127). However, unemployment increased from 22.6% in 2008 to 26.6% in 2016 – a 13-year high (SAIRR, 2017: 286).
Figure 4-9: Real GDP growth rate against the unemployment rate, 2008–2015

Source: SAIRR (2017: 82–286)

Figure 4-9 shows that South Africa initially recovered from the global financial crisis of 2008–09, with economic growth climbing in 2010 and 2011. However, growth has since then been on a slow decline, dropping every year since 2013.

Figure 4-10: Delivery of state-subsidised housing, 2007/08–2015/16

Source: SAIRR (2017: 713)
Figure 4-10 shows the total number of housing opportunities available from 2007/08 to 2015/16 during Zuma’s presidency. There has been a steady decline in the number of housing opportunities during this period. This could be due to generally weak economic conditions in the country since 2013 (see Figure 4-9) which has put pressure on the state’s finances and its ability to deliver services.

Figure 4-11: National Senior Certificate results compared, 2008–2015

Source: SAIRR (2017: 520)

Figure 4-11 indicates the proportion of pupils who passed the National Senior Certificate examinations between 2008 and 2015. Although this proportion increased steadily from 2008 to 2013, thereafter there was a gradual decline which coincided with weak economic growth (see Figure 4-9).
Figure 4-12 shows the level of direct investment as a proportion of total investment between 2008 and 2014. Whereas direct investment stabilised during the Mbeki presidency (with figures mainly above 40% and in one year reaching a peak of nearly 50%, as seen in Figure 4-8), there has been a noticeable and consistent decline since Zuma took office in 2009. It could be deduced that shrinking direct investment signals the fleeing of capital due to concerns about Zuma moving away from the economic conservatism that had characterised Mbeki’s presidency.

4.9 Political uncertainty and the economic consequences

The last few years of Zuma’s second term have been marred by persistent allegations of corruption and infighting within the Tripartite Alliance.

Early in 2016, the Constitutional Court ordered Zuma to pay for the non-security upgrades at his homestead in Nkandla, as remedial action recommended by the previous public protector, Thuli Madonsela (Segodi, 2016). The non-security upgrades included a visitors’ centre, a swimming pool, an amphitheatre and a chicken run, for which – according to a report submitted by the National Treasury to the Constitutional Court – Zuma would have to pay R7.8 million (Segodi, 2016). Zuma also faced calls for his resignation in January 2016 following his decision to fire the then Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, in December 2015 (Marrian, Bisseker, Hasenfuss, Thomas & Rose, 2017). A severe
backlash from the markets, South African civil society as well as members of his own party forced Zuma to replace his preferred candidate for the position of Finance Minister, Des van Rooyen, with the more respected Pravin Gordhan (Marrian et al., 2017).

However, in March 2017, Zuma proceeded to fire both Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, replacing them with Malusi Gigaba and Sifiso Buthulezi as the new Finance Minister and Deputy Finance Minister, respectively (Marrian et al., 2017). This drastic move saw the value of the South African rand drop overnight from R13.26 to R13.47 to the US dollar (Marrian et al., 2017). The fact that South Africa has had four finance ministers in such a short period has prompted international rating agencies such as Fitch and Standard & Poor’s to downgrade the country’s investment grade to junk status (Joffe, 2017). In the face of the downgrade to junk status, a rise in government debt-servicing costs can most certainly be expected (Joffe, 2017). This will have a serious knock-on effect as the government will have less money to channel towards critical services such as housing, education and sanitation (Joffe, 2017). Cutting back on expenditure on critical services will only exacerbate social instability in the country as more people will protest over the lack of service delivery (Joffe, 2017).

The international credit rating agencies, Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, have expressed their concerns about Zuma’s Cabinet reshuffles and what the effects are likely to be on fiscal discipline and economic growth (Joffe, 2017). Another major area of concern for the rating agencies is South Africa’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the numerous bailouts that they have required, particularly South African Airways and Eskom (Joffe, 2017). Fitch, in particular, suspects that Gordhan was fired because of his efforts to improve governance and transparency at the SOEs and his doubts about the affordability of the proposed nuclear programme (Joffe, 2017).

