Introduction

The National Party's election victory in 1948 may not have originated the practice of apartheid in South African industry, but it certainly intensified legislative provisions for racial discrimination. Thus, in 1954, the Industrial Conciliation Act was redrafted, and, after much controversy, passed into law in 1956. Apart from maintaining the existing system of industrial councils and conciliation boards, the revised Act contained three major provisions. Firstly, no further "mixed unions" were to be registered. Secondly, those "mixed unions" which continued to exist were required to have separate branches and hold separate meetings for its white and coloured members, while membership of the "mixed union's" national executive was restricted to whites. Thirdly, Section 77 of the Act made it possible for specified types of work to be reserved for persons of a particular race group. In this regard, provision was made for the establishment of an industrial tribunal whose function would be to make recommendations with regard to job reservation.

Although Section 77 stipulated that the Minister of Labour was empowered to introduce job reservation "in order to safeguard the economic welfare of employees of any race", the Minister made it quite clear which race he had in mind: "Clause 77...is a precautionary measure to safeguard the standard of living of the White workers of South Africa and to ensure that they will not be exploited by the lower standards of living of any other race." This discriminatory interpretation was commented upon in the Financial Mail:

"It has merely served to demarcate, [the Minister pleads], the occupational inheritance of each separate race, already set out by a tradition dating back to Van Riebeeck. It is thus a respectable enactment: like solemnising the marriage some time after the christening of the second and third child and perhaps the grandchildren."

Nevertheless, the government lost no time in providing several categories of white employees with statutory protection. Between 1957 and 1960, no less than fourteen job reservation determinations were gazetted, which affected employees in the clothing industry, the iron, steel, engineering and metallurgical industries, the building industry, municipal drivers and passenger lift operators. As will be seen, Section 77 was to set the tone for labour relations in the South African motor industry during the 1960s.

Growth of Local Motor Car Assembly Industry

The growth and development of the motor car industry in South Africa has been shaped both by spontaneous forces and deliberate policy. After the establishment of Union, motor car imports grew at a steady pace: there was a tenfold increase from £289 000 in 1910 to £2 753 000 in 1924. Such was the strength of this growth that Ford and General Motors established local assembly plants in Port Elizabeth in 1924 and 1926 respectively. These moves coincided with the election of the Nationalist-Labourite Pact in 1924, a coalition government which was committed to a policy of tariff protection for secondary industry. Accordingly, the mid-1920s marked the beginning of an inward-looking strategy of import substitution in an economy dominated by agriculture and mining. Although the local assembly industry did not receive much support by way of tariff protection during the second-half of the 1920s, the industry enjoyed a phase of considerable growth: the value of South African motor car imports doubled from £2 573 000 in 1924 to £5 365 000 in 1929. The depression years of the early 1930s inevitably brought about severe contraction in an industry which produced what was still considered a luxury item. Nevertheless, recovery was swift: the abolition of the gold standard, devaluation and increased tariff protection combined to produce a phase of unprecedented industrial expansion during the 1930s. Motor car imports more than trebled from £3 024 000 in 1933 to £10 227 000 in 1937. The strong growth in motor car sales, together with the incentive offered by enhanced tariff protection, encouraged the local manufacture of tyres and glass, items which were easily excluded from 'CKD' (Completely Knocked Down) packs and which enjoyed a large replacement market. Further evidence of the remarkable expansion of the 1930s was the establishment of a third assembly plant: National Motor Assembly in Johannesburg in 1939, which was locally owned and assembled motor cars under licence from several European companies. After the Second World War, the motor car industry enjoyed a new phase of rapid growth. Motor car imports more than trebled from £11 856 000 in 1946 to £39 056 000 in 1948. Such was the buoyancy in the market that four new assembly plants were established during the second-half of the 1940s: Car Distributors Assembly in East London and Motor Assemblies in Durban, both in 1946; Chrysler in Cape Town in 1947; and South African Motor Assemblers and Distributors (SAMAD) in Uitenhage in 1948. All, except Chrysler, were financed and controlled by local capital and, like National Motor Assembly in Johannesburg, assembled a variety of models under contract to several foreign manufacturers. In response to the balance of payments crisis in 1948, a policy of import control was introduced in November 1948, which tended to encourage local assembly of motor cars because more 'CKD' packs instead of 'SUW' (Stood Up on Wheels) units - could be purchased with the limited foreign exchange allowances. During the first-half of the 1950s, motor car
sales averaged 36,000 units per annum, but when import quotas were increased in 1954-55, sales jumped to over 50,000 units per annum. The fact that demand outstripped supply encouraged the British Motor Corporation to establish an assembly plant in Cape Town in 1955.12

