Cognitive development in planning theory

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Any opinion, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author.
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This study reconsiders cognitive development in planning theory, in order to expose the underlying cognitive framework through which academics communicate in planning literature. A cognitive framework develops over time and through experience within the minds of theorists and readers of planning theory. This framework forms the basis for orientation and interpretation of planning literature by the reader. This is illustrated by describing the various perspectives within planning theory and the connotations they have with different levels of theorising. The different perspectives involve the nature thereof, the history and its political conviction, underpinned by ideology. The different levels of theorising involve a framework which descends from thinking through to implementation and consists of a philosophical-, meta-theoretical- and a technical (tools) level. The problem is that the concept of a developed cognitive framework is rarely discussed in a constructive manner in planning literature. This proves to be the cause of confusion for students and other readers whom have not yet developed their own cognitive framework. An incomplete framework causes misconceptions from existing literature for example: the purpose of Faludi’s book *Planning Theory* (1973). A discussion of this framework by academics could explain unresolved debates such as the substance and procedural debate and the normative theory versus the positive theory debate. The application of this framework proves that the political conflict in planning theory literature such as the more rational perspectives versus the more socio-political perspectives could be more constructive. Therefore this study argues that a cognitive framework could be determined by the general perspectives in planning literature together with different levels of theorising, and should become a constructive part of planning theory (debate) and education. Furthermore this study argues that if all perspectives are allowed to develop fully (non-competitive and attaining all different levels of theorising), connotations could be made on a meta-theoretical level to provide a proper cross range description of planning and provide a proper basis for comparison and would lead to more relevant and constructive debate(s).

Keywords: cognitive framework, planning theory, perspectives.
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION

This dissertation serves as a plea for the consideration of the existence of a cognitive framework inherent in planning theory, which subliminally impacts on how planning theory is or how planners and planning students engage with planning theory. Ideological underpinnings change with trends of time. Arguments in planning theory echo arguments in the philosophy of science – transversely with time. Different ideologies are linked with the philosophy of science and the debates in planning theory. The more dominant trend of time would indicate the direction and substance of arguments in planning theory. This is not particularly constructive to the development of planning theory. The results stay the same even though the directions of arguments change.

This study focuses on the concept of planning theory. The underlying, indirect question is ‘what is planning theory?’ In short this study states that there are different ways of planning and planning theory and planners should not be indoctrinated to believe or think in just one way. This cannot be a clear concept. It is the idea of planning which is approached in this study.

To be able to practice one would need to understand or know the concept of what one would be practicing, which would direct practice or ‘learning by doing’. In this way planning theory could be interpreted into a framework, formed by different ideologies, which encourage certain arguments and in turn certain practice. These arguments could be distinguished in the trends of time. Planning theory follows a norm at any point in time. To have an opinion which questions the one in the order of the day would be perceived as being ‘wrong’. On this level of argument, it is this dissertation’s perception that the arguments in planning theory cannot be right or wrong – it could only be an opinion. The ideology which is more dominant within a certain span of time dictates how planning should be. Who decides this? This dissertation perceives this reality as forced into one way of thinking and therefore inhibits perspective and thinking. If the arguments from the different ideologies were constructive it would build on the character of planning. It seems as if the current pattern of forming arguments in the broad picture over time aims at making planning theory ‘walk the plank’. Therefore this dissertation encourages the acknowledgement and awareness of different perspectives in planning theory – however simple this may sound – it is not. To be forced to think in one way could lead to tunnel vision. How could an argument be formed if every planner has the same perception – and has to be ‘politically correct’ with regards to the ideology in demand?

Any new interpretation of nature, resembling a theory, would first be realised in the mind of one or more individuals (Kuhn, 1970:144). According to Faludi (1973:22) theory is a form of human thought as the result of asking questions of why particular events occur, which could also be called explanation. An explanation is a description of an observed phenomenon (Faludi, 1973:22). According to Einstein’s theory it is a logical system (Einstein, 1933:81) and according to Popper ‘theoretism’ is the task of natural science to formulate and test theories (Popper, 2009:470). Science, as perceived in this dissertation, is analysing and constructing (positively - a positive manner) from the analysis and not analysing and criticising (breaking down). Science builds.

This study is based on the perception that theory is the description of a cognitively perceived reality. The description of these cognitive descriptions could vary from more empirical descriptions to more vague descriptions of reality and its connections. The variation of empirical to the more philosophical description should not be limited, but rather left to be explored freely, and not caged into a rigid formality.
It is difficult to analyse the nature of the logic based approaches of scientific practice. If theories are mental versions of reality, then their construction could be explained by the underlying mental processes that generate hypothesis (Thagard, 2008:541). This may be directed by the different ideological orientations and their philosophical foundations.

1.1 BACKGROUND: EXPLAINING COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK; PLANNING THEORY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

A cognitive framework develops over time and through experience within the minds of theorists and readers of planning theory. This framework forms the hidden basis of theory formation, everyday knowledge and argumentation. The framework consists of different patterns, constructed in arguments and knowledge. These patterns are formed independently from planning theory. The constructed arguments and knowledge patterns form general groupings with general features, one pattern usually following some kind of an ideology (Kuipers, 1995:25); these patterns are ‘cognitive’ patterns. Scientists, according to their own conviction, prefer one cognitive pattern rather than another and these patterns may function as guidelines in action and development of methods (Kuipers, 1995:25). A cognitive framework is a framework which exists, whether it is acknowledged or not.

Planning theory is inherent to planning and visa versa. There are more than one manner to perceive planning theory and planning. It could be ‘abstract’ or ‘a-contextual’ as well as contextual. Both are neither right nor wrong. This dissertation is focussed on the normative view on planning theory from a philosophical stance. It should provide a scope over the larger idea of planning theory. Planning theory consists of debates formed by certain and at times repetitious arguments, which could be rooted and traced to different ideologies inherent in the arguments. The trend of arguments in planning theory seems to be informed by the philosophy of science. At some point in time some perspective will be in trend and be prominent and overbearing and criticising any earlier thought which does not cohere with the trend. Perhaps like a fashion statement.

In the case of planning theory (see figure 1), based on the perception of this study, the different ideologies or belief systems and arguments are extracted from the different ideologies present in the philosophy of science. Arguments within the philosophy of science are echoed in planning theory and follow trends across time. Internal maps of the external world (Giere, 1988:6). According to Kuipers (2000:10) the main aim of the philosophy of science is to uncover (cognitive) structures (patterns) in knowledge and knowledge development. Nigel Taylor identifies Ethics and Epistemology, which is topics within the philosophy of science, as being relevant in the formation or arguments of planning theory (Taylor, 1980:161).
Figure 1: Planning theory, paradigms and the philosophy of science, forming trends of time in relation to their arguments.

In addition to Taylors connection between planning theory and the philosophy of science; science is a cognitive activity concerned with the generation of knowledge (Giere, 1988:1). The generation of knowledge are typically founded in some type of an ideology. Ideologies relate to a paradigm or world view with a basic set of beliefs that guide or inform action or practice (Guba, 1990:17). There are different identified world views. To mention a few are: post-positivism, constructivism, and advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism (Creswell, 2003).

The different world views or paradigms and/or ideological frameworks form trends over time (Kuhn, 1970); the same development could be seen in the history of planning theory or in retrospect, the different dominant perspectives.


Sir Peter Hall (1988) in *Cities of Tomorrow* explains the development of planning thought (theory) in Chapter 10 as: **Post positivist:** firstly the development of, and becoming of planning as a discipline in Britain and in North-America – established as traditional planning; **Rational Comprehensive:** the Systems revolution; **Advocacy planning:** Social Learning (New Humanist) – and the Marxist ascendancy (from 1970’s) – Manuel Castells, Scott and Roweis, John Forester.

Patsy Healey, Glen McDougall and Michael, J. Thomas (1982), distinguish between **Procedural planning theory**, **Incrementalism** and other decision-making methodologies, Implementation and policy, social planning and advocacy, political economy, new humanism and **pragmatism** in *Theoretical debates in planning: Towards a coherent dialogue*.


The different perspectives form larger groupings which are identified in Nigel Taylor’s *Anglo-American town planning theory since 1945: three significant developments but no paradigm shifts* (1999), identified as shifts in planning theory over time, concerning the nature of planning theory or what kind of an activity town planning is (Taylor, 1999:327). These are referred to in his work as changing conceptions (Taylor, 1999:327). He referred to three shifts: The first shift is from the planner as a creative designer to the planner as a scientific analyst. It refers
to Logical Positivism. The second, from a technical expert (substantive/systems planning) to a manager and communicator (rational process) and the third is a shift from modernism to post-modernism (toward communicative planning theory). These ‘shifts’ indicate the different types of concentrations or trends in planning theory thought. The ‘shifts’ were from a type of Pragmatism to Rationalism and to a different type of Pragmatism. This study recognises these shifts as being trends of time. According to the perception conceived in this study, the trends are notably similar to the debates and the trends present in the philosophy of science, perceived over time. Trends indicate the popularity of one view over another and in my opinion, not the evolution of thought. The previous ways of thinking of planning do not and did not disappear. These views are still present in some planning schools and literature. It is imperative, in my opinion, for the understanding and making sense of planning theory; to know these different ways of thinking as well as where they come from, which would enable proper arguments. Theory formation could be thought of as argumentation patterns (Kuipers, 1995:26) situated in a body of common sense knowledge often called the “cognitive map” (Kuipers, 1978:129). The patterns of argument follow patterns situated in time. Sense could be made of cognitive aims, and these aims do play a role in practice.

1.2 DEFINITIONS

1.2.1 WHAT IS THEORY?

Theory could be seen as a construction of elements consisting of abstractions of reality from a general or specific set of principles, which explains the functioning of the theory (Allmendinger, 2002:1). Theory informs and aid planners in seeking positive change (March, 2010:109).

Relevant for this dissertation, Allmendinger calls for theory which would identify its own assumptions and identify the different levels of theory; provides the context of the theory; and acknowledges the political and temporal element to theories (Allmendinger, 2002:2). Another distinction which could be made in planning theory is between positive theory and normative theory. Ambitious

1.2.2 POSITIVE THEORY:

Positive theories are typically subject centred and related to empirical questions and actions. Allmendinger perceives theories in planning as being prescriptive theories (Allmendinger, 2002:8). This thesis regards theories in planning as Empirical theories and not as prescriptive theories. Empirical theories explain and interpret reality and focuses on connecting relationships with dependent and independent variables (Allmendinger, 2002:8).

1.2.3 NORMATIVE THEORY:

Normative theory is conceptual in its nature. Normative theory, according to Philip Allmendinger (2002:8) indicates “...how the world ought to be and provides ideas about how to achieve this state...these could be regarded as theories of planning...” In my opinion normative theory does not necessarily indicate how the world ought to be, but describes the concept of how it is seen or perceived on a broader scale than positive theory. Conceptual frameworks or perspectives form part of theories of planning and therefore normative planning theories (which could also overlap with philosophical foundations).
1.2.4 WHAT IS PLANNING THEORY?

This dissertation perceives planning theory as being constructed from certain debates. These debates are constructed by certain arguments. These arguments form certain patterns.

Planning theory is dynamic, not just in action, but in thinking as well. If one should ask, many people would say different things. Some of the most prominent definitions of planning theory are given below.

John Friedmann spent his lifetime in planning providing him with much insight. He defines planning theory as a systematic reflection on actually existing planning practices in context with the city or region or country. Reflection coexists with values or a philosophical foundation, which includes ethics (Friedmann, 2010: contact by e-mail).

Another one of Friedmann’s definitions is: “…a pragmatic definition – such as planning is what planners do …” He argues that is not necessary to have a definition of planning. The central concept of planning theory is planning. What is needed in planning theory is: what phenomena should be investigated; what questions should be asked; and what philosophical perspectives should inform the planner’s inquiry. The boundaries need to be indicated, which could only be done by a conceptual definition (Friedmann, 1987:35-36). Friedmann describes what planning theory should be, and perhaps not what it is.

Taylor provides a good summary for distinctions in planning theory: “It is the case for this improved empirical understanding which Andreas Faludi (1973) has argued, distinguishing between the understanding of the environment planning is concerned with on the one hand (‘substantive’ theory) and the understanding of the procedures and process of planning on the other hand (‘procedural’ theory). And since the latter is, literally, theory of planning (in contradistinction to theory of the environment), Faludi insists that it is the study of the process of planning which constitutes the discipline of planning theory (Taylor, 1980:159).” He expressed in 1980 that planning theory remains a vague combination of philosophical judgement and sociological theory (Taylor, 1980:160).

Leonie Sandercock, in 1998, expressed that planning theory is modernist and underlined with the Enlightenment epistemology. She argues for the restructuring of planning theory to be inclusive of race and gender issues – and cannot be neutral (Sandercock, 1998: 85). She argues what planning theory should be.

Marios Chamis wrote that planning theory is concerned with procedure and indicated that it should be concerned with substance (Chamis, 1979:1). He argues what planning theory should be and should not be. In his opinion procedural planning theory is a theory of abstraction and lacks substantive issues – which should be incorporated (Chamis, 1979:1-7).

1.2.5 WHAT IS A PARADIGM?

The concept of a paradigm borders on both physical and logical to a ‘scientific community’. A paradigm is something a scientific community share (Kuhn, 1977:294).

The term ‘paradigm’ is used, at times, to describe major shifts in thought (Taylor, 1999: 328). It is also used to refer to different world views – people’s views of the world (Taylor, 1999:329). Another term or used for paradigms is – a conceptual scheme (Taylor, 1999:329).
1.2.6 WHAT IS A COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK?

A cognitive framework could be seen as a conceptual framework embedded in a certain way of thinking. An example is the structure of scientific theories. It consists of a family of models – each with their own structure. They usually share a corresponding linguistic structure or definition (Giere, 1994:277). There is a connection between a model-theoretic of scientific theories and research into the nature of concepts and categories (Giere, 1994:278). The concept of a cognitive framework is that certain core principles create an arrangement of explanatory links which involve individual concepts as well connections with related concepts (Giere, 1994:283). These families of models could be mapped in horizontal and vertical, and radial structures. It serves as an important guide of how scientific theories are learned and used in practice (Giere, 1994:295).

1.3 HYPOTHESIS, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

**Hypothesis:**

Theorists and authors of planning theory have developed cognitive patterns of what planning and planning theory is, which directs their arguments and debates from their conviction. This pattern may develop without the realisation that it exists. It is used to orientate the authors and theorists, as well as directing planning education. The cognitive patterns, from which is argued, does not necessarily allow the display of any assumptions made. Inherent in the fact that there exist different cognitive patterns is the fact that there are different perspectives. This in turn could cause the misinterpretation of planning literature, unresolved debates and political conflict in planning – if the perception of the literature is misunderstood or just not tolerated.

The different cognitive patterns form, together, a cognitive framework for planning theory. It describes the underlying framework, inherent in planning theory.

Planning theory is constructed by debates. These debates consist of arguments. The different arguments form patterns. The patterns of arguments within planning theory reflect another existing pattern of arguments which is present in the philosophy of science and the trend it sets in thinking. Therefore planning theory is directed by the norm set by its time in the reflection of time and opinions.

**Problem statement:**

The reason for setting this hypothesis is to make sense of planning theory. Planning literature is written from many different perspectives and planning consists of many types of theories. To understand the bigger picture it is necessary to understand the underlying structures (framework) in planning theory to make sense of what is read and to see the part in the whole. It is necessary to form arguments which could enhance planning – from different perspectives (different patterns).

The arguments and debates present in planning theory are present in the philosophy of science as well, particularly in epistemology and ethics. The cores of the arguments follow certain patterns, which could be compared with each other. These patterns also follow trends of time. The newly followed trend does not mean that the previous trends disappear – they are just not dominant at that point in time anymore.
The applicable arguments in Epistemology, engaged in planning theory, involve Rationalism and Empiricism. Ethical arguments involve Pragmatism and Utilitarianism. It is possible to extract the core debates of the related topics from the philosophy of science and compare it to the debates and arguments in planning theory. This indicates that the development of arguments and debates originates outside, and independent of planning theory. And that these patterns, indeed, forms an underlying cognitive structure in planning theory.

Furthermore, these different patterns argue on different levels of theorisation, when in fact the combination of them in their uniqueness forms practice. They are not opposing, the ideas are complimentary (even though the arguments are in conflict).

This attempt could easily be overseen as a concept too simple and everyday to explore – when it is simplified. The simplicity of this concept should not be underestimated, for it consists of a world of complexities. Contemplation of the concept is necessary to understand the complexity behind the simplicity. If it is not thoroughly considered it could pass by as something too simple to consider. A fine line is drawn between the concepts explained, which carries the importance of this dissertation – to capture the significance of this concept.

The stance of this study does not follow a particular ideology. It assumes that all different patterns of arguments and therefore all different ideologies in planning theory have something to contribute to planning. The study does not order an either / or conviction. Arguments which address the assumptions of other arguments, and not attempting to realise what the seemingly opposed argument could contribute to planning, to me seems too righteous. It is assumed that no perception could be objective, but in this dissertation, it is still an aim.

**Research aims:**

The aim of this study is to indicate that:

- there are different ways of thinking in planning;
- These ways of thinking, which could be determined within certain ideologies, follow certain patterns of arguments;
- These arguments are reflected from the philosophy of science, which provides the norm of a certain way of thinking at a particular point in time.
- This study indicates that these different arguments are directed on different levels of perception other than just different ideologies. Not just horizontal debates of conflict, but arguments are vertical and on different levels, which is directed parallel in nature and not conflicting – as the general perception of planning theory accepts.
- The different patterns of thinking and the different levels of perception should provide a framework of frameworks in planning theory
- To provide a broader idea of planning theory and the concepts associated with arguments within the field.

**Objectives:**

Determine the different ways of thinking about planning and their primary sources.

Determine repetitious words and phrases in planning theory literature, which would indicate the repetition of arguments.

Determine the nature of the arguments. Scientific nature as well as ideological differences.
Determine the structure of the arguments. The vertical levels.

Determine the pattern of arguments.

1.4 SCOPE OF WORK

Methodology

The methodology designed for this study is a hypothetico-deductive meta-analysis of planning theory as a concept approached from a rational-constructivist orientation with a coherent-Bayesian influence. This is a qualitative analysis.

The hypothetico-deductive model of scientific method from the philosophy of science describes the way in which all the different branches of science work. The following phases are habitual to a hypothetico-deductive model:

1. Analyse or identify something about the world.
2. Construct a theory about the world.
3. From the theory, develop a hypothesis.
4. Test the hypothesis; analyse results.
5. Use results to modify theory.

The hypothetico-deductive model is a general scientific model. It states that science involve the formulation of hypotheses and theories from which particular occurrences could be deducted. This will allow one to predict and explain occurrences. It is a form of scientific discovery and explanation.

Meta-analysis is the analysis of a vast collection of analysed results with the intention of integrating the findings. The fundamental purpose of a meta-analysis is to present the same methodological tenacity to a literature review that would need from an experimental study. The integration of findings is a narrative review.

Some reasons to perform meta-analyses are to:

- Establish the existence of an effect.
- Determine the extent of the effect.
- Explain differences in literature.
- Determine important influences of an effect.

When the boundaries of the meta-analysis is determined, one would need to locate all of the studies which would belong within these boundaries. If a meta-analytic study is done it is most likely that one would know from the start what the study should or what one wants to include.

One would need to use different methods to acquire the prominent content of the subject, or in this particular study – the concept.

Performing a comprehensive search of the literature involves working with a huge amount of information.

Planning theory is seen in this dissertation as consisting primarily of debates. These debates are formed by arguments. These arguments follow certain patterns. The patterns of arguments are reflected from the philosophy of sciences timeline of trended arguments. This is not commonly known or acknowledged in planning theory literature.
The Bayesian influence in this dissertation relates to the probability which relates to the hypothesis. One stream of the Bayesian analysis evolved into different disciplines. It could be perceived as being interested in characterising correct patterns of inductive reasoning and provide rational reconstructions of scientific methodology.

The topic of interest (Planning theory) was analysed and as the analysis would progress, more concrete topics evolve through the recognition of similarities in the observations. It could also be seen as interpretational analysis. A theoretical informed analysis framework guides the deductive analysis.

