THE SOUTH SUDAN PEACE PROCESS: THE CASE OF AFRICAN INDIGENOUS HERMENEUTICS AND PROBLEMATISATION

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A MINI DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AS A PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AT THE NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY

SUPERVISOR: PROF. MASOGA

DATE: OCTOBER 2015

DECLARATION OF AUTHENTICITY

I, the undersigned, declare that this dissertation for the degree MA Indigenous Knowledge Systems (MA.IKS) has been submitted by me, Johannes Titus Thari Moatshe, to the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, of the North-West University, Mafikeng Campus. This MA dissertation has not been submitted to this university before or to any other university. It is my own work in origin and that material contained herein has been fully acknowledged by means of a reference or bibliography.

01/10/2015

Signature

Date

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DEDICATIONS

This research is dedicated to the following and highly respected people: my late sister Hedwish Moatshe and my late mother Mmatsela Sophie Moatshe for nurturing me towards a right direction in life, for being that positive wind beneath my wings, being life's compass when I seemed to be losing live's direction and for the unconditional love that you showered me with from my birth until a point where your mandate here on earth ended and you had to ascend to heavens for the Lord to give you a new and spiritual mandate to watch over us and the rest of world now as our guardian Angels.

Acronyms and Abbreviation

AU: African Union

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSAC: Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

EAC: East African Community

GoS: Government of Sudan

GRSS: Government of the Republic of South Sudan

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGADD: Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

IMF: International Monetary Font

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation

MDTF: Multi-Donor Trust Fund

NCP: National Congress Party

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NIF: National Islamic Front

PDF: People Defence Forces

SAF: Sudan Armed Forces

SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army

SPLM: Sudan People's Liberation Movement

SPLM-DC: Sudan People's Liberation Movement – Democratic Change

SSAF: South Sudan Armed Forces

SSDF: South Sudan Defence Force

SSDM /A: South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army

SS PS: South Sudan Police Service

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

UNMISS: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

WFP: World Food Programme (UN)

ABSTRACT

The Sudan is considered a microcosm of Africa in terms of its ethnic and religious diversity as well as its geography, which dictate multiple livelihoods and cultures. The competition between these distinct groups over land and other resources has always been a source of conflict, albeit manageable through traditional methods of conflict resolution. However, with the emergence of the nation state, the political system and the power struggle among the elites of different ethnic origins as well as the marginalization of certain groups have led to deeper divisions between these ethnic entities.

After 50 years of war ended with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and the cession of South Sudan in July 2011, rather than going into an era of peace and stability Sudan entered a phase of more complex wars and violent conflicts. The new conflicts are now interstate between Sudan and South Sudan and intrastate within the two countries. Indeed, conflicts have emerged even at the local level in what can be described as intra-ethnic conflicts, emerging from within a tribe or one ethnic group. In the light of the above the thesis however seeks to test the effectiveness of the application of African indigenous hermeneutics and problemitisation as of the approaches to resolve the conflict in Sudan.

Keywords: Peace, Conflict, Interstate, Comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), Ethnicity, Hermeneutics, problemitisation.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Background

Most of the conflicts that have taken place in many parts of Africa are largely the results of matters emanating from the past. The militarization of societies and the social strains which are the fundamental causes of these conflicts often stay long after violence has declined, and as a result, have long-term effects on opportunities for the development and improvement of human well-being. In the 1950s and 1970s, most African countries gained their political independence from colonial control. Nonetheless in several countries, most of which were in Southern Africa, western powers proceeded to play a pivotal role in the affairs of those countries. In several states, the anti-colonial struggles which had continued for many years, had an extremely damaging impact on the social and political lives of the people, including of course their environmental resources. Therefore, prevailing strains in some African countries might not be generally understood without making mention of these primary struggles.

A civil war that took place amongst the predominantly Muslim north part of Sudan and the Christian south contributed towards the southern provinces of Sudan declaring a state of emergency. Such a conflict was perpetrated primarily by the Sudan government's decision to sidestep the Addis Ababa Agreement, which amongst other things had given southern provinces a considerable amount of self-rule. By the time government tried to impose new Islamic laws on the whole of Sudan, the southern troops rebelled. As a result they launched attacks along the north/south border and

dragged the region, including strategic crossfire areas such as the Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains, back into a bloody war. As a result of famine, drought, and continuing violence, thousands of poor Sudanese people continued to die especially when the war continued to escalate between the government and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels. Following the ousting of the former President Gaafar Nimeiry and a new government being put in place, the war still escalated even when negotiations were unfolding between the SPLA and several political parties within Sudan. Though minimal, this was the first chance at peace since the starting of the war (Hacket 2010). In June 30, 1989, Colonel Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir seized power through a bloodless coup d'état and without waste of time he quickly started to consolidate more power over the years that followed. Nearing the end of the year 1999, Bashir had managed to have total control of the government. Bashir continued to demonstrate his might by sending government soldiers and weapons to parliament by ousting the then speaker of parliament, Hassan al-Turabi. At that particular time, however, the SPLA was scoring major victories against the government troops together with their proxy militias known as the People Defence Forces (PDF.)

In the meantime the government kept on controlling most key urban areas and towns across southern Sudan SPLA forces were, then again seizing huge zones especially outside of the more populated urban communities, and kept on strengthening their assaults on transport lines and government compels that moved in the middle of urban areas and bases. When the new century rolled over and regardless of the way that the SPLA was picking up quality on the front line, boundless starvation kept on incapacitating the district. Observing the reality as the SPLA was currently a force that

could never again be overlooked and the administration had no craving for peace, the United Nations and the United States got authorization from the administration and the renegades to launch Operation Lifeline Sudan, which saw a huge number of huge amounts of sustenance and crisis help supplies conveyed specifically to ranges influenced by the clash (Hacket,2010).

By the year 2002, the United States government's Sudan Peace Act was passed which declared that Bashir's regime was conducting a programme of mass killings or genocide, which had claimed at least two million lives, from the southern provinces. At that time the international community led by the United States stepped in and pressured both sides into a long series of peace talks. In 2003 and 2004, a substantial amount of progress was made and the conflict began to decline. The negotiations finally brokered a peace agreement on the 9th of January 2005 under the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which stated inter alia the following to be implemented:

- That the Southern part of Sudan be given 6 years of autonomy, at the end of which a referendum be held to decide if the southern part should separate from the rest of Sudan.
- That the revenue collected from the oilfields should be split equally between north and south
- That the Islamic laws should remain in the north and voted on in the south
- That if ever the secession vote was negative, the south and north would combine their troops into a 39,000 strong force (Hacket 2010).

1.1.   Statement of the problem

After decades of brutal civil war that left two and a half million dead, the devastated and vastly underdeveloped southern part of Sudan secured independence in 2011. The world's youngest nation came into existence amid great challenges. Secession from Sudan marked a major milestone and a fresh opportunity for South Sudanese. But massive state-corroding corruption, political instability within the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and persistent tensions with Sudan over the sharing of oil revenues left South Sudan deeply vulnerable to renewed conflict.

On December 15, 2013, tensions between factions loyal to President Salva Kiir, of the Dinka ethnic group, and those aligned with his former Vice President, Riek Machar, of the Nuer ethnic group, exploded into fighting on the streets of Juba, the capital city. South Sudan's dramatic return to war has torn communities apart and left countless thousands dead. As of September 2014, 1.8 million people were still too afraid to return to their homes. Even through humanitarians have given assistance to over 3.1 million people in South Sudan, they estimate that at least 2.2 million were still facing either crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity. This puts them at just one level under levels during a "famine" or "humanitarian catastrophe."

It is in light of the above to observe that various internationally orientated measures have been taken in order to try and bring an end to the Sudan and south Sudan conflict with any amount of success, the absence of local indigenous local input in the conflict is also a fundamental cause of the clash.

1.2. Aim of the study

The study aims at providing an in depth understanding of the causes of conflict in South Sudan, using African indigenous approaches with regard to problematisation and hermeneutics can go in resolution of the conflict in South Sudan.

1.3. Objectives of the study

1.3.1. Objectives of the study are the following:

- To identify the factors that contributed to the conflict in south Sudan.

- To investigate on how the conflict has impacted on the lives of the South innocent Sudanese people.

- To determine how African indigenous hermeneutics can assist in the south Sudan peace process.

- To prove the relevance of African indigenous problematisation of the South Sudan conflict.

1.4. Hypothesis

As part of the conflict resolution intervention strategies in South Sudan, the application of African indigenous hermeneutics and problematisation will assist in finding an African solution to the conflict in South Sudan.

1.5. Significance of the study

The study is significant in that it provides an in depth understanding of the underlying causes of conflict in South Sudan. It also further elucidates how far the use of African indigenous approaches with regard to problematisation and hermeneutics can go in resolution of the conflict in South Sudan and serve as a benchmark for the rest of the African continent.

1.6. Methodology

One single type of data collection technique is used in this research, namely secondary data collection technique/qualitative method. The secondary technique has been applied through publications such as books, journals, newspapers and other forms of articles, reports, speeches and internet publications. Babbie and Mouton (2006:53) define the purpose of qualitative research as being a descriptive understanding of the human behavioural system rather than prediction and explanation. This mini-dissertation uses qualitative research methodology to establish factors that contributed to the South Sudan conflict and to investigate the what, where, when, why, and how connections in relations to this conflict.

1.7. Limitation of the study

Due to financial constraints, the researcher was not able to take a trip to South Sudan and engage in participatory observation or to carry out interviews with the community and the South Sudan government in an attempt to collect as much data as possible with regard to the research topic. Thus the researcher had to rely solely on the secondary

data which was collected through books, journals, articles, internet sources and conference papers to be able to complete the research project.

1.8. Organization of the study

Chapter One: This chapter presents the orientation and problem statement of the study

Chapter Two: Definition of concepts, literature review on the African conflicts, their causes and their distinct conflict resolution mechanisms of the study are presented in this chapter

Chapter Three: This chapter presents the historical perspective on the Sudan and south Sudan conflicts

Chapter Four: This chapter identifies the factors hindering resolution of the South Sudan conflict and exploration on what other methods should be employed such as the use of African indigenous ways to resolve conflict in South Sudan.

Chapter Five: This chapter presents research findings, interpretations and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

Welman and Kruger (2001) indicate that in order to develop an understanding of and insight into previous findings that may be helpful to your research question/problem, a critical review of the literature relating to your research topic is critical. Such a literature review will help you to recognize and identify variables that may hamper or influence the results of your own study even before the empirical research starts. By presenting the finding of other studies relating to your research topic broadly at the start of the literature, you are familiarizing the reader of the research report with the background of your investigation.

2.2. Definition of concepts

Consensus exists among scholars that conflicts cannot be resolved unless their root causes, nature and their scope are addressed by those who are called in to resolve them. According to Burton (1990:2), conflicts are behaviours that have the potential of being destructive of persons, properties and systems.

According to Deutsch (1973), a conflict can at times exist whenever dissenting activities occur that when one side is, disturbing, hindering, or in a particular way making another sides actions less effective.

Wall (1985), emphasises that conflict is somehow a process wherein two or more parties try to aggravate the other groups goal accomplishments. The typology of factors underlying conflict are as follows: interdependence, differences in goals and differences in perceptions.

2.3. Conflict in the African continent

Conflicts now and again happen as a consequence of contrasts of interests in the relationship between parties, groups or states, either on the grounds that they are propelling contradicting or disagreeing objectives. Despite the fact that the term war is in some cases utilized as an equivalent word for conflict, it is more common to confine the significance of 'war' to the savage sort of conflict, including militarisation. Be that as it may, much the same as war, conflict is, and has been all through history a typical method for leading debate between political gatherings inside human society.

Africa is an extremely diverse continent with its diversity seen in ethnic, religious and socio-cultural terms. The 1990s saw no lessening in the quantity of conflicts that occurred in Africa, and most counts anticipate a further increment. While Africa has had its part of inter- state wars, the larger part of its clashes exude inside, and these interior clashes seem, by all accounts. However a shocking component in this is that the civilians turn into casualties in such conflicts, estimated at some 80-90 per cent of total casualties across the world. These conflicts cause not only casualties and refugees but contribute vastly to the spread of disease, malnutrition and starvation, social and economic decline and moral deterioration (Oyeniyi, 2011).

Analysts who are experts of civil wars in Africa are divided on identifying root causes of these conflicts. Some scholars perceive wars in Africa as essential due to high level of poverty, failed political systems and economic dependence on natural resources. However some analysts further identifies internal political factors related to state building and nation building as being responsible, while others explain wars in the continent by ethnicity as major factor (Arnold,2005:153).

The growing absenteeism of harmony only underscores the complexity of the calamities in the region of African as well as the difficulty of resolving them. Nonetheless, there is a broad unanimity among social science scholars that, the vulnerability of the African continent to conflict is not only rooted in its past but also in the present activities particularly by some of external forces. Be it as it may there is however a little doubt that transnational actors, such as western states and international financial institutions have continued to perpetrate, facilitate, compound and sustain conflicts in Africa for their own strategic national interests.

Portrayal of African wars is key to the text 'The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs. This is wherein which authors highlight the factors that have attracted Africa into continuous conflict cycles which are mostly intra-state conflicts. Wars are typically related to imperialism, decolonization, ethnicity, religion and political malfunction in the various papers. The external and internal pressures leading to terrorism are identified as national, transnational and global.

2.4. Distinct perceptions about conflict in Africa

In his survey of the papers Zeleza (2008) notes that" African wars can be separated as far as causal elements and motion, spatial scale and area, military supplies and engagements deployed, effects of military and regular citizen populaces, and results on governmental issues, the economy, society, the nature's turf, social structures and mental states". This perspective cuts over the papers as reflected in what Ali Mazrui broadly expounds on the examples in African wars calling attention to religion, ethnicity and bigotry, which he distinguishes as parts of pluralism which is hazardous to society's agreeable concurrence. Henderson (2008) inspects the occasion involving political problem in African states referring to the condition of state building in Africa as having the difficulties of a "state fortifying difficulty. In this arrangement as opposed to accomplishing nationals conformity to the state, resistance was created prompting political despotism and along these lines uprising.

Ghaffer (2008) offers a thorough analysis of Sudan, an African state he depicts imperilled by religion, ethnicity and language as well as monetary imbalance which has swelled into strife created by doubt in the middle of North and South Sudan. He further fixates his contention on the colonial proposition of stopping the Islamizing of black Africa which has, the whole time opened the opportunity to different manifestations of disunity and along these lines conflict.