The former public protector, Thuli Madonsela, discussed the reasons for Nene and Gordhan being fired and why the rating agencies are concerned about South Africa’s SOEs in her State Capture report. Based on the report’s findings, Madonsela recommended that Zuma establish a judicial enquiry to probe allegations of improper conduct and the excessive influence that the wealthy Gupta family appeared to have over the presidency (Lekabe, 2016). The controversial Gupta family is accused of using their power and connections to influence the appointment of Cabinet ministers and senior
officials to head the country’s SOEs so that they can benefit from these appointments (Lekabe, 2016). Some of the highlights of the State Capture report are as follows:

- “Zuma and ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe took an interest in the appointment of [parastatals] board members. President Zuma took an interest in the appointment of board members at Eskom and Transnet, whereas Mr Mantashe was interested in the appointment of board members at Transnet.” (Lekabe, 2016)
- “Jonas, in his discussion with Finance Minister Gordhan about the Guptas offering him Nene’s job, stated that they [the Guptas] informed him they made R6 billion from the State and wanted to increase it to R8 billion. The family apparently also said they can report ministers who refuse to take their orders to their superiors to deal with them.” (Lekabe, 2016)
- “The report confirmed that Cooperative Governance Minister, Des van Rooyen, was at the Guptas’ Saxonwold compound the night before he was appointed Finance Minister on 9 December 2015...”. (Lekabe, 2016)
- “Ajay Gupta apparently said Treasury was a stumbling block; he needed to get rid of its director-general, Lungisa Fuzile, and other key officials.” (Lekabe, 2016)

4.10 COSATU and the SACP’s rejection of the Zuma administration and the second jump to the left

Divisions between the ANC and its Alliance partners were reinforced during COSATU’s nationwide May Day rallies in 2017 as Zuma and his allies were heckled and booed. During COSATU’s main Workers’ Day celebrations in Bloemfontein, Zuma was met with hostility as COSATU members chanted anti-Zuma songs in his presence (Gallens, Madia, Singh, Khoza, Makana & Nkosi, 2017b). In fact, anti-Zuma sentiment was so high that the federation was forced to prematurely end the event and all speeches were cancelled (Gallens et al., 2017b).

Meanwhile, ANC national chairperson, Baleka Mbete, presented her speech in Durban while the crowd chanted “Gupta” despite attempts by SACP second deputy general-secretary, Solly Mapaila, to calm the crowd (Gallens et al., 2017b). ANC deputy secretary-general, Jessie Duarte, was booed at a gathering in Polokwane when she was introduced (Gallens et al., 2017b). Cyril Ramaphosa, on the other hand, received a warm welcome from COSATU members as he delivered his speech in Nkomazi, Mpumalanga (Gallens...
et al., 2017b). At the COSATU rally in Gauteng, general-secretary Bheki Ntshalintshali confirmed that they would campaign to ensure that Ramaphosa becomes president, stating that: “We as the workers want Cyril Ramaphosa to be President, we will elect him in December.” (Gallens et al., 2017b)

Although COSATU played a major role in ensuring Zuma was elected ANC president in 2007 at the Polokwane Elective Conference, COSATU has switched its allegiance and is now actively calling for Zuma’s resignation (Gallens et al., 2017b). Among the factors that have contributed to the increasingly strained relationship between the presidency and the ANC’s longstanding Alliance partner, the SACP, are: Zuma going ahead with a series of sudden Cabinet reshuffles over the past couple of years without consulting COSATU; Zuma ignoring the federation’s calls for the e-toll system in Gauteng to be scrapped and the use of labour brokers to be banned nationally; and Zuma failing to implement more radical changes to the economy (Gallens et al., 2017b).

In a similar display of discontent with the Zuma administration, the SACP barred Zuma from attending and speaking at its 14th National Congress in 2017 (Quintal & Marrian, 2017). The SACP had informed the ANC that they would prefer someone other than Zuma to address its congress (Quintal & Marrian, 2017). Solly Mapaila said: “We had initially invited the ANC and left it to them to decide who should attend. We felt appropriately that we needed to inform the ANC that perhaps any other delegate could be much better than…sending the president who we have asked to step down” (Quintal & Marrian, 2017).

