Indigenous “Africans” and transnational “Pan-Netherlanders”: Past and present in the “re-construction” of post-1994 Afrikaner identity

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Abstract

This article explores two strategies to “re-imagine” Afrikaner identity in a post-apartheid South Africa in which white Afrikaners, once politically and culturally dominant, have become increasingly marginalized. One, using the early meaning of “Afrikaner” as “African”, claims “indigenous” status, pressing for limited autonomy as an African “tribe,” championing language rights for all Afrikaans-speakers regardless of color, or embracing a larger “African” identity, even joining the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The other seeks to rebuild old links, broken under apartheid, to Flemish and especially Dutch cousins, joined in a pan-Netherlandic community. The article explores how, although in recent times the parochial and essentialist “official” Afrikaner nationalist understanding of Afrikaner “ethnogenesis” had stressed its shaping by the “original” “white” settlers’ struggles with Africans and British latecomers, denying multiracial ancestry and even downplaying broader, European (particularly Low Country) influences, a closer examination shows that that this narrower model long contended with more multicultural and transnational approaches. The evolution of these rival views of Afrikaner identity and responses from the Low Countries and some ANC leaders to these alternative models suggest that such ethnic “re-construction” could help recast Afrikaner self-definition in promising contemporary yet historically grounded terms, provided in the case of pan-Netherlandism that it is not hijacked by the extreme Right, but instead presents Afrikaners as a bridge between Europe and Africa.

Keywords: Afrikaner; Nationalism; Ethnic identity; Indigenous status; Pan-Netherlanders; National Party; Apartheid; African National Congress; Transnational; Far Right.
Introduction

In 1961, as apartheid approached its zenith, Afrikaners, descendants of 17th and 18th century Dutch, German, and French settlers, achieved their long-sought South African republic, entrenching white rule and ending the last vestiges of British control. Announcing a referendum on the republic, Prime Minister and ruling National Party (NP) leader Hendrik Verwoerd presented breaking with the monarchy as ending intra-white division to build a “unity people” (eenheids-volk), which would surely be predominantly Afrikaner in character.¹ For Afrikaners, Verwoerd noted, were “so strongly tied to this own fatherland”,² unlike the less numerous English-speaking whites. The name of the white suburb rising over the newly demolished Sophiatown African township epitomized that era: “Triomf.”

Since 1994 a very different republic has emerged under African National Congress (ANC) rule. Afrikaners became increasingly marginalized, politically and culturally. Afrikaner control of the civil service disappeared as did the NP; with Afrikaans one of eleven rather than two official languages, English increasingly became the lingua franca. How could Afrikaners “re-imagine” their identity in this new world? The degree and nature of interest in Afrikaner identity varied: some sank into apathy, some joined with white English-speaking liberals and likeminded others, some hoped for some kind of group rights or withdrew into their community; younger Afrikaners with transferrable skills began to emigrate.³ This article examines two quite different, contrasting approaches to rethinking Afrikaner identity, both deeply grounded in history: one claiming “indigenous” “African” status, the other looking to re-build transnational links with Europe’s Low Countries broken under apartheid.

The essentialist view of Afrikaner “ethnogenesis” and identity

Superficially, both last approaches were novel: essentialist, parochial assumptions long undergirded “official” views on Afrikaner “ethnogenesis,” stressing its shaping by the “original” white settlers’ struggles with Africans and British latecomers. In *500 Years*, a staple 1970s “approved” history textbook, CR Kotzé claimed that when Britain occupied the Cape a second time in 1806, the “Cape Dutch”, left by the Dutch East India Company to open the interior and protect themselves from the indigenous peoples, “had already acquired the characteristics of an embryo nation”. By 1908 Daniël Malan, who as NP Prime Minister in 1948 introduced apartheid, was telling the Afrikaanse Taalvereniging (Afrikaans Language Union) that in South Africa, whereas complex Dutch had an unnatural, forced existence, Afrikaans (its local variant, which had replaced it as a spoken language) lived in the heart and mouth of the (Afrikaner) people. As Gerrit Schutte notes, despite Afrikaners’ gratitude for Dutch help in the Anglo-Boer wars, they “moved away from Holland” as Afrikaans replaced Dutch even in writing and they increasingly stressed differences from the Dutch; the new Afrikaner histories published in the 1920s and 1930s stressed the oppression of Company rule and Dutch officials’ unpopularity in the old Boer Transvaal republic. When in 1940 Hitler invaded the Netherlands and Belgium, with its related Flemings, the Cape Town NP daily *Die Burger* rejected Prime Minister Jan Smuts’s claim that the Netherlands was Afrikaner “sacred ground”, arguing that, unlike English-speakers, for Afrikaners, with as much German and French as Dutch ancestry, such “home” sentiment was “unnatural”; Afrikaners purportedly knew only one fatherland, unlike a British imperialist, or German or Dutch colonist.