1.5 OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION

Chapter one, the Introduction to the study, provides an explanation of the connections between planning theory, the philosophy of science and cognisance of theorisation. The hypothesis is stated as well as a description of the methodology used for the study, explaining how the study was done.

Chapter two is a summary of prominent theoretical works, which are used to make sense of planning theory. It is not a discussion of theoretical work. The original sources are used in the summary only, to keep it clean from different or streamline critique and comments. The summary entails historical overviews, typologies and philosophical orientations.

Chapter three provides an opinionated analysis of different perspectives within planning theory. It is written in the form of an historical timeline. The timeline could, in retrospect, be connected to the formation of trends in time, which reflects on the philosophy of science.

Chapter four explains the connections between arguments in planning theory and the philosophy of science. Planning theory reflects mostly arguments in epistemology and ethics in the philosophy of science.

Chapter five distinguishes between different levels of theorisation. This plays a role in the cognition of arguments within planning theory. It explains how theory is perceived in this study as well as the different levels of theorisation which is regarded as philosophy, meta-theories, and entity theories.

Chapter six is a possible explanation of why the work of Faludi (1973) was underutilised and overly criticised.

Chapter seven is a summary of conclusions made in the study as well as recommendations for arguments and perceptions on planning theory.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO PLANNING THEORY

Planning theory is a vast concept and theorists have different ways of approaching the subject of planning theory or just to make sense of it. Some, if asked to explain what planning theory is, would start with an historical overview, others may try to categorise subjects in various ways. This chapter provides a theoretical summary of prominent work within the field of planning theory, based on the summary of theories from the various authors and their perceptions.

2.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEWS

2.1.1 NIGEL TAYLOR (1998)

Nigel Taylor provided an historical overview in the book Urban Planning Theory since 1945 (1998). It is written from a British context and entails primarily British planning history. Some years later, Taylor produced a work in article form called Anglo-American town planning theory since 1945: three significant developments but no paradigm shifts (1999), which should be read as a companion in relation to the book.

Taylor divides the history of planning theory into three time periods: The first period, Early Post War Planning Theory, which is Planning as physical and urban design; the second period, Planning Theory since the 1960’s, which consists of Systems and the Rational Process view of planning, and planning as a political process; the third period is, Planning theory from the 1970s, which refers to theory about the effects of planning, Rational planning and implementation, and planning theory after the New Right. These three stages are then discussed in the backdrop of Modernism and Postmodernism.

Taylor stars by sketching the picture of town planning in Britain after the War in Early Post War Planning theory, subsequently known as Town planning as physical planning and design (Taylor, 1998:3). During and after the war, in the time of the economic depression, the government was of the opinion that the state should be more actively involved in social relations and play a more intervening role in society – which is known as ‘social democracy’ or the idea of a ‘welfare’ state (Taylor, 1998:3).
Post-War conception of planning

Physical planning

Design is central to planning

‘master’ plans
‘blue print’
‘end-state’

Figure 2: Post-War conception of planning.


Town planning was conceived of as a primarily physical planning and design, which involved the creation of ‘master’ plans or ‘blueprint’ plans which is focused on an ‘end-state’. This was typically the work of architects or engineers (Taylor, 1998:5). Planning was concerned with the physical environment (Taylor, 1998:3), while the definition was concerned with physical, social and economic planning (Taylor, 1998:6). In Britain there was already an ideological debate between, the ‘physicalist’ view and a wider ‘social’ concept of town planning (Taylor, 1998:6). Physical planning engenders that physical form and layout of buildings and spaces could determine the quality of social or economic life, also referred to as physical, architectural or environmental determinism – an example is the development of new towns (Taylor, 1998:7). Planning was perceived, to some extent, as being an outflow of architecture, which was the norm for North-America and European countries (Taylor, 1998:17).

Taylor explains the normative theory underlying the British Post-War planning under Utopian comprehensiveness, Anti-urban aestheticism, the ordered view of urban structure and the assumed consensus over the aims of planning (Taylor, 1998:22-23). Utopian comprehensiveness emphasises the creation of an ideal, desirable construction, which was viewed as a comprehensive redevelopment (Taylor, 1998:23-24). Anti-urban aestheticism brings together radical and conservative factors (Taylor, 1998:27). The radical modernism was concerned with constructing or developing the world anew as opposed to the conservative values, which portrayed conservation, containment and protection – reflecting resistance to modernised change (Taylor, 1998:27). The ordered view of urban structure aims at improving the quality of the physical environment of urban areas and improves accessibility within towns (Taylor, 1998:29). The assumed consensus over the aims of planning suggested the physical basis for a better urban community life – reflecting a unitary view of the public interest (Taylor, 1998:34).
Critique of the post-war planning theory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early critiques of post-war planning theory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms of physical and design prejudice of town planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- social blindness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- physical determinism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- lack of consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms of blueprint planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Precision failed to address the possibility of possible changes in urban development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- blighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms of the normative ideals and assumptions of post war planning theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- utopianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- anti-urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ordered view of urban structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Critique of the consensus view of planning values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3:** Early critiques of post-war planning theory.


Taylor divides the early war critique into three parts. Criticisms of physical and design of town planning, of blueprint planning and, thirdly, the normative ideals and assumptions made (Taylor, 1998:38-55). The physical and design prejudice of town planning addresses social blindness, physical determinism and the lack of consultation (Taylor, 1998:39-44). The criticism of blueprint planning indicates how precision, related to zoning, was too inflexible and unable to cope with possible changes in the future, as well as a reluctance to acknowledge the standing built environment (Taylor, 1998:44-45). The normative ideals and assumptions of post-war planning theory is criticised because of utopianism, anti-urbanism, its ordered view of urban structure, and the consensus view of planning values (Taylor, 1998:46-51).

The second part of the book addresses planning theory in the 1960s. In this season of planning theory, the Systems and the Rational Process view and planning as a Political process was identified (Taylor, 1998:59-91). The Systems view of planning (spatial planning) perceived cities and regions as systems with complex inter-relationships (Taylor, 1998:64). It was formed through the fields of operational research and cybernetics (Taylor, 1998:65). The Rational Process view of planning refers to the rational processes which take place in urban planning (Taylor, 1998:66), describing the 'form' of reasoning in making rational decisions – not addressing the substantive ends or goals (Taylor, 1998:71). Taylor couples this with Faludi’s procedural planning theory (Taylor,
Planning as a political process (Taylor, 1998:75-91) indicates the modernist desire to break away from traditional tendencies and was rooted in the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. It was the modernist aspiration to break away from the past and reconstruct everything on new principles. This was expressed via physical form and ‘utopian comprehensiveness’ (Taylor, 1998:75). It was suggested that planning could not be described as a ‘science’ and should rather be viewed as a form of political action directed at realising certain values. The Systems and Rational Process view of planning seemed to neglect the values or political nature of planning and resorted to a ‘technicalist’ view of planning (Taylor, 1998:77). Meyerson and Banfield (1955) were of the first planners to acknowledge the matters of political debate and decision as central to planning (Taylor, 1998:83). This gave way to public participation and a political system which endorses democracy (Taylor, 1998:85). Public participation in planning walks hand in hand with governance (Taylor, 1998:86-87).

2.1.2 JOHN FRIEDMANN (1987)

*Planning in the Public Domain: From knowledge to action* (1987), is the well renowned work of John Friedmann, which has proved to be a foundational piece in the history and influence of planning theory.

It provides an historical overview of the development of planning thought (Friedmann, 1987:15), evaluating the history by comparing it or relating it to governance and measuring it in terms of power (whom has what?). The secondary purpose of this book was to suggest where the emphasis in future planning practice ought to lie (Friedmann, 1987:15). It outlines a theory and practice of radical planning, because “radical planning encounters the powers of the state and corporation on all sides, the theory is self-limiting. It points to a dialectical process in which both traditional planning modes and radical planning modes interact to produce the kind of society was able, collectively, to achieve (Friedmann, 1987:15).

Radical planners are committed to an alternative world-historical project that points to greater self-reliance and a more active political life. As part of this undertaking, they perform critical roles in their facilitation and promotion of efforts that will lead to the self-empowerment of households, local communities, and regions, encourage thinking without frontiers; help to devise practical visions of the future; assist in building political coalitions to advance the aims of the counterforce; inform the strategic choices of activists; and encourage the practice of dialogue and mutual learning (Friedmann, 1987:14).

The book begins with the inheritance given to planning, setting it in the 18th century – which left planning with the “legacy of reason and democracy” related to the capacity of the mind and self-governance – presupposed the capacity for reasoning in all of us (Friedmann, 1987:3). Friedmann identifies four traditions in the history of planning thought: social reform, planning as policy analysis, planning as social learning and planning as social mobilisation.

The criteria used to group the traditions were:

- They had to have a similar ‘language’ such as economics through which scientific work is carried out.
- A common philosophical foundation
- Addressing certain central questions which should define them (Friedmann, 1987:73).

Friedmann is of the opinion that the common denominator amongst all the traditions is the fact that every tradition is concerned with how knowledge is linked to action (Friedmann, 1987:74).
The four traditions are:

1. **Social Reform:**

This tradition focuses on the role of the state in societal guidance (Friedmann, 1987:76) and finding ways to institutionalise planning practice and accommodate action by the state, making it more effective (Friedmann, 1987:76). Friedmann relates this to ‘scientific management’. Strongly connected to economic management determined to manage the economy “in the public interest” (Friedmann, 1987:77).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge to action</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In societal guidance</td>
<td>Policy analysis</td>
<td>Social reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In social transformation</td>
<td>Social learning</td>
<td>Social mobilisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Friedmann perceives planning as a possible tool for the meddling of politicians in a community and to plan according to the public interest, this kind of meddling should be guarded against. If it was allowed planning would be a scientific exercise, of which planners would generate a comprehensive plan and resources for a future rational design (Friedmann, 1987:6).

The social reform tradition started in France with Saint-Simonian (commonly associated with technocracy) engineers and particularly, Auguste Comte (Friedmann, 1987:12) situated at the beginning of the French Revolution. This tradition could be traced in the works of Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Rexford G. Tugwell, and more recently Charles Lindblom, Amitai Etzioni, and Harvey S. Perloff. Their work searched for the proper place of planning in society (Friedmann, 1987:12). The work of Karl Marx was not particularly focussed on planning (the discipline) it was a philosophical outlook on how to change ‘Democracy’.

2. **Planning as policy analysis**

During the 1940s, faith in science was questioned, because no one knew how society “really” worked. Austrian critics, Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper, proposed that scientific reason of social planners (Tugwell and Mannheim) are replaced either by the invisible handoff an unfettered market economy (Hayek) or with the piecemeal reformism that Austrians call *Schlamperei*, or “muddling through” (Friedmann, 1987:12). Policy analysis is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon, which is an extension of management science and public administration, the neo-classical revival in economics, and the new information sciences called cybernetics. This is often referred to as systems analysis. There are various schools within this phenomenon and all of them lead back to the work of Herbert Simon, a shift towards a social learning model of planning was observed (Friedmann, 1987:12).

Herbert Simon was said to have had a strong influence on this intellectual tradition, drawing on Weberian sociology and neo-classical economics, and facilitating synoptic analysis and decision-making as the means of determining the best possible courses of action (Friedmann, 1987:78-79). Most frequently this is criticised by being limited to
‘bounded’ rationality (Friedmann, 1987:78). Analysts are taught in neo-classical economics, statistics, and mathematics forming different streams within the tradition, such as systems analysis, policy science, operations research and futures research (Friedmann, 1987:79).

Friedmann is of the opinion that Policy analysis has no distinguished philosophical orientation and considers themselves as technicians or technocrats serving those in power – able to calculate the best solutions – social engineers (Friedmann, 1987:79). It seems as if decisions could be made to be a science, rather than a political process (Friedmann, 1987:79). Inherent in policy analysis are the tools of neo-classical economics – these values are amongst others: individualism, supremacy of the market in the allocation of resources (Friedmann, 1987:79). Market outcomes are regarded as rational (Friedmann, 1987:79).

3. Planning as Social Learning

The Social Learning tradition was more conceived of as a theory of knowledge or epistemology, with the initiator John Dewey, the American Philosopher (Friedmann, 1987:12). He advocated “learning by doing” (Friedmann, 1987:13). Dewey conceived of social policy as a quasi-scientific experiment, and of democracy as a form of scientific politics. Dewey's teachings influenced two different streams of planning practice. The one was adapted by theorists of organization development (a development of scientific management movement) applied to problems of corporate control. Figures in this group are Kurt Lewin, Chris Argyris, Donald Schon, and Warren Bennis. This tradition focuses on narrowing the gap between theory and practice or knowing and acting (Friedmann, 1987:81). Friedmann identifies John Dewey's pragmatism (epistemology) as a major influence and the second stream as Marxism (Friedmann, 1987:81).

Social learning may be considered as a major departure from the technicalist tradition, because it claims that knowledge is derived from experience and tested in practice or action. The focus is on the relationship with theory and practice, where theory is claimed to inform and to be understood through practice. In contrast, the earlier tradition treated scientifically based knowledge as the foundations to reconstruct society (Friedmann, 1987:81). Social learning is flexible, allowing room for error and learning lessons from them. It accepts that social behaviour can change and social experimentation is inevitable (Friedmann, 1987:82).

4. Planning as Social Mobilisation

This tradition states the domination of direct collective action “from below”. Planning appears to be a form of politics, not science. Scientific analysis is applied in the form of social learning to enable the transformative process. The philosophical foundations of this tradition could be traced to utopian communitarianism, anarchist terrorism, Marxist class struggle, and the neo-Marxist advocacy of emancipator social movements (Friedmann, 1987:83).

There are three political movements within Planning as Social Mobilisation. They are: Utopianism, Social Anarchism and Historical materialism.

Friedmann provides more than a few reasons for the crisis in planning. Among them are that the theories about how knowledge is obtained about society are being radically overhauled; the tempo of historical change seems to be too fast to adapt social abilities or purpose; and the kind of problems planners have to deal with cannot be solved through historically derived knowledge. Planners sought different ways of solving problems, none of which
is sustainable in the long run. According to Friedmann there is a course of direction which could re-centre political power in civil society (Friedmann, 1987:13).

Friedmann provides an overview of planning thought by, firstly, identifying different intellectual disciplines, evaluated or perceived from their relationship with social values (Friedmann, 1987:54). He divides the different intellectual traditions into three larger categories. These categories provide a framework in which different authors of planning theory could be categorised. The first tradition is dubbed within the most conservative ideology. Their vocal points are, according to Friedmann and many other authors:

- Their concerns are technical
- Proclaiming to be politically neutral
- They serve those who are in power and
- Their primary function is serving the state.

Not redressing the book of Friedmann (1987) - these arguments are typically present in the theory of knowledge in the philosophy of science. This follows a typical trend in time, considering the criteria on which the evaluation or categorisation is based to explain what planning theorists do and what planning is. The arguments in planning theory represent different philosophical ideologies – and these arguments present (also serving as a critique of this particular ideology) relates, inexplicably, to arguments in the philosophy of science. This would signify this book in a certain trend of time and way of argument – traceable in arguments of our time. These arguments of time are not just relevant for planning, but certainly most other disciplines.

**Figure 4**: Different traditions in planning thought and intellectual traditions.


In Figure 4 the three intellectual traditions are concurrently: Systems analysis, policy science and public administration. Systems analysis consists of a cluster of theories which falls under Systems Engineering (cybernetics, game theory, information theory, computer science, robotics etc) concerned with large scale quantitative models. It relates to prediction and is largely focused on futures research with the help of systems-
analytic languages. Policy science relates to issues in public policy and socio-economic analysis - Costs and benefits. The logic is largely derived from neo-classical economics with the infusion of welfare economics and social choice theory (Friedmann, 1987:54). Public administration is said to focus on the functions of central planning, the conditions for its success and the relation of planning to politics together with the implementation of public policies and programs (Friedmann, 1987:55).
In Figure 5 on the continuum line, to the left is the most politically neutral stance also regarded as the most conservative ideologies. The Utopians and Anarchists are situated in the more left sphere of the continuum. On the right of the continuum is the politically focused ideology (ies) which concerns relations of power within civil society. Historical materialism and Neo-Marxism is situated within the more right sided sphere on the continuum. The Frankfurt school of critical sociology is situated in the middle of the continuum. It is a radical critique on ‘technical reason’ and capitalism, based on Marxist and Hegelian foundations (Friedmann, 1987:55). The conservative ideologies (left on the continuum) are typically criticised, from (the right of the continuum) more political focused ideology, relating or interpreting power.

Friedmann (1987:63), on the origins of planning thought, refer to Claude Henri de Rouvroy (1760-1825), the Comte de Saint-Simon as the father of planning. It might be useful to keep in mind that Rouvroy, was not a planner and nor was his work intentionally directed to urban and regional planning. Planning as a discipline was not yet established in the early 1800s. Neither was planning developed as planning. The claim of such a foundation already constitutes or rather assumes that urban and regional planning is straight and completely within one certain ideology – which it is not.

If the ‘evolution’ of planning thought is compared to the ‘evolution’ of the philosophy of science (particularly epistemology) over time – it should be visible or realised that the perspective from which the assumptions Friedmann make are situated in a certain perspective. It could be related to pragmatism and social constructivism.
in the philosophy of science, which traditionally and in the spectrum of time do not agree (arch enemies) with Rationalism. If looked at in time, Rationalism comes before the trend of pragmatism, a critique of Rationalism. This would signify that if planning thought was evolutionary and if the philosophy of science was part of the foundational arguments that in Friedmann's work he skips the rational foundation of planning theory and accepts only the existence of the ideology he is writing from. It is an argument or persuasion against, for one, capitalism - against industrialisation. The fight against capitalism is out of range for the concept of planning, which would bring about another debate in planning theory; what is the domain of planning and planning theory? The domain of planning theory was arguably not determined yet. Agreement may not be necessary – acknowledgement is needed.

### 2.2 TYPOLOGIES

#### 2.2.1 OREN YIFTACHEL (1989)

Oren Yiftachel (1989) in the piece *Towards a new typology of planning theories*, divides planning theory into three major debates, which form the main streams of thought in the development of urban planning (Yiftachel, 1989:23). It proposes a new typology of planning paradigms and concepts, as a tool. He indicates that the different approaches could co-exist without compromising their own ideology (Yiftachel, 1989: 23). The aim of this piece was to create a framework which outlines urban planning knowledge in a coherent body, depicting the approach of explaining planning theory thought in terms of an evolution (Yiftachel, 1989:23). The main reason for this typology is an attempt to better the confusion around planning theory and the gap between theory and practice (Yiftachel, 1989:24).

Yiftachel identifies previous classification attempts as the work of Faludi (1973), Taylor (1980) and Cooke (1983):

- **Faludi (1973)** in *Planning Theory*. Yiftachel specifically focus on the division between *Theory of planning (Procedural)* and *Theory in planning (Substantive)* (Yiftachel, 1989:24) in Faludi’s work. According to Yiftachel, Faludi interprets procedural planning theory as theories which define methods for decision-making and substantive theories relate to interdisciplinary knowledge relevant to the content of planning (urban land use) (Yiftachel, 1989:24). Faludi provided a threefold typology namely the object-centred (comprehensive knowledge), control-centred (degree of control needed to affect environmental change) and decision-centred view of planning (preparing and evaluating alternative courses of action).

- **Taylor (1980)** in *Planning theory and the philosophy of planning*, address planning theories as the embodiment of sociological and philosophical elements (Yiftachel, 1989:25). The perception is that the sociology of planning focuses on the social impact which could be studied empirically. The philosophy of planning focuses on the question ‘why plan?’ Philosophy of planning could be divided into Ethics and Knowledge. Ethics asks the question – ‘What is good?’ and Knowledge asks the question ‘what is valid knowledge?’ Taylor indicates that it is highly unlikely to separate process from substance and the critical importance of the relationship between values, the nature of knowledge and land use plans (Yiftachel, 1989:25).
Cooke (1983) in *Theories of planning and special development* developed a broader theory of land-use planning, rejecting the substantive procedural distinction. He differentiates between three types of ‘theories of planning and spatial relations’:

- Theories of development process
- Theories of the planning process
- Theories of the state

Depicting ‘what planners do’ by determining the character of development, follow certain methodological routes, and allocate resources (Yiftachel, 1989:26). Cooke directly relates planning as existing in the sphere of public policy and theories concerning the state (Yiftachel, 1989:26). Cooke dismisses procedural theory of planning, arguing that it is abstract and general. He argues that substance and process is inseparable. He links planning to the nature of knowledge, the process of state intervention in the market place through land-use planning, and the outcomes expressed as the spatial division of labour (Yiftachel, 1989:26).