Akokpari (2008) connects African conflicts to the colonial experience, miscarriage of the state and external components. He notes that African states are replicated and are an outline of colonial creative ability as opposed to the real nationhood. Akokpari refers to the disagreement and complexities of overseeing heterogeneous African states and the ramifications of outside effects on African governmental issues.

2.5. Inter-state boundaries conflict

The similarity of many conflicts in Africa is the unacceptable nature of inter-state boundaries. Almost all these boundaries were inherited from the colonial epoch, and at times were the outcomes of negotiations and agreements between the colonial masters, decided upon in Europe, with the support of poor maps, and with scant attention to African peoples. At independence, most African governments shied away from making changes even if they were able to make such changes. This however would have been difficult as they did not all reach simultaneously. As a result the existing state structures are inconsistent with the people's aspirations for cultural identity, autonomy, economic democracy and self-determination as different 'nationalities' find themselves co-existing with the contemporary states. Hence, it is easy for dissidents of one state to be at times harboured, in neighbouring countries, and with guerrillas armed and trained. This outcome is itself a cause of both internal and inter-state conflicts.

2.6. Ethnicity as a cause of conflict

Ethnicity is one of the significant reasons for African conflicts, and it keeps on being so. The formation of new nation states at the time of independence was joined by pressing

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and genuine calls for nation building by the new African leaders who were very much aware of the trouble in rising above African ethnic and regional loyalties. One of the issues was that the European idea of a country was exported to Africa.

Stephen McCarthy's meaning of a country as 'a complex web of regular social, social and economic interests among individuals, prompting a feeling that what they experience basic is more prominent than their territorial, tribal or other contrasts' just reflects characteristics which numerous African states did not have, but ought to have. There have been various separatist movements causing attempted secessions, for example, Katanga in Zaire, Biafra in Nigeria, and others in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.

Military coups in Africa have regularly been brought on by ethnic contention, and additionally individual driven competition. For example, Idi Amin's coup in Uganda in 1971, essentially created by between ethnic competition among driving army officers, and by ethnic feelings of disdain against the common head of state. Idi Amin was, accordingly, ready to select troopers exceptionally devoted to him from over the northern outskirt, from the Sudan, for his own Kakwa tribe had been split in to two by the colonial border.

2.7. Historical perspective on the Sudan conflict

The north-south conflict has been to a great extent executed by race over political control or power, social personality, land, water and regular assets. However other key structural components hidden in the clash incorporate Sudan's fragmented methodology

of state building, administration by a first class, and endeavour endeavours at national character fabricating around Arabic society and Islam in a multicultural and religious nation (el-Battahni, 2006; Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003).

Adding to these, the progress in economic change in the 1970s conflicted with more customary methods for living. Pushed by urban elites, modernization in rustic areas included, in addition to everything else, the abrogation of customary area rights and the traditional systems of local organizations for the acknowledgment of large scale activities of mechanized agriculture. The merging of state building, character legislative issues, and modernization cultivated genuine minimization thus extending the threats among different people groups of Sudan (Matus, 2006; Ylönen, 2008).

Amid the 1940s and 1950s, there was an Arabic nationalist movement that rose in Sudan and therefore turned into the fundamental questioner for the British Government's arrangements on autonomy (Johnson, 2004, p. 27). In 1956, Sudan saw itself being made an Arabic state despite the fact that the nation was a multicultural connection in the middle of Africa and the Middle East. As an issue just 30 for every penny of the Sudanese populace distinguished themselves as having an Arabic character. Then again substantial parts of the south were prevalently Christian in religious conviction (Jok, 2007, p. 5). Post-autonomy legislative issues in Sudan were led through an arrangement of tribe and religious systems, which was driving an inexorably one-sided radical Islamic project. The political flimsiness that came as an issue was just an impression of interior debate between Arabin elites and was checked

by military overthrows in 1958, 1969, and 1989 (Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003, pp. 112-114).

After the 1989 coup, Sudan was represented by the National Islamic Front (NIF) and its President, Omer Hassan al-Bashir. The NIF, together with its successor association the National Congress Party (NCP), got its might from its impact especially over the Islamic keeping money framework and its control of Sudan's economy and military. Furthermore, the NCP kept control of a significant number of well-trained cadres and coordinators that continuously suppressed developing political opposition and as a result created what is known as a politico-economic elite.

The NCP's financial plan likewise had a directing result on its Islamic introduction, especially when oil legislative issues had turned into the first need of the Government of Sudan. By and by, vital divisions stayed over the openness of the nation's political framework and social liberties, prompting ejection of Hassan al-Turabi and the production of the Popular National Congress (ICG, 2002, pp. 33-36).

The Southern People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was shaped under the umbrella of expanding levels of disappointment with the administration of Sudan. Headed by John Garang de Mabior, the SPLM/A needed to first take lessons from mistakes by rebel groups that have existed before in Sudan countering terrible association, supply issues, restricted financing, and insufficient preparing. SPLM/A however appreciated and got support from Ethiopia (until the fall of Mengistu in 1991), Eritrea, and Uganda (Johnson, 1998, p. 54).

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Like whatever other renegade gathering in Africa the SPLM/A endured an arrangement of divisions in the early 1990s and it was just in the year 2001 that it was it conceivable to unite the different administrators under Garang's initiative (ICG, 2002, p. 47).However after the demise of Garang in a shocking helicopter crash in 2005, there was an expansion of divided military. This was mostly as a result of the reason that a few officers departed from the SPLM/A to structure their own particular gatherings (SAS, 2007:320-326).

The armed clash in the middle of northern and southern Sudan was joined by eight covering peace activities somewhere around 1972 and 2005, including no less than 25 intervened talks (Simmons and Dixon, 2006, p. 17; Simon, 2006, p. 70). These activities were determined by the key hobbies of Sudan's neighbouring states, where the clashing gatherings were on occasion deftly controlled as a major aspect of extra political or military destinations (ICG, 2002, pp. 153-154).

The principal local skeleton was made in 1986 with the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). The IGADD was established by the following states Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda; (El-Affendi, 2001, p. 582).The IGADD additionally reflected the wish of the administrations to bring a stop to real calamities that could potentially debilitate its administration security. Up until the year 1989, the IGADD stayed deadlocked. Following the of the 1989 coup in Sudan, both Nigeria and the United States got to be included in the circumstances. Consequently various gatherings among groups or parties were held, which as an issue

prompted a recharged exertion for peace, now in the motivation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The IGAD was however a regionally found organ with a particular agenda to address political, monetary, advancement, and trade and also security issues. Essentially this approach led to the 1994 Declaration of Principles. Then again, in the accompanying year the deadlock continued, having negative results from the crumbling of relations amongst Sudan and its neighbours, and also the negative of the IGAD as an issue stage against Khartoum (El-Affendi, 2001, pp. 586-587).

In the year 2002, the IGAD circumstance had its revitalisation with the arrangement of Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo to head the intervention between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. In addition to this is that the process by IGAD received international support from countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway. The European Union did not give a verbal sort of help yet guaranteed financing for the peace process (Simmons and Dixon, 2006, p. 27).

Over a period of about four years, the IGAD at last prompted various interceded talks in Kenya (Nairobi, Karen,nakuru, Nanyuki, and Naivasha), which obviously in their aggregate prompted the marking of the thorough peace understanding (CPA) January 2005.This short breakdown of peace-production underlines that there has been a history of around 20 years of peace intervention in Sudan. The stage paving the way to the marking of CPA got its advantages from the cumulated encounters of past peace courses of action arrived at. All agents from both northern and Southern Sudan luckily or lamentably had been included in different past peace transactions and brought their

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experience to the table. It is accordingly critical to recognize that the issues on the table that included among others determination toward oneself, the relationship in the middle of state and religion, influences and riches offering, and security game plans had formerly been of examination in arrangements and the unique or separate positions of the gatherings were known (Morrison and de Waal, 2005, p. 170).

Consequently, the said arrangements started from a generally composed edge and the main test for the middle people was just to secure a shared opinion on the primary standards hidden to the definite plans in the conventions (Martin, 2006, pp. 139-140).

2.8. The conflict in Sudan

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan was however seen as a landmark for the settlement of Africa's longest civil wars between the Government of Sudan (Gos) and the Sudan people's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It likewise included agreements for a short-term period from 2005 to 2011 on imperative issues, for example, security, riches imparting, power sharing, and on the status of the three districts of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. It additionally seeks to bring an end to Sudan's other or probably on-going clashes. However vital future steps for building any practicality of peace in Sudan included arrangements for 2009 decisions and a foundation of submission addressing the future status of Southern Sudan in the year 2011.The IGAD process has so far been modelled as an endeavour to devise a structure for riches imparting amid a peace process. What is more is that it did not just set up an asset offering recipe, yet it likewise planned various vital foundations to deal with the relationship between the Government of the Republic of Sudan in the north

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(alluded to from now on as northern Sudan) and the Southern Sudan amid this interval period.

The CPA is, as a result, thought to be a positive case illustration, and the beginning stage, for the development of some functional lessons for peace process administration in Sudan and Africa in particular. The principle findings in this respect are:

- The vicinity of oil encouraged engagement in an arranged peace settlement because of the way that the vicinity of regular assets changed the motivation structure of savagery.

- The Sudan case demonstrates that capital-concentrated, non-lootable regular assets can give a chance to peace forms on the grounds that their commercialization relies on upon a certain level of security.

- Wealth offering transactions just unfolded after an assention had been arrived at on the crucial standards on self-determination, state and religion, and security.

- Although an essential element in the clash, particular talk of oil assets relied on upon the advancement of a shared seeing between the groups on these bigger incompatibilities.

- An arrangement on asset sharing was encouraged by permitting exchange offs in a solitary content report; the key utilization of asset persons; a trade- off between Obligation administration commitments and financial improvement needs; and changes in the instalment modalities for oil trades.

- The decoupling of assets possession and administration subsequently kept an early fall of the riches imparting transactions.

However the effect of the asset imparting process on post-clash period was decreased by usage connected with the restricted or absence of trust between the gatherings, straightforwardness in the abuse of oil, and ability to actualize the understanding. Other exacerbating variables included deferments in guaranteed improvement support, and an unfavourable setting characterized by militarization and the advancement of new clashes in different parts of Sudan. The declining stores of amazing oil wells in the south represent a test to the future reasonability of an autonomous condition of Southern Sudan. Exertions ought to consequently be put on creating Southern Sudan's non-oil economy and reclassifying Sudan's focal point fringe relations. Delaying the choice may be a common sense system to fortifying riches imparting understandings and the numerous on-going peace forms in Sudan past 2011.Together with studies on Nepal and Indonesia (Aceh), this research's endeavour is a piece of a bigger extensions that endeavours to create a confirmation base on the administration of financial issues

2.9.   Ethnicity as a cause and solution to conflicts in Africa

While trying to dissect conflicts in Africa, most conflict specialists consider ethnicity as one of the real reasons for conflict in Africa. However a couple of conflict scholars consider it as being instrumental for durable peace. Past and current predicaments in Africa like the Rwandan genocide, the crisis in Darfur, the wars in Nigeria, the fights between the whites and blacks in Zimbabwe or Tutsi and different Rwandophones in Eastern in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) show proof of the part that ethnicity plays as a major cause of conflict in a few parts of Africa. This section of the research work attempts to clarify why this is the situation; how this circumstance developed from

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colonial times to after independence and which are the fruitful stories of stable African multi-ethnic states.

As a matter of first importance, what is ethnicity and what does it mean inside the casing of a State? An ethnic gathering is a gathering of individuals whose parts relate to one another through a shared heritage, joint language, culture, religion, philosophy or geopolitics. Ethnicity is an identity and as a result, it definitely involves an incredible space inside the political coliseum furthermore it is the simplest and most regular path for individuals to assemble around fundamental human needs, for example, security, sustenance, shelter, monetary prosperity, inequality, land appropriation, self-sufficiency, and distinguishment. This is the reason ethnicity is an effective impetus of violence. (Sebastien Porter: 2011)

In Africa, countries are territories whose borders were drawn falsely at the Berlin Conference in 1885 by colonial forces to fit their financial accommodations. In the pre-colonial period, African groups emulated the regular methodology of ethnicisation with covering and exchange personalities with huge development of people groups, blending of groups and societal and linguistic borrowing. The Africa experienced by European colonizers in the nineteenth century was multi-ethnic with diverse manifestations of directing toward oneself. The colonial forces pulverized those aged African social orders with servitude. In the wake of guaranteeing landownership, the colonial forces characterized, ordered, numbered and mapped African ethnic groups to make regulatory units to encourage better political and institutional control.

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Colonization likewise made disparities between ethnic groups focused around the way and level of inclusion in the colonial political economy. This "decentralized tyranny" implied the utilization of cultural and tribal leaders through disparaging connections where their steadfastness was remunerated through access to assets controlled by the colonial forces. These wellsprings of riches and influence were dispersed unevenly and allowed colonial powers to create their authenticity through the technique of separation and tenet. The effect of these arrangements was a new cleavage of class intensifying existing inside contrasts of sexual orientation, generation and client hood. Power was given to some at the cost of others making disappointment and rivalry.The broad utilization of benefactor customer's arrangements left little premise for the improvement of advanced states. Regardless of the fact that we attempt to make speculations, one must comprehend that the African experience of colonialism differed through- out the continent. (Sebastien Porter : 2011)

In the first decade of the granting of independence up to the end of the 1970s, the political talk was about nation building, development and nationalism. This did not last long in most sub-Saharan African countries. Colonial patron client's connections remained a current political practice. The absence of administration experience and political development of the new African leaders was clearly because of the absence of arrangement colonial controls before and amid the decolonization process. An outcome of this neo-patrimonial framework is the production of single party political frameworks to offer a "national" ground where dissemination of assets between ethnic groups could be decided between the leaders of different groups, without needing to organize public supporters.