As for being “indigenous Africans”, the post-1948 *apartheid* laws distanced Afrikaners yet more than already was true even from their Afrikaans-speaking mixed Coloured cousins. Even in the early 1960s, when the winds of change in Africa led to repackaging apartheid as “separate development”, Verwoerd’s newfound pragmatism was limited to accommodating English-speakers in a

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5 DF Malan, “Dit is ons ernst”, 13 August 1908, SW Pienaar with JJJ Scholtz (Eds), *Glo in u volk: Dr. DF Malan as redenaar* (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 1964), p. 173.
broader white nationalism.

**A closer look: The fluid nature of early Afrikaner identity**

Yet, a closer look shows that the construction of Afrikaner identity had long been more fluid, oscillating between being “an outpost of Europe”, focused on the Dutch, less so German or French *stamland* (land of origin), and the literal meaning of “Afrikaner”: “African”. Peter Kapp has noted the complexity of early identities at the Cape and the difficulty in determining how much of later Afrikaner identity was evident before the 1795 first British occupation.\(^9\) The contested nature of the emergence of “national” or “ethnic’ identity is hardly peculiar to South African studies.\(^10\) Nor, as Jeffrey Butler points out, does the added class dimension which Marxist historians such as Dan O’Meara have added to analyses of Afrikaner nationalism overcome such problems in determining the emergence of identity: showing for instance how Transvaal farmers abandoned the United Party for the NP prior to the 1948 apartheid election does not explain why it was Afrikaner farmers, rather than all white farmers, who did so.\(^11\)

Hermann Giliomee points out that Afrikaner ancestors in the 17th and 18th century Cape usually called themselves “burghers” (citizens), “Christians”, or “Dutchmen”.\(^12\) Adam Tas, the earliest Afrikaner nationalist hero, was a newcomer who still saw the Netherlands as his homeland;\(^13\) he and his supporters’ 1706 “complaint” against Governor WA van der Stel stressed loyalty as “freeborn persons and subjects” of the Dutch Estates-General (parliament).\(^14\) In 1778 the “Cape Patriots,” the next key actors in the nationalist pantheon, expressed criticism of Company abuses as “free citizens

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\(^12\) H Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people* (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2009), p. 50.


of the united Netherlands.”

Yet, as Giliomee notes, the term “Afrikaander”, “Afrikaner”, or “Africana”, applied to Cape-born settlers, had appeared already in 1707 when Hendrik Biebouw, an unruly young man, protested as an “Afrikaander” against a magistrate’s thrashing. However, the term usually meant an indigenous African or child of Africans, non-indigenous slaves or “free blacks”; André du Toit argues that into the 19th century “Afrikaander” usually meant a person of “mixed race”, but increasingly in the 1800s outsiders used it, albeit pejoratively, to describe a Cape-born Afrikaans-speaking colonist. Giliomee too notes that it sometimes recurred in Biebouw’s sense, becoming quite common by the late 18th century to designate settlers no longer seeing themselves as Dutch, German, or French. Yet, given substantial partly “non-European”, including Malagasy and East African, ancestry, chiefly via unions with slave women, the earlier usage fit many settlers too - despite the increasing denial of such mixed origins. As for the Dutch connection, settler identity, rooted both in Africa and Europe, was so fluid that even the Cape Patriots called themselves “Africaners”, or the Cape their “fatherland”, yet claimed that, unlike the rebellious American colonists, redressing their grievances would produce gratitude, “passed on from generation to generation. And so the free name of the Netherlands will be perpetuated in Africa”.