**Table 2.** Operation levels and theoretical characteristics of the three debates in planning


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A simple planning process</th>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Theoretical debate</th>
<th>Dominant theoretical characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formulation of goals</td>
<td>Broad societal/political</td>
<td>Analytical</td>
<td>Explanatory and substantive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation of goals into plan</td>
<td>Narrow professional</td>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>Prescriptive and procedural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of plan</td>
<td>Broad professional</td>
<td>Urban form</td>
<td>Prescriptive and substantive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 2 the three debates are namely ‘analytical’, ‘urban form’, and the ‘procedural’ debate (Yiftachel, 1989:23), which comes from distinctly different traditions and overlap. The underlying questions of each are:

- ‘what is planning?’*, relating to analytical theories,
- ‘what is a good urban plan?’*, relating to urban form, and
- ‘What is a good planning process?’ relating to procedural theories (Yiftachel, 1989:26).

Yiftachel argues that the three types of planning theories are really part of different processes of planning and should therefore not be in conflict with each other (Yiftachel, 1989:30). Together they form planning theory. The analytical debate is concerned with a broad societal-political spectrum of planning and planning’s distributonal effects (Yiftachel, 1989:30). The procedural debate, according to Yiftachel (1989), is engaged with finding the best way to fit ends and means, which is seemingly to be controlled by planners (Yiftachel, 1989:30). The urban form debates are largely concerned with land-use planning and control, analysing the actual physical effects (Yiftachel, 1989:30).

Yiftachel (1989) provides another dimension of his typology. The typology should be seen in vertical as well as horizontal processes (graphical dimensions). The horizontal level refers to the different ideologies, which had and
have a strong influence on theorisation. The vertical level or dimensions are seen as the historical evolution of knowledge within each debate. Ideology essentially predetermines methodology. Yiftachel (1989:31) argues that the use of each stream of thought is a constructive way to advance planning knowledge.

Yiftachel argue that by defining the three different debates on planning theories properly, and determining the interconnections between them could serve as a proper foundation for the urban planning discipline. These interconnections concern state intervention, policy formulation, and urban form. He proposed that by analysing the historical overview of planning thought, it could serve as being constructive in the typology of planning and grasping its organisation. The historical evaluations could be useful to understand the increasing orientation towards the social sciences, ideological polarisation, and some other adaptations (Yiftachel, 1989:32).

Figure 6: The three debates of urban planning and their evolutionary patterns


In figure 6 the three debates, namely, the analytical debate, the urban form debate and the procedural debate are described as follows:

- **Analytical debate**: The core of this debate is the socio-political role of land-use planning. The nature of planning is perceived as a social phenomenon and practice. There are different streams of ideology within the analytical debate, to name a couple are neo-pluralism and reformist-Marxism (Yiftachel, 1989:33).
- **Urban form debate**: The main concern of the urban form debate is to find solutions for urban problems via land-use planning. It is typified, with reference to the modern movement of architecture and its connotations to social reform. More recent developments of this debate are urban sustainability, environmental protection, energy efficiency, urban consolidation, clearance/redevelopment versus rehabilitation, urban renewal, urban centralisation versus decentralisation, metropolitan containment versus infinite expansion.
conservation/rehabilitation, urban renewal, urban centralisation versus decentralisation, and metropolitan containment versus infinite expansion (Yiftachel, 1989:34).

- **Procedural debate:** The procedural debate is concerned with the evolution of decision-making procedures (Yiftachel, 1989:34). The evolution in this debate starts at planning as design method, planning as a component of state policy inherent in the Rational Comprehensive method – in this text – first advanced by Meyerson and Banfield (1955), then Andreas Faludi (1973) and method, quantitative revolution in the social sciences which was expressed in the systems revolution (Yiftachel, 1989:34) – challenged by disjointed incrementalism, mixed scanning, advocacy planning and transactive approaches (Yiftachel, 1989:35).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 7:** The interaction of knowledge that is relevant to urban planning theories


Figure 7 indicates the connection and classification of urban planning theories. Decision theories are perceived as being procedural. Social-political theories are seen as being analytical and Land-use theories are described in relation to urban form. Together they form the body of planning theory.

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### 2.2.2 PATSY HEALEY, GLEN MCDougALL AND MICHAEL J. THOMAS (1982)

Healey, McDougall and Thomas’s work is a combination of a typology and an historical overview of planning theory. This work was presented at a conference held in Oxford 2-4 April 1981. They identify seven different theoretical positions, in figure 8, namely:

1. Procedural planning theory;
2. Incrementalism and other decision-making methodologies;
3. Implementation and policy;
4. Social planning and advocacy planning;
5. Political economy approach;
6. The new humanism; and
7. Pragmatism (Healey et al., 1982: 7).

They emphasise that all these positions developed from, or in opposition to procedural planning theory. The opposition to procedural planning theory are identified as the political economy approach, new humanism, and pragmatism (Healey et al., 1982:7).
• Procedural planning theory, according to Healey et al., is a form of a general systems model which assigns societal responsibilities. It solves problems through decision making methods based on rational procedures. Healey et al (1982:8) holds that procedural planning theory rests on the assumption that there exists a type of planning which occurs without reference to any particular object, and which can be adopted within any societal context. Their critique against procedural planning theory are that it is ‘contentless’, ‘contextless’, and claiming that rationality could be illustrated scientifically (Healey, et al, 1982:8). Their main reference to this kind of theory is Faludi (1973). As seen in figure 7, most other theories or perceptions are perceived as being developed in reaction to or because of procedural planning theory.

Figure 8: A map of theoretical positions in planning theory in the 1970's.

• Incrementalism and other decision-making methodologies are regarded as a development from procedural planning theory and falls in the category of decision-making theories. It is concerned with connecting context with decision-making methodologies and the pursuit of the most rational way of proceeding (Healey et al, 1982:8).

• From strategic choice to implementing strategies: implementation and policy is an attack against procedural planning theories’ tendency to separate policy from action or implementation. Analysis draws on organisation theory and local policies. The perspective is centred on the functionalism of procedural theory and social exchange theories (Healey et al, 1982:9).

• Goal-directed planning: social planning and advocacy planning is a critique of procedural planning theory, but stays similar to procedural planning theory. The public interest is regarded in terms of different groups with different interests – pluralist. It aims to link technical expertise to a model of participatory democracy. Social planning is regarded as centred on the direction of power and who has it, together with the principle of equality (Healey, 1982:9).

• Marx revived: the new political economy argues the moral of a more just society, directed against the fuel of capitalism and the state and planning aiding in the agglomeration process. This approach relate wide economic and political forces to the detailed operation of government policy in the urban and regional planning field, which Healey et al regards as a complete reversal of the ‘contentless’ and ‘contextless’ nature of procedural planning theory (Healey et al, 1982:10).

• Withdrawal into idealism: new humanism is associated with the work of John Friedmann (1973), as well as Donald Schon. It seeks the societal organisation based on individual interaction (Healey, et al, 1982:10).

• Pragmatism aims at ‘getting things done’, which relates to purposes and values within a society (Healey et al., 1982:10).

Healey et al., (1982:10) promotes the reason for the plurality of planning thought or perhaps the many different ways of thinking about planning and the ‘fall’ of procedural planning theory – as being that planning theory is ‘not produced in a social vacuum’ (Healey et al., 1982:10) and that planning theory and planning practice are interactive (Healey et al., 1982:11). To understand the changes it is needed to consider the political and economic forces which have affected practice of planning (Healey et al., 1982:11). They identify various factors which influence planning practice. They explain why it was attractive to use technocratic theories as guides.

Healey et al subscribed the factors involved in underlying changes in theoretical debate, by identifying forces which influence the practice of planning and changes to practice and the profession. The involved concepts are government activity, the adapted ideology, policy, economic performance (particularly capitalism), a focus round local government and the disagreements between ideologies (Healey et al., 1982:10-14).

The argument in the work of Healey et al., (1982) which addresses the changes in theoretical debate is largely preoccupied with the idea that procedural planning theory is the cause of development, or out of rebellion against, for the different theoretical positions in planning theory. It is useful to mention the core critique against procedural planning theory in this work, because this is repeated in so many other pieces of work and this work. Healey et al. is largely an onslaught against procedural planning theory – or rather the ideology. The most common critique against Procedural planning theory is the following:

• It has a consensus view of society;
• Social distribution is said to be absent;
• The operating values are technicist and conservative and deny the political nature of planning practice;
• It assumes economic growth, which should ensure political and social harmony;
• It is value-less;
• Treats planning practice in an implicit or superficial way;
• It is too abstract.

Figure 9: Two tendencies in theoretical debate about nature, purpose and method


Healey et al. conclude that the theoretical debate could be categorised by nature, purpose and method of planning into two tendencies (see figure 9): the technocratic, managerial tendency of procedural planning theory and the other is the social democratic tendency focussed on resource distribution and compensatory programmes (Healey et al., 1982:17). Furthermore, they suggest general procedural rules to guide theory development and evaluation (Healey et al., 1982:18-22). Their work concludes that “The discussion of abstract principles and values simply stops”.

2.4 OTHER

2.4.1 ANDREAS FALUDI (1973; 1986)

“We have great need of a science of planning in order to determine what science is in planning...” (Britton Harris (1967).

Faludi started to create a structure for planning theories in which they could be classified. The division starts with theory (ies) of planning and theory (ies) in planning. In the theory (ies) in planning could be seen as having substance – substantive theory, which “helps planners to understand whatever their area of concern many be”. 
Whereas theory (ies) of planning “can be seen as planners understanding themselves and the ways in which they operate... (Faludi, 1973:3).” Hence, planning procedures, the designing of planning agencies and the way they operate (Faludi, 1973:1).

Faludi wrote that planning is concerned with the best way of producing results – action. The right course of action would develop (assumed) from a proper analysis of the area of interest. The areas of concern differ for every planner and this relates to the planner himself, the agencies in which he/she operates, and the procedures which are adopted (Faludi, 1973:5).

According to Faludi, planning theory can help to solve problems on three different levels (Faludi, 1973:8):

- Understanding planning (agencies, procedures): The planner's orientation of himself as a planner. The involved agencies and their operations. The affected environment (Faludi, 1973:8, 9). “To aid planners in constructing such self-images, this book proposes a model of planning agencies forming part of the proposed conceptual framework for planning thought” (Faludi, 1973:9).
- Comparing different experiences.
- Designing planning agencies and their procedures (Faludi, 1973:8).

Theory is an explanation of why particular events occur (Faludi, 1973:22). Faludi distinguishes between two different manners of explaining or forming of theory, particularly for planning. The manners of explanation are the pattern and the deductive model of explanation (Faludi, 1973:22). The pattern model of explanation explains how observed planning phenomena fits in or is part of a structured whole. The deductive model demonstrates through general propositions or laws and initial conditions what should be expected (Faludi, 1973:22). The deductive approach would be based on empirical observations which would be based on a hypothesis (Faludi, 1973:23).

Faludi emphasises the importance of the development of social theory on a normative level, because the created frameworks which links empirical facts are influenced by values in the construction of the frameworks (Faludi, 1973:23). According to Faludi, the development of planning theory starts with raw data on planning which is explained as a rational process of thought and action which aims at promoting human growth. The next phase is the construction of a model which entails the rational and conceptualisation of a group of phenomena which explains relations, propositions which forms a system and if validated, would become theory (Faludi, 1973:25). He prefers the instrumentalist view on how to relate theory to practice over the purists or realists views of how to relate theory to practice (Faludi, 1973:27). The realist could be associated with the deductive model of explanation (based on laws) and the instrumentalist view would be associated with good theories guiding action (Faludi, 1973:26). He argues for the acceptance of both the pattern and the deductive model of explanation as being useful in practice (Faludi, 1973:29). Furthermore: “Working towards the deductive model of explanation, and introducing all the refinements to the conceptual framework which formulating testable hypotheses entails, further improves their quality (Faludi, 1973:29).”

Faludi develops a conceptual framework for planning thought consisting of the rationale of planning theory and the model of planning agencies and regard the concept of Rational planning as superior to any other concept of planning, simply because it promotes human growth as a product and a process (Faludi, 1973:33). He specifies the motivation of planning theory as that of promoting human growth. Human growth is seen as a product and the best way of attaining ends and future growth. It is also perceived as a planning controlling and accelerating
process by the use of rational procedures of thought and action (Faludi, 1973:35). Human growth here refers to the continuing enrichment of human life and the widening range of goals which human beings are capable of pursuing (Faludi, 1973:33). He perceives science as being analogous to planning (Faludi, 1973:33). Planning translates as taking intelligent, rational action (Faludi, 1973:35).

The planning literature calls this the rational planning process of going through generation of alternatives, evaluating and choice based on the evaluation with reference to proposals which would have been the support of forming substantive policies which already went through the rational thought process. What Faludi means with rationality in this context is to give reasons in a clear and demonstrable form (Faludi, 1973:36). He regards planning as identical in concept, but in different context, to systems analysis and operational research (Faludi, 1973:38).

Faludi asks the question: “...why should one plan?” and answers this question with the aim and rationale of planning theory; human growth (Faludi, 1973:39). He supports this view in a three-fold: man guiding his own development; the interpretation of human growth in past developments and the availability of models of growth explaining goal seeking behaviour (Faludi, 1973:41, 46). Human growth is a complex concept, which could primarily be divided into two categories. The one is the process of human growth and the other the product of human growth (Faludi, 1973:40).

Faludi pertained that the rational planning process seems to be a vehicle for the process of growth and growth as the product or end state (Faludi, 1973:49).

2.5 PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATIONS

2.5.1 NIGEL TAYLOR (1999)

In ‘Planning Theory and the Philosophy of Planning’, Nigel Taylor (1999) explains planning theory by addressing the sociological and philosophical assumptions in planning theory. Taylor’s core aim in this work is the development of planning theory by understanding the world in which planning operates (Taylor, 1999:159).

Substantive theory: understanding of the environment planning is concerned with

Procedural theory: understanding of the procedures and processes of planning

Philosophy: Fundamental philosophical judgements are made about the nature, premise and purposes of planning

Figure 10: Different areas of theoretical understanding.

He identifies the sphere of philosophy in planning or the ‘why to plan’ as in need of development, amongst the others (see figure 10). This sphere is where fundamental philosophical judgements are made concerning the nature, premises and purposes of planning (Taylor, 1999:160).

Figure 11: Philosophy of planning.


In the philosophy of planning there are two areas of interest, particularly for planning theory (see figure 11). They are Ethical judgement and the acquisition of Knowledge – Ethics and Epistemology respectively (Taylor, 1999:160-171). Ethics in planning is inherent in making decisions, given assumptions which have to be made. Most often the cost benefit analysis is used to choose between possible plans in problem situations. Taylor considers two principles of social justice; Utilitarianism and the equalitarian principles. The modernist guide to planning decisions, based on the individual, is Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is roughly the principle of maximising happiness and this could be determined empirically (Taylor, 1999:162). The adding of equality (in principle) to cost benefit analysis, renders a moral which seeks a manner to favour the weak or less advantageous community (Taylor, 1999:164).

The other area of interest from philosophy is the proper manner of gaining knowledge or truth (Taylor, 1999:165). Taylor mentions Logical positivists (related to the scientific method) (Taylor, 1999:165), the Rationalists, Phenomenologist’s, Empiricism (Taylor, 1999:168), Materialism (Marxism) (Taylor, 1999:170), Induction and deduction (Taylor, 1999:167), and ideology (Taylor, 1999:171). Taylor concludes in the section on Epistemology: “...sociological explanation is simply a matter of ideological commitment and belief, but then this makes social science into an exercise in ideological persuasion and commitment in which theories become rather like religious dogmas to be accepted or rejected on the basis of faith. ...what counts as valid knowledge, and...the study of the philosophy of knowledge can help to illuminate this question of how we may arrive at and determine the validity of
our scientific understanding of the world in which planning takes place (Taylor, 1999:171).” Taylor stresses the importance of studying the assumptions made in the philosophy of ethics and the philosophy of knowledge, which concerns planning (Taylor, 1999:171).
In this study, ‘general perspectives’ are regarded as the ‘development of different perspectives in a historical retrospect’. This forms perceptions and influences opinions, which are developed over time. The different perspectives are still very present in literature today. The variety of perspectives should be considered with the movements in the philosophy of science to better understand the arguments inherent within them.

Knowing these different paradigms is not just important to understand planning history (Weaver et al., 1985:153) as it is so frequently referred to, but to understand planning and planning theory today. These perspectives are still very present in the communications and arguments of theorists and other academics. More importantly it is needed to know why planners think the way they do and why they have a certain conviction – related to purpose.

Different schools of planning reflect meta-theory (ies) related to methodology (Weaver et al, 1985:153) and on a more philosophical level – ideology (ies). Paradigms, as referred to by Kuhn (1962), represent the different trends of planning over time, explained through the philosophy of science. A paradigm is defined by common problem definitions, concepts, vocabulary, methods, and intellectual background (Weaver et al., 1985:153). The different perspectives form the foundation in which planners are taught and it is embedded in their thinking about planning. Contrary to Kuhn – this dissertation does not regard one paradigm replacing the other. There are trends connected to time in which perspectives develop – the previous, most popular trends perspectives are then reconsidered through the current popular trend and ‘remoulded’ in their critique – which is what Kuhn (1962) also said. The difference is that these older trends – do not disappear – they are still very present and exist. When literature is read it is evident that these different trends of time are in a duel.

Kuhn boarded against the concept of development by accumulation (Kuhn, 1970). This study does not attempt this, though there might be, in my opinion, a thin line between the difference between seeing planning from many perspectives and seeing planning as concepts developed by accumulation. It does not appear to be constructive towards planning theory as a whole, arguing either or perspectives – the one perspective being right and the other not. There cannot be a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ perspective. There can only be such a thing as perspective. It would be useful to bear in mind the feud in the philosophy of science and how it relates to the debates between and within the different perspectives of planning.

It is my opinion that perspective cannot be obtained by demeaning different points of view – but to embrace them. Kuhn (1970) made a crucial point, very relevant to planning. He argued that whatever perspective is dominant at a particular time will ‘reform’ or attempt to mould, in a very convincing way, whatever else perspectives there may be. Basically rewrite history to fit the binoculars of that time. The arguments in planning, over time, reflect this principle. However, the ‘reform’ takes place in the one dominant perspective while the other perspective still exists.

The establishment of a perspective (the concept thereof), which is similar to existence of different schools of planning, situates the perspectives on a meta-theoretical level (Weaver et al., 1985:153). Planners are taught from these different perspectives and it is embedded in their thinking about planning. Contrary to Kuhn this study does not regard one paradigm replacing the other – though it is the next developing paradigm which aims to do just this.
There are trends connected to time in which perspectives develop – the previous trends perspectives are then reconsidered through the current trend and ‘remodelled’ in their critique – which is the same statement Kuhn (1970) made. The difference is that these older trends do not disappear. They are still very present in literature, education and way-of-thinking about planning. When literature is read it is evident that these different trends of time are in a duel. These paradigms or their foundations are still very present in the communications and arguments of theorists and other academics. More importantly it is necessary to know why planners think the way they do and why they have a certain conviction – related to their purpose. This would resemble the connection between conviction and trends of time.

The development of paradigms are not perceived (by this dissertation) as linear – even though perspectives seem to develop in reaction to, or in response to other perspectives, when they do not agree. These perspectives do not replace the other – it invoked an attribute to planning or a new way of thinking about planning.

The origins of planning are rooted in pragmatism, with a prominent exchange, encounter and combination with rationalism. Rationalism after some time became less popular in planning thought to pragmatism. Pragmatism and the smaller groupings of perspectives are currently most popular in approach in planning theory and in publications.


