From “struggle” to “post-revolutionary” politics: The National Party, the African National Congress, and the “great rapprochement”

Patrick J Furlong
Alma College
Michigan, USA

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Opsomming

Die Nasionale Party as regerende party onder Suid-Afrika se apartheidsbestel, en sy langtydse teenstander en navolger, die African National Congress, blyk onwaarskynlike onderwerpe vir ’n vergelyking: Die een verwant aan, en bekrompe etniese “verregse” nasionalisme, militante anti-Kommunisme, rassisme, en deur sommige kritici ge-etiketeer as te assosieer met afwisselende kwasie-fascisme. Die ander: Die ANC, as ’n politieke groepering met vae sosialistiese neigings en langdurige bande met die Kommunistiese Party. Tog het beide die NP en die ANC baie in gemeen. Beide het ontwikkel in ’n tyd van oorloë: Byvoorbeeld die Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog, die Wêreldoorloë, en ’n langdurige stryd teen ’n vorm van blanke heerskappy. Albei het ook vir jare hulself aangebied as buitengewone politieke party binne ’n nasionalistiese grondslag (NP: Veral die wit Afrikaan en die ANC: Veral die swart Afrikaan) en as bewegings gemoeid met ’n revolucionêre stryd teen een onderdrukkende stelsel (NP: Teen Britse kolonialisme en die ANC: Teen apartheid). Voorts was albei ondubbelsinnig teenoor grootskaalse kapitalisme. Toe beide hierdie politieke groeperinge in ’n stadium aan bewind gekom het, het elk ’n meer pragmatiese vorm van politiek gevolg, ’n wyer steunbasis gesoek, en hulle aangepas by die voorskrifte van die wêreldkapitalisme. Tog het geeneen heeltemal ontslae geraak van die “strydpolitiek” nie. Dit sluit in ’n beperkte geduld met direkte kritiek, of standpunte oor, die desentralisasie van gesag, asook die neiging om terug te val op groepsidentiteit en ’n sterk afkeer te toon vir individualistiese liberalisme. Ondertussen het die NP tot niet gegaan, en heelwat van die oorblyfsels daarvan is deur die ANC verswelg. In vele opsigte beklemtoon hierdie historiese gegewe in welke mate hierdie “ou vyande” met mekaar in gemeen gehad het.

Keywords: Afrikaner; Afrikaan; African; Nationalism; Struggle; Post-revolutionary; Pragmatism; National Party; African National Congress.
Introduction

South Africa’s long-ruling National Party and its longtime foe and successor, the African National Congress, seem unlikely subjects for comparison. The NP, in power from 1948 to 1994, was associated with white Afrikaner rule, apartheid racism, militant anti-Communism, and at times even charges of quasi-fascism.¹ The ANC, in contrast, led a decades-long anti-racist insurgency. Its socialist leanings became more explicit after in 1960 it was outlawed and, lacking Western support for armed struggle, turned in exile to Soviet sponsorship, strengthening existing ties to the South African Communist Party.²

This essay is not offered as a work of original, archive-based scholarship. It is more of a “thought-piece,” exploring some possible parallels between these movements, however improbable given the above considerations, the idea for which was first prompted by the extraordinary rapprochement between the ANC and revamped “New” NP (renamed “New NP” in 1998 in the hope of stemming recent voting losses),³ most of its leadership ultimately absorbed by the ANC after successive election defeats in 1999 and 2004.⁴ The salience of that development seemed only underlined in May 2009 following the next election. Even the remnant in Parliament of the exclusivist Afrikaner nationalism once promoted by the NP, Pieter Mulder’s Freedom Front Plus party, which had long held out for an Afrikaner homeland or Volkstaat, now also embraced the politics of rapprochement when Mulder accepted an invitation to join new President Jacob Zuma’s government as a

⁴ In August 2004, after winning 1.7% of the vote in the April election (compared with 20% in the 1994 first non-racial election), the NNP announced it would cease operations in the next few weeks, when party leader M van Schalkwyk applied for ANC membership, but exist in name until September 2005, when Parliament next allowed switching between parties. See M Wines, “South Africa dissolves party that was architect of apartheid”, New York Times, 9 August 2004, p. A4.
deputy minister.\(^5\)

Were these movements really such opposites after all, or has the conservative commentator RW Johnson been proved correct in a 1996 article that “the continuities between Afrikaner and African nationalism are far greater than the discontinuities”?\(^6\) His piece predated the shift from the newly more liberal if still oppositionist NP led by FW De Klerk (after withdrawing from Nelson Mandela’s post-1994 Government of National Unity in 1996) to the more overtly accommodationist NNP under Marthinus van Schalkwyk, who led what was left of his party into the ANC, but that development seems only to confirm RW Johnson’s view.