COSATU, the SACP and former president of the ANCYL, Julius Malema, have all rejected Zuma and his faction within the ANC. It should be noted that those opposing Zuma are all far-left organisations. NUMSA is continuing to forge ahead with its creation of a worker’s party (see Chapter 1, section 1.1) while the EFF has grown in every election in which it has campaigned. South Africa has also seen the rise of student protests across the country (some very violent) which can be interpreted as a response to what students believe are the excesses of the political elite while the average South African is facing a drop in living standards and dwindling meaningful economic opportunities. Haupt (2016) cites Nkandla, a bloated and ineffective public sector, and numerous bailouts of state-owned-enterprises as a worrisome trend, set against the backdrop of rising university fees which prevent many young black South Africans from accessing the opportunities that would lift them and their families out of poverty.
4.11 White monopoly capital

A few months before the staging of the ANC ‘s National Elective Conference, a policy conference is held to prepare draft policy resolutions following thorough debates (Kotze, 2017). Some might argue that the policy conference is treated as a prelude to the party’s leadership race (Ndlangisa, 2017). At the 2017 policy conference, the contentious issue of ‘white monopoly capital’ was debated and it is the researcher’s opinion that this debate was used as a means of determining the influence of the different factions within the ANC. The two main presidential candidates, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, took opposing views regarding the term ‘white monopoly capital’ (Bendile, 2017). Pro-Ramaphosa provinces such as Gauteng and the Western Cape argued that monopoly capital has no specific racial characteristic (Bendile, 2017). Pro-Dlamini-Zuma provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State argued, on the other hand, that monopoly capital should be called white monopoly capital (Bendile, 2017). However, nine out of the eleven commissions concluded that the phenomenon of white monopoly capital is a global one and manifests differently in various parts of the world (Bendile, 2017).

4.12 Is the ANC currently neoliberal or socialist?

To reiterate, the ANC’s ideological roots can be found in the objectives espoused in the Freedom Charter (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1). Both of the ANC’s Alliance partners endorse the provisions of the Freedom Charter (see Chapter 3, sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) and base their political views on far-left ideologies. Even though there has been a gradual shift to the left under the Zuma administration, ANC economic policy has up to this point remained largely neoliberal. This is reflected in the following developments in 2017:

- Speaking to investors at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in Midrand, new Finance Minister, Malusi Gigaba, eschewed Zuma’s ‘radical economic transformation’ catchphrase and instead opted to use the term ‘inclusive growth’ (Menon, 2017). Echoing Pravin Gordhan’s previously expressed views on the matter, Gigaba’s ‘inclusive growth’ reference would definitely sit well with asset managers (Menon, 2017). Furthermore, Gigaba managed to secure further investor confidence by stating that policy was “unlikely to change” and that the medium-term budget remains the same (Menon, 2017). “I have given the guarantee that on the level of government,
we are completely committed to the previous policies and programmes” said Gigaba (Menon, 2017).

- Gigaba released his 14-point programme in July to wrench the economy out of recession (Kumwenda-Mtambo & Toyana, 2017). Gigaba’s plan includes the sale of ‘non-core’ assets and partial privatisation of state-owned entities (SOEs) (Kumwenda-Mtambo & Toyana, 2017). NKC African Economics analyst, Gary van Staden, said: “The last time I heard the ANC even talk about privatisation or the sale of state-owned assets of any kind was when Thabo Mbeki was president” (Kumwenda-Mtambo & Toyana, 2017). The government previously sold its stake in mobile phone company, Vodacom, in 2015 as part of a R23 billion capital raising exercise for Eskom (Kumwenda-Mtambo-Toyana, 2017). Similarly, the government is considering selling its multi-billion rand stake in Telkom to bail out another SOE, South African Airways (SAA) (Ndenze, 2017).

- Current public protector, Busisiwe Mkhwebane, proposed changing the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) mandate of maintaining currency and price stability (Penny & Bateman, 2017), saying that the Bank’s mandate should include improving socioeconomic conditions in the country (Penny & Bateman, 2017). If this proposal had been accepted, it would have interfered with the independence of the Reserve Bank. However, Gigaba came to the Reserve Bank’s defence, saying that the Bank does not protect the currency for its own sake but rather to ensure balanced and sustainable economic growth (Penny & Bateman, 2017). Gigaba went on to challenge Mkhwebane’s proposal and instructed that her report, on which her proposal was based, be taken on review (Penny & Bateman, 2017).

With the second jump to the left, the Alliance partners of the ANC and various groupings outside the Alliance are now actively promoting leftist and anti-corruption policies. Lately, the ANC has gone through a tumultuous time as different factions have campaigned aggressively for their preferred candidate to be elected the party president in December – all while the country is immersed in its second recession in less than 10 years (see Chapter 4, section 4.1).