Knowing these different paradigms is not just important to understand planning history (Weaver et al, 1985:153) as it is so frequently referred to, but to understand planning and planning theory today.

The groupings under ‘experiential holism’ and ‘scientific conjuncture’ are the two identifiable paradigms before World War II. Both are regarded as part of traditional planning.
Figure 12: The development of different planning paradigms across time.

Figure 12 is a representation of the development of the different planning perspectives over time. Traditional planning was the time of origin for the planning discipline. Certainly one could trace all different kinds of historical relations to pre-historic times long before planning as a discipline existed. This was not done in this study. In the figure the development of the rational comprehensive way of planning, procedural planning, systems planning, advocacy planning, radical planning, political economy, liberal planning, equity planning and social learning and communicative planning is indicated. The dominant perspectives over time are indicated in red. They are traditional planning, rational comprehensive planning, which are at times generalised with procedural planning, and, more recent, communicative planning.
3.1 TRADITIONAL PLANNING

Traditional planning is a design-oriented physical planning approach (Frank, 2006:16; Taylor, 1998:5, 6), which focuses mainly on the structure of cities and the physical environment (Taylor, 1998: 5, 6). Its emphasis is on planning as design through form and function (Hillier, 1998:39). The aesthetic character and qualities of the physical environment (Taylor, 1998:10) – on existing as well as future probabilities is prolific focus.

One of the most renowned methods of planning was by, Patrick Geddes (also a botanist). His method was commonly known as ‘survey-analysis-plan’. It entailed the empirical observation of phenomena in the world to gain knowledge. This could reveal regularities or processes in the behaviour of some phenomena; derive the facts of the given situation and generalise the observations to determine a universal empirical or scientific theory of the phenomena in question. This is perceived as a technical or scientific method of gaining knowledge (Taylor, 1980:165). In the philosophy of science this refers to the positivists’ stance.

Planners developed similar analytical skills to that of engineers and applied it to the design of public works to the design of the city (Hall, 1988[1996]:322). The planner was characterised as an architect, engineer or a geographer.

The following words and phrases are frequently used to refer to traditional planning: visionaries (Hall, 1988:4; Reismann, 1970:37); civic design; urban design (Taylor, 1998:8); architectural design; physical planning (Taylor, 1998:5, 14); blue print planning (Taylor, 1998:14); architect planning (Taylor, 1998:8); utopian planning (Branch, 1975:4; Taylor, 1998:23); anarchists (Hall, 1988:3); master plans (Taylor, 1998:111); modernist (Taylor, 1998:11); functional architecture (Taylor, 1998:11).

Authors whom strongly influenced traditional planning are Kevin Lynch; Peter Hall; Patrick Geddes; Ebenezer Howard; Le Corbusier; Raymond Unwin, Barry Parker, Frederic Osborn, Henri Sellier, Ernst May, Martin Wagner, Clarence Stein, Henry Wright, Arturo Soria, Frank Lloyd Wright; Patrick Abercrombie, Frederic Gibbert; Thomas Sharp. This is by no means a complete list, but a largely generalised one.

The traditional planning perspective does not, historically, have a philosophical background or foundation, though it is possible to connect it to philosophical underpinnings. The methodology of traditional planning applies to the notion of form and function, describing the systems within the city, attending to the design and aesthetic character of the city.

Certainly there are different streams in traditional planning, in most different paradigms – they are grouped in this section. Experiential Holism and Scientific Conjuncture (as described by Weaver et al, 1985) represents two of the streams within Traditional planning.

3.1.1 EXPERIENTIAL HOLISM (1900-1935)

Experiential Holism was based on a combination of Comptian influenced Empiricism (Patrick Geddes) and the American school of philosophy: pragmatism (Peirce, Dewey and James) (Weaver et al, 1985:156).

Patrick Geddes was regarded as being a radical and original thinker for his time. He was fascinated with the French belief of anarchistic communism, which was based on the free association of independent regions. This
might be considered as the initiation of regional planning. His ideas were expressed by Lewis Mumford which Mumford combined with his own work. This was passed on to planners in New York City and influenced Howard’s work. This had a prominent influence on the New Deal in the 1930s presented by Franklin. D. Roosevelt and eventually influenced the planning of the capitals of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s (Hall, 1996: 138; 159).

The origins of traditional planning are anarchistic and communistic, which was an anti-government call for freedom (Hall, 1996:144) and a non-hierarchical system of government (Hall, 1996:143). It proclaimed that society should have their own basis of co-operation (Hall, 1996:144) and that a central government was no longer needed (Hall, 1996:144). The industrial city was perceived as being an unpleasant, improper environment for communities. This tradition argued that skilled labour did not need economies of scale. Newer industries would supposedly be smaller in scale in contrast to the large industrial concentrations (Hall, 1996:144). Planners wanted to change the industrial city by combining the country and the city in an attempt to improve the physical environment and social relationships within the community (Hall, 1996:147; Weaver, et al, 1985:153).

Their focus was on direct personal knowledge of the world in its sociological and geographical location (Weaver et al, 1985:155). This involved observing possible existing relationships and problems in context to conclude to possible solutions (Weaver et al, 1985:156). The combination of scientific knowledge and the positive world was the experimental systematic ordering and understanding of personal knowledge. Planning seems to rely on personal knowledge (Weaver et al, 1985:156). There is a tendency to overstate the public interest, explained best by the term communalism. The public interest could be explained as fading in its purpose across time and fragmented or splintered amongst the happiness of the social classes, yet (Hall, 1996:144; Weaver et al, 1985:156).


### 3.1.2 SCIENTIFIC CONJUNCTURE (1935-1950)

Scientific Conjuncture refers to the first experimentation with planning and scientific decision-making among Western governments in response to the Great Depression, World War II and Fascism. Two prominent theorists, Tugwell and Mannheim, drew on Pragmatism, institutional economics and the German Historical School (Weaver et al., 1985:156).

Society was seen as an organic development and planning was regarded as a governmental power which could address and solve the problem of conflicting social interests. An example of this approach is French indicative planning, as a way of post-war reconstruction. Some form of this approach was also present in Japan – leading rapid industrialisation (Weaver et al., 1985:156).

Macro social and economic theory forms the logic of this approach (Weaver et al., 1985:156). Social knowledge was the connection with the empirical world, which required value judgements. This relates to the work of Mannheim’s substantial rationality. He argued that the planning authority should base judgements and decisions of what kind of action should be taken on empirical grounds, of a scientific study of society together with sociological
experiments (Mannheim, 1940:266). Planning was seen as the bureaucratic institutionalisation of social power. This approach represents a collective, overemphasised public interest (Weaver et al., 1985:157).

The period after World War II created a favourable climate for the development of many new and different perspectives.

Prominent authors in this approach are: Karl Mannheim (1935, 1936), Rexford Guy Tugwell (1975), French ‘indicative’ planning as described by Cohen (1969), and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and its Japanese precursors as analyzed by Johnson (1982).

Planning literature could be divided into two categories of theory: Theory of planning and theory in planning (Faludi, 1973). Theory in planning would entail the substantive sphere of theorising. Theory of planning consists of the description of planning, implying the broader perspective over planning and methodology. The latter group of theories could be divided into two broad groupings.

The two broad groupings within planning theory literature seem to divide themselves on philosophical grounds purporting their political conviction within their arguments. These two groupings could be distinguished into the more rational oriented perspectives and the more socio-political perspectives.

The more rational perspectives could be identified as the Rational Comprehensive perspective (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955), the Systems planning perspective (Hall, 1988:326) and Procedural perspective (Faludi, 1973) accordingly.
PART II: POST WORLD WAR II PARADIGMS OR WORLD VIEWS

3.2 RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING (SYNOPTIC PLANNING)

After the war there was a change in the way of thinking about planning, what might be termed as a paradigm shift, from substantive rationality toward the more rational comprehensive way of thinking about planning. The development of the rational comprehensive way of thinking about planning, in the Western world, developed during the 1950s and 1960s (Weaver et al., 1985:157). The rational comprehensive perspective attempted to apply logical positivism to society. Rationality was formed by positive knowledge and instrumental calculation, which claimed to be objective and universal. From a pragmatic perspective, the deeper, underlying sociological structures and personal experience where left unattended.

The public interest was regarded as a collection of individual goods. This was considered to be typical of the political economist’s view of human nature, traditionally influenced by the work of John Locke, Bentley and Jeremy Bentham (Weaver et al., 1985:158). Locke was an Empiricist, his work argued that “our knowledge comes to us through our senses and that we have no innate ideas” (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:235). He believed that the only two sources of knowledge were sensation and reflection (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:236). Bentham’s work has been interpreted as being Utilitarian (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:37).

Rational Comprehensive planning is often referred to in planning literature, the context and meaning of referral differs from author to author. The perspective from which the text is written from could explain the difference in meaning of rational comprehensive planning.

Perhaps the most common reference to the Rational Comprehensive planning is the referral to the case study of Meyerson and Banfield’s work Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (1955). There are authors who place the work of Meyerson and Banfield (1955) within Liberal Political-Science Critique – but most authors regard it as the Rational Comprehensive way of planning. Though this study does regard the work of Meyerson and Banfield’s (1955) as being pragmatic – or rather falling within this category as opposed to the usual critique it has been given. The critique could be understood when looked at through the philosophy of science and movement of ‘thinking’ trends over time.

In short reference to Meyerson and Banfield and what it truly represented; the main object of their case study was slum clearance (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955:18); based on the assumption that low rent projects and slum clearance were influential on the health, safety and moral welfare of the public (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955:25). However, Meyerson and Banfield did not use the term Rational Comprehensive Planning to define their work – though they did use the phrase.

Sandercock, writing from a Radical Perspective, describes the Rational Comprehensive planning’s central concern as being in hierarchy (bureaucracy) and endorsing alternative courses of action for those in power (top-down), guiding social processes (Sandercock, 1998:87-88). This view or perception of Sandercock, supposedly, does not refer to this specific ‘Rational Comprehensive Planning’ per se - but it seems more likely that she is referring to ‘Rationalism’ in a political sense and therefore the underlying concept of rationalism in planning. Rationalism – seen from a Radical social perspective in planning literature, in general, regard rationalism as being bureaucratic, top-down and empowering only those in control. When looked at it from a philosophical viewpoint, which in
planning is purported to political foundations, rationalism is thought and reason construction of knowledge opposite to Empiricism which relies on sense created knowledge. Therefore such a statement made about Rational Comprehensive planning, should be properly defined in planning to prevent such a broad spectrum of generalisations and perhaps misleading of planning thought.

David Shon (1983:21-22) in turn, refers to Rational Comprehensive planning as ‘Technical rationality’ of which the “…professional activity consists in instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique.”

Faludi (1973: 207-223) places ‘Multi-planning Agencies” equal to a “Rational Comprehensive manner”. Note that he did not call part of his theory the Rational Comprehensive method – as so often referred to. He simply referred to the manner of, and therefore the concept of, rational comprehension being the nature of multi-planning agencies. It should be noted that, more than often the rational process planning are referred to in a general context to Rational Comprehensive planning (Taylor 1998).

Hudson (1979: 388[84]) refers to Rational Comprehensive planning as being “Traditional planning”. For the purpose of this dissertation Traditional planning is regarded as ‘design’ oriented a perspective which was dominant before and during the Second World War

Rational Comprehensive planning, if a relation is made to the work of Meyerson and Banfield (1955), is an empirical study of land use planning in America (Confirmed by Andreas Faludi by e-mail in 2009).

Taylor refer to the ‘rational model’ grouping rational comprehensive planning and rational process planning together as similar perspectives – not explaining to what extent they are related. Though, his work is one of the clearest and comprehensive descriptions on the historical events in planning theory. The Rational Comprehensive theory and the Rational Process theory are two very distinct theories or perspectives, especially when Meyerson and Banfield (1955) are compared to Faludi (1973). Thus referring to a certain kind of planning, this grouping or term does not seem sufficient and could be regarded as a rather confusing statement. However, if it is used in a philosophical sense, which in planning seems to be the foundational source of politics in planning, it could be just. The term ‘rational model’ should perhaps be referred to ‘rationalism’ rather than a model. A model is specific, which could be that of Andreas Faludi, Friend and Jessop, Einstein, and the list goes on. Each one of the examples is very different – the only thing they have in common is perhaps the philosophical nature of gaining knowledge – which could be termed – Rationalism.

Though Taylor does not refer to Meyerson and Banfield (1955), but rather to a debate around whether rational process is comprehensive to planning and policy making. Meyerson and Banfield are referred to within the context of physical policy in Taylor (1998:50).

The object of the perspective in Meyerson and Banfield (1955) is land-use planning and policy; unitary concept of public interest; technical relationship; objective reality (Hudson 1979:392).

From a radical perspective the planner is a ‘handmaiden of power’ (Sandercock 1998:87); ‘the knower’; relying on professional expertise; not asking who is in control and what consequences (Sandercock, 1998:88).
From a rational perspective the planner is the mediator between information gained, comprehension and interpretation and applying the knowledge into action which would serve the greater good for the community in general.

The Rational Comprehensive perspective is rooted (by reference within planning literature), in the infamous University of Chicago planning programme (Sandercock, 1998:87; Taylor, 1998).

The most important part of Meyerson and Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (1955) work was arguably their concept, which was different from the concept of traditional planning. Their focus was on people. The Act’s main purpose was slum clearance (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955:18) and this was based on the allegory that slum clearance and low rent projects were instrumental to the health, safety, and moral welfare of the public (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955:25). In almost no city was a public housing program developed as part of a long range plan for all types of housing or as part of a reasonably detailed comprehensive plan for the growth and development of the community (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955:25). It is important to acknowledge that in their work they stated that the Planning Division of the City of Chicago believed that a comprehensive plan should guide the development of the city and that there existed no comprehensive plan in Chicago in 1949, which would govern the actions of public and private agencies intentions with land use in the future (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955:273) – introducing the question of governance. Furthermore, they stated that it is not possible to achieve a comprehensive plan with the means of one single intention when power is widely dispersed and power holders have conflicting ends – and this was written in the context to end racial segregation within the city of Chicago or not (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955:274).

Hudson wrote at the end of the seventies that the rational comprehensive approach was the dominant tradition at that point in time. It seemed as if though the most other planning approaches develop either in reaction to this approach or a reaction against it (Hudson, 1979:388; Weaver et al, 1985:158).

Words often associated with the Rational Comprehensive perspective are the following: survey, analysis; synoptic; ends and means; trade-offs; large scale action; instrumental rationality (Sandercock 1998:87); policy analysis; administrative behaviour; organisation theory; decision theory; public choice theory; systems theory (Sandercock, 1998:87-88); technical rationality (Schon 1983:21-69).


Philosophy is not an inherent part of the Rational Comprehensive perspective; still it could be connected to philosophic principles as a post analysis in its development. The methodology of the Rational Comprehensive planning.

3.3 SYSTEMS PLANNING

Systems planning perceive the city and regions as a complex system of interconnected and dynamic parts or phenomena in constant change (Allmendinger, 2002:44; Taylor, 1998:62-63). The perceived or observed systems of the cities and regions (Taylor, 1998:62-63) are associated with prediction models and large-scale quantitative

The nature of planning from this perspective is perceived of as environmental and rational. The object of the theory is the environment as a system or systems (Taylor, 1998:62, 66) with interconnections between the parts of a system (Taylor, 1998:61). Change to one part will cause change to another part (Taylor, 1998:62). The planner is seen as an industrial economist (Hall, 1988) or geographer (Hall, 1988).

Systems’ planning was regarded as a revolution in Hall’s historical reference to theories (Hall, 1988:326). Taylor also dubbed it a radical change in planning thought (Taylor, 1988:59) in his book Urban Planning Theory since 1945. The origin of Systems planning, however, differs from author to author, supposedly because of the difference in planning literature between the United States of America and that of Europe.

According to Taylor (1988) systems planning developed in response to criticisms of traditional planning (Taylor, 1988:64) and the foundation of systems planning seems to rest on the work of Brian McLoughlin (1969) and Lewis Keeble (1969) (Taylor, 1998:59). While Allmendinger (2002) indicated that systems planning developed within the mid to late 1960’s in the UK. Referring to the work of Brian McLoughlin (1969) and George Chadwick (1971) as the most influential work for this perspective (Allmendinger, 2002:43), linking human systems (cities) with ecological or natural systems (Allmendinger, 2002:44).

Hall (1988), on the other hand, in Cities of Tomorrow, provides a detailed description of the development of the systems perspective. Systems’ planning was an intellectual revolution in urban and regional social studies (Hall, 1988:326). The perspective evolved from human geography together with the German tradition of locational economics (Hall, 1988:327).

Geographers and Industrial economists discovered the works of German theorists of location such as Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1826) on agriculture, Alfred Weber (1909) on industry, Walter Christaller (1933) on central places and August Losch (1940) on the general theory of location (Hall, 1988:326). In the United States academics from various disciplines began to find regularities in many distributions including spatial ones (Hall, 1988:326-327). The geographers’ principally logical positivist found that spatial distributions could accurately be tested against reality (Hall, 1988:327). This new human geography was united with the German tradition of locational economics by Walter Isard in the 1950’s (Hall, 1988:327).

Cities and regions were perceived of as existing complex systems (Hall, 1988:327; Taylor, 1998:66). Planning (Theory) was regarded as the object being the environment, which entails towns, cities and regions, which needed to be planned (Taylor, 1988:60). Planning Theory therefore consisted of perceived systems or parts thereof, of cities and regions.

Models where designed, reflecting the relationships within the systems and from these models alternative solutions could be developed and analysed and the best option chosen. When implemented the network or system would be continually monitored (Hall, 1988).

Another discipline developed from the systems view of planning in 1954. Robert Mitchell and Chester Rapkin from the University of Pennsylvania published a book suggesting that traffic patterns was the result of the pattern of
activities – and different land-uses generated traffic patterns. This was the inception of urban transportation planning (Hall, 1988:328), another discipline.

Words commonly used to indicate the presence of systems planning are: system; model; location theory; spatial distributions (Hall, 1988:327); spatial planning (Faludi, 1973:7); systems analysis; systems engineering (Friedmann, 1996:11).

Authors commonly used in Systems Planning are Johann Heinrich Von Thunen; Walter Isard; Alfred Weber; Walter Christaller, August Losch; Brian McLoughlin (Allmendinger, 2002:53; Taylor, 1998:112); Chadwick (Allmendinger, 2002:53).

3.4 PROCEDURAL PLANNING (RATIONAL PROCESS PLANNING; CRITICAL RATIONALISM)

The procedural planning theory could be linked to many authors, for example Melvin Webber, Andreas Faludi and Patrick Geddes (Taylor, 1998:66). Though Patrick Geddes was a notoriously 'different' thinker connected to radicalism, anarchism and communism. For the purpose of this study, Faludi will be used as the main reference for the Procedural planning theory.

Planning could be defined as a “rational planning process of going through generation of alternatives, evaluation, and choice based on that evaluation (Faludi, 1973b:36)."

Procedural planning is theory which is used in practice and could be deemed inherent to practice. It is methodology. The perspective is rational in its nature and combines the two fundamental contradictory ways of thinking in planning via methodology.

Procedural planning theory is most often connected to the work of Andreas Faludi (1973) (Allmendinger, 2002:53) with referral to the book Planning Theory. Most frequently when referred to procedural planning – the referral points to the whole body of work initiated by Faludi in this book. However, it is necessary to understand that this book does not just address procedural planning – but places it into context by creating a framework for planning theory. Firstly Faludi distinguishes between Theory (ies) of planning, which is also called Procedural Planning, and Theory (ies) in planning, which is called substantive planning. Procedural theory in itself has two purposes, firstly to develop methodology (ies) with a meta-theoretical function and would then, secondly, describe ‘how to plan’. The central feature of procedural theory is thus methodology. Faludi called this meta-planning (Faludi, 1973:3). This could be described as a conceptual framework for planning thought consisting of rationale of planning theory and the model of planning agencies (Faludi, 1973:33), which regards rationalism as inherent in planning. Besides the fact that Faludi proposed the development of methodologies, he developed his own description of how planning works.