After all, both long presented themselves not as ordinary political parties but as “national” (NP: white Afrikaner; ANC: African\(^7\)) liberation movements in a revolutionary struggle against an oppressive system (NP: versus British colonialism, ANC: versus apartheid), and both were ambivalent about large-scale capitalism. In power both adjusted to a more pragmatic politics, sought a more diverse base, and accommodated, albeit with some internal dissent, the dictates of global capitalism.

**From “struggle” radical populism to “post-revolutionary” pragmatic capitalism**

RW Johnson noted the NP’s curious whites-only “leftism” prior to its 1948 victory, including the goal of nationalizing the gold and diamond mines, hostility to “Jewish capitalists” and the white English-speaking upper class, and much rhetoric about “saving” poor Afrikaners. In practice, the apartheid regime soon showed the interests of its mainly petit bourgeois leaders -- many of them members of the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond (Afrikaner Brothers’ Union or AB) - backing off nationalization and making a peace of sorts with English-speaking capitalists. Its turning the large public sector into an

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Afrikaner preserve, blocking English-speakers’ competition at one end and that from blacks at the other, merely enriched an expanding Afrikaner middle class.

The parallels with the post-apartheid era are, as RW Johnson comments, striking. The revolutionary ANC, led by “another class of teachers, trade unionists, lawyers, and clerics,” made its own peace with capitalism, also not nationalizing the mines, focusing instead on aggressive “transformation” benefitting primarily the black petite bourgeoisie. RW Johnson argues that the once highly secretive South African Communist Party (which like the AB provided key Cabinet members) functioned like the AB had for the NP (as an elite vanguard group), although the SACP, like the AB, found that ideology often had to give way to pragmatism once in power. However, this was far more rapid in the case of ANC rule, while taking several decades in the apartheid era.\(^8\)

RW Johnson’s critique of the ANC’s accommodating capitalism once in power is even more true for after Thabo Mbeki succeeded Mandela as president. Leftwing critics concur. John Saul derides Mbeki’s “unqualified commitment to his chosen role of architect of South Africa’s appeasement of capitalism....”\(^9\) Patrick Bond views the “neoliberal clique” in the ANC as the captives of global capitalism.\(^10\) As tensions grew between the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Mbeki government, the former complained of an ANC leadership “drifting towards dictatorship” amidst efforts “to shift the ANC... from its radical character into a moderate, centre-left political party....”\(^11\) SACP General Secretary Blade Nzimande warned of “the triumph of money (greed, get-rich-quick mentality) over the will of the people” and “overlapping interests between some of our cadres in the echelons of the state and business.”\(^12\) A 2006 CP discussion document described emerging black

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capitalists as “parasitic” in “reliance on and symbiotic relation with the upper echelons of the state apparatus”\textsuperscript{13} - parallelling the rise of Afrikaner capitalism after the NP coming to power in 1948.

In some ways, the growing divide between the populist left (SACP, COSATU, and ANC Youth League hardliners in particular) and the more pro-business wing of the ANC and its close allies, the newly wealthy beneficiaries of the post-1994 government’s “Black Economic Empowerment” program, parallels those noted by Dan O’Meara between the traditionalist petit bourgeois and working class \textit{verkrampte} (“narrow”) NP hardliners in the AB (and Afrikaner trade unions) and the emerging pragmatic \textit{verligte} (“enlightened”) aggressive, self-confident \textit{nouveau riche} capitalists.\textsuperscript{14} The latter benefitted most from the NP’s own Afrikaner economic empowerment program, emerging dominant in the PW Botha era from 1978, when the NP regime tried to marry a “reformed” apartheid to the realities of modern capitalism.

\textbf{The “politics of struggle”: Nationalism, anti-imperialism, liberation, and the crucible of war}

The history of the ANC and NP during their respective “liberation struggles” suggests why they eventually found more in common with each other than, for instance, with South African liberals. Both parties were shaped deeply by wars and associated brutalization, not least due to the notion that as the bloodied banner-bearer of the “nation,” the NP or Congress was no ordinary party, but the political embodiment of a righteous “national” struggle. The exact meaning of the “nation” embodied by the party was often unclear, varying over time and by audience. Did the NP mean “Afrikaner nationalists” (as in the NP ca.1948), all Afrikaners, all whites committed to South Africa (NP founder JBM Hertzog’s definition of “Afrikaner”), or later all supporters of “Western Christian” values, as the NP moved from a narrowly ethnic to a white nationalist to (in the early 1990s) a broad Christian Democrat-style party? Did the ANC, long riven by debate on the “national question,” mean committed “African nationalists,” all “African” blacks, all South African blacks- including mixed race “Coloureds” and “Indians”- or all