This fluidity persisted after the British occupied the Cape, leading to the 1830s Great Trek by many Boers (farmers), who set up the Orange Free State and Transvaal republics in the interior. British immigration and the end of Dutch rule increased the sense of being a distinct community, reinforced by growing divergence between Netherlandic Dutch and “Afrikaans”, spoken by Afrikaners and the mixed population which would become known as the

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15 A Du Toit and HB Giliomee (Eds.), Afrikaner political thought..., pp. 252-253.
16 H Giliomee, The Afrikaners..., pp. 22-23.
18 Giliomee, The Afrikaners..., p. 51.
20 H Giliomee, The Afrikaners..., p. 52.
22 Letter in De Post van de Neder Rhijn, including copy of 1784 proposition, in A du Toit and H Giliomee, (Eds), Afrikaner political thought..., pp. 262-264. On the mix of Patriot influences from the Enlightenment and Dutch political developments as well as local Cape issues, see G Schutte, “Company and colonists at the Cape,” R Elphick and H Giliomee (eds.), The shaping of South African society..., pp. 312-313.
Cape Coloureds. However, the new states split loyalties between the various territories, while language varied from something close to Dutch to the *patois* of poor Afrikaners and “Coloureds”. Moreover, limited educational infrastructure meant that Afrikaners long had to import most clergy, teachers, lawyers, merchants, and journalists: most Cape Reformed Church clergy came from Scotland, while most officials in the Transvaal “South African Republic” came from the Netherlands.

**The Low Countries and nascent Afrikaner nationalism**

Although hostility to such outsiders fed some pan-Afrikaner political mobilization in an aspiring middle class, cultural and religious links to the Low Country *stamland* survived and grew amid British imperialist pressure on the republics. Visiting the Netherlands, even SJ du Toit, who led the Cape Afrikaans language-based movement of “real Afrikaanders”, as opposed to ones with “English” or “Hollands” hearts, was so impressed by Dutch politician Abraham Kuyper, that the 1882 proposed program for Du Toit’s Afrikaner Bond (Afrikaner Union) party was a near-copy of that of Kuyper’s Anti-Revolutionary Party. When in 1880 Boers rebelled against British occupation of the Transvaal and in 1899 again took up arms against Britain, many Dutch backed the notion of a common “blood bond” advanced by the Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Vereeniging (Dutch-South African Union), founded in 1881.

Even in Catholic Belgium many Flemish companies and streets adopted Transvaal names and Flemish nationalists raised funds for Boer war victims.

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Indigenous “Africans” and Transnational “Pan-Netherlanders”

Many Afrikaner intellectuals and professionals, especially after the Anglo-Boer wars, now pursued higher education and, even after founding their own universities, did at least their post-graduate studies in the Netherlands. The *stamland* link was strengthened by Low Country immigrants such as Arnoldus Pannevis, who promoted Afrikaans, and JWG van Oordt, one of several late 19th century Dutch historians who promoted an Afrikaner national awareness. JBM Hertzog, who in 1914 would found the National Party, had backed Transvaal president Paul Kruger’s appointing many Dutch immigrants as officials precisely so as to build on Afrikaners’ *Diets* (pan-Netherlandic) background.

“White” but not “European”: Redefining Afrikaner identity in the apartheid era

After the 1910 unification of South Africa, sympathy in some Afrikaner nationalist quarters with Germany threatened to eclipse the Dutch connection, particularly in the 1930s, when nationalist figures such as Hans van Rensburg, Nico Diederichs, and Piet Meyer were drawn to elements of national socialism. During the Second World War, when the most militant nationalists hoped for a German victory, such sentiments were in tension with the views of others, such as Daniël Malan, who favored neutrality. For the latter, South Africa’s interests “demanded that it keep itself far from Europe’s wars”.

In 1946 NP leader Daniël Malan asked Eric Louw, later his Foreign Minister, to write a piece for overseas newspapers; Louw’s draft, framed around not being dragged into conflicts by Britain, repeatedly stressed how, unlike most

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English-speaking South Africans, the Afrikaner had “long since severed the sentimental and racial ties which bound him to the lands of his forebears... He is purely a South African”. Yet, Louw was too much the segregationist to mean a South African identity which included blacks, likening Afrikaners to European immigrants to the United States, who became “full-blooded Americans”. Even the 19th century Afrikaans language movement had rejected embracing “Coloured” Afrikaans-speakers.

Under apartheid, from 1948 the NP would seek to segregate them almost as rigidly as were black Africans. For instance, the Group Areas Act mandated residential segregation even in areas of Cape Town in which Coloureds and whites had long lived alongside each other. Similarly, the new government expanded a 1927 law which had outlawed extra-marital sexual relations between whites and Africans, prohibiting both marriages and sexual relations between whites and all others; the vast majority of such relationships involved whites and Coloureds.

