

Curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces: consciousness and becoming in identity construction based on human rights values

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ABSTRACT

The growing marketisation of education has resulted in curriculum being conceptualised as a predesigned means to an end. Many South African scholars such as Jansen, (1999, 2009, 2011) and Du Preez (2009, 2011, 2012) have critiqued the instrumental nature of the post-apartheid curriculum and pleaded for an ethical perspective on curriculum conceptualisation that would encourage the construction of dialogic spaces in curriculum.

This study questions technical and critical approaches to curriculum conceptualisation and advocates a reflexive conceptualisation of curriculum, intra-dialogue, identity construction, consciousness, becoming and human rights values within an ethical perspective to curriculum conceptualisation in the post-structural paradigm.

The central theme of this reflexive reconceptualisation is the hope of continual revolutionary new beginnings by which identity construction (*who* we are) and the realisation of human rights values in the ethical relation self:other can be re-imagined. This hope has also been central to the (re)structuring of the post-apartheid curriculum premised on the values of *The South African Constitution and Bill of Rights* (1996). Curriculum, structured within a predesigned market-related and instrumental approach to curriculum, can however not aid identity construction, re-imagine a new society or realise human rights values. A new society is re-imagined between teacher:child, disrupting *how* and *what* they know of self:other and re-imagining new ways of knowing and being with self:other rooted in human rights values.

The conditions for intra-dialogue, namely the ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness, are also interrelated elements in intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. The ethical relation teacher:child roots intra-dialogic curriculum spaces in human rights values and the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other. Spaces of togetherness situate teacher:child in specific and non-linear space and time in which they narrate their different life experiences from which identity is constructed. Intra-dialogue is the

disruptive, revolutionary and intentional action between self:other as simultaneously singular in equal difference and together in a shared humanity.

Human rights values are dialogic, relational and revolutionary in nature. Human rights values are realised when teacher:child within intra-dialogic curriculum spaces premised on equal difference, freely confess autobiography and continually (re)construct identity and the relation self:other. In equal difference teacher:child are received and defined as *someone* – unique, dignified and irreplaceable. As equal and irreplaceable partners teacher:child disrupt, deconstruct and re-imagine the ethical relation self:other.

Within intra-dialogic curriculum spaces, teacher:child can reclaim the revolutionary capacity of curriculum and revolutionise self, self:other, education and society in continual becoming.

Key words: curriculum, intra-dialogic spaces, identity, consciousness, becoming, human rights values, relation self:other

Kurrikulum en intra-dialogiese ruimtes: die konstruksie van identiteit, bewussyn en vernuwing gewortel in menseregte waardes

OPSOMMING

Die groeiende markgerigtheid van onderwys het tot gevolg dat kurrikulum gekonseptualiseer word as 'n middel tot die realisering van ekonomiese doelwitte. Verskeie Suid Afrikaanse kurrikulumkundiges soos Jansen (1999, 2009, 2011) en Du Preez (2009, 2011, 2012) bepleit daarom 'n etiese benadering tot kurrikulumontwikkeling wat ruimte skep vir dialoog in kurrikulum. Hierdie studie lewer kritiek op die groeiende tegniese en instrumentalistiese benadering tot kurrikulumontwikkeling en is 'n reflektiewe konseptualisering van kurrikulum, die konstruksie van identiteit, vernuwing, bewussyn en menseregtewaardes.

Sentraal tot hierdie studie is die hoop om telkens nuut te begin. Die voortdurende konstruksie van identiteit (*wie* ons is) en die moontlikheid vir die realisering van die menseregtewaardes: vryheid, gelykheid en menswaardigheid binne die verhouding self:ander, is 'n revolusionere proses. Die hoop op 'n nuwe begin word vasgevang in die Suid Afrikaanse Konstitusie en Handves van Menseregte (1996) waarop die waardes van die post-apartheid kurrikulum gebaseer is. Die realisering van menseregtewaardes en die konstruksie van identiteit geanker in *wie* en nie net *wat* ons is nie, word egter onmoontlik gemaak deur die instrumentalistiese en tegniese gerigtheid van die post-apartheid kurrikulum. Die kategorisering van Suid-Afrikaners na gelang van *wat* hulle is aborteer verder enige hoop op enige hernuwing van die verhouding self:ander.

Die vernuwing van die verhouding self:ander kan binne kurrikulum nuut gekonseptualiseer word tussen onderwyser:kind in ruimtes van intra-dialoog. Intra-dialoog is afhanklik van die etiese verhouding tussen onderwyser:kind binne ruimtes van saam-wees waarin die gelykheid van elke 'unieke self' omarm word. Binne ruimtes van saam-wees en deur middel van intra-dialoog, konstrueer onderwyser:kind nie net identiteit nie, maar in die dialoog tussen self:self en self:ander, kom onderwyser:kind ook tot die besef van die uniekheid binne self en tussen self:ander. Intra-dialoog is 'n bewuste en revolutionere keuse in die hoop op nuwe moontlike maniere van saam-wees binne die verhouding self:ander. Intra-dialogiese ruimtes in kurrikulum voorveronderstel

die meervuldige uitdrukking van uniekheid binne die verhouding onderwyser:kind. Dissonansie en die oop skeur van die betekenis wat ons heg aan self:ander is daarom onafwendbaar. Gedurende hierdie proses het onderwyser:kind die geleentheid om die betekenis wat ons heg aan self:ander te dekonstrueer en nuut te konstrueer.

Die hoop om herhaaldelik nuut te begin binne die verhouding self:ander, gewortel in die waardes van menseregte, kan in intra-dialogiese kurrikulum ruimtes tussen onderwyser:kind realiseer. Die realisering van menseregtewaardes is 'n dialogiese en revolutionere proses binne die verhouding self:ander. Wanneer self:ander vryelik in intra-dialogiese ruimtes hul gelykwaardige uniekheid ontbloot, konstrueer hulle *wie* hulle is en word sodoende 'n menswaardige en gelyke vennoot in die voortdurende vernuwing van die verhouding self:ander, gewortel in die menseregtewaardes van vryheid, gelykheid en menswaardigheid.

Sleutel begrippe: kurrikulum, menseregtewaardes, identiteit, bewussyn, intra-dialogiese ruimtes, vernuwing.

DIBAKA TSA KHARIKHULAMO LE PUISANO-TENG: BOITEMOGO LE GO NNA MO POPONG YA BOITSHUPO E E THEILWENG MELEMONG YA DITSHWANELO TSA BOTHO

(CURRICULUM AND INTRA-DIALOGIC SPACES: CONSCIOUSNESS AND BECOMING IN IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES)

KHUTSHWAFATSO

Kgolo ya thekiso ya thuto e feleleditse mo go bopeng kharikhulamo jaaka tlhamo e e pele go gorosa maikaelelo. Barutegi ba Aforikaborwa ba bantsi jaaka Jansen, (1999, 2009, 2011) le Du Preez (2009, 2011, 2012) ba sekasekile bodiriswa jwa kharikhulamo ya morago ga tlhaolele mme ba rapelela thetologelelo e e tshwanetseng mo tlhamong ya kharikhulamo, go thusa kago ya dibaka tsa puisano mo kharikhulamong. Patlisiso e ke potsololo ya mekgwa ya setegeniki e e botlhokwa ya tlhamo ya kharikhulamo le tlhamo e e ipopang ya kharikhulamo, puisano-teng, popo ya boikao, boitemogo, go nna teng le melemo ya Ditshwanelo tsa botho mo tebong ya maitsholo ya tlhamo ya kharikhulamo mo tebong ya morago-ga-popego.

Thitokgang e e leng pinagare ya tema ya tlhamo e e ipopang seša ya kharikhulamo e, ke tsholofelo ya tsweletso ya ditshimololo tsa diphetogo-dikgolo tse dintšhwa tse ka tsona popo itshupo (*se re leng sona*) le temogo ya melemo ya Ditshwanelo tsa botho mo kamanong e e tshwanetseng ya sebele:yo mongwe e ka akanngwang-gape. Tsholofelo e e ne ya nna pinagare popong (-gape) ya kharikhulamo ya morago-ga-tlhaolele e e theilweng fa godimo ga *Molaotheo wa Aforikaborwa* le *Molaotlhamo wa Ditshwanelo* (1996). Kharikhulamo e e bopilweng fa teng ga mokgwa wa tlhamo-ya-pele e e amanang le thekiso le tsela ya sediriswa kharikhulamong, le fa go ntse jalo e ka se thuse popo ya boitshupo, go akanngwa-gape ga morafe o moša kgotsa go lemoga melemo ya Ditshwanelo tsa botho. Morafe o moša o akanngwa-gape fa gare ga morutabana: morutwana, go senya gore ba itse *eng* le *jang* ka ga itse sebele: yo mongwe le go akanngwa-gape ga ditsela tse dintšhwa tsa go itse le go nna le sebele:yo mongwe tse di theilweng mo melemong ya Ditshwanelo tsa botho.

Boemo jwa puisano-teng, e e leng kamano e e siameng ya sebele:yo mongwe le dibaka tsa bommogo, le tsona ke dintlha tse di amanang fa teng mo dibakeng tsa kharikhulamo ya puisano-teng. Kamano e e tshwanetseng ya morutabana: morutwana e tlhoga dibaka tsa kharikhulamo ya puisano-teng mo melemong ya Ditshwanelo tsa botho le maikarabelo a boitemogo go sebel:yo mongwe. Dibaka tsa bommogo di tlhoma morutabana: morutwana mo sebakeng se se totobetseng le se sa totobala le nako a di anelang ka tekatekano maitemogelo a botshelo a a farologaneng go tswa tlhamong ya boitshupo. Puisano-teng ke tiragatso e e kgoreletsang, e e dirang diphetogo tse dikgolo, e e dirwang ka maikaelelo fa gare ga sebele:yo mongwe jaaka bongwe jo bo mmogo mo dipharologanong tse di lekanang mme di le mmogo mo kabelanong ya setho.

Melemo ya Ditshwanelo tsa botho ka tlholego di a buisanya, e a tsalanya, e dira diphetogo-dikgolo. Melemo ya Ditshwanelo tsa botho di lemogiwa fa morutbana: morutwana fa teng ga dibaka tsa kharikhulamo e e puisano-teng e theilwe mo godimo ga pharologano e e lekanang, e ipobola ka lokwalo la boikwalo ka kgololesego le go tswleela go bopa(-gape) boitshupo le kamano ya sebel:yo mongwe. Mo pharologanong e e lekanang morutabana: morutwana ba amogelwa le go tlhaloswa jaaka *mongwe* – wa mofuta wa gagwe o le nosi, yo o tlotlegang, mme a sa kgone go emisetswa. Jaaka balekane ba ba lekanang ba sa refosanwe morutabana: morutwana ba a kgoreletsa, ba bopa seša le go akanya-gape kamano e e tshwanetseng ya sebele:yo mongwe.

Fa gare ga dibaka tsa kharikhulamo e e puisano-gare, morutabana: morutwana ba ka lopa-gape bokgoni jwa kharikhulamo jwa go dira diphetogo-dikgolo le go iphetola thata, sebele:yo mongwe, thuto le morafe mo tswelala go nna.

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(Romans 12:2b)

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CHAPTER ONE

REFLEXIVE QUESTIONING

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Dlamini (2010:12) describes the meta-narrative of the South African society as follows:

In this romantic telling, there is a neat separation between a merry pre-colonial Africa, a miserable apartheid South Africa and a marvellous new South Africa in which everyone is living democratically ever after. That, alas, is not true.

The meta-narrative of a transformed democratic South Africa rooted in human rights values such as freedom, dignity and equality was dramatically disrupted by the well-publicised Reitz incident at the University of the Free State in 2008. A video made by four white male students won the first prize at the annual cultural evening held at the Reitz residence. This video recording of a mock initiation of black workers was a protest against the plan to implement an integration policy at the university (News 24. 2008-08-05. 22:55). It included images of students pretending to urinate into a concoction given to the workers to drink (Jansen, 2011a:14). The Reitz incident resulted in a massive public outrage and became a symbol of divided communities and campuses in South Africa (*ibid*:18). The four students were charged with *crimen injuria* and after pleading guilty, were subsequently found guilty and sentenced during 2011 in the Bloemfontein Magistrates Court (News 24. 2008-08-05.22:55; News 24. 2011-07-27.15:20).

This incident however posed some serious questions to society and education as to our respective responsibilities *for self:other*¹. Given that this incident occurred during 2008, more than a decade after the promulgation of *The South African Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996) had been promulgated and the phasing in of Curriculum 2005 between 1998 to 2005, which aimed to construct a collective identity and society based on human rights values through education, one could question the success of these endeavours (Asmal, 2011:263). The four students confessed at the court hearing that they had never intended to violate the workers' dignity. However, they had, during the time since the incident, realised that they had violated the dignity of the workers (News24.2011-07-

¹ Self:other is the relationship between self, an other, and all others. The relation self:other is simultaneously representative of all of humanity in space and time and singular in difference. Self:other is used to indicate the simultaneous singularity and togetherness in this relation. The concept self:other is explained in more detail in 1.8.1.

27.15:20). This confession led me to conclude that these four students might never have been challenged by educators before this incident to deconstruct and reconstruct their own meanings and understandings of human dignity, equality, freedom and the relation self:other.

The decision of the university not to pursue institutional charges against the four perpetrators was based on a recognition of the limits of legal action in resolving deep-seated meanings and understandings, distorting the relation self:other (Jansen, 2011a:15). It was also based on an acceptance and acknowledgement of the historic role the university played in shaping meanings and understandings relating to racism and the educative responsibility which the university has to the construction of new meanings and understandings regarding self:other (*ibid*:13,14). The university thus accepted the responsibility to deal with institutional racism and their educative responsibility towards the students by engaging with them in dialogue on their responsibility *for* the reconstruction of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values.

The responsibility for the deconstruction and reconstruction of our understanding of self:other is defined by Jansen (*ibid*:15) as an ethical and dialogic responsibility. A desire to replace the language of condemnation and retaliation with the language of conciliation and restoration was paramount (*ibid*:15). In this case, institutional forgiveness preceded a process of dialogue before the nine individuals involved in the incident, were ready to ask and grant forgiveness and (re)constitute the relation self:other on 15 February 2011 (*ibid*:18). Individual as well as collective meanings and understandings were disrupted, deconstructed and reconstructed resulting in a new ethical relation self:other. As Jansen (*ibid*:270) underlines: "It is amazing what happens when people talk."

With the Reitz incident as background, my questioning regarding the nature and purpose of education and specifically the curriculum in constructing identity rooted in human rights values, was set in motion. By accepting institutionalised responsibility, the University of the Free State acknowledged its historical role in dehumanising South Africans during apartheid. This acknowledgement implies that education is not only a structured expression of the knowledge deemed valuable by society, but that education also shapes the meanings and understandings of students concerning self:other by the teaching and learning of meta-narratives concerning self:other. I also see this acknowledgement as an assumption that education is merely an expression or reproduction of society with little or no transformative power. This would clearly render impossible the aims of the Revised National Curriculum Statement (hereafter RNCS)

(2004:6-8) to construct a collective identity and society based on human rights values through education.

The University of the Free State however transcended this assumption by engaging in a normative process towards (re)constructing the relation self:other. This process was dialogic, ethical, relational and revolutionary (Jansen, 2011a:14-16). Forgiveness was asked and granted, a new relation self:other was established, a new core curriculum constructed and a new institutional culture accepted (*ibid*:16,270).

From the above, I conclude that the how, why and what we teach and learn are deeply influenced by our understandings of the nature and purpose of education and curriculum and our understandings of self:other, society and education. The Reitz incident illustrates both the consequences of education understood as a mere expression and reproduction of the meanings and understandings constructed by society and the revolutionary power of education understood as an ethical event and experience, reconstructing identity rooted in human rights values, with self:other.

An introductory exploration of the relationship between curriculum and society and the potentially transformative role of a curriculum follow in order for me to identify the gap in scholarly knowledge and construct my research statement and questions.

1.2 EDUCATION AS AN EXPRESSION OF SOCIETY

Educators and curriculum scholars agree that education is closely related to power relations and the resulting resource distribution within a society (Apple, 1979:17). Education is never a neutral act (Msila, 2007:146). Values, norms and beliefs, structured and communicated as shared meaning knowledge by the curriculum, should continually be deconstructed in historical and socio-political context in order to reveal both the relationship between society and education and the relationship between state and education (Graham-Jolly, 2009:248,249). Msila (2007:146) argues that education is always about politics. The political relationship between the state and education can be illustrated by the numerous incidences throughout human civilisation where state schools supported and communicated the ideals of non-democratic governments as knowledge about self:other (Tozer, Violos & Senese, 1993:3).

Education in South Africa has often fallen victim to legislators with political, social or cultural agendas in mind. Colonial and apartheid education constructed a South African identity by dividing society and preserving the master-servant relationship between

South Africans of different ethnic groups (Msila, 2007:149). Christian Nationalist Education (hereafter CNE) aimed to domesticate black children and indoctrinate white children (*ibid*:149). While the goal of CNE was the control and the protection of power and privilege, the RNCS (2004) introduced an egalitarian pedagogy (*ibid*:151). This will be explored in more detail in Chapter Five.

Curriculum is thus often situated and constructed within a specific societal, political and historical context (Graham-Jolly, 2009:250). The curriculum describes the total experience within the learning institution which includes explicit, official knowledge and implicit and unintended knowledge constructed (the hidden and nil curriculum) (Tozer *et al.*, 1993:3). Within the reciprocal relationship between curriculum and society, curriculum is influenced by the societal values and conditions a particular society regards as meaningful. The formal and the informal curriculum are saturated with values, norms and beliefs which are implicitly and explicitly communicated to children through teaching, learning and socialising in schools. Curriculum thus reshapes or reproduces embedded meanings and understandings (Slattery, 2006:40).

The transformational purpose of education has been explored for many decades resulting in diverse understandings (1.3). Dewey (1990:6) explains the inter-relation between school and society as follows: "All that society has accomplished for itself is put, through the agency of the school, at the disposal of its future members. All its better thoughts of itself it hopes to realise through the new possibilities thus opened to its future self." Dewey (*ibid*:6) sees schools as representing everything that society *is* and working towards everything that society *hopes* to become. Asmal (in RNCS, 2004:1) echoes Dewey in explaining the role of schools and the post-apartheid curriculum in South Africa as "the expression of our idea of ourselves and our vision as to how we see the new form of society being realised through our children and learners". He regards the curriculum as an expression of what South African society *is* but also the expression of what South African society *hopes* to become through education (Asmal in RNCS, 2004:1).

In the light of the arguments presented thus far, I conclude that education and curriculum can be regarded as social constructs, expressing and reproducing society as what *is* but also the social construct trusted by society to reconstruct what we hope society *could be*. Education and curriculum are also primary constructs which society uses to communicate historical and socio-political meanings and understandings. If education has a pivotal role to play in the reconstruction of society and hopes to communicate our vision of what we wish society to become, it implies that education should primarily be

transformative in nature and purpose.

The conceptualisation of the emancipatory role of education originated during the late 1920s with the Frankfurt School (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:38). In order to understand and give meaning to the period between the two World Wars the Frankfurt School attempted to find a unity between theory and practice grounded in the historical awareness of the social, political and cultural problems of that era (Calhoun, 1995:13). Critical theory has many lines of thought but all have in common the re-appropriation of classic Marxism. Critical theorists, informed by strong ethical concerns, have a critical stance towards society and its developing forms. Since the 1920s, they have been pivotal in challenging our conception of humanity especially from the position of the oppressed, and they have continued to strive towards creating a humanised world (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:38-39).

I will now briefly explore the conceptualisation of the emancipatory nature and purpose of education as understood within the paradigm of critical theory.

1.3 THE EMANCIPATORY POWER OF EDUCATION: CRITICAL THEORY

Critical theory has reconceptualised the emancipatory possibilities of education in three phases since the 1920s. During the 1930s the theories of Marx and Freud were used to clarify the relation between psychology and society regarding its structures (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:40). During this period, critical theory marked itself off from traditional theory in its analysis of how human consciousness is shaped by the world and in turn also constitutes the world (Calhoun, 1995:15). Under the influence of Hegel, critical scholars understood the subjectivity implicit in both individual freedom and in the ideal social totality as central to modernity. Working through the dialectics of the Enlightenment, critical theorists were interested in what *is* but also what *ought* to be or *could* be (*ibid*:15). At the same time, they denounced subjectivity and the emancipatory potential of both education and society (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:40; Calhoun, 1995:15)

The second phase focused on a critique of instrumental reasoning. This period of development relied mainly on Weber's analysis of bureaucracy as the completion of instrumental rationality (Calhoun, 1995:16). The degradation of individuals described as replaceable and a "mere moment of an administered totality" was of deep concern to critical theorists (*ibid*:16). They challenged the sameness and otherness project of modernity and the conformism among members of society. Conformism makes it

impossible to bring to foreground the underlying tensions and contradictions resulting from interpreting reality and humans as a singular means to an end (*ibid*:16). The complicity of reason, as intrinsically instrumental in the reduction of human life to a “good that could be owned” was critically analysed during this period (Blake and Masschelein, 2003:40).

Influenced by scholars such as Adorno and Horkheimer, critical theorists argued that society does not allow transformative criticism and provides no basis for revolutionary transformation (Calhoun, 1995:25). Scholars of critical pedagogy such as Apple (1979:1999) argue that schools (and education) are places of social reproduction and should rather emphasise their role in the transformation of society (Calhoun, 1995:50). The engagement between critical pedagogy and liberation movements especially in South America, strongly critiqued the reproduction of power structures and oppression by education, and educational praxis was therefore conceived as a means to emancipation. Freire’s (1993:52) critique of the dehumanising effect of the banking concept in the teaching-learning context and his exploration of the emancipatory character of education shifted understandings of teaching and learning to teaching and learning as praxis.

The third phase of re-conceptualising critical theory was led by Habermas in his attempt to reinstate the emancipatory character of society and education by reformulating it as praxis. Critical theory, in the line of Habermas, redefined emancipation and self-determination as the purpose of education (Blake and Masschelein, 2003:42). The emancipatory interest in both its social and psychological forms was redeveloped within a theory of communicative competence (*ibid*, 42). Relating to the discourses resulting from the analyses of communicative competence and strategic interaction, a ‘discourse ethics’ as the normative core of critical theory was developed under the influence of Habermas (*ibid*:41).

Critical Theory has played a pivotal role since the 1920s in redefining our understanding of the world and self:other. In critically challenging the institutional and instrumentalised power of society, giving a voice to the oppressed and continually moving towards humanising the world, critical theory has led to many changes to the world, society and education. Its role in critiquing ideology and laying bare the underlying tensions within society that shape human consciousness is undisputed (*ibid*:40).

1.3.1 Questioning the concepts transformation, emancipation, praxis and liberation defining critical curriculum theory

Since the 1920s, the proposed transformational nature and power of education and curriculum has been conceptualised and reconceptualised by critical theory only to result in an instrumentalised project using education to meet predesigned ends. The concepts emancipation, transformation, liberation and praxis, as used in the conceptualisation of the power of curriculum to reconstruct society, are briefly explored next.

1.3.1.1 Emancipation

Emancipation, stems from the Latin word “emancipare”, which originally described the freeing of humans from bondage or restraints (Booth, 1999:40). Since the 20th century, emancipation primarily concerns a struggle for something, such as liberation or transformation (*ibid*:40). Liberation achieved through a process of emancipation or transformation thus proceeds towards a preconceptualised end. The liberation of the oppressed and the transformation of society are predesigned.

Deconstructing what *is* and then constructing from it a predesigned educational programme aimed at utopia, leaves education subject to an instrumental and functionalist logic (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:53). Education, in service of this process, is but a means to a predesigned end. Liberation by means of education as *praxis* in such a predesigned context, renders transforming the world *with* others as an irreplaceable partner irrelevant.

This logic is illustrated by Msila (2007:146) when he argues: “education is seen as a *weapon* of transformation” and “The RNCS (2004) sees education as a *tool* that could root the South African values enshrined in the Constitution” (my emphasis). Education is thus merely a weapon or tool in the prestructured liberation and emancipation of South African society.

1.3.1.2 The circular and selective transformation of *what* humans are

It further seems that critical theory has limited the transformational power of education with its narrow description of *who* and *what* the oppressed and oppressors are. During the student protests in the 1960s, critical scholars like Marcuse, Adorno and Habermas, critiqued the protests on the grounds that the students were not underprivileged (Calhoun, 1995:26), that the students attacked high culture and authority (Blake and Masschelein, 2003:52), and that the students dogmatised ideology critique (*ibid*:52).

European students were not regarded as oppressed or as representing the oppressed. The masses of the Third World and their counterparts were defined as the oppressed. Critical scholars therefore regarded the European students as ill equipped to transform own or any social reality (Calhoun, 1995:27).

Defining humans by *what* they are and describing their respective roles in society by predesigned categorisation reduce humans to being a means to an end. Jansen (2009:257) argues that although critical theory has moved beyond the strict categories of class analyses relating to oppression by regarding the influence of intersectionality on oppression, it remains the pedagogy of specific categories of humans defined as oppressed. He regards the simple narratives framing oppressed and oppressor inadequate to describe and understand the complexities of education in a post-conflict context such as South Africa (*ibid*:267). Both oppressor and oppressed need to be reframed to describe the unexpectedly rich complexity of the human condition and social contexts (*ibid*:267).

This narrow and circular conceptualisation of the emancipation of a categorised group defined by *what* (oppressed) they are, is subject to the same logic as the circular power of capitalism and oppression which critical theory critiques. Not only is the oppressed predefined but their envisaged emancipation is predesigned.

1.3.1.3 Praxis

The use of the concept *praxis* as a means to emancipation needs clarification. Critical theory, in accepting educational praxis as a means to an end (liberation and emancipation) defines educational praxis as an instrumental project. *Praxis* when used to describe labour or work (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:53) or the emancipation of labour itself (Arendt, 2002:279) can have no transformational potential for humanity. All labouring activities remain a means to a predesigned end (Arendt, 1958:104,180). Labouring activities are driven by sameness and otherness, defining humans by *what* they are perceived to produce and consume. No human relations or acting on, in and with the world (Freire, 1993:63,64) by means of speech and action are needed to complete labouring activities (Arendt, 1958:27,175-181). This is explored in more detail in Chapter Three.

Educational praxis understood as revolutionary action is rooted in the human capacity for new beginnings *with* others by means of speech and action. In order to transform the world *with* others, humans need to individuate themselves as to *who* they are in their

unique difference, rendering them an irreplaceable partner in transforming the relation self:other. By continually individuating ourselves in the relation self:other, a dialogic revolution starts with the transformation of self when defining *who* we are. Revolutionary action cannot be predesigned. It remains unexpected and unpredictable in nature and depends on the relation self:other in togetherness (*ibid*:244).

1.3.2 Neo-liberalism saturating critical curriculum theory

Apple (1979:18) argues that liberalism, in a quest for social progress, has saturated educational theory more decisively than any other ideology. Neo-liberalism premised on a rethinking and reassertion of classical liberalism became influential during the 1980s. It mainly concerns the assertion of the rights of individuals related to the state. Although originally mainly influencing economic and political sciences, the effect of neo-liberalism on the social sciences such as education is now clearly visible (Scott & Marshall, 2009:509). Neo-liberalism fails to understand the connection between the 'production' of *what* humans are perceived to be and the reproduction of an unequal society (Apple, 1999:208,211). Equality 'produced' by neo-liberalism is framed as "we are all consumers." (*ibid*:212). The construction of identities are therefore premised on and positioned related to what we produce and consume (*ibid*:212).

The instrumental power of market rationality, fed by neo-liberalism, had despite heavy criticism from critical theorists, become an institutionalised educational power during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Conformism is apparent in increasing sameness among humans, driven by self-interest and consumerism and regulated by mass culture and corporate capitalism (Calhoun, 1995:26). Children became a means to a predesigned end, predetermined by the political and economic elite (Gershon, 2011:538; Pitkin, 1998:256).

Neo-liberalists regard education and the curriculum to play a pivotal role, not in the transformation of society trapped by market rationality, but in the reproduction of market rationality. Schools are entrepreneurial service providers for predetermined market related qualifications (Bridges & Jonathan, 2003:128). *What* children are and *what* they should and could become in service of the market-orientated society have become the main purposes of education. Although the transformative capacity of education is still widely proclaimed by scholars and educators, education remains a functional and instrumentalised reproduction of society. This can be illustrated by a brief analyses of the rhetoric used in regard to the post-apartheid curriculum. The influence of neo-liberalism on the South African curriculum is explored in Chapter Five.

OBE was proposed in answer to the quest to create a “South Africa which is prosperous, truly united and democratic.” (Msila, 2007:150). OBE was introduced not only to change the education system but also to transform society (*ibid*:150). Paradoxically, however, the discourse regarding the envisaged transformation of society by OBE is saturated with both instrumentalised rhetoric and an appeal for critical transformation. This can be illustrated by rhetoric such as: “difference between learners *produced* by apartheid and learners *produced* today” (own emphasis added) (*ibid*:147), teachers “attitudes towards learners of different cultures need to be *shaped*” (Gumbo, 2001:240), “schoolmasters and communities need to be *workshopped* towards a *mind shift*” (*ibid*:240). This instrumentalised rhetoric is in sharp contrast to the claim that education is “the key because it empowers citizens to exercise their democratic rights and shape their destiny.’ (Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy, 2001:13, hereafter Manifesto).

It is argued by many South African scholars and educators that the post-apartheid education system and curriculum are the chosen *weapons* of transformation, of *producing* the future members of a predesigned emancipated society (Msila, 2007:146). The argument is that empowerment and emancipation is simply the result of a *mind shift* towards a predesigned set of rules (Gumbo, 2001:240). It is argued that members of society who adhere to prescribed attitudes and values will be emancipated from ignorance and able to shape their destiny (Manifesto, 2001:13). Free citizens, fully able to exercise their rights will be *produced* by OBE (Msila, 2007:147). This process is structured and described in the official curriculum and supplemented by means of informal, implemented programmes.

Jansen (2009:171) however, argues that the *mind shift* achieved by means of an instrumentalised process only results in individuals accepting new values and attitudes out of pragmatic self-interest while deep-seated meanings and understandings stay intact. Although it may thus appear that new values and attitudes towards others are expressed in open society, South Africans still regard each other along essentialist lines (Jansen, 2011a:190). Meanings and understandings, or what Jansen (2009:171) calls *knowledge in the blood*, are not easily changed. By teaching children to superficially and pragmatically adhere to rules, regulations and values prescribed by the curriculum, the deconstruction and reconstruction of what society *is* and *could* be are impossible to achieve, as the Reitz incident so clearly illustrates.