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Likewise, competition for power was high. Factually until 1991, 59, 4 % of the 485 post-colonial African heads of states were either murdered, put in prison or compelled to outcast. The cost of the neo-patrimonial framework is high on the grounds that the State device gets burrowed out from assets and serves individual enhancement. Its authoritative capacity is definitely diminished and along these lines is its scope to its own particular populace. Hence, state leaders saw this framework as the most ideal approach to hold control. When other ethnic groups couldn't be influenced; ethnicity was used to denounce them as scapegoats it was also used to distract public opinion from important issues. Samples are various and include the discharging of well off Indians and Pakistanis by President Idi Amin Dada in Uganda or the endeavour of previous President of Zambia Chiluba to bar his forebearer Kenneth Kaunda from political challenge on grounds that his parents were from Malawi. Additionally, the continuous issue of Rwandophones (Hutu and Tutsi) in Eastern DRC is worth specifying. Emulating an interesting divide and conquer strategy; Mobutu declined Tutsi Congolese nationality and utilized them as scapegoats to reinforce his administration that was losing strength in the early 1990s. It worked on the grounds that amid that time violence erupted between ethnic groups in eastern DRC. The second Congo war (1998-2003) in spite of the fact that it has been ended up being a war of natural assets predation, it was ethnically incited. (Sebastien Porter, 2011)

In Rwanda, for instance, power has dependably been ethnically focused, somewhere around 1959 and 1962, there is record of ethnic savagery in the middle of Hutu and Tutsi. The Hutu-headed political powers succeeded to ending the Tutsi rule in 1961 Hutu powers utilized each one assaults as a reason to fortify their power by slaughtering

Tutsi people, bringing on a wave of Tutsi exiles into neighbouring countries. In 1990, the Tutsis in exile chose to return home forcefully and this war ended in 1994 with genocide of the Tutsi and remarkable slaughter of Hutus in striking backed by the recently Tutsi administration in Rwanda. In 1947, Nigeria was partitioned into three political districts including the three primary ethnic groups: the North with the Hausa-Fulani, the West with the Yoruba lastly the East with the Ibos.

As the Nigeria moved towards independence, its conflict was lessened to the mission for ethnic predominance with minority groups revolting and battling for ethnic strength. At this point, ethnic and sub-ethnic loyalties undermined the survival of both East and West, while the North was religiously separated in the middle into Christianity and Islam. It was a time of politicized ethnicity and rivalry for assets which compounded the connections between ethnic groups. There was a high level of defilement, nepotism and tribalism. Military intercession built up and finally finished in the abhorrent ethnic war from 1967 to 1970 including the Hausa-Fulani and the Eastern Ibos (Biafrans) and the Yoruba and Hausa, the minorities of the oil creating conditions of the South .One must realize that the ascent of ethnic clashes in Africa reacts additionally to outer impact that some portray as neo-imperialism. All through the Cold War, numerous African pioneers were indiscriminately helped and this provided for them an aggregate freedom to oversee ethnic contrasts as they needed to, and frequently in violence. In the '80s, the States' abilities to give social administrations debilitated further more. It was underweighting by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) changes and the loss of open incomes which prompted more predation for the leaders.

In this disorderly setting and with the Cold War, ethnically-based developments began testing the state for successful control.

At the start of the 1990's, a wave of democratization hit Africa. Prevalent dissents and remote weights pressed tyrant administrations for political changes and multi-party races. Western forces and monetary foundations, frightened at the rot of African states, pushed for better administration and the executions of neo-liberal changes. The end of the Cold War additionally connoted the end of backing to tyrant administrations. Yet before the end of the 1990s, notwithstanding, the tide of democratization was ebbing and many governments were receding back into semi- democracies and a reassertion of elite control revealed serious limits of the process (Sebastien Porter 2011)

Really, the opposition between ethnically based support systems for access to state assets and force was increased by open appointive rivalry and was presently done through races. Votes were currently traded for a political position and expected redistribution of material advantages. Moreover, the significant utilization of dominant part races in Africa has a tendency to upgrade this quality. The little variety in philosophy or program between parties' leaves little yet their ethnic base for legislators to engage. Politicizing and bungling the rich ethnic African differences keeps on being one of the reasons for political crises and is frequently trailed by ethnic wars. In a state where awareness of patriotism is powerless and ethnic uprisings win, just majority rules system is an alternative to bring unity (Sebastien Porter, 2011).

2.10.1. African colonial borders created by Europeans

Over the earlier decade four of these specific nations (Mali, Niger, Sudan and Chad) have candidly encountered uprisings or common wars battled overwhelmingly inside ethnic or racial divisions. However this is not expecting to propose that ethnicity and race are inexorably the main driver of such clashes and that the racial clash was unavoidable. Be it as it may the part that ethnicity and race had played cannot be released either.

The ethnic and racial contempt that exists are genuine and distinctively clear to any individual who has spent time in the region. These wars have happened for various standard reasons being governmental issues, assets, religion and history, yet it was clear that ethnicity and race were deciding elements when local people picked which side to battle for. Sudan then again battled two civil wars between the Arab-commanded north and the black African south, the latest structure being between 1983-2005 came about into the sway and later the autonomy of South Sudan in 2011. The Sudanese Civil War however had overflowed into Chad from 2005-2010.For the most part an intermediary war in the middle of Sudan and South Sudan utilizing the exceptionally same ethnic guerrillas from the Sudanese Civil War.

Sudan and South Sudan were shockingly at the edge of war after simply a year of detachment. They were battling over demarcation of boundaries and oil incomes. What is more these sides are utilizing intermediary revolutionary strengths and Sudan has utilized air strikes against specific parts of South Sudan. If history shows anything, the violence will slowly but surely spill over Chad as rebels groups conduct cross border

raids. On the other hand it is also likely that Uganda can assist militarily and fight on the side of south Sudan if necessary.

2.10.2. The problem with resolving ethnic conflicts in Contemporary Africa

In the previous decades and moving towards about 50% of a century, our African social orders and the creating country states have been through troublesome times as to ethnic clashes and oppositions. However this does not mean to say that clashes did not exist preceding this age. The history and oral tradition of most African social orders have in them some certain components of clashes and ethnic clashes, and intra ethnic clash circumstances. Furthermore the issue that displays itself in the contemporary African social orders is the seriousness and nature of these ethnic issues. These ethnic clashes have really showed themselves into distinctive shapes and measurements which now and again differ from those of the pre-colonial period. Most African researchers have sent contentions that in as much as ethnic clashes in Africa proclaimed the appearance of colonialists; the problem is surely propagated and influenced by the colonial regulatory frameworks in their colonies. Basic examination concerning structures and reasons for these clashes in the contemporary Africa are of vital imperativeness meaning a fitting administration of the circumstances. What is consistently recommended by numerous researchers and experts now is really not a prompt or absolute annihilation of the said issue which appears inconceivable; but to present a better option to be adopted remains the answer to the problem. This turns into the circumstances on the grounds that the current ways and method for overseeing and treatment of the ethnic clashes in Africa have not delivered much enduring results. It is

against this backdrop to come to a conclusion that it is apparent that there has been a constancy of ethnic clashes coming about into the obliteration of lives, property and traditional powers and obviously establishments in Africa. (Emeka &Obioha: 2005).

A perfunctory look uncovers that in excess of two thirds of the developing African country states have experienced or are experiencing genuine ethnic clashes. With reference to the work or Ikeazor (1996) Nigeria, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Ghana, South Africa, Rwanda, to say however a couple among others have been diminished to theatres of clashes and ethnic battles. These battles might not have an unequivocal end if nothing dire is carried out to spare the appalling circumstance. In light of the last position, the imply of this work is to look at the structures, roots, costs and the determination stratagems of ethnic clashes in contemporary African social orders. This will purposively concentrate on the deficits of the administration methods set up and the suggestion of African options in such circumstances.

2.10.3. Structures and nature of ethnic clashes Africa

There are diverse sorts of ethnic clashes in the current African country states or African social orders. Clashes can be characterized to either war of words or war. Clash can start from the purpose of unimportant contradiction to a point where open roughness gets to be inexorable and a ceaseless threatening environment is sustained. On a very much alike level, ethnic clashes can be ordered in various ways (Osaghae 1993)

- there may be a refinement between open domain ethnicity which have the association of clashes that are identified with the determination of who gets what,

when and how he gets it, and a more private domain ethnicity that may not welcome state intercession (Osaghae 1994). In association with the above however what acquires most in Africa is general society domain ethnicity. This may part of the way be a result of the restricted advancement especially of the private area in the vast majority of our African social orders, despite the fact that ethnicity in the two domains is recursive (Rahushka and Sheplse. 1972).

- An inter-change estimation in the categorisation of ethnic conflicts in Africa separate from the informative delineation of masses above is beyond any doubt the level of appearance. On this particular level, ethnic conflict may and can be latent or manifest. The dormant structures are seen as those that are tranquil in their propensity. Notwithstanding the way that they help towards obliteration they can incite sporadic unpleasantness, they are verifiably grievances and concealed unnerves. This war is called cool war in the overall political coliseum. In this condition there are natural disdain among ethnic get-togethers and enclaves (Osaghae, 1994).

Ethnic clashes are not so much or rather constantly savage. In a more regular or typical sensation clashes are peaceful and they happen as a feature of ordinary life. By and large, they are underground or inactive and may not be seen with an exposed eye or rather be clear to the spectator. Subsequently peaceful ethnic clashes may be alluded to as common, ethnic clash which can rise in a type of focused gathering governmental issues, legal change, media challenges, and much of the time quiet shows. On the other hand of this situation is the vicious clashes which speak to one and only compelling of a continuum.

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The end of channels of statement and government's disappointment to react or rather a negative reaction by government to issues can prompt a clash taking a brutal structure. (Osaghae: 1994).

The structures and nature of ethnic clashes as portrayed above are fascinatingly classified as interethnic clashes. All things considered the level of indication, or whether individuals that are immediate members are private or open domain, the element that is fundamental however their orientation is on entomb ethnicity. This as an issue bringing the consideration of this exploration to the issue of inter-ethnic brutality in the African continent. In a real actuality the history and pictures depicted by the ethnic clashes in Africa that has been promoted is one of ethnic gatherings shredding themselves and neglecting to achieve concurrence on essential matters.

The inter-ethnic brutality which term "ethnic genocidal wars that keep on ejecting over area and different matters of simply local nature in ZagonKataf / Hausa conflict Tiv / jukun conflict, and Ibo / Annang conflict in Nigeria, Konkomba / Narumba conflict and Nawauri / Gonga conflict in Ghana and Topose and Dongiro (Southern Sudanese groups) Kokuro Mayatta conflict in Kenya have been cited as classical cases of ethnic violence. On the other hand, civil wars in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, Angola, Rwanda, Sudan and Mozambique indicate the ethnic scourge perspectives" (Agyeman :1992).

There are, additionally, occasions of intra ethnic brutality in Africa, such among the Modakeke/ Ife in Nigeria to say yet one sample. It is huge that intra ethnic clashes wherever they happen may be rough however not precisely tantamount to what gets in

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the interethnic clashes. One of the explanations for this may be the vicinity of ethnic cognizance and tying elements which are practically nonexistence outside a specific ethnic enclave.

Ethnic clashes can likewise be ordered or sorted on the premise of their pervasiveness or consistency and power. In this respect, among African nations-states expresses the degree, force and recurrence of event of ethnic clash changes. For example, the issue of ethnicity and the forerunner issues is more clear in Nigeria, Cameroon, Uganda and Sudan than it is in Benin, Zimbabwe and Tanzania (Osaghae: 1994). Lately, ethnic conflicts are on the increase in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Mozambique, Zaire (Congo Democratic Republic) and Burundi. Having talked about the structures and nature of ethnic clashes in Africa, it is essential likewise to inspect the basic elements or reasons for these clash circumstances

2.10.4. Primary factors and causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa

While the issue of ethnic clash in Africa is getting to be true and wide spreading, there is however an essential need to study it from an anthropological cum chronicled point of view in respect to what may have been the key variables supporting the event of these clashes. Ethnic clashes may happen as an issue of a few variables that incorporates among others the structural ethnic cognizance, components of expansionism and unfortunate rivalries. Among these components, what is seen as the cardinal and crucial connection which offered climb to different matters that hastened ethnic contentions and clash circumstances in Africa is the colonialism component. An individual's cognizance of his/her ethnic inception or foundation is seen as an issue of sociological reality that is

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universal in nature. Ethnic cognizance may and ought to be characterized as that subliminal or cognizant identification with an individual's ethnic foundation. Such distinguishing proof may in some cases be unpretentious, unobtrusive, and generally unnoticed by others. Then again, it might be prominent and roughly harsh. Ethnic cognizance among individuals can be found in numerous multicultural social orders in shifting degrees, in clash or conjunction with different manifestations of awareness, for example, class, religious or national awareness (Ikeazor: 1996).

From this point of view, an incredible level of ethnic acknowledgment or unguarded ethnic cognizance can be the conclusion to genuine ethnic pressure and clash where two restricting thoughts or perspectives meet. Contingent upon the way of cognizance, national awareness can be an instrumental and a solid variable towards nation building. On the negative perspective however of which a large portion of most people are more worried about, ethnic cognizance might completely be divisive, and of parochial form. These undesirable types of awareness have, especially in their unconstrained structures, driven numerous countries into messes of blood draining strife and instability. Ethnic cognizance otherwise called tribalism in a few structures in Nigeria in its amazing level declined Uganda from one of Africa's most promising countries to one of the poorest. It is the same manifestation of cognizance among some South African blacks that is putting their nation's post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation future in danger. In 1994 around five hundred thousand Rwandans ladies, youngsters, men, old and youthful passed on, butchered by their countrymen devoured by the bitterest ethnic bias. (Ikeazor: 1996).

The ingredients of ethnic awareness have been contrarily bridled by the African rising unpatriotic leaders who typically count on ethnic assumptions and contentions for their egotistical closures. Ethnic awareness gives African leaders with stages to their ideological and ethically insufficient political positions. The ruling class keeping in mind the end goal to manage their position confound their different people groups with clash creating hypotheses and clarifications despite social and political inquiries confronting them. Ethnic clashes at times have been created as an issue of this solitary variable. In Nigeria case in point, the scene in the fifties amid the first republic at the Western House of Assembly, which denied the Easterner non-Yoruba part from turning into the first Premier of Western region built up and finally finished in a persevering ethnic clash among the two groups In spite of the fact that, as prior specified these clashes are not so much brutal, rather they are inactive and underground in nature (Ikeazor: 1996).

Separated from the ethnic awareness which is a greater amount of an ideological skeleton or foundation to ethnic clashes in Africa, there is the issue of colonialism, and westernization connections and circumstances that offered climb to and even advanced ethnic contention and clash in Africa. These incorporate the political structure, financial and social change of the conventional social orders to country states. They are basically the counterfeit manifestations of the provincial experts in their offer to catch Africa's feeling of solidarity. In any case, pilgrim organization in Nigeria made interlocking clashes circumstance through their example of organization or administration.