The distinction between theory in planning and theory of planning (planning theory) should not result in an entirely separate development of the two. Faludi quoted Britton Harris (1967) stating that a science of planning is needed to determine what is science in planning (Faludi, 1973:4). Clearly both types of the theory are needed for effective planning (Faludi, 1973:7).
The rationale behind the procedural planning theory is in the guidance, interpretation and availability of explanations of human growth (Faludi, 1973:41, 46). Human growth could be divided into two categories: the process and the product of human growth (Faludi, 1973:40). These two groupings directly implicate theory of planning and theory in planning. Theory of planning or procedural theory connotes to the process of human growth. Theory in planning or substantive theory connotes to the product of human growth. Human growth compels the enhancement of human life and the widening of goals being pursued (Faludi, 1973:33). It could be controlled and accelerated by the use of rational procedures of thought and action (Faludi, 1973:35). Faludi proposed a model of planning agencies which would form part of the proposed conceptual framework for planning thought, which should indicate what planning is trying to achieve (Faludi, 1973:9).

The rational planning process of going through generation of alternatives, evaluation, and choice based on that evaluation (Faludi, 1973b:36).

One of the common criticisms is that the theory does not address the problem of social distribution and the complex structure of society (Healey et al., 1982:14). It might be worthwhile to note that this is criticism from a different perspective with definite Marxist influences, which on its own terms are valuable. Still procedural theory is criticized with the aim of conforming the theory towards a different perspective, trying to mould it into a certain way of thinking from which it is criticised. Certainly there should be different perspectives which contribute to planning, each in their own way. It seems rather impossible to judge the form of a tree from standing just on the one side. Again different theories have different purposes and could work together to promote planning and ultimately human well being, if they are not in a duel.

Other criticisms are that the perspective is technicist, conservative, ignores the political nature of planning or aims to depoliticise decision-making and increase the role of power of technical experts (Healey et al., 1982:14-15). The keyword – power – characteristic of the more pragmatic/social constructivist perspectives address something altogether different than from what procedural planning aims to achieve in theory. The perspective is not about power or who has it, which is partially what the more pragmatic perspectives are useful for. This indicates intolerance towards other ways of thinking and reluctance in acknowledging different purposes connected to different theories. Different theories have different uses. There should not be one theory and certainly not just one perspective.

Other critique which falls in the same category as presented above are that procedural planning theory cannot maintain problems of political, social and an economic nature – and in this challenges the structure and processes of decision making (Healey et al., 1982:15; Taylor, 1998:97). Again – this is not the principle aim of procedural planning theory. Yet, it sounds as if problems were identified from a different perspective, which should be solved from that perspective and then in conjunction with other perspectives or the ‘problem’ identified or shortcoming which the other perspective would like to address could be constructed into something positive – contributing to planning.

Similar criticisms in nature of the above are that procedural theory’s lack of testability and specificity (Taylor, 1998:96). Procedural theory is per definition not specific – and should not be specific. It is designed as a framework – with ample room for the development of different perspectives.
Taylor refers to Camhis and Thomas that procedural planning leads the planner to turn away from the substantive issues, which according to his opinion, is the purpose of planning to address (Taylor, 1998:97). This is their perception of what is important in planning, which of course is important, but this is not absolute, no perspective or theory for that matter is. Procedural planning theory simply has a different focus on a different level of theorizing and therefore a different purpose. What if theorists considers that procedural planning theory is attempting to provide a connection point or meeting ground for all different perspectives; where they could build on each other to form a collage of planning – each perspective contributing to the picture of planning.

Another argument against procedural planning, which I do not understand, because procedural planning never argues to be, ‘the theory’, nor claim to be the miracle worker which could attract this much critique – is that theory should be grounded on a more empirical research of planning – be a social scientific theory of planning (Taylor, 1998:97).

It seems too easy to criticise a theory from a certain perspective, when the purpose of the criticised perspective was not the same as the perspective it is judged from. The intention of the procedural planning theory was merely a starting place for the development of many different perspectives – meant to build on each other, rather than telling planners what to do or what to think.

The procedural planning theory could be linked to many authors, for example Melvin Webber, Faludi, Geddes (Taylor, 1998:66).

Faludi distinguished between theory of planning and theory in planning, theory in planning could constitute as the domain of theorisation where the products, being substantive, would be allocated. Theory of planning however would represent the way the products would be used (approach), what products there will be and why – the products would be determined by the way of thinking and the relevant approach. Therefore the theory of planning, by Faludi, did not intend to describe the changes in the environment – Faludi described a framework in which other theorists could compare their different perspectives and build constructive arguments on a meta-theoretical level. Just the fact that one theorises that theory should be empirical – already justifies a certain perspective which is situated in a meta-theoretical level. The theories which tend to call for only empirical theories are usually those which have rich philosophical backgrounds. Most of these theories are brilliant and they should be used constructively. In general I found that the number of papers which is constructive, with regards to theory of planning, is less than those which is destructive.

Signal words commonly associated with procedural planning are: procedure or process (Faludi, 1973b:35); decisions (Faludi, 1973b:36; Taylor, 1998:113); theory of planning (Faludi, 1973a:3); theory in planning (Faludi, 1973a:3); meta-planning (Faludi, 1973b:52); Rational planning process (Faludi, 1973b:36); implementatation and policy tradition (Healey et al., 1982:15).

Influential authors of procedural planning are: Melvin Webber; Andreas Faludi; Friend and Jessop;

The more Socio-Political group of perspectives could be identified as the Advocacy planning-, Political Economy-, Radical planning-, Liberal planning-, Equity planning-, Communicative planning theory perspective.
PART III: THE PRACTICE MOVEMENT

3.5 LIBERAL POLITICAL-SCIENCE CRITIQUE

The Liberal Political-Science Critique’s most influential time was during the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s. In North-America it paved the way for a more philosophical tone in planning education. It entailed the market model of political society. The well renowned, ‘Chicago School’ was first subject to Scientific Conjuncture and then to Rational Comprehensive (Weaver et al, 1985:158).

In the philosophy of science, particularly epistemology, scientific conjuncture would typically represent a cynical logical positivism. The tendency was to indicate the limits to ‘expert’ knowledge and attended to a more non-structural sociological knowledge, which may reflect the work of Karl Popper’s ‘critical positivism vaguely (Weaver et al, 1985:158).

The central concern of liberal critique was its pluralist view of society. Interests were determined through the perception of self interested individuals. Individual values were known to cause at least some level of conflict. The democratic procedure was followed as a way of ‘muddling through’. Communities and groups, acting as individuals, would work out the public interest through ‘partisan mutual adjustment’. Inherently, the political-science critique was an anti-planning model of planning (Weaver et al, 1985:158).


Words which are often used to refer to Incremental planning or Liberal political-science critique are: disjointed incrementalism; public interest; criticism rational comprehensive; policy decisions; institutions; democratic political economy; implementing policies.

The initial author of Incremental planning was Charles Lindblom. Incremental planning developed in reaction to the criticism of Rational Comprehensive planning. General criticisms were: failure to identify the cognitive ability of decision-makers; the nature of social values within the perspective, the separation of ends and means, a general public interest as opposed to pluralist interests; subjectivity toward central control in the definition of the problem, the valuation of alternatives and implementation of decisions; and the reductionist nature of epistemology. Incremental planning could be referred to as ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ or ‘disjointed incrementalism’. The development of incremental planning could be said to be initiated in reaction to rational comprehensive planning. It states that policy and policy decisions should be addressed through familiar institutions in a free market and democratic political economy (Hudson, 1979:389).

The foundation of Incremental planning is based on discourse and negotiations among plural interest without open handling of power (Hudson, 1979:389[88]). It claims to be a more realistic description of planning processes and practice, which focus attention on the implementation of policies (Hudson, 1979:393[89]).
The Radical Liberal Critique of Rational Comprehensive planning also referred to as Advocacy Planning could be said to be an extension of the liberal political-science critique (Weaver et al, 1985:159).

The initiation of the Radical-Liberal Critique could be placed in the context of the different protest movements in the 1960s in North America. The 'rad-lib' movements criticised the limits of white professional expertise and that scientific knowledge should be more accessible to poor and disadvantaged people, practicing a principle of equality. This movement left an inheritance to planning of community based action programmes, racial equality and the continued opposition to a bureaucratic society (Weaver et al, 1985:159).

The radical-liberal critique could be seen as falling into the logical positivist tradition, from an epistemological point of view. It advocates the interest of the poor (social epistemology), which seems to be in conflict with the dominant paradigm of the time and Universalist philosophy of science. This was a period of action. The public interest tended towards the collective idea of society, though it was still regarded as being situated in the North American ideology of the individual. The conflict is purported by the professional 'experts' acting to empower the marginal or disadvantaged groups. It could be said that Advocacy planning indicated the way for the Learning Theorists and the Neo-Marxist Critical studies (Weaver et al, 1985:159).

Authors whom are commonly associated with Advocacy planning are: Davidoff and Reiner (1962), Davidoff (1965), Cloward and Piven (1966), Marris and Rein (1967), Goodman (1971), Grabow and Heskin (1973), and Heskin (1980), Paul Davidhoff; T.A. Rainer; Sherry Arnstein (Sandercock, 1998:90).

Words which commonly indicate the presence of and/or with reference to advocacy planning are: advocate; disadvantaged; minority groups; representation in process of planning; social welfare; political view; value formulation; social injustice; economics; division of resources; judicial perspective.

The foundation of Advocacy planning is situated in conflict models of public interest (Hudson, 1979:392[88]). Paul Davidoff was of the opinion that planners should be more involved in the political process of planning. Planners should be concerned with advocating and ensuring that the interests of the disadvantaged or minority groups are being represented in the planning process (Hudson, 1979:390[86]; Taylor, 1998:85).

Advocacy planning is vague in terms of governance. It is primarily concerned with client-centred and social welfare. It does not address the changes it proposes in the structure of planning practice and the interaction between institutions and operating procedures for implementation (Healey et al., 1982:16). Advocacy planning initiated the challenge to traditional planning by creating awareness of a pluralist public interest as opposed to a unitary public interest (Peattie, 1968). The planners role was seen as being more political than the traditional view of planning in his calling and focus on the ‘many interests groups’ and their involvement in planning and the development of public (Taylor, 1998:85).

The classic work of Paul Davidhoff “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning” (1965) (Sandercock, 1998; Shönwandt, 2008:7-9) describes the proposed role of the planner in the planning process. The planning process involves the political orientation of advocating the pluralist interest of society. It was based on the idea that the planner could contribute to the development of policy (Davidhoff, 1965:331), particularly to rectify social injustice and the
establishment of equality in a Democratic environment (Davidhoff, 1965:331-337). This in turn, implies that a democratic government is the driving force for the creation of equality (Davidhoff, 1965:332, 336).

Planning is aimed at creating a better environment for the people and to enable this, debates about political and social values should be encouraged and are indeed crucial (Davidhoff, 1965:331,332,336). An emphasis is made that planning cannot and should not rely on technical abilities only – this is reference to the traditional way of planning. The technical abilities of the planner should be directed towards the improvement of communities, which in turn emphasises the need for attention on poverty stricken and disadvantaged peoples or communities.

Advocacy planning criticise ‘physical’ planning or traditional planning as being one sided. Planners need to be familiar with, and understand socio-economic problems, their causes and solutions (Davidhoff, 1965:336). Advocacy planning emphasise that planning should be able to aid the needy by transformation in government structure, which would allow the planner to influence policy with regards to planning for the city environment with particular attention on the poor and disadvantaged and enable their involvement in the planning process. It is largely influenced by a judicial perspective and theories of economics. The law is used in comparison to advocate for those who cannot fend for themselves, because of their status. Economics is used to explain the unequal division of resources and that there should be a redistribution of these resources. Those who have should provide for those whom do not have (Davidhoff, 1965:331-337).

Planning from this perspective could be defined as the process for determining appropriate future action (Davidhoff & Reiner, 1962:42). Being the advocate planner would entail being a provider of information, an analyst of current trends, a simulator of future conditions, a detailer of means and an advocate of specific substantive solutions. Advocacy planning could be seen as an extension or rather filling the gap of a perceived need for planning. It seems as if the theory attempts to aid in shortcomings of planning rather than providing a new theory of planning. It recognises that planning is a thinking process, which in turn would lead to action. This is a decision centred view of planning.

Another important work with regards to Advocacy and Pluralism is the earlier work of Paul Davidoff and Thomas Reiner, written in 1962: A Choice Theory in Planning. This theory propose to describe planning from a meta-theoretical perspective in which they explicitly state that this theory is not just for urban planning, but planning in any context (Davidhoff & Reiner, 1962:103).

Planning is presented as a process, which is directed towards future action (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:103). The planning process has a three levelled precondition, which would allow the planning process to take place (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:103). The three levels constitutes firstly: ends and criteria to determine ends. This level represents the “world-as-it-is” and thus the environment in which planning takes place. This environment is pictured from an economic perspective and draws strongly on economic theories. The criterion which identifies this environment is: 1) Individual preference and behaviour; 2) General groups (not the same as the individual); 3) Constraints which would diminish returns; 4) Resources are scarce and output limited: prioritise; 5) Entity within the interrelated parts which are in flux; 6) Bounded rationality (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:103-104). The second layer represents alternatives which are in relation to the ends and criteria of the first level. This provides the objectives for planning (why plan?) and there are three identified classes of objectives which are: 1) Efficiency and rational action; 2) Market aid or replacement, which aims at the model for optimum allocation, even distribution; 3) Change and choices about the way resources should be allocated (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:104-106). The third level
relate to action towards the determined ends, which entails the planning characteristics (elements consistent in the planning act). In the theory the subsequent elements are deemed basic for the planning act. 1) The achievement of ends; 2) The employment of choice; 3) Actions should be future oriented; 4) Results should be evident in a systematic manner; 5) Planning is comprehensive and the planner could distinguish and describe in detail the constituents of the complex system (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:106). After these preconditions are established the theory continues to describe the planning process.

The planning process was described with the help of identifying three constituents of the planning process which is needed for the creation of choice. The three necessary choice initiators are value formulation, means identification, and effectuation (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:106). Value formulation uncovers all hidden and contextual values, which would provide a hierarchy of values to be analysed, evaluated and then in turn could be tested (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:107, 109-110). Means identification would imply the reformed ends and the best alternative related to the given purpose would be chosen in a systematic way (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:112-113). Effectuation is the part of the planning process which entails the movement from the means which has been identified to the process of action (Davidhoff & Rainer, 1962:113).

This theory or perspective seems to be an extension of planning theory rather than suggesting a complete renovation of theory.

3.7 NEW HUMANISM (TRANSACTIVE PLANNING)

Transactive planning refers to interpersonal discourse through a process of mutual learning, which is enabled through decentralised planning institutions. This would promote the contribution of people over social processes that govern their welfare (Friedmann, 1973). During the early 70’s John Friedmann proposed a new way of thinking about planning (Friedmann, 2003:8; Taylor, 1998:113) as opposed to the rational decision-making planning. He proposed planning as social learning, which would involve dialogue as a basis for mutual learning between planners and client groups (Friedmann, 2003:8; Hudson, 1979:392). Its aim was to be one of innovation and action, involving questions of what values should guide practice and what strategies and how to develop community participation in planning (Friedmann, 2003:8). Emphasising dialogue and development of trusting interpersonal relationships (Hudson, 1979:394), which would focus more on face-to-face interpersonal dialogue with the people affected by decisions (Friedmann, 1973).

Another influential work was Friedmann’s (1973b) Retracking America: a Theory of Transactive Planning. Friedmann was educated in Chicago in the traditions of Scientific Conjuncture and its Liberal Political-Science Critique. During the late 1960s when he joined the University of California he viewed planning as a process of innovation and social learning. He acknowledged different forms and approaches of planning. He was of the opinion that valuating and knowing in the post-industrial society and the theories concerned with prediction was inappropriate. He directed his work to innovate structural change in institutions in a bureaucratic or hierarchical society. Transactive planning proposed a mixed method of scientific and personal knowledge through mutual learning in discourse (Weaver et al., 1985:160). Knowledge was connected to action with the purpose to create a learning society of people working together (Weaver et al, 1985:160). The heart of this approach is rooted in epistemology. The learning theorists argued against logical positivism and the Rational Comprehensive model. Their approach was centred on personal knowledge in social learning. Gaining knowledge was a process and not
a scientific fact, where the substance and process are not separate. It relates to the philosophy of the Pragmatists and Experiential Holism. The public interest could be seen parallel to the ideals of advocacy planning. It was regarded as being communal (Weaver et al., 1985:161).

Friedmann was concerned with the problem of implementation (‘action’) developed from the critique of decision planning approaches, which, according to Friedmann, was preoccupied with how to make decisions, with an overemphasis on reasoning, without knowing or successful attempts to implement decisions or to improve on the action thereof (Taylor, 1998:113). It calls for the development of community-based institutions which are traditionally overshadowed by centralised and bureaucratically organized agencies of government and corporate activities (Hudson, 1979:393[89]).

The transactive planning approach is centralised around the experience of people’s lives, which should inform policy issues (Friedmann, 1973). Friedmann maintained that the rational decision planning approaches were inclined to divide the stages of plan making and implementation (Taylor, 1998:113).

Other authors influenced by the transactive planning perspective were Donald Shon (reflective practice), John Forester (communicative planning) and Patsy Healey (Collaborative planning) (Friedmann, 2003: 8). Donald Schöns (1971) work on technology and social change had a significant influence on planning literature. He argued against the conservativeness of the Rational Comprehensive model and deemed it unsuitable for an unstable environment. There should be learning systems and networks which would promote contextual knowledge and horizontal communications (Weaver et al, 1985:160).

During the early 1970s the work of an economist named Dunn (1971) portrayed the temperament of science during that point in time. The work was titled: Economic and Social Development: A Process of Social Learning. Dunn questioned the appropriateness of general approaches related to prediction and he argued that planning would need to reconsider the process of social learning completely (Weaver et al, 1985: 159). He agreed with a Kuhnian notion of scientific evolution of paradigm shifts. It was said that social learning could be seen as the emerging paradigm for social science. Other authors as well as Dunn portray pragmatism, reflecting Experiential Holism and Scientific Conjuncture (Weaver et al., 1985:160).


Words commonly used to indicate the presence of Transactive planning or New Humanism are: mutual learning; decentralised planning institutions; social process; social action; dialogue; organisational development; transactive planning; new humanism.

According to Healey et al. (1982:17) New Humanism provides a philosophical basis for individual action and confronts the main paradigm of the time with its concepts of the expert professional.
3.8 EQUITY PLANNING

Words which may indicate the reference to or the presence of equity planning are: poverty and exclusion (Sandercock, 1998:97); empower (Sandercock, 1998:97); structural transformation (Sandercock, 1998:97); systematic inequalities (Sandercock, 1998:97).

Authors commonly associated with equity planning are: Norman Krumholz (Sandercock, 1998:93), John Forester (Sandercock, 1998:93).

According to Krumholz, equity planners seek to distribute power and resources. Another aim is to direct participation towards the poor, disadvantaged, working class community, instead of focussing on the local elites and those in power. Equity planners are concerned with urban inequalities with a political economy approach of who is getting what (Sandercock, 1998:93). The planner is a skilled communicator, a gatherer of information, a formulator of problems and a propagandist (Sandercock, 1998:93-94).

3.9 COMMUNICATIVE PLANNING

The communicative planning theory could be termed in many different ways (Communicative planning theory (CPT); Critical theory; Practice Theory; Collaborative Planning), however there are some variants to certain terms (Harrison et al, 2008:176; Huxley, 2000:376; Shönwandt, 2008:47; Watson, 2008; Yiftachel, 2003) and has been the dominant theory or perspective since the early nineties (Campbell & Marshall, 2002:180; Fischler, 2000:358; Harris, 2000; Innes, 1995; Sager, 2006:246; Sandercock, 2004; Taylor, 1999; Watson, 2002:28, 2003, 2008).

The Communicative Planning Theory (CPT) claimed to have constituted a revolutionary shift in the world of planning theory. It suggests the closing of a gap between theory and practice.

The ideal of the communicative planning process (which is, admittedly, unattainable), is unconstrained dialogue; a democratic craft (Sager, 2006:227), created on an argumentative platform within the planning practice (Fischler, 2000:364). It should foster community empowerment and recognise difference, diversity and disadvantage which have implications for the development of rational local democracy transcending issues (Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000:33).