In the apartheid era defining the nature of Afrikaner “Africanness” remained mired in the prejudices of white South African politics. Ex-President FW de Klerk recalled how, as a 1950s leader in the Afrikaanse Studentebond (Afrikaner Student Union), Afrikaner nationalists could not resolve disagreement between hardliners chiefly loyal to the “Afrikaner nation” and those wanting “balance between loyalty to South Africa and... to the Afrikaans people”. Yet, as De Klerk concedes, “At that time we did not regard non-white South Africans as part of the South African nation”. Piet Meyer, who led the influential Afrikaner Broederbond (Brothers’ Union), warned in 1966 that a new NP emphasis on Afrikaner-English integration (subject to English-speaking whites backing apartheid and a white republic) threatened a “liberalistic” Western influence, negatively affecting “survival of the Afrikaner nation as an indigenous, separate and independent Western

38 D Joubert, Met iemand van ‘n ander kleur: Beskouings en wetgewing oor ontug (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 1974), p. 3.
40 FW de Klerk, The last Trek..., p. 28.
cultural community in Africa”. Thus, he sought to balance the notion of Afrikaners being “indigenous” yet at the same time “Western” (provided that “liberalism” was kept at bay).

Still, as NP apartheid replaced colonial-style segregation, official discourse shifted from “European” and “non-European” to “white” and “non-white”. In a 1924 speech NP founder JBM Hertzog had insisted that its policy was based on maintaining “existence of the European population and of the European civilization”, underlining the limits of Afrikaner “indigenization”. By the time of the apartheid-oriented 1948 NP election manifesto, the language had shifted to “maintenance and protection of the white population of our land as a pure white race”. While the manifesto distinguished between whites and “indigenous racial groups”, this clear shift in language perhaps reflected growing estrangement from a Europe increasingly rejecting colonialism, settler rule, and especially, “racial” segregation.

Afrikaner historian Floris van Jaarsveld argued that the post-1945 anti-colonial pan-African tide at the United Nations gave white South Africans an “Africa consciousness”. In the 1960s Verwoerd, then Prime Minister, believed that a focus on “separate development” (offering autonomy and eventual “independence” for the residual African reserves), while proclaiming “white South Africa” an anti-Communist bastion of “Western civilization” would improve critical Western countries’ views of his government. By 1975 NP hardliner Andries Treurnicht (who in 1982 led a far Right split from the by then “reformist” NP) showed how much still further younger, more moderate Afrikaners had moved when he complained that they were torn between claiming to be as much of Africa as a Zambian or Congolese, part of “an Africa people, the Afrikaner people”, yet wanting to belong to the wider Western world, with which Afrikaners were in collision, due to what he argued was the “liberalistic” tendency to deny a place for a specifically Afrikaner consciousness.

In a post-colonial world many Afrikaners concluded that the only hope for preserving an Afrikaner-dominated state was to reaffirm their not being just “settlers”, who could be persuaded to go “home”, like elsewhere in Africa, but Africa’s “white tribe”, with no other home, living alongside other African communities, however separately. Already in 1960 Verwoerd, replying to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” speech, had declared that “We call ourselves Europeans but in reality we represent the whites of Africa” and that the trend toward independence in Africa meant not only being just to the “black man of Africa”, but also to the “white man of Africa.”47 By 1971 Prime Minister BJ Vorster could go so far as to tell a rural NP rally:48

...for too long we described ourselves to the world outside as Europeans. We are not Europeans, we are of Africa like any other person is of Africa. Africa is our land of birth. Here in Africa we shall die.

Yet, no matter how much such Nationalists upheld both an “African” identity and Afrikaner rule, justifying “independence” for poor, fragmented black African “homelands” as “separate freedoms” for other Africans, they could not similarly mask the sentiment behind excluding mixed race “Coloureds”, lacking even such territory, from a common polity. Teruuricht complained that some “thoughtlessly” termed them “brown Afrikaners”, but that they could not overcome “ethnological, psychological, and sociological” differences, expressed, he argued, also in different Afrikaans, even among the well-educated.49 However, by the 1980s limited reforms promoted by NP leader PW Botha forced Nationalists to work with an accommodating minority of “Coloured” and Indian-descended politicians in a “tricameral” parliament. Pragmatists such as Botha’s successor FW de Klerk, who from 1990 oversaw the NP shift to non-racialism, were becoming convinced that the former not only spoke Afrikaners’ language, but shared their culture, opening the way for accepting far greater changes after De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and other restricted political groups in 1990.50