1.4 GAP IN KNOWLEDGE AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

Drawing on the Reitz incident (1.1) and the introductory exploration concerning educational theories relating to emancipation, transformation and praxis (1.3), I will identify the following problems, pose three research questions and discuss the gap in knowledge in the next section.

1.4.1 Problem identification

- Education and the curriculum are assumed to be emancipatory, but are in fact a reproduction of what society *is*, reflecting society as a process of instrumentalised progress. This conception of the nature and purpose of education results in an inability to conceptualise curriculum theory moving from the descriptive towards the normative, escaping a circular means-end rational (Biesta, 2009:35). The *is-ought* problem is a philosophical question relevant to all social sciences, since it concerns decisions about the direction we envisage education, curriculum and society to take (*ibid*:35).
- The preconception and reproduction of identities rooted in *what* humans are perceived to be, disregards the complexity of the human condition and re-affirms definitions of humans in categories of sameness and otherness. It renders personal change and escape from circular conceptions of identity impossible.
- The understanding of praxis as a means to an end diminishes the capacity of education and curriculum to spark any revolutionary new beginnings. The means-end rational also inhibits the human capacity for continual new beginnings. This is only possible when individuals continually individuate themselves by *who* they are in the dialogic and ethical relation self:other.

1.4.2 Research questions

Against the background of the problems that were identified and discussed in the previous paragraph, I formulated the following research questions:

- To what extent, if any, can curriculum aid the re-imagination of self:other in continual identity construction and becoming?
- To what extent, if any, can curriculum accommodate continual identity

construction by accommodating teacher:child² to define *who* they are and not only *what* they are?

- To what extent, if any, can curriculum accommodate spaces of togetherness aiding the continual constitution of the ethical and dialogic relation teacher:child rooted in human rights values?

1.4.3 Gap in knowledge

I would argue that there are no curriculum theories which “include personal transformation and intellectual critique, without reproducing the basic instrumental logic of all traditional concepts of education that remain closely tied up to means-end reasoning” (Blake and Masschelein, 2003:42). Such curriculum theories need to be rooted in the ethical, dialogic and revolutionary relation self:other. In the view of Morrison (2004:488) new curriculum theories rooted in the complexity of the human condition in its rich and multilayered diversity should be explored.

Jansen (2009:266) argues that a pedagogy of dissonance would make personal change possible in South African classrooms. This would require bringing self:other together in the same dialogic space acknowledging the complexity of the human condition (*ibid*:260). Jansen (*ibid*:260-276) explores the conditions for dialogic spaces. He regards the conditions as: acknowledging the importance of indirect knowledge, the importance of listening, the disruption of received knowledge, the significance of dissonance, the reframing of victors and victims, the acknowledgment of brokenness, the importance of hope, the value of demonstrative leadership and the establishing of risk-accommodating spaces (*ibid*:260-276). However, he does not explain what such a pedagogy of dissonance or a process of disruption would entail.

Post-apartheid South Africa lacks curriculum theories, which would, by means of a process of dissonance and disruption in intra-dialogic spaces, move from what *is* towards what *ought* to be – a re-imagination of self:other rooted in human rights values. It needs curriculum theories revolutionising the continual reproduction of society. Such curriculum theories would regard education as revolutionary praxis escaping the predesigned defining of *what* South Africans are and should be.

In order to constitute the intra-dialogic spaces needed to do this (*ibid*:260), such a curriculum theory should focus on inviting an other, as an irreplaceable, unique partner

² The concept teacher:child is used to indicate the contextualised self:other in education, curriculum or classroom.

in constituting the relation self:other into the classroom (Blake and Masschelein, 2003:42). Personal change and intellectual critique, not tied up in means-end reasoning, in classrooms as intra-dialogic spaces, need to be explored in order for teacher:child to continually reconstruct identity rooted in human rights values, within the relation self:other.

1.5 INTELLECTUAL CONUNDRUM RESULTING FROM RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE GAP IN KNOWLEDGE

The identification of the above research problems, questions and gap in knowledge, presents the following intellectual conundrum.

1.5.1 Curriculum theory is structured to reproduce what *is* without possibilities to re-imagine what *could* be.

As education is never a neutral act, the notion of education as an expression of society relates to the extent by which education expresses and reproduces the meta-narratives and shared meanings and understandings by which society is ruled and structured. The acknowledgement of the University of the Free State as to its historic responsibility to the reification of apartheid is proof of this conception (1.1). The neo-liberal understanding of education moving from what *is* to what *ought* to be, however only relates to the extent by which a society is deemed to be in a process towards predesigned market-related progress.

One could argue that education does not intend to express society as a lived experience but aims to express and reproduce the structural and institutionalised embedded meta-narratives of power, be they political, cultural or economic. If education were to express society as lived experiences: as it *is*, curriculum theory would have no choice but to address the problems related to society and the dehumanising effects of the meta-narratives ruling society. The curriculum would then have to disclose and address the discrepancy between the existing normative structures and framework of society and its reality (Vally, 2007:40). It would have to express society as a lived experience and not an institution or structure.

In order to move from what society *is* to a normative re-imagination of what society *could* be, a deconstruction is needed regarding the premise by which education as expression of society is described. Such a descriptive examination should focus on the embedded institutionalised and structural meta-narratives expressed through education and the discrepancy between society expressed as a structure and framework and society

expressed as a lived experience. Only then can the notion of education as an expression of society be reconceptualised and re-imagined.

1.5.2 Curriculum theory is not rooted in the human capacity for continual new beginnings

The understanding of liberation, emancipation, transformation and praxis as a means to an end not only diminishes the capacity of education and curriculum to spark revolutionary new beginnings, but also the human capacity for continual new beginnings. Although the capacity of both society and education for emancipation and transformation has been questioned, criticised and re-conceptualised since the 1920s, it has resulted in individual humans becoming the means to ends in an instrumentalised project towards predesigned emancipation and transformation (Calhoun, 1995:25).

In trying to deconstruct the use of the concepts revolution, emancipation and praxis in the tradition of Marx, Le Baron (1971:562) argues that revolution, human emancipation and praxis should be regarded as one integrated and interrelated process. Revolution, as human emancipation, should always be undetermined praxis (*ibid*:562). It should never be regarded as 'a destination' but 'a journey' to the creation of something new. In order to understand change as new beginnings, Le Baron (*ibid*:559) relies on Arendt's inquiry on revolution in *On Revolution* (1965). Arendt (1965:28) argues that change can only be regarded as revolutionary when it serves to create something new. New beginnings should not only include structural, political or economic changes but should emphasise new ways of thinking and acting: personal new beginnings (Le Baron, 1971:560). Regarding education and praxis as a means to a predesigned emancipatory destination therefore is a flawed start to any perceived new beginning.

The capacity of education to move society from what *is* to what *ought* to be without taking the means-ends circular route, needs to be reconceptualised. New beginnings regard new ways of thinking and acting, originating with individual becoming. Personal change and new beginnings, Jansen (2009:260,266) argues is possible by means of dissonance, disruption and dialogue. Individual and collective new beginnings would need dialogue, relational and ethical spaces in which self:other could be constituted and the continually changing *I*, rooted in human rights values, could be constructed. Transcending means and ends, this should be a process of revolutionary becoming.

1.5.3 The assessment of education by *what* it produces, renders individuals incapable to individuate themselves by *who* they are

In order to conceptualise curriculum theories providing for dialogic spaces aiding revolutionary becoming, self:other have to be constituted, premised on an acknowledgement of *who* we are. Praxis, as continual collective and individual new beginnings, relies on each partner in the relation self:other to continually individuate themselves by *who* they are in the dialogic, revolutionary and ethical relation self:other.

An instrumentalised curriculum, however, is concerned with *what* children are and *what* they should be. Au (2011:26) describes scientifically – managed education as a process aiming to efficiently produce, by means of teaching and learning, predesigned products (children). Education and curriculum design are driven by objectives and assessments which dictate teaching-learning and the relation teacher:child. Children are the ‘raw material’ used to ‘produce’ commodities according to designed objectives (*ibid*:26-27). The means-end rationality paramount in neo-liberal curriculum design dehumanises teacher:child and disregards the dialogic, relational and ethical character of education (*ibid*:28). A technological pedagogy is premised on a scientific and rational view of education (Ruiz, 2004:273). Curriculum theories premised on *who* we are need to transcend *what* we are and *what* we need to ‘produce’.

1.6 THEORY GENERATING HYPOTHESIS

The premise on which the post-apartheid curriculum is theorised should be re-conceptualised to describe and express South African society as a lived experience while simultaneously moving, by means of a process of disruption and intra-dialogue, towards becoming in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values. The normative process of becoming should be rooted in the human capacity for continual new beginnings in the relation teacher:child, in which the unique *I* is continually (re)constructed, rooting identity in the human rights values: freedom, dignity and equality.

1.7 PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PREMISE OF STUDY

Humanity’s search for an answer as to how our lives ought to be lived in order for it to be defined as ‘good’ lives go back to the beginning of philosophy. Ever since philosophers such as Socrates and Plato questioned the meaning and understanding of what a ‘good’ life is, secular and religious scholars searched for possible answers to this question

(Ishay, 2004:7, 23). Humanity has always been preoccupied with the continual movement from what *is* to what *ought* to be.

The debate on the role of education in this regard is ongoing. Questioning whether education should be concerned with the preservation of existing morality or teach towards moral progress and change has been prevalent in educational discourses since the eighteenth century (Gilead, 2009:96). Scholars like Locke, have argued that moral education should aim at keeping of the ethical *status quo*. Opposing this line of thought, scholars like Buffier, argue that any ethical system or progress should rely on reason (*ibid*:98). They argue that the relation self:other should be governed by rules and customs derived from reason (*ibid*:98). Reason is used to reform existing ethical systems towards positive change in the relation self:other (*ibid*:99; 2.4.2.2).

The liberal notion rooting the construction of the relation self:other in reason and human nature, oriented towards constant moral progress is still upheld in moral education today (*ibid*:93). Moral education is geared towards the predesigned moral progress of humanity. The idea of progress itself became the goal of morality and moral education. Moral education becomes a tool for continual change and progress (*ibid*:102). The notion of moral progress, however, is a highly contested notion. Postmodernists argue that there are no universal truths regarding morality and ethics and moral change can therefore not necessarily be defined as moral progress (*ibid*:105).

The first article of *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) states that humanity “should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood [*sic.*]” (Ishay, 2004:19). Education and curriculum, rooted in human rights values should revolutionise the relation self:other from what *is* to what *ought* to be. The revolutionary process moving from *is* to *ought* starts with self in choosing responsibility *for* self:other. Choosing responsibility *for* self:other, precedes being with an other and the construction of the moral self would thus precede the relation self:other (Bauman, 1994:13). There can be no hegemony in moral choice or responsibility *for* others (*ibid*:121). To live a moral life is an individual choice. The moral self, in responsibility *for* all others, should leave the customs, traditions, rules, laws and duties which govern the relation self:other behind. The moral self could then become his/her own interpreter of what morality and responsibility *for* self:other might entail (*ibid*:80).

Any re-imagination of self:other, curriculum and education originate from the anthropological, ontological and epistemological premise from which self:other is defined, positioned and (re)presented. The anthropological, ontological and epistemological premises of this study are explained next.

1.7.1 Anthropological premise

The need to search for an anthropological and ethical premise, when constructing the relation self:other in education and curriculum, has been increasingly voiced in curriculum reconceptualisation. The shift towards the “human factor in curriculum” (Cary, 2006:133) is a reaction to the marketisation and instrumentalisation of education and the curriculum (*ibid*:137). The anthropological premise from which self:other are described will have implications for the normative re-imagining of education and curriculum (Ruiz, 2004:287). An ethical turn in the curriculum concerns subjectivity, autobiography and the struggle to give meaning to human lives (Cary, 2006:137). It concerns the fact “that one’s autobiography matters” and a search for “how it matters” (Reilly, 2009:383).

1.7.1.1 The human condition

Arendt (1958:10) distinguishes between human nature and the human condition. The human condition, she describes as the three human activities and related conditions necessary for human life on earth. She describes the three activities as: labour (relates to the human condition of life itself), work (relates to the human condition of worldliness) and action (relates to the human conditions plurality and natality) (*ibid*:10). Humans sustain life itself by labour, create a world to live in by means of work and individuate themselves and constitute their reality with others by means of speech and action in continual new beginnings (*ibid*:7-8).

Human dialogue and action are possible, because of the human conditions plurality and natality (*ibid*:10). Plurality has the twofold character of equality and distinction (*ibid*:175). It describes the confessing of the uniqueness of self by means of speech and action in the relation self:other (*ibid*:178). The confessing of different *doxas* by means of autobiographic narratives enables humans to confess *who* they are, transcending *what* they are. They confess their fluxing position in the relation self:other and in historical and socio-political space and time. They also re-imagine *who* they hope to be in future time and space. The human condition of natality enables humans to continually start a-new (*ibid*:178). Confessing an individual narrative is thus a revolutionary process of becoming in which the individual deconstructs past and present but also reconstructs a possible future. During this process individual identity is continually deconstructed and reconstructed in the relation self:other. The continual individuation of self is thus possible because of the human condition of natality and plurality.

The human condition is characterised by distinction and individuation (*ibid*:175). Arendt

(*ibid*:10) argues that it would be impossible to describe the nature or essence of humans, because that would imply that one could explain a *what* as if it was a *who*. Jansen (2009:267) argues in this regard that defining humans by *what* they are renders us incapable of perceiving the “unexpected complexity of the human condition.” In a classroom context the complexity of the human condition is revealed when teacher:child face each other and not only recognise their shared humanity but confess the unique and irreplaceable distinction of *who* they are. The recognition of our shared humanity and the individuation of self, however, can be inhibited by the silencing of voices (3.6.1.1 [c]). In constituting the relation self:other the confessing of the unique distinction of humans is paramount. The voicing of difference makes it possible to come to know self:other from a variety of aspects and in diversity. Self:other are not constituted by the common nature of humans, but by the different positions and perspectives confessed in spaces of togetherness (Arendt, 1958:57).

Relating to the human condition is the notion that humanising depends on the inclusive nature of the relation self:other in spaces of togetherness. In spaces of togetherness humans confess and recognise their common humanity, brokenness and incompleteness (Jansen, 2009:262) but also their equal difference. They recognise their power to continually start a-new but also their limitations and frailty in redeeming the unpredictable consequences of human power (Arendt, 1958:200; Arendt, 2001:244; Jansen, 2009:268-270). In my view, which is related to the theory of Arendt (1958) on the human condition, humans are distinctively unique and equally different in their shared and inclusive humanity and continually constitute the world and are constituted by the world they create.

The constituting of the relation self:other is made possible by the complexity of the human condition, which both individuates humans and relates humans in their shared humanity. In an educational context teacher:child acknowledge each other as equally different to me (Makgoba, 1997:140). When confessing difference in spaces of togetherness teacher:child acknowledge their power for continual new beginnings constructed with others and their frailty, which are protected by the ethical relation teacher:child.

1.7.1.2 Narrating autobiography

Self:other are situated human beings. They are situated within a specific time and space in which they, by means of life experiences, deconstruct and reconstruct meanings and understandings. They are also irreplaceable partners to all of humanity in non-linear and

infinite time and space in the re-imagination of new meanings and understandings (Arendt, 1958:184; Freire,1993:74). Individual life experiences are confessed by means of narratives. Narratives link past, present and future expected experiences to describe the story of a life in non-linear time and space. The complexity of the human condition is not confessed in a single story describing a single experience (Forde, 2011:xvii). Manifesting the complexity of the human condition, every individual narrative confesses not only a single life but also all of humanity in time and space (*ibid*:xvii).

Narratives rely on the situated self being conscious of self:other mirrored against individual “background awareness” (Freire, 1993:64). In confessing narratives humans link the situated self to their ‘background awareness’ and reflect upon their experiences and meanings and understandings (*ibid*:64). During reflection and in intra-dialogue, self:other realise that life and reality is not static but a revolutionary process (*ibid*:64). By confessing life experiences against ‘background awareness’, ontological experiences and epistemologies are linked. Self:other justify what, how and when they know and justify why this knowledge could be regarded meaningful (Morrison, 2004:490; Cary, 2006:14)

It is therefore necessary for the curriculum to provide for ethical and dialogic spaces which not only narrate autobiography, but also allow for a search as to how autobiography matters in teaching and learning. The narration and continual reconstruction of autobiography as identity confess *who* we are. It is a confession of the multiple stories situating self:other in present time and space but also link autobiography to the storybook of history spanning over unlimited and non-linear time and space (Arendt, 1958:184). In being able to confess *who* we are, we transcend *what* an instrumentalised society and education define us to be.

1.7.2 Ontological premise

Ontology concerns questions regarding the *nature* of an entity and the conditions (explicit and hidden) which constitute such an entity. The true nature of an entity can be hidden, because it is unknown or can be known but buried up in systems and structures. This may cause no deeper exploration or explanation regarding the nature of a specific entity (Heidegger, 2008:60).

This study focuses on the nature of human rights and the curriculum. The nature of these concepts are constituted by the ethical and revolutionary relation self:other/teacher:child. The nature of and conditions for the relation self:other (being-

with and being-for) should thus be carefully explored. My understanding of the relation self:other is grounded in Arendt's defining of human plurality within a common human ontology in equal difference. Villa (2007:999) refers to Arendt as the "champion of human plurality." Arendt (1958:175) defines the characteristics of human plurality as that of equality and distinction. Heidegger (2008:161) similarly describes *Dasein's* being as "Being-with" and "Being-in-the-world" with others. The distinctness of humans within human plurality (as explored by Arendt) is a theme she borrowed from Heidegger (2008:68), who states that *Dasein* "has in each case *mineness*." *Dasein* is personal and needs a personal pronoun in addressing it: "I am" (Heidegger, 2008:68).

In exploring the relation self to other, "Being-with-one-another," Heidegger (2008:165) states that the "they" (self and other) disburden and accommodate *Dasein* and this results in "everyone is the other, and no one is himself." Arendt (2006:294-295) remains outspoken about the distinct, personal responsibility of self to choose right from wrong. In contrast to Arendt however, Heidegger later replaces the authentic self with the authentic community (Villa, 2007:996).

For Arendt the nature and meaning of *Being* is grounded in the world we share and continually (re)structure with others and in which every individual define *who* he/she is. The theory of Arendt on revolution as continual movement, stabilised by means of acts of foundation relates to the human capacity for new beginnings. Arendt (1958:177) and Heidegger (2008:425) both explored beginnings and ends in human existence. While for Heidegger the existential challenge was the confrontation with the finality of death, Arendt focused on the hope of continual new beginnings in the world with others. Heidegger (2008:425) posed "but death is only the 'end' of *Dasein*; and, taken formally, it is just one of the ends by which *Dasein's* totality is closed round." In contrast to "Being-towards-the-end" (Heidegger: 2008:477) Arendt (1966:479) argues: "that every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only 'message' which the end can never produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man [sic]." I therefore define the nature of the relation self:other in the human conditions of plurality and natality.

This study explores *how* we know and *what* we know of the relation self:other . Such an exploration blurs the boundaries between epistemology and ontology. The understanding of the nature of the relation self:other will necessarily influence our understanding of the nature of human rights and curriculum. The choice to be responsible *for* self:other (pre-ontological) is however made before being with or knowing self:other and therefore moves beyond the boundaries of *what* (epistemology)

we know of self:other. *How* we come to know self:other by means of intra-dialogue and in responsibility *for* is then irrational, non conditional and non-reciprocal. Coming to know self:other by means of intra-dialogue do however construct new knowledge and the relation between ontology and epistemology thus remains open, blurred and shifting.

Jansen (2009:172) regards curriculum as an institution and describes institutions as socially embedded meanings and understandings about self:other, defined in social structures. He argues that curriculum is not only the text and syllabus prescribed for certain qualifications but an encoding of meta-narratives embedded in all aspects of educational institutions. Educational institutions are one of the major social structures in which power and inequality are reproduced or contested (Apple, 2008:25). All educational institutions reflect meanings and understandings about the relations self:other, knowledge, power, authority and the understanding of self:other as situated (non)partners in these relations (Jansen, 2009:172). The behavior of teacher:child is controlled by institutionalised embedded knowledge, values and beliefs (*ibid*:173).

The ontological life experiences of humans are not sterile, neat, ordered or even structured (Morrison, 2004:490). These experiences relate to poverty, violence, greed, death, life threatening diseases and political turmoil. Despite human rights frameworks and watchdogs, humans experience the violations of dignity, equality, freedom of speech, association, religion and racism and sexism every day (*ibid*, 490). Curriculum theory cannot distance itself from life. It is not a “spectator theory; it is an involved theory” (*ibid*:490).

Any inquiry into curriculum, should pay attention to the structural relation curriculum, society and inter-generational, institutionalised knowledge regarding meanings and understandings (*ibid*:25). Curriculum is not an isolated phenomenon, since political, societal and cultural power mediate what knowledge is validated and how knowledge is constructed.

1.7.3 Epistemological premise

The concept knowledge is complex and contentious. Knowledge concerns not only what we know, but also how we know and the time and space in which we know (Cary, 2006:136). The time and space in which we know concerns our epistemological positioning in cultural, social and historical time and space (*ibid*:136). An analysis of the legitimising of knowledge through the discourses on knowledge and knowing in non-linear time and space brings us to an understanding of the shifting spaces in which

knowledge is constituted and validated (*ibid*:136).

The recent turn towards the self has focused epistemology towards the experiences and social constructions of individuals and the resulting multiple ways of knowing (*ibid*:136). These multiple ways of knowing in shifting time and space influence the including (legitimisation) and excluding of knowledge and the possibilities of re-imagining future knowledge (*ibid*:136). They determine what we teach and learn and the imagining of future knowledge deemed meaningful in a teaching-learning context. Multiple ways of knowing accentuate the complicated, uncertain and complex nature of epistemology rooted in an acceptance of the diversity of the human condition. By centring multiple ways of knowing, rooted in the complexity of the human condition, epistemology is moved towards the ethical (*ibid*:137). It turns towards our responsibility as educators regarding how, when and what we know. It turns epistemology towards self:other embedded, as knowing subjects, against the social (*ibid*:137).

1.7.3.1 *Doxa* and episteme

Epistemology is defined as a theory of knowledge or justification of knowledge (Carter & Little, 2007:1317) Classical philosophers understood *episteme* to be validated and justified by means of conversational and dialectic questioning (Brinkmann, 2007:1117). *Doxa* was understood by Classical philosophers as knowledge constituted by means of personal and individual experiences and opinions (*ibid*:1117). If we understand knowledge to be constituted by subjective multiple ways of knowing rooted in the lived experiences of a diverse humanity, then questions arise regarding whether such knowledge can be regarded as episteme. Can knowledge derived from multiple different personal lived experiences and opinions be regarded and validated as *episteme*?

a) *Episteme*

Since the 1980's and 1990's debates in social science concerning difference and otherness have led to objects of analysis being seen as complex, uncertain and contested (Smit, 2005:417). Knowledge is much more complex than the simple relations, sensations and impressions artificially organised through our perceptions (*ibid*:419).

In social science a number of complexities are at work, such as practical complexity, imaginative complexity, situated complexity, representational complexity and structural and deep complexity (*ibid*:419-420). When these social complexities are acknowledged, the preference for authoritative knowledge and disciplinarily and closed systems of analyses come into question. In an open or post-disciplinary system of analysis, a state

of complexity is acknowledged, no external boundaries are assumed and all objects of study are recognised as having intrinsic properties and structures which affect their performance in different situations (*ibid*:418). Knowledge is a complex product of practices, grounded in cultural values and constructed in historical and social locations representative of meaning, composed of linguistic, symbolic and cultural elements (*ibid*:420).

Brinkman (2007:1123) argues that *episteme* is validated and referenced in normative spaces of reasoning and not in empirical spaces of reasoning. Knowledge is constituted by being able to justify what we know in a normative practical reality. *Episteme* is constructed when humans engage in intra-dialogue, questioning and reflecting on what and how they know in order to normatively justify their knowledge. We are prompted by others to justify what and how we know. Self:other are thus active and equal participants in the construction of knowledge (*ibid*:1126).

b) *Doxa*

Doxa concerns the emotional and intellectual meanings and understandings, rooted in life experiences, through which self constructs beliefs, attitudes and opinions. Traditionally, emotions (related to life experiences) and emotional learning have been regarded as in opposition to reason, thought and knowledge construction (Winans, 2010:478). This assumption has been challenged recently and emotions, reason and thought are now being regarded as inseparable (*ibid*:479). Transcending the psychological lens through which emotional learning is studied, emotional learning is understood to be a cultural and societal mediated process (*ibid*:479). Bauman (2001a:2) argues that societies are factories and nurseries of meanings and understandings. Knowledge regarding the understanding (beliefs, attitudes and opinions) of self:other is constructed and dignified by humans through dialogue. Society thus validates knowledge constructed between self:other as the shared meanings and understandings significant for living a 'happy life' or 'good life' (*ibid*:2). Shared meanings and understandings, dignified and validated between self:other provides epistemological structures of stability and solidity to societies and communities (Bauman, 1994:248; 2001a:2).

Jansen (2009:171) regards shared meanings and understandings as both inter-generational and interdisciplinary. Collective and shared meanings and understandings constitute society, but society also mediates individual *doxa*. Constructing individual *doxa* is thus an interrelated and multilayered process between society and self:other.

This process includes *how* we know: by means of many individual and unique experiences and autobiographies, *what* we know: different individual understandings of self:other, *when* we know: this includes intergenerational knowledge as well as shifting social and personal dialogic revolutions in non-linear space and time (Cary, 2006:15).

Arendt (1958:57) therefore argues that the situated self:other become known when a situation can be seen and confessed by many in a variety of ways. The time and space in which we come to know can only be deconstructed when different *doxas* are voiced and shared in spaces of togetherness. In her view, *doxa* is understood to be individual: “my truth as it appears to me” (Arendt, 1990:84). *Doxa* or ‘my truth’ is related to ontological experiences of life and self:other. Arendt (1958:175,176) argues that different life experiences confessed by individuals as *doxa* are the manifestation of the complexity and differentiation inherent in the human condition but also the complexity of the time and space in which we know (*ibid*:57,58). In order to construct *episteme*, it is therefore paramount that every *doxa* is freely expressed and questioned by self:other. When someone is not allowed to express their *doxa* freely or choose not to reveal their *doxa*, the situated self:other cannot be deconstructed and the relation self:other cannot be re-imagined.

Single opinions or *doxas* (not questioned) are often structured as ideologies and meta-narratives regarded as truth. An ideology is a single opinion (*doxa*) strong enough to attract and persuade a majority by presenting it, either as a key to history and liberation or a solution to the problems of the universe. Ideologies and meta-narratives furthermore rely on and relate to shared societal experiences and desires (Arendt, 1966:159). Arendt (*ibid*:159) illustrates this with an explanation of how ‘race-thinking’ became an ideology in the service of colonialism. Race-thinking became the ideology of choice during the Industrial period when Europe needed to expand their territories for economic profits (*ibid*:159). Arendt (1990:80) describes the process of legitimising one *doxa* through power as truth, as “an attempt to use violence by words only.” The effect of meta-narratives on identity construction rooted in human rights values is explored in Chapter Two and Five.

Like *episteme*, *doxa* is constructed in dialogic relations. It concerns confessing life experiences (how we know), situated and mediated in historical and societal contexts (when we know) in a search of own meaning and understanding regarding self:other (what we know). *Doxa and episteme* are complex systems of meanings and understandings relying on a multidisciplinary and open-ended process for validation.

c) *Validating doxa and episteme*

Doxa and *episteme* are justified by means of dialogue within a normative space (Brinkmann, 2007:1123). Shared meanings and understandings, validated by society, are inter-generational, emotional and intellectual in nature and include psychological, spiritual, political, economic and cultural embedded beliefs, attitudes and values through which individuals, communities and societies understand and structure the relation self:other (Jansen, 2009:171). This would imply that the construction of (shared) episteme and *doxa*, validated between self:other is always relational, dialogic and contextual (time and space of knowing) (Brinkmann, 2007:1127). Meanings and understandings have definite collective characteristics. The focus of this study, however, is on the deconstruction and reconstruction of *doxa* – the unique, individual beliefs, opinions and knowledge constructed by the situated self, in the relation self:other, from individual life experiences.

In the context of this study, my epistemological questioning concerns the deconstruction and reconstruction of individual *doxa* and the influence thereof on identity construction rooted in human rights values. The self, by means of disruption and intra-dialogue, questions and deconstructs own meanings and understandings with self:other in spaces of togetherness. Conceding that shared meanings and understandings, validated between self:other, influence individual *doxa*, it should be emphasised that meanings and understandings related to individual *doxa*, remains in essence unique to each individual (Dlamini, 2010:18,19).

Brinkmann (2007:1116) argues that the knowledge-producing potential of humans is possible in dialogue. Knowing (*episteme* and *doxa*) regards the discursive testing, questioning, exploration and reflecting on opinions, beliefs, attitudes and knowledge. Brinkman (*ibid*:1136) argues that beliefs, attitudes and opinions require an “intrusion,” demanding questioning and deconstruction in order to construct new knowledge. Du Preez (2009:101) regards discomfort due to stepping out of our comfort zones as the spark for new knowledge construction. Jansen (2009:266) advocates a pedagogy of dissonance, disrupting beliefs, attitudes and opinions as the starting point to the construction of new knowledge.

In the educational context the relation teacher:child is influenced by specific and individual prior meanings and understandings representing the situated self as multiple stories linking past, present and future. The diverse and divided meanings and understandings within a classroom not only illustrate the complexity of the human

condition, but are also exactly what is needed to enact a pedagogy of dissonance (*ibid*:258-259). During intra-dialogue teacher:child disrupt and deconstruct own *doxa*, acknowledge own difference and the difference between self:other and reconstruct new meanings and understandings.

The purpose of disruption and questioning of *doxa* is not the validation of prior or future individual meanings and understandings. The purpose remains the deconstruction and reconstruction of own meanings and understandings towards becoming and new beginnings.