By the late 1950s – on the eve of Phase 1 of the government’s local content programme13 – the motor industry had established itself as an important branch of manufacturing. The assembly industry employed almost 10,000 workers who earned almost £500,000 in salaries and wages, while the manufacturers of local components and the motor services sector employed more than 82,000 workers who earned almost £36 million in salaries and wages.14 It is evident from the data contained in Table 1 that during the decade of the 1960s – the period under review here – the four assemblers located in Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage dominated the industry. These companies – in order of their market shares, General Motors, Ford, Volkswagen and Rover – collectively held between 50 and 60 per cent of the total South African market for motor vehicles. It is not surprising, then, that when the government and some trade unionists sought to implement job reservation in the motor industry, attention was focused primarily on this branch of the industry located in the Eastern Cape.

### TABLE 1 MARKET SHARES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of total vehicle market</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkswagen</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rover Leyland (Rootes)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage Total</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Motor</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town Total</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA (Mercedes Benz)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London Total</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (Toyota)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Harvester</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyland</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban Total</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Motors (Rootes)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaiser</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datsun-Nissan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal Total</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 3. Job reservation in the Eastern Cape Motor Industry

By the early months of 1960, the “Suid-Afrikaanse Yster, Staal en Verwante Nywerhede-Unie” had been successful in recruiting some white workers in the Port Elizabeth assembly plants. On the strength of this support, the “Unie” wrote to the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) in February 1960 with a request for negotiations on minimum working conditions. The final sentence of the letter contained a sting in the tail: the “Unie” stated that if NAAMSA did not agree to negotiations, then “either strike action could be taken or job reservation could be applied for, in terms of the Act”.15 NAAMSA refused to negotiate with the “Unie” on the grounds that it was registered in respect of white workers only in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage area, and therefore did not represent coloured employees or employees in the industry in any other area.16 NAAMSA’s refusal to be intimidated elicted the following response from the “Unie” in May 1961: “We have no alternative but to apply to the Minister for job reservation in the motor assembly industry as a result of your refusal to enter into negotiations with us.”17

It ought to be noted that the negotiations to which the “Unie” referred did not relate to job reservation, and the fact that NAAMSA was not prepared to negotiate minimum working conditions could have had no relevance whatsoever to the necessity or otherwise of a job reservation investigation. It is evident that the “Unie” regarded job reservation proceedings as an alternative to strike action. That such a view was based on a serious misconception of the functions of an industrial tribunal did not appear to perturb the Minister of Labour who, on 8 September 1961, appointed an industrial tribunal to investigate the motor industry.18 Perhaps the timing of this was guided by a desire to win over white voters in marginal seats in Port Elizabeth before the general election of 18 October 1961.19

In evidence before the tribunal during 1962-63, the “Unie” stated that “whites are eager to work in the assembly industry, but employers are taking little trouble to recruit Whites”. The “Unie” charged assembly plants on the Witwatersrand with the employment of “large numbers of Bantu workers” at a time when, it was alleged, that there existed considerable unemployment amongst whites.20 On the basis of employment statistics made available by the tribunal, the “Unie” pointed to the decline in the percentage of whites employed in the motor industry from 82 per cent in 1949 to 41.7 per cent in 1963. Concurrently, the percentage of coloureds employed had risen from 4.9 to 40.6 per cent, and that for Africans had increased from 13.1 to 17.7 per cent.21