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47 AN Pelzer (Ed.) Verwoerd aan die Woord..., p. 319.
49 A Teruuricht, Credo van ’n Afrikaner, p. 19.
50 FW De Klerk, The last Trek..., pp. 96-97.
The post-apartheid crisis: Reclaiming “Africanness”

The Botha era reforms did not halt the growing global isolation of South Africa, as even the United States imposed economic sanctions against it. The Dutch, despite their old links to South Africa, had taken a notably hard line. One reason was that many Dutch opponents of apartheid believed, despite the many differences between the two political systems, that it echoed the Nazism which they had experienced under German wartime occupation.\(^{51}\) Not until 1998, four years after the first post-apartheid elections, did the Dutch government renew its 1953 cultural accord with South Africa, which the Netherlands had terminated in 1981 in protest against Pretoria's policies.\(^{52}\)

Such isolation, along with the ANC-led liberation struggle, the end of the Cold War, and demographic reality, as low birth rates made whites a shrinking minority, forced an end to merely “reforming” apartheid. President De Klerk made a dramatic break with the past when in 1990 he initiated the unbanning of the black liberation movements and the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela, leading to the end of international isolation as negotiations with the ANC and other parties got underway. The negotiations led to beginning the dismantling of apartheid, a new interim constitution, and the first non-racial elections in April 1994, following which De Klerk agreed to serve as a deputy to Mandela, his successor as president, in an ANC-dominated government.

The 1990-1994 transition to black majority ANC-led rule created a crisis for Afrikaners, who lost control of the civil service and the many parastatal corporations, which had employed a great number of Afrikaners. Yet, in one respect they were better positioned than the more cosmopolitan English-speakers. Although in more recent years Afrikaner emigration has come to equal that of English-speakers, before 1994 the latter predominated in the growing white exodus. For instance, in the 1980s most South Africans emigrating to Australia (which today has many Afrikaner immigrants) were English-speaking whites;\(^{53}\) as late as the 2006 Australian census, the home


In the aftermath of the coming of majority rule, Afrikaners could reaffirm claims to being “indigenous”, with far deeper roots in South Africa as its “white tribe” than English-speakers, but now without seeming to use such claims to justify an oppressive system. As shown below, those who espoused this position found common ground with several top ANC leaders, at least in the latters’ speeches, even though the growing number of Afrikaner emigrants since 1994 has shown that many were too pessimistic about their future to put much stock in this line of argument.

In 1991 the NP became a multiracial party; it drew approximately two-thirds of “Coloured” and half of Indian-descended voters in the 1994 election.\footnote{H Giliomee, The Afrikaners..., p. 647.}

In 1993 the Afrikanerbond replaced the Afrikaner Broederbond, opening its membership to women and black Afrikaans-speakers. In its new “Credo” it described Afrikaners as “the only people on the continent of Africa” which had “spontaneously” and “of its own accord” named themselves after the continent on which they and their ancestors were born.\footnote{Afrikaner champion Afriforum, linked to the Afrikaner trade union Solidarity, insisted: “we know no other home” than the southern end of Africa;\footnote{See opening lines of Afriforum “Burgerregtemanifies” (Civil Rights Manifesto) (available at http://www.afriforum.co.za/oor-afriforum/ burgerregtemanifies/, as accessed on 1 August 2012).} the related website Blynet (Stay-net) declared Afrikaans “an indigenous Africa-language”.\footnote{Blynet, “Verklaring” (Declaration) (available at http://www.blynet.co.za/verklaring, as accessed on 1 August 2012).} Afrikaner champion Afriforum, linked to the Afrikaner trade union Solidarity, insisted: “we know no other home” than the southern end of Africa;\footnote{See opening lines of Afriforum “Burgerregtemanifies” (Civil Rights Manifesto) (available at http://www.afriforum.co.za/oor-afriforum/ burgerregtemanifies/, as accessed on 1 August 2012).} the related website Blynet (Stay-net) declared Afrikaans “an indigenous Africa-language”.\footnote{Blynet, “Verklaring” (Declaration) (available at http://www.blynet.co.za/verklaring, as accessed on 1 August 2012).} Afrikaners are Africans,” urging that “the Afrikaans idea” be broadened to became part of an “African Renaissance”.\footnote{T Mbeki, “Statement to the Afrikanerbond”, 27 July 1999 (available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ mbeki/1999/tm0727.html, as accessed on 3 September 2009).}