1.8 CONCEPT CLARIFICATION

This study explores how we understand and make meaning in and of the relation self:other, and how we position and represent self:other in non-linear curriculum time and space (*cf* Cary, 2006:136). The continual quest to deconstruct meanings and understandings related to the construction and reconstruction of self:other rooted in human rights values concerns continual identity construction, consciousness and becoming. The three interrelated elements in deconstructing self:other in curriculum spaces are the ethical relation self:other constituted in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values, spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue. In spaces of togetherness we confess difference and deconstruct misunderstanding and disruption in non-linear time and space. Intra-dialogue questions, deconstructs and reconstructs new ways of knowing and being with self:other by means of continual dialogic revolutions. In the following section these and related concepts used in this study are clarified.

1.8.1 Self:other

The relation self:other describes the multilayered and complex self in relation(s). Self:other embraces the intersections of self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:88): self in relation with an other and self in relation with all others in non linear socio-historic and political time and space.

The relation self as two-in-one is a manifestation and an expression of human plurality (*ibid*:88). Arendt (*ibid*:88) argues that human plurality is indicated in the fact that “I am two-in-one.” Humans “not only exist in the plural as do all earthly beings, but have an indication of this plurality within themselves” (*ibid*:88). In the dialogue between self as two-in-one, deconstructing and reconstructing own difference, ethics and the relation self:other have its origin (*ibid*:86,87). Bauman (1994:75) similarly argues that the

construction of the moral self in responsibility *for* self:other is a pre-ontological happening. The relation self:other is a result of the continual intra-dialogic relation self as two-in-one constructing the moral self and constituting the relation self:other as a result thereof (Arendt, 1990:86-87; Bauman, 1994:75).

The constituting of the ethical relation self:other is a result of the invitation from self to an other to enter this dialogic relation in order for self to be responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other (Bauman, 1994:74). In the relation self:other, self is simultaneously separate and together with self:other. Self remains singular, unique and irreplaceable in difference in the relation self:other. Self can only be individuated in self:other but paradoxically cannot be individuated in relation *to* self:other (Ruiz, 2004:274).

Self:other simultaneously represent the specificity of humanity and our shared humanity in non-linear time and space. The relation self:other is a manifestation of human difference and an inclusive, shared humanity (Arendt, 1990:88). Self:other are thus representatives of all of humanity in contextual and infinite time and space but remain singular and unique in difference.

Teacher:child is the contextualisation of the relation self:other in education and curriculum. The relation teacher:child would then also describe our shared humanity and equal difference in non-linear space and time.

1.8.2 Spaces of togetherness

Spaces of togetherness are not a physical secured space but an inclusive space in which self:other share words and deeds – a space in which humans confess difference and construct new beginnings (Arendt, 1958:198). Spaces of togetherness include all of humanity in non-linear time and space confessing difference. It can be a classroom, a lecture room, any social gathering or any political gathering. Spaces of togetherness are not bound to physical or geographic space and time. By means of social networks spaces of togetherness can be global or local. Time is transcended when written text enters such a space as the voices of self:other, confessing past, present or future situated difference.

I define spaces of togetherness as spaces in which the liberated self:other are free to become equal and dignified partners in difference by means of intra-dialogue and dialogic revolutions. Self:other are liberated by the choice to be responsible *for* self:other rooted in human rights values. Responsibility *for* self:other liberates self:other from the

conventions, rules and regulations of moral codes of conduct regarding self:other (Bauman, 1994:79). Self:other are free to individuate themselves in difference and continually revolutionise the relation self:other rooted in human rights values.

Spaces of togetherness are premised on inclusive difference, in the acknowledgement of the equality of difference and in the freedom of expressing difference. It is revolutionary, as the deconstruction and reconstruction of meanings and understandings are the primary concern. Spaces of togetherness are a pre-condition for intra-dialogue, dialogic revolutions, becoming and identity construction.

1.8.3 Society, community and spaces of togetherness

Both societies and communities have exclusive and inclusive characteristics. The criteria for exclusion often rest on genealogy, citizenship and nationalism. In a post-conflict society such as South Africa, historical voices are for example, often selectively excluded or included. This is done by either silencing or accentuating historical voices depending on ruling meta-narratives and ideologies. An example of this is the ongoing debate between the ANC, members of the dissolved UDF (such as Alan Boesak) and the PAC³ regarding their respective roles in the constituting of a liberated South Africa.

The deconstruction and reconstruction of meanings and understandings depends on the equal voicing of difference. In spaces of togetherness, the ethical relation self:other holds each individual *doxa* (past, present and future) in equal value, including all. Both the concepts society and community will by nature, exclude certain voices. Spaces of togetherness thus transcend both society and community while the reconstruction of meanings and understandings within spaces of togetherness revolutionise and constitute society and community a-new.

1.8.4 Dissonance and Disruption

Confessing difference in spaces of togetherness, inevitably results in dissonance and disruption. Dissonance is derived from the Latin word *dissonus*, meaning inharmonious,

³ ANC: The African National Congress was originally established as the South African Native Congress in 1912 and renamed as the African National Congress in 1923. The ANC was banned by the apartheid government following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960. The ANC became South Africa's governing party after the first democratic elections in 1994 (Mandela, 2010:421).

UDF: The United Democratic Front was formed during 1983 to fight the apartheid government's constitutional proposals. The UDF consisted of 32 organisations pledged to fight reform proposals (Mandela, 2010:287).

PAC: The Pan African Congress was founded in 1959 by Robert Sobukwe as a breakaway organisation from the ANC. The PAC was banned during 1960 and unbanned during 1990 (Mandela, 2010:436).

different and disagreeing (Cassell, 1969:197). Dissonance occurs when experiences relating to the world and others dis-orders prior meanings and understandings (Jansen, 2009:266). This dis-order in prior meanings and understandings, results in a paradoxical situation of unlearning and learning in which the individual feels dis-connected from prior meaning knowledge but has not yet constructed new knowledge.

Bauman (1994), Jansen (2009) and du Preez (2009) regard feelings of dissonance in a learning situation as a prerequisite for the construction of new knowledge. Bauman (1994:148) argues that in relations rooted in human difference and complexity mis-understanding is the starting point for new knowledge building. Mis-understanding demands questioning, explanation and reflection. It demands the disruption of prior meanings and understandings and the reconstruction of new meanings and understandings (*ibid*:148). Bauman (*ibid*:148) concludes: "Knowledge picks up from the point of breach, disruption and mis-understanding."

While dissonance results in feelings of discomfort or disagreement, disruption is an active process of deconstruction and reconstruction. Disruption follows feelings of dissonance, cuts into, interrupts and questions prior meaning knowledge. Disruption of meanings and understandings concerns the questioning and deconstruction of hegemonic understandings, more specifically the meanings by which the self constructs and understands the relation self:other. Their purpose is new understandings and new meanings (*ibid*:148). In order to re-imagine and reconstruct the South African society a process of disruption is therefore essential.

Disruption of meanings and understandings in a classroom context does not imply chaos (Jansen, 2009:276). Disruption is an ethical, dialogic, relational and revolutionary process. It concerns meanings and understandings of teacher and children who are each unique in their difference, confessing unique narratives and life experiences which they do not share with any other (*ibid*:269). Within a complex intra-dialogic relation, teacher:child question and deconstruct collective and individual meanings and understandings.

1.8.5 Dialogic revolution

In the context of this study, the concept dialogic revolution is used as a metaphor for continual new beginnings following the disruption of meanings and understandings. Arendt (1960:47) regards change only as revolutionary when it marks a significant new beginning resulting in personal and social changes such as greater freedom, equality and material and spiritual well-being for human beings. Dialogic revolutions concern new

beginnings resulting in personal and social change. Political change is not the purpose of dialogic revolutions (Le Baron, 1971:559).

Dialogic revolution is both dialogic and dialectic, disrupting what *is* and propelling humanity to what *ought* to be. The concept of dialogic revolution is intrinsic to the human condition of natality. Natality is linked to human birth and describes the human capacity for new beginnings (Arendt, 1958:9). The character of all beginnings is its unexpected newness (Arendt, 1958:178). It cannot be pre-designed. Dialogic revolutions start a new story, a new narrative and a change in human history (Arendt, 1965:28). New beginnings, however, should always be stabilised by acts of foundation as promises to enable continual new beginnings (*ibid*:223).

By means of dis-ruption, own meanings and understandings is dis-ordered, dis-connected and de-stabilised. The following dialogic revolution within and between self:other aids the construction of new meanings and understandings. The relation self:other is stabilised after dialogic revolutions by responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values but knowing within and between self:other has changed. Disruption of meanings and understandings aids deconstruction by analysing and de-sedimenting knowing. During the revolutionary process new meanings and understandings are constructed and although the nature of the relation self:other remains intact, knowing within this relation has changed.

1.8.6 Intra-dialogue

Intra-dialogue is the active meaning-making process by which self:other deconstruct and reconstruct what we know and how we come to know self:other in past, present and future non-linear curriculum spaces (*cf.* Cary, 2006:136). Intra-dialogue is a relational, ethical and revolutionary non-linear and open-ended dialogue between self:other in equal difference, happening in spaces of togetherness.

Intra-dialogue starts with the dialogue between self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:88). In this dialogue the difference within self is deconstructed and reconstructed. In the relation self:other, the intra-dialogue between self as two-in-one (*ibid*:88), deconstructs the fluxing positioning of self and the situated self as the specificity in the relation self:other. The invitation and reception of an other into intra-dialogue moves intra-dialogue from the inside-of-self to the outside-of-self in deconstructing and reconstructing the difference between self:other (Nancy 1998:438). Self thus continually and simultaneously deconstructs and reconstructs the difference within self and the difference between self:other.

Disruption of meanings and understandings sparks intra-dialogue and dialogic revolutions. Disruption demands questioning of own *doxa* (Bauman, 1994:148). In the continual movement between inside-of-self and outside-of-self (Nancy 1998:438), self balances commitment to own *doxa* with openness to the *doxas* confessed by an other during intra-dialogue (Du Preez, 2009:108). During this process, meanings and understandings are deconstructed and new meanings and understandings are reconstructed.

During intra-dialogue self:other deconstructs what we know of self:other and how we know self:other as situated humans (*cf.* Cary, 2006:136). Self:other also reconstruct and re-imagine new ways of knowing and being with self:other during intra-dialogue. Intra-dialogue is thus a revolutionary process continually starting a new narrative. The conditions for the re-imagination of self:other during intra-dialogue are the ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness. The liberated self:other are not confined to the predesigned rules, regulations and conventions in responsibility *for* self:other. Self:other are free to confess and disrupt *doxa* within spaces of togetherness and by means of intra-dialogue re-imagine new ways of being responsible *for* self:other, rooted in human rights values.

The continual intra-dialogue between self as two-in-one during which self constructs the moral self and choose to be responsible *for* self:other continually re-constitute the relation self:other (Arendt, 1990:86-87; Bauman, 1994:74). Within the relation self:other, self individuates him/herself and continually reconstructs identity and becoming in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other (Arendt, 1990: 86-87; Bauman, 1994:74).

1.8.7 Identity construction

Any attempt to answer the question '*who* am I' remains a philosophical and linguistic impossibility (Berger, 2010:34). Self can only confess and narrate the continual changing awareness of *who* he/she is in the relation self:other (*ibid*:34). Identity in the post-modernity is not given or complete.

This study therefore explores the continual (re)construction of identity and does not attempt to define identity. Identity construction is explored as the continual deconstruction and reconstruction of the *what* and *who* self is defined by in the relation self:other. The construction of identity is a fluxing and continual process of individuation in the relation self:other. Self is continually confronted with the difference confessed within self and the difference confessed between self:other in a search for *who* and *what* he/she is and could be. This search is possible within the ethical, revolutionary

and intra-dialogic relation self:other in spaces of togetherness.

During intra-dialogue, in search and in questioning of *who* and *what* self is and could be, self deconstructs what he/she knows of our shared humanity (Jansen, 2009:268) and our equality of difference (Makgoba, 1997:144). *What* humans are, is an important aspect of identity construction and human plurality (Arendt, 1958:176). Humans, however, have the capacity to transcend *what* they are when they confess *who* they are in spaces of togetherness and individuate themselves as unique and irreplaceable in difference. Continual identity construction is thus an attempt to merge *what/who* self is and could be.

Identity construction starts with the intra-dialogue between self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:88). In confessing and deconstructing own *doxa* in the relation self as two-in-one, the self liberates self:other and constructs the moral self (Bauman, 1994:75). The ethical liberation and the construction of the moral self are the beginning of ethics, the relation self:other but also the beginning of the unique *I* in the relation self:other (*ibid*:75). The unique and irreplaceable *I* and the relation self:other is the consequence of the choice made by self to construct the moral self in responsibility *for* self:other (*ibid*:75).

The relation self:other and spaces of togetherness are critical to identity construction. Our awareness of self is shaped and constructed through concepts, meanings and understandings made available to us through religion, society, cultural communities, education, state and family (Tomasello, 1999:513). Within the relation self:other, the construction of identity is influenced by the meanings and understandings validated within the relation self:other, attaching significance to skills, knowledge, attitudes, behaviours, and understandings of self positioned and (re)presented in the relation self:other (Smith, 2003:257).

Although the material from which identity is constructed is thus provided within the relation self:other, *who* we are is shaped by the intra-dialogue between inside-of-self and outside-of-self (Nancy, 1998:438) in spaces of togetherness (Appiah, 1997:88; Oyeshile, 2007:234). Liberated to responsibility *for* self:other, self is free to disrupt concepts, meanings and understandings and continually to question and deconstruct own fluxing identity and reconstruct own distinction and difference in the relation self:other.

1.8.8 Consciousness

The meaning of the concept consciousness is much debated. Human consciousness has been explored by philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists and socialists for many decades.

Consciousness is related to both the human conditions plurality and natality (Arendt, 1958:178). In the relation self:other, self:other remains aware of own uniqueness in singularity but also of humanity's shared incompleteness demanding continual new beginnings. As I see it, human consciousness is the awareness of the self in an intra-dialogic relation self:other, searching for meaning and understanding in the process of becoming. All individuals are conscious of self:other as incomplete and unfinished in a continual process of becoming by means of dialogic revolutions (Freire, 1994:65; Jansen, 2009:269). Consciousness as subjective awareness of self implies being conscious of self as the unique, irreplaceable and incomplete self, constituting self:other in responsibility *for* self:other which are rooted in human rights values and continual becoming. My understanding of consciousness is thus relational, individuating, ethical and revolutionary.

1.8.9 Emancipation, liberation and becoming

Human emancipation, linked to revolutionary action and praxis has its origin in the theories of Marx and the socialist scholars of the Industrial period who introduced the social question into the political sphere and as a result turned social issues into political questions (Arendt, 1965:62). Human emancipation resulting from revolution was never regarded as a final destination or a means to a predesigned 'good society' (Le Baron, 1971:562). It was regarded as a process and a journey towards humanisation. Revolutionary praxis towards human emancipation and liberation was originally geared towards individual and collective new beginnings and not necessarily political change.

In the context of this study, I use the concept becoming to indicate continual collective and individual movement towards freedom, dignity and equality. Becoming is more than emancipation. Freire (1993:65) describes humans as beings in the process of becoming, as unfinished and incomplete beings in a similarly unfinished and incomplete world. Becoming relies on an acceptance of human brokenness and incompleteness. It is the acknowledgement of a continual inward struggle and questioning resulting in questioning, deconstruction and reconstruction within the relation self:other (Jansen, 2009:269)

Becoming is not liberation. Becoming is a condition of human consciousness and the world we live in, which indicates its brokenness and incompleteness and humanity's desire to understand and humanise the world (Freire, 1993:25). Becoming is the continual revolutionary praxis towards new beginnings in spaces of togetherness. Becoming is possible through intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness.

1.8.10 Human rights values

The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (hereafter UDHR) adopted in 1948 by the United Nations was a result of a historical quest by humanity to find an ethical code by which humans could live together (Ishay, 2004:19). At the inception of human rights, it was believed that the human rights values of freedom, dignity and equality were self-evident and inalienable and that human rights as a legalised structured morality, will protect and guarantee these values. This has, however, proved not to be the case (Becker, 2012:84).

For the purpose of this study understandings and revolutionising of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality are explored. I regard the realisation and continual revolutionising of human rights values possible in the ethical and intra-dialogic relation self:other. Freedom, dignity and equality are not gifts, but are acquired through dialogic revolutions (Freire, 1993:29). Human rights values need to be continually realised and revolutionised in the relation self:other.

The liberation of self:other when choosing responsibility *for* the realisation of the human rights values of self:other, free self:other to become dignified and equal in the relation self:other. To realise human dignity, self needs to individuate him/herself as *someone* in the relation self:other. Humans cannot realise human dignity *en masse* (Arendt, 1958:180; Dlamini, 2010:21). When self:other are received as *someone* in the relation self:other the equality of difference between self:other is realised. Self:other become equal in difference – not equal in sameness or unequal in otherness (Arendt, 1958:41).

There seems to be a growing perception that human rights have become a morality of power in favour of those who are deemed more 'human' than others and that human rights in an individualised age, are rendered powerless to protect individual human difference (Ci, 2005:159; Neocosmos, 2006:369). The revolutionary, relational, dialogic and individuating nature of human rights values and the conditions necessary for the realisation of these values between self:other are explored in this study.

1.9 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL MAP FOR THE RESEARCH

Explaining the link between purpose and premise of any study, Rodgers (Rodgers & Skinner, 1956:1061) argues that in any scientific (pure or applied) endeavour there is a prior subjective purpose or end the endeavour is perceived as serving. This subjective value or purpose lies outside of the endeavour but guides the process. The subjective premise and values determine the goals, choices, methods and ends regarding the endeavour made by the researcher (*ibid*:1062). In curriculum research, any analyses, questionings or explorations are an engagement with values (Biesta, 2009:35).

This study is an inquiry into subjective ethical, relational, dialogic and revolutionary understandings regarding human rights values, self:other and curriculum. It aims to explore curriculum as an ethical, revolutionary and relational experience rooted in continual dialogic revolutions towards new meanings and understandings through which self in the relation self:other constructs identity. Self:other continually construct identity and becomes in the consciousness of responsibility *for* the freedom, equality and dignity of self:other.

The relationship between the epistemological premise, research design and methodology operates in two directions. The reflexive researcher actively adopts a theory of knowledge as it is impossible to engage in knowledge, without assumptions of what knowledge constitutes (Carter & Little, 2007:1319). The objectives, research questions and design will thus shape the choice of methodology but the methodology also shapes the objectives, research questions and design (*ibid*:1323). This study will rely on the epistemological premise defining *episteme* and *doxa* as open, complex and interrelated systems. New knowledge is constructed by means of a process of disruption and intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness making the search for and the construction of knowledge dialogic, relational, revolutionary and ethical (1.7.3).

1.10 METHODOLOGY

The choice of methodology is influenced by the research questions, hypothesis and the anthropological, ontological and epistemological premise of the study. Once chosen, the methodology to be used determines the use of particular research methods (Carter & Little, 2007:1318).

1.10.1 Research design: conceptual reflexive

This study is a conceptual reflexive study in the post-structural paradigm. Reflexivity involves questioning of different and alternative frames of reasoning and the construction and understanding of meaning (Gilbert & Sliep, 2012:470). Reflexivity is relational in that it questions premises and listens to different *doxas*. Questioning and grappling with different *doxas* always occur in different contexts (*ibid*:470). Reflexivity is revolutionary as it describes a continuous and dynamic process of questioning, aimed at discomfort and disruption (Pillow, 2003:192,193; Gilbert & Sliep, 2012:470;). Reflexivity thus goes beyond pragmatic reflection towards a critical questioning of the conditions in which knowledge is constructed and re-imagined (Kinsella & Whiteford, 2009:251).

Jansen (2009:256) describes South Africa as being in a post-conflict context striving towards reconciliation and transformation and therefore argues that the use of critical theory which constructs knowledge in opposites has limited potential in a post-conflict situation. Exploring the intellectual conundrum as stated in section 1.5 will require disruption (interrupting what is), reflexivity and a re-imagination of what could be. By means of questioning, reflecting on and reflexive conceptualisation many possible re-imagined understandings of human rights values, curriculum and self:other may emerge.

It is necessary, however, to emphasise that the revolutionary, ethical and dialogic relation self:other as conceptualised in the space of this research remains unfinished and incomplete and thus the re-imagination resulting from this conceptualisation will be unfinished and incomplete. This, however, illustrates the power of dialogic revolutions, as a new search for meanings and understandings will be sparked by the conceptual reflexions in this research space.

1.10.2 Conceptual paradigm

I do not regard critical theory and post-modern paradigms as mutually exclusive. A dialectic and dialogic relation between paradigms is used in conceptualisation. Slattery (2013:241) argues in this regard: “However, there appears to be conflict as to whether political curriculum theory should remain rooted in Marxism and the Frankfurt school or engage poststructural, racial, ecological, queer and gendered perspectives in the curriculum field. The debates over these issues certainly will intensify in the coming years as the dangers of global conflict force us to re-evaluate our understanding of the world.”

In order to respond to the gap in knowledge, I have to move beyond the boundaries within which the gap in knowledge is posed. If curriculum, identity, self:other, becoming, consciousness and human rights are conceptualised only related to power and politics, any reconceptualisation will stay within the boundaries of power and politics.

A possible re-imagination of the post-apartheid curriculum beyond the boundaries of power, economy and politics, is explored in reference to Arendt's theories (1958) on human plurality and natality and revolution as continual new beginnings. In conceptualising the relation self:other in reference to human plurality and natality, I ground this relation in the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality as a personal choice to responsibility *for self:other*. This is done in reference to Bauman's (1994) conceptualisation of post-modern responsibility.

This study will use post-structuralism⁴ in order to explore subjective and different meanings and understandings. Post-structuralism embraces the metaphoric and the undecidable character of meaning (Jackson, 1996:22). Derrida's "différance" describes the dynamic that predetermines meaning as differential or deferential rather than identical or referential. It advances the common root between opposites such as writing-speaking, nature-culture, universalism-particularism (*ibid*:22). In a post-conflict situation, post-structuralism would then not construct different meanings and understandings as opposites, but would deconstruct and reconstruct meanings and understandings, advancing the common root of difference.

Deconstructing difference requires an ethical approach. Ryu (2001:8) argues that post-structuralists such as Derrida and Levinas define ethics in terms of respect for, and

⁴ **Poststructuralist** refers to the questioning of structuralism reproducing the humanist notion of an unchanging and static human nature. The boundaries set by the conception of static human nature Foucault (1965:268) describes as: "There man is finally attuned to his own nature; or rather, by an ethic peculiar to this strange confinement, man must scrupulously maintain, without deviation, his fidelity to nature.." Within this frame of reference the boundaries set by language between signified and signifier are opened and 'meaning', 'subject', 'object' and 'truth' lose their assumed value and substance. Within the poststructuralists framework the discursive practices forms the objects of which it speaks (Pinar et al, 2004:461).

Post structuralism concerns itself with how discursive patterns map and construct an "other" within intersecting discursive and non discursive practices such as schools, classrooms and the curriculum (Pinar et al, 2004: 468).

Deconstruction is often construed as a method of analyses within post structuralism and often subsumed in the term poststructuralist (Pinar et al, 2004:451). Deconstruction however differs from post structural insights in radicalizing certain post-structural insights and incorporating phenomenological insights. Within deconstruction reality itself is text and is constituted in intertextuality (Pinar et al, 2004:465).

responsibility to alterity or difference. Posing oppressor and oppressed or liberator or liberated in discourse as opposites, constitute and reinforce an unequal power relationship. In seeking the equality or common root of the opposites, post-structuralism would advance the equality of different meanings and understandings and not pose difference as opposites. It provides possibilities of deconstructing and reconstructing all voices as equal (Chapters Three and Four).

As stated, knowledge in this study is assumed to be constructed in ethical, relational and revolutionary dialogic spaces, embedded in open, interrelated and complex contexts. The interrelatedness of the concepts and contexts regarding this study makes a post-disciplinary approach necessary. This will open the possibility for alternative interpretations and avoid partial and one-sided accounts (Smit, 2005:437). A post-disciplinary approach is appropriate for the search for meaning and understanding with regard to the relational and intersectional character of society, education, curriculum and self:other.

1.10.3 Contextualisation

Although South Africa is described as a post-conflict society, South Africa remains conflicted and polemic in nature. Polemic concepts used in this study, such as dialogic revolutions, dissonance and disruption, were used with specific intent, because within the boundaries of conflict lies the many possibilities for the re-imagination of our society and curriculum within the ethical relation self:other– as the Reitz incident indicated.

This study concerns the post-apartheid curriculum, constructed after the first democratic elections in 1994, revised in 2002 and 2009 and (re)implemented in 2004 and 2011. The ‘internationalisation’ of curriculum warrants an exploration of the apartheid and post-apartheid curriculum in historical local and global contexts (Pinar, 2010:3). The post-apartheid curriculum is premised on the *Constitution of South Africa* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996). Therefore it is necessary to explore how revolutionising and fluxing understandings of human rights impact on the realisation of human rights values as envisaged by the post-apartheid curriculum.

1.10.4 Methodology made visible through methods

Methods can be described as research in action (Carter & Little, 2007:1318-1319) to make epistemology visible (*ibid*:1321). The specific methods used in this study to make the epistemology and methodology visible, will be discussed next.

1.10.4.1 The proposed literature study and the body of scholarship

Any conceptualisation of curriculum is rooted in a complex and multilayered dialogue. It concerns dialogue about understanding our past, our present and our hopes for the future. It also includes dialogue about identity: *who* and *what* we are (Pinar, 2008:493). How we know, what we know and the specific space and time of knowing, determine our inclusion and exclusion of knowledge, text and voices (Cary, 2006:136).

I acknowledge that in the proposed literature study and the body of scholarship, the relevance of my autobiography in the deconstruction and reconstruction of meanings and understandings is of importance. I acknowledge that the deconstruction and reconstruction of meanings and understandings in this research space is influenced by *who* and *what* I am (Pinar, 2008:493)

a) *The proposed literature study*

In this research space, I will deconstruct:

- many different and contradictory textual voices regarding the relational, revolutionary, ethical and dialogic nature of curriculum, identity, consciousness, becoming and human rights values (such as books, journals);
- spoken text, such as discussions with my promoter, at workshops, seminars and conferences are valuable when one's own *doxa* is questioned by others, which leads to validation or renewed deconstruction and reconstruction of own *doxa*;
- documentary sources, such as NCS and policy documents.

Relating to the epistemological premise of this study, the body of scholarship includes a multidisciplinary and open-ended approach encompassing educational science, sociology, anthropology, history, political science, philosophy, moral philosophy and psychology. Different views relating to *how* we know, *what* we know and *when* we know will be explored (Cary, 2006:15).

b) *The body of scholarship*

The emancipatory power of education to re-imagine society has been conceptualised and re-conceptualised since the 1920's (1.3). This has mostly been done in the critical paradigm. The discussion of critical theory on emancipation, liberation, transformation and praxis will focus on the work of critical scholars such as Paulo Freire (1993) and Michael Apple (1999).

A deconstruction of the limited and limiting use of the concepts emancipation, liberation, transformation and praxis by critical scholars has prompted me to explore the views of Arendt (1958, 1965, 2006a) on natality and revolution and the views of Booth (1999) on humanity's self-creating emancipation and change as continual.

For the inquiry into the normative possibilities, which human rights values could offer in transformation, liberation and emancipation, the article, *What are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought*. (Dembour, 2010), is used throughout this study to explore and position different understandings attached to the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality. Diverse and shifting understandings and their influence on the relation self:other and identity construction rooted in human rights values are explored by means of the work of Ishay (2004) Arendt (1958, 1965, 1966, 1990), Ci (2005) Derrida (2005), Freeman (1994) Howard & Donnelly (1986), Neocosmos (2006) and Parekh, (1999, 2000).

The questioning concerning the continual construction of identity and the normative possibilities to re-imagine self:other of human rights values, include the work of Arendt (1958, 1965, 1990, 1994), Bauman (1994), Noddings (1995), Williams, (2011), Midgley (2010), Derrida, (2005), Jansen (2009), Du Preez (2009, 2011, 2012) and Biesta (2004, 2009).

The understanding of the ethical, revolutionary and dialogic relation self:other is crucial in the construction of identity. Within the ethical relation self:other, self finds the opportunity for individuation. Self:other transcend *what* they are and individuate themselves as *who* they are (the situated self) and hope to be (normative continual revolution). This exploration is done in reference to the work of Arendt, (1958, 1966, 1990), Bauman (1994, 2001), Derrida (2005), Freire (1993), Levitt & Morris (2011), Nancy (1998), Jansen (2009), Cary (2007), Greene (1988), Du Preez (2012), Biesta (2004, 2009), Ellsworth (1989) and Pitt (1998).

The possibility of intra-dialogue as a process of disruption aiding continual revolutionary new beginnings in curriculum theory and identity construction is explored with the help of the work of Du Preez (2008, 2009), Jansen (2009), Rivage-Seul (2003), Ruiz (2004), Pitt (1998).

Curriculum as intra-dialogic spaces in which teacher:child can individuate themselves, disrupt categories and boundaries to continually start new, is explored in reference to the work of Arendt (2006), Pinar (2004, 2008, 2010), Slattery (2006, 2007), Du Preez (2009,

2011, 2012), Cary (2006), Popkewitz (2009), Au (2011).

1.10.4.2 Questioning

The human capacity for asking (un)answerable questions has always been and will always be the beginning of all knowledge (Arendt, 1990:99). Questioning regards the understanding of self:other, curriculum and human rights values. It concerns questioning one's own *doxa* truthfully as well as the questioning of other *doxas* in an ethical manner. Arendt (*ibid*:84) explains the questioning of one's own *doxa* as "only through knowing what appears to me – only to me, and therefore remaining forever related to my own concrete existence – can I ever understand truth. Absolute truth, which would be the same for all men [*sic*] and therefore unrelated, independent of each man's [*sic*] existence, cannot exist for mortals." The questioning of one's own *doxa* would thus always be related to one's own experiences and ontological context.

Questioning one's own *doxa* truthfully entails self in continual intra-dialogue with self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:85). Only when self can truthfully confess to be in agreement with him/herself can he or she be a reliable partner in the relation self:other, questioning and reconstructing reality (*ibid*:85) The questioning of own *doxa* does not aim to validate *doxa* as truth but to make *doxa* truthful (*ibid*:84). At the heart of dialogue is the critical examination and questioning of the *doxa* and episteme confessed by self:other (Leigh, 2007:312).