Fischler (2000:362) argues that communicative planning theory rests on two assumptions, the first being that planning discourse is the best view into planning practice and the other that the most important element of planning practice is discursive interaction. The vulnerability of the communicative planning theory lies in its tendency to substitute moral persuasion for analysis (Fanstein, 2000:455). Some aspects of the communicative planning approach seem to be problematic as a theoretical basis for planning, mainly because they draw attention away from the underlying material and political processes which shape cities and regions (Yiftachel and Huxley, 2000:334, 338).

The planner is the mediator and facilitator of communicative interchanges (Huxley, 2000:274; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000:333; Healey, 1999; Marshall, 1999; Taylor, 1999:122, 162) between the institutional body and the community. Planning as a process of deliberation (Fischler, 2000:361-362), smoothing out obstacles within the different communicative spheres (Healey, 1999). The planner needs to understand the different arguments of the community, identify what is factual and substantive (Sager, 2006:227) and guide the knowledge or direct the
attention to where it is needed (Innes, 1995). Furthermore, communicative theorists make the role of the planner the central element of discussion, while the context in which the planner work and the outcome of planning becomes vague. Communicative planners ask what planners should be doing and the answer is that they should be ‘good’ (Fanstein, 2000:455).

The theory can be divided into three main paths (see figure 13): The ‘communicative turn’, the ‘institutional turn’ and the ‘Foucauldian perspective’ (Sandercock, 2004). The communicative turn is the most dominant of the three paths, best represented by John Forester (1989). The institutional turn is best represented by Patsy Healey and the Foucauldian perspective is best represented by Flyvbjerg and Fischler.

Figure 13: Three paths within communicative planning theory.

The communicative turn in CPT is largely influenced by Habermas (Taylor, 1998:123,124); Watson, 2002:29, 30; Hoch, 2007:272, 273, 276; Sager, 2006:228, 230, 234, 235, 246), although they have many critics such as Yiftachel and Huxley (2000) and their protest against Judith Innes’s (1995) statement of an ‘emerging paradigm’ also noted in Harris (2000:312), Hoch (2007:137, 274) and Watson (2008). This group forms the most dominant path within CPT (Sandercock, 2004; Watson, 2003). John Forester (1989) is arguably the best representative of the Communicative Turn path (Sandercock, 2004; Watson, 2008). In his article Understanding planning practice (Forester, 1989), he refers to the now known Communicative Planning Theory as “Critical Theory of Planning Practice.”

Forester explains that a planner should be a rational, ethical and effective person. He argues that as planners: “We need to know more than whose ends or interests planners may serve” (Forester, 1989:139). In other words,
we need to know about the people we plan for. This can be done through communicative interactions which should result in consensus and mutual understanding, which makes this theory inherently democratic (Foster, 1989). Mutual understanding is undoubtedly important and without that there cannot be meaning. Therefore the success of the planner depends on his or her intentions, interests and the audience. Forester provides descriptive verbs of what planners do: they are to warn others, present information, suggest new ideas, agree to perform tasks, argue for or against particular efforts, report relevant events, offer opinions and advice and comment on ideas and proposals for action (Forester, 1989:142). He claims that by perceiving planning practice as a communicative action, it provides a connection from analysis to implementation and in this way direct attention where it is needed (Forester, 1989:157).

Patsy Healy (‘institutional turn’) detests the notion of Habermas’s influence and maintains that it is several years of practical experience that equated to, in Healey’s case, Collaborative Planning. Healey’s CPT path could be called the ‘Institutional turn’ (Watson, 2008). It focuses mainly on the role of the government or institutional forms promoting them as a ‘dynamic endeavour’ which addresses the agendas of those with power to form the design (Healey, 1997). The design of institutional processes should facilitate collaboration, mutual learning and consensus building (Healey, 1997). Healey (1997:243-248) proposes planning as a strategic activity.

The Foucauldian path within CPT may be best described by Flyvbjerg and Fischler (Sandercock, 2004). The main ideas of the Foucauldian perspective are to ‘describe the problem’ and to ask or understand the history of why people think how they think, to know the person beyond or behind speech (Fischler, 2000:358). Flyvbjerg (1998) called academics to focus planner’s attention on the ‘dirty work’ of democracy rather that on the lofty ideal of consensus-building which is free of constraints (Fischler, 2000:358). Fischler writes with high regard of Foucault, but called him in good humour the “Frenchman and irresponsible cynic” (Fischler, 2000:359). Indeed, he seems like one, but he may have contributed unequivocal insight on how to look at communicative planning. Foucault being a social historian, studied the historical frameworks of groups and therefore understood the necessity to understand the historical framework of thinking, to be able to understand what people are saying (Fischler, 2000). He emphasises the importance of describing the problem, a phenomenon he refers to as “Problematisation” (Fischler, 2000:363).

Communication may well be the most important ‘tool’ in planning (from the CPT perspective), relating to the role of the planner as the communicator or facilitator. Fischler (2000:362) went so far as to state that the emphasis shifted with this theory from communication in planning to a definition of planning as communication. There is more to communication than simply words; there are many ‘elements’ intertwined and overlapped to eventually create a communicative body which transcends the obvious. The communication aspect of this theory includes language and rationality, arguably the foundation of communication and understanding. This gives rise to what one could gain from communication, which is social learning. More ingredients are consensus (the ideal) and power (the need to spread equally).

Words commonly associated with Communicative Planning are: mutual learning (Sandercock, 1998:95); transactive style of planning (Sandercock, 1998:95); social learning (Sandercock, 1998:94); power (Sandercock, 1998:96); Habermas (Sandercock, 1998:96); Rawls (Sandercock, 1998:97); social justice (Sandercock, 1998:97); Foucault; Forester; Healey.
Authors commonly associated with communicative planning are: John Friedmann; John Forester; Judith Innes; Bent Flyvbjerg; Patsy Healey; Beauregard (1996).

3.10 NEO MARXISM AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

Words commonly associated with the Political Economy perspective are: social distribution; economical distribution; government; economic organization; Marxism; anti-capitalist; political activity; public interest; class domination; network of power; major structural change; local government; market system; system of private land ownership; private property rights; organization of production and society.

Authors writing or whom wrote within the Political Economy perspective are: Samir Amin, Manuel Castells, David Harvey; Beauregard, 1978; 1980; Darke, Kirk (1980), Paris (1982), Peattie (1978), Robert Goodman (1971), Kuenzlen (1972).

The emergence of Political Economy gained attention between the end of the 1960’s or early 1970’s as the critique of mainstream planning in the work of Samir Amin, Manuel Castells and David Harvey (Sandercock, 1998:91; Schönwandt, 2008:10; Weaver et al, 1985:161). Neo-Marxism emerged in as a critique of capitalist society (Schönwandt, 2008), which entails capitalist urban and regional planning (Weaver et al, 1985:163). The perspective’s inherent principle and aim is that the only valid social action is the promotion of major structural change or to instigate it (Healey, 1982:17) with regards to the organization of production is based on private ownership of the means of the production and exchange (Taylor, 1998:105). Planning is seen as part of the state and serves as a representative for the interests of dominant groups (Allmendinger, 2002:74). Neo-Marxism is based on the assumption that political power in society and class structure is founded on the economic relations of production (Weaver et al, 1985:162).

The foundation of the Political Economy perspective is in the disapproval of the social distribution of advanced capitalist societies (Healey, 1982:16). Epistemologically Neo-Marxism is based on sociological knowledge, which could be understood as being structuralist and deterministic (Weaver et al, 1985:162). According to Taylor, the system of private property rights and a free competitive market could arguably be the central aspect of land development in capitalist societies (Taylor, 1998:102). This theory locates planning as an inherently political activity within a capitalist state (Sandercock, 1998:91). The state is seen as an instrument of the bourgeoisie and a means to express the vanity of the oppressive ruling class; a mechanism to enable capitalism (structuralism) and its survival and an instrument which enables class domination or the class system (Allmendinger, 2002:73, 81). The state is central to the network of power relations, characterised by capitalist societies (Allmendinger, 2002:73, 74). A capitalist state revolves around profit by disposing of surplus goods and planning seems to change with the tide of where the capital lies. The state serving the interest of capital and therefore planning, seen as part with the state, and therefore promoting capitalism (Allmendinger, 2002:75, 79; Taylor, 1998:104).

Schönwandt (2008) calls this model the (neo) Marxist Model of planning, which questions the concept of “public interest” and argues that class interests are the true driving forces of public interest. There is no definition of the task of the planner in this model (Shönwandt, 2008:10), though Healey proposed that the planner would need to have practical skills based on broader knowledge of economic organisation and the role of the state, because this
perspective provides a description of how the variation of the economy influences the problems of government and how this influences planning practice (Healey, 1982:16). Planning and planning theory develops and changes in accordance with where capitalism is served best (Allmendinger, 2002:81), assessing the effectiveness in shaping urban development in relation to the market system (Taylor, 1998:102).

Central to planning is the where and how of production and consumption of labour goods and where these centres are positioned in the towns and cities (Allmendinger, 2002:75). Traditionally markets are located within the town centres, because the town centre was usually most accessible and accessibility and market location are synonymous (Allmendinger, 2002:75). The organization of production is basic to the organisation of society in general. In production people have certain social relations of production and a system of production determine certain social rules and laws for it to be maintained – which in turn implies a certain system of powers or political system (Taylor, 1998:104).

Marxism argues that the existence of the state and its economic system are passed on from the government in power to the proceeding government, which leads to the managing and maintaining of the already existing economy. Their actions would be to enhance and strengthen the inherited system, instead of changing it – and therefore strengthening capitalism. Theorists within this perspective share the Marxist view of capitalism (Taylor, 1998:105).

The Marxist urban theorists agreed, during the 1970s, that after World War II, the planning systems in capitalist countries (Western Europe and North America) remained to be in support of the power of the capitalist class. This was supposedly why the system of private land ownership and property development was not replaced but rather instigated planning systems which regulated capitalist land development (Taylor, 1998:107). But according to Weaver et al. (1985:162) the public interest, in capitalist society, is fragmented along class lines, developed through historical circumstances (Weaver et al., 1985:162). Marxist argues that under socialism, if the working class control the means of production and the state, the public interest would become collective-monumental (Weaver et al., 1985:163).

Furthermore, by identifying planning largely with state intervention in the land market and development process, and the relations between the public and private sectors, it provides planners with a clear substantive area of concern, and one which relates to government procedures and institutional arrangements. Statements in this perspective have a tendency to be highly generalised and based on superficial evidence or case studies (Healey et al., 1982:16).

3.11 RADICAL PERSPECTIVE

Radical planning is aimed at permanent change in social institutions and values, based on ideas which are tested in context (Hudson, 1979:394[90]) and opposed to unequal relations and distribution of power (Sandercock, 1998:223). The Radical Perspective is a postmodern critique of planning (Hoch, 2002:63) rooted in civil society rather than the state (Friedmann, 2003:9). The state is seen as an organisation serving the interests of the bourgeois (Fanstein and Fanstein, 1979:382). Rational planning fail to establish the greater good of public interest (Hoch, 2002:63), by depoliticising activities of the state based on scientific rationality (Fanstein and Fanstein, 1979:328), a scientifically determined public interest (Fanstein and Fanstein, 1979:383). Planners are perceived of as agents of the state (Fanstein and Fanstein, 1979:383). The impression is sketched of the weak and poor whom
suffer under the powerful and prosperous elite (Hoch, 2002:63). The solution is a motion for structural change (Fanstein and Fanstein, 1979:381). Emphasis is placed on the heterogeneous public and providing a democratic foundation to everyone, enabling different groups and interests in a society (Hoch, 2002:63). It is action-orientated (Friedmann, 2003:9). There are two streams within the Radical planning, firstly, a combination of activism, idealism and pragmatism which focus on precise substantive ideas about collective action with results for the immediate future, for example transactive planning (Hudson, 1979:390). The second stream of thought focuses more on the theory of the state and the cause of class structures and economic connections (Hudson, 1979:390). Both streams of Radical planning accentuate ideological orientation, the limitations of social science, the role of personal knowledge, and participation (Beard, 2003:17; Hudson, 1979:392). Common arguments would entail for example the focus on long run results instead of short run, the process of change involve social, economic, and historical connections, methods should reflect the precise nature of the social problems in its socio-political context (Beard, 2003:18; Hudson, 1979:393). Hudson contrasts these arguments with the other more dominant theories of the time, indicating that they are more focussed on prediction based on existing social structures and processes (Hudson, 1979:393). The scholars connected to the Marxist type of theories believe that urban planning can be connected with social progress (Fanstein and Fanstein, 1979: 381: [63]).

The philosophical foundations are rooted in the thinking of John Dewey, Ivan Illich, and Paul Goodman amongst others. The general tendency draws on everyday life of the local communities, with minimum intervention of state and maximum participation of the public (Hudson, 1979:390). It is rooted in the system of economic production and exchange (Fanstein and Fanstein, 1979:383).

Words commonly associated with the Radical Perspective are: distribution of power; poverty and exclusion; advocacy; feminism; racism; oppression; exploitation; Marxism; social transformation; marginalised; contextual knowledge; social transformation; social activism; community-based planning; marginalised communities; societal guidance (Sandercock, 1998:97-99).

Authors generally associated with the Radical perspective are: Castells (1983); Clavel (1983); Friedmann (1987: 317-412, 1989); Grabow and Heskin (1973); Heskin (1991); Leavitt (1994); Leavitt and Saegert (1990).

### 3.12 LIBERTARIAN / LIBERAL PLANNING

This perspective encompasses a vast variety of economic and political-economy theories (Shönwandt, 2008:16). The liberal planning perspective argues that planning should be kept to a minimum and only done when absolutely necessary. The primary foundation for Liberal theory is the idea of the priority of the right over the good and the principle of state neutrality concerning the good itself. An acceptable state would be one where its principles and criteria do not assume an all-inclusive idea of what a ‘good’ life is (Moroni, 2004:156). Liberals do not reject the idea of the public interest – they simply have their own interpretation of it (Moroni, 2004:165).

Stefano Moroni, an Italian Liberal planner, identified common features in a variety of political philosophies which are present in liberalism. They are:

- Idea of moral individualism;
- The idea of moral universalism;
- The idea of the priority of the right over the good;
• The idea of a plurality of conceptions of the good;
• The idea of the centrality of certain basic rights and liberties, guided by philosophers like Kant and Locke;
• Existing different liberal perspectives.

The different liberal perspectives are on the one hand the libertarian-liberal and on the other hand the 'egalitarian-liberal' perspectives. There are only a few examples of libertarian-liberal perspectives in planning theory. Egalitarian-liberal perspectives are more common. The main difference between the two distinctive liberal groupings is that the libertarian-liberals are concerned with negative rights only. Negative rights are for example rights against oppression. The egalitarian-liberals deal with positive rights as well. Positive rights include rights to certain resources (Moroni, 2004:165).

The most recent development in planning theory tends to focus on the issue of planning in uncertainty and what it entails. Jean Hillier is one of the leading authors of this new development of planning thought.
CHAPTER 4:  THE DIFFERENT TRENDS OF PLANNING THEORY EXPLAINED
VIA THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Scientist, or in this case, planners, are not questioning whether the tradition in and from which they are taught is right or wrong, or perhaps even realise that a certain way of thinking is governing their education and way of thinking (Giere, 1988:35).

The cognitive approach in the philosophy of science could be divided into two groups before the 1960s (Giere, 1988:22). These two groupings are, according to Giere, Logical Empiricism and The Social Structure of Science. These two groupings are inherent in planning theory and form the divide between the two major groupings.

4.2 TWO DIFFERENT GROUPINGS OF WRITING PLANNING THEORY AS SEEN THROUGH THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Planning literature could be narrowed down to two fundamental, larger groupings, according to my understanding of the field of planning literature. These two groupings are inexplicably linked to two seemingly opposed philosophical groupings. The philosophical groupings relevant for discussion are frequently referred to as the Rationalists and the other grouping, the Empiricists. Rationalism refers to the theory of Science and Empiricism refers to the division in the Theory of Knowledge (Faludi, 1985:33; Teitz, 1985:139). In the same way Faludi (1973; 1985:29) divided the planning literature into the Theory of Planning and the Theory in Planning; relating this division to the division between Empiricism and Rationalism and at the same time created the start of a framework for planning literature and a description of planning. The Rational group connotes to the same term referred to in planning literature – the Rational group. This group, when seen in a historical perspective, would entail logical positivism, which has a strong empirical orientation. This division (4.2) ignores this fact for the sake of argument – which should make sense when perceived in an even broader spectrum. The other grouping, the Empirical group relates to the Pragmatic movement in planning literature.

In my opinion, the division in planning literature could be understood by means of the Theory of Knowledge, also referred to as Epistemology. Here is a short description of the origin of the division of the two groupings within planning theory. It should be emphasised, in my opinion, that this causes the division in planning thought. This has already been mentioned. There is a fine line, which should be visible, only if it is considered with an open mind. It could serve as a tool for orientation as well. The Theory of Knowledge inherently asks the question – “What could we as human beings know for certain?” The relative answer was that almost everything human beings know is open to doubt. This became the driving force for philosophers to develop a Theory of Knowledge (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:269-270). The Theory of Knowledge is a science of science – a theoretical science (Popper, 2009:7) relying on different ways to obtain knowledge or seeking truth. The rationalist tried to find certain knowledge in terms of procedures of human reasoning (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:269-270). The logical system or reasoning could be traced back to the cradle of western science – ancient Greece, more particularly Euclids Geometry (Einstein, 1933:81). The common way of thinking in the traditional rationalist view is that knowledge cannot be discovered by sense-experiences, but only in some mental realm. In reaction to this a different approach developed to address the problem of knowledge (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:269-270) realised after Kepler and Galileo (Einstein, 1933: 81) – the Empiricists – the primary second truth (Einstein, 1933:81) in an attempt to discover the basis for knowledge in
The nature of the theory of knowledge could be divided into an inductive or a deductive orientation (Popper, 2009:8). The deductive nature relates to Rationalism (classical) and the inductive nature relates to classical Empiricism (Popper, 2009:8). Popper rejects the idea of traditional Rationalism and classical Empiricism; he combines a more mediocre form of Rationalism and Empiricism in his thinking, which he relates to deduction, rather than induction. Deduction is a logical derivation (mentally) to obtain knowledge and induction provides generalisations about empirical (senses) studies (Popper, 2009:8). Classical Rationalism is a synonym for reason without the reference to experience with deductive conclusions. Classical Empiricism is seemingly opposite to rationalism. Empiricism’s fundamental statement is that the truth could only be decided by means of experience (Popper, 2009:11) and that pure logical thinking cannot provide knowledge of the world of experience (Einstein, 1933:81). According to the Empiricists all knowledge about reality begins and ends in the world of experience and they regard conclusions obtained by purely rational processes as ‘empty’ systems (Einstein, 1933:81).

Karl Popper, whom received much criticism from the well renowned “Vienna Circle”, combined the two approaches in a certain sense, as noted by Faludi (1973, 1985, and 1986) – in methodology. Yet, certainly as Popper (2009:403) stated: “The way in which one judge the significance of a science is, no doubt, a matter of taste to a certain degree.”

4.3 EPISTEMOLOGY IN PLANNING THEORY

4.3.1 RATIONALISM

Rationality is the logical explanation of an action. The logical construction of an argument would be determined from the view it is argued from – paradigm or inherent conviction. Therefore there are different types of rationality, as portrayed by Diesing (1962), which relates to the context they are used in. He distinguished between technical, economic, social, legal, and political rationality (Reade, 1985:81).

Altogether, there should be a distinction between classic Rationalism, Rationalism and Rational thought. Classic Rationalism relates to a very strict way of thinking and fundamentally to the philosophical notion of how to obtain knowledge. The theory of knowledge is inevitably divided between Rationalism and Empiricism. The most basic way of explaining this is that knowledge is obtained by thinking, or going through a mental process. This relates to philosophers as Descartes (“I think therefore I am”). However, this point of view is very different from what Rationalism and Rational thought is a somewhat different concept. Rationalism, as here Diesing (1962) and Faludi (1973) already explained is the different ways of thinking of planning and could be termed or classified in even opposing group. Being rational is inherent to being and what one might term as rational may be, from a different point of view, irrational simply because it does not make sense to that group and then make complete sense to another group. The trick, it appears to be, is to try and see things from different points of view – even those whom one decided would or could not make sense.