This insistence on being an “indigenous” community helps explain the gradual rapprochement between the ANC and “New” NP (NNP), as the NP was renamed in 1997. Even many ANC leaders came to accept Afrikaners’ “African-ness.” Addressing the Afrikanerbond in 1999, President Thabo Mbeki insisted that “Afrikaners are Africans,” urging that “the Afrikaans idea” be broadened to became part of an “African Renaissance”.\footnote{T Mbeki, “Statement to the Afrikanerbond”, 27 July 1999 (available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ mbeki/1999/tm0727.html, as accessed on 3 September 2009).} In 2001 ANC electoral strategist Peter Mokaba argued that the NNP and ANC had much in common as “African parties” and that supporters of the NNP would have
less far to go in joining the ANC than those of the “liberal international” Democratic Alliance. The 2004 NNP-ANC “Reconciliation” agreement had as a strategic goal “the recognition that South Africa is an Africa land”. When the NNP dissolved itself in 2005, its remaining leaders joined the ANC. At a seminal subsequent meeting between the ANC and the Afrikanerbond, Mbeki quoted the above passage from the latter’s “Credo” in his weekly online newsletter, declaring that they could work together precisely “because they share common African roots and are tied to our country by an emotional bond.”

In a controversial speech to Afrikaner leaders before the April 2009 election, ANC leader Jacob Zuma, praising Afrikaners’ historical role, insisted they were regarded as an indigenous African tribe and that:

... of all the white groups in South Africa it is only the Afrikaner who is really South African in the true sense of the word.

In a February 2011 interview with the Afrikaans daily newspaper Beeld, Zuma expounded further on how Afrikaners differed from other whites, declaring them the only white group which could claim that they too fought for their freedom against the British and died in concentration camps. This, he asserted, was the kind of group which carried not two passports, but one.

Such efforts may have promoted more than mere co-operation with the ANC, as some Afrikaners at least appeared to continue in the steps of the former NP leadership. In August 2010 Deputy Police Minister Fikile Mbalula claimed in a media briefing that one sign of the ANC’s continued wide support was that the Afrikaners in particular were joining the ANC.

President Zuma also embraced conservative Afrikaners who identify as Africans, naming as a Deputy Minister Pieter Mulder, leader of the small

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60 T Lodge, Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki (Cape Town, David Philip, 2002), p. 155.
65 “Afrikaners joining the ANC, says Mbalula”, Mail & Guardian Online, 12 August 2010 (available at http://www.mg.co.za/printformat/article/2010-08-12-afrikaners-joining-the-anc-says-mbalula, as accessed on 12 August 2010).
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Freedom Front Plus Party.\textsuperscript{66} Like many Afrikaner nationalists today, Mulder promotes using indigenous African tongues (among which he includes Afrikaans), rather than English, which is increasingly displacing the other languages in government, broadcasting, and education. He has built ties to indigenous minorities such as the Lakota and Tibetans, noting that the green in Freedom Front Plus colors is in ninety percent of African countries’ flags.\textsuperscript{67} The African bloc in the Brussels-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, dominated by indigenous minorities, even backed the successful 2008 FFP application for Afrikaner membership.\textsuperscript{68}

Although such claims of being indigenous “Africans” may find resonance well beyond the ranks of Afrikaners themselves, it certainly is possible to read too much into Afrikaners describing themselves as such. A recent study by two psychologists, Cornel Verwey and Michael Quayle, based on private conversations with eleven male and four female middle-class Afrikaners, most in their twenties and thirties, does offer a note of caution. During two evenings in the setting of informal \textit{braais} (barbeques), the authors found that their informants rejected many longstanding identifiers of being “Afrikaner,” including apartheid as a policy, the importance of the Great Trek, “traditional” Afrikaner dress such as safari suits, and even retaining Afrikaans as a dominant language in South Africa. However, while several embraced the notion of Afrikaners being “African,” this did not imply embracing a broader identity, as they drew sharp distinctions between themselves and black Africans, whom they viewed as threatening, whereas they felt a greater affinity with other whites. Most viewed “Africa” as a dangerous continent in which declining numbers of whites led to a general deterioration in standards.\textsuperscript{69} This insubstantive understanding of being “African” and “indigenous” clearly hearkens back to the earlier, tortured apartheid-era connotations discussed earlier in this article, despite the formal rejection of apartheid as a system. Leaders such as Mulder or Mbeki seemed to have something more genuinely inclusive and optimistic in mind.