Questioning different *doxas* in the relation self:other reveals many different possibilities to re-imagine the world. This may not bring about a result or consensus as to what is or ought to be (Arendt, 1990:81-82) but emphasise contradictions and inconsistencies. Leigh (2007:310) argues that the Socratic method of questioning leaves humans confused and without knowledge and therefore regards this method of questioning *doxa*, as negative. She recommends *maieutic* (or mid-wifely) dialogue under which proving a *doxa* false or correct is dependent on certain conditions (Leigh, 2007:319-320). However, Bauman (1994:147) argues that contradictions, inconsistencies, misunderstanding and uncertainty is the spark for new knowledge construction.

I regard the dissonance and disruption following questioning as an invaluable means of sparking the process of intra-dialogue, dialogic revolutions and the construction of new meanings and understandings.

1.10.4.3 Reflection and reflexivity

The terms reflective and reflexive are widely, but sometimes confusingly, used in social science literature. The term 'reflective practice' is widely used in education, understood to include characteristics of both reflective and reflexive practices (Gilbert & Sliep, 2012:469). Scholars in the field of psychology prefer the term 'reflective', while scholars working within the post-positivism paradigm such as critical theory and gender studies prefer 'reflexive' (*ibid*:469). I will use both reflection and reflexion as methods.

Reflection describes the human capacity for making connections between thoughts and ideas (Denton, 2011:838). It is the active and prolonged in depth exploration of one topic. An in depth exploration suggests the understanding and ability to apply knowledge to new problems and contexts. The sources of reflection can be written or spoken text (*ibid*:841). Reflection alone can have the consequence, even although a topic is thoroughly understood, that one can remain fixed in a specific position or logic limiting the construction of new knowledge (Gilbert & Sliep, 2012:470).

Reflexivity is an "attempt to move to a more 'meta' level of reflection"(*ibid*: 470). In questioning issues of categorisation and power in research, reflexivity is of great significance in the deconstruction of knowledge (Pillow, 2003:178). Reflexivity is the relational, contextual and revolutionary disruption of frames of reasoning towards a critical re-imagination of knowing and being (Pillow, 2003:192-193; Gilbert & Sliep, 2012:470). Nicholls (2009:121) describes reflexivity as multilayered and distinguishes between self-reflexivity, inter-personal reflexivity and collective reflexivity.

Self-reflexivity requires the researcher to lay bare hidden assumptions and awareness regarding power and privilege in the research process (*ibid*:122). Inter-personal reflexivity concerns the relation self:other as partners in the research process. It concerns *who* and *what* we are as participants in the research process. It also positions the partners in the research process (*ibid*:123). Collective reflexivity determines the terms of participation and inquiry. In this multilayered approach to reflexivity as process, the researcher is decentred, positioning is unstable and complex and learning is not *about* the other but *from* an other (*ibid*:122-124). The need for the continual deconstruction and reconstruction of the positionality and (re)presentation of self:other by means of reflexivity and questioning is explored in Chapter Four.

1.10.4.4 Document analysis

An analysis of the South African post-apartheid curriculum will be done in Chapter Five. The overview to the *Revised National Curriculum Statement* (2004) and the overview to the *National Curriculum Statement Grades R-12* (2011) are used. Supporting documents included in the analyses are *The Manifesto for Values, Education and Democracy* (2001) and related published policy documents and speeches.

The purpose of this analysis is to explore the 'internationalisation' of the South African curriculum since colonialism and the intersections of curriculum/society/politics/history and economy (Pinar, 2010b:3). In the last section of this analysis, the boundaries, which the South African curriculum constructs and the influences thereof on the relation self:other, identity construction, consciousness and becoming rooted in human rights values, are explored (Popkewitz, 2009:303).

1.10.4.5 Discourse analysis

Discourse is constituted by words, spoken or written, grouping themselves together to establish a discursive pattern (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery & Taubman, 2004:462). Post-structuralism regards discourse as historically and socially contingent. When analysing a discourse the emphasis is not on what it means, but on how it works, what conditions make such a discourse possible and how a specific discourse intersects with non-discursive patterns (*ibid*:462).

Discourse and discursive patterns are not regarded by post-structuralism to represent reality but it is argued that discursive patterns, construct reality. Power, as a function of discourse, therefore has the ability to define and totalise phenomena (*ibid*:462). Any appeal to meta-narratives and authoritarian knowledge in discursive patterns is regarded by post-structuralism as a disguise to exercise power (*ibid*:464; 4.5.2; 5.5; 5.6.3).

Under the influence of Derrida, text replaced the term discourse in post-structural scholarship. Reality itself is regarded as text, constituting intertextuality (*ibid*:466). Every text (written or spoken) is regarded as being divided into two texts without opposition between them (Kierans, 1997:60). All texts are presupposed to have a double perspective, inside and outside the text. Language is thus not a simple "code" or "system" but becomes a heteroglossia or a multiplicity of meanings and understandings in usage. Intertextuality in language echoes other meanings and understanding, even when trying to exclude such meanings and understandings (Billig, 2005:288-289; 5.6.3; 5.7).

Reason is disrupted from the inside in order to lay bare how western philosophy has reduced multiple meanings to “one” or the “right” meaning (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:466; 5.6.3). This is explored in Chapter Five with reference to the South African curriculum. Deconstruction challenges meanings represented as circular and linear, thus resulting in final truth (*ibid*:468). Meaning-making happens on multiple levels and in non-linear time and space (Cary, 2006:16). In this regard, history, as a linear or circular process is challenged. The deconstruction of history illustrates that discursive patterns are always different to what they seek to represent and that they necessarily defer meaning (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:468).

1.10.5 Positioning of self

I am a white female South African scholar. My ‘background awareness’ (Freire, 1993:64) of South Africa in the time and space of my own autobiography stretches over many disruptions and new beginnings in the history of South Africa. It includes the birth of the Republic of South Africa, the Verwoerd era and apartheid, the Rivonia Trial, the Soweto uprisings, the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, the first democratic elections in 1994 and the successes and failures of our transition from apartheid to democracy, amongst others, the Reitz incident in 2008.

Freire (*ibid*:38) argues that oppression renders both oppressor and oppressed unfree and dehumanised. Considering the ethical framework of Bauman (1994), I would argue that oppression also distorts any normative choices, as the choice to be responsible *for* self:other in the context of oppression is always superficial. It rarely results in anything more than temporary charity rooted in feelings of pity. My background awareness does therefore not include any ethical relations self:other or any inclusive ethical, dialogic and revolutionary spaces of togetherness.

Oppression defines all, in an attempt to cling to power, by *what* they are, fragmenting self:other. For most of my life, I have been defined by *what* I am: a white Afrikaner female. One could argue that for most of my life I have been in a position of privilege and power. My experience of the white narrative of power and privilege, however, was influenced by my gender. I did not experience equality under apartheid. “Some animals are (*were*) more equal than others” (Orwell, 1977:114) during apartheid. Dlamini (2009:158) posits a similar argument regarding the black narrative during apartheid South Africa: “the masses of our people of struggle lore were not one undifferentiated mass but a collection of individuals from different class, ethnic and gendered backgrounds”. Slattery (Jupp & Slattery, 2010:456) regards the value of different and

conflicting autobiographies and positions as providing a backdrop for complexity.

I do not regard myself as defined by any static race, gender, ethnic or class meta-narrative. However, this does not mean that I do not attempt to 'see' and 'hear' experiences of race, ethnicity, gender or class confessed as narratives and autobiographies. I can, however not 'own' or validate these *doxas* as I have not and never will be able to 'copy' and understand an other's unique life experiences confessed as narratives. I can therefore never speak on behalf of the oppressed, the oppressor, the poor or the affluent. The intent of this research is not a colonised act of scrutinising the narrative patterns and autobiographies of self:other (*ibid*:457). It is a revolutionary search for own meaning, understanding and fluxing identity in spaces of togetherness. It is not an attempt to teach others but rather an openness to learn from others.

1.11 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF RESEARCH

The goal of all research is a search for understanding. All researchers have an ethical obligation to the practice of science, their society, the subjects of science and the environment. The responsibility of the researcher to acknowledge the equality of different voices in the consciousness *for* the continual constitution of the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other is emphasised by Cary (2006:137), Slattery (2006:5), Bauman (1994:13) and Arendt (1958:236). This includes the following:

- The moral commitment to integrity and honesty,
- The full disclosure of methodology and methods,
- The appropriate ascription of authorship and reference to sources,
- Accountability and responsibility to society, education and the research community

1.12 CONCLUSION

The positive conclusion to the Reitz incident illustrates the capacity of education to transcend the reproduction of meta-narratives and continually (re)constitute the ethical relation self:other. It also illustrates the powerful influence of meta-narratives, reproduced in curriculum and educational institutions, in dehumanising self:other. In order for curriculum to re-imagine self:other by means of intra-dialogue, the ethical relation teacher:child needs to be continually (re)constituted in spaces of togetherness. The continual (re)constitution of self:other is a result of the construction of the unique self in responsibility *for* self:other, rooting this relation in human rights values.

This study explores understanding and meaning-making in the relation self:other in curriculum spaces. The continual quest to deconstruct meanings and understandings related to the relation self:other rooted in human rights values concerns continual identity construction, consciousness and becoming. The continual deconstruction and reconstruction of the moral self happens during intra-dialogue and dialogic revolutions. Identity construction and becoming in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other, is therefore pivotal to any re-imagination of what *could* be. Spaces of togetherness provide the opportunities for the confession of equal difference and re-imagination. The construction and continual revolution of the moral self is the origin of any normative re-imagination of curriculum and society.

Any deconstruction of curriculum and society should always be situated in the historical, societal and political contexts in which the relation self:other and knowledge regarding self:other was/is constructed. The fluxing understandings of the anthropological, ontological and epistemological premise of the relation self:other in context, also influence how (experiences confessed as narratives) and what (multilayered and different *doxas*) we know of self:other. The revolutionary nature and diverse understandings of freedom, dignity and equality and their effect on the relation self:other and education are explored in Chapter Two. The normative and dialogic nature of the relation self:other, continually revolutionised in a quest for understanding, is explored in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER TWO

THE META-THEORETICAL AND ETHICAL DISCOURSES REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

“How should one live?” is the question that Socrates concerned himself with many years ago (Williams, 2011:1). This question goes beyond the “What should I do?” of everyday life. It is also not an explanation of the question “Why should I be moral?” (Powell, 2006:535). The question of how one should live is about a manner of life and a reflection of one’s life as a whole (Williams, 2011:5).

While not contending that human rights could or should give a full and final answer to this question, I do maintain that the study of human rights should be concerned with the question of how we should live. Herodotus, the Greek historian, claimed that there are no universal ethics (Ishay, 2004:16). Any ‘foolproof’ recipe, design or final argument concerning how we should live could be proved wrong and rejected at any time (Bauman, 1994:9), and the possible diverse answers to the search for an ethical code, I would argue, do not lie in any moral system or recipe but in the continual search for answers.

The progress of human rights has been built on the hopes and achievements of previous generations through every revolution (or new-beginning)⁵ in the ongoing search for a universal ethical code (Ishay, 2004:4,17). It is only in exploring the many diverse past, present and expected future understandings and meanings attached to the values inherent in human rights that we can attempt to understand the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality.

Many post-modern writings celebrate the recent supposed demise of ethical structures and the freedom from obligations, commandments and duties as the ultimate emancipation of humans (Bauman, 1994:2). Bauman (*ibid*:2), however, argues that the self-dismantling of modern ethical theories have opened many paths to new and radical understandings of moral-phenomena and ethics. He regards this as creating the

⁵ Arendt (1965:11) regards the aim and justification of revolution as the historical quest for freedom. Revolution, in this view, is bound to the principles of natality and plurality. It is bound to the expectation of a sudden new course to history, a new story, a new narrative interrupting and changing history (Arendt, 1958:176-177; Arendt, 1965:28). The concept revolution will be used in this study to indicate any individual and collective deconstruction of meanings and understandings and the reconstruction towards a new beginning in the search to realise freedom, dignity and equality.

possibility of a continual revolution of our understanding of moral concerns and experiences.

The twenty-seven articles of the UDHR (1948) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 were divided between the three human rights values that crystallised after the French Revolution, namely dignity, liberty and equality (Ishay, 2004:3). The UDHR (1948) was the intentional act of legalising a foundation for human rights, resulting from the various revolutions before 1948. The first two articles of the UDHR (1948) aim to protect human dignity shared by all individual humans. Articles 3 to 19 adopt and protect the first generation rights to freedom, which was fought for during the Enlightenment, and articles 20 to 26 are related to the rights fought for during the Industrial Revolution, namely second generation rights to political, social and economic equity (Ishay, 2004:4).

Although the UDHR (1948) initially defined human rights as representing the fundamental interests of individual human beings, Articles 27 to 28 of the UDHR (1948) aim to protect communal and national rights that were advocated as collective rights since the beginning of the 20th century (Twiss, 2004:42). Human rights in the twenty first century were claimed and won collectively and in relation with, and to others (Bauman, 2001b:76; Twiss, 2004:42). There is thus an implicit agreement inherent in the acceptance of human rights that human rights should protect collective and communal belonging and sharing. We belong to a family, religion, ethnic group, a social class, a nation and a country (Becker, 2012:84). The meaning and understanding of belonging and sharing, as an ontological experience carry both the risk of opposition (defining humans only as *what* they are) and the responsibility for seeking togetherness (defining humans in their unique individual difference by *who* they are) (Arendt, 1958:180-181; Derrida, 2005:80). Human rights should thus be a protection against the risk of opposition and pave the way to togetherness, protecting *what* and *who* we are.

Although all human rights have intrinsic value (Ingram, 2003:373), a human right is not and cannot be an end in itself (Ci, 2005:249). The values inherent in human rights as a legalised structured morality are relational. They affect the relation self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:88) and the constructing of identity in the relation self:other. In this chapter the continual revolution of human rights and the effect on the relation self:other will be explored. The human rights values freedom, dignity and equality will be investigated in socio-historic contexts concerning the philosophical and ethical grounding of human rights. The normative and dialogic nature of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values is explored in the next chapter. Understanding of these issues critically relates to

the meanings and understandings of the concepts becoming, identity and consciousness.

My argument is that the revolutionary progress of human rights towards humanising the world are continual and influenced by societal and historical contexts, emphasising different values and different aspects of human rights as an ethical code. Dialogic revolutions as continual disruption and new beginnings that result in shifting understandings and different moral accents on the values freedom, dignity and equality through history will be explored in the first section of this chapter. In the tradition of post-structuralism the historical context and resulting diverse conceptualisation regarding the philosophical and ethical understandings of human rights values will be explored to illustrate how human rights evolutions are a continual revolutionary, historical and contextual process.

This chapter indicates the global and historical revolutionary nature of human rights and the shifting meta-theoretical positions on human rights due to societal and political changes. It is not intended as a linear history of the development of human rights.

2.2 DIALOGIC REVOLUTIONS AS CONTINUAL NEW BEGINNINGS

In the context of this study, the concept dialogic revolution is used as a metaphor for continual new beginnings. Continual new beginnings are possible because of the human conditions natality and plurality (Arendt, 1958:178). Revolution is a dialogic and dialectic process, disrupting what *is* and propelling humanity to what *ought* to be. The revolutionary process is sparked by questioning what *is* (Freire, 1993:33,67). Revolution should not and could never define humans or the world (Arendt, 1958:246; Arendt, 1960:45). It is the process, however, which enables humans to continually liberate themselves, (re)constitute the relation self:other and spaces of togetherness enabling them to act in, on and with the world a-new (Freire, 1993:64).

2.2.1 Revolution as continual movement towards new beginnings

The word revolution was originally a term used in astronomy, which gained importance in the natural sciences after Copernicus used it to describe the natural predesigned revolving motion of the stars. The original use of the word thus indicated a recurrent, cyclical movement back to its point of origin (Arendt, 1965:42). During the seventeenth century the word revolution, used as political metaphor, described a motion of moving

back to a pre-ordained point of origin, for example the restoration of the monarchy after the overthrow of the Rump Parliament (*ibid*:42-43).

Although the word revolution has thus always indicated continual movement, the implicit understanding of the revolutionary spirit as newness and novelty was only introduced into the political sphere during the eighteenth century revolutions (*ibid*:46). French revolutionaries broke with past politics to establish a new community insisting that it be realised through politics and not religion, past traditions or social contracts (Hunt, 1983:90). On 14 July 1789 the word revolution as a political metaphor indicating continual forward movement to something new, unpredictable and willed by humans acting on, in and with the world and each other was fully adopted for the first time (Arendt, 1965:47). By making a conscious decision to start a-new, the French revolutionaries founded modern politics (Hunt, 1983:91). Dialogic revolutions originate between self:other and intentionally disrupt meanings and understandings towards new beginnings.

Arendt (1965:41) argues that the revolutionary spirit, as an eagerness for new things and the conviction that novelty is desirable, is a characteristic of the modern age. Continual dialogic revolutions indicate the human consciousness of being incomplete and unfinished and the hope of becoming. Freire (1993:65) describes education as “revolutionary futurity.” Education should be rooted in the hopeful quest to transcend what *is* towards what *ought* to be, by means of dialogic revolutions. Education should be the manifestation of humanity’s continual revolutionary quest towards new beginnings.

2.2.2 Freedom and revolution

Arendt (1965:29) argues that revolution resulting in new beginnings can only have freedom as its purpose. She concludes that since every individual human birth is a new beginning, freedom cannot be regarded as an inner human disposition but as a characteristic of human existence in the world (Arendt, 1960:43). Every individual birth is symbolic of a new beginning, interrupting history and creating a new possibility of freedom (Arendt, 1960:44; Arendt, 1958:11,177-178). Freire (1993:29) similarly states: “freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift.”

Natality, as the human condition of continual new beginnings and revolutionary action, is ontologically rooted, and happens with and between humans (Arendt, 1958:246). However, the choice to be *for* others, liberating self:other is a pre-ontological choice

(Bauman, 1994:71). The self chooses responsibility *for* self:other before *being* with self:other (*ibid*:71). Liberation towards responsibility *for* self:other is thus a pre-ontological choice, resulting in freedom. Freedom is ontologically rooted as the action to continually start a-new with self:other. Dialogic revolutions concern the continual liberation of self:other from prescriptive and predesigned consciousness to dialogic revolutions (re)constituting freedom and the relation self:other. In the consciousness of responsibility *for*, self:other can freely and continuously revolutionise the relation self:other (*ibid*:79).

Although dialogic revolutions, because of their unpredictability, can never explain *what* or *who* we are, (Arendt, 1958:246; Arendt, 1960:45), the pre-ontological choice to *be for* others, define the moral self and thus define *who* we are. During the choice to be responsible *for* others, the moral self is constructed (Bauman, 1994:72). The moral self transcends what *is* in a search to what *ought* to be. The freedom to start dialogic revolutions towards what *ought* to be is never complete – “no single event can ever once and for all deliver and save a man [*sic*], a nation, or mankind [*sic*]” (Arendt, 1960:45).

2.2.3 Revolution as intentional action

Dialogic revolutions are continual and deliberative actions towards freedom. All historical processes, societal changes and human rights progress has been and will be a result of the human capacity to answer to the opportunities the world offer to liberate self:other as a responsible act towards freedom (Arendt, 1960:33,44). In response to these opportunities, humans intentionally interrupt, disrupt and create a new world and history through speech and action (*ibid*:33,44). Both Arendt (*ibid*:33) and Freire (1993:31) link humanity’s capacity for freedom to speech and action resulting in new beginnings. Although revolutions are unpredictable and spontaneous, they remain dependent on human will and intentional action (Arendt, 1965:29,42,47).

The shifting understandings and emphasis on different human rights values which result from historical and societal changes and lead to diverse moral systems accentuating certain aspects of human rights values will be discussed next.

2.3 DIALOGIC REVOLUTIONS DISRUPTING MEANINGS AND UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES.

Disruption of meanings and understandings regarding human rights values, spark dialogic revolutions and the construction of new understandings. The understanding of human rights as legalised duties and obligations towards self:other and the understanding of human rights and human rights values as responsibility *for* self:other is explored next.

2.3.1 Duties towards others

During and after the Second World War, Arendt (1994:740) concluded that morality was/is nothing more than a set of customs and manners. She argues that morality is at any point in time exchangeable for any other set of values, customs and manners with “hardly more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of an individual or a people.” (*ibid*:740). This leaves the protection of human dignity without any guarantee (Arendt, 1966:ix).

Williams (2011:7) argues that morality has taken on a distinctive meaning in western culture. The understanding of morality often relies on the development of notions regarding obligations and duties. Moral and non-moral behavior are precisely defined, measured and regulated (*ibid*:7). Morality employed as a means to control and rule emphasises a sense of obligation or duty to state or society and inhibits individual responsibility towards ethical responsibility. Morality in such a context is used as a means to order, civilize and structure opposition and have ruling and power as an end. It does not constitute the ethical relation self:other and is not constituted within the ethical relation self:other.

The exchange of morality at a moment’s notice, as if it were a new protocol related to table manners (Arendt, 1994:740), was introduced to South Africans after the 1994 election. During colonialism and apartheid, apartheid morality structured opposition, oppression and dehumanising. The power of morality and law to coerce individuals into following the law instead of making their own judgment regarding right and wrong (Arendt, 2006b:294-295) are best described in the words of Lourens du Plessis, a SADF colonel during apartheid:

What is of the utmost importance is to examine the backgrounds in which we grew up. I mean that's where we were moulded. I'm not accusing anybody, but people were placed on a pedestal....not, I think, by intent, but it was carried over from family conversations....What I would have liked to have done is to follow my conscience, because I really did have ... the knowledge that we were doing wrong..... I must say that I had a family to feed....

(in Krog, 1998:72).

During 1994 a new moral system was introduced to South Africans and legally replaced apartheid oppression. It is based on democratic values, non-racialism, non-sexism, justice and human rights (Msila, 2007:150). South Africans had to exchange the morality of colonialism and apartheid to the morality of the "Nelson Mandela viewpoint" (Haste & Abrahams, 2008:390). However, the official and legal replacement of apartheid morality with a culture of human rights did not guarantee that individual South Africans would be able to choose right from wrong even if it is at odds with what others believe to be the right thing to do (Arendt, 2006b:195). As Jansen (2009:171) argues: "it would be a serious mistake to read bureaucratic responsiveness to the formal demands of reconstruction as altering deep-rooted assumptions and beliefs about history, identity and knowledge."

Arendt (2006b:294) sees the central moral question of all times, as the capacity of humans to guide themselves in their own moral judgment when choosing right from wrong. Human rights, understood as a moral system of rules, duties and obligations, de-personalise the realisation of freedom, dignity and equality of self:other. Self regards the realisation of the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other as a contractual duty and obligation (2.5.1; 3.3.1).

I will argue that the realisation of human rights values is dependent on the ethical, revolutionary and individuating relation self:other in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values.

2.3.2 Responsibility *for* self:other

The postmodern "demise of the ethical" (Bauman, 1994:2) is regarded by many as humanity's emancipation from the duties, obligations, restrictions and constraints of morality and ethical codes. The new minimalistic view on morality and the scepticism

regarding a universal ethical code, however, has not liberated humans to enjoy moral freedom but individualism and self-interest. The moral 'duty-free' era has resulted in unadulterated individualism and the continual search for the good life restricting human relations to means and ends (*ibid*:3). Self-interest is expressed as rights and entitlements that every human being could and should claim from the state, society or the community (Dembour, 2010:4-5).

The origin of ethics, Arendt (1990:87; Arendt, 2006b:295) and Bauman (1994:72) conclude, stems from the dialogue between self as two-in-one in a search of own moral truth when choosing responsibility *for* self:other. Responsibility defines post-modern morality (Biesta, 2004:243). In facing self:other, self chooses his/her pre-existing responsibility *for* self:other and declares: *I am for* (Bauman, 1994:76). The awakening to being is in choosing *I am for* before *I am I* (*ibid*:76). This choice is the birth of the self as the unique *I*, the irreplaceable *I*, answering to the responsibility *for* self:other (*ibid*:77).

Responsibility *for* self:other is not obligatory, is not dictated by reason and is unconditional (*ibid*:74,78). In choosing the option of responsibility, self:other are liberated to continually realise freedom, equality and dignity. Responsibility *for* is a non-reciprocal choice. It does not concern any obligations or duties to self:other. It is unconditional (*ibid*:74-77).

As to the question concerning right and wrong, Biesta (2004:243) concludes; "we will never be able to answer that question conclusively." Choosing right from wrong in responsibility *for* self:other, self:other cannot rely on ethical rules or the law. In responsibility *for*, the self is compelled to continually revolutionise right from wrong within each new life-experience, in acknowledgement of the fact that rules and duties do not apply to the unprecedented (Arendt, 2006b:295). Moral choices resulting from life experiences are ambivalent – unlike clear ethical principles (Bauman, 1994:32). It does re-personalise morality, however, grounding it in moral responsibility (*ibid*:34). In choosing moral responsibility *for* self:other, responsibility *for* becomes the starting point and not the end result of morality and ethics (*ibid*:34-35). Morality becomes of interest and concern to individual human beings (*ibid*:35).

Moral liberation, resulting from the personal choice to be responsible *for* self:other, results in unsettledness and dis-order (*ibid*:72). The possibility to revolutionise morality and the possibilities of the epistemology of morality is in the unsettledness, disorder and disruption resulting from the choice to be unconditionally and irrationally responsible *for* self:other (*ibid*:76). Care, compassion and responsibility simultaneously (de)stabilise the

relation self:other, because it holds an other to the self in the relation self:other. The self stays with an other, keeps an other from falling and continually confronts self:other to construct the moral creative self (Bauman, 1994:73; Noddings, 1995:376).

2.3.3 Continual dialogic revolutions in responsibility *for* self:other

The understanding and interpretation of responsibility *for* self:other during dialogic revolutions, are in contextual and historical flux. Responsibility, care and compassion are constituted in time: as past, present and future and in the stability of continual new beginnings that time affords (Derrida, 2005:14-17). It relies on the deconstruction and reconstruction of all past, present and future individual and collective narratives. Self:other choose to receive an other in the relation self:other and respond to their responsibility *for* self:other in the deconstruction and reconstruction of what *is* and what *could* be (Ruiz, 2004:275; Derrida, 2005:99).

The responsibility to receive and answer self:other in the consciousness of *I am for an other and all others* (Bauman, 1994:76) is threefold. Firstly, it is a responsibility to answer *for* self, secondly, a responsibility to answer *to* an other as a singular other, and, thirdly, a responsibility before and representing all other (Derrida, 2005:251-252). Self thus simultaneously answers to and is responsible *for* self:other and all of humanity in historical and future time and space.

Self:other, (de)stabilised by responsibility *for*, are defined in two dimensions (Derrida, 2005:99). They are defined by the bond or tie of self:other being equally human and responsible *for* self:other (a common human ontology in difference), and the bond between self:other stabilised by law, oaths and promises as the manifestation of continual promises after new beginnings (Arendt, 1966:222-223; Derrida, 2005:99). There are thus a moral responsibility *for* self:other (non-written – as self:other above and before justice) and a necessary legal dimension (promises written as treaties, oaths, declarations) in the ethical relation self:other (Derrida, 2005:278). Our responsibility *for* precedes and surpasses any reason, obligation or duty towards self:other: “responsible friendship before reason, when reason makes the Idea of equality an obligation.” (*ibid*:276). Our performative commitments and promises by means of speech and action (continually realising and revolutionising human rights values in responsibility *for*) to self:other continually (de)stabilise the unsettledness, unpredictability, uncertainty and irreversibility of the relation self:other. It affords humans the joy of inhabiting a world

together with others “whose reality is guaranteed for each by the presence of the other.” (Arendt, 1958:180,244).

The two dimensions discussed in the previous paragraph, defining the relation self:other can be illustrated by means of Arendt’s (1965: 202,222-223) understanding of revolution. In a dialogic revolution premised on a common human ontology in difference, self:other choose to answer their responsibility *for* self:other, which transcends rules and obligations and disrupt certainty to (un)certainly. Self:other receive and face equally valuable but different *doxas* and question and challenge meanings and understandings during a dialogic revolution. The resulting new beginning is stabilised by the performative responsibility *for* self:other in continually revolutionising the promises made, such as the *South African Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996) in South Africa. Promises are acts of foundation and stability, shielding new beginnings (*ibid*:202) and creating spaces of freedom and togetherness in which self:other can act again (*ibid*:222-223).

I contend that the answer to Socrates’ question: “how should one live?” lies in the continual moral deconstruction and reconstruction of self constituting self:other and revolutionising responsibility *for* the realisation of the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other. In inclusive spaces of togetherness, self:other accept and come face to face with each other, disrupting the certainty of ethical codes, moral and societal conventions. In accepting responsibility *for* self:other, they intentionally move towards moral liberation and freedom. In spaces of togetherness self:other balance the revolutionary spirit of continual new beginnings with the stability of promises and declarations embedded in the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality.

2.4 DISCOURSES REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES IN SOCIO-HISTORIC CONTEXTS

New forms of suffering and oppression emerge every day and in order to address this, human rights values should be continually revolutionised in responsibility *for* self:other (Bauman, 1994:228). Human rights and human rights values should be regarded as the continual revolutionary ethical process of humanising and becoming, transcending what we should do towards how we could live. The fluxing understandings of human rights and human rights values have influenced and are influenced by revolutions and societal changes over many decades. Over centuries, political considerations, traditions and societal changes have emphasised and prioritised different aspects of human rights and have shaped the understandings and meanings attached to human rights values (Ishay, 2004:3).

The continual revolutions concerning the ethical structuring of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values illustrate the capacity of humans to successfully disrupt and reconstruct meanings and understanding attached to human rights values. They also illustrate that these disruptions, when not followed by acts of foundations such as declarations and treaties that shield the relation self:other and spaces of togetherness, could fail dismally (Pitkin, 1998:252). An understanding of the changing and diverse interpretations regarding human rights values as intrinsic to the global and national historic processes helps define the normative role of human rights values in a global and local context.