It was also the Unie’s contention that this shift in the employment pattern had brought with it increased racial friction. The chairman of the Unie’s branch in Port Elizabeth complained that “I have often seen White and non-White employees sitting together and conversing during tea breaks”. When it was pointed out by a mem-

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number of the tribunal that this evidence, instead of supporting claims of racial friction, indicated the reverse, the trade union assessor replied that he deplored the “friendly relationship which is springing up between White and Coloured employees”. He was adamant that such “familiarity” justified the introduction of job reservation. To this end, the “Unie” submitted a list of 68 operations which it wanted reserved for white workers, with the balance of 23 operations to be reserved for coloured workers.22

In its evidence before the tribunal, NAAMSA criticised the “Unie” for its attempts to harm the interests of coloured workers. It was pointed out that:

“...a very large number of the jobs which they requested should be reserved for White workers are at present being done by both Whites and Coloureds. If, therefore, these jobs were reserved for White workers this would result in the Coloured employees being ousted from their employment.23 In this regard, NAAMSA referred to the verbal evidence heard from the Western Province Motor Assembly Workers’ Union (a union registered for coloured workers only in the British Motor Corporation plant). This Union had stated that it was opposed to job reservation which might restrict employment opportunities for Coloureds, but added that “we are opposed to any type of job reservation whether for Coloured workers or not”.24 Assessors for NAAMSA reported that there was “no evidence whatsoever of displacement of one race by another”.

NAAMSA acknowledged the Wage Board’s report of 1954 which had found that “the racial composition in the industry tended to show a weakening in the number of Europeans with a more or less corresponding strengthening in the number of non-Europeans employed”.25 However, NAAMSA denied that this had been an attempt to take advantage of cheap black labour, but rather that it was the result of a shortage of white employees. It pointed to the Board of Trade and Industries’ Report No.613 of 1960, which had estimated that 25 000 employees would be required to produce an anticipated 100 000 vehicles per annum. Given the constraint of a white labour shortage at a time when members of NAAMSA had already undertaken considerably increased capital investment in the industry, it was concluded that job reservation would strangle the industry’s growth.26

The fact that one unrepresentative trade union wanted job reservation while all other interested parties had spoken out against it, did not deter the members of the tribunal when they drew up their final report and recommendations.27 The report paid fleeting attention to
the absolute increase in employment amongst all races, but concentrated on the percentage decline in the number of whites vis-a-vis other races:

The percentage of Whites in proportion to the total labour force has dropped from 82 to 41.7. On the other hand, the phenomenal increase in Coloured and Bantu employment...is remarkable. 28

By excluding administrative office staff and labourers from the total number of workers, the tribunal found that whites accounted for only 34.2 per cent of production workers as opposed to 41.7 per cent of all categories of employment. The report went on to claim that “This tendency towards displacement has since 1955 already caused anxiety among Whites inside and outside the industry. The non-White races with the lower standard of living have been able to compete with the Whites...on an unequal basis.”

With regard to the shortage of white labour, the report placed the blame on insecurity resulting from the absence of a strong trade union which itself was “partly as a result of the attitude of employers”. In its view:

“It must have been humiliating to any employee, whatever his race, to have to stand and wait in front of the gates with little more than a vague hope of getting employment, especially where the crowd waiting in front of the gates was multi-racial.” 29

The report therefore concluded that job reservation was desirable in respect of the category of “production workers”. It accepted NAAMSAs’s assurance that administrative work was exclusively white, and agreed that the “physical strength” of the African was required for the category of “labourers”.30