\textsuperscript{68} See “Afrikaner issues brought to international level”, 20 May 2008 (available at http://www.unpo.org/content/view/8156/236/, as accessed on 1 August 2012).
Post-apartheid crises moments: Reconnecting to the Low Countries

Mulder has also embraced the pan-Netherlandic option in “re-imagining” Afrikaner identity. In 2002 he visited the Netherlands and Belgium to build “closer ties with members of the Afrikaans language family in these lands”, albeit insisting to a warmly receptive Flemish Antwerp audience that Afrikaners were “now of Africa”. 70 Afriforum, seeing strength in numbers, has promoted the place of Afrikaans in the Nederlandic language group. 71 The Solidarity Afrikaner trade union announced in a news release that as part of a 2010 campaign which it was backing to promote Afrikaner “Africa identity” with the theme “Enough! Our Footprints are in Africa!” singer Gerrie Pretorius was taking his footprint cast to Oudorp, his Dutch ancestral town. 72

Those yet further Right also sought such links, aided by a nationalist anti-immigrant backlash in Europe. Henk van de Graaff, who promoted the “Boer heritage,” led a South African branch of the militant Diets (pan-Netherlandic) Dutch and Flemish nationalist organisation Voorpost; in 2003 he addressed the annual Ijzerwake (Yser vigil), which uses the commemoration of World War I battles near the Ijzer River to promote radical Flemish nationalism. 73 In January 2009 he and his Paardekraal branch of the militant Afrikaner nationalist organization, the Verkenners (“Scouts”), offered to host Geert Wilders, a leading far Right Dutch politician, to show a controversial film on Islam. 74 In 2010 the website of the small Afrikaner Volksparty, advocating old-time apartheid, had a regular link entitled Nederlandse Nuusflitse (Netherlands Newsflashes), updating viewers on Wilders, Muslim immigration, and other major concerns of the Dutch populist Right. 75

75 See link “Nederlandse nuusflitse” (available at http://www.afrikanervolksparty.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=38&Itemid=33, as accessed on 28 July 2010).
Interest has been mutual. During an official 2008 visit Dutch Deputy Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans (as a member of the Dutch Labour Party, no rightist) expressed support for improving the position of Afrikaans, which needed to be freed of its past association with apartheid, and which he puzzlingly described as “the lingua franca” of Netherlanders, Flemings, South Africans and Namibians. Flemish Foreign Minister Geert Bourgeois, a mainstream Flemish nationalist, worked in mid-2008 with Timmermans to promote cultural cooperation with South Africa, including regarding the position of Afrikaans (Bourgeois left office later that year). In 2005 the largest hardline Flemish nationalist party, Vlaams Belang (VB), raised the murders of many Afrikaner farmers in the Belgian Parliament, and in the Flemish Parliament, where VB championed preserving Afrikaans and preventing Pretoria’s name being changed to the Sesotho “Tshwane”.

When Afrikaner rights activist Dan Roodt, who compares the Flemish secessionist movement to the Boers’ struggle against Britain, visited the Low Countries in 2010, he was a guest and speaker (in Afrikaans) at a fund-raising dinner at the home of the Vlaams Belang leader, Filip de Winter. Dutch cultural nationalist Marcel Bas edits a Dutch/ Afrikaans website, *De Roepstem* (“for Great-Netherlandic and Afrikaner identity”), he has ties to conservative Afrikaner activists and promotes what he views as the common Dutch-Flemish-

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81 D Roodt, “Afrikaner-’sagtemag’ in die Lae Lande”, 1 June 2010 (available at http://roodt.org/?m=201006, as accessed on 1 August 2012).
Afrikaner struggle for language and culture. In 2010 the website of the small Pan-Netherlandic group, Dietse Kameraden, a “Nationalist Volk Movement for Volk and Fatherland”, listed links to like-minded groups, including Vlaams Belang, Voorpost - and the Afrikaner Volksparty. Voorpost has viewed Afrikaners as part of “our volk”, supported their struggle “for their culture and language”, and in a 1999 Voorpost “action” demonstrated against the University of Leiden’s giving President Nelson Mandela an honorary doctorate with a banner proclaiming: “MANDELA MOORDENAAR [Murderer].”

Voorpost’s Revolte, “the struggle magazine for Netherlands and Flanders”, had as its cover article “The death of a nation and of Eugène Terre’blanche”, following the 2010 murder of the leader of the ultra-Right Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement); the magazine pictured him on the cover with the Afrikaans motto “Ons Vir Jou Suid-Afrika” (“We For You South Africa”). Vlaams Belang echoed this same sentiment with a piece in its on-line magazine, in which it depicted Terre’blanche’s death as part of an alleged pattern of widespread killings of Afrikaner farmers.