“progressive” South Africans?\textsuperscript{15}

The notion of uniquely embodying a “national” struggle is less contested, if more familiar in the case of the ANC as an armed liberation movement that had difficulty adjusting to conventional party politics after its unbanning in 1990. The ANC’s 1979 “Green Book” alluded to the view of the ANC as not a party in the ordinary sense, but a broad national movement.\textsuperscript{16} Mandela acknowledged in his memoirs that one of the ANC’s most demanding tasks in 1990 was “to transform an illegal underground liberation movement into a legal mass political party.”\textsuperscript{17}

Yet the NP also viewed itself as a liberation movement, even if in opposition (1914-24, 1934-48) - it ruled in coalition with the English-speaking Labour Party and the more “centrist” South African Party from 1924 to 1933 - it never openly embraced violence against the still “imperialist”-dominated state. As Malan told the 1941 NP Congress, “We are no ordinary party-political organization. We occupy a central position in our Afrikaner volk (people’s) life... we have our party to thank for our national consciousness, our language rights, our Afrikaans National newspapers, the expansion of our freedom, our republican aim and struggle, our united volk will for the preservation of our white civilization....”\textsuperscript{18}

Afrikaner nationalism certainly was shaped by wars and other violent episodes, just as African nationalism was shaped by earlier anti-colonial wars, the world wars, later anti-segregationist campaigns, and the later armed “struggle.” Both viewed their struggles as against not just internal foes, but broader “imperialism.” Ironically, to the ANC the NP regime was an agent of imperialism; in 1970 ANC president Oliver Tambo told the Non-aligned States:\textsuperscript{19}

The South African white minority regime has over the past few years matured to become a fully fledged member of the imperialist conspiracy [including France, the United States, Portugal, West Germany, and Japan];

\textsuperscript{15} See footnote 7.
\textsuperscript{16} As quoted in Bua Komanisi, 5(1), May 2006, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{18} “Die party is moeder”, Speech, Union congress of NP, 3 June 1941; SW Pienaar, SW Pienaar and JJJ Scholtz, Glo in u volk: Dr DF Malan as redenaar 1908-1954 (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 1964), pp. 38-39.
this criminal conspiracy [aimed] at regaining lost colonial territories and countries, the plunder of and exploitation of the peoples and resources of their country, and the perpetuation of a system of amassing fabulous profits for industrial and armaments monopolies.

Yet this has echoes of a Malan speech to the 1942 NP congress, describing the NP as “the antipode (teenvoeter) of capitalism and volk exploitation” and attacking “British imperialism” for causing such destruction in South Africa and wanting to tie Afrikaners to the “leading strings” (leiband) of another land, whether Britain or the United States.20

Afrikaner nationalists were inspired by British treatment of the “Boers,” the Afrikaners of the Orange Free State and the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR), in the South African War (1899-1902), when thousands died in concentration camps and Boer farms were laid waste. Afterwards, as after a shorter war in 1880-1881 between Britain and the Transvaal, Afrikaner intellectuals rallied around a new, broader consciousness distinct from “Cape Dutch”; “Free Stater” or “Transvaler,” focused on the emerging Afrikaans patois.21 Rodney Davenport has argued that in the negotiations that led to the Union of South Africa in 1910, Afrikaner leaders rejected any coalition with the English-speaking “Unionists,” believing that intra-white conciliation was only possible via “annihilating” the Unionist opposition and that: “The only acceptable organization for bringing the white groups together ...was one over which they exercised control.”22 This stance was shaped by war: “It would have been asking a lot of a community which had recently paid in suffering for its lack of power to suggest that it should now relax its grip on the power which it had now acquired.”23 This position foreshadowed that of the ANC in post-1990 negotiations with De Klerk’s NP government: the ANC insisted on clear primacy in any “power-sharing” arrangement, rejecting minority “group rights” or some type of white veto.24

War and struggle shaped even more the early NP, representing a yet narrower strand of Afrikaner nationalism than that of those negotiating the agreement on Union such as General Louis Botha, and founded in 1914 by JBM

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20 DF Malan, “Opmars na die republiek”, Policy speech, Union congress of NP, 16 September 1942; SW Pienaar and JJJ Scholtz, Glo is u volk, pp. 43, 49.
24 A Sparks, Tomorrow is another country: The inside story of South Africa’s negotiated revolution (Wynberg and Sandton, Struik, 1994), pp.126-129; N Mandela, Long walk to freedom, p. 569.
Hertzog, another South African War Boer commander, benefitted greatly from elections a few months later after a brief but bloody Afrikaner rebellion against South African participation in the First World War. It swept to power in the 1924 elections on a tide of anger against the government’s crushing of a still more violent white worker revolt in 1922. After Hertzog reconciled with moderate Afrikaners and English-speakers in the 1930s to form the United Party, the NP leader in the Cape Province, Daniel Malan, remained behind with hard-line elements as the “Purified” NP, the core of the party that came to power in 1948.