For Osaghae (1994) conflicts in Africa are both unavoidable and anticipated. This is not on the grounds that Africa is the bedrock of clashes, but since of its curious late history.

From the pre-colonial period through the colonial and post-pilgrim periods, Africa has been the focal point of various types of clashes. These clashes have needed to do, not just with diversions that are short lived or changeless, or more settled in than that anyplace else, yet engages that have had the ring of congruity amidst changes over the ages and over the times of African history.

What we have today is an indication of a recorded development that has made conflicts, unavoidable and crisis the significant gimmick of African circumstance. In the event that we periscope the actualities from the present, it would presumably be valid to say that what we are seeing in Africa today, whether in Liberia or Somalia, in Rwanda or South Africa or even in Nigeria, is really indication of the gigantic inconsistencies that exist on the African continent". African states are simulated manifestations and to an expansive degree inverse to the organismic hypothesis of state creation. The different sorted out and working countries were united in an unexpected way, broadened as they were before the provincial experience by the finesse of pilgrim powers which annihilated the conventional African political frameworks. Conventionally, when individuals with diverse cultures, assorted, varying financial conditions and political frameworks are united, clash is unavoidable among them".

Osaghae (1994) keeps on submitting that also, "the frontier creation did not simply end with the demonstration of state creation and inconvenience of qualities on the current social orders. The colonial experts proceeded to control, playing one gathering against the other so as to advance shared hostilities among African people. It could be valid to say that a portion of the showed clashes that we have in Africa today really go once

again to the starting or the colonial epoch and standard approaches. In Nigeria, case in point, Lord Lugard's colonial administration made and made utilization of quiet rulers where they were in presence and the warrant leaders where there are no substantive focal political framework, for example, among the Ibo's or the South Eastern Nigeria".

From the information gathered from history, the colonial masters are seen to have helped massively to what we encounter as relentless ethnic clashes in many parts of Northern Nigeria. There, amid colonialism the Hausa/ Fulani Emirs were forced on the non-Hausa Fulani ethnic countries. The leaders of these non-Hausa/ Fulani gatherings were made to languish colossally over any demonstration of insubordination to the misleadingly organized powers. It is the wistfulness of these occurrences that gave the simple ground to the Zangokataf/ Hausa clash in 1992. Essentially the utilization of ethnicity by the British colonial commanding voices in their divide and rule strategies left various undesirable legacies for the recently autonomous Nigeria in 1960.

Today, very few Nigerians will be mindful that the colonial powers presented isolated quarters known as Sabongari and Tudan Wada in a few Northern. Nigeria urban areas for "more bizarre" coming to settle from the south and different parts of Nigeria and the indigenes separately. (Ikeazor, 1996).

The segregated quarter's policy was one of numerous divisive plots brought forth by the colonial powers that favoured not to encourage close common relations between the different groups and ethnic gatherings of their Nigerian colony managed this inquiry broadly with specific reference to one interethnic uproar impelled in the Northern Nigeria by the pioneer authorities in Jos Plateau (Nnoli,1989).

An alternate central or root issue in ethnic clash in Africa is the multi ethnic component. Like ethnic cognizance, multi-ethnicity is a common setting inside which most African country states ended up. In spite of the fact that, the two related conditions have been horribly abused and misused by the colonial powers and the African nationalist leaders for their narrow minded agenda. This circumstance typically comes about to show conflictual condition where one or a couple of gatherings command as in Nigerian case. For this situation, the ethnic game is principally played among the lion's share gatherings beset by a dominant part mastery complex, while the minorities need to interminably battle for reasonable treatment (Osaghae, 1994).

The ethnic awareness, colonial administration and multi-ethnicity have been recognized and examined as the real root connections of ethnic conflicts in African states. Different variables that can be considered as quick and paramount components incorporate related social clashes, the character of ethnic requests and investment enunciation; the degree and authenticity of ethnicity and nature of administration; the harmony in the middle of financial and political control; the level of decentralization of government, structure, rivalry for rare assets, rivalry for state power, minority patriotism and social prevalence and burden (Osaghae 1994)

A few clashes in Africa today have been credited to profound ethnic request and interests verbalization. These requests when dispossessed by a dictator government typically offer climb to fierce clashes. This was the situation in Liberia, Ethiopia, Chad, Sudan and Rwanda. Indeed where the channels of ethnic battle and verbalization are genuine and open, fumble of the ethnicity variables might similarly prompt clash

circumstances. Case in point where the decision class pays lip service to ethnic interest other than those by their own ethnic groups (Osaghae,1994).

Control of economic and political force is yet an alternate wellspring of ceaseless clashes among ethnic groups in emergent African nation states. Correctly the extent of which groups that create the national riches have admittance to political influence or rejected from it may represent ethnic clashes in the country. Generally, where the riches creating ethnic gatherings feel conned or minimized in the plan of things, in compelling cases, it may prompt separatist inclinations. Like the above variable is the degree and centralization or decentralization and government structures and powers, while Barongo (1989) in his near study in the Nigeria and Uganda circumstance presumed that ethnic clashes have a tendency to be higher and more serious under an incorporated organization,

Wunsch and Olowu, (1990) on the other hand found that decentralization shows improvement over centralization of force. From this notes, alarm of dominance of one ethnic gathering by an alternate or others may prompt resistance moves if under centralized government. In the Nigerian case, alarm of ethnic domination prompted few ethnic clashes among the Ibo and Hausa ethnic groups in the mid-1960s. Particularly the presentation of the unitary arrangement of government and the cancelling of regional structures by the Aguiyiironsi administration accomplished fear of dominance among the Hausas who had to rely on savagery and ethnic battle against the Ibos.

In the monetary sense, assets are usually rare in relation to demand. Relatively, rivalry for scarce resources may be considered as one of the patent wellsprings of ethnic

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clashes in Africa. This is maybe the most typical clarification for ethnic clashes in the world (Osagha 1994).

As Nelson and Wolpe (1970) pointed out, in the context of Africa, the coordination of diverse groups through colonialism into a capitalist arrangement brought new and antagonistic ideas of development, and increased existing clashes and created new ones among different groups. In recent times, the inquest of ethnic minority right, have been annoying most African states. This issue in numerous states has prompted savage clashes at the astonishing case.

Basically in African states, with not very many exemptions, the minorities are generally underestimated and persecuted which is a consistent wellspring of their resistance to dominant groups. The minority patriotism may be in a form of resistance against the predominant language as an issue franca or a ques for fair dissemination of resources which are gotten from their domain as its the situation in Nigeria. Minority ethnic groups normally from the southern part of Nigeria have recently in the democratic change declared their entitlement to the administration. Their grievances have been that they are underestimated irrespective of the fact that they contribute towards the country's oil wealth. From this it can be deduced that ethnic conflict is normally inflated by either remote or what can be alluded to as root components and the quick settings. Typically any pronounced conflict circumstance would have taken a progression or a greater amount of the kinds officially examined.

2.10.5. Repercussions of ethnic conflicts in Africa

One of the noticeable after effects of happening ethnic battles and clashes in African has dependably been civil war case in example South Sudan clashes. Numerous countries however in Africa have really been drawn into the results of wars. Case in point in 1967, after a year-long bash of conflict and violence, Africa's most crowded country, Nigeria slid into a full scale civil war. Toward the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, over a million lay dead, bombed, shot or starved to death. The Congolese civil war then again broke out instantly before Nigeria had lessened the nation to shambles and left it with a standout amongst the most autocracies the continents had known when it was over. Proof of civil wars and wicked genocide are still clear in nations like Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Burundi to say yet a couple. In Rwanda, between a large portion of a million and a million individuals were butchered in a matter of months in center of 1994. "Their wrongdoing was that they originate from the wrong ethnic group" (Ikeazor, 1996).

This made Ikeazor (1996) to conclude that the fundamental subject in a large portion of the clashes in Africa is ethnic division or ethnicity. Inside the setting of civil wars which is the most declared result of ethnic clashes, different variables or connections have particularly been connected to ethnic clashes. These incorporate monetary, political and social issues. Economically, civil wars coming about because of ethnic strains and clashes normally plunge countries and nations into financial wreckage. Normally amid civil wars and brutality, property which is profoundly esteemed is wrecked. Houses are blazed, and some economic assets vandalized. Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and

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different nations that saw civil strife will confirm this. Different financial operations normally granulate to a stop, case in point, amid the Liberia civil war, their monetary creation ceased. Ethnic tension in Nigeria at present in the Niger Delta region has mostly incapacitated exploration of unrefined petroleum in that zone.

The ethnic strain between the Ijaws, the Itshekiris, and the Urhobos has generally affected the oil business in the area. In the process, economic setbacks are normally experienced.. The Liberian clash prompted expansive passing outcomes on the individuals. The clash additionally had different outcomes on soldiers, children and the elderly. Other social results of ethnic clashes incorporate absence of trust and partiality among the citizenry. These are a couple of the different outcomes of ethnic clash circumstances in Africa.

2.10.6. Intervention strategies in Africa

Because of the reality of the results of ethnic clashes it has turned into an issue of genuine consideration among African country states especially on how best to determine the clashes. At present, African country states have concocted approaches to ethnic clashes in their different areas. Such approaches however do not necessarily bring an end to the clashes but rather assist in management of the situation. Consequently, it is critical to look at a percentage of the refereeing techniques embraced in African states. These incorporate, the sacred means, conceding of local independence, inter-ethnic linkage, monetary deregulation and welfare programs.

Inter-ethnic linkages have been embraced with a specific end goal to cultivate better connections among individuals from diverse ethnic gatherings. In Nigeria for example a few approaches have been launched since autonomy in 1960. The unity schools were built to cater for students from all parts of the federation. In 1973, the General Gowon administration likewise presented the National Youth Service Corps Program. Comparable projects were presented in Kenya and Zimbabwe among other African nations.

In perspective of the constant ethnic pressure and alarm of domination, the national administration of Nigeria conceived a method for adapting to the circumstances through formation of nearby government regions with degrees of self-rule. Local independence subsequently activates a feeling of government toward oneself and diminishes alarm of domination. This is in the same posture that Barongo (1989) in asserting that decentralization as an issue of ethnic peace-making.

Most African nations have acquainted one manifestation of decentralization with nearby government or the other however the issue is the unwillingness of the focal government to let local localities get to be autonomous. In spite of the fact that, the level of independence is a vital piece of the constitutional provisions of the country. The constitutional provisions incorporate the central human rights which are universal. As a component of the management techniques, it is accepted that the surety of human rights is an essential for ethnic management, despite the fact that practice has demonstrated that this assurance is not sufficient (Osaghae 1994).

For example as Osaghae brought up, the idea of group rights battle emphasized noticeably in the move to the third republic in Nigeria, particularly from minorities groups who contended that it is the main path by which their marginalization can be overcome. Other issues that are a part of the constitutional provision incorporate, the government character guideline, the zoning or rotational equation for sharing of political and economic power (Livingstone 1952; 1956).

As opposed to this position, Slabbert and Welsh, (1979) said that constitutions are not sufficient conditions for the regulation of conflicts. They must be supplemented and underpinned by a surge of other formal and casual gadgets and foundations that concentrate specifically on the conflict. Repetitively, the current conflict resolution mechanism systems are westernized and un-indigenous. At the worse, armed conflicts and violence are overseen through arms. The example of Liberia and other African nations ring a bell. In these nations, the different ethnic clashes circumstances have been smothered by armed stratagems. However the issue is that these methods are impermanent and not sufficiently persevering to resolution the current clashes circumstances in African nations. Thus, ethnic clashes endure with an unforeseeable end (livingstone 1952; 1956).

2.10.7. Conflict resolution theory and practice

Lederach (1997) gives an indepth clarification that conflict resolution systems that get players in the conflict together are critical for a productive peace-building methodology. Nonetheless he further utilizes particular models that were utilized as a part of the conflict between the North and South Sudan. Furthermore gives a clarification that in

the event of conflict determination and peace building in Sudan, grassroots leaders from religious groups, chiefs, cattle camp leaders, sheikhs, and church leaders ought to be utilized as instrument to agent peace arrangements between the warring groups. This model succeeded in light of the fact that the groups that Lederach examined were militia groups from inside Southern Sudan. By and by, the conflict between North and South Sudan was a constant ethnic and religious persuaded and the warring groups or parties were in short of the aforementioned strategy as a remedy.

2.10.8. Conclusion

Application of the casual frameworks for ethnic conflict determination is to be sure what ought to be the primary area of concentration by the African nation states in their mission in determining ethnic differences. Such casual frameworks in the African connection may be incorporated as a feature of the determination program. The utilisation of local efforts is believed to be an instrumental and correct approach to ethnic conflict conditions (Edevbie1999).

The organisation of elders or community seniors and joint group designations which are an important part of African society are just sufficient in our present situation and difficulty. These methods however are sadly not by any means constitutional, they are not written down in the nation's constitution, and in any case, they may be basically instrumental and effective thus the research topic states: *African indigenous hermeneutics and problematisation in South Sudan of course.*

Diof (1990) contends that however these methodologies or non-constitutional arrangements are normally pragmatic, practical arrangements which by their nature may be hard to institutionalize, In the present administration of ethnic clashes in African states, it is essential to recognize that the western, formal arrangement of peace-making have not so much spared the circumstances. In occasions it has been connected, they have just gone about as administration rather that method for determining the conflicts thus the continuing in South Sudan.

The search for a lasting resolution mechanism is still relevant. Albeit, the current written works and perception, there are customary, indigenous, informal frameworks that have not yet been used in the present situation. There is then obviously a dire need to give another lease of life to those current frameworks for a more utilitarian and responsive society. Subsequently It is in this manner accepted that researchers in African issues and Africanists ought to focus on discovering answers for African ethnic emergency inside social standpoint instead of grasping the western standards that are essentially non-useful to the African circumstance, "African answer for an African issue". Consequently there is a major need to create consultative channels with the indigenous organizations looking for new approach to determining conflicts in Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

Historical perspective on the Sudan and south Sudan conflicts

3.1. Introduction

The Sudan is considered a microcosm of Africa in terms of its ethnic and religious diversity as well as its geography, which dictate multiple livelihoods and cultures. The competition between these distinct groups over land and other resources has always been a source of conflict, albeit manageable through traditional methods of conflict resolution. However, with the emergence of the nation state, the political system and the power struggle among the elites of different ethnic origins as well as the marginalization of certain groups have led to deeper divisions between these ethnic entities. After 50 years of war ended with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and the cession of South Sudan in July 2011, rather than going into an era of peace and stability Sudan entered a phase of more complex wars and violent conflicts. The new conflicts are now interstate between Sudan and South Sudan and intrastate within the two countries. Indeed, conflicts have emerged even at the local level in what can be described as intra-ethnic conflicts, emerging from within a tribe or one ethnic group (Gonmaa: 2013).