Potential for furthering pan-Netherlandic relationships seems to go beyond “just” hardline nationalists. In the months following Terre’blanche’s death, several hundred Afrikaners joined a “Right of Return” campaign to persuade the Dutch authorities to enact a Jus Sanguinis (right of blood law) to allow Afrikaners to obtain asylum in the Netherlands as their “original” home. Although there was no official response, Kees van der Staiij, a Dutch Member of Parliament and chairman of the conservative-Protestant Staatkundig-Gereformeerde Party (Political-Reformed Party), argued that the Netherlands had a “special responsibility towards the often very religious South Africans of Dutch descent”. Another example is the interest in new Afrikaner music
in the Low Countries, as is the support for Afrikaans language rights by a centre-left Dutch politician such as Frans Timmermans. Since 2002 the satellite television channel *Het Beste van Vlaanderen en Nederland* has been available on the South African DStv network.\(^9\) A May 2010 conference in Amsterdam to promote Afrikaans and Afrikaans literacy (not only among white Afrikaners, but also Afrikaans-speakers) was co-sponsored by the quasi-governmental Nederlandse Taalunie (Dutch Language Union), the trade union Solidarity, and the Foundation for the Empowerment of Afrikaans; representatives of the Dutch and Flemish governments were also present.\(^9\)

There was a major post-1990 revival in cultural exchanges between Afrikaans-speakers and the Netherlands and Flanders. For instance, four Dutch and four Flemish writers and poets visited South Africa for two weeks in 1996, giving readings and workshops, and appearing on the main program at the Little Karoo National Arts Festival; six prominent Afrikaans writers undertook a similarly unprecedented trip to Flanders and the Netherlands the next year, sponsored by the Nederlandse Taalunie. Ten Flemish musical theatre productions were presented at the Little Karoo festival in 2001, while Afrikaner and Flemish music groups began to perform in cultural exchanges at festivals in South Africa and Belgium. As early as 1993, Afrikaans was featured as a “daughter language of Dutch” in the Dutch and Flemish exhibition at the Frankfurt Book Fair, the largest such event in the world. The divergence over time between Afrikaans on one hand and Dutch/Flemish on the other has, however, admittedly limited the sales of Afrikaans books in the Low Countries.\(^9\)

By 2000 the only African land among the six countries where the regional Flemish government had diplomatic representation was South Africa.\(^9\) Conversely, even late “alternative” Afrikaner musician Ralph Rabie, alias “Johannes Kerkorrel” (“Johannes Church Organ”), whose anti-Afrikaner establishment music was very popular in the 1990s in the Low Countries,\(^9\) declared that he increasingly felt drawn more to them than to South Africa.\(^9\)

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Conclusion

Afrikaners face a challenging future. Amongst other issues, affirmative action aiding historically disadvantaged groups has replaced practices favoring whites, especially Afrikaners, in employment, promotions, and admission to universities. Afrikaans-medium schools and universities have increasingly adopted English, which is in greater demand, and appalling violent crime rates afflict all South Africans; now even many younger, more educated Afrikaners are emigrating, while others fall into apathy and some into deep poverty. Some black political activists echo the Afrikaner far Right in keeping alive old enmities. Still, many, especially younger, Afrikaners seem committed to an over-arching “South Africanness,” assuming an “African,” not a “European settler” identity. To the extent that the ANC leadership recognizes the potential from drawing on this identification with “Africanness”, rather than demonizing them for past sins, Afrikaners may succeed in at least one respect in the new South Africa: making their case as its “white tribe”.

As for pan-Netherlandic ties, the relationship was always complicated by distance, early divergence between their societies and languages, and very different socio-political contexts. Nevertheless, except perhaps in the heyday of apartheid, there probably was more love than hate between these long-separated cousins. Rebuilding those links allows Afrikaners to enjoy a different sense of wider belonging or even to act as a possible transcontinental bridge between the peoples of Europe and Africa.

It is of course always possible to use such ethnic re-construction of Afrikaner identity as “African” or “pan-Netherlandic” cynically, or as a means of harnessing ethnic grievances to promote extremism, or in a hollow, meaningless fashion, as shown by some of the examples cited above. Nevertheless, to the extent that such “re-construction” is genuine in recasting Afrikaners’ self-definition in contemporary multi-cultural and transnational terms, it could make the most (and best) of Afrikaners’ much changed circumstances.

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