The historical shifting meanings of human rights values is explored in the contexts of four periods namely the Enlightenment, the Industrial revolution, Modernity and the World Wars, Globalisation and Post-modernism. Since human rights remain a historical quest for an ethical code that could structure and (de)stabilise the relation self:other, the meanings and understandings attached to human rights as a morality system and, human rights as a possible ethical code, will be explored.

2.4.1 The origin of the search for a universal ethical code

The understanding of ethics and morality is related and indebted to many diverse secular and religious traditions (Ishay, 2004:7). The influence of religious humanism and ancient traditions on our understanding of human rights is undisputed (*ibid*:17). The Human Rights Commission tasked with the drafting of the UDHR (1948) affirmed that human rights transcend the limits of Western tradition and argued that the traditions of human rights, as the search for an ethical code, goes back to the beginning of philosophy (*ibid*:17).

Most religious texts contain notions of universalism and altruistic guidelines. Although human rights are concerned with universalism in political and economic terms, human rights are very much concerned with the normative horizontal structuring of the relation self:other (*ibid*:19). During the founding stages of liberalism, Hobbes advocated tolerance for diversity regarding higher things such as religion but did not fully acknowledge the natural diversity and different desires of the individual (Owen, 2005:146). Hobbes and Locke, sought conformity around political and economic enlightenment principles, but during the post-modern era human rights activists are confronted by many diverse and relativist worldviews and a need to structure the relation self:other normatively around deep diversity (*ibid*:146-147).

The first article of UDHR (1948) states that all human beings “should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood”, corresponding to the biblical injunction “love thy neighbor as thyself”. (Ishay, 2004:19). The precepts structuring the relation self:other can be traced back even further to the Hammurabi Code. This Babylonian code narrates the moral principles structuring a society (*ibid*:19-20). The concept of brotherly love is explained and explored in various religious and humanist traditions. It is central to Christianity. Furthermore, the prophet Mohammed claims a common point of origin for all humans and claims that humans are created to know, and not despise, each other (*ibid*:27). Brotherly love and altruism are inherent in Buddhism, in the Vedas and were extensively explored by the Stoics in the writings and teachings of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero (*ibid*:19).

The human capacity for universal goodness and altruism was explored by Socrates and Plato, who maintained that all humans have a concept of what constitutes good (*ibid*:23). They argued that goodness is not a particular characteristic but, since it can be found in all topics of inquiry, it can be assumed to be universal (*ibid*:23). Maintaining this argument, both Socrates and Plato refuted the Sophists’ claim that goodness and related justice are only relative to the customs of each society. This ancient debate can be viewed to be the prelude to the current debate regarding the universalism of human rights and the rights pertaining to cultural or religious relativism (*ibid*:23).

More than two million years ago, Confucius (in Ishay, 2004:22) explained that all individuals have the capacity for rational, aesthetic, political, social, historical and transcendental self-actualisation through education. He believed that by following an altruistic and dutiful path, all individuals could become self-aware and expand their network of relations towards self:other; only by their commitment to society, family, nation or community could they claim any entitlements due to them (*ibid*:22). His view is that individual reflection aimed at inner harmony and order or self-awareness is of equal importance to the role of any government in the economic, moral and social well-being of individuals, thus emphasising the importance of individual responsibility in structuring the relation self:other rooted in human rights values (*ibid*:22).

In sum, the continual attempt to structure the relation self:other through sharing and togetherness has many ancient and new, diverse humanist and religious roots. Although the understandings of the content of brotherly love and identity of others (brother/sister) have been revolutionised many times over the decades, loving thy neighbour or fellow human seems to be a longing and normative quest inherent in the majority of humanist and religious traditions since the beginning of human history.

The normative structure of the relation self:other rooted in human right values will be explored in detail in the next section. The revolutionary shifting understanding of human rights values structuring self:other and the implications thereof for the interpretation of human rights values as an ethical code, will be explored as a historical process as well as a process of deconstruction and reconstruction.

2.4.2 The Enlightenment – the revolution for freedom of religion and opinion

During the early part of modernity, philosophers such as Rene Descartes and Hugo Grotius sparked the revolt against assumptions, beliefs, superstitions and traditions held as universal ethical truth and resulting in religious wars and oppression enforced by the Roman Catholic Church (Ishay, 2004:8,75; Midgley, 2010:8). During this revolt, the Reformation led by Martin Luther was premised on the authority on the divine word and not on tradition or the church. It thus contributed to the loss of authority in customs and tradition (Arendt, 1965:26). A new secular language affirmed a common humanity and challenged feudalism and religion (more specifically the Catholic Church), as the origin of ethical truth. Resulting from the Reformation and the founding of the new church, a new secularised Judeo-Christian ethics developed (Arendt, 1965:26; Ishay, 2004:64-65).

Enlightenment discourses resulted in enlightenment individualism (Ishay, 2004:8; Midgley, 2010:4,77). Enlightenment individualism was fuelled by Hobbes' theory of psychological egoism as origin of morality and Locke's theory of morality originating in human nature (Wren, 2008:21-22). Scientific progress, colonisation and the mercantile exploitation of the new world changed the social and economic landscape of Europe during this period (Ishay, 2004:70-71). The new political and economic landscape created new spaces of freedom for the development of a relative autonomous class, the bourgeoisie. Trapped between their own interest and that of the nobility still dominating politics, the economy, societal institutions and the church, their needs and acts of liberation eventually fuelled the English, American and French Revolutions (*ibid*:72).

2.4.2.1 The revolutions for freedom

The American Revolution in 1775 to 1778 resulting in the *Declaration of Independence* in 1776 and a new constitution in 1778 (*ibid*:73) was a liberation towards freedom, the foundations of freedom and the lasting institutions of freedom (Arendt, 1965:92). The French soldiers fighting with the Americans returned home to a country on the verge of bankruptcy and hordes of starving peasants and angry bourgeoisie. The French Revolution was directed by a liberation from necessity and the resulting violence and

lawlessness, which sprang from it (*ibid*:92). On 14 July 1789 protestors stormed the Bastille and on 26 August 1789 the French National Assembly adopted the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* (hereafter the DRMC) declaring that all humans, by virtue of being human, have natural, inalienable and sacred rights (Ishay, 2004:74; Parekh, 2008:21).

The DRMC (1789) is still regarded as one of the most important human rights documents of the eighteenth century (Ishay, 2004:74). The DRMC (1789) aimed to protect human individuality and dignity. Individual identity was no longer dependent on social status or social class but was a natural right which individuals claimed simply by virtue of being human. These rights were defined as liberty, the right to property, the right to security and resistance to oppression (Parekh, 2008:21).

Following Locke's proposals for the separation of powers providing checks and balances, the nation-state replaced the feudal and authoritarian systems. The nation-state's existence was justified by the protection it would provide to the natural and individual rights of its citizens (Ishay, 2004:94). The DRMC (1789) linked the legitimacy of government to its ability to guarantee natural rights to its citizens and resulted in the birth of popular sovereignty. The conceptual tying of human rights to national sovereignty and political freedom to security had profound implications for the relation self:other in social, political and economic contexts (Arendt, 1960:31; Goodhart, 2003:946; Parekh, 2008:12).

The negative implications of liberal rights on the relation self:other, Arendt (1958:254-255) argues, stem from the isolation of humans from their social structures, which led to worldlessness, statelessness and world alienation. The conceptual tying of the DRMC (1789) to national sovereignty, Arendt (1966:299) concludes, set the stage for the destruction of human dignity during World War Two (4.4.1). Goodhart (2003:955) argues that as the DRMC (1789) was used to justify the pulverising of societies and moralities during the Enlightenment, human rights are used today to justify globalisation and neo-liberalism.

Although the Enlightenment revolutions played a critical role in humanity's hopes of applying human rights to life, to property, to freedom of religion and opinion (Ishay, 2004:108), it could not deliver on its universal promise of rights for all. Individuals who did not own property, women and slaves were regarded as secondary citizens and denied the right to vote. Indigenous populations in the European colonies were denied all rights. Even in revolutionary countries rights were denied to all Jews. Homosexuality

was regarded as a criminal offence and the right to choose one's sexual orientation was denied to all (*ibid*:108).

2.4.2.2 New understandings of morality

The Enlightenment revolutions had a profound influence on the development of the conceptualisation of morality and ethics (2.3). In this regard, Hobbs' theory of psychological egoism and the grounding of morality in reason and their influence on the theory of social atomism and how human rights were understood, is worthy of emphasis. The Enlightenment, in its bid to protect and preserve individual choice, autonomy, identity and subjectivity, prompted many forms of individualism which remain relevant to the understanding of human rights even today (Heller, 1988:533; Midgley, 2010:1,2,77). During the Enlightenment, reason and choice, understood as the guarantee for personal autonomy, replaced the transcendental as the origin of morality. The new ethical code was grounded in the 'nature of Man' (Bauman, 1994:25).

Bauman (*ibid*:26) argues that the anticipated emancipation of humans during the Enlightenment, which held the possibility of the structuring one's own morality, required the 'midwife' of reason. Knowledge and the knowledgeable became the authority on morality guiding humans to an understanding of their unfulfilled moral potential and interests (*ibid*:26-27). Newly constructed rules and obligations rooted in rationality, (it was argued during this period), limited individual freedom and autonomy, leaving humans unable to act morally autonomously (*ibid*:31). Although "reason is a shared human property" Bauman (*ibid*:26) argues, "in the case of this particular equality, as in all other cases, some humans are more equal than others" (*ibid*:26). Those deemed more equal than others in capacity for reason declare which behaviour is regarded moral or ethical, and communicate this to the less equal in capacity for reason using their authority as 'those in the know' and in the form of the law (*ibid*:28). The choice to behave morally or ethically is thus prompted from the outside after a pattern of submission and external force (*ibid*:28).

The fight for freedom of religion and opinion during the Enlightenment resulted in a new form of oppression and power: ruling as a rational predesigned external system of morality regarded as truth. This was far removed from a liberal view of rights in which universal morality grounded in reason and human nature is paramount. This issue will be explored in detail in section 2.5.1 in which the meanings and understandings of the natural school are explored.

2.4.2.3 Enlightenment liberalism and education

Liberalism, rooted in the intellectual and individualist movement emanating from the Enlightenment, has been criticised for losing its revolutionary spirit of origin and lacking the capacity to change society in recent years (Guttek, 2009:231,234). Education and curricula influenced by liberalism are process-orientated towards evolutionary change and progress. They emphasise individualism, citizen and constitutional education, rationality and the power of reason (*ibid*:231,234).

The Enlightenment educationalists' view that an ethical environment should be modelled according to the dictates of reason and moral education was soon regarded as a tool towards the creation of an ideal ethical environment (Gilead, 2009:93,104). Progress, as a goal for its own sake was the quest of the Enlightenment, and education was the means to the achievement of that goal (*ibid*:93). The notion of moral education aimed at moral progress is contested today. Moral progress, as the aim of education, presupposes that the understanding of moral conduct is universal and that moral progress towards a universal moral understanding is possible. Although many post-modern scholars do not reject the notion of progress, they argue that societies are in constant flux and regress as well as progress on a continual basis (*ibid*:104-105).

Education concerns more than intellectual growth, rational choices, a conceptual framework or technological planning (Ruiz, 2004:287). It also concerns the ethical and relational capacities of children and adolescents, facing self:other in diverse contexts (Noddings, 1988:221; Ruiz, 2004:287). The continual creation of the moral self, relies on a dialogic reality in responsibility *for* self:other (Noddings, 1988:221; Ruiz, 2004:287). Liberalists, however, argue that educated, reasonable individuals could weigh all options and evidence rationally and make autonomous moral decisions (Guttek, 2009:231,234,237,239). They rely on the power of the majority in decision making and thus reinforce the external patterns of submission and coercion limiting the construction of the moral self in responsibility *for* self:other.

2.4.3 The Industrial Revolution – claiming social and economic equality

While freedom was the quest and emphasis during the Enlightenment, the dehumanising social conditions resulting from the Industrial revolution were instrumental in the conceptualisation of second generation rights and the quest for equality and dignity. Revolutionary rhetoric consisting of concepts such as 'exploitation' and 'expansion,'

were used by socialists under the influence of Marx to fuel the Industrial revolutions and to indicate the merging of economics and politics (Arendt, 2002:278). This rhetoric was instrumental in defining not only new forms of oppression but also new understandings regarding oppression and the values of dignity and equality.

The ontological reality of biological needs such as extreme poverty and misery resulted in the socio-economic revolutions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The poor, who were not driven by a quest for freedom but by their biological needs, burst into the Industrial revolution as a plurality of people in a quest for socio-economic equality (Arendt, 1965:60). The shift of economic principles into the political sphere made it possible to overthrow a political economy by revolutionary means (*ibid*:62). The socialists rejected the liberal belief that free market and trade would advance human rights and proposed an egalitarian and inclusive vision instead (Ishay, 2004:120-121). They advocated the prioritisation of the material conditions related to the social forces of production on the grounds that the history of human rights needed to be marked by the actual and real transformation of society (*ibid*:147).

Labour, became a force in both the political and public sphere during the Industrial period. Arendt (2002:279) argues that the socialists, under the influence of Marx, understood that the consciousness of labour would become the compass by which all human activities would be directed in future. Labour became dignified and glorified as the origin of property, of wealth, of all values and finally, as the most fundamental human activity (*ibid*:283). Consequently, all human and social values such as human rights values, were defined in the sphere of labour (Arendt, 1958:105; Arendt, 2002:283).

Although socialism is denounced by many social-democrats and post-structuralists as repressive, it has made a significant contribution to challenging the liberal vision of rights, to the struggle for universal suffrage, and to social justice and worker's rights during the nineteenth century's human rights revolutions (Ishay, 2004:119). Despite heavy opposition from liberals, second generation social and economic rights were conceived during the Industrial Revolution. Manhood suffrage was adopted in most industrialised countries, childhood labour was restricted, and public education was mandated in most countries (*ibid*:155). Women, however, remained disenfranchised until the movement for women's rights, which attracted women from all social backgrounds, led to the achievement of universal suffrage in 1918 (*ibid*:165). Progress in terms of first generation rights was also evident in that slavery was abolished in most countries, homosexuality became better tolerated and even legalised in some European countries (*ibid*:155).

2.4.3.1 Imperialism, racism and anti-Semitism

Nineteenth century imperialism, racism and anti-Semitism halted the progress of human rights considerably. The period of Imperialism, the scramble for Africa and the birth of the pan movements towards the end of the 19th century were the preparatory stage for the first World War in 1914 (Arendt, 1966:123). The emancipation of the bourgeoisie, the first class to achieve economic power without political rule, was central to the imperial period. The conflict between state and bourgeoisie became a struggle for power when the nation-state proved to be unfit to guarantee further economic growth (*ibid*:123). Economic expansion as a political concept resulting in imperialism and colonialism was inevitable when the ruling classes were confronted by the limited capacity of the nation-state to achieve economic expansion and capitalist production (*ibid*:126). Economic expansion thus provided the political rationalisation for the foreign investment by means of imperialism and colonialism (*ibid*:136-137).

The emergence of racism, which had its roots in the eighteenth century, emerged in western countries during the nineteenth century and became a powerful ideology in imperial politics (*ibid*:158). Racism was used to justify imperialism and colonialism, but Arendt (*ibid*:184) argues that had there been no racism in the civilized world, imperialism would have necessitated inventing it to excuse the oppression of colonialism. Humanists, philosophers and scientists all participated in the fuelling of racism (Ishay, 2004:156). Racist thinking was evident across all national borders and surpassed class-thinking as the ideology suppressing all principles of equality and solidarity (Arendt, 1966:161). The ideology of the superiority of human over human, of 'higher breeds over lower breeds' resulted in the arrogant belief of imperialist nations that the *natives* were incapable of governing themselves, and that the *natives* could only benefit from imperial rule (*ibid*:130).

Despite a spirit of emancipation spreading over western and southern Europe, anti-semitism was on the incline (Ishay, 2004:170). This was because Jews had lost their political power, although not their wealth (Arendt, 1966:4). Anti-semitism had its origin in the socio-economic climate and its relation to power and ruling during the Industrial period (*ibid*:37). The ideologies of imperialism, colonialism, racism and anti-semitism proved to be the new paradigms in which oppression was structured. Arendt (1958:121) contends that the enormous changes effected by the industrial revolutions remain changes to the world, not changes to basic human life on earth. She concludes that, as a result of the emancipation of labour itself, modern society is still defined by labour, thus

replicating the principles of labour, and can therefore not contain the values of freedom, equality and dignity (Arendt, 1958:130; Arendt, 2002:285).

The Industrial revolutions, although halted by imperialism, racism and anti-semitism, resulted in many acts of foundation regarding social and economic rights fought for during this period. The socialist movements were instrumental only in changing the world and delivering humans to the new bondage of labour. This rendered humans as a means to an end, used as cheap labour, and exploited for economic and political aims in colonies.

2.4.3.2 Education defined in labour

The shift towards defining life and morality in labour itself during the Industrial period still has a profound influence on education and society. The use of the Darwinian theories of natural selection and survival of the fittest, combined with Hobbes' theory of self-interest for political and economic gain to justify imperialism, had and still has profound moral and ethical implications (Midgley, 2010:2). It not only resulted in the ideology of racism and the oppression of minorities on the grounds that they were less human, but also resulted (many years later) in the ideology of social atomism, where freedom is equated to individual self-interest and capital gain explained as the power of the free market (*ibid*:2).

Critical theory, conceptualising the emancipatory role of education, commenced towards the end of the Industrial period (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:38). Socialist theories influenced by Marx defined the nature and purpose of education as emancipation. Since the 1920s, critical theorists had challenged conceptions of humanity, especially from the position of the oppressed (*ibid*:38-39). The construction of society rooted in enlightenment reason and the effects of racism, anti-semitism, colonialism and imperialism on education, had been critiqued by critical scholars since the Industrial period (*cf.* Blake and Masschelein, 2003:40).

Despite criticisms of the growing neo-liberal influence on education and curriculum, education has adopted a corporate and survival rhetoric (Masschelein, 2001:14). Reality has become a predesigned environment, which is processed as information and perceived as resource. Learning has become a process aimed to satisfy the demands, needs and wants of life defined in production and consumerism (*ibid*:14). Parents and children are consumers and schools are small businesses, which have to adhere to efficiency and effectiveness in their processes of delivering products (Biesta, 2004:233,238). In this corporate context, learning is a regulating, adapting activity,

dictated by learning objectives continually changed to make economic sense and to be economically viable (Slattery, 2006:238).

2.4.4 The World Wars and the Age of Modernity – an attack on human dignity

Modernity, born after the final collapse of the *ancient regime* during the *French Revolution*, set out to restore and bring order and structure to society. External, coercive and collective regularities, norms and patterns disregarded individual voices in a quest to master nature and the human species (Bauman, 2005:125). In the quest to attain the common purposes of society, human behaviour was pre-designed and streamlined (*ibid*:125).

The twentieth century was characterised by the emerging of national and cultural relativist positions and claims of rights pitted against the advancement of universal rights (Ishay, 2004:174). Modernity was also the age in which the Holocaust disrupted humanity's conception of itself as civilised (Colomos & Torpey, 2004:140). The global attack of totalitarianism on the destruction of human dignity and individuality led to the UDHR's (1948) emphasis on individual dignity and the resulting tension between individual and collective rights still prevalent in human rights discourse today (Twiss, 2004:42).

During and after the First World War opposing efforts to institutionalise human rights emerged (Ishay, 2004:178). However, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the global implementation of the liberal visions of human rights became plausible. During 1948 the UDHR, for the first time in history, secured human rights politically (Ishay, 2004:179,212). The UDHR (1948) addressed the dehumanising of Jews and other marginalised populations during and after the Second World War (Twiss, 2004:42). In a quest to prevent a repeat of the uncivilised and barbaric practices which stripped humans of all civil and human rights, liberal individual rights were emphasised in the UDHR (1948) (*ibid*:42). This resulted in the rapid spread of socialism and communism in opposition to the liberal interpretation of human rights (Ishay, 2004:180).

The demise of colonialism during the 1950s and 1960s resulted in International Covenants acknowledging civil-political, socio-economic and cultural rights to indigenous people and minorities (Twiss, 2004:43). The rights to self-determination, including rights in determining own political status and economic, social and cultural development featured prominently (*ibid*:43). The failure of the UDHR (1948) to conceptualise and implement a balance between universal and relativist visions of human rights resulted in

the continual challenging of human rights by nationalistic claims to self-determination (Ishay, 2004:242).

2.4.4.1 Human dignity and the right to have rights

The World Wars brought a radical change in the way we understand ourselves, our world and the values governing us (Arendt, 1994:740). The total collapse of all established moral standards in public and private life during the Second World War, the “horror itself in its naked monstrosity” (*ibid*:745), transcended not only all known moral categories but also all judicial standards. During this period, morality was revealed as a system of customs unable to explain or regulate real evil (*ibid*:740-742).

Arendt (1966:447) argued that the atrocities of the Holocaust had been easy to perpetrate because the DRMC (1789) had never been philosophically established but only formulated. It had never been politically secured, merely proclaimed. Arendt (*ibid*:ix) therefore advocated a new guarantee for human dignity, premised on new political principles comprehending the whole of humanity. Human dignity, Arendt (*ibid*:297) argued cannot be inherent in human nature or dependant on human rights. She regards humans as having dignity only when they are afforded a place in the world which allows all individual *doxas* to be significant and actions to be effective for every individual – a space of freedom and togetherness in which every individual can individuate themselves as *someone* and freely act with self:other in continual new beginnings (Arendt, 1958:180-181).

Arendt (1966:296) grounds humanity’s ‘right to have rights’ in the anarchic, unpredictable event of natality as new beginnings. Natality, as continual new beginnings, is realised within the framework of human plurality, which defines humans as distinct and unique beings acting with equals (Arendt, 1958:178). Arendt (*ibid*:296) defines natality as not merely the right to freedom, but the right to action towards the continual revolutionising of freedom, dignity and equality. Humans, when granted the right to start a-new with self:other, in spaces of togetherness attain human dignity. Human rights, without the right to speech and action in the relation self:other, are meaningless. Without the right to speech and action to continually individuate self and revolutionising self:other, all speech and action “remains without significance and consequence to others” (*ibid*:58). Human dignity is realised when self:other confess individual *doxas* in spaces of togetherness and continually revolutionise human rights values with self:other (*ibid*:296).

In the guarantee of continual new beginnings constructed in spaces of togetherness, regarding every individual opinion as equal in value and every individual as unique and irreplaceable, self:other represent the source and goal of the right of all humans to have rights.

2.4.4.2 Education revolutionising human dignity

During modernity moral philosophy denied all moral uncertainty in theory and repressed it in deed (Bauman, 1994:23). Following a model of efficiency and controlling the variables concerning teaching-learning processes, submitted education and learning to levels of control and rationalisation similar to an industrial process. Children are 'fashioned' during this process leaving no room for uncertainty and ambivalence (Bauman, 1994:23; Ruiz, 2004:272). During this process the emphasis is on children and adolescents becoming efficient and specialised members of society; the creation of morally responsible human beings is of secondary importance (Ruiz, 2004:272).

The unconditional acceptance of societal moral duties and obligations changed during the second half of the twentieth century when the grip of tradition was loosened and the growing plurality of contexts in which many individuals conducted themselves, became apparent. Individuals with fluxing identities moved to centre stage (Bauman, 1994:4). In continually constructing individual identities, humans needed to make choices. In making personal moral choices, humans needed new criteria of evaluation (*ibid*:4). The all-comprising idea promoting a unitary and universal moral vision of the world, developed during early modernity, could not provide the criteria of evaluation in these new ambiguous contexts (*ibid*:4-5). During the twenty-first century moral choices became riddled by moral uncertainty as society lost its solidity and constraining power (*ibid*:222,229). The acknowledgement of the importance of individual and collective choices, resisting the solidity of moral rules, values and norms in favour of unconditional and infinite moral conscience and moral responsibility, is perhaps what we gained from the Holocaust (*ibid*:248-249).

The classroom should be the starting point for questioning and constructing morally responsible individuals. Education should be an ethical revolutionary act positioned in societal, political and historical contexts, questioning and challenging self:other (Ruiz, 2004:284). Ruiz (*ibid*:275) argues that education is an ethical event and an ethical experience. In an ethical relation, teacher:child should accept each other as *someone*, a unique individual, in contextual and historical flux (*ibid*:283). Before the acceptance and

receiving of an other, teacher:child continually choose responsibility *for* the revolutionary questioning and reconstruction of the moral self (Bauman, 1994:77). Receiving an other does not originate in reason. It originates in the self, being affected by an other – feeling ‘pathos’ for an other and choosing responsibility *for* self:other (Ruiz, 2004:283).

Teaching-learning understood as an ethical event should resist any rigidity of predesigned moral rules and regulations. It should be a revolutionary process of constructing moral selves in responsibility *for* self:other. In the acceptance of the unique and different *I*, confessing equally different *doxas* in spaces of togetherness, the ethical relation self:other guarantees individual human dignity during teaching-learning. The teaching-learning of human rights are meaningless without teacher:child being granted the right to speech and action in spaces of togetherness, confessing and (re)constructing their *doxa*. The right to express an opinion and the right to confess and continually (re)construct the unique and irreplaceable *I* is the guarantee for the protection of human dignity.

2.4.5 Globalisation and the post-modern world – emphasising the relational aspects of human rights values

During the last five centuries society has become a global plurality of subcultures and diverse episteme and ideologies (Slattery, 2006:19). The concept globalisation has many and diverse interpretations. While some would describe globalisation as nothing but an extension of western capitalism on an unprecedented scale (Ishay, 2004:256), Twiss (2004:40) describes globalisation as the multidimensional and interactive processes of economic, political, and cultural change across the world resulting in increased social interconnectedness, as well as opportunities for social confrontation among peoples. Although these processes are not new, they are, due to technological communication and transport advances, accelerated and intensified (*ibid*:40).

2.4.5.1 Post-modernism

Postmodernism brought a rethink of beliefs and structures, which dominated human consciousness for the past five hundred years (Slattery, 2006:19). Postmodernists define themselves as advocates for a new social movement and a politics of difference. By the deconstruction of philosophy, society and identity they envisage new forms of social life and a new sense of responsibility (Ryu, 2001:7). Postmodernism moved humanity into an expanded concept of the “self-in-relation.”(Slattery, 2006:19).

a) Questioning truth and the right to opinion

The quest for freedom of religion and opinion dating from the Enlightenment revolution re-emerged during postmodernism in the continual deconstructing of meta-narratives regarding the truth-power relation. Postmodernists challenge the conception of absolute truth discovered by rational humans using objective scientific methods (Gutek, 2009:137). They argue that there are many claims to truth and in the interplay of diverse discourses, representing multiple regimes of truth, the relation truth-power in a given context can be deconstructed (*ibid*:138).

Nietzsche (2010:115) argued that the movement towards reason, rests in our *belief* in the *I* as substance and subject. According to this argument, the *I* as substance is the sole reality according to which we understand, attribute and communicate all reality. The *belief* in the truth of reason and the *I* as subject, the cause of things, shapes our concepts about reality and being (*ibid*:116). The *I*, central to our understanding of being and reality, will then also be central to our conception of morality. Nietzsche (*ibid*:90) argued that in order to stand on moral ground the self should acknowledge: "I want not to deceive, not even myself." The *I* as origin for moral truth, if unqualified, circles back to the nihilist morality of 'everything is permitted' since each individual's moral truth is then *believed* to be true and validated for any action.

Although sharing Plato's commitment to the authority of reason concerning the validation of truth, Nietzsche (*ibid*:67) argues that there can be no self-evident truth. Arendt (1990:84) contends that truth is related to human experience. She argues that no absolute truth, independent of human existence, could ever exist. Each individual can only know truth as it appears to him or her relating to his or her life experiences and existence. Assertions about self-evident and universal conscience mean nothing more than the moral structuring of human affairs according to usages and habits (Arendt, 1994:741).

b) Human rights perceived as a morality of power

The continual challenge to deconstruct human rights values and the quest for a universal ethical code answering 'how one should live' become important when we acknowledge that "no victory over inhumanity seems to have made the world safer for humanity." (Bauman, 1994:228). The moral triumphs and acts of foundations of the past human rights revolutions do not seem to accumulate, despite many narratives of progress. Every shift in power and every human rights revolution leads only to the return of inhumanity (*ibid*:229).

During post-modernity the questioning of meta-narratives concerning humanity and human life and the resulting deconstruction and reconstruction of human rights values, laid bare the many negative but also positive effects of human rights on humanity (Ryu, 2001:6). In embracing difference and the deconstruction of foundational meta-narratives and rationalisation, new challenges but also opportunities for the understanding and interpretation of human rights and human rights values, emerged (*ibid*:6).

The perception that human rights favour those deemed (by the state and the world) more 'human' than others, result in increasing concerns regarding human rights becoming a morality of power. Comments such as "the concept of human rights fits with the life of the well-off much more accurately (and conveniently) than those of the badly off" (Ci, 2005:159) and "by accepting 'human' rights we have agreed to alienate our right to the state to decide for us what and who is human" (Neocosmos, 2006:369), emphasise these concerns. These perceptions have resulted in many human rights scholars to join Nietzsche in calling for a re-evaluation and reconstruction of human rights values and the construction of new understandings and values (Dembour, 2010:10). The nihilistic conception of reality, humanity and the world remains a powerful force in human rights discourses (2.5.4).

c) Neo-liberalism, social atomism and post-modernism

Post-modernity has smashed all efforts or ambitions to find universal ethical principles but opened the door to new and radically novel understandings of ethics and morality (Bauman, 1994:2,223). The dissolution of groups and their protective shield of order and certainty, during late modernity, atomised all social structures into isolated individuals (*ibid*:192). This paved the way for the reintroduction of the ideology of self-interest by neo-Darwinians in its simplest form as mere universal selfishness with an emphasis on competition and survival as a basic pattern in the cosmos (Midgley, 2010:5).

Proponents of neo-liberalism, social atomism or neo-Darwinism claim humans to be solitary, singular beings and argue that they should therefore be studied and understood by means of scientific methods which view separate components as having more importance than the larger wholes they belong to (*ibid*:19). Within a neo-liberalist frame of reference, self-interest, the driving force behind the quest for ultimate freedom, self-preservation and self-fulfilment, has in recent decades developed into the conceptualisation of morality as originating from universal 'selfishness.' (*ibid*:5). Individualism has a positive effect on humanity in that it regards people as distinct from each other, breaking with the sameness and otherness project of modernity (*ibid*:2).