The Second World War was crucial in mobilizing divided Afrikaner nationalists, as Prime Minister Jan Smuts led South Africa into the war on the Allied side, despite bitter NP opposition; Hermann Giliomee recently argued that the war was more important than the apartheid platform in Malan’s 1948 victory. Malan, in the 1941 speech depicting the party as the “mother” of the Afrikaner nation, compared Smuts’s alleged efforts to threaten, persecute and oppress the pro-neutral NP with those of British imperialists who, despite “all of the armed might of the British Empire and “all the barbaric methods of the [also called the Second English War]” South African War, could not break the back of Afrikanerdom.” The post-1948 government introduced apartheid, the first all-Afrikaner cabinet, and a republic outside the British Commonwealth, marking the triumph of the struggle against the “English” foe and its likely successor as the primary designated enemy of Afrikaner nationalism, the increasingly politicized, urbanizing black majority.

Although the NP had not become, as many have charged, a “fascist” party, its complex relationship in the late 1930s and early 1940s with radical Right movements such as the Ossewabrandwag (Ox-Wagon Guard or OB) and Greysheets, and the presence inside the NP in the early war years of a fascist caucus, the New Order, did not leave it untouched, helping give it its more authoritarian, “revolutionary” flavor in the run-up to coming to power in 1948 (at least relative to Hertzog’s old NP), even though more radical aspects of its rhetoric (such as nationalizing mines) became less apparent after consolidating power.

26 DF Malan, “Die party is moeder”, SW Pienaar; JJJ Scholtz, Glo in u volk, p. 38.
27 R Bunting’s Rise of the South African reich is the most sustained exposition of this view.
28 This is the central thesis of Between crown and swastika.
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There are parallels with the impact on the ANC of its own “wartime” (i.e. during the armed phase of the liberation struggle) relationship with the SACP, imparting a revolutionary, sometimes authoritarian flavor that lessened after 1990, but which did not wholly disappear. In one of his frequent attacks on “reactionary” liberals, Thabo Mbeki asserted that “No revolution is possible without revolutionaries” and, regarding countering liberal efforts to promote their vision of change, warned that “To ensure the victory of the national democratic revolution, this is a struggle we must and will continue to take on, namely the political and ideological struggle to determine the dominant ideas for the transformation of our society.”

The ANC-led armed struggle from the 1960s onward re-shaped the NP differently from the old Boer-British struggle, encouraging it to reach out beyond its Afrikaner core to other whites and, in the 1980s, even to “brown” (“Indian” and mixed race) and black collaborators, to join the struggle against “the Total Onslaught” (by “international Communism” and its alleged liberal fellow-travellers), a concept used by PW Botha’s increasingly militarized regime to justify armed intervention in neighboring states, sending the army into black townships, and, despite denials, even torture and death squads. Ironically, this paralleled the ANC admitting non-Africans, even whites, including in leadership, as it moved from pre-exile “multi-racialism” (when the ANC led a broad “Congress alliance” including the South African Indian Congress, the South African Colored People’s organization, and the small leftwing white Congress of Democrats) to the “non-racialism” of a single party, while permitting the separate existence (with dual membership) of the SACP and later the newly formed COSATU in a new alliance.

The problem of violence

If the NP in opposition officially distanced itself from violent resistance by more extreme Afrikaner nationalists (the rebels of 1914 or 1922 or the OB, with its associated Stormjaer (Stormtrooper) “saboteurs”, this was always a complex relationship (state-sanctioned violence once in power is a different issue: note De Klerk’s discomfort with and Botha’s hostility to the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission). The NP benefitted at the polls in 1915 and 1924, as in 1943 and 1948, from its sympathy for reducing the penalties imposed on those “persecuted” by the state, such as the jailed rebels of 1914 or convicted OB saboteurs, and from its outrage at such state actions. One of Malan’s first steps on coming to power in 1948 was to free pro-Axis prisoners: Eric Holm, who broadcast pro-Nazi propaganda to South Africa during World War II, OB members Julian Visser and HS van Blerk, instigators of a deadly post office bombing in the war, and Robey Leibbrandt, a Nazi agent who sought to assassinate Smuts and set up a puppet regime.