The approach of the international community in dealing with these conflicts is based on diplomacy and using the "carrot-and-stick" to shepherd the two countries into stopping hostilities or even referring some of the conflicts to courts of arbitration and negotiation led by regional and international personalities. If the final goal is to stop wars and

transform these countries into democratic states that respect human rights, equality, justice, and freedom, then paving the way for a system of governance that will eventually address these social grievances can only be done through a more diverse approach. The tendency of the United States and its allies to count on the existing regime in Khartoum to embark on serious reforms toward democracy and stability is illusive. It is even risky to adopt such a policy because it will threaten the very existence of the remaining Sudan as a united country.

Putting all the eggs in the current regime's bag is dangerous gambling. It is however very clear that the confirmed position of the U.S. and some officials from the west on Sudan is relying on the certainty that the stability of the country and the region is largely dependent on keeping the current regime in power. For an example the U.S. special envoy to Sudan Ambassador Lyman in an interview said, "frankly we do not want a regime change we want to see freedom and democracy in Sudan but not necessarily via Arab Spring." As a result this position received criticism on the ground that it has a potential of sending the wrong message and emboldening the Khartoum government as it continues aggression against its own people. Most of the Sudanese civil society organizations as well as other concerned parties have voiced their fears of the possible disintegration of Sudan and fears that the country is on the verge of collapse (Gonmaa:2013).

The Sudanese people accepted around then that if the socio-political conditions keeps on crumbling, as it was the situation, it is exceptionally likely that the representing government will lose control of the nation, prompting turmoil. Consequently Sudan being

now alluded to by most eyewitnesses as a failed state, hence the UNHCR reported that a circumstance that is just deteriorating with the new wars in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, which resulted about mass displacement and instability among the populaces of these territories. "South Sudan has by most accounts 200,000 exiles, including more than 170,000 in Unity and Upper Nile states." It is additionally however worth specifying that the agitator coalition known as Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), which united shockingly Darfur movements that were once broken into little factions, is now controlling 40 per cent of the international border separating South Sudan and Sudan, It is also reported that the regimes armed forces have recently been seriously defeated by the SRF. (Gonmaa:2013).

Adding salt to the wound, the regime further started a war with South Sudan, creating a dire situation in the border areas with regard to accessibility to basic consumer goods and other sources of livelihood. The regime declared an emergency situation along the border areas, blocking cross border trade between the inhabitants, and declared South Sudan an enemy state. All this stemmed from losing 70 per cent of the oil revenue after the secession of the South, doubled by South Sudan's halting of oil production. Darfur is still on fire, without any progress on the latest Doha agreements, and conflict and related crimes are still reported there on daily basis. The protests and demonstrations of last summer, which broke out in the capital city of Khartoum and many other places in the country due to the austerity measures declared by the government, are an indication of the complete failure of the Sudanese government's economic policies.

Despite the intervention by the UN that gave birth to the UN resolution 2046 that urges the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to push for settlement of the unresolved issues between them, to this day there are no prospects of implementing the agreement. Abyei however is a perfect a case in point: that the government is still using it as a bargaining chip whist on the other hand pretending to protect the Messeriya interest. This is evident considering that the Messeriya have never been engaged in any serious way to participate in deciding their position, hence there is a wide dissatisfaction among them on the manner in which the government is dealing with the issue. The bombardment of civilians inside the South Sudan territory on November 20 and 21, in addition to the recent foiled coup attempt lead by leading figures in the military and security apparatus of the regime, are strong evidence of serious cracks(Gonmaa:2013).

It has however got to be strikingly clear that the management and having a determination to the numerous and complex difficulties persevered by the populace of Sudan at this crossroads won't be acknowledged by changing the current administration. It would however be of high hazard to rely on this administration for the maintenance of security and solidarity in Sudan. This is a basic period to bring diverse Sudanese political associations, scholastics, agents of different districts, and ethnic groups to investigate conceivable option game plans to guarantee peace and security. They must receive and actualize devices and techniques for conflict determination and change to investigate and address conflicts at distinct levels, looking into all stake holders. This is basic so as to address the wellsprings of conflict and move to peace building and conflict transformation as an essential to solidness, thus having a political

body or structure that can fill the crevice and save the respectability and solidarity of Sudan(Gonmaa:2013).

3.1.2. The Darfur Massacre

The year 2005 was seen to be a definitive achievement required to secure an enduring peace in Sudan. A more positive methodology to Sudan's future by the international society by method of putting weight on the warring capacities had put a hang on the common war and despite the fact that the situation was greatly strained even in the year 2003 when the peace talks started, yet to a certain degree a quiet arrangement. However as the common war in the middle of north and south was moving towards what was thought to be a definitive conclusion, an alternate clash was preparing in the minimal known western share of Sudan. Today, because of the aggravating events that have occurred there over the few years, we know it as Darfur.

With the entire world concentrating on the CPA, little consideration was generally given to western Sudan, which had endured minimization and sporadic assaults under the administration for quite a long time. It ought to have been no astound that the looming emergency would witness unlawful acts similar to that of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, particularly considering the years of strain and doubt that made a gap between the administration and the ethnic-African Darfur individuals. Be that as it may, the community then again was centred around bringing all factions from the north and south together to bring an end to the war and as an issue gave careful consideration to Darfur, in spite of a few cautioning signs that an approaching emergency was going to end up known as the first genocide of the 21st century.

The exact date of the beginning of the war in Darfur was February 26, 2003, when a radical group called the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) launched an attack on the military central command of the Jebel Marra locale of Darfur. Be that as it may, the actual battling did not start until April 25, 2003, when a sequence of attacks by some militia resulted into a joint operation by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) against the government army installation at al-Fashir. As indicated by the government, when the renegades withdrew from the range, four Antonov aircraft and helicopter gunships were destroyed, the base's commander was also murdered, and in excess of one hundred fighters, pilots, and specialists were killed or taken as hostages. The rebel attack made a significant setback for the administration in the region, and gave the radicals a noteworthy vital point of interest in the quick range for that time being (Hackett: 2010).

As a result of the seriousness of the April 25th strikes by militia and the rebels groups winning conflict after engagement against the administration drives in the territory, the administration in Khartoum was briefly without an answer. Government forces were not prepared for far reaching desert battle and not used to battling off the effective attempt at manslaughter strategies of the agitators. The CPA was still two years from being signed and government troops were tied up in the southern areas and eastern Sudan. Before the end of 2003, the revolutionaries had won well in excess of 30 fights against government drives and were soon inside striking separation of significant towns, provincial capitals, and were setting their look on the close-by oil-rich Kurdufan district

of Sudan. On the off chance that the rebels seized this region from the administration, they would be inside striking separation of Khartoum, as well as would have the potential chance to unite with the becoming force of the southern dissident development, spelling fiasco for north Sudan and a certain end to the administration's energy (Kebbede:1997)

With the diminishing options to battle two civil wars simultaneously, the government needed to turn to an old strategy of equipping local people. For this situation the ethnic-Arab groups loyal to the government were employed, and further paying them in real money, military attires, and weapons, then sending them into the conflict area. This specific strategy however had been amazingly compelling in repulsing southern attacks amid the north/south civil war and made another test for southern troops. As the Darfur radicals proceeded with their fruitful revolt battle, the government reacted by utilizing the neighbourhood Darfur Arab tribes, now known as the Janjaweed, as its key counter-rebellion force. Through the following a few months, the Janjaweed, backed by armed components of the Sudanese government, led clearing seared earth battles crosswise over Darfur. Scattered reports of mass murder, assault, and ethnic purifying started to hole out of the district as the rebels were compelled to withdraw into safeguarding groups or communities that were devoted to them (Hackett 2010).

3.1.3. The absence of Multi-tasking in International Community

To this day, certain vital or key components of the CPA stay unimplemented because of the way that the international community has bungled in managing the two noteworthy emergency zones of Sudan, and the potential flashpoints for future emergencies, for

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example, Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and the minimal known Eastern Front. Eastern Sudan alone has an exasperating number of government troops conveyed to secure key segments of the oil business from Eastern Front radical gatherings (a few assessments state upwards of three times the measure of government drives in Darfur).This is an extensive part because of not viewing Sudan's conflict from a comprehensive viewpoint, prompting a failure at multi-tasking in problem administration and counteractive action in Sudan. After the signing of the CPA, the world turned its look to Darfur. Today, Darfur stays unresolved and widespread instability keeps on plaguing the region, exacerbated by recent government hostilities in the heart of Darfur at Jebel Marra. Then, between the north and south, a few key segments of the CPA including security changes stay unimplemented. As opposed to concentrating on Darfur and actualizing the CPA at the same time, the international community, basically under the supervision of the United States, failed by attempting to handle one problem at a time.

3.1.4. Lack of a Free and Secure Society

Since Bashir's administration seized power in 1989, it has however in the long run fizzled at bringing peace to Sudan. As opposed to ensuring Sudan's numerous wellsprings of national pride, including both solid Islamic and Christian legacies, Bashirs administration has picked the course of attempting to constrain Sudan to turn into a simply Muslim country inciting more conflicts as a result, much of the time it connected fierce strategies to attain such a country. This was however made clear amid the civil war between the north and south, dragging many Christians away to servitude in the

furthest north of the nation, constraining a large number of them into a religion they never had any plan of joining. Notwithstanding, the genuine drive for the failure of the administration to give a free and secure society for all Sudanese remains a hunger for power. While Bashir has utilized his administration to advance Islam, in both serene and savage ways, his making of an Islamic dictatorial single party state, concluded in 1993, demonstrates the administration's longing to stay in control and not be supplanted by free and reasonable decisions, uprisings, or armed force revolts.

This is most detectable in Darfur, which is overwhelmingly Muslim. The government never had a need to push the Muslim confidence into the region because of Islam effectively assuming a key part in ordinary life for a large number of the people in Darfur. The broad abominations submitted by the administration through the military and Janjaweed were done to ensure the administration's energy and control over Sudan. Bashir's administration just reacted to the dissident risk in Darfur when it was sure the agitators were turning into a significant danger to the legislature's power. The government's desire for power is presently clear in south Sudan also, however it was not from the get go. At the point when the civil wars between the north and south started, it was clear that religious and social contrasts were a main consideration. Today however, the government's broad utilization of arms shipments to supply distinctive ethnic groups in the south against each other has been to a great extent fruitful in keeping a significant part of the locals in a condition of humanitarian crisis Firstly, this could have all the earmarks of being a move to keep the south weaker than the government. Notwithstanding, an arrangement of quickly approaching key CPA due

dates, necessities, and occasions help clarify the explanation for the government's latest endeavours to keep up its solid position (Kebbede: 1997)

3.1.5. The manipulated National Elections.

The destabilization crusade of the south coupled with the rise of the administration's military operations in Darfur takes a swing at what could turn into the bloodiest expansion to Sudan's history. With national elections nearing, this was Bashir's opportunity to be accepted as democratically elected leader. Under normal elections and international circumstances, this would be adequate.

Nonetheless, Bashir has a global capture warrant collected against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for atrocities carried out in Darfur. On top of this, the court is rethinking adding charges of genocide to the warrant. There is additionally sufficient confirmation showing that the late national evaluation was intensely controlled by the administration, with a huge number of Darfur outcasts and Idps not enrolled. The polls, initially to be printed in a nation nonpartisan to the Sudan emergencies, rather are consistently printed in Khartoum, with the south expressing that a percentage of the tickets have as of now been openly appropriated in expert government territories. Wild instability in Darfur and parts of the southern territories will undoubtedly keep countless displaced people and Idps far from the surveys. Political suppression against restriction gatherings stays high, particularly for northern resistance parties. Additionally, certain southern political components under the SPLA's political arm have purportedly mistreated resistance at the neighbourhood levels of national decisions.

Other than the profound running control of the constituent process on the administration's part, the uncontrolled unreliability in Darfur is profoundly threatening towards free and reasonable races. Separated the unreliability, government enrolment of Darfur was unmistakably controlled by paying off nearby authorities, denying individuals sufficient time to enrol, and working intensely in remote regions to enlist bunches dedicated to the legislature. These exasperating activities have been further added to by numerous Idps and displaced people declining to enlist by and large, because of absence of trust in the administration. The evident outcomes of activities, for example, these for Sudan as an issue are self-evident, particularly in Darfur. The areas rebels rose up in 2003 because of minimization, and further underestimating Darfur will without a doubt make the circumstances in Darfur furthermore desperate. The world could witness a renewed effort on the part of Darfur, everywhere, including the universal diaspora, to help the agitators with expectations of getting their property, and through this, their lives back.

From the Jewish rebels against the Romans to the present day, history is loaded with samples of what happens when a legislature further underestimates a minimized social order. These controlled races accompany the high danger of heading Sudan into a condition of full-scale common war, whether it be in the middle of north and south, Darfur and Khartoum, or both. This potential danger for war could accompany a sticker much higher than the 2.5 million that have died in the south and in Darfur over the past a few years. Regardless of the fact that war is deflected, there is still the submission on southern autonomy soon a short time later, which conveys an alternate high danger of

war with it because of the apparently expanding craving of southerners to withdraw from whatever remains of Sudan.

Further exacerbating the outcomes of sham national decisions, a few restriction hopefuls have withdrawn from the appointive methodology. While Bashir would have won in any case, the volunteer withdrawal of such a large number of hopefuls leaves the few remaining rivals of Bashir with zero trusts of actually representing a minor test to his administration. Regardless of the fact that decisions were free and reasonable, the absence of any aggressive test made by such a variety of hopefuls declining to take an interest because of the control leaves Bashir as the main genuine hopeful. To say these races are free and reasonable would be like stating that the administration is not blameworthy of mass monstrosities. Because of the political situation and insecurity issues confronting both the South and Darfur, by acting proactively now, the international community can fight off looming calamity, conceivably spare a huge number of lives, and start to stroll in association with Sudan towards a protected, secure, and free society that values the multi-cosmopolitan, ethnic, and religious legacy of the whole nation(Kebbede:1997).