Elections since 2006 have highlighted the ANC’s slow electoral decline, with the municipal elections in 2016 showing the ANC taking a record low of around 54% of the votes (see Chapter 1, section 1.5). Add this to COSATU’s and the SACP’s rejection of Zuma (see
Chapter 4, section 4.10) and the ANC finds itself losing support on both fronts (internal and external). This has prompted several ANC politicians, especially from the Zuma faction, to regularly resort to populist rhetoric in an attempt to ratchet up support for the ruling party. At the NEC lekgotla, Zuma expressed his desire for ANC policies to be implemented immediately, including those aimed at spurring on radical economic transformation (Modjadji, 2017). Zuma’s preferred presidential candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, also pushed for radical economic transformation at the Progressive Professionals Forum event in August 2017 (Mkentane, 2017) when she said:

Radical economic transformation is nothing new. The land is nothing new, the wars of dispossession went for centuries because our forebears knew that land was an asset. Just in the Eastern Cape, they (forebears) fought for 100 years for land, but this time we are not going to fight for it. Our forebears sacrificed and lost their lives so that now we can be able to get it (land) in a civilised manner…Radical means real change, it’s a break from the past. Our colonisers saw us as people who must go and get water and wood for them, and gave us education to take command and not graze in the green pastures. They saw Africa generally and South Africa in particular as a supplier of raw materials. Our economy is mainly like that: supplier of raw materials (Mkentane, 2017).

Mineral Resources Minister, Mosebenzi Zwane, declared at a business breakfast held by the Black Business Council (BBC) that radical economic transformation can no longer be delayed and that it is a painful but necessary process (Lindeque, 2017).

Further rhetoric and populist dialogue surrounds the issue of land. Speaking at the National House of Traditional Leaders in March 2017, Zuma commented that the Constitution needed to be changed to allow for the restitution of land without compensation (Quintal, 2017). ANC branches in KwaZulu-Natal (one of Zuma’s strongholds, as discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.1) have also emphasised the need for land reform without compensation (Singh, 2017). Provincial chairperson, Sihle Zikalala, said that their branches want leaders who will not be apologetic about the expropriation of land without compensation. “I know for a fact that branches of KZN want leaders who will expropriate land for [the] people” (Singh, 2017).
Chapter 4 focused on analysing and comparing the state of the Tripartite Alliance and the economy under each successive, post-1994 president.

Before the 1994 elections in South Africa, the ANC entered into a formal alliance with COSATU and the SACP in order to solidify the African electorate behind the ANC and ensure political stability. This required the ANC, who had opted for a neoliberal approach to economic policy, to make concessions with its Alliance partners in order to retain their support. However, shortly into Mandela’s tenure and throughout Mbeki’s presidency, COSATU and the SACP found themselves sidelined in discussions on economic policy. Despite the Alliance partners’ best efforts, economic conservatism prevailed under the first two democratic presidents.

With Mbeki having been replaced by Zuma, the Alliance partners expected a return to a more socialist-inspired and -driven approach which would enable South Africa to tackle pressing socioeconomic problems. A shift to the left did occur in terms of economic policy under Zuma, most notably during his first term. This showed a strengthening of COSATU’s and the SACP’s position in the Tripartite Alliance. However, in Zuma’s second term, the Tripartite Alliance once again came under pressure as numerous political scandals surrounding Zuma and other ANC officials began to surface and circulate in the public domain.

The political instability caused by the scandals has rocked the Tripartite Alliance and has had negative, knock-on effects for the economy. As the economic health of South Africa deteriorates, and more and more evidence emerges of corruption among the political elite in the ANC who are disregarding the needs of the poor, COSATU and the SACP have found themselves once again at odds with the ruling party, and especially with the Zuma faction. A particular threat facing the ANC is that it may lose its majority in the next two elections. This is partly because of newly established, far-left wing political parties such as the EFF, which is courting former ANC voters disenchanted with the ruling party’s betrayal of the Freedom Charter, and the continued plundering of state resources for the benefit of the political elite. A number of ANC officials, especially from the Zuma camp, have started to loudly hail the virtues of radical economic transformation in order to win back votes lost to the opposition.
Zuma’s faction finds itself in a precarious position as, in practice, it still caters to a mixed economic model, while its far-left wing Alliance partners and other radical parties are sabotaging its prospects at the ballot box.