Individualism, only rooted in the importance of self-interest, free competition, free enterprise and the deregulation of business, however, can result in very un-free conditions for self:other (*ibid*:2).

Post-modern individuals, isolated from society and community, face loneliness, a loss of meaning and a loss of order and certainty (*ibid*:2). In a search for belonging and, security they commit to a community that shares their anxiety and fear (Bauman, 2001b:16). These shared communal-identities result in boundary-drawing which perpetuates the new post-modern version of the sameness and otherness project (Bauman, 2001a:146). Spoilt for choice, lacking commitment, and using their power as consumers, individuals can freely move from one group or community to another. They are free to choose a new identity or community as soon as their current identification with a particular community proves to be outdated or does not yield the necessary results (*ibid*:146).

Midgley (2010:2,55) argues that the coercive power at play in the universal meta-narrative of self-interest is the powerful ideology of commerce and politics. By equating human freedom to the free-market and free trade systems, neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism is camouflaged. The belief in the power of human selfishness and competitiveness to rule the cosmos is an obvious circling back to the coercive power of universal and absolute truth (humanity is driven by universal selfishness). The de-humanising effect of neo-imperialism on many developing countries is becoming increasingly evident (Neocosmos, 2006:372; 2.4.2.1).

2.4.5.2 Globalisation

Globalisation happens on two levels namely: globalisation from above (economic and political globalisation mainly associated with state, financial and corporate power) and globalisation from below (social, political, cultural collaboration between societies, NGOs and the United Nations organs) (Twiss, 2004:40). Globalisation from below has as aim the establishment of a global civil and humanised society, although Twiss (*ibid*:40) argues that it would only be possible when globalisation from above shares similar aims.

Globalisation and post-modernism has brought many changes to human rights in both interpretation and content. The emphasis of post-modernists on the self-in-relation and the emphasis on interconnectedness due to globalism have accentuated the relational aspect of human rights values. However, interconnectedness has also led to concerns about neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism as means of oppression.

a) The plight of refugees and non-citizens claiming human rights

Prior to 1800 the concepts cosmopolitanism, nationalism, citizenship and patriotism co-existed in European political thought. Since the Enlightenment however, citizenship and nationality have virtually become synonyms. In the face of globalism, it is not possible to maintain this position (Davies, Evans & Reid, 2005:66-68). There has been increasing concern for the rights of non-citizens during the twenty-first century. The position of refugees and their access to rights in a nation-state is not a new concern, however. This phenomenon has been extensively explored by Arendt in *The Human Condition* (1958) and *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1966) in reference to the millions of refugees resulting from the two World Wars.

Arendt (1966:293-295) argues that refugees not only lose their home, nationality, country and any protection from government but most importantly, lose their right to belong. Rightless and stateless refugees are thus powerless to claim rights to life, liberty, freedom of opinion, equality before the law or the pursuit of happiness as these rights are constituted and structured within the relation citizen and nation-state (*ibid*:295). It is not the loss of rights, which leaves the stateless refugees powerless but the loss of the right to be a partner in the inclusive relation self:other which guarantees those rights (*ibid*:297; 2.4.4.1).

Refugees, apart from losing their civil rights, lose their fundamental right to meaningful speech and action and thus the right to participate fully in the world (Arendt, 1958:175). In losing part of their human condition, which distinguishes them as individuals and affords them the opportunity to become equal (*ibid*:175), they also lose part of their worldly condition. When humans are denied the right to participate in the world in a meaningful way, they lose their place in the common world of equality and cannot confess their difference in equality (Arendt, 1958:58; Parekh, 2008:27).

b) Relational rights: belonging and togetherness

The right to belonging and togetherness, paramount to the realisation of human rights values, features prominently in human rights discourse. Cosmopolitans argue that citizens own the character of citizenship not through nationality or ethnicity, but through its common constituents such as legal procedures, shared values and common work (Ishay, 2004:270). Cosmopolitanism is often described in terms of global citizenship where people feel linked to a world community and take it upon themselves to act in the

interest of that world community (Davies *et al.*, 2005:72). They might for instance, share the values and aims of conservation in an organisation like Greenpeace. Global citizenship emphasises affective considerations and collective arrangements in the interests of the common good of the world. It is therefore a misconception that a global polity is necessary for global citizenship (*ibid*:72). Cosmopolitans also advocate a universal moral community in which values are decided upon based on morals relating to human universals (Parekh, 1999:150).

Proponents of citizenship defined as dependant on national ethnicity, however, argue that while tolerating immigrants and refugees, the cultural spirit or ethnic composition of the state should remain unchallenged (Ishay, 2004:269-270). The struggle between universalists and cultural relativists perceptions, which has been prevalent in human history since the Greek and Roman empires, has been intensified during the twenty first century by the globalisation of the economy, power relations and socio-economic disparities. The post September 11 Al Qaeda threats have added a new dimension to this struggle when not even the question of which universal interpretation of human rights should be accepted has been settled (*ibid*:278). Due to globalisation, culture has emerged as one of the primary issues of contestation in the world (Lieber & Weisberg, 2002:291,294). Cultural relativism has become a signifier for other more deep-seated issues such as collective identity. Culture has become the mode of self and group expression and differentiation in a globalised world (*ibid*:291,294).

In the context of human rights, cosmopolitans argue that universally held morals and values are interpreted, prioritised and applied differently by different societies and cultures since different cultures and societies have different contexts and ways of understanding the world (Parekh, 1999:150). The acknowledgement of cultural diversity and the promotion of cultural rights promotes comparative analyses of belief systems and can promote internal critique and independent thought (Parekh, 2000:168). However, it also carries the risk, expressed by both liberal and socialist international human rights activists, of cultural relativists being used to justify oppression (Ishay, 2004:276).

Within this context, the protection of refugees and non-citizens becomes all the more important. The right to belong to cultural, ethnic, religious or any other groups expressing *what* we are, must be undisputed. This requires an ongoing quest to protecting the right to inclusion in spaces of togetherness in which all humans are free to confess *who* they are, irrespective of *what* they are, should be a continual quest.

c) *Globalisation, citizenship and education*

The impact of globalisation on education is increasingly visible on both the structure and the content of the curricula (Davies *et al.*, 2005:68). As new forms of citizenship are developing in the globalised world, new forms of education become necessary. Since Aristotle, who argued that all citizens of a state should be educated to understand and adhere to the constitution of that state, the nature and content of education have been influenced by the ideology of the nation-state (*ibid*:68). The exclusive forging of the nation by means of citizen education, excluding by definition “the other,” has been apparent in most educational systems and structures throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (*ibid*:68). Every democratic society faces the challenge and responsibility to develop and educate future generations to be good citizens (Schoeman, 2006:130).

If we regard Arendt’s theory concerning the ‘Right to have Rights’ (2.4.4.1) in relation to citizen education, the very notion of citizenship education tied to ethnicity, nationality or the ideologies of the nation-state, is exclusionary in nature and fuels opposition that endangers human dignity. Educationalists have recently advocated that education should focus on both national and global citizenship education (Davies *et al.*, 2005:84). Citizenship education and global education share clear overlaps but also manifest key differences (*ibid*:8). Citizenship education focuses on community-based involvement and cognitive reflection while global education tends towards the affective. Global education emphasises political activity (not so much political science) and other relevant social sciences emphasised by citizenship education. The context of citizenship education is the nation-state while global education focuses on global interconnectedness (*ibid*:84).

Dieltiens (2005:189) distinguishes between and describes a maximalist and a minimalist approach to citizenship and human rights education. The maximalists argue that ideal citizens are those who conform to a certain value system, value their community and uphold the common good. Minimalists argue that such an approach inhibits autonomy. They advocate citizenship education, which promotes the development of individuality and develop individuals able to freely express themselves (*ibid*:189). Defining the moral (liberal or communitarian) expectations and duties children and adolescents should demonstrate to be regarded good citizens, does imply a predesigned morality. Defining *who* and *what* citizens should become instrumentalises education, does not consider difference and diversity and often relies on coercion (*ibid*:194-195).

I contend that issues concerning citizenship education should be approached by linking global and citizenship education, emphasising the affective capacities and

interconnectedness of humanity. If we regard education as an ethical experience, global and citizenship education provide the perfect opportunities for facing self:other in difference, in a caring and compassionate relation and constructing new understandings. This will not only lead to teacher:child acting in the interests of the common good of the world and its communities but also to teacher:child continually revolutionising the values of freedom, dignity and equality.

The understanding and interpretation of human rights values have been revolutionised over many centuries. The understandings and interpretations regarding freedom, dignity and equality have been influenced and accentuated by societal and political changes and new scientific, biological and economic discoveries and developments. Although human rights revolutions have been instrumental in liberating humans from oppression, the free spaces of togetherness in which humans can act in, on and with the world, are shrinking. This limits the human capacity for starting a-new, which is crucial to not only the constitution of human rights values, but also to the necessary continual revolution of these values.

In the next section the diverse understandings and conceptualisations of human rights will be explored.

2.5. MAPPING THE CONCEPTUAL FIELD CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES

Dembour (2010:4-5) attempts to categorise the conceptual field of academic writings on human rights into four schools of thought or orientation, as scholars explicitly or implicitly adhere to precepts regarding human rights and human rights values. Her proposed categorisation will be used in the next section as it is useful in clarifying positions from which arguments about human rights and human rights values are made. She distinguishes between the natural school, the deliberative school, the protest school and the discourse school (*ibid*:4-5).

2. 5.1 The natural school: emphasising individual freedom

The essentialist conception of human rights as universal and self-evident, grounded in human nature, has been evident in the language of human rights since the DRMC (1789) during the Enlightenment period, and is also implicit and explicit in the UDHR (1948) (Parekh, 2008:123). These declarations describe humans as inherently born free, equal, with dignity, reason and consciousness and that they therefore have inalienable, self-evident, and universal rights (*ibid*:123). The natural school understands human rights as *given*, universal and absolute, and emphasises the value of individual freedom

and autonomy (Dembour, 2010:2). The conception of self-evident moral truth and the belief that human rights and human rights values are universal and self-evident has been embedded in western reasoning since Plato claimed that truth, originating in rationality, to be self-evident and universal to humanity (Parekh, 2008:123).

The anticipated emancipation of humans during the Enlightenment period by grounding morality in human reason, is deeply embedded in the understanding of human rights by natural school scholars (Bauman, 1994:26; Parekh, 2008:123). Human rights regarded as universal moral codes structured in reason and objectivity, emphasise the authority and power of 'those in the know' and the law (Bauman, 1994:28). By means of power and the law, human rights structured by those humans regarded as more equal than others in the capacity of reason, declare which behavior is regarded moral or ethical (*ibid*:28).

Howard and Donnelly (1986:804) explain the origin of the liberal view of humans as rooted in the social changes during the Enlightenment period in Europe. The natural human of early liberalism was defined as a distinct individual in his or her own right, rather than a member of a community or society. Entitlement to rights was unconnected to relations to community, society or state (Goodhart, 2003:948). The conceptual tying of human rights to national sovereignty and political freedom to security during the Enlightenment, resulted in the isolation of humans from their social structures, distorting the ethical relation self:other (Arendt, 1958:254-255; Arendt, 1960:31; Goodhart, 2003:946; Parekh, 2008:12). The isolation of self, in order to claim rights, is justified during globalism in a similar way as during the Enlightenment (Goodhart, 2003:955; 2.4.2.1).

The liberal human of the Enlightenment period has progressed into the modern day liberal citizens with "equal and inalienable rights, in the strong sense of entitlements that ground particularly powerful claims against the state" (Howard and Donnelly, 1986:802). The quest to protect individual choice, autonomy, identity and subjectivity, during the Enlightenment, has grown into social atomism and neo-liberalism during the 21st century. Self-interest has become the force behind freedom in order to protect fulfilment and economic interests (Midgley, 2010:19). Individualism, originating during the Enlightenment in a bid to protect and preserve individual choice, autonomy, identity and subjectivity, remains prominent in the understanding of liberal rights. Human rights are regarded by scholars of the natural school as strongly individualistic – as entitlements that every human being could and should claim against the state, society or community (Dembour, 2010:4-5).

The understanding and conceptualisation of human rights by scholars of the natural school are grounded in the inherent dignity of humans and morality situated in rational autonomous choices made by individual humans. Howard and Donnelly (1986:803) describe human rights as a social construct derived from a specific conception of human dignity. The conception of human dignity, figuring prominently in liberal international human rights documents, is premised on assumptions of the inner moral nature and worth of an individual in relation to his or her society (*ibid*:803). Scholars of the natural school, who emphasise individual freedom and autonomy, believe that human dignity and value are rooted in humanity's distinct capacity for rationality and autonomy (Ingram, 2003:370). In the natural school's view, human rights should emphasise the conditions of rational freedom (non restraint) and well-being that all humans are entitled to (Parekh, 2008:130).

Howard and Donnelly (1986:802) conclude that human rights defined as social constructs in which the values of equality, dignity and autonomy are fully adhered to, is only possible within a liberal regime. Liberalism values and treats each individual as discretely individual and not as merely separable from the community and society. Scholars of the natural school assume that the isolation of self makes it possible for each individual to live a dignified, equal and free life (*ibid*:803). They argue that human rights demand a liberal regime, but in turn, if implemented, human rights create a liberal society and the envisaged liberal human (*ibid*:806).

Scholars from the natural school understand human rights as self-evident, universal, given and inalienable to humans. They ground human rights externally in self-evident and universal truth, human nature, human reasoning and human action aimed at freedom and autonomy. In their emphasis on freedom and individualism, they regard human rights as a means to structure society to enhance the conditions necessary for individuals to live a life free from any constraints. They regard a liberalistic regime as essential for the operationalisation of individual freedom to act autonomously on rational choices.

2. 5. 2 The deliberative school: human rights as rationally deliberated values

The deliberative school regards human rights as *agreed upon* (Dembour, 2010:3). Deliberative scholars agree with the natural school on the individual nature of human rights and even collective human rights are regarded to be reducible to individual rights (Freeman, 1994:494). They reject the conception of natural rights, (which the natural school adopts) as they regard human rights as political and constitutional values that liberal societies determine and choose to adopt. They do not believe human rights to be

universal but hope that, through deliberation and consensus, they can become universally accepted (Dembour, 2010:3).

Although scholars from the deliberative school also position human rights within an Enlightenment frame of reference emphasising freedom, individualism and reason, they emphasise dialogue in the structuring of human rights. The deliberative school grounds human rights in the human capacity for rational deliberation and social discourse (Ingram, 2003:370). The need for deliberation has been brought to the fore by the growing struggle between universalists and cultural relativists in a globalised world (Ishay, 2004:278). As a result of globalisation, culture has emerged as a signifier for multiple deep-seated issues such as self-determination and collective identity (Lieber & Weisberg, 2002:291,294).

Deliberative scholars argue that humans are rational, reasonable and autonomous (Ingram, 2003:370). In line with the post-modern scepticism regarding foundational meta-narratives and truth claims (Ryu, 2001:6; Gutek, 2009:136), they reject the notion of natural rights based on human nature or transcendence. They claim that human nature is culturally mediated and that the only access we have to human nature is through its articulation in different cultures (Parekh, 1999:140). They also reject the notion of human rights grounded in the reality of an objective moral life (Parekh, 2008:135). Deliberative scholars do not necessarily regard human rights as values in themselves, but are committed to the idea of consensus towards deliberated human rights values (Dembour, 2010:32). Ingram (2003:378) describes the theories of Habermas and Rawls as examples of deliberation towards consensus. Attempts to reach consensus are undertaken by means of rational and egalitarian dialogue, acknowledging all subjects as free and morally equal (*ibid*:368).

Arendt is defined by scholars such as Neocosmos (2006:259) as an advocate for liberal consensual politics. Canovan (1983:108), however, describes the difference between the theories of Habermas and Arendt as the substitution of “talking for acting, consensus for disagreement and unity for plurality”. Although Habermas (in Canovan, 1983:106) acknowledged an intellectual debt to Arendt, Arendt (in Canovan, 1983:108) never shared Habermas’ belief in the possibility of rational consensus. She called attempts to persuade a multitude of humans to consensus an attempt to use words as violence when one opinion is forced on multiple opinions (Arendt, 1990:79-80) and concludes that ‘common convictions’ resulting in consensus are not possible between free humans (Canovan, 1983:108; Arendt, 1990:81-82). Arendt (1990:81) defined dialogue in reference to the understanding of early dialogue conducted by Socrates, which

frequently concluded inconclusively. In such an understanding of dialogue, dialogue did not aim to produce a result such as consensus. Dialogue was understood to be about talking through something or someone's *doxa* (*ibid*:82).

Deliberative scholars agree with the protest school that the understanding and interpretation of human rights values are relative and they therefore aim to achieve universal agreement on human rights values by means of rational deliberation. They regard human rights dialogue as a possible means to end political, cultural or economic conflict. They rely on humanity's capacities for reason, autonomous questioning and choice to realise human rights values as reasonable ethical choices towards consensus and peace. They ground human rights in human universals, making ethical and reasonable cross-cultural dialogue possible.

2.5.3 The Protest school: the relation self:other as prerequisite for the realisation of freedom, dignity and equality

The protest school regards human rights as *fought for* (Dembour, 2010:6-7). Globalisation has been instrumental in increased interconnectedness between humans but also in an increase of social conflict (Twiss, 2004:40). The conflict between universal and relativist conceptions of human rights has been prevalent since the adoption of the UDHR (1948) (Ishay, 2004:179,212). The twentieth century was characterised by the conflict between claims to cultural relativist rights and universal rights (*ibid*:174). The atrocities of the holocaust emphasised the need for the protection of individuals, aiding the saturation of liberal conceptions in human rights discourse (Colomos & Torpey, 2004:140). In reaction to these historic conflicts in human rights understandings, the protest school emphasises the collective claims, which the poor, the unprivileged and the oppressed have against the state and the global community (Dembour, 2010:6). They use human rights to contest the status quo on behalf of the oppressed.

According to protest scholars there will never be an end to injustice and they therefore continually advocate the revolutionising of human rights (*ibid*:6,7). Human rights are regarded by them as an ethical, revolutionary and relational process of humanising and becoming (*ibid*:9). Although protest scholars acknowledge the universalism of human suffering, they understand human right values to be relative, constituted and institutionalised in communities between self:other (*ibid*:9).

Protest scholars argue that the revolutionising of human rights values towards humanising the world, is possible within the relation self:other. Arendt (1958:246)

describes humanising as the ethical and relational process of becoming and individuation by means of continual new beginnings. The understanding of humanising might be best described by its flipside, namely dehumanising. Freire (1993:26) argues that dehumanising and world alienation are historical realities. He calls the struggle for humanising a struggle for emancipation of labour, the overcoming of world alienation and the affirmation of men and women as persons (*ibid*:26). Realising human dignity by individuating self as *someone* within the relation self:other is described by scholars of the protest school as a continual and historical quest (Arendt, 1958:246; Freire, 1993:26).

Liberal individualism originating during the Enlightenment, implicit and explicit in theories of the natural and deliberative schools, has as consequence the distortion of self:other and the exclusion of group rights such as cultural rights, gender rights and the rights of immigrants and subnationalities (Ingram, 2003:374). The distortion of the relation self:other by liberal individualism inhibits the realisation and the revolutionising of human rights. In order to realise and revolutionise human rights values, the relation self:other and spaces of togetherness need to be constituted (Arendt, 1958:176; 2.4.4.1). In advocating the protection of diversity and difference, in which the relation self:other and spaces of togetherness are rooted, the protest school emphasises the importance of the ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness in the process of becoming and humanising the world (Arendt 1958:244-245; Isaac, 1996:64-69; 2.4.5.1).

The choice to use individual and collective responsibility *for* the realisation of the human rights values, is explored by protest school scholars. Derrida (2005:37) describes the ethical relation self:other as a bottomless, double responsibility towards the “interlacing of the same and the altogether other”. He describes an ethical gesture as that of two hands, texts, visions and listening – simultaneously together and separate (Ryu, 2003:9; Derrida, 2005:37). This ethical gesture occurs in an ethical moment which disrupts the context of conditioned imperatives (foundational meta-narratives and the law) by an unconditional and open imperative (Ryu, 2003:10-11). The emphasis on and openness to difference in the relation self:other opens the way to the ethical process of speaking for and to the oppressed and victimised (*ibid*:14).

I agree with the scholars of the protest school that the realisation of human rights values depends on human action and inter-action. In turn, human rights and human rights values condition humanity’s perception of what the world should be like. It conditions humanity’s hope towards the future and motivates humans to act in the light of this hope. Human rights are, in this sense, the crystallisation of the interaction between self:other

and the result of the continual disruption of meanings and understandings of human rights values towards new beginnings (Parekh, 2008:146-148).

Protest scholars do not regard human rights as universal or self-evident but as a continual ethical revolution towards humanising and becoming. They emphasise the relation self:other as a prerequisite for the realisation of freedom, equality and dignity. The emphasis on the responsibility *for* self:other, accentuate individual responsibility in the realisation of the human rights values of self:other. Protest scholars regard members of communities and societies as having equal responsibility to humanise the world and operationalise human rights values.

2.5.4 The Discourse School: human rights as ethical discourse

The quest for freedom of religion and opinion dating from the Enlightenment revolutions re-emerged during postmodernism in the continual deconstructing of meta-narratives regarding the truth-power relation. Postmodernists challenge the conception of absolute truth 'discovered' by rational humans using objective scientific methods (Gutek, 2009:137). They argue that there are many claims to truth and in the interplay of diverse discourses, (representing multiple regimes of truth) the relation truth-power in a given context can be deconstructed (*ibid*:138).

The discourse school regards human rights as *talked about* (Dembour, 2010:5). It does not believe that human rights can correct the ills of the world but agrees that the political ethical discourse on human rights constitutes a powerful tool in claims against the state (*ibid*:5). The effects of liberal individualism rooted in self-interest, free competition, free enterprise and the deregulation of business, saturating human rights discourse are continually critiqued by discourse scholars (Neocosmos, 2006:377; Midgley, 2010:2).

Neocosmos (2006:377) argues that the discourse and struggles regarding human rights have become nothing more than a forceful process of incorporating human rights into existing systems of neo-imperialism, neo-colonialism, and capitalism. He argues that human rights discourse has become a hegemonic civil religion, replacing 'development' in Africa by the imprisonment of many Africans in a state of passive victimhood (dependent on trusteeship), instead of freeing them to active subjecthood (*ibid*:365,376).

Scholars from the discourse school are, like the deliberative school, more interested in finding agreement than in exploring and explaining the foundations of human rights values (Dembour, 2010:7). They focus on the repeated non-delivery of human rights. Their discourse pivots on the establishment of equality among humans so they

continually search for better processes towards emancipation and equality (*ibid*:8). Discourse scholars find the universal claim of the natural school imperialistic and point to the obscuring of unequal power relations and coercion in the deliberative school's emphasis in consensus (Ci, 2005:253,259; Dembour, 2010:9). In deconstructing power relations, scholars from the discourse school explore the reproduction of inequality in the relation self:other by human rights (Ci, 2005:252)

Ci (*ibid*:252) argues that individual identity is constructed through experiences of power. If self experiences powerlessness, the appropriation of power happens through identification with others that have power. He defines this process as agency through identification. Inherent in agency through identification is coercion and distorted communication, as a misrepresentation of the ontological and moral status of authority or any other power source (*ibid*:252-253). Ci (*ibid*:260,263) therefore pleads for the abandonment of the concept human rights in favour of moral rights, which dictate a proper division of responsibility and power between the individual, society and the state in terms of proper respect for human agency. He describes humans as agents with a desire to act rather than to be acted upon. Humans are not only agents but also comprehend life experiences in terms of agency (*ibid*:249,251). According to Ci (*ibid*:251), humans have dignity and deserve respect, because as agents they act in, on and with the world and are co-creators of the common world.

Ci (*ibid*:262) argues that prioritising legal rights, which naturalise the bias of the well-off as universal, marginalise the moral rights required by the poor and oppressed to improve their life-world. He argues that the concept of human rights fits the well-off perfectly as all they require and advocate (in self-interest) is non-interference by the state into their lives in order for them to acquire more from the poor (*ibid*:263). Discourse scholars regard the discourse about human rights and the ongoing search for an ethical code as a powerful tool in deconstructing the truth-power relations.

In this study, I will continually deconstruct the influence of neo-liberalism on the constitution of the relation self:other, the realisation of human rights values, the curriculum and identity construction. In my view the realisation of human rights values and the construction of identity is only possible in the ethical, revolutionary, individuating and dialogic relation self-other.

2.6 SUMMARY

The answer to Socrates' question as to how we should live lies in the continual revolutionary search towards humanising and becoming. The historical human quest to find an ethical code has been revolutionised and deconstructed over many centuries, influenced by historical, societal, scientific and technological changes and advances. During these revolutions humans have deconstructed and reconstructed what *is* towards what *ought* to be. In the continual movement towards what *ought* to be, the world is continually humanised and humans are provided the opportunities to co-construct the world as equal partners.

In historical and societal contexts, different human rights values have been accentuated, emphasised and legalised as acts of foundations aiming to protect humanity. This process will never be completed as each victory is followed by new forms of oppression and dehumanising (Bauman, 1994:228). In natality and plurality the hope and frailty of humanity come together, enabling humans to continually start new, revolutionising the world and human rights values. Revolutions, rooted in responsibility *for* self:other is stabilised by forgiveness and promises. Promises, as acts of foundations, stabilise new spaces of togetherness and make it possible for liberated humans to act a-new as singular and together in the relation self:other.

The unconditional choice to be responsible *for* self:other disrupts meta-narratives and ideologies, sparking new revolutions and new acts of foundation. This is clearly illustrated by means of the many human rights revolutions since the Enlightenment. Human rights and human rights values can thus never be self-evident, universal or pre-designed. The diverse understandings and interpretations of human rights values and the philosophical and ethical grounding of human rights, illustrated by means of the four schools, indicate the diversity of humanity and the resulting diverse opinions and views on human rights. It is only by exploring the many diverse views on the world, humanity and human rights with an openness to all views, that we can commit to our own views regarding human rights.

In my view, the realisation of human rights values are only possible when explored as a continual revolution to new understandings and new beginnings. Human rights values are realised and revolutionised between self:other in responsibility *for* self:other. The values of freedom, dignity and equality can thus only be realised within the dialogic and ethical relation self:other in spaces of togetherness. In the relation self:other, humans transcend *what* they are, individuate themselves in their difference and become equal and dignified, defined by *who* they are.

Education is crucial in the quest for the constitution of the relation self:other and spaces of togetherness aiding the revolutionising of human rights values. The relation teacher:child, should continually be (re)constituted as a dialogic and dialectic relation revolutionising human freedom, dignity and equality. Knowledge about freedom, equality and dignity does not lead to the realisation of human rights values. Living and acting as liberated humans in responsibility *for* self:other realise and revolutionise human rights values.

The normative and dialogic nature of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values will be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NORMATIVE AND DIALOGIC NATURE OF THE RELATION SELF:OTHER ROOTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The historical quest to make meaning of the relation self:other and individuate self as unique and irreplaceable is made possible by the human conditions of plurality and natality (Arendt, 1958:178). Natality (as the human capacity for new beginnings), makes it possible for humans to continually (re)construct identity and revolutionise meanings and understandings relating to self:other. Plurality describes the human capacity to be simultaneously singular and together in the dialogic relation self:other (*ibid*:178). In the relation self:other, humans disrupt and revolutionise meanings and understandings by means of dialogic revolutions.

The revolutions related to the shifting ethical premise of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values have been explored in Chapter Two. The normative and dialogic nature of the relation self:other is explored in this chapter. Questions regarding the ontology of society, the power and powerlessness inherent in society and its capacity for dialogic revolutions have been a historical concern (1.4). The ‘problem of the social’ has been extensively explored by Arendt (1958, 1966, and 1990) and since her, by many other scholars such as Nancy (1998), Pitkin (1998) and Bauman (2001a, 2005). As education and society is interrelated, the ‘problem of society’ is often reproduced as the ‘problem of education’.

The vision of a society expressed by the *South African Constitution* (1996) and the post-apartheid curriculum is a vision of a society rooted and structured in and on human rights values (Msila, 2007:151). South Africans, however, do not experience being together with others in an ethical relation self:other. Jansen (2011a:190) describes South Africa as a world “divided neatly among the protagonists, as between the tribes of Good and the tribes of Evil”. Human rights, as institutionalised and legal rights, are therefore often meaningless to many South Africans. Education can never be indifferent to this state of affairs. Education and the curriculum, have a pivotal role to play in the realising of the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other.

The first half of this chapter is an exploration of the normative nature of the relation self:other as continually revolutionised in spaces of togetherness. Different understandings concerning the relation self:other, rooted in human rights values, are

considered. The influence of society, as “factories of meaning” (Bauman, 2001a:2) on the continual (re)constitution of the relation self:other in spaces of togetherness, is explored. In the second half of this chapter, the dialogic, revolutionary and individuating nature of the relation self:other in spaces of togetherness is explored. Intra-dialogue, disrupting, deconstructing and reconstructing meanings and understandings are introduced. By means of intra-dialogue, self continually reconstructs and revolutionises his/her identity in the relation self:other.

3.2 CURRICULUM, THE ETHICAL RELATION SELF:OTHER AND DIALOGIC REVOLUTIONS

Curriculum does not only concern the subject knowledge required for a particular qualification, but also contains implicit knowledge about dominant beliefs, values and behaviors embedded in society and in institutionalised life (Jansen, 2009:172-173). The curriculum is thus tangible with regard to course outline and subjects, but also intangible in terms of discursive patterns and content. It shapes the meanings and understandings of everyone involved in teaching-learning (*ibid*:172-173). Therefore the potential of dialogic revolutions following disruption is unlimited and crucial for education and curriculum.

In *Knowledge in the Blood* (2009), Jansen explores shared meaning knowledge⁶ embedded in the emotional, spiritual, social, economic, political and psychological lives of communities in South Africa and how it manifests in education and curriculum. He understands shared meaning knowledge to be habitual, second generation knowledge related to how children, adolescents and students understand themselves and give meaning to their respective histories and realities. Shared meaning knowledge is emphatic knowledge relying on order and authority. It does not tolerate ambiguity (Jansen, 2009:171).