4.4 ETHICS IN PLANNING THEORY

4.2.1 PRAGMATISM
Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition (Healey, 2009:287) in planning, which places emphasis on practical judgment situated in specific contexts (Healey, 2009:279), learning from social experiments in order to develop a healthy democracy (Friedmann, 1996: 15[14]). The pragmatist asks the question of what does the planner need to know for the problem at hand? – closing the gap between analysis and action (Hoch, 2002:53). It seeks the continuous systematic flow of action (Healey, 2009:285) connecting this to the social sciences interpretive nature into a social context (Healey, 2009:279; Stein & Harper, 2003:127). Fitting purposes to context (Hoch, 2002:66).

The relation with pragmatism in planning was at times intentional and in other instances unintentionally used by planning authors (Healey, 2009:287). This view is most commonly connected with postmodernism, post positivist, poststructuralist or ‘cultural’ ideas within Western philosophy and social sciences (Healey, 2009:287).

The wave of pragmatism in planning started during the 1970’s (Healey, 2009:278), and since the initial influence, there has been many different developments and interpretations of pragmatism in planning perspective. In the United States pragmatic philosophy is related to three scholars – Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey (Healey, 2009:278). Dewey had a noteworthy influence on the Chicago school of planning and policy in the 1940s and 1950s (Healey, 2009:280). UC Berkeley also had a significant role to play in the pragmatic ideas within planning (Healey 2009:286). Planning thinkers associated with the pragmatist way of thinking influenced by Berkeley, is C.West Churchman, Hilda Blanco, Niraj Verma and John Forester (Healey, 2009:284-285). Donald Schon, Rorty and Bernstein had a significant role in the revival of planning thought which connected planning practice and the method of planning (Healey, 2009:284). Other authors within the pragmatic tradition is Charles Hoch, influenced by the work of John Forester and drawing on James’s ideas (Healey, 2009:285); Frank Fischer influenced by Forester and Hoch; Judith Innes.

Some words commonly associated with pragmatism in planning theory are: complexity; uncertainty; democracy; ethics; logic; Nathaniel Lichfield; context; poststructuralist; postmodernist; liberal democracy; Lindblom; liberal values, nonrelativist; communicative planning theory; Innes, Sager , Healey; empirical; objective laws; governance; sociospatial process; practical; transformative; practical judgement; discovery through experience; situated particularities of practices; diverse purposes; Edgar Dunn (Friedmann, 1996:15[14]); reflection in action (Hoch, 2002:65).

Philosophers and authors associated with pragmatism in planning are: Stephen Toulmin; Charles Pierce; Oliver Windell Holmes, William James; John Dewey; Donald Schon The reflective practitioner (1983); Jurgen Habermas; Michel Foucault; Hoch (1984a, 1994, 1996, 2002, 2007a, 2007b) Nathaniel Lichfield; James Thormington (1996); Richard Rorty; Robert Bernstein.

4.2.2 UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism is a philosophy of ethics (Taylor, 1980:162). It has been perceived as a political philosophy connected to a democratic government as well (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:39).

Central to this perspective is the identification of individual utility, which is used to evaluate the proposals of policies, projects and plans. This should guide the decision makers’ course of action, within the public interest. The most common application or tool to determine public interest within the Utilitarian concept is the economic
investment analysis method (Alexander, 2002:230). Happiness, in the Utilitarian tradition is determined by the utility measures of individuals (Moroni, 2004:155) and according to Alexander the Utilitarians are not individualistic enough (Alexander, 2002:228-230) and therefore prone to loose the intended individual utility in a general impersonal calculus (Moroni, 2004:155). The principle of utility attempted to create a determinant of when actions are right and wrong. An action would be right when it produces greatest happiness for the majority. When an action produces more happiness than harm, it would be regarded as a good action and the other way around (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:38).

Utilitarianism incorporates the concept of the public interest which is equated as the collective good, maximized in general welfare. Underlying Utilitarianism are welfare economics, some economists and philosophers (Alexander, 2002:230).

Criticisms of Utilitarianism seem to be of a more methodological nature rather than from an ethical stance. One of these criticisms is that happiness and unhappiness cannot actually be measured and seems impossible (Taylor, 1980:162). An example is the question of how to divide the cost and benefits amongst the population (Taylor, 1980:163).

According to Moroni, from a philosophical stance, Utilitarians usually have a strong individualistic focus. This implies individual preferences, desires and interests. Public choice, however, is in contrast with the original principle of the individual focus - it tends toward the idea of a collective utility or the sum of individual utilities. The individual person is lost in a large-scale calculus of utility measures and not of individuals. Moroni refers to John Rawls (1971:27) when he writes that “…utilitarians do not take seriously the distinction between persons” (Moroni, 2004:155).

Modern planning decisions are generally guided by Utilitarianism. The work of Jeremy Bentham is seen as foundational for Utilitarianism. It argues what planners should do, which could be determined empirically to maximise happiness in a population (Taylor, 1980:162).

Words commonly associated with Utilitarianism in planning theory are: maximizing happiness; plan evaluation; benefit-cost analysis; public interest; utility; individualistic; general calculus; decision making; economic analysis; ethical principles; multi-criteria decision analysis; instrumental rationality; comprehensive framework.

The Utilitarian philosophy of ethics is chiefly concerned with the principle of maximizing happiness (Taylor, 1980:162; Alexander, 2002:228). The principle of utility claims to be objective in the judgement of being right or wrong (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:38). This is the driving force for what planners ‘should do’ which in this view relates to plan evaluation (Taylor, 1980:162), generally (or widely) directed by the benefit-cost analysis (Taylor, 1980:162; Alexander, 2002:230) in the evaluation of proposed public projects (Alexander 2002:230).
“It is not just our commonsense concepts that are important for an understanding of the world, however, but also how we structure our thought in our commonsense framework as well. How we reason and argue in this framework are preconditions of scientific knowledge and theorising. Scientific understanding depends, in other words, both conceptually and pragmatically upon our commonsense understanding, including the way the world is categorically structured, and the way we reason in terms of that structure. In this regard, the representation of our scientific knowledge involves more than the representation of a large number of facts or beliefs about the objects in a given domain of scientific enquiry, regardless of whether those facts or beliefs are in conflict with what is believed by common sense (Cocchiarella, 2007:9).”

In reaction to this quote, firstly the question will be asked: “What is a theory?” followed by the underlying question of the construction of theories and their differences in nature (well purported by Einstein (1933).) After the ‘framework’ for theory is realised, the preliminary sections could be divided into the levels of philosophy, methodology and empirical levels of theorising.

5.1 DIFFERENT LEVELS OF COGNITION AND ITS CONNECTION TO EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE TWO GROUPINGS WITHIN PLANNING THEORY

According to Hempel, any criterion of cognitive significance would have to meet certain requirements if it is to be acceptable (Hempel, 1965:41-53).

To illustrate the connection between theory and different levels of arguments, the work of Einstein is used. See Figure 14 for the following description. Einstein explains the structure of theoretical science as follows: First of all, science comprise of the totality of primary concepts. The concept encompasses a variety of layers starting with concepts and theories directly linked to sense experiences. This could be called the first stage of development or the primary system. These concepts have a lack of logical unity and to derive relations between these concepts it is needed to take a step back and invent a system which could interrelate the different concepts (making sense) in a logical manner. This could be called the secondary system which provides the primary concepts and relations for the first layer. Again, to find interrelations in a logically derived system, which would make sense of the secondary system, one could invent a tertiary system. This ‘pattern’ of conceptual layers or perhaps as the inductivists would call it “degrees of abstraction” and it would continue the process until a system of greatest conceivable unity is conceived. It would not be a definite system, but a logical derived one, in aid of making greater sense of the world. The layers proposed should not have a definite separation between them, because it would not always be clear what belongs where or in which direction it is going. In his own words Einstein (1933:83-84) wrote: “The relation is not analogous to that of soup to beef but rather of wardrobe number to overcoat” and with regards to the choice of fundamental relations: “... it is similar to that of a man engaged in solving a well designed puzzle”.

Figure 14: Einstein’s structure of theories.

Socrates described a similar way of perceiving information (See figure 15). He noted that there are two types of information. The one is ‘intelligible information’, which relates to Platonic ideas and reason. In planning literature, there are frequent referrals to Platonic type of ideas. Here it is attempted to place it in context. This type of information uses the world of knowledge to find forms or universals that are within us and could be divided into two levels. The highest level would be regarded as complete knowledge, fully aware of the platonic idea in ones mind and understanding its nature. The lowest level of intelligible information would be regarded as ideas as hypotheses without understanding their nature and assumptions are made because of uncertainty. The second type of information is visible information or sensible information (acquired through the senses). This information would only report how ‘the world’ would seem to us or what it appears to be. According to Socrates this does not constitute to knowledge – it seems as if he meant that only once these observations are interpreted that it would constitute to knowledge. The visible information could be divided into two levels. The higher level would involve
clear patterns, which is identifiable objects and coherently organised images. The lower level forms vague, blurred conglomeration of patterns (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:216-220).

**Figure 15:** Socrates' different manners of perceiving information.

According to Rosenberg the brain and the mind are two separate and distinct substances. The mind is a non-physical substance which could directly be related to human action – which is not always related to physical science, while the physical brain as substance could contribute to human action as well. The point is – in the same way cognitive constructions of how humans organise the facts which surrounds them is crucial. One could relate the cognitive development and mind to Rationalism and the physical brain to Empiricism. The Theory of Knowledge implies that there is an Empirical (sense) and a Rational (mind) connection to theorising.

There are three levels of theorizing indicated. The level, which relates most to thinking, is philosophy. The level which connects mostly with implementation is the empirical level of theorising. In the middle of philosophy and the empirical level is the level of methodology – connecting the two different levels. Each level has a different purpose with regards to theorising. The pattern of the three levels of theorisation is present in not just planning literature, but other disciplines as well and addressed in philosophical literature.

John Friedmann’s article *A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behaviour* (1967) could be related to the different levels of theorising. His distinctions between the different levels are addressed as functionally rational thought, non-bounded rationality and extra-rational thought.

### 5.2 AN EXPLANATION OF THEORY AND COGNITION

In an attempt to explain planning theory, authors tend to give either an historical overview or create a typology of planning theory. In both planning is purported through the author's perspective. The different perspectives are 'rewritten' and 're-classified' according to the perspective of the author. The seemingly only way to create a wider perspective from one perspective is to allow the being of different perspectives, and in this not to accept just one
perspective to be ‘truth’. Truth in planning is relative and should rather be a collage of different perspectives than one.

John Friedmann gives a vast overview over planning theory and its different perspectives in Two Centuries of Planning Theory: an Overview in the book Planning in the Public Domain: from Knowledge to Action (1996). What should be known is that all these perspectives are rewritten in terms of power and its relation to power. Providing proper ground to typify this work as reflecting planning theory in terms of power onto all other perspectives, which do not necessarily encompass this vision. The object of this work is then – power (Friedmann, 1996:9).

Faludi approaches the understanding of planning theory by addressing the nature of planning (Faludi, 1973:30[2]) and then creating a kind of a framework by means of abstract criteria to explain what planning theory is from his perspective (Faludi, 1973:34).

Yiftachel created a typology of planning in order to make sense of what planning theory is in the well renowned article Towards a new typology of urban planning theories (1989). The typology is written from an advocacy planning perspective and all comments are related to this perspective.

Another argument to explain planning theory or structure is to endeavour the ideas of modernism and post-modernism (Fanstein, 2000:140; Sandercock, 1998).

Planning (theory) has not developed into something vast and elusive, it has always been. Since its inception it was an overlapping of different disciplines with different aims and purposes. The intention of planning has never been definite – it is a balancing act in context.

As perceived by this study, the relevant paradigm comprise of a certain view over planning in particular. As already explained, all perspectives, regardless of their nature, would have methodology whether it be complete or not. Just a reminder and emphasis on the argument that the concept of something is not the something as seen in reality, indeed they are very different in their nature. In another way to perceive of the ‘slices of reality’ it is necessary to evaluate reality in a secondary system and the secondary systems, again, in a tertiary system, and this process could go on. Furthermore, theoretism is descriptions of either reality or systems deducted from reality. Bearing this in mind, if the description would entail a description of an empirical study which is much focussed it would be regarded as an Empirical theory. For example the study of the development corridor between (fictitious) Sentimentville and Abstractville, with a focus on the locations of small businesses or a description of the exclusion of people with regards to work opportunity, living in an informal settlement outside the perennial area of the city.

For the purpose of this study, methodology is an analytic description of logical circumstance. This study proposes that the next conceptual level, the different perspectives relevant to planning theory should be inherent to theory of planning (Faludi, 1973), which should be regarded as a tool for the development of methodologies in planning. It is understood that Faludi regards theory of planning as methodology – here this study makes a slight distinction between methodology and theory of planning. This study regards theory of planning as a tool for the development of methodologies for planning. Though in theory of planning – the complete theory – already proposed a framework for the development of methodology and in the same breath Faludi provided his own methodological description based on the combined nature of Rationalism and Empiricism, interpreted by Karl Popper in combination with the works of Friend and Jessop. The largest perceivable description of systems or reality would be regarded as philosophy. Philosophy, for the purpose of this study, would be regarded as a conceptual
framework, administering the nature of planning. Therefore just by stating that the nature of planning should be empirical, would be regarded in this dissertation, as being philosophical.

5.3 PHILOSOPHY

Popper argues that the difference between something and the concept of that something derives a kind of hierarchy of analytical types – a hierarchy of meta-theories (Popper, 2009:427). In this sense theorists would write about empirical science and about logic and about the relationships between these sciences. In my opinion, the concept of empirical science is not a concept of empirical science and the concept of logic is not the concept of logic. This would result to a system of concepts that would most probably be identified as philosophy (Popper, 2009:427). Popper regards methodology within the sphere of philosophy, however this dissertation is of the opinion that philosophy and methodology are separate and yet intertwined. Philosophy, here, is regarded as a broader conceivable perspective than methodology, this statement is similar to the view and description of Einstein’s (1933:83-84) different conceptual layers.

Philosophy forms the basis for political conviction and hence different perspectives – which could be traced back to philosophical origin in its arguments – if it is arguments of our time rather than arguments of planning. Philosophy in planning literature is unclear and uncertain (Faludi, 1987:60) and still important (Faludi, 1987:220). Philosophy underpins planning ideas and these ideas are accepted around the world without questioning what these ideas constitute (Faludi, 1987:221) or understanding the depth or direction thereof.

The term and definition – extra-rational thought – by John Friedmann (1967) could be related to philosophy in planning. This level of thought (here presented as a level of theorisation) is not situated on specific technical expertise. It is the foundation of political decisions and inherent in planning decisions.

5.4 META-THEORY

The theory of knowledge as noted above deals with the essential question of what could we know for certain as human beings. This implies that the questions which would relate to the Theory of Knowledge would deal with questions of validity and not questions of fact. This then, in turn, provides a methodology for Empirical science. Methodology in science is the procedure by which something is justified and not the way in which something is discovered (Popper, 2009:4).

In my opinion, methodology, as a procedure, which describes the justification of something provides the framework for all theories, being Empirical, Rationalist or intermediate. This should allow the development and/or description of paradigms (each one of them) on a methodological level. This in turn implies that methodology cannot be contextless or “hollow”, for there should be ample room for definition of the context within the framework of the paradigm from which the world would be viewed from.

According to Hempel it is a basic principle of Empiricism that a sentence makes a cognitively significant assertion and it should be either analytical (purely logical meaning or significance) or should be testable by experiential evidence (having empirical meaning or significance) (Hempel, 1965:41-53). Hempel was a self proclaimed Empiricist and his basic principle was that an empirical sentence creates a cognitive assertion either in a logical or a testable way (Hempel, 1965:44-53). This implies, in my opinion, that there must be a rationalisation (higher level
of thinking) within Empiricism, being able to create a cognitive assertion, of course then based on fact. Faludi states it in a different way. Empirical theory presupposes a normative point of view towards its subject matter (Faludi, 1985:29).

According to Popper the theory of science relates to methodology as a concept (Popper, 2009:434). Methodology is an analytic-descriptive description of logical circumstances (Popper, 2009:434). Note that Hempel described the basic principle of Empiricism as an either analytical or experimental (description). Popper combines the two fundamentally different foundations (Rationalism and Empiricism) within methodology – explained here in his definition of methodology. Popper relates methodology to the description of the scientific spirit naturalistically and that the description could be derived systematically from some hypothesis (Popper, 2009:435). This is not, according to Popper, an attempt to form a system of securely founded knowledge, but to understand the connections within nature on a deeper level (Popper, 2009:437). In my understanding his work, Popper states that there are different levels of thinking about the world. This study regards it as the different levels of theorising – Popper intends it to establish methodology – connecting it with the theory of knowledge and the theory of science this dissertation, regards the theory of knowledge and the theory of science as being philosophical foundations for methodology and then in turn how to view or apply empirically (or action).

According to Popper the theory of knowledge is a general methodology for empirical science. Methodology is the attempt to explain the methods of, for example, empirical science and not to determine the methods, which Popper terms as the theory of method (Popper, 2009:467).

In planning theory or literature, according to my understanding of the field, the predominant view over methodology, or anything other than what is known in this study as Empiricism, would be regarded as an empty, hollow framework, which is incapable of explaining planning in reality (Healey, 1982:18). This is not the perception of this study, but it is of the opinion of the larger planning academic community. Popper regards, as do this study, methodology as being far from being devoid of practical utility (Popper, 2009:403) Furthermore, and rightly so, methodology would be regarded as normative theory (Healey, 1982:18). However as previously explained, it will be emphasised by repetition to make sense of planning, it is crucial to describe planning from a broader level. Placing the different paradigms within the construction of methodology would equate to the development of many different methodologies which could be compared on the same cognitive level, referring here to the different levels of conception as described by Einstein (1933). In conjunction to this, the concept that the mind is not the same as the brain and therefore cannot or should not be explained on the same cognitive level as if they where. The only level of abstraction where different paradigms could result in the development of many descriptions of planning is in methodology – providing its rightful place as the describing of the process in view of the many perceptions of planning. If only one theory should exist and all other theories are determined according to this perspective – it would bluntly be - unscientific - and undoubtedly, one sided. By allowing different perspectives to prosper it could contribute to a healthy constructive debate in planning literature. Just by the acceptance that there is no ultimate theory and that to enable the growth of planning and in the faith of being constructive, planning theorists should promote the development and education of different perspectives. The acknowledgement of different perspectives in planning literature should allow a more creative learning and thinking environment in planning schools and theory and would create the awareness that it is possible to mould theory into one perspective which would result in a ‘one way’, tunnel vision thinking. The assumption, and the idea, gladly excepted by this study, is that all perspectives has value in the sense of contributing to the constructive development of planning, planning theory or
literature, with the main aim of constructing the environment for the purpose of human well being and ultimately finding out what this may be with regards to planning and its activities and influence. This would discourage stagnant arguments and open up perception. Thinking about planning should not be confined to just one way of thinking, creating a field devoid of perspective. We need to continuously question the reliability of our knowledge (Popkin & Stroll, 1986:204) about planning to secure growth in thinking about planning.

“Thinking is general, too. It is useful, nevertheless, to pay attention to how it is done... (Faludi, 1987:135).”

5.5 EMPIRICAL THEORIES (ENTITY THEORIES)

The Empiricist theoretisms position requires that empirical-scientific theories must contain a hypotheses or at least provisional assumptions (Popper, 2009:470). According to Popper the axioms of a theory could be regarded as implicit definitions of its basic concepts (Popper, 2009:473). The empirical sciences are in a position where basic concepts are defined implicitly. The theory as a whole – with all its concepts corresponds to reality and not the basic concept (Popper, 2009:473). In my opinion, the empirical scientific theories relates more directly to reality, in a different way than the concept.