3.2.   Factors hindering the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan

3.2.1. Ethnicity as the source of conflict in South Sudan

There is an opportunity to stop South Sudan's slide into war and states disappointment, yet it must be seized inside days or it will be lost. This requires the leaders of South Sudan to move above limited, tribalistic, zero-total administrative issues and make a national framework. President Salva kiir and distinctive parts of the country's political

elite class in government and in his adversaries, inside South Sudan and in the diaspora must respond to this test now or be associated with unsurpassed as having deceived their kind. Nine years earlier, on Jan. 9, 2005, the Sudanese government and the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) denoted a critical peace accord that brought an end to more than 20 years of war amidst northern and southern Sudan. That assention completed in a summit, held from Jan. 9 to Jan. 15, 2011, in which the southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for determination toward oneself. Africa and the overall gathering regarded the new Republic of South Sudan, bright in that it would put this history of controversy and enduring behind it.

But the peace agreement on the other hand and the show of solidarity and independence masked various unhealed wounds. In the midst of those long years of common war, the South Sudanese were not united, and their divisions impacted into a shrewd internecine conflict in 1991 after SPLM officers tried the organization of Col. John Garang. The strife transformed into a tribal war, transcendently between ethnic Dinka and ethnic Nuer , including the slaughtering of normal individuals on both sides and mass starvation. The masses left significant scars. For the going with decade, pioneers of spots of love and common society and the worldwide society, including US. agents, grasped a watchful effort at "persons peace" among South Sudanese bunches. This task was lacking when the 2005 north-south peace understanding was arrived at. Amidst the euphoria of that peace and the aggregate recreation of the area harmed by clash, President Kiir, accepted control after Garang passed on in a helicopter crash in July 2005.

3.2.2. Unhealed wounds breaking South Sudan apart.

Two years in the wake of attaining independence, a political debate between President Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar emitted away from any confining influence. Kiir rejected Machar and the vast majority of his bureau. After two weeks, this question abruptly changed from a challenge over votes in the decision assemblages of the SPLM into a terrifyingly vicious tribal clash.

The pace and power of ethnic mobilization debilitated an expanding war and risked the very suitability of the South Sudanese state. African and international mediators were in a race against time to stem this tide. Once the political problem has plunged totally into a battle for public survival, foreign assistance was nowhere to be found. Ethiopia and Kenya, following up for sake of African countries, made key strides at a summit in Nairobi to attempt to stop further viciousness. They required a truce and for the privileges of 11 abnormal state political pioneers captured by the legislature to be regarded. They asserted the center African standards: no unlawful change in government and South Sudan must form a suitable state. President Kiir stays, yet he must negotiate. Halting the shooting is of importance. The arbiters ought not to be content with the patching together of the coalition that is leading and returning to business as usual in advance for planned 2015 electoral spoils.

A power sharing formula could get to be only one more division of the riches, and elections could get to be an alternate practice in ethnic division. For a really long time, South Sudan's leaders avoided their obligations by faulting their troubles for the war and severe arrangements of the administration in Khartoum. Presently, having joined the

club of countries, they must play by its rules. The United States, having given South Sudan the benefit of a doubt, threatens to withhold support if force is seized or held by power. That is truly right. Any political methodology must consider South Sudan's extraordinary and tormenting history. The greatest errand is a comprehensive national exchange on what it intends to be a country.

The political elites ought to listen to the intelligence of ministers and common society pioneers, who are demanding that the government officials come back to the way of dialog and recuperating. The street to a feasible state lies in national reconciliation. The elites have inherited vast natural riches and limitless worldwide great will taking after the notable choice, however they misused both. They passed into a society of defilement, arresting individual utilization and tribalistic political intrigues. They have not been kidding about democratization, organization building or even the most essential administration conveyance, which they have wanted to outsource to outside alleviation offices. African pioneers upheld by the United States and United Nations have made key strides to constraining South Sudan's pioneers to stop the war. Anyway the deeper obligation regarding making a South Sudanese country content with itself lies with the nation's pioneers

3.2.3. The Dangers of Tribalism in South Sudan

The violence in South Sudan proposes there could be more regrettable times to aim to get the nation. It will fuel the deep rooted inter and inter and intra-tribal tensions that have characterized the political scene in South Sudan since it picked up freedom in 2011. It could likewise make an outcast predicament for the nation's neighbours. The

progress of the initiative battle between President Salvakiir, a Dinka, and previous VP Riekmacher, a Nuer, colours legislative issues all through the nation, outlining the pervasiveness of political tribalism at the highest office.Following Kiir's dismissal of Machar and the whole bureau, not this attempted coups or its substantial concealment will have come as a surprise to the people in South Sudan. The view of Dinka command infesting not one or the other the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) nor the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) by other ethnic gatherings is not new. However it has ended up progressively stamped in a nation with a delicate economy, constrained open doors for business and profound established patrimonialism all through all levels of government (Bryce: 2013).

While there is a long-standing competition for force between the Dinka and Nuer, South Sudan's two biggest tribal groups, others, for example, the Equatorians, see both gatherings as monopolizing power. Tending to this apparent disparity inside the administration will be vital to move past political tribalism towards a comprehensive arrangement of government that ensures minority representation. Without this change, discontent and dissatisfactions inside the disappointed provincial groups that make up most of the populace are obligated to climb to the surface. While government strategies since autonomy have been mindful so as to utilize the dialect of inclusivity, the truth is altogether different. Jonglei, the biggest of South Sudan's ten states and home of the Nuer, has seen extreme battling between the Dinka, Nuer and Murle, for instance. In December 2011 tribal assaults and counterattacks in the middle of Nuer and Murle brought about no less than 1,000 passings. These pressures have been further bothered by the disappointment of the focal government to give even fundamental

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levels of nearby administration, exacerbated by systemic defilement and patrimonialism. The degree of defilement, and the administration's absence of control over it, was showed in 2012 when President Kiir issued a sort of mournful call to his legislature authorities to return stolen money (Bryce ,2013).

Government changes and enactment have stripped customary powers of their previous capacities and parts inside nearby society, without reintegrating them into new parts inside the administration device or giving reasonable choices. This has brought about conflicting and divergent frameworks of nearby administration all through South Sudan, helping existing impression of disparity. This is regularly thought to be focused around tribal elements, regardless of whether this is in fact the case. With strains giving off an impression of being unabated in the capital, Juba, and with the dry season approaching, which will encourage a more versatile populace, there is huge potential for security to decay further. Also it may not recuperate for quite a while. Displeased and minimized, the tribal populaces that have felt avoided from the political methodology, or on account of the Nuer, undermined in that process, may utilize the current political turbulence to bring matters to a head and test the power of South Sudan's heading figures.

An enduring clash in South Sudan would likely prompt further removal of individuals, which would put an expanded strain on host groups in neighbouring nations. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda as of now have a long history of tolerating exiles from the Sudanese common war. With the current streams of removed populaces from clashes in Somalia, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo be that as it

may, an extra convergence of South Sudanese displaced people would possibly overburden and destabilize the district further (Bryce ,2013).

3.2.4. Ethnic enclosing

It is a fact that the dynamics of armed violence in Juba and across over South Sudan have taken an ethnic dimension. The roughness has its causes in a stand-off between diverse factions of the presidential watchman. This issue line rapidly spread inside the military, as the battling over key areas in Juba pitched parts of the Dinka and Nuer ethnic gatherings against one another. Reports of focused killings and culprits selecting victimized people focused around their relationship with particular ethnic gatherings propose that refinements between companions, foes and separate battle procedures are presently generally educated by the framework of ethnic belonging. The rationale of violence now likewise informs the continued of brutality in Jonglei state, where armed youth have focused on regular citizens particularly focused around their ethnic character (as incidents in Akobo and Bor make clear.) The surrender of Peter Gadet, recognized as an ethnic Nuer, reports of preparation in Unity State propose that South Sudan is on the verge of civil war (Hirblinger& Simone 2013).

Ethnicity gives a lens through which power battles have been surrounded all through the majority of Southern Sudan's late history. Not minimum have view of prohibition and minimization from force and assets frequently been joined by ethnic scape-goating. The nearby linkages between ethnic belonging, armed clash and survival tightened amid the many years of civil war, including basically all ethnic groups. This militarization of ethnic identity got to be especially stark after the SPLA part in 1991 led by Riekmachar and

Lam Akol. In its repercussions, outfitted savagery between the two SPLA factions got to be progressively ethicized, prompting random focusing of regular people on both sides. As a result, ethnic personalities got to be more maintained and exclusive, and more significant for the customary South Sudanese, both inside and outside the military. Ethnicity matters in South Sudan not just through the immediate or circuitous reliance of military and volunteer armies on their military and political leaders. It matters in the procurement of assurance to the more extensive populace.

Given the formal state's shortcoming outside of South Sudan's urban focuses, most of the provincial populace keeps on understanding the procurement of insurance and security as an issue matter. Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, endeavours to change the security segment, to formalize and democratize the security contraption and to isolate the composed strengths from political initiative have created extremely constrained conclusions. This is most noticeable in poor focal control over the military, as showed by Peter Gadet's defection. It additionally took Riekmachar just several days (after the first emission of savagery) to claim control over the armed forces in Jonglei state. These diffusive elements have been joined by a surge of ethnic brutality against the Dinka populaces in Bor, though it must be noted that numerous assaults are done by powers not formally connected with the individuals who deserted from the SPLA. These motion propose a nearby connection between battles over political authority, the customized control over military utilized as a part of the last, and ethnic having a place (Hirblinger& Simone ,2013).

3.2.5. Ethnic disintegration

It is critical to note that the utilization of ethnicity as an issue of reference in the resurgent armed conflict remains as opposed to the substantially more unpretentious and complex part of communal belonging in South Sudan's ordinary political situation. Since the political move of 2005, the reinforcing of political organizations, and the vicinity of the state at the local levels of government, has made political elements in which ethnicity frequently assumes a significant part. Endeavours to make a decentralized arrangement of government focused around the principles of democracy have in numerous situations made tensions between diverse ethnic groups, which see access to government services and also political representation at the local levels of government as a rule through an ethnic lens.

These propensities have been exacerbated by late political changes which have given an unmistakable part to "customary" powers, which ought to give the linkage between nearby governments and ethnic groups. These change procedures and the journey for reinforcing the state in more inaccessible areas have prompted expanded ethnic fragmentation across the nation, a process through which territory became more strongly linked to notions of communal belonging. Be that as it may, the ethnic classes conjured in battles over access to state assets scarcely match the classifications summoned in the current armed conflict. Rather than in the broad terms, for example, Dinka versus Nuer, ethnicity matters more often than not in neighbourhood legislative issues. While these are regularly alluded to through ideas of "tribe" and 'area', the implications of such sections shift the nation over. What these littler sections have in like

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manner is that they do not attractively clarify the current political emergency (Hirblinger& Simone: 2013).

3.2.6. Accommodation related politics

In the national force battle, none of the conspicuous heroes has straightforwardly played the 'ethnic card'. The eruption of armed savagery is nearly connected to the political stand-off between President Salvakiir and other heading parts of the SPLM, including former members of parliament. The factions between the SPLM initiative had gotten to be open through a question and answer session on 6 December 2013 in which senior parts of the SPLM, including the previous Vice President Riekmachar, the previous SPLM secretary Pagan Amum, and additionally the dowager of the SPLM's departed leader John Garang, blamed President Kiir for "tyrannical propensities." They diagnosed "profound situated divisions inside the SPLM administration" and requested that party structures be improved to make conceivable "collective authority." These appeals stayed unaccounted for.

Key parts of the SPLM most noteworthy official organ, the Political Bureau, exited the National Liberation Council (NLC) meeting, because of what they portrayed as the absence of political dialog. It is striking that the requests made by the political restriction make no notice of ethnicity or "tribalism" in their conclusion of the late political moves by the administration. Rather, they scrutinized the fortifying of dictator inclinations, the absence of aggregate and democratic decision making mak and Salvakiir's becoming more influential. The evasion of ethnic surrounding out in the open talk concurs with political elements in which the significant heroes have effectively planned to advance

ethnic convenience and compromise since the CPA. Amid his position as Vice President, Riekmachar emphatically pushed the launch of a national recuperating and compromise process, and apologized to the Dinkabor group for the Bor killings sought after by his faction in 1991. Salvakiir's system of standard has been astoundingly comparable, going for ethnic settlement at the national level, as noticeable in the reshuffle of the national bureau in August 2013.

As a local of more noteworthy Bahr el Ghazal, the President guaranteed the solid representation of the Nuer from Upper Nile and other ethnic group from Equatoria regions through strategic positioning of regional delegates in the second and third most prestigious government positions, to be specific the Vice Presidency and the Speaker of the National Legislative Assembly. While a portion of the conspicuous political figures rejected by the President were ethnic Dinka, for example, the previous legislative leader of Lakes State Chol Thong Mayay, large portions of the new bureau parts fit in with other ethnic gatherings. What is by all accounts most important in the decision of new parts of the legislature is political dedication to the President and the adjusting between distinctive areas and ethnic groups nation over, with a specific end goal to accomplish inter-ethnic settlement or accommodation.

3.2.7. The Sardonicism of Non-tribalism

In their response to the late episodes, the political authority in both factions used an unequivocally all inclusive and hostile to tribalism talk. Parts of the SPLM initiative faithful to Kiir have as of late focused on that the armed savagery unleashed in South Sudan is not tribal. More fundamentally, president Kiir was cautioned around a

repetition of the 1991 Bor killing, expressing that his "legislature is not and won't permit the occurrences of 1991 to rehash themselves once more". Drawing on the memories of past ethnic clash, Kiir subsequently supported the military move made against parts of the SPLA and additionally the regular citizen populace through an unequivocally hostile to tribal dialect. In a similar vein Riek Machar has blamed Salvakiir for "actuating tribal and ethnic brutality".

The risk of ethnic clash is utilized by both sides as an issue to legitimize the crackdown on the charged culprits of viciousness. In the general population space, ethnic classes are not used to separate companions and adversaries. Rather, by blaming the particular opponents for impelling or conferring ethnic conflict, ethnicity however informs current measures of violence in a significantly more unpretentious way. Through the development of an existential risk threat in the enemies pernicious 'tribalism', both factions aim not just to mobilize for clash inside their bodies electorate, However to legitimize the utilization of force over international audience, progressively agonized over the conceivable results of ethnic clash in South Sudan (Hirblinger& Simone :2013)

CHAPTER FOUR

South Sudan peace process: A case of an African Indigenous hermeneutics and problemitisation.