Embedded meanings and understandings are not easily changed. Individuals may realign themselves to changing contexts and ideologies while deep-rooted assumptions and beliefs regarding history and identity, still remain intact (*ibid*:171). Teacher:child may for example learn about and adapt to a new culture of human rights without living a life in responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other. The acknowledgement and questioning of own meanings and understandings and how they affect the relation

⁶ In *Knowledge in the Blood* (2009), Jansen explores and emphasises the collective characteristics of meanings and understandings. Although I agree that meanings and understandings have definite collective characteristics, I contend that meanings and understandings remain unique to the individual and are continually (re)constructed from individual and unique life-experiences .

self:other, should be the starting point when exploring the capacity of curriculum for dialogic revolutions which could construct new understandings regarding self:other.

The questioning of own meanings and understandings regarding self:other in difference has disruptive consequences. I therefore propose two conditions for the disruption of meanings and understandings in a classroom context: spaces of togetherness and the ethical relation teacher:child. These two conditions are extensively explored in this chapter.

A classroom as a space of togetherness is an inclusive space in which all voices are of equal value in difference. It is expected that all would share their unique meanings and understandings in order to reflect the South African society in “utter diversity” (Arendt, 1958:57). Teacher and child are co-partners in constituting the ethical relation teacher:child and all are co-responsible for deconstructing and reconstructing own meaning knowledge. Conceding that the relation teacher:child is a complex and multilayered relation, I intend dealing with two possibilities by which this relation could be constructed namely, in categories of sameness and otherness (*ibid*:41) or in equality of difference (Arendt, 1958:57; Makgoba, 1997:144).

Bauman (1994:154) describes the construction of the relation self:other in categories of sameness and otherness as an attempt by communities and societies to provide security and stability. The relation self:other in this context is constructed to include only others like us, excluding others perceived to be alien to us (*ibid*:153). The construction of the relation self:other by means of categories of sameness and otherness is thus rooted in *what* individuals are perceived to be. In a relation which only includes others like us there is mostly a reciprocity of perspectives, beliefs and attitudes so dissonance and disruption can be safely avoided (Bauman, 1994:79; Schutz in Bauman, 1994:147). When the relation teacher:child is constructed in the comfort zone of only including others like us (be it implicitly or explicitly), spaces of togetherness cannot be constituted and the disruption of meanings and understandings becomes impossible.

On the other hand, the relation teacher:child, rooted in equality of difference, relies on mis-understanding and dissonance to spark the process of disruption which will result in new knowledge being constructed (Bauman, 1994:147). The ethical nature of the relation teacher:child in spaces of togetherness mediate the consequences and the risks associated with disruption (Bauman, 1994:147; Jansen, 2009:276). Responsibility *for* self:other is a choice made by teacher:child before meeting each other or being with each other (Bauman, 1994:74). This choice lays the foundation of the moral self and the ethical relation teacher:child (*ibid*:74,77-78). In this context, education itself becomes an

ethical event and an ethical experience of disrupting meanings and understandings (Ruiz, 2004:273-274). Teacher:child are continually re-imagining their compassionate responsibility *for self:other* in the classroom and in South African society. Dialogic revolutions within the relation teacher:child in a classroom as a space of togetherness, are the continual movement between disrupting and stabilising the relation teacher:child while re-imagining the future.

Disrupting meanings and understandings in a classroom can have “explosive” (Jansen, 2009:261) consequences. Jansen (*ibid*:265), however, argues that post-conflict pedagogy demands facing and disrupting meanings and understandings.

3.2.1 The courage to spark dialogic revolutions

The assumption that self:other would readily confess *doxa* in the knowledge that it would spark conflict and disruption, was one of the mistakes made by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (from hereon TRC) (1996) (Jansen, 2009:274). Jansen (*ibid*:275) makes the point that “human beings do not willingly release painful memories”. It takes courage to risk mis-understanding when confessing own *doxa*, disrupting the relation self:other (Arendt, 1958:186). The confessing of difference imply an expectation of disruption and it therefore remains an act of courage to expose self:other to critique and ridicule when confessing own *doxa* (*ibid*:186). The courage to spark a dialogic revolution resulting from mis-understanding, stems from the human will to share a common world with self:other in dialogue (*ibid*:246).⁷ In a classroom or any other space of togetherness, the risks associated with confessing own *doxa* should be mediated by the compassionate responsibility which hold self:other together and regard each *doxa* in equal difference (Jansen, 2009:275). Facing self:other in responsibility, requires the courage to step out of self-interest and act in compassion (Arendt, 1965:79; Pitkin, 1998:266).

The self can choose to re-act to the confessing of difference or suffering of self:other from a distance in pity. Pity is possible from a distance and mainly arises from the uncomfortable position other’s suffering inflicts on the self (Pitkin, 1998:266). Compassion requires courage to act selflessly and against self-interest (Arendt, 1965:79). Compassion and ‘co-suffering’ has no capacity for generalisation (*ibid*:85).

⁷ Arendt (1958:242) relates the common world, the in-between, to a child born from love. As a product of love, responsibility and care, it relates and separates the parents and brings togetherness and common interest (Arendt, 1958:242). In the shared common world humans, although forever separated from each other, find togetherness and unlock their potential responsibility, equality and freedom by acting a-new with self:other.

Compassion regards the particular, the singular of human suffering. It does not depersonalise victims of suffering and lump them together (*ibid:85*). It regards the suffering of every individual in his irreplaceable distinct dignity. Co-suffering acknowledges self:other in the equality of their difference. Compassion also requires courage from self:other to face each other as distinct, equal and dignified.

3.2.2 Forgiveness and promises facilitating the continual (re)constitution of self:other

Arendt (1958:244) maintains that the unpredictable consequences of speech and action are the price humans pay for freedom. Forgiveness and promises free us from the unpredictably and de-stabilising consequences of confessing *doxas* in difference, and enable us to act a-new (*ibid:241*). Forgiveness and promises transcend the laws of morality, disrupt biological existence and carry the possibility of new beginnings. This emphasises the fact that humans are not “born in order to die but in order to begin.” (*ibid:246*).

Promises, stabilising new beginnings are made possible because of the human capacity to forgive and judge, ground our identities and give us direction (*ibid:243*). The stabilising power of promises as treaties and agreements, can be traced back to the Roman legal system (*ibid:243*). Self:other acting free, confessing different *doxas* in shared spaces of togetherness, necessitate the making and keeping of promises to stabilise the relation self:other (*ibid:244-245*).

The making and keeping of promises, as acts of stabilising and foundation, result in the solidarity and sovereignty of a body of people bound together by an agreed purpose (*ibid:245*). Arendt (*ibid:245*) quotes Nietzsche who made the point that the very distinction between human and animal life is in the faculty of promise. The DRMC (1789), the UDHR (1948) and *Constitution of South Africa* (1996) are examples of collective promises made by humans in a quest to normatively structure the relation self:other, rooted in human rights values.

The unpredictable and unforeseen consequences of the confession of difference in classrooms should therefore be mediated by responsibility *for* self:other and facilitated by forgiveness and promises.

3.3 HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE REGARDING THE RELATION SELF:OTHER

The human rights discourse regarding the normative nature of the relation self:other in togetherness is unpacked in reference to the diverse understandings of the four schools discussed in section 2.5.

3.3.1 The natural school

The natural school defines the individual as separable from society or community. It regards the special value of humans to be rooted in their capacities for rationality and autonomy (2.5.1). Howard and Donnelly (1986:804) argue that human rights are the foundation on which the relation self with others is based. This relation is defined, by scholars of the natural school, as contractual. They regard any association or social constructs such as the state or society to be in service of the full unfolding of human potential, which is made possible by means of entitlements to individual rights (*ibid*:803). In line with the liberal notion of nation-state, dating from the Enlightenment period, the social contract between state and the individual grants the state the power and the responsibility to protect and afford the natural rights of the individual (Goodhart, 2003:951). In all matters protected by human rights, the individual *prima facie* takes precedence over the state and the collective self. All claims to individual rights are thus prior and above society, community and the state (Howard & Donnelly, 1986:804).

The liberal individualism advocated by scholars of the natural school and hailed by them as the main achievement of the Enlightenment, has many positive and negative effects on the relation self:other. On the positive side individuals are regarded in their difference and considered in their singularity. This is indeed important for personal freedom, agency and autonomy (Midgley, 2010:1-2). Negatively, the powerful meta-narrative of social atomism describing humans as solitary and isolated from one another has profound implications for the understanding of morality and the construction of the ethical relation self:other. When individuals are isolated from each other the question as to how they can ever live in responsibility *for* self:other is almost impossible to answer (*ibid*:1-2).

Individualism does afford humans the opportunity to be free in their difference but claimed as commercial ideology and social atomism, isolates humans from each other and distorts the ethical relation self:other to a relation rooted in opposition, mistrust and loneliness (*ibid*:1-2). Individuals may believe themselves to be free when they claim rights but they can never become equal and dignified partners in their difference when isolated and in opposition. In practical politics, human rights advocated by liberal

individualists becomes a commercial ideology of free enterprise, free competition and the deregulation of business resulting in unfree conditions and powerlessness for many humans (*ibid*:1-2).

The emphasis on self-interest and individual freedom, leaves no space for responsibility *for* self:other. Social atomism, centres the self in the relation self:other and aborts responsibility. When self:other are unable to face each other in equal difference in spaces of togetherness and disrupt meanings and understandings, dialogic revolutions and the realisation of freedom, dignity and equality are impossible.

3.3.2 The deliberative school

Scholars from the deliberative school envisage the relation self:other as a consensual relation where identified principles allow for democratic decisions and fair judgment (Dembour, 2010:6; 2.5.2). Deliberative scholars regard human rights as a guide to political structuring and action. Human rights are thus the 'code of conduct' regulating a democratic and fair process structuring the political relation self:other (*ibid*:6,8).

The consensual relation between self:other rooted in democratic principles advocated by the deliberative school presupposes that all humans understand and agree, or should understand and agree, to democratic principles. It implies a perception that human rights are conceptually tied to democracy. If, for example, individuals choose to claim their right to self-determination and opt for a non-democratic government or any other popular sovereign choice, which does not require democratic government (Jones, 1999:98), the question arises whether their choice implies abandonment of democratic principles only or the relation self:other rooted in human rights as well.

The right to self-determination in UN declarations and covenants is due to anti-colonialism (*ibid*:99) and the quest for liberation from oppression. The deliberative school advocates for the right to interpret human rights, according to own political and cultural traditions thus accommodating the principle of self-determination (Parekh, 1999:140). Although many post-colonial African countries like Zimbabwe claim to be democratic, moral communities rooting the relation self:other in responsibility *for* self:other are rare. The intricate social dynamics of ethnicity in Africa necessitates constant shifting of allegiances and self-invention and results in incompatible individual and collective values (Oyeshile, 2007:232). Any quest for consensus in this context will, inevitably result in the marginalisation of smaller groups (*ibid*:232-236).

In my view, presupposing a relation self:other rooted in common (universal) ethical convictions regarding democracy, deliberation, consensus and compromise places severe strain on a relation self:other rooted in difference. It implies a relation based on conformity and unity in consensus. Individual and minority rights are swallowed in the process towards deliberating collective consensus as it is envisaged that the understanding and interpretation of human rights values should be deliberated in a collective culturally diverse manner. I find both the conceptual tying of human rights to liberalism propagated by the natural school (2.5.1) and the conceptual tying of human rights to democracy by the deliberative school, problematic (2.5.2).

Like du Preez (2008:55), I contend that consensus can only be discretionary in dialogue regarding human rights values. Du Preez (*ibid*:55) regards critique as the focal point of dialogue concerning the understanding and meaning of human rights values. I would agree that critique is of great importance for dialogue but would argue that the continual search for new meanings and understandings, which would include critique, aids identity construction and becoming and should remain the focal point of dialogue regarding human rights values.

3.3.3 The protest school

The protest school regards human rights as an evolving concept and human rights values as dialogic revolutionary aspirations. Scholars from the protest school regard the struggle for liberation, from what *is* to what *ought* to be, only possible within and through societies and communities (Dembour, 2010:3; 2.5.3). The protest school thus argues that the deconstruction, reconstruction and the realisation of human rights values is a continual, revolutionary process from what *is* to what *ought* to be, rooted in the relation self:other. The realisation of human rights values happens between self:other as simultaneously singular and together when regarding each other as equal and irreplaceable partners in the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of human rights values.

Derrida (2005:22) describes the relation self:other as characterised by the two irreducible laws of the “countable singularity” and “the universal fraternity”. Universality and difference is the “divided virtue” by which the relation self:other sustains itself (*ibid*:22). Arendt (1990:81) defines the irreplaceable value of self in the relation self:other as realised when *doxas* are confessed within the relation self:other, individuating self:other in difference. In confessing *doxa*, self:other are defined by *who* they are – a dignified *someone* in the relation self:other. In the acknowledgement of equally different *doxas*, revealing unique identities and views on the world, self:other become equal and

dignified in their difference (Arendt, 1990:83; Gordon, 2002:136). They do not become the same or even equal to each other, they become equal partners in the common world which they share (Arendt, 1990:82-83).

The relational and individuating nature of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values is emphasised by both Arendt (1958:181) and Derrida (2005:37). Both argue that an ethical relation self:other is necessary in order to respect difference and realise human rights values. Human rights values become meaningful when humans realise freedom, dignity and equality *with* others (not *for* or *on*) (Greene & Griffiths, 2003: 83). Every individual, as a valuable and equal partner in the relation self:other, needs to continually deconstruct and reconstruct own meanings and understandings of human rights values related to individual and unique life experiences. “Freedom is to be found in action with others.” (*ibid*:82). Between self:other and in inclusive spaces of togetherness providing opportunities for all of humanity to voice difference and act on compassionate responsibility *for* self:other, human rights values become meaningful. I therefore agree with protest school scholars that the ethical and dialogic nature of the relation self:other should be the premise for disruption and dialogic revolutions realising and revolutionising human rights values.

3.3.4 The discourse school

The discourse school describes the relation self:other rooted in human rights values as in opposition. They believe that the global discourse concerning human rights does not free self:other but rather imprison them in new forms of oppression towards serving capitalism and new-liberalism (Neocosmos, 2006:366). They place a high premium on individual human agency and subjecthood. They argue that although human agency has been emphasised in recent human rights discourse, there is a simultaneously emphasis on the “trusteeship of the state” (*ibid*:375). Humans are juridical subjects, victims or passive citizens for whom the rhetoric of democracy, freedom, equality and dignity remains empty (*ibid*:375).

Neocosmos (*ibid*:365) claims that in many developing countries, human rights discourse disable active citizenship. Enabling human agency, in many African countries, is left to the state if and when they commit themselves to institutionalise human rights. Humans, in this context, become passive legal subjects or victims propelled by the power of victimhood, having their rights ‘delivered’ to them by the state or aid organisations (*ibid*:366). Scholars from the discourse school argue that during this process self:other are coerced into relinquishing their power of agency to power vested in victimhood, which keeps them imprisoned and dependent (*ibid*:366).

I share the discourse school's concern regarding human rights discourse becoming a global religion in the service of capitalism, neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism. I believe that continual deconstruction and reconstruction regarding the meanings and understandings of human rights values are vitally important. However, I find their emphasis on individual and collective agency placing the self in opposition to another to be a distortion of the relation self:other. My own critique regarding the effect of neo-liberalism on the relation self:other rooted in human rights values is discussed in section 3.4.2.1 and 3.9.3.4.

In the next section society as structuring and institutionalising the relation self:other is explored.

3.4 SOCIETY AND SELF:OTHER

Nancy (1998:434) defines society as an association and division of forces and needs, while Bauman (2005:135) regards a society as humans sharing a space, purpose or interest in a structured closeness or togetherness. Other meanings attached to the concept society are a "number of persons associated together by some common interest or purpose," a "state or condition of living in association, company or intercourse with others of the same species" or an "aggregate of persons living together in a more or less ordered community" (*ibid*:135). The common denominator of the different meanings attached to modern society is the implicit and explicit images of closeness, togetherness and sharing of space, purpose or interest they convey (*ibid*:135).

One of the reasons humans enter into societal relations is that societies influence the meanings and understandings we attach to life, the world and self:other. Societies are pivotal in understandings of what a meaningful life would entail. Bauman (2001a:2) argues: "All societies are factories of meanings. They are more than that, in fact: nothing less than the nurseries of meaningful life." The intersection of society and education results in education becoming the 'nurseries' of what society regard as a meaningful life. Although the beliefs, customs and meanings attached to self:other, influence the meanings and understandings individual humans construct regarding self:other, every individual could have a profound influence on societies as 'nurseries of meanings' when they confess their individual *doxa* in the relation self:other. Societies and education are structured and revolutionised by self:other and society and education in turn structure and revolutionise self:other.

The revolutionising of society and education within the relation self:other happens in spaces of togetherness. Spaces of togetherness are spaces in which self:other are free

to become equal and dignified partners in difference by means of intra-dialogue and dialogic revolutions. The inclusive nature of spaces of togetherness transcends the exclusionary nature of society while the reconstruction of meanings and understandings within spaces of togetherness revolutionise and constitute society and community anew. Before exploring spaces of togetherness, I will briefly define physical and social 'spaces' as understood in post-modernity.

3.4.1 Spaces in post-modernity

Physical (objective) space and social space stand in a metaphorical relationship with each other (Bauman, 1994:145). Social space is referred to in terms of objective and measurable proximity/distance, but is far more complex than an intellectual mapping of qualitative diversified relations. Social space is a complex interaction of cognitive, aesthetic and moral 'spacings'. All three 'spacings' use notions of proximity and distance, closeness and openness, but are different in pragmatics and outcomes (ibid:145-146). Cognitive space is constructed intellectually by means of the attribution of knowledge, aesthetic space is constructed affectively and moral space is constructed through uneven distributions of felt or assumed responsibility (ibid:146)

Cognitive spacing concerns *knowing* self:other. It concerns *what* (ibid:146) we know of others but also *how* we come to know others (Cary, 2006:136). We know others as either 'like us' or 'alien to us' (Bauman, 1994:147,150). Cognitive 'spacings' filled with others 'like us' are familiar, neighbourly and intimate. We understand others 'like us'. Cognitive spacings in which others are 'alien to us' is uncertain and uncomfortable (ibid:146). The strangers bring distance, anonymity and mis-understanding. We do not know the stranger and do not know how to act or what to expect (ibid:146). Categories or types are constructed in order to anticipate possible ways of knowing how to act and which rules to follow. Rules of conduct define knowing "how to go on" in situations of mis-understanding (ibid:146). A social distance is constructed between self:other – we do not know the other, we know *of* the other (ibid:146-151).

Living with strangers, we master the art of mis-meeting (ibid:154). The stranger becomes an irrelevant presence, a non-recognised being. We deny strangers admission to spaces of intimacy and being together. In silencing their narratives, we tolerate their difference and we deny self:other opportunities to come to know each other (ibid:154-155). The pragmatics of such cognitive 'spacings' have as outcome the knowledge of rules of conduct but not the *knowing* of self:other (ibid:164).

The possibility of knowing the stranger as equally different from me lies in meeting and mis-understanding the stranger (*ibid*:147). In mis-understanding, self poses questions such as *how* I know self:other and *what* I know of self:other. This is the ethical turn to centre and reveal what and how we know others (Cary, 2006:137). Mis-understanding disrupts *what* we know of self:other and sparks the process of new knowing and new ways of knowing. The construction of new social spaces starts when mis-understanding happens (Bauman, 1994:147).

The objects of cognitive spacing are others we live *with* – the objects of moral spacing are others we live *for* (*ibid*:165). In moral spacing others are not categorised nor are there any rules of conduct. It is constructed by moral responsibility *for* all others irrespective of *what* we know or do not know of self:other and how we come to knowledge of self:other (*ibid*:165-166). In moral spacings proximity and distance, closeness and openness merge in responsibility *for* self:other.

The stranger in cognitive ‘spacing’ may become the object of intense interest and a source of entertainment in aesthetic spacings (*ibid*:168). The strangeness of the stranger and their unexpected ways becomes a spectacle of amusement value (*ibid*:167). Control and power in aesthetic ‘spacings’ are not about knowing self:other. It is about investing in the control and construction of meaning about self:other. The construction of an imagined aesthetic fantasy of the other is not a re-imagining of self:other (Bauman, 1994:168-169 & Nealon, 1997:129). This is a colonialist and imperialist presumption of knowing self:other, which reduces an other to the desires and needs of the self. Self makes use of, and invest in, an other to find him or herself when reflected and compared to otherness (Nealon, 1997:129). Self is constructed in comparison to, in differentiation to and in opposition to self:other.

The risks in confronting and conquering otherness are calculated and rooted in a means and ends process as engagement with otherness produces a return for the self (Nealon, 1997:130). Affective control and power in aesthetic ‘spacings,’ distance an other from self. Self constructs a new ‘Othering’ (Spivak in Cary, 2006:13) tolerating the difference of an other from a respectful distance (Neocosmos, 2006:372). In this colonised relation, the colonised other remains a nobody (Gordimer, 2011:642)

Post-modern spaces and ‘spacings’ are metaphors for the proximity and distance between self:other, familiarity and strangeness, togetherness and loneliness in the relation self:other. It is only in allowing mis-understanding in cognitive spaces, sparking

questioning and the continual construction of moral 'spacings' that self:other can constitute spaces of togetherness.

3.4.2 The legacy of the Greek society and spaces of togetherness

Arendt (1958) uses the ancient Greek *polis* as metaphor to describe the sharing of space, interest, purpose and togetherness in Greek society. Liberated men participated equally in the *polis*, sharing a common concern regarding the structuring of human affairs and the constitution of freedom, dignity and equality in their difference (Arendt, 1958:23). Greene and Griffiths (2003:88) argue that the metaphor of *polis*, as used by Arendt, although still relevant to a globalised humanity is a frozen metaphor. In a global post-modern context there cannot be one *polis* or public arena in which humans engage in politics and structure human affairs (*ibid*:88). The public sphere, in Arendt's view, has very little to do with professional politics or modern electioneering (Higgins, 2010:280). The public sphere, Arendt (1958:26) understands as an individual and collective space in which everything is decided by means of words and deeds and not by coercion, violence or power.

Arendt is often criticised for displaying an unqualified admiration for the Greek city-state, which was riddled with inhumane practices (Tsao, 2002:98). I agree with Tsao (*ibid*:98) that her understanding of speech and action not only departs from the Greeks, but that the sections about Greek society in *The Human Condition* (1958) should be interpreted as part of her larger argument concerning the understanding of discourse, action and humanity. Arendt (1958:119) describes the enormous burden (the burden of biological life and consumption) slaves, women and barbarians in Greek society had to pay as a heavy price to pay in order for (only) men to become free, equal and dignified. Because slaves, women and barbarians could never be part of the *polis* they were never able to reveal *who* they were. They were defined as to *what* they were – an inhuman practice against which Arendt (*ibid*:175-181) is very outspoken. I would contend that the burden of biological life, being defined as *what* self:other are, is still the price that many humans pay for others to be economically free in modern society. In that sense, when Arendt (*ibid*:175-181) criticises modern society defined in biological life and rooted in inequality and un-freedom, she also criticises the Greek society for condemning many humans to the same inhumane treatment.

I share Arendt's (*ibid*:175-181) concern with the burden of slaves, women and barbarians in Greek society, which is still replicated in many modern societies. However, I regard Arendt's (*ibid*:23) conception of the *polis* as metaphor for spaces in which

humans can become free, equal and dignified as narrow. The ancient Greek *polis*, modern societies and communities are exclusionary in nature and characteristics. I therefore regard inclusive spaces of togetherness as crucial to the continual (re)constitution of the relation self:other and the revolutionising of human rights values. Globally, there are many (possible) spaces of togetherness. Spaces of togetherness are constituted in theatres, on television, in blogs or in classrooms (Greene and Griffiths, 2003:89). It is a space between and within self:other in which self:other come together and co-construct and revolutionise their world (Arendt, 1958:242).

Because individuals continually revolutionise self:other, new spaces of togetherness in new contexts are continually (re)constituted. Spaces of togetherness cannot be fixed or predesigned, but are continually (re)constituted by individuals. In inclusive spaces of togetherness, self:other transcend belonging and *what* we are perceived to be and focus on individuating and revolutionising self:other. Spaces of togetherness are characterised by the equal recognition of *who* we are and not by equality of sameness defining *what* we are (Greene and Griffiths, 2003:83). Spaces of togetherness include all of humanity in responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other.

Since the Enlightenment, many dialogic revolutions have aimed to liberate humans to inclusion in spaces of togetherness. However, such spaces do not automatically come into existence. The exclusion of humans from spaces of togetherness are still prevalent today, resulting in the distortion of the relation self:other and the loss of spaces of togetherness. I will briefly discuss three meta-narratives aiding exclusion and inhibiting the constitution of spaces of togetherness, next.

3.4.2.1 Marketisation and the relation self:other

In modern society, Arendt (1958:322) claims, humans are slowly turning into the animal, Darwin contended they come from. Protected by “soft totalitarianism” from critical reflection (Masschelein, 2001:3), modern society structure and manage biological life (Arendt, 1958:322). It is defined in, and replicates the principles of the sphere of labour in Greek society where humans were un-free and powerless to liberate themselves, voice their difference and become equal and dignified in inclusive spaces of togetherness (*ibid*:130).

The marketisation of the relation self:other can be traced back to the new economy driving European societies after the Industrial Revolution perceiving labour to equal wealth (Bauman, 2001a:18; 2.4.3). During the period of globalisation, the combination of free and rapid spatial movement of capital, free enterprise and a demand for a new

flexible labour market diminished the power of labour considerably (*ibid*:27). The union between labour and capital, which characterised early modernity, has now been replaced by an engagement between capital and the consumer force. Capital is no longer dependant for its profits on labour or labourers, but on new ideas, which produce a continually growing consumer market (*ibid*:27).

The defining and re-defining of life in the consciousness of labour has since the Industrial revolution, rendered humans powerless (*ibid*:77). The relation self:other and the possible constitution of spaces of togetherness is severely affected by the ongoing struggle for survival and the posing of rich and poor in opposition. The meta-narrative that only money liberates individuals to participate as free, equal and dignified partners renders the poor and the unemployed, who globally amount to millions of humans, powerless and voiceless (Bauman, 2001a:77 & Verwey, 2011:114).

Education plays a pivotal role in securing these perceptions. Schools have become entrepreneurial service providers and parents and children consumers insisting on multiple choices regarding market-related qualifications (Bridges & Jonathan, 2003:128). The rich purchase education which will expand the future choices and possibilities which lie ahead for their children (*ibid*:128). All speech and action in a marketised society are regulated and structured in order to attain predesigned ends and teacher:child are the means towards these predesigned social, economic and political ends (Bauman, 2001a:150). In a world, which is constantly shifting and moving, products sell identities and membership to a group or society (*ibid*:150-152). The ethical relation self:other is distorted in a quest to belong to consumer groups or predesigned categories structured in the frame of market rationality.

The poor and the unemployed play a pivotal role in the predesigned continual cycle of production and consumption. Bauman (2001a:117) argues: "The sight of the poor keeps the non-poor at bay and in step." The sight of growing poverty prompts the employed to tolerate demands for flexibility. The sight of the poor and the unemployed is the "alien other" to both the consumer and the producer (*ibid*:147). Fearing such dehumanisation the producer conforms to efficiency standards and the consumer compulsively guards his or her purchased status of belonging to a frame, social class or category (*ibid*:147).

3.4.2.2 Self:other defined in genealogy

The political manifestation of the relation self:other defined in genealogy has its roots in the conceptual tying of human rights to national sovereignty during the Enlightenment (2.4.2). This had profound implications for the relation self:other in social, political and

economic contexts. It resulted in the central conflict between national sovereignty and human rights (Parekh, 2008:21-22). The root of this conflict is in the tension between the rights of the individual, as free and equal and the rights of the collective self:other as sovereign. Although individuals claim their rights to emancipation, freedom and equality, they are swallowed in the collective self:other as belonging to a sovereign free *people* with a right to national self-determination (*ibid*:21,23). The rights of humans expressed in the DRMC (1789) have become civil rights and the rights of men and women have become the rights of the *people* (*ibid*:22-23).

Arendt explored the effects of the conceptual tying of human rights to national sovereignty and genealogy, extensively in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1966). She argues that the dignity of humans can only be guaranteed by the acknowledgment of all *doxas* as equal in value (Arendt, 1966:297). In my view, human dignity relies on equal participation in spaces of togetherness in which every individual can freely act in, on and with the world in the relation self:other, individuate self as an irreplaceable *someone* and in doing so, continually revolutionise human rights values (2.4.4.1).

The conceptual tying of human rights to national sovereignty defined in genealogical roots presents unique challenges in a globalised era in which humans have global citizenship. At a local level, citizens claim rights or are afforded rights because of the constitutional duty, which the nation-state has towards its citizens. Non-citizens are excluded from political participating and access to state benefits in the nation-state. The purpose and objective of the state are related to the legal responsibility to provide rights and protection to its citizens. This ties human rights to citizenship and the nation-state (Currie & de Waal, 2009:469). The South African Supreme Court of Appeal⁸ (*ibid*:469), however, seems to agree with Arendt (1966:297) in ruling that: “human dignity has no nationality.”

Foreigners in South Africa, however, do not experience being in an ethical relation self:other that affords them free and equal participation in spaces of togetherness. They are defined as a ‘non’ group in South Africa, pursued, attacked and killed (Jansen, 2011a:210) Defining humans as belonging to ‘non’ groups leads to xenophobia, race hatred and stereotyping (*ibid*:210). I contend that the redefining of education for democratic citizenship (tying human rights to citizenship) is necessary. If we agree with Arendt (1966:297) and the South African Supreme Court of Appeals that ‘human dignity has no nationality’, then we must concede that the very notion of human rights education

⁸ Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 25 in Currie & de Waal, 2009:469)

tioned to citizenship education defined in ethnicity, nationality or the nation-state is exclusionary in nature and cannot aid the revolutionising of human rights values.