The ANC, like the NP, had a long history while in opposition of rejecting revolutionary violence against those in power. For nearly forty years after its founding in 1912 the ANC was remarkably conservative, relying primarily on petitions, letter-writing, and deputations to state officials. It took repeated arrests, failure to reward blacks for their support in two world wars, the unsuccessful five-year long “Treason Trial” of the leaders of the ANC and its allies, police mass shootings such as at Sharpeville in 1960, and outlawing the major liberation organizations that year to push Congress into backing a limited armed struggle, initially avoiding civilian targets. As Mandela insisted at his 1964 trial, the ANC stood for non-violent struggle even after shifting in 1949 from “strictly constitutional means of protest” to Gandhian mass non-violent defiance and chose armed struggle only when “all lawful modes of opposition” were outlawed and crushed by force: “We did not want interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute.”

Yet these last words hint at the complexity of the ANC’s position on revolutionary violence too, as it came to accept “collateral damage” and strikes against “soft” targets. When in 1983 an ANC bombing of air force headquarters in Pretoria killed and injured many black passersby, ANC President Oliver Tambo dismissed white critics’ “crocodile tears”.

The innocent were injured by the apartheid system itself, and as our own struggle intensifies more innocent people are going to get hurt...the exploited masses accepted that those of them who died were simply casualties...

When in April 2006, liberal Democratic Alliance Cape Town Mayor Helen Zille was assaulted by ANC supporters, some Congress officials’ defence was that she had not sought permission to be in an ANC-dominated area.35

Like the NP, the ANC hastened once it had the power to do so to organize the release of political prisoners, including ones jailed for violence against civilians. After 1990, in a move reminiscent of Malan’s 1948 amnesty, the ANC insisted in negotiations with the De Klerk regime that it release prisoners, including those involved in killings that matched some of the worst excesses of apartheid regime death squads, such as the bombing of a bar or “necklace” murders (burning with a petrol-soaked tire around the neck) of alleged collaborators.36

After the revolution...

The political economy of patronage...

Despite the NP’s accommodating large-scale capitalism after 1948, contra RW Johnson, it did not embrace truly free market approaches, remaining as leery of “neo-liberal” economics as the ANC of the 1990s. Walter Williams has argued that capitalism and apartheid, far from being bedfellows, were antithetical, insofar as apartheid involved “extensive government allocation of resources and significant restrictions on exchange.”37 From 1948 to the early 1990s the NP, seeking to uplift the previously relatively poor Afrikaners, shifted some 57% of fixed assets to state ownership.38 Apartheid required a massive expansion of the state bureaucracy and of the state into the economy, using regulation, licensing and investment to help Afrikaner business. By 1970 half of economically active Afrikaners (versus 17% of English-speaking whites) worked in the public and semi-public sectors.39 Only in 1987, on...

36 FW De Klerk, The last trek, pp. 250-251.
37 W Williams, South Africa’s war against capitalism (Johannesburg, Juta, 1990), p. 4.
the eve of black majority rule, did the NP government decide to deregulate and privatize the huge parastatal sector, a longtime job haven for whites and especially Afrikaners, including the post office, railways and harbors, state airline, nuclear energy, electricity, and iron and steel production. This may have been as much for political reasons, anticipating the transfer of state assets into ANC hands, as due to a change in economic philosophy.  

Ironically, the ANC protested loudly, hoping once in power to steer to its supporters the same patronage the NP had once used. Yet after coming to power in 1994 its stance toward capitalism was, again reminiscent of the old NP, ambivalent. Indeed, Sampie Terreblanche argues for considerable continuity between the increasingly cosy relationship between the NP and corporate interests in the last two decades (the “reform” phase) of apartheid and the increasingly similar relationship between the ANC and neo-liberal big capitalists, especially after the signing in late 1993 of a secret protocol between big business, NP government, and ANC leaders, reading like a corporate sector wish list, and a “curtain-raiser” for the ANC’s 1996 shift from its 1994 “Reconstruction and Development Program” to the more business-friendly “Growth, Employment and Redistribution” strategy.

...Exclusive versus inclusive nationalism

Yet neither party completely shook off the “politics of struggle,” including limited tolerance for forthright criticism or de-centralization of power, a tendency under attack to fall back on group identity, and a visceral dislike for incremental reformist, individualistic liberalism. The NP had abandoned its “Afrikaner first” ethnic nationalism only with difficulty. As late as 1973 the government, despite recent efforts to attract foreign capital by for instance giving large coal export allocations to oil companies such as Shell, decided to restrict to 50% foreign shares in banks and insurance companies. The English-speaking whites, despite voting in larger numbers for the NP, remained at the fringes of government, and while the state still tried to limit English economic power by, for instance, in 1977 backing off selling a huge manganese producer, Samancor, when the highest bidder was the

leading “English” company, the Anglo-American Corporation, and blocked the merger of the two biggest English-speaking newspaper companies; at the same time the Afrikaans press obtained very profitable government printing contracts, such as for telephone directories. All of this has parallels in the vast bureaucratic complexities of satisfying the ANC’s “Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Codes,” which mandate multiple forms of assessing private capital’s compliance with the ANC’s own patronage machine.