4. Sudan Government and peace process

4 .1. Introduction

The word Sudan is used in ancient Arabic to symbolise all of Africa, Sudan denotes all those who have lived in the continent of Africa throughout the ages, transcending the days of Adams descent from Heaven to earth, as proved by Biblical and Quaranic statements. This back drop is critical in deepening the understanding of the prevailing political situation in Sudan today, given the historic political boundaries that were demarcated by condominium of Egypt –British colonisation on 1 January 1956.The country is presently identified as being multi ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious. In brief a relatively small continent of Africa, where all ethnic, linguistic and religious groups from the north, east, west and south melt down to form a rainbow image.

The culmination of this melting pot community was visibly manifested in the establishment of the first modern nation state in the history of the country in (1504-1820).It took the name of the black sultanate, which refers to the complexion of the people and asserting their Africanism and Sudanism. Sudan is historically recognised as being a tolerant and permissive nation, with regard to co-existence, when compared

to any country in out outside the African continent .The total number of tribes in Sudan is estimated to be 572,with the majority living in the south of the country(Talib :2004).

4.2. A Succinct history of the conflict in South Sudan

The Republic of South Sudan gained its Independence on 9 July 2011; the process thereof was a much anticipated completion of the 2005 peace understanding between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). The past five decades of non-stop, ruthless conflict took the lives of an estimated 2.5 million residents and as a result leaving the poor southerners 'with no hope for economic improvement, political consideration, delivery of basic services to the people and social peace. At that point in July 2011, with a portion of the most exceedingly terrible human improvement indicators in the world, the Republic of South Sudan was conceived. At this point leaders and the citizens knew that translating peace into prosperity was a overwhelming task for such newly born nation. Social and political cohesion could give a firm creation to state- and nation-building; however they are a long way from being assured in South Sudan.

The nation is a mixture of more than 60 ethnic groups, a hefty portion of which live in generally homogeneous, physically divided pockets. In the same way as other states on the African landmass, the way that such a various groups impart a typical destiny owes substantially more to the verifiable legacy of colonialism than it does to any feeling of imparted identity, dialect, religion or cultural practice. The unity of southerners has dependably been questionable, and in the post-independence time it is further

debilitated by the apparently inescapable rivalry for resources, political force and different riches of the state building methodology.

4.2.1. Historical perspective on the resolution of the conflict

Ronen (1999) submits that Sudan is a nation that is topographically and socially diverse as far as the accompanying: dialect, race, religion, and area. Sudan is an Arabic name signifying "the land where there are dark people" .it was given this name by the then Arab traders when they took haven in the nation amid a prior movement. Before the Arab traders' could arrive, the area was possessed by African Christians and traditional beliefs. The Arabs imperiously took control of the area, changed names, and even endeavoured to incorporate African societies with their own. This attitude all of a sudden started the conflict between African Christians, traditional beliefs and Arab muslims.

The nation Sudan, which is luckily one of the biggest nations in Africa and in the Arab world, celebrates dual membership, in Africa and the Middle East in view of social associations and geological area. The country is positioned in Northeast Africa and shares borders with nine countries. Sudan is known as assembly of Africans, Arabs, Christians, and Muslims. These different conventions ought to make the nation rich and tranquil, yet this hope has been precluded by the burden from claiming ethnic customs and religious convictions. This mandated created enmity among groups and brought about perpetual conflicts for nearly 51 years. The conflict started even before British colonials left Sudan in 1956.

4.2.2. Effects Colonialism in Sudan

Huge numbers of the current challenges in Africa and Sudan are followed back to colonialism; Africa is reviled with perpetual conflict, widespread corruption, and extreme destitution, which grew from provincial guideline. Zeleza and Nhema (2008) clarified that colonists improved African groups and favored certain ethnic elites who they trusted to run different nations' issues in their absentia. Amid the colonial period, colonists themslves worked nearly with elite politicians from certain ethnic groups who did not challenge colonial rule.

As indicated by Deng (1995) and Jok (2007), when the British settlers left Sudan, they gave the administration to Arab Muslim elites in light of the fact that they were more instructed than the Southern Sudanese around then. According to Deng (1995), British approach in Sudan made the Arab Muslims feel they had the chance to force their conventions on non-Arabs and non-Muslims.

The contemporary conflict is proceeding with this unfinished business from the misusing of colonial rule. The on-going catastrophes in Sudan are faulted fundamentally on lack of good management by the British colonialists (Nhema& Zeleza, 2008). It was British rules that separated Sudan into an Arab Muslim North and African Christian and Animist South. This division disregarded ethnic and religious convictions all through in Sudan. The British favoured Arab Muslims over African Christians and Animists, and relegated powers to the Arabs, who forced their "new form of colonialism" on Africans. Arabs called themselves superior and saw others as mediocre (Jok, 2001). This ethnocentrism

and pride made a force battle focused around ethnic identity and perpetuated conflicts all through Sudan.

The act of occupation, abuse, and enslavement prompted disengagement, contention, and hatred between ethnic groups. The divide and rule attitude of the colonialists made hostilities that still gap African people today. Rabie (1994:164) writes that "When the colonial forces understood that they needed to withdraw, they made sure that they transferred the helms of control to their companions and local agents". This created serious divisions between ethnic groups who attempted to force their customs on others and exploit resources. This new form of colonialism and exploitation is the same as that of the previous colonists and has created mass murdering of people in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and somewhere else. This form of favouritism prompted genocide in Rwanda, in the Tutsi and Hutu conflict (Bakwesegha, 2004).

This same approach prompted what has been called genocide in Darfur and unspeakable murders in Southern Sudan. Along these lines of colonial control in Africa have somewhat ended, however the divisions it made are blockades to peace and solidarity among the African people. These antagonisms however still proceed right up 'til today.

4.2.3. South Sudan calamity

South Sudan issue is indeed the issue of the SPLM as a political party, which was supposed to have been the issue of South Sudan in any case. In any case, as the SPLM is the overwhelming decision party in government, the issue has turned into a

South Sudan issue due to the part of the SPLM and rebellions from the SPLA that has happened to national concern. The issue began when voices started to grumble poor administration conveyance by the SPLM headed government. Instances of widespread defilement were additionally reported. As indicated by an assessment survey in Sudanic Magazine of March/April 2008 Vol. 1 Issue 2, the Government of Southern Sudan was seen as being very corrupt.

The problem reached a critical stage when there was a split in the SPLM leadership. This transpired because of inconsistencies in what the vision of SPLM was and what was really happening in practice on the ground. The inconsistencies appear to have been an excessive amount of to be attended so the SPLM authority was divided directly into two with one section as the SPLM in Government and the other SPLM in opposition.

The SPLA was likewise divided in unwaveringness. Some SPLA commanders and their men defected to the SPLM in Opposition with their resources. The part split was no more a SPLM issue yet a South Sudan issue that had dragged in the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in light of a legitimate concern for peace and stability in the region furthermore to maintain a strategic distance from a compassionate disaster in South Sudan.

4.2.4. Ethnic Identity conflict in Sudan and the South Sudan

In Sudan numerous sub-ethnic groups distinguish themselves as Arab and Muslim, while 60% sub-ethnic groups in Southern Sudan are Christian or Animist and proclaim

African persona. The conflict between African Christians and Arab Muslims in Sudan has been seen as animated by pathetic contemporary traditions (Deng, 1995). The traditions of Africa and Arab oddity have not been accommodated since the birth of Sudan. Deng (1995) thinks that Sudan is even now developing a national character. Individuals from East, North, and West Sudan call themselves Arabs. They may distinguish themselves just as being from the Middle East or Africa. Individuals from Blue Nile, Southern Sudan, and Southern Kordofan call themselves Africans. The conflict in Sudan was the same as different conflicts specified. One of the elements connected with the Sudan conflict has been ethnic persona contrasts (Deng, 1995; Jok, 2007; Olson & Rothman, 2001).

Dynamics included in these cultural shift include amongst others, ethnic character, geopolitical clashes, and problem of the Islamic religion. These systems have strained connections and blocked serene concurrence between African Christian and Animist groups in the South and Arab Muslim masses in the North (Jok, 2007) .This clash has been hard to resolve in light of the fact that the appeals of African ethnic groups were not met by the Arabs. These appeals were:

- to keep up their groups' identities;
- equal recognition and
- equal status with Arab Muslims (Deng, 1995; Jok, 2007).

This continued on the grounds that ethnic identity survived in each and every group and no group was eager to bargain. This absence of bargain made coexistence   less

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for quietness, adoring, and absolution. A few religious pioneers depend on confidence in battles for political and social flexibilities. Gopin (2003) gave samples of serene development through the religious sparks of Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Dalai Lama. As indicated by Gopin, insome places, religious leaders endeavour to advance unification between enemies. He gave a case of deliberations to make quiet concurrence in Israel by Jewish Rabbis and Muslim Sheikhs who proposed a religious peace arrangement. Despite the fact that this exertion did not accomplish durable peace, the methodology and demeanour of turning to religious conviction option uncovered conceivable outcomes for groups in violent clash to take part in peacemaking. Gopin has proposed eight recommendations that can be utilized to help concurrence through a religious lens. These are:

1. Perceive the conundrum of religious spurn and love, brutality, social values, and face the outcomes.

2. Rein in the harm of partialities and disdain exuding from the writings and conventions of arranged religion, and also from religious leaders and agents.

3. Comprehend the conundrums of hermeneutic variety with time and place

4. Comprehend the war inside every religion both in the traditional route and in the contemporary setting.

5. Find the peacemakers, and reinforce them inside and between groups.

6. Construct collusions of new hermeneutics, translations, and images to backing Co-existence.

7. Concentrate on deeds more than dialog, or make dialog dependent upon or intelligent with an administration of religious two-sided deeds.

8. Comprehend and utilize the communication of matters of trade and profit, intelligence research, power relations, and military reality, alongside religious patterns, to facilitate all the more viably mainstream and religious deliberations of peace, security, and improvement, (Gopin, 2003, p. 260).

Gopin (2001) clarified that religion, as "a method for recuperating human connections and comprehending human clashes," is an age-old practice that shows up in various religious customs (p. 87). Gopin recommended that religion was instrumental in reconciliation developments in South Africa, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Religious societies instruct teachers to pardon each other for submitting savagery or causing agony on others. Showing pardoning is a method for recuperating wounds and accommodating people or groups to live as cases of religious principle. Gopin clarified that forgiveness can take different structures.

Forgiveness can be "verbal acts and formal motions; admission, conciliatory sentiment, contrition, and affirmation of the past; an ability to endure discipline as a component of pardoning" (p.88). The serene teachings of religious confidence can now and again incite both negative and positive activities. Anyway conflict determination points of view have persuaded numerous that religion assumes the more prominent part in peacemaking.

4.2.7. Efforts for a solution

As highlighted above combined exertions to accommodate the contrasts between SPLM leaders that were backed by the nations of the region, international partners and the

African Union did not succeed. Before the end of November 2013 pressures between the SPLM in government and the SPLM in Opposition expanded. The SPLM in Opposition blamed the SPLM in Government for authoritarian propensities and unfair decisions.

The split in the SPLM authority created a savage encounter. In Juba on fifteenth December 2013 different components of the presidential guard began battling in their barracks. In any case, the SPLM in Government was fast to depict the battling as an endeavoured over throw of government executed by forces associated with the SPLM in Opposition. The SPLM in Opposition on its part denied any association in the asserted coup d'état. A delegation of the IGAD Council of Ministers underpinned by the UN and AU made a trip to Juba in a push to convince the groups to settle their disparities calmly. A second IGAD assignment headed by the President of Kenya and Prime Minister of Ethiopia went by Juba for the same reason as that of the first delegation.

The actions taken by the President of Kenya and Prime Minister of Ethiopia reached a state of perfection in the convening of Nairobi of an uncommon summit of IGAD member states where three special envoys to backing the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM in Opposition were named. The point was to empower the parties to reach in a comprehensive way, a determination to the conflict and to start a dialog by 31 December 2013

4.2.8. Problem continuing

Events took a vicious turn when extraordinary battling broke out on 15 December 2013. The issue between the SPLM in Government and the SPLM in Opposition is by all accounts persisting. The membership of SPLM is not the whole populace of South Sudan and the SPLM is only one single group among a lot of people in South Sudan. As opposed to depending on IGAD, the UN and the AU to resolve the parting in the SPLM, it is likewise essential for the populace of South Sudan to take a gander at themselves as an issue figure in determining the brutal clash that is destroying their nation. South Sudanese need to be self-reliant and confident.

No arrangement is to be forced without a comprehensive cooperation of all political parties, for an accord on the path forward to the greatest advantage of South Sudan as a nation however not so much in light of a legitimate concern for an individual grouping and the international society ought to observe this. The parting in the SPLM has brought about much ache to individuals of South Sudan. On the other hand, it appears that when South Sudanese are taking sides it perpetuates the conflict. There must be a shared opinion to intention on the issue. The shared opinion ought to be a dynamic temporary government. Accusing either side eagerly is not the path forward; however, looking for a shared view is in light of a legitimate concern for national solidarity.

4.2.9. South Sudanese indigenous interventions

The SPLM in Government and the SPLM in Opposition appear to be excessively closed minded and just seem to think about their authority's survival and power in the nation.

They are similar to two boxers in a ring everyone needs to win by all means. The two boxers don't see a win-win circumstance as an alternative however an all total of the rival for a grandness in the ring. South Sudan is draining with the individuals continuing untold hardships as opposed to appreciating the foods grown from the ground of their sharp battle for autonomy from Arab Islamic fanaticism and oppression in the old Sudan. Figuratively speaking, the populace of South Sudan appears to have been tossed from the griddle into the blaze.

The SPLM in Government and the SPLM in Opposition ought to be made intensely mindful that their combativeness is a flat out risk for all in South Sudan. Individuals require an authority brimming with certainty, to give and take, and be sufficiently definitive to bring the peace for which individuals are longing. A win-win circumstance for the SPLM in Government and the SPLM in Opposition is conceivable where a dynamic temporary government is going by technocrats of demonstrated trustworthiness however excluding both of the belligerents.

At the point when the November 1958 military administration of Ibrahim Aboud was toppled through a famous common disobedience, Sir el Khatim el Khalifa, an Educationist, headed the temporary government. Additionally, when the May 1969 military administration of Jaafer el Numeiri was toppled Djouzili Daffalla, a Medical Doctor, headed the temporary government.