Chapter 5 will offer a holistic summary of the previous four chapters, and will offer some concluding thoughts on what the current state of the Tripartite Alliance is and where the Alliance may be heading.
CHAPTER 5: THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE – A FINAL ASSESSMENT

5.1 Introduction

This dissertation will be brought to a close by: first, summarising the key issues and arguments raised in Chapter 1 to Chapter 4; secondly, providing an assessment of the current state of the Tripartite Alliance in the wake of what was discussed in earlier chapters; and finally, speculating about the future prospects and sustainability of the Tripartite Alliance in a post-Zuma era.

5.2 Part 1: A brief summary of Chapters 1 to 4

Chapter 1 began with a description of the Freedom Charter and its rationale for the nationalisation of the country’s financial and resource-based wealth. Up until the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC had been committed to the principles enshrined in the Freedom Charter – a commitment reinforced by the ANC’s allegiance to the economically radical political organisations of COSATU and the SACP. However, in the face of pressures from foreign investors and the domestic business community, the ANC was forced to reconsider its position regarding economic policy and the Freedom Charter.

After the ANC came to power, the government officially introduced an economic policy framework and approach that had a distinctly neoliberal flavour. This triggered the first of a number of rifts between the ANC and its socialist- and communist-inspired Alliance partners. Recent trends suggest a much-weakened ANC, both internally and externally, as both COSATU and the SACP are campaigning vigorously against the ANC’s current leadership, while growing support for far-left movements such as the EFF is eroding the ruling party’s electoral support and prospects.

Chapter 2 examined a number of political ideologies with a view to clarifying the divisions between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP which in turn stem from these groups’ ideological differences. These ideologies were discussed in the context of different political spectrum models, of which the two most prominent are the economic spectrum and the political spectrum. In short, the economic spectrum consists of three major positions: 1) economic conservatives; 2) economic liberals; and 3) economic radicals. Economic conservatives are highly supportive of neoliberal policies; economic liberals are centrists who are in favour of a mixed economy; and economic radicals are highly
critical of the market, and see socialism as the best alternative. The political spectrum, in turn, categorises ideas and views according to how quick and how fundamental change should be in society. It consists of five major positions: 1) radical change; (2) liberal change; 3) moderate change; 4) conservative change; and 5) reactionary change. In the latter half of Chapter 2, a number of political ideologies were discussed with a focus on their respective interpretations of how to achieve economic prosperity in society.

Chapter 3 looked at the ideological roots of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP in some detail in order to gauge each Alliance member’s stance on how best to address South Africa’s myriad socioeconomic problems. Major differences were identified in the three Alliance partners’ understanding of the NDR. The SACP views the NDR as a pathway to a socialist revolution; COSATU views it as a means to liberate black Africans from political and economic oppression (even though, ironically, it has been hijacked as a vehicle to enrich a small but growing, black capitalist class); and the ANC sees it as a means of fostering public-private partnerships.

Chapter 3 also discussed the various macroeconomic policies and strategies that the ANC has embarked upon since its rise to power. The RDP was seen as a compromise to satisfy the various constituencies (both from the left and the right) that the ANC represents. The RDP’s successor, GEAR, was a more aggressive push towards the adoption of economically conservative policies which would appease investors. Although strong economic growth rates were recorded under GEAR, the strategy failed to make a significant dent in South Africa’s high poverty, unemployment and inequality. GEAR was later dropped in favour of AsgiSA. AsgiSA encouraged a more interventionist approach by government but this, too, proved to be unsuccessful. The latest macroeconomic blueprint, the NDP, was introduced with much fanfare, but it provoked the ire of both COSATU and the SACP for being too accommodating of the private sector.

Chapter 4 analysed the political climate prevailing during the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma presidential terms and the economic policies accompanying each one. It also traced the changing relationship between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, showing how the Alliance started to unravel under Mbeki and continues to do so under Zuma. Socioeconomic conditions have deteriorated significantly during Zuma’s second term, which has put even more strain on the Tripartite Alliance. The ANC’s traditional support base is starting to wither and is finding new ideological homes in more radical economic
parties, such as the EFF. This has prompted Zuma and many of his associates to echo his competitors’ and rivals’ (the EFF and now also COSATU and the SACP) calls for radical economic transformation. COSATU and the SACP have rejected the Zuma administration in the face of growing evidence of enrichment among the top leadership structures of the ANC at the expense of the poor, which flies in the face of the Freedom Charter.