Work Reservation Determination No. 16 of 1964 accordingly stipulated that “supervisory and control work and welding” were to be reserved for whites. In addition, there was to be no replacement of currently employed white workers by coloureds (which included Asians), and no replacement of coloureds by Africans. Furthermore, within six months of the date of the Determination, employers were obliged to ensure that a minimum percentage of their personnel was white. The prescribed minimum percentage varied from 20 per cent in Durban; 25 per cent in East London, Johannesburg, Germiston and Alberton; to 45 per cent in Port Elizabeth and Bellville; and to 65 per cent in Uitenhage. The area of Blackheath, near Cape Town, where the British Motor Corporation had established a plant employing almost exclusively white and coloured labour, was completely exempted from all of the foregoing provisions on condition that coloureds were not replaced by Africans.31

The Trade Union Council of South Africa’s conservative reaction to the Determination was hardly calculated to enhance its relations with the black unions. Instead of job reservation, TUCSA argued that:

“...the White man’s position should be safeguarded by the payment of equal pay for equal work. With his better opportunities and greater skills the White man could then not be replaced by non-Whites who are prepared to work for less money.” 32

NAAMSAs’s response was a hastily-called meeting at which it expressed its “surprise and concern” and issued a terse statement:

“The industry is currently spending R70m[illlion] on expansion and finds itself working under extreme pressure due to an increasing pressure of labour of all races. Even a cursory glance reveals that compliance with the Tribunal’s dictates will be impossible unless exemptions are granted.” 33

The greatest concern was shown by the Eastern Cape plants because they had experienced more severe labour shortages. 34 Not surprisingly, therefore, when the regional quotas came into operation on 19 April 1965, these plants applied for blanket exemptions.

After protracted negotiations with the “Suid-Afrikaanse Yster, Staal en Verwante Nywerhede-Unie”, during which employers gave the assurance that they would not allow coloureds or Africans to replace whites unless there was full employment amongst whites, an agreement was reached and a blanket exemption was granted to the assembly plants in Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage in mid-1968. 35 This move made a mockery of the previous three years of wrangling, and was particularly galling to the other assembly plants which had not been at the heart of the original dispute but which still remained subject to the Determination.36

Meanwhile, another hammer-blow struck the motor industry in the Eastern Cape, this time delivered by the government in the form of the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act No.88 of 1967.37 The Act was intended not only to improve and extend town and regional planning, but also to promote industrial decentralisation by the control of industrial land proclamation. That the Act was specifically designed to further the ends of apartheid was revealed by the Minister of Planning when he introduced the Bill:

“The Government is determined that there should be no unrestricted increase in the number of Africans in metropolitan areas. It is our intention whenever possible to freeze, and in due course to reduce, these numbers, in the interests of the country as a whole.” 38 Accordingly, the Department stipulated that the black/white ratio in the metropolitan areas was not to exceed 1:2.5. Furthermore, Section 3 of the Act made it necessary to obtain ministerial approval for any new factory or factory extension which involved increased black employment in the metropolitan centres in the Transvaal, Cape and Orange Free State. 39 That the Act gave the Minister effective control over virtually every job in the affected urban areas may be seen in the definition of the term “factory”. It included every concern which
was aware of widespread unemployment and poverty amongst the coloured population of the Eastern Cape, and it believed that this action would help to ensure full employment amongst the estimated 110 000 coloureds living in this zone. A spokesman for the Department of Planning claimed in April 1968 that work had already begun in moving coloureds in outlying areas into the towns and "endorsing out" some of the Africans. The only problem, he conceded, was a shortage of some 10 000 houses for coloureds.