Although even in the early apartheid era the NP tried to entice votes by English-speaking whites, the most they could hope for in political rewards, even in the 1980s “reform” era, was a token Cabinet seat, long held by Owen Horwood, and a deputy ministership or two. The top level of government was an Afrikaner preserve. In Mbeki’s cabinet, an essentially African preserve, the parallel was perhaps Van Schalkwyk’s lone Afrikaner seat (other “white” ministers were English-speakers with old “struggle” credentials, primarily in the SACP).

The ANC might, ironically, have adopted a yet more overt African nationalism once in power were it not for Joe Slovo’s SACP, which under Slovo pushed for “reconciliation, power sharing and economic accommodation” of fearful whites’ interests. It was Slovo, central to the armed wing of the ANC, Unkhonto we Sizwe, who proposed in July 1990, against strong objections in the ANC National Executive Committee, that Congress suspend the armed struggle to promote a climate conducive to negotiations.

The issue of perceived African domination, however, not only led to tensions with whites, but to the perception among many “Coloureds” that, just as they were insufficiently “white” under the NP regime, so had they become marginalized as insufficiently black. This led after 1994 to many
Coloureds (the great majority speaking Afrikaans at home) backing the newly “deracialized” NP, led by De Klerk, by then widely viewed in such circles as a liberator.\textsuperscript{48} However, De Klerk’s retirement in 1997 undercut Coloured support in the 1999 election even in the remaining NP stronghold of the Western Cape and many white supporters, unhappy at De Klerk’s “selling out” of white interests, favored Democratic Party leader Tony Leon’s feisty combativeness over the inexperienced Van Schalkwyk’s more conciliatory style.\textsuperscript{49} The NP’s disappearance after further losses in 2004 left the “Colored” community triangulated between secondary status in the ANC or the still English-dominated liberal Democratic Alliance, or smaller and essentially ephemeral ethnic “Colored” organizations.

There are related parallels with the longtime struggle between Afrikaner hardliners and NP leaders seeking a broader, less ethnic, even less purely “white” support base (although not necessarily a more open, liberal democratic political system- as reflected by Botha’s 1980s shift from an openly racist, but still pluralist party-based system to a less overtly racist, but more totalitarian, military-technocratic model).\textsuperscript{50} From 1994 there was a complex set of tensions in the ANC between a bourgeois black nationalist wing, emphasizing color over class for purposes of mobilization, led by Thabo Mbeki, and a populist worker-based wing, emphasizing class over color, and currently led by Mbeki’s deputy, Jacob Zuma, now ANC and national president, although neither leader or faction was wholly immune from using aspects of the other side’s rhetoric and there is even a conservative “Zulu ethnic” dimension to Zuma’s support base, as became apparent in the comments from his followers during controversial legal proceedings over charges of rape and corruption. Mbeki appeared more modernizing, but was highly intolerant of dissent; Zuma represented some of the old-time religion of the “struggle” era for those who feared the direction of the “new South Africa” under Mbeki.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} C Alden, \emph{Apartheid’s last stand: The rise and fall of the South African security state} (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
...Discipline, authority and “redemptive” nationalism

The ultimate rapprochement between the ANC and a NP that steadily lost support in elections in 1994, 1999, and 2004, rather than between the NP and the liberal Democratic Party (despite a brief and unsuccessful marriage in 2001 between the latter two in a renamed “Democratic Alliance”) can be ascribed not only to the kinds of parallel histories noted above, but to the historic nature of their party organizations and their common view of the role of the state. For liberals, the party is one cause amongst many others; for African and Afrikaner nationalists, it is a more sacred project worthy of a higher level of loyalty. In Frederik van Zyl Slabbert’s memorable phrase, the NP and ANC represented two competing “redemptive ideologies;”\(^{52}\) Patrick Laurence elaborates:\(^{53}\)

> While there may have been occasional nods in the direction of political tolerance, the antagonists tended to assume that they had all the answers, and that those who were not with them were against them.

Thus the Transvaal wing of the old NP (each province had considerable autonomy) demanded members’ “undivided loyalty,” binding themselves faithfully to fulfil “the obligations attaching to membership” and submitting to party “authority and discipline.”\(^{54}\) A tight hierarchical party structure ensured an active grassroots membership devoted to the NP; those who strayed could be expelled without giving cause.\(^{55}\) NP officials and party holders had to swear to “seek the development of South Africa’s national life along Christian-National lines” and “with undivided loyalty uphold the declared principles of the National Party as the national political front of Afrikanerdom.”\(^{56}\)