5.3 Part 2: The state of the Tripartite Alliance (2017–)

Populist rhetoric, including calls for radical economic transformation, is coming out of different corners of the ANC. For example, ANC branches throughout KwaZulu-Natal, the Minister of Mineral Resources and Zuma himself have been agitating for radical economic transformation and land expropriation without compensation.

When one studies chapter 4, section 4.7 and section 4.12, one might conclude that the ANC is indeed shifting more to the left of the economic spectrum. However, the researcher presents a different argument in this dissertation. ANC member and Finance Minister, Malusi Gigaba, has begun to use the term ‘inclusive growth’ instead of radical economic transformation; he has also released his 14-point programme which includes partial privatisation of SOEs; and he has challenged the public protector’s report which proposes changes to the Reserve Bank’s mandate (see Chapter 4, section 4.12). Although several radical land reform policy proposals have been made, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, section 4.12, the researcher believes that these policies will not be implemented – rather, they are being used as tools to attract voters who have become disillusioned with the ANC. In other words, the ANC has continued with its strategy of ‘talk left, but walk right’ (see Chapter 3, section 3.3).

The ANC is still committed to a mixed model of redistributionist and neoliberal policies, which places it in the economic liberals camp. However, this could change if the Tripartite Alliance fails to unite behind one leader at the upcoming National Elective Conference in December 2017. Figure 5-1 indicates where the researcher believes each of the Alliance partners is on the economic spectrum. COSATU and the SACP retain their places at the far left of the economic spectrum known as the economic radicals camp.
5.4 Conclusion: How the shift to the left in the South Africa political milieu has impacted the Tripartite Alliance, and what the prospects are for the future

In conclusion, the researcher envisages two possible future scenarios for the Tripartite Alliance.

In the first scenario, the Tripartite Alliance is able to unite behind one leader. However, the political will to enforce a new radical economic agenda will be absent, as the new president’s administration will still need the backing of local and international investors to keep the country from economic collapse. In addition, the populist rhetoric will continue, as will current forms of redistributive policies such as black economic empowerment (BEE), land reform with compensation and the racial transformation of the business sector. These changes, though, will be superficial as only the educated and the black middle class will benefit from these polices. The rest of the population will continue to be deprived of any meaningful economic opportunities.

As the socioeconomic situation in South Africans becomes increasingly dire, the environment for a revolutionary movement might develop. If this happens, the ANC could
either submit to the demands of the majority who are still marginalised and desire immediate change. The ANC would then become both politically radical as it would allow sweeping changes to the country’s economic agenda, and economically radical as it would have to increase public ownership of various industries to appease its support base.

In the second scenario, a new leader is elected at the upcoming National Elective Conference who further divides the ruling party and the Tripartite Alliance. The researcher expects the internal pressures to be so great that a faction within the Alliance, possibly the SACP, will break away. If the SACP breaks away from the Tripartite Alliance, this would severely limit the far left’s influence in the Alliance. This may prompt the ANC to become more brash in its economic policies and to return to being a more economically conservative political party. Alternatively, the ANC might seek to continue on its ‘talk left, walk right’ path since, even though its majority is being threatened, it will mostly likely still be able to win elections by a narrow margin in the short to medium term. It may also happen that the SACP and/or COSATU have no intention of leaving the Tripartite Alliance, despite their disapproval of the new leader. COSATU and the SACP may reason that it would be best for the people whom they represent to remain within the Alliance so that they can still attempt to discipline the ANC when it strays too far from its developmental role which has been fostered under Zuma.

By way of a different outcome, an ANC faction that is not happy with Zuma’s successor could possibly break away and form a new splinter group. This new splinter group may distance itself from the populist rhetoric espoused by the remaining ANC officials and consist of members who would likely retain an economic agenda that is both redistributionist and neoliberal, as opposed to the EFF’s more radical approach. Whether it is a far-left leaning group such as the SACP abandoning the Tripartite Alliance or a more economically moderate faction breaking away, in either case the ANC would be left considerably weakened. This breakaway from the ANC could result in a highly competitive political environment when one considers the DA’s, EFF’s and IFP’s electoral support bases.

With the ANC’s support waning even more due to its inability to curb corruption, coupled with heightened competition during elections, a scenario may develop in which the ANC
finally has to reform its internal structures, root out corruption and push for the necessary reforms that would ensure South Africa’s long-term recovery.


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