The Midland Chamber of Commerce agreed that the housing shortage was a serious obstacle, but questioned whether coloured workers were suitable for employment in industry. In the case of the motor industry:

“There are alarming tales of the effects on productivity: 20 per cent absenteeism in some plants rising to 40 per cent on night shifts; and management standing at factory gates at lunch-time to prevent the disappearance of the labour force for the rest of the day, plus frequent reports of drunkenness and damage to equipment.” However, according to B.D. Phillips’ survey on employment in the region, which had just been released, the vicious circle of poverty in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage region had its origins in the residential environment. Based on a survey of 20 000 coloured households, Phillips found that an average of 4.1 coloureds shared one bedroom. Unemployment was found to be particularly high amongst the coloured youth, and that approximately 25 per cent of all coloured work-seekers had been without a job for more than a year. Furthermore, for those who were unemployed, the mean monthly income of male coloureds stood at R74.10 which just covered the barest minimum living expenditure in terms of the poverty datum line of R73.68. It is not surprising, therefore, that the inadequacy of the residential environment, combined with frequent unemployment and low wages, was associated with “ample evidence” of inadequate work performance and work commitment. The inevitable result, concluded Phillips, was high labour turnover, absenteeism and lack of punctuality. Furthermore, the high labour turnover in the motor industry was singled out for special mention: 24 per cent for Africans and 32 per cent for coloureds.

Despite such convincing evidence, the Department of Planning was adamant that a “crisis situation” did not exist in the Eastern Cape motor industry. In August 1969, it was pointed out that only 71 applications for additional African labour had been received from the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage region since January 1968. Of these, 50 applications had been approved (12 on a permanent basis and 38 on a temporary basis) while the remaining 21 applications had been refused. “If manufacturers want more [African] labour”, challenged the Minister, “why don’t they ask us?” In reply, one motor plant stated:

The fairly low rate of applications for exemptions is due to the administrative difficulties and uncertainties involved. Re-applications every six months, with no guarantee of continuity in the labour force, is not only undesirable, but an impossible situation.” It appears that it was in response to this “situation” that, in October 1969, the Department of Planning informed the Port Elizabeth City Council that 3 000 morgen of African land in the direction of Uitenhage should be converted to coloured use in order to ease the urban housing shortage. Fearful that such a move would further cripple supplies of African labour, the city council petitioned the Minister of Planning for Port Elizabeth to be released from its classification as a “coloured preference” zone. This appeal failed, but the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr P. Koornhof, mollified the city council by assuring it that land which had been earmarked for African development would remain classified as such. The gyrations of the city fathers appear to have been largely self-defeating. They were not prepared to endanger their supplies of cheap African labour by making provision for increased coloured housing, the lack of which had been shown to be at the root of the “undesirable” characteristics of coloured workers.

4. Concluding Comments

During the course of 1971, the motor car industry was launched into Phase III of the local content programme, a phase which demanded expansion into the local production of more sophisticated motor vehicle parts and accessories. Accordingly, the perception of the labour problem appears to have shifted from one which had centred primarily on the quantitative supply of labour to the quality of labour available to the motor industry. Indeed, a slump in motor car sales during 1971-72 had forced all the major motor car manufacturers – Ford, General Motors, Volkswagen, Chrysler and Leyland – to engage in retrenchment. On this occasion, however, there were not the same strident calls for the protection of whites at the expense of blacks. In fact, numerous pleas were made for the training and use of blacks in semi-skilled and skilled jobs in the motor industry. For example, Mr P.Haak, chairman of the “Motorhandelskamer” in the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, said in April 1971 that while he did not favour "the opening of all the labour gates to all races...a new approach to the training of apprentices would put White brain-power to its full use and allow non-Whites to make a greater contribution".
The opportunities for the maintenance of profit margins in a depressed market by the increased use of cheaper labour probably did not go unnoticed by employers. The new Industrial Council Agreement for the Motor Industry (excluding assembly plants), presented in September 1971, made provision for wage increases which ranged from 4.5 per cent for unskilled labour, 10 per cent for semi-skilled workers, and 22.5 per cent for skilled operatives. Whatever claims have been made about the narrowing of the white/black wage gap, it is evident that the gap was not in the process of being closed in the motor industry. Furthermore, the Agreement widened the scope of both "operative" and "labourer" so that Africans were permitted to perform more semi-skilled functions. But they remained in the same category of worker, and thereby provided a significantly cheaper source of labour for the new categories of work performed.