The ANC is more centralized than was the NP, but requires a similarly disciplined membership. Members are expected to show “humility,” “a selfless dedication to the struggle for a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society,” and “a commitment to implement the policies of the movement and the decisions of the collective.” As in the NP of old, they are expected to be active members, and, in the tradition of Leninist “democratic centralism,” to “accept and defend the decisions of the relevant structures of the movement” and combat “factionalism” while behaving “in an exemplary way in day-to-day

\(^{53}\) P Laurence, “Liberalism and politics”, p. 46.
\(^{55}\) W Vatcher, *White laager*, pp. 119-123.
life.”  Even Mandela, presumably seeking to offset suspicions that he sought to negotiate privately with the De Klerk government, stressed on his release in 1990 that he was “a loyal and disciplined member” of the ANC and “therefore in full agreement with all of its objectives, strategies and tactics.”  Just as the apartheid-era NP leadership insisted on submission (as when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd forced Cape verligtes into silence on Colored rights), so under Mbeki, according to leaked 2002 “briefing notes,” the ANC National Executive Committee demanded COSATU and SACP submission, as the “ultra-Left” was accused of being in counter-revolutionary league with the liberal “Right.”

In contrast with liberal thinking, in which the state, like the party, has a limited role, for such “national” movements the state is expected to have an intrusive role, re-shaping society with a view to noble goals, whether empowering previously marginalized Afrikaners or blacks. Once the post-apartheid NP had abandoned ethnicity and race for a broader South Africanism, this was another reason to embrace the ANC. At one level, this expressed a positive development, as spelled out in a joint statement by the leaders of the two parties: the recognition that it was time to move from addressing the past, as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had done, to work jointly toward building a democratic society. At another, however, it was the result of a pragmatic decision that, as NNP Secretary-General DW Swanepoel put it, there was a choice between continuing a “polarizing style” leading to further isolation and marginalization or joining with the ANC to take the hand of the majority and be part of the decision processes.

60 See “Gesamentlike deklarasie van die president van die African National Congress en die leier van die Nuwe Nasionale Party,” NNP federal council, Versoening… pp. 8-10.
61 DW Swanepoel, NNP Secretary-General, “Voorwoord,” Versoening… p. 2.
...Control of the state and the problem of liberalism

Presumably the chief medium of a “polarizing style” was the Democratic Alliance, heir of the old white liberal Progressive Party and its successor, the Democratic Party, both of which had long so annoyed the NP regime, and which as the DP/DA never failed to get under the skin of the ANC leadership. Despite their ostensible differences, the NP and ANC shared a fundamental distaste for liberalism, even though the constitution to which they adhered in 1993 was essentially liberal in structure. That said, the ANC “final” adjustments of the 1996 constitution are less satisfying to liberal tastes, giving more weight to the ambitions of a centralizing state over regional, local, and individual rights. As Anthea Jeffery puts it:

If the aim of the ruling party is to implement a new form of social engineering, this constitution gives it the tools to do so.

There has been, for instance, talk in ANC circles of reducing the powers of the nine provinces or even eliminating them altogether (in power, the NP long resisted liberal calls for federal decentralization, embracing the latter only when an ANC rather than NP government seemed likely at the national level). In the past, two provinces, the Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal, remained in opposition hands, but although by the last years of the Mbeki era both were effectively under ANC control (the DA gained control of the Western Cape in the 2009 election), the provinces undercut the ability of the central government to dominate powerful regional party bosses, leading to the policy of the ANC leadership of “re-deploying” regional leaders to other roles, preventing their building up local constituencies. Similarly, after the 2004 election the ANC government in the Western Cape province sought to end the last bastion of opposition control of a major South African city (Cape Town, led by then DA mayor Helen Zille, supported by a narrow majority coalition), just as the NP in the past undercut opposition voices by, for instance, stacking representative black bodies with appointees to overcome

hostile elected majorities (such practices in the old Transkei legislature and Colored Representative Council come to mind).65

But this distaste for liberalism went far back. In the old South Africa, liberals were bracketed with communists, in the new South Africa with racists. Longtime AB boss and NP pillar Piet Meyer’s memoirs close by naming the two great threats to “separate development” (i.e. apartheid) as communism and liberalism.66 Andries Treurnicht, leader of the Verkrampte wing of the NP in the late 1970s, listed as the chief foes of Afrikaner nationalism from the 19th century British imperialism- and liberalism, with its emphasis on “equality and brotherhood, Christian unity, the worth of the individual, the rejection of protection, the rejection of laws and force.”67