3.4.2.3 Power and self:other

The political community represents the generalised form of the self-determination in self:other determination (Jacobson, 2004:220). In its historical context, the sovereignty of nation-states denotes power separate and above self:other, who are regarded as the object of power and not the author of power (Snauwaert, 2009: 94,95). Self:other can only be the author of power when speech and action (re)constitute the relation self:other and create new beginnings (Arendt, 1958:200). Power associated with the relation self:other, keeps free spaces of togetherness in which continual new beginnings are possible, in existence. Arendt (*ibid*:206) describes the power of self:other as constituted through speech and action in “actuality.”⁹ When self:other are liberated in responsibility *for* self:other, they disrupt the world by starting a new “actuality” by means of speech and action and in so doing, claim power, sovereignty and create individual, collective and political identities. In “actuality,” means and ends merge (*ibid*:207). Acting in “actuality” transcends means and ends and in this process the continual re-imagination of responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of others, becomes “actualities” itself (*ibid*:207).

3.5 THE NORMATIVE NATURE OF SPACES OF TOGETHERNESS

The constitution of inclusive spaces of togetherness is a historic and continual quest for humans (2.4.1). The false consciousness of economic freedom (freedom to produce and consume) as human freedom and genealogy defining power and sovereignty, however, leave humans incapable of living a life rooted in relations (plurality) and becoming (natality). Children educated in the consciousness of labour may agree with Arendt (1958:58): “Whatever he [sic] does remains without significance and consequence to others, and what matters to him [sic] is without interest to other people.”

When children are liberated in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other and educated within an ethical relation teacher:child in classrooms as free spaces of togetherness, they can individuate themselves by confessing their *doxas* and living their

⁹ Arendt relates the living deed and the spoken word, which she believes to be the greatest achievements of which human beings are capable, to Aristotle’s *energeia* (actuality). He described activities designed to have their full meaning in their own performance as *energeia*. Arendt (1958:27,206) states that Aristotle’s perception of *energeia* as relating only to contemplation and thought is not relevant to the use of “actuality” in the context under discussion, as she believes that action and speech find its full meaning in the actuality of performance.

imagination (Greene & Griffiths, 2003:90). They realise and exercise their power to change the world with self:other. In exercising this power they do not only liberate and individuate themselves, but also liberate self:other to confess *who* they are. They take part in the dialectic of freedom and together with others constitute free spaces of togetherness in equality and dignity (*ibid*:90).

Classrooms, as spaces of togetherness, are characterised by the coming together of teacher:child, structuring their world and (re)constituting the relation self:other. The revolutionary and unpredictable nature of spaces of togetherness in which difference is confessed, imply that such spaces cannot be pre-designed and cannot be either a means to an end or an end in itself. New spaces are continually (re)constituted as the relation teacher:child is revolutionised.

Spaces of togetherness are normative in nature. They are concerned with a shared interest in the (re)constitution of the responsible, caring and compassionate inclusive relation self:other. In the context of this study, spaces of togetherness concern a shared responsibility *for* the individuation and revolutionising of self:other towards becoming rooted in human rights values.

3.5.1 In(ex)clusive relation self:other in spaces of togetherness

The relation self:other is a relation of *knowing* and *being-known* (Derrida, 2005:11,120). Facing self:other in equality of difference defines self:other as *someone*, as *an* other and not *the* other, alien to us (Booth, 1999:31). *Who* somebody is, becomes known when he/she narrates their autobiography in spaces of togetherness (Arendt, 1958:186). The ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness would then be the material conditions for revealing *who* we are in our equal difference (Arendt, 1990:83).

3.5.1.1 The relation self:other structured within a common human ontology in difference

It is difficult or even impossible to define *who* someone is. We find the description of the living essence of an individual person difficult, because it is defined in the realm between humans without the stabilising or solidifying influence of things (Arendt, 1958:181). It is easy to define *what* something or somebody is. Our vocabulary leads us to describe *what* something or somebody is, but words allude us when we endeavour the uncertainty and changing perplexities of *who* somebody is (*ibid*:181-182).

The modern world regards equality and sameness as interchangeable and equality and difference as opposites. While this legal egalitarianism aimed to eradicate discrimination, its product was that difference became intolerable to the modern world (Parekh,

2008:17). The eradication of self:other in distinction and difference, promotes universalism without pluralism (Jacobson, 2004:220). Arendt (1958:57) argues that the eradication of difference in the construction of human relations distorts the relation self:other. Difference is a characteristic of the human status in the world, without which the word humanity would be devoid of meaning (Isaac, 1996:68).

3.5.1.2 Diversity and difference

Schneider (1997:101) claims that daily encounters with diversity are a hallmark of our time. Diversity is defined as encompassing race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age and ability. The study of diversity explores the meaning and understanding regarding human and cultural variety, societal interactions and structures across time and space (*ibid*:107). Diversity as variety within society also refers to the diverse meanings and understandings in a plural society.

Modern societies tend to respond negatively to diversity or 'otherness'. Cultural avoidance and separation from those viewed as outsiders, leads to segregation and the cultural devaluation of groups (*ibid*:108). Makgoba (1997:144) states that during apartheid diversity were acknowledged and engaged but the result was the degradation of millions. The mere acknowledgement or tolerance of diversity does not free individuals to become equal and dignified.

Arendt (1958:176) describes the special difference of humans from non-humans as based on the principles of otherness, distinction and uniqueness. All organic life shows distinction and differentiation in its otherness. However, only humans can express their distinction and in doing this, differentiate themselves. In humans, otherness and distinction are expressed as uniqueness in dialogue (*ibid*:176). Our affinity to define the world and ourselves in differentiation from something or somebody, bears testimony to our affinity with otherness. Although otherness is an important aspect of plurality, human difference transcends otherness and defines plurality (*ibid*:176).

In describing difference, Zagzebski (2001:414) defines an individual as an "incommunicable unique subject." Incommunicable, she explains as that which belongs to the self and is in principle not shareable with self:other (*ibid*:414). She quotes Wojtyla (in Zagzebski, 2001:416) who states that personhood is irreducible in human beings and defined in the subjectivity of life-experiences. The word unique means to be the only of a kind. To describe or define the uniqueness of an individual thus implies that it cannot be done with reference to any other individual, group, object or subject. The fact that each individual human is irreplaceable and unique implies that the defining of *who* someone is

cannot be done in collective historical and social context, as every individual enters and disrupts history and society in singularity and in a unique way (*ibid*:416).

The particular, non-shareable uniqueness of individuals is a subjective, non qualitative mode of being (*ibid*:416). The world depends on the unique and irreplaceable disruption by individuals in time and space. Only in the unique life-story of each individual can the world be described and only through the irreplaceable and unique *doxa* of each individual human, can self:other be revolutionised.

Schneider (1997:106) recommends an engagement with difference as actively moving towards understanding. She further argues that dignity, respect and equality are only possible through engaging difficult differences instead of suppressing, denying or patronising it (*ibid*:106). I contend that moving towards understanding difficult difference needs more than an intent to understand or an acknowledgement of diversity. Difficult difference implies dissonance and disruption of meanings and understandings.

A pedagogy of dissonance in South African classrooms does not only concern the master narratives and ideologies embedded in the curriculum. It concerns teacher:child who are each unique in their difference (Jansen, 2009:258). Each carry unique meanings and understandings constructed from life experiences, which do not correspond to the life-stories and life-experiences of other children and the teacher they share the classroom with. They do not share a common understanding of the present, the past or a shared vision of the future (*ibid*:259). They need to confess their difference, disrupt own meanings and understandings and reconstruct new knowledge of self:other (*ibid*:258-259).

From the first half of this chapter I conclude that the normative relation self:other is constituted in responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other. In inclusive spaces of togetherness self:other construct the moral self, constitute the ethical relation self:other and disrupt and revolutionise meanings and understandings. Dialogic revolutions are sparked by the disruption of meanings and understandings, stabilised in responsibility *for* self:other and continually mediated by the moral precepts of forgiveness and promises.

Having explored the diverse views on the normative nature of the relation self:other in difference, I will now consider the intra-dialogic nature of the relation self:other in spaces of togetherness. In the final part of this chapter, I will indicate how intra-dialogue influences becoming and consciousness related to identity construction rooted in human rights values.

3.6 THE NATURE OF INTRA-DIALOGUE

Intra-dialogue is the ethical, relational, revolutionary and individuating deconstruction and reconstruction of difference in search of one's own meanings and understandings towards continual becoming. The dialogue in search of understanding and identity construction requires two selves in dialogue (Pitt, 1998:542). Arendt (1990:88) describes the dialogue between "I as two-in-one" as an indication of human plurality and the origin of ethics and the relation self:other. Cary (2006:10) describes such a dialogue as "the analysis of discourses of self." The quest to understand and make meaning of one's own life experiences by means of intra-dialogue has been described by scholars such as Arendt (1990:88), Bauman (1994:77), Cary (2006:10) and Pitt (1998:543).

Pitt (1998:543) argues that narrating an autobiography in a search of understanding is interrelated to the construction of identity. Methods, such as life history and psychoanalyses, are used to explore and understand the construction of narratives and identity. In these frames of references, narratives and identity are structured by deconstructing past life stories from the vantage point of the present (*ibid*:543). The ethical, individuating and revolutionary nature of the dialogue between self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:88) has been extensively explored within the post-structural and psychoanalytical frameworks.

In the psychoanalytical frame of reference the revolutionary and individuating nature of the dialogue between self as two-in-one (*ibid*:88) in identity construction is described as becoming in terms of a progressive and linear process by which past life experiences are deconstructed, reconstructed and reintegrated into more recent understandings (Pitt, 1998:543). The dialogue between the superego and the ego, in the psychoanalytical framework is understood to be a continual process exploring multiple possible meanings (Meyer, Moore & Viljoen, 2008:55,89). Narrating autobiography in this framework is understood to be a continual creative and dialogic process of self-transformation and identity construction (Pitt, 1998:542).

The ethical nature of identity construction, within the psychoanalytical framework is described as the dialogue between the superego and the ego (Meyer *et al.*, 2008:55). The superego, as representative of moral codes and societal rules, guides the ego to accepted and expected conduct and behaviour (*ibid*:55). Pitt (1998:541) argues that psychoanalyses is an ethical and continual process, as the self never reaches the goal of ego and superego in balance. During deconstruction, self is continually confronted by his/her own difference between moral self and societal rules and codes of conduct

(*ibid*:540). This confrontation can be between dominant social moral codes and rules and the meanings and understandings of self or it can present itself as feelings of dissonance when new knowledge disrupts prior knowledge and prior self-understandings (*ibid*:539).

While psychoanalysis emphasises the role of societal moral rules and codes of conduct (super-ego) on the construction of the moral self (ego) in the dialogue between self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:88; Pitt, 1998:541), my focus is on the construction of the moral self as a pre-ontological happening (Bauman, 1994:76). In my view, psychoanalytical analysis, in its narrow emphasis on the authoritarian role of society in the construction of the moral self, inhibits the personalising of morality and the becoming of self:other. During intra-dialogue the construction of the moral self and identity starts with the choice to be responsible *for* self:other (*ibid*:77). In responsibility *for* self:other, self deconstructs the conflicting difference between self as two-in-one and the conflicting difference between self:other. During intra-dialogue self:other is thus not an authoritarian other, prescribing rules and codes of conduct but an other who is invited and received, as a significant partner, by self into the conflict between self as two-in-one and self:other (Ruiz, 2004:275).

The self deconstructs and reconstructs own difference during intra-dialogue but is simultaneously open to difference confessed within self:other (Du Preez, 2009:108). Self continually and simultaneously disrupts own difference and the difference between self:other in a search for understanding own responsibility in the relation self:other. The self is constantly confronted with his/her own difference and discomfort regarding self:other and the difference between self:other as a significant partner in the intra-dialogue self as two-in-one (Arendt, 1990:88). Intra-dialogue is thus the intimate dialogue between and within self:other in historical, present and future non-linear space and time. It is not a progressive or linear process of becoming. Self questions, deconstruct and critically assess, own and other meanings and understandings while linking past and future expected (individual and collective) life experiences to the conscious awareness and understanding of a present life experience (Ochs & Capps, 1996:21,22; 3.7).

The ethical nature of the dialogue between self as two-in-one needs unpacking (Arendt, 1990:88). Within the psychoanalytical framework the ethical nature of analysis presumes that societal rules of conduct and moral behavior guide the self through dialogue and analysis, to 'normalised' behaviour (Meyer *et al.*, 2008:55). Both Arendt (1990:87) and Bauman (1994:77), however, argue that the ethical relation self:other has its origin in the

construction of the moral self. The ethical relation self:other is a result of the construction of the moral self when choosing responsibility *for* self:other (Arendt, 1990:87; Bauman, 1994:61). Bauman (1994:61) argues: “We are not moral thanks to society (we are only ethical and law-abiding thanks to it); we live in society, we *are* society, thanks to being moral.” This would imply that self:other is not a regulating force to the moral self, but *someone* for *who* the self is responsible (*ibid*:79). Self remains his or her own interpreter in the dialogue self as two-in-one, however unsure and anxious this renders self (Arendt, 1990:8; Bauman, 1994:80).

The ethical, individuating, relational and revolutionary nature of intra-dialogue aiding individuation and identity construction, will be explored in more detail next.

3.6.1 Intra-dialogue as ethical experience

Derrida (2005:37) describes responsibility *for* self:other as a double responsibility. It is a responsibility for answering before and for myself and answering before and for us. Intra-dialogue in the ethical relation self:other starts with the continual deconstruction of the moral self (as singular) and self:other (together) as simultaneously equal and different and as equally responsible for questioning meanings and understandings and individuating self:other. In acting on the double responsibility *for* self:other, the self regards all others as equal partners in difference through which the normative and dialogic self:other relation is (re)constituted, questioned, and revolutionised (Hale in Nealon, 1997:131).

During intra-dialogue all *doxas* are held in equal value and answered in compassionate responsibility. It is thus not in *what* truth is spoken or *what* truth is believed to be true, but in the responsibility and answerability to the confessional nature of the truth or individual *doxa* shared (Arendt, 1990:81; Derrida, 2005:54). In compassion and responsibility, self:other, in singularity “come together without ceasing to be what they are destined to be.” (Derrida, 2005:54).

3.6.1.1 Answering narratives confessing *who* we are

The ethical responsibility to answering a narrative confessing *who* we are, relies on the acknowledgement that each individual *doxa* is equal in difference and continually being revolutionised.

a) *The responsibility to confess difference in intra-dialogue*

The confession of difference demands responsibility from self in being truthful when confessing *who* he/she is. Levitt (Levitt & Morris, 2011:157) describes her responsibility to honesty in intra-dialogue as: "Saying no to elision of perspectival differences was for me all about being brutally honest about what I experience and not pretending to conform. And it was scary and hard." It, however, also demands the responsibility from self:other to answer for and before all of humanity (Derrida, 2005:37). In the relation self:other humans may choose to not confess own difference or to disregard difference confessed, by representing self:other as a single story (Forde, 2011:xiii-xv). Regarding self:other as a single story silence a confession of *who* someone is by replacing it with a representation of *what* they are.

Every individual life, confessed and deconstructed as narrative during intra-dialogue, includes all of human life over time but also situates the self in a specific time and space (Bauman, 1994:41). Individual narratives confessed during intra-dialogue, are in this regard multiple stories stretching over the limited span of a beginning (birth) and end (death) of a specific and unique human life. Relating present experiences to other past and future expected individual and collective experiences and narratives, self:other cannot be known in the time frame of a single narrative (Arendt, 1958:184; Ochs & Capps, 1996:23). It is not possible to confess the complexity of a human life in a single story (Adichie in Forde, 2011:xiii-xv). Every single story confessed as narrative is partial in nature (Forde, 2011:xiii-xv). In this sense, narratives confessed during intra-dialogue, give meaning to multiple partial selves confessed as multiple stories (Ochs & Capps, 1996:21). By using narratives, self attempts to connect these multiple stories as his/her fluxing identity in time and over time (*ibid*:29).

Humans structure and confess individual and collective life experiences as narratives by means of language. Following Nietzsche's (2010:28) argument regarding the structuring of concepts by which we communicate, it becomes clear that confessing autobiographical difference is risky and difficult. Nietzsche (*ibid*:28) argued that humans, by allocating words to life experiences, confess life experiences by means of shared concepts. We confess single, individual and unique experiences by means of concepts, but then also fit multiple similar experiences into the same concept. We thus group together and name countless different experiences by seeking sameness or similarity. We regard one concept as representing multiple individual *doxas* and life experiences (*ibid*:28). Concepts, by which humans confess difference are thus constructed by overlooking the individual and concentrating on generalisations.

It would seem then, that even when affording the opportunity to reveal difference by means of intra-dialogue, humans structure difference according to generalisations. The necessity of multiple *doxas* confessing *who* we are should therefore be the premise for spaces of togetherness narrating difference (Nealon, 1997:131). Arendt (1958:57) argues in this regard: “Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.” The responsibility towards answering equally different narratives as a biography of multiple stories, is thus crucial to the structuring of self:other and identity.

b) Narrating difference: individuating self by means of intra-dialogue

Confessing *who* we are carries the risk of generalisation. In order to narrate the essence of a life expanding over multilayered time and space as well as multiple individual and collective experiences, multiple stories are linked and questioned during intra-dialogue. Each of these stories is unique and equal in difference although every story also represents all of humanity.

Narratives are constructed in the immediate conscious awareness of an experience. It translates reflective awareness of personal life experiences into *who* we are, affirming our irreplaceable value in the relation self:other (Ochs & Capps, 1996:21; Brown, 2009:599). Self, experience and narrative are thus inseparable during intra-dialogue. Self comes to know self:other through autobiographical narratives. While tapping into pre-existing understandings and knowledge, the immediacy of narratives results in and mediates an ever flowing, fluxing, and evolving identity (Ochs & Capps, 1996:22).

Narratives simultaneously define the fluxing position of self in difference and togetherness. The construction and confessing of narratives during intra-dialogue are instrumental in the individuation of the self in difference as well as the positioning of the self in the relation self:other (4.6.4.1). It defines the simultaneous separateness and togetherness of self:other (*ibid*:32). The experience of being both singular and together in the relation self:other, creates opportunities for self to navigate and understand the relation self:other as separate and together (*ibid*:18-19).

Narrating an autobiography is thus an attempt to individuate self:other by means of understanding and meaning-making of life experiences. When personal or collective

narratives are silenced by force, domination or trauma, it results in dissociated, alienated and repressed self:other (*ibid*:30).

c) The silencing of narratives

The implicit or explicit silencing of narratives can have many possible origins. Explicit silencing of narratives during any form of oppression reduces humans to being defined as a 'single story' such as being poor, being imperialists, being black or being white. The horror of oppressive and dehumanising experiences, the "naked monstrosity" (Arendt, 1994:745) of it, leaves humans unable to narrate an autobiography. Dehumanising trauma at the hand of self:other, severs the connection between self:other (Brisson, 2007:366). In not being able to narrate horrific experiences, humans cannot reconcile past, present and future and cannot reconnect with self:other.

Recollections of historic horror by future generations, may also drown present individual life-stories, making it difficult to distinguish between truthful autobiography and deferred autobiography (Levitt & Morris, 2011:159). When narrating an autobiography, it is necessary to distinguish between multiple own stories, losses and horror and the legacies of collective past loss and horror (*ibid*:159). The meta-biography of historical horror within a space and time may blind us to multiple rich, different and continually new autobiographies.

Autobiographic narratives are situated in specific contexts of historical space and time and are therefore not always rooted in un-coerced knowledge. Narrating an autobiography was for many years regarded as a sole prerogative of western cultures (Forde, 2011:xiii). The western locus of autobiography dating back to enlightenment individualism, has however been disrupted by the way in which African writers have resisted, and rejected this colonial meta-narrative in recent decades (Berger, 2010:35). African autobiographies only recently became autonomous voices of freedom and de-colonisation representing human difference (*ibid*:35).

Confessing our difference takes courage (Arendt, 1958:186). The self may thus voluntarily choose to hide *who* he/she is. This choice consequently makes it impossible for self to know self:other or be known in the relation self:other. By choosing identification as a task in post modernity, humans present themselves as "true to kind" and not true to self (Bauman, 2001a:145). Accentuating sameness and otherness, "true to kind" offers self an opportunity to belong and construct an identity by means of

identification. Although sameness and otherness are important aspects of plurality, togetherness and intra-dialogue provide self:other opportunities to individuate themselves in difference and in doing so, transcend sameness and otherness by defining *who* they are (Arendt, 1958:176).

3.6.2 The relational character of intra-dialogue

In the relation self:other, self as two-in-one, finds the space and rhythm for questioning and confessing autobiography by means of intra-dialogue in continual movement between the inside-of-self and outside-of-self in spaces of togetherness (Arendt, 1958:175-177; Nancy, 1998:438). By means of intra-dialogue, self finds the “inclination *towards* the other, of one *by* the other and of one *to* the other.” (Nancy, 1998:431).

Within the relation self:other, intra-dialogue does not aim to reach consensus or find ‘truth.’ Arendt (1990:80) understands dialogue between self:other to be “talking something through with somebody.” She uses the Socrates’ model of dialogue to structure her understanding of the relational nature of dialogue. In confessing and questioning difference in *doxa*, multiple different *dokei moi* (it-appears-to-me or my individual, different truth), becomes known to self:other (*ibid*:81,84). By understanding and investigating difference confessed by self:other, many possible answers regarding what an ethical life could or should be, will unfold. In following the Socrates model of dialogue, I would thus argue that intra-dialogue concerns questioning own and other viewpoints and exploring different meanings and understandings in the relation self:other. The relational purpose of intra-dialogue is thus not persuasion or consensus but understanding and revolutionising the relation self:other.

Human rights dialogue often concerns or aim to reach consensus (2.5.2; 3.3.2). Habermas (in Du Preez, 2008:53-55) regards dialogue as crucial to reaching consensus when diverse meanings and understandings present themselves. His theory of temporal consensus reached by means of the better argument remains of great importance in many contexts (Du Preez, 2008:53-55). In the context of identity construction, consensus is in my view, not relevant although possible. When the self narrates his or her *doxa*, there is no possibility of others validating this. Every life story and *doxa* is unique and even if life experiences are shared by others, self when narrating this experience, links it to own unique past experiences and future expectations, not shared by anyone else. The value in sharing my *doxa* remains in the experience itself (3.4.2.3). It provides self:other with an opportunity to question own truthfulness, confess *who* self

is and continually revolutionise self:other. Although others may not be able to validate or share a *doxa*, the relation self:other remains a prerequisite to the questioning, individuating and revolutionising of identity.

3.6.3 The revolutionary nature of intra-dialogue enabling becoming

Freire (1993:65) describes humans as always being in the process of becoming. He argues that humans are unfinished and incomplete in a likewise unfinished and incomplete world (*ibid*:65). The fact that human life and the world is and will remain incomplete and unfinished, makes humanising possible. It is in the continual birth and re-birth of humans that faith and hope for every individual and all humanity lies (Arendt, 1958:247).

Becoming is the continual revolutionary process by which humans individuate themselves in the relation self:other as irreplaceably unique partners. Becoming is dependent on the ethical, relational, individuating and revolutionary characteristics of intra-dialogue. Becoming happens during intra-dialogue in a quest to humanise an incomplete and unfinished self:other. Intra-dialogue is the manifestation of the conscious awareness of the inevitable continual re-birth of self:other. By continually questioning self:other, meanings and understandings are disrupted, deconstructed and reconstructed in the relation self:other. Jansen (2009:256-259) explains that the displacement of indirect knowledge with liberating knowledge requires both oppressor and oppressed to move to the understanding of self:other in their brokenness, and not focus on the world as pre-designed and statically divided between oppressors and oppressed.

In a post-conflict context such as South Africa, neither authoritarian knowledge nor absolute relativism will lead to understanding and becoming. Jansen (2009:259) and Du Preez (2009:101) criticise a moral relativist position with no commitment or moral fibre and argue that through dialogue, the balance between commitment of own understanding and openness to the understanding of self:other, can be found (Du Preez, 2009:101; Jansen, 2009:259-260). I would thus argue that both openness and commitment are crucial to disruptive moments, sparking dialogical revolutions.

Becoming by means of autobiographical narratives is not a soothing process. Confessing difference by means of narratives during intra-dialogue illuminates oppositional opinions or viewpoints. Intra-dialogue will not yield absolute truth. It will yield truthful and authentic feelings, *doxas* and new understandings (Levitt & Morris,

2011:157). It is about “talking about my own desires and where they come from, what they mean, and how they are connected to these larger narratives, stances and postures.” (*ibid*:157-158).

New beginnings are not the beginning of the world or the beginning of new objects created by humans (Arendt, 1958:177). They are the continual new beginnings and becoming of an incomplete unique and irreplaceable someone constituting the relation self:other during intra-dialogue as an equal partner (Arendt, 1958:177; Freire, 1993:25).

3.7 INTRA-DIALOGUE AS REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS

Human consciousness has been extensively explored by many philosophers, psychologists and educationalists. Nietzsche (2010:92) rooted consciousness in the human herd instinct and not in individual existence. Consciousness is in his view, developed only *in relation* to all others (community and society). Freire (1993:60-61,69) argued that through authentic words, which include the two dimensions of reflection and action, humans become conscious beings transforming self:other by means of praxis. Consciousness of self *in relation* is also described by Nancy (1998:438-439) as the awareness of the inside-of-self in relation to the outside-of-self which is only possible in the relation self:other. During dialogue between the inside-of-self and outside-of-self, the self is conscious of self as in intimate dialogue within a space of communion, constructing community (*ibid*:439). Nietzsche (2010:94) stated that consciousness of the self in self:other is not related to difference. He argues that consciousness of self in the relation self:other can only make known the common-ness of humanity – that which we share (*ibid*:94). Consciousness, according to Nietzsche (*ibid*:94) involves an awareness of and acting on a shared truth regarded as useful and of interest to the human species.

I regard human consciousness as ethical, relational, revolutionary and individuating. My argument is that consciousness is related to both plurality and natality. As I view it, human consciousness is the awareness of self in the intra-dialogic relation self:other, reflexively searching for meanings and understandings in responsibility *for* self:other. In the relation self:other, all individuals are conscious of self:other as incomplete and unfinished and are in a continually process of becoming by means of dialogic revolutions. Consciousness as subjective awareness of self in the revolutionary relation self:other also implies being conscious of self as unique, irreplaceable and incomplete, co-constituting self:other (equally incomplete) as an equal partner.

Freire (1993:56) distinguishes between a conscious being and a possessor of a consciousness. Consciousness of *being* is the awareness of self being singular and simultaneously together with self:other in the world. Self is conscious of being in a simultaneous intra-dialogic relation self as two-in-one and self:other. The essence of being conscious of self in intra-dialogic relations is intentionality. Self is conscious of being *in relation* and intent on revolutionising self:other (*ibid*:60; 2.2.3).

Consciousness of being in the dialogic, revolutionary, ethical and individuating relation self:other in a classroom as a space of togetherness, relates teacher:child as simultaneously singular and together (*ibid*:61-62). Teacher and children are jointly and separately responsible *for* self:other in teaching and learning and jointly and separately responsible *for* self:other in questioning understandings (*ibid*:61,62). By questioning meanings and understandings in responsibility *for* self:other, dialogic revolutions are sparked.

Humans use language to express their experiences around a core of meaning found in primary consciousness (Greene, 1988:158). Freire (1993:64) describes the core of meaning as background awareness. Humans living in the world and continually transforming the world with self:other, simultaneously create history and become historical-social beings (*ibid*:82). Individuals connect a momentary fragmented present experience, by means of memory to past experiences in order to present a unified perception of subjective awareness (John, 2003:244,246). Each individual life experience is subjective and unique and linked to present conscious awareness and background awareness (Zagzebski, 2001:414). Even if an experience is shared, the lived experience of any event remains individual and can only be deconstructed and reconstructed by self in intra-dialogue.

Conscious beings are self:other in the world, (re)constituting self:other and co-creating the world as equal partners (Freire, 1993:56,60). In order to learn and make sense of the world children need to voice their consciousness (Greene, 1988:158). The child can then reflect upon him/herself as a conscious being in relation with self:other. The child, conscious of self:other, constitutes meanings and understandings to own experiences. This will then imply that the child also gives meaning to the world and constitutes the world and in doing that, (re)create a curriculum in terms of own consciousness (*ibid*:159).

Humans share a collective consciousness of objects or subjects (Nietzsche, 2010:94). The danger inherent in being only conscious of objects and not conscious of being responsible *for* self-other is described by Freire (1993:40) as “to *be* is to *have*.” A consciousness to have is a consciousness only related to objects. The consciousness of *having* and not *being* transforms the earth, property and people themselves into objects at the disposal of those who are in a position to have and those who aspire to have. In an unrestrained quest for possessions, humans stay in contact and situated in the world by having and not by being responsible *for* self:other (*ibid*:40). Perceiving having as a condition for being, humanity is perceived as a right, a claim, a thing exclusive to some and an aspiration to others. By defining humanity as having, possessing or producing, self:other cannot be liberated to accept the responsibility *for* realising freedom, dignity and equality.

Arendt (1958:41,45) emphasises the dangers of oppression inherent in the consciousness of labour or *having* as Freire (1993:40) defines it. The consciousness of labour does not root itself in plurality and natality. It regards and distinguishes between ruling and being ruled (Arendt, 1958:119; Arendt, 2002:203), equality and inequality (Arendt, 1958:27,119,175-181) and define humans as only *what* they are (*ibid*:180-181). Humans are regarded as a means to an end, objects which could be predesigned and efficiently controlled by theories of behaviourism (*ibid*:41,45) and the banking concept of learning and teaching (Freire, 1993:53). Individual and collective revolutionary becoming rooted in plurality and natality is not possible in the consciousness of labour.

In the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other, the conscious awareness of self:other is continually narrated by means of intra-dialogue, connecting present, partial and individual experiences to past and future awareness of self:other. In relation and by means of intra-dialogue, self:other deconstruct and reconstruct own, individual experiences as self-consciousness (simultaneously individuating and relational) and acknowledges self:other as incomplete and unfinished. In the consciousness of being incomplete self:other continually reflexively deconstruct own doxa and intentionally revolutionise meanings and understandings in responsibility *for* self:other.

3.8 DISRUPTION AND INTRA-DIALOGUE

By means of intra-dialogue self:other narrate a fluxing autobiography and identity related to multiple meanings and understandings of self:other. Narrating an autobiography truthfully, implies facing self:other in difference. There is no “reciprocity of perspectives”

(Schutz in Bauman, 1994:147) when difference is narrated. Mis-understanding, resulting from difference confessed between self:other, demands questioning, deconstruction and reconstructing of meanings and understandings (Bauman, 1994:147