This narrowly exploitative approach - whereby employers sought to gain the best advantages within the protective strictures of the apartheid system - was reflected in the White Paper on the Riebert Committee Report tabled in June 1971. In an effort to bring about a "more effective implementation" of the government's policy of industrial decentralisation, the White Paper recommended concessions for employers in border areas. While it favoured the retention of the principle of job reservation, the White Paper indicated that "The Government is prepared to consider granting exemptions for the employment of Africans on more advanced types of work".

In line with government policy, however, such concessions would only be granted on condition that Africans were not placed in positions of authority over whites, that "different national groups" were not employed on the same level of work, and that separate facilities were made available for the different race groups.

Meanwhile, pressure from external sources gathered momentum as the disinvestment campaign gained ground. It was becoming clear that a considerable body of opinion had ranged itself against the apartheid system, particularly "unfair labour practices". In 1971-72, Charles Diggs, chairman of the Africa Sub-Committee of the Congressional House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the United Nations Association of the United States both issued policy documents which, in part, foreshadowed the Sullivan Code of July 1978. Both documents contained clauses which called for a ban on the establishment of new United States businesses in South Africa, and that the United States government should force American businesses already located in South Africa to adopt "fair employment practices and to refuse to adhere to racial policies". It was as a direct result of this pressure that Ford, General Motors and Chrysler embarked upon various programmes in their South African plants. Thus the decade of the 1970s marked the beginning of the end of an extraordinary phase of blatantly discriminatory labour relations in the motor industry, especially in the Eastern Cape.

ENDNOTES

1. *Industrial Conciliation Act No. 28 of 1956*.
2. The Department of Labour's *Job Reservation Determination No. 1*, relating to the clothing industry, was declared null and void by the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court on the ground that the Industrial Councils for the clothing industry had not given their approval. In reaction, the *Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act No. 41 of 1959* stipulated that it was no longer necessary for the Minister to obtain the consent of an Industrial Council.
6. R.H. Johnston, *Early motoring in South Africa*, p.114 and E. Rosenthal, *The Rolling Years: Fifty Years of General Motors in South Africa*, pp.4-5. All of the statistics relating to motor car imports have been drawn from the *Annual Statement of the Trade and Shipping of the Union of South Africa* for the relevant years.
13. The local content programme was designed to encourage the local manufacture of motor car components. Phase 1 (1961-64) set a target of 40% local content by weight, and Phase 2 (1964-67) raised that target to 55%.
16. Ibid., p.6.
17. Ibid., p.5.
20. Department of Labour, *op. cit.*, par. 47.
22. Ibid., par.5.
23. Ibid., Appendix B, p.6.
24. Ibid., p.7.
27. Curiously, it appears that neither the Motor Industry Combined Workers' Union nor the Motor Industry Employees' Union of South Africa gave evidence before the tribunal.
29. Ibid., pars.46-47, 74.
30. Ibid., par.86.
31. Work Reservation Determination No.16, Government Notice No.1597, Government Gazette, 16 October 1964. This was applicable to the motor vehicle assembly plants only, and not to the branch of the industry manufacturing motor vehicle parts and accessories.
37. This Act replaced and extended the provisions of the Natural Resources Development Act No.51 of 1947 as amended by Act No.30 of 1955.
39. After considerable debate in the Assembly, during which it was alleged that the Act usurped the powers of the United Party-controlled Town and Regional Planning Commission in Natal, it was decided that Natal would be exempted. Hansard, 26 May 1967, cols.6781-6788.
40. Section 3(2).
42. "P.E. Industry: Labour", Financial Mail, 19 April 1968. It was anticipated that the backlog would be overcome by the construction of 2 700 housing units per annum over the following three years.
43. Evening Post, 2 July 1968.
45. Ibid., p.122.
57. White Paper on the Rieker Committee Report, June 1971, par.11. This paragraph went on to report that "...if White workers become available at a later stage, the concessions will be adapted to the changed circumstances".
58. Ibid.