Why is it so unnerving to permit South Sudanese technocrats, who may incorporate legislators of respectability, to head a temporary government as an issue notwithstanding unnecessary decimation of the nation? The combativeness in the Addis

Ababa peace talks could be brought about by the alarm in people who think they may face charges for wrongdoings submitted against mankind due to their apparent commitment to the bloodshed created by the awful split in the SPLM and the desertions from the SPLA.

It is with certainty however that the populace of South Sudan will acknowledge the offer of invulnerability for the on edge SPLM authorities as an exchange for them giving over force to technocrats to head a temporary government for the profit of all. This can be through a transaction with receptive outlooks and hearts. This in an indigenous and ingenious arrangement by the south Sudanese to the fierce clash and the anger the clash has produced. This is in place for security and stability to come back to their nation with least suspension for individuals to go about their everyday business with true serenity.

4.2.10. The failure of traditional conflict resolution and state organs

An entire scope of traditional and religious conflict determination instruments give method for conflict determination among South Sudan's different ethnic groups. This area delineates how in the past these systems have served to minimize conflict in Wanglei (and South Sudan all the more extensively), partially by managing proximate reasons for conflict and to some degree by relieving the danger connected with wounded pride. It then portrays how these systems have ended up ineffectual in this group, part of the way on the grounds that tribal power has been undermined and mostly in light of the fact that the components have not possessed the capacity to contain the scale of savagery that the group has experienced. in the light of these a

conclusion can be arrived at by showing how embryonic state organizations (especially the legal framework) have additionally been incapable and have really served to compound the conflict. As a result, the framework has stayed in an 'at danger state' where violence is prone to happen.

The traditional conflict components that operate in this region of South Sudan can be recognized from the rising justice arrangement of the state insofar as they work in amicability with the neighbourhood social chain of command, social standards and traditional practices. A Traditional court includes tribal elderly people who serve as arbitrators in disputes relating to customary law at the village or country level, or when met to arbiter uncommon question. Customary laws are occasional arranged and are sufficiently adaptable to permit seniors the likelihood of modifying decisions keeping in mind the end goal to suit specific circumstances. One peculiarity of this generally adaptable methodology is that it furnishes seniors with more space to elevate co-operation and reconciliation between groups in dispute, instead of essentially figuring out who is not right and who is correct.

The Dinka word for trial is 'luk', which additionally signifies 'to induce' and as Francis Deng clarifies, 'Case among the Dinka is planned more to accommodate the enemies than it is to discover a right or wrong side' This methodology has vital ramifications for peace making insofar as the capability of making victors and failures is restricted and, accordingly, the likelihood of a court choice injuring pride is minimized. As talked about in the past area, this is critical as it diminishes the requirement for groups to turn to conflict to restore injured pride (Deng 1984:113).

Customary conflict determination components, likewise, relieve the danger connected with wounded pride by awarding remuneration to victim's families. Case in point, when somebody is killed the executioner's family must pay the victimized person's family 50 cows for a man and 30 for a lady. Cattle are both a wellspring of riches and pride and the payment in cows thusly serves to balance both the financial expense of losing a relative, and additionally a piece of the grievance that identifies with the inclination of injured pride felt by the family.

Thus, it gives the idea that customary conflict determination systems capacity at any rate to some degree keeping in mind the end goal to review pride lopsided characteristics. Consequently, when the framework enters an 'at danger state', customary conflict determination systems diminish the 'pride deficiency' accomplished by an individual or a gathering, subsequently helping furnish a proportional payback to a 'typical state' and lessening the probability of brutal confrontation. In this way, conventional clash determination systems give an option to violence as an issue of restoring pride balance between contending gatherings.

4.2.11. Conclusion

The population of South Sudan share one destiny. It is just appalling that they appear to be failing to offer an agreeable direction by a visionary authority that cares for each and every ethnic group in the area. This is on account of individuals are regularly slanted to be intuitively tribalistic. The individuals in South Sudan need conclusive administration that is seen to secure every single South Sudanese paying little respect to ethnicity or

locale. Maintaining the rule of law is vital so none feels injustice in the Republic of South Sudan.

Everything stakeholders need to strive enthusiastically to make South Sudan continuously free of the individuals who are slanted to be naturally tribalistic for the national solidarity of South Sudan to thrive like blossoms with the absolute most wonderful shades on planet earth. However conflict, open deliberation, and hatred brought on by ethnic and religious contrasts seem unavoidable. The individuals ought to, and must perceive an admiration of one another's disparities and elevate positive practices' to build peace. It is a human obligation to start perceiving variable customs, advance solidarity, and attempt to close holes that make separation and disparity. Individuals must support systems that make solidarity rather than sadness so individuals can live in a tranquil world with resistance and acknowledgement maintaining to the very end the spirit of *Ubuntu and Ujamaah* for things never to fall apart. Conflicts connected with ethnicity and religions have happened in numerous parts of the world. Many researchers from Southern Sudan have said that issues identified with race and religion are divisive components that confuse serene concurrence between Arab Muslims in the north and African Christians and animists in the south. These scholars trust that Sudanese powers will build a superior framework and empower solidarity and peace rather than division and clash (Deng, 1995, Jok, 2001, Wai, 1973).

CHAPTER FIVE

Research findings, interpretations and recommendations

5.1.   Findings

The conflict has harmed more than one thousand South Sudanese lives. It keeps on filling groups with mentally debilitated troopers, the injured, youth soldiers, dowagers and vagrants who need recovery to help them work and live in the general public. Also as a result of this conflict, about 4000 individuals escape from their towns thus preventing them from performing their everyday tasks for living, for example, running organizations, dairy cattle keeping and farming. They knew they must move out of their homes and flee or else they would be executed .Such development of displaced people known as internally displaced persons, to refugee camps where they will be given food, water, teaching and medical treatment largely provided for by foreign aid such as the Red Cross.

The building of peace in South Sudan is a magnificent and essentially a generational test in light of the disengagement of society and domain and in the vested interests and characters of numerous key performing players and formations. From one perspective, the political, monetary, security, equity and social structures that underlie most conflicts in the nation have profound roots in what is ostensibly Africa's longest and most ruinous war and in a connection of compelling underdevelopment and seclusion. The few solid establishments that were characterized through the knowledge of war and dislodging the SPLM/A, the Church and customary authority are in a few faculties difficulties to

comprehensive state-building. however, in different ways they are essential and generally unsurprising wellsprings of patience and capacity.

South Sudan is not being constructed from nothing. Perceiving and working with what as of now exists and has authenticity is a key test. Then again, there is not a private clash or any more one overwhelming clash in South Sudan. Rather, there are scores of basically little scale clashes that pit the legislature, security power, armed rebellions, lawbreakers and non-natives against each other. Each one conflict has its own particular flow and obliges a bespoke reaction and also an attention to inter linkages to different conflicts. What serves to deal with one clash may disturb an alternate. The CPA determined South Sudan's global status and gave a percentage of the financial assets to (re)construct the nation however left much else unresolved. From political consideration to decentralization to national compromise, the assignment of building a tranquil state and society is scarcely starting.

5.2. Steps for conflict resolution

5.2.1. The reactive conflict resolution approach to proactive conflict prevention.

There is however a pervasive vagueness in South Sudan about the scene and practice of peace-building. Much of what passes as peace building has fizzled in light of the fact that it takes an impromptu and responsive methodology to conflict resolution as, when and where savagery flares. This has required a wide scattering of peace building assets, staff specifically, slight planning time and inexorably an absence of catch up, as has been seen in the to a great extent failed quest for local peace conferencing. Peace constructors additionally have an obligation to take a proactive strategy to conflict

counteractive action, captivating with groups at risk of flare-ups of violence and working with them over the more drawn out term to assemble trust and change conflict. Undertaking this will require concentrated preparing of government and common society in the ideas and practices of longer-term peace building, distinguishing proof of the basic underlying drivers of viciousness, and directing more point by point peace building examinations of particular segments and geographic zones.

These investigations might be possible participative as a feature of a preparation process. They could be utilized to create local and sector particular peace arranges by specific actors by cooperating. Neighbourly peace plans and conflict investigations need to be imparted broadly, talked about and considered in connection to the effects of all local improvement and sympathetic activities, not simply to preach discrete "peace building" exercises. Doing this viably requires peace building associations with the ability to aid local partners creating managed vicinity in their precincts of engagement.

5.2.2. Reconciliation and confronting impunity

Reconciliation has been one segment that is to a great extent left at the national level, and local level activities have commonly been spontaneous and connected to fleeting conflict determination exercises. Distinguishing the legislature's vigilance of clear transitional equity instruments and prevalent desires for compensation and reconciliation ought to be highlighted as a feature of local conflict prevention work and empowered to connection into a more elevated amount national reconciliation process. Community groups at danger of conflict ought to come together in cooperation to arrange, actualize/manufacture and keep up such services for the benefit of all sustainably so. It is additionally essential to energize and prize a talk of compromise

among pioneers, to encourage an open exchange of the need to accommodate and proceed onward. The media and the civil society likewise have a basic part to play, and the houses of worship to be exact. Encouraging the conditions for significant reconciliation in the more drawn out term additionally means focusing on standing up to exemption in the close term and sending strong flags that the offenders of viciousness will confront justice for their activities. This could mean resourcing and sending mobile courts to areas where noteworthy savagery breaks out.

5.2.3. Engaging young men

Rural young men are by and large the main actors of the viciousness in South Sudan, whether they get paid for doing such, revenge, self-preservation, out of political influence, social desires or essentially weariness and dissatisfaction. There is a central need to put more attention on captivating these disappointed young people in more term peace building and improvement exercises, incorporating in areas, for example, directing research and encouraging dialog to build their interests, desires and inspirations. Economical business related job opportunities likewise need to be desperately settled. Youth leaders from outside the informed extremist domain, for instance cattle camp leaders, ought to be included in peace panel sort dialogs and certainty building exercises. Backing could likewise be given to the young wings of political gatherings, to permit them to be tranquil activists inside and outside their formations for youngsters' requirements and viewpoints, and to support a post-war era of political leadership.

5.2.4. The vulnerable group: Women and girls

The part of women in building peace remains truly negligible but then noteworthy, paying little mind to the presence of broad women' systems, networks and a vast group of female parliamentarians. A more prominent and more independent role for women in peace dialogue liberating them from subordinate help parts to male senior mediators is regularly alluring, perceiving that women might as frequently be the inciters or rewarders of rough conduct as peace advocates. A critical consideration ought to likewise given on gathering the specific needs of women and young girls is additionally vital, beginning with enhancing access to justice and better attention to female security needs among police and standard security and equity suppliers. This implies working with the police and customary pioneers to sharpen them, and transforming and scattering particular insurance enactment. Help likewise needs to be given to women in political gatherings, to advance their dynamic contribution and the advancement of women requirements and viewpoints. Fundamental the majority of this is a requirement for more noteworthy consideration regarding women requirements in financial remaking and improvement, supporting young ladies education and sustainable livelihoods for women.

5.2.5. Role of churches and religious groups

The (South) Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) remains the focal performer, albeit all the fundamental houses of worship do some type of peace building or clash determination work. The Church has robust good power over most areas of South Sudanese society, including the president and ministers, and was broadly referred to as the most trusted middle person by respondents. It has ministry at all levels of society, is

seen to be moderately self-sufficient of tribal or religious alliance and remote plans, and is generally tried to encourage peace gatherings at county and states level. Muslim leaders are likewise once in a while engaged at local level, in spite of the fact that they are seen by a few as connected to Sudan. A lot of South Sudanese maintain conventional religious convictions (regularly in parallel to Christianity). Samples were given where such "prophets" were effective operators in activating groups for war. All things considered, it is indistinct if this impact has ever been harboured for peace-building. Traditional leaders are the essential performers in debate determination inside families and between communities, either all alone or when assembled by magistrates or governors to take part in bigger methodologies or peace gatherings. The genuine impact of boss and senior citizens shifts by tribe and area and is frequently debated or matched inside a group. Impact over youth is generally seen to have faded amid and after the war, despite the fact that there should be formal linkages between youth cows camp pioneers and their *boma* leaders. The traditional authorities must be given a platform to start and educate their communities' at grass roots levels about the importance of indigenous methods of conflict resolution, such methods of course are driven by our African value system: such as respecting the elders, neighbour is family, respecting of royal houses and their voice of command,

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5.2.6. Conclusion

Conflicts connected with ethnic and religious contrasts have destabilized numerous countries. These conflicts are inescapable in view of unflinching ethnic oppression minorities and political and monetary imbalances in numerous parts of the world. Ethnic minorities have turned to violent conflicts with the point of securing their presence and preventing assimilation by and burdens from the predominant ethnic group. Conflict is hard to maintain a strategic distance from and intelligent of a specific social milieu. To comprehend human conduct better and the reason for conflict, it is paramount to consider the impact of ethnic, religious, political, and financial crevices between individuals. Such gaps create injustice and inequalities thus increasing violence and hate among groups.

The human suffering brought about by ethnic, religious, political or financial savagery continues because of unjust systems of the world. As a consequence, burdened individuals or groups resort to vicious conflicts to test unjust regimes and frameworks and case essential needs and characters. The rise in violent conflict filled by a dissent of essential needs, ethnic personalities, and religious convictions has asserted extensive quantities of individuals. Albeit such conflicts appear entangled to avert, it is additionally conceivable that there are methodologies that can be utilized to diminish violence and advance co-existence in harmony. There are African indigenous techniques for management of conflict and scholarly resolutions from the field of conflict resolution. These systems can oversee clashes, contingent upon a given society. Cases of such instruments have been recommended by Fry and Fry (1997) when they explain that "A few societies have formal instruments for management of conflict", for example,

courts or mediation sheets, though different societies depend on casual systems, for example, teasing, tattle, prohibitions, witchcraft, et cetera. These strategies can instruct individuals of diverse races and religions to see one another's traditions. In the wake of looking into contrasts there is the likelihood of common admiration and resilience among groups living calmly. A few conflicts in underdeveloped nations are brought on by an absence of resilience in the middle of groups and individuals only due to specific contrasts. Education of individuals about different societies can bring comprehension. Perhaps individuals will see social and religious contrasts as parts of their uniqueness, Grassroots pioneers from religious gatherings, boss, cattle camp leaders, sheikhs. and church leaders ought to be utilized as system to specialist peace relations between the warring groups in the South Sudan conflict specifically.

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