As far back as the 1930s, future ANC president A.B. Xuma, although willing to work with white liberals and not an opponent of liberal ideology as such, repeatedly criticized paternalistic white liberals, who often seemed to want to guide or even restrain blacks in their political efforts.68 The belief that liberals sought to control the black political agenda remained with later generations of ANC leaders such as Thabo Mbeki. In post-1994 South Africa, liberals were so often excoriated by the new establishment as racist reactionaries that the German liberal Friedrich Naumann Foundation published a whole volume on the subject.69 Mbeki particularly disliked liberals; quoting Oliver Tambo from as far back as 1971, he described them in a 2005 ANC newsletter as “sweet birds.” Such “sweet birds” said they “were opposed to apartheid’ and in favor of change,” but were “objectively” opposed to such change, since they opposed sanctions or the armed struggle, and after 1994 continued to oppose the ANC’s affirmative action program, criticized the perceived blurring of

65 B Maclellan, “Govt plan for Cape Town a blatant abuse, says Zille”, Mail & Guardian online, 19 September 2006 (available at http://www.mg.co.za/printPage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__national/ &articleId=284543, as accessed on 19 September 2006; in 2006 Zille headed a mayoral committee consisting of a coalition of parties, led by the DA (which won a plurality in the previous local elections), but which excluded the ANC and its ally, the Independent Democratic Party. The ANC’s Western Cape minister of local government, R Dyantyi, announced that September that he would create a new executive committee that would include the ANC and IDP, but according to a complex formula that would give the ANC control, under the banner of “inclusiveness.” See “Backlash over Cape Town ‘power grab’”, Mail & Guardian online, 11 October 2006 (available at http://www.mg.co.za/printPage.aspx?area=/ breaking_news/breaking_news__national/ &articleId=286373, as accessed at on 11 October 2006).
69 L Husemeyer, Watchdogs or hypocrites? The amazing debate on South African liberals and liberalism (Johannesburg, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1997).
state and party, and opposed the ANC emphasis on racism and apartheid as “re-racialisation.”

The theme of an intrusive state returns in the use by both the NP and ANC of the public broadcaster, in a land with limited alternative broadcast media, as an instrument to further a political agenda. Meyer, also longtime head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (1959-79), describes at length in his memoirs his annoyance at liberal criticisms of the use of the SABC as a NP propaganda instrument. Ironically, in October 2006 even the Young Communist League joined longstanding DA criticism, stating that under the ANC the SABC had a credibility crisis, that its reporting was biased in favor of “certain factions in the ANC,” and that certain journalists and analysts had been censored “as part of the broader agenda in the usage of the SABC to further political battles within the liberation movement.” The DA argued that (as under Meyer) the SABC was controlled by persons aligned with the ruling party and gave extraordinary coverage to ANC events, while ignoring damaging scandals and overlooking or misrepresenting opposition events.

Conclusion

Post-revolutionary politics and the great rapprochement

The view was quite different in ex-NNP eyes. Renier Schoeman, ex-NNP executive director and now an ANC “deployed cadre,” argued in the ANC’s *Umrabulo* that the DA merely harmed the interests of minorities by being “consistently destructive” and contributing to polarization, rather than supporting the “efforts to build a national consensus founded on true South African patriotism,” a cause which had driven NNP leaders “to disband the

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73 “DA to expose SABC `manipulation, propaganda’”, *Mail & Guardian online*, 1 August 2006 (available at https://www.mg.co.za/printPage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/ breaking_news__national/&articleId=279450, as accessed on 8 August 2006). An equally disturbing phenomenon from the liberal viewpoint was the harnessing of the Human Rights Commission to attempt to force newspapers, including ones with a long record of often risky opposition to apartheid such as the *Mail & Guardian*, to reduce open criticism of the ANC government on the grounds of alleged racism. See D Glaser, “The media inquiry reports of the South African Human Rights Commission: A critique,” *African affairs* 99(396), July 2000, pp. 373-393.
NNP after 91 years and to join the ANC.”74 The alternative to “positive dialogue” was, according to a 2003 Van Schalkwyk speech, isolation, arrogance, and antagonism, such as what had led to disaster in Zimbabwe75 (although in fact the vast majority of the Mugabe regime’s opponents in recent years were black, rather than from the tiny remaining white minority).

War and conflict had shaped the NP and ANC; fear of conflict now drove the NP into the arms of the ANC. Unvarnished criticism was, in this view, simply bad manners, unpatriotic opposition to change, and an invitation to renewed violence; the nation, however defined, was more important than sub-groups or individuals. If RW Johnson is correct that there are many continuities between Afrikaner and African nationalism, perhaps it ultimately made sense in a now clearly “Post-revolutionary” political context for the NNP leadership to throw in their lot with a movement which shared more fundamental values than with one that did not do so. For such Nationalists, the ANC had, however ironically, become, to borrow Malan’s terms, “the Mother of the nation”, no ordinary party-political organization, but occupying “a central position in our Afrikaner volk (people’s) life,” at least for those who preferred not to spend the rest of their days wandering in the opposition wilderness.