Wittgenstein’s view purports the idea that it is only a singular empirical statement or a particular “slice of reality” that are meaningful statements. Logical tautologies and contradictions are empty of meaning and all other statements are meaningless, i.e. Philosophy and methodology (Popper, 2009:409). Already mentioned in section 2.2.4, I regard Empiricism as being highly philosophical and that it has its own methodology, comparable to Rationalism. There should be a distinction between Empiricism and empirical studies. Empirical studies refer to studies of reality – case studies if that is what one would prefer to call it.

According to Popper strict positivism is the view that natural laws are not universal empirical statements but singular empirical statements. In my understanding of this, a connection is made between concepts. The positivist theory is related to empirical theory. An empirical statement relates to reality. Empiricism relates to a philosophical orientation and a particular methodology – under which different perspectives could be grouped. A methodological decision would be to limit the number of attempted tests of a theory, which would bring about symmetry of truth values (Popper, 2009:418).
Procedural planning theory in this study primarily refers to the work of Andreas Faludi (1973). This study argues that his work has been underutilised. Procedural planning theory has much to offer the development and constructive formation of debates in planning literature. The potential of the contribution of this work seem to have gone largely unnoticed or unseen.

The reason for this seems to be the misconception that what could have been regarded as a call for the development of planning theory was seen as an authoritative call or attempt to create one theory and one theory only. There is a distinct difference between the aim of procedural planning theory (PPT) and its description. The aim and functions of procedural planning theory (PPT) are clearly stipulated. There are two functions of PPT: firstly it serves a meta-theoretical function and secondly as a description or question of 'how to plan'/planning of/or methodology.

It seems clear in the book *Planning Theory* (1973), that Faludi encourages other theorists to develop planning theory on a meta-theoretical level (Faludi, 1973:3). Furthermore, he then described planning from his own perspective, which is the second function of procedural planning theory (Faludi, 1973:3). It seems as if critics perceive the two functions as one and do not separate them.

The first function of procedural planning theory is to develop methodologies for planning, illustrated by the empty frame. In the book *Planning Theory* (1973), Faludi provided his own description of methodology, which could be seen as an example and motivation for other authors from different perspectives to develop their own methodologies and doing so, would enable a proper variety of meta-theoretical theories for planning.

Faludi specifically called the first function of procedural planning theory: the meta-theoretical function for the development of planning methodologies. It was a call for all theorists to help develop methodologies for planning from different perspectives. Faludi simply saw the necessity of such a level of theorising and thinking in the planning literature. This still needs to be adamantly pursued in a constructive manner. Furthermore, the first function of PPT relates to Theory of Planning, which was regarded as planning methodology in his book *Critical Rationalism* (1986).

Different theories, and therefore different perspectives, will have different methodologies. Methodologies are interpreted, for the purpose of this study, as different perspectives.
Faludi (1973) intended procedural planning theory to have two distinct functions (see figure 16). The first was the development of planning methodologies. With an emphasis on the plural form of methodology. The other function was for the description of methodology or ‘how to plan’. The two functions are most frequently seen as one by critiques – deterring the purpose of procedural planning theory. This study interprets the different methodologies as being grounded in different perspectives. In turn, Theory of planning is being referred to in Faludi’s book Critical Rationalism (1986) as methodology. One could argue that different perspectives are the foundation of different methodologies, which builds theory of planning and therefore, the different planning methodologies.

His intention with PPT does not seem to propose one ultimate theory, on the contrary. After explaining the shortcoming in planning literature, he described planning from his own perspective, in a meta-theoretical manner of course. From my perception, his work was greatly misunderstood and misinterpreted in many ways by many authors. One example is the substantive and procedural debate. It should rather be the meta-theoretical and empirical debate. His book was not a call on all theorists to endeavour in one theory or that there could only be one theory and neither did Faludi claim that he has ‘the’ theory.

Critiques often argue procedural planning to be ‘abstract’, ‘formal’, contentless, empty and vacuous (Healey et al., 1982:19; Taylor, 1998:97); and that Faludi did not address the products of planning agencies and what planning is doing, i.e. effecting particular changes in the environment (Taylor, 1998:97). In defence of Faludi, he distinguishes between Theory of planning and Theory in planning – theory in planning could constitute as the domain of theorisation where the products, being substantive, would be allocated. Theory of planning however would represent the way the products would be used (approach), what products there will be and why, the products would be determined by the way of thinking and the relevant approach. Therefore the theory of planning, by Faludi, did
not intend to describe the changes in the environment, Faludi described a framework in which other theorist could compare their different perspectives and build constructive arguments on a meta-theoretical level. According to my understanding, just the fact that one theorises that theory should be empirical, already justifies a certain perspective which is situated in a meta-theoretical level. The theories which tend to call for only empirical theories are usually those which have rich philosophical backgrounds. Most of these theories are brilliant, they should be used constructively. In general I found that the number of papers which is constructive, with regards to theory of planning, is less than those which is destructive.

Taylor argues that the critiques of Faludi’s theory wanted theory to be grounded in the in the empirical investigation of planning or the (social) scientific theory of planning (Taylor, 1998:97). In my opinion, this could be addressed by definition of the different levels of theorising and the purpose of PPT. Not all theories have the same purpose and there should be enough room for the development of all kinds of theories. Otherwise the critics would be calling for one theory in a completely different manner.

Allmendinger (2002), like other theorists whom intentions seems pure, pertain that the work of Faludi seems to overshadow the work of the ‘Chicago School’ of planning, Banfield, Perlof, Max Weber and Karl Mannheim and perceives Faludi’s work as a debate on rationality further referring to Plato and Aristotle (Allmendinger, 2002:53). In my opinion, Allmendinger does not distinguish between Rational Comprehensive, Procedural planning and philosophy – all of them do however fall in the sphere of ‘rationality’. Rationality forms part of Faludi’s perspective, but this is hardly the only argument or aim for his work. Neither is his purpose on par of that of the aims or objectives of the mentioned authors or academics. It does not seem to form a concrete argument when theories are generalised in this way. Again, in this the referred to theories lose their purpose when it is compared on a different level of theorising.

One general tendency of critiques, according to my perception, are that they criticise a theory from their own perspective, reflecting what their own perspective would like from a theory, instead of building constructively on what is useable or concrete for planning (literature), shining the light on the theory in question’s apparent inadequacies and almost ignoring the contributions made.
Figure 17: A general tendency of critiques is that they criticize other theories from their own perspective with the aim of moulding the other within their own frame of reference.

Faludi started to create a structure for planning theories in which they could be classified. The division starts with theory (ies) of planning and theory (ies) in planning. In the theory (ies) in planning could be seen as having substance – substantive theory, which “helps planners to understand whatever their area of concern many be” (Faludi, 1973:3). Whereas theory (ies) of planning “can be seen as planners understanding themselves and the ways in which they operate...” (Faludi, 1973:3), hence, planning procedures, the designing of planning agencies and the way they operate (Faludi, 1973:1).

Faludi indicated that he paraphrased Britton Harris (1967) with regards to theory of planning and theory in planning, which in turn was explicated by Hightower (1969). Faludi quoted Britton Harris (1967): “We have great need of a science of planning in order to determine what science is in planning...” (Faludi, 1973:4).

Faludi wrote that planning is concerned with the best way of producing results (action). The right course of action would develop (assumed) from a proper analysis of the area of interest. The areas of concern differ for every planner and this relates to the planner himself, the agencies in which he/she operates, and the procedures which are adopted (Faludi, 1973:5).

According to Faludi, planning theory can help to solve problems on three different levels (Faludi, 1973:8):
• **Understanding** planning (agencies, procedures): The planner’s orientation of himself as a planner. The involved agencies and their operations. The affected environment (Faludi, 1973:8, 9). “To aid planners in constructing such self-images, this book proposes a model of planning agencies forming part of the proposed conceptual framework for planning thought” (Faludi, 1973:9).

• **Comparing** different experiences.

• **Designing** planning agencies and their procedures (Faludi, 1973:8).

Theory is an explanation of why particular events occur (Faludi, 1973:22). Faludi distinguishes between two different manners of explaining or forming of theory, particularly for planning. The manners of explanation are the pattern and the deductive model of explanation (Faludi, 1973:22). The pattern model of explanation explains how observed planning phenomena fits in or is part of a structured whole. The deductive model demonstrates through general propositions or laws and initial conditions what should be expected (Faludi, 1973:22). The deductive approach would be based on empirical observations which would be based on hypothesis (Faludi, 1973:23).

Faludi emphasises the importance of the development of social theory on a normative level, because the created frameworks which links empirical facts are influenced by values in the construction of the frameworks (Faludi, 1973:23).

According to Faludi, the development of planning theory starts with raw data on planning which is explained as a rational process of thought and action which aims at promoting human growth (Faludi, 1973:25). The next phase is the construction of a model which entails the rational and conceptualisation of a group of phenomena which explains relations, propositions which forms a system and if validated, would become theory (Faludi, 1973:25 influenced by Willer, 1976).

Faludi prefers the instrumentalist view on how to relate theory to practice over the purist (realist) s views of how to relate theory to practice (Faludi, 1973:27). The realist could be associated with the deductive model of explanation (based on laws) and the instrumentalist view would be associated with good theories guiding action (Faludi, 1973:26).

Faludi argues for the acceptance of both the pattern and the deductive model of explanation as being useful in practice (Faludi, 1973:29). Furthermore: “Working towards the deductive model of explanation, and introducing all the refinements to the conceptual framework which formulating testable hypotheses entails, further improves their quality.” (Faludi, 1973:29)

Faludi develops a conceptual framework for planning thought consisting of the rationale of planning theory and the model of planning agencies (Faludi, 1973:33) and regard the concept of rational planning as superior to any other concept of planning, simply because it promotes human growth as a product and a process (Faludi, 1973:33).

Faludi specifies the motivation of planning theory as that of promoting human growth (as a product – best way of attaining ends and future growth; and a process – planning controlling and accelerating process) by the use of rational procedures of thought and action (Faludi, 1973:35). Human growth here refers to the continuing enrichment of human life and the widening range of goals which human beings are capable of pursuing (Faludi, 1973:33). He perceives science as being analogous to planning (Faludi, 1973:33). Planning means taking intelligent, rational action (Faludi, 1973:35).
The planning literature calls this the rational planning process of going through generation of alternatives, evaluating and choice based on the evaluation with reference to proposals which would have been the support of forming substantive policies which already went through the rational thought process. What Faludi means with rationality in this context is to give reasons in a clear and demonstrable form (Faludi, 1973:36). He regards planning as identical in concept, but in different context, to systems analysis and operational research (Faludi, 1973:38).

“This notion of planning is identical to what, in different contexts has been termed systems analysis and operational research.” (Faludi, 1973:38)

Faludi asks the question: “...why should one plan?” and answers this question with the aim and rationale of planning theory; human growth (Faludi, 1973:39). He supports this view in a three fold: man guiding his own development; the interpretation of human growth in past developments and the availability of models of growth explaining goal seeking behaviour (Faludi, 1973:41, 46). Human growth is a complex concept, which could primarily be divided into two categories. The one is the process of human growth and the other the product of human growth (Faludi, 1973:40).

Faludi connects the aim of planning (human growth) with that of planning, pertaining that the rational planning process seems to be a vehicle for the process of growth resulting as growth as the product or end state (Faludi, 1973:49).
There is an underlying cognitive framework in planning literature or planning theory. When the paradigms are referred to, each from a different perspective, the referrals are not consistent – terms aren't consistent. This indicates that the cognitive structures which are developed are at times different; this in turn implies that the interpretation of planning literature in a wider scope, forming the cognitive framework in time, could be and seems prone to misinterpretation. Misinterpretation here refers to the inability or unwillingness to consider the value of a different perspective. Just one misinterpretation or conviction causing judgement, could result in a chain of misinterpretations. This would cause a distortion in arguments and inevitably create debates which contribute to nothing but aggravation.

Planning: a tautological system?

The rational and the empirical ways of obtaining knowledge or the rational and pragmatic traditions of planning could be stringed together on a theoretical hierarchy. The system is essentially the same, but the concepts used and the methods are different. The different methods could be identified by the different perspectives within the field.

First of all, concepts are involved which could be categorised as philosophical, the concepts need to be defined. The defined concepts form part of a system, the involved system. This would be called the theory of knowledge (transcendental). The system could be divided into the rational and the empirical systems. These could be regarded in the planning theory field as the tautological systems. The deductive system could be regarded as the rational tradition in planning, which relies on logical derivation and the Empiricist tradition could be regarded as the pragmatic tradition in planning which relies on generalisations. These systems have certain procedures. These procedures could be termed methodology, which relates to pure theory, which is relevant for the pragmatic and the rational tradition of planning. The empirical level relates to applied theory, based on facts. All of the above are used for the implementation of planning.

The description or rather statement that Empiricism should only rely on empirical facts and context, could immediately be deemed as a certain procedure and therefore methodology, which has already been linked to philosophy through its nature or philosophical debate. The empirical sciences have had methodology all along.

Within the planning field, in the rational and the pragmatic tradition could be represented on all levels of theorising – and could be compared on a meta-theoretical level. Planning starts with the same problem – determined in different ways – implemented in different ways – but the procedures could be related on different levels of theorising.

It is possible to show that their levels of theorising could be grouped on the same level which in turn produces the same manner of planning – just with different views. Empiricism and Rationalism go hand in hand. Perhaps a combination of the two concepts results in practice.

It could be perceived through the use of a metaphor of two hands. The concept is explained as followed. The left hand and the right hand are opposites, yet they are the same – hands. Each hand has fingers which define them. Together they work interactively with each other to perform a task.
The left hand, in this example, is called the rational basis – there is no significance in allocating the rational basis to the left hand, it is just for the purpose of explanation and distinction. The right hand would then be the pragmatist basis.

The hand structure would be the base of the hand – this is the philosophical foundation. Methodology would be the direction the fingers are moving, driven by the different perspectives, cognitive frameworks. Therefore the direction of the fingers would be represented as the first part of the hand directly connected to the base. The fingertips would be the touching the ‘slices of reality’ and therefore the senses. The right hand with the Empiricist foundations fingertips could be called ‘empirical’ and the left hand, with the rational basis’ fingertips would be deemed as tools. The tools could be called technical and the empirical could be more concerned with the social though the social structure would be defined in both structures within the methodology, which is spurred by the different perspectives. The hands work together to form a system.

The planning literature refers to the philosophy of science and more particularly, the theory of knowledge (Epistemology) and Ethics. Within the theory of knowledge the two opposing groups are Rationalism and Empiricism. In planning theory the larger groupings form two seemingly opposing groupings, differentiated in their nature. They are the Rationalists and the Pragmatists. The philosophical Rationalism relates to the Rationalists in planning. The philosophical Empiricism relates to the Pragmatists in planning literature. The philosophy of science forms an important part of the structure of understanding planning literature.

In my opinion, the theory of knowledge could describe the division within planning literature, the two fundamental different natures within planning literature.

In planning literature there are different levels of theorising. These are often disregarded as something political – which in my opinion, it is not. Every level of theorising has a purpose in the larger picture of planning. When these different theories, in the nature of their purpose, are generalised together they lose their purpose, at least to some extent, and their meaning becomes vague. The different levels of theorising are very present in both the Rational and the Pragmatic paradigms. It serves from thinking through to implementation – the wording used here does not refer to the work of Friedmann. The first and broadest level of theorising is that of philosophy. Philosophy is then connected to the highest level of thinking. Methodology, lying between thinking and implementation, is the second level of theorisation. It is within methodology where the different paradigms should be situated as a tool to develop perspective, methodology and definitions of planning. The next level of theorisation is the Empirical level. It lies closest to implementation.

There are many perspectives present in planning literature. In the development of different paradigms there are, with the World War II period as a beacon, the Pre-World War II paradigms; the Post-World War II paradigms; the practice movement and the current trends. The Pre-World War II paradigms relate to planning in its development stage toward a professional discipline and consist of Traditional planning; Experiential Holism and Scientific Conjuncture. These paradigms are generally more pragmatic in their nature. The Post-World War II paradigms are the Rational Comprehensive planning; Systems planning and Procedural planning. The Rational Comprehensive planning perspective has been referred to in planning literature as being Rational by some authors and Pragmatic by others. Systems planning and Procedural planning are inherently rational or rather refer to Rationalism. The Practice movement collection of perspectives is the Liberal Political-Science Critique; the Radical-Liberal Critique (Advocacy planning); the Learning Theorists (New Humanism) and Neo-Marxism (critical
studies). The Learning Theorists consists of Transactive planning, New Humanism and the Communicative Planning Theory (CPT). These are inherently pragmatic in their orientation.

Theorists and academics judge from their own perspective and conviction. At times these judgement toward other theories and opinions are directed in such a way that the aim is clearly to mould the other perspective or opinion in their own perspective or opinion with disregard to any positive contribution the scrutinised perspective could or perhaps intended to have, devaluing that theory or perspectives because it does not look, sound or smell like the perspective it is criticised from. Positive in this paragraph does not refer to positivism, but to being constructive toward the development of planning literature and perspective.

Planning theory as portrayed by Faludi seems misinterpreted by many authors and academics, according to my own interpretations of his work and perception thereof. Planning Theory (1973) provides the start of a framework for planning theory, which would make it easier to understand and ultimately create a cognitive framework. Basically what this work reflects is the ambition to develop methodology (ies) for planning theory and planning. Planning theory starts with dividing the types of theory in two distinguished- and yet interconnected parts. The division is that of Theory of Planning and Theory in Planning. Theory in Planning is linked to more empirical theories, which are a different level of theorising to methodological theories or philosophical orientations. These theories are directed towards more definite elements. These needs to be filled in (defined) with which ever methodology and orientation it is suited or implemented from. Theory of Planning is a broader field of theorisation. It describes how to plan or methodology. Another purpose is the role it plays on a meta-theoretical level, to develop methodology (ies). This is where the different perspectives could develop the different methodologies in planning.

Pragmatism and Rationalism is perceived as tautological system within planning theory and literature and furthermore in planning. Both natures are used in planning whether this is wishful or not. It could be explained through the concept of hands. The left and the right hand are opposite, yet they are the same. They work together for one purpose. Sometimes the right hand is more dominant in action and at other times the left hand is more dominant.

In conclusion to pertinently address the goals of this study, I will recap. The primary goal of this study was to determine if there was an explanatory framework. In planning literature the attempts to explain planning theory are usually dependent on historical overviews or a certain typology. On a different level, Nigel Taylor (1999) made sense of planning theory by connecting it with the philosophy of science and portraying planning theory through it, indicating that Epistemology and Ethics form a fundamental part of the debates in planning theory. By studying more broadly, it became clearer that there are different patterns of arguments in planning theory. This could be interpreted if Kuipers and Giere are read and kept in mind when reading planning theory and literature. Furthermore, the different dimensions of planning theory could be discovered. Planning theory does not just follow a horisontal timeline or trends but there is also a vertical set of levels present in the arguments. Indeed there is a very complex and still simple framework of planning theory inherent in, perhaps, all literature?

Another objective was to identify the patterns of development of paradigms within planning theory. The patterns of development are perhaps not evolutionary, but rather follow trends of time. Many authors perceive the development of planning thought as evolutionary. My opinion is different. I regard the changes in planning thought as trends and arguments within the dominant trends mould the other perspectives within their own criteria and
order. This, in my opinion, does not change planning thought, it creates conflict. The trends of time are connected with the philosophy of science and the arguments situated therein.

Recommendations with regards to planning literature and education are, firstly the development of the different paradigms on all levels of theorising, from thinking through to implementation. The development of the paradigms does not necessarily imply creating new ideas around the paradigm or perspective. Just creating a structure within which arguments could proceed on the same level or purpose of argument. Applying the perspective to the levels of theorisation and develop proper definitions within the perspective.

Furthermore, it is recommended that arguments within planning literature should argue according to the purpose of the theory or perspective – therefore in context with the other theory intended to be criticised. This would imply the same level of theorisation.

Another recommendation is to include cognitive frameworks of and in planning literature in planning debate and education. The open stage for cognitive frameworks would broaden the perspective of students and readers as well as aid in the constructive development of planning perspectives and cognitive frameworks. Furthermore, it will improve thinking, orientation and conception of planning and planning literature. This could develop a broader interest in thinking about planning.

Everything being said is not just conclusions and recommendations, but it is imperative to the understanding and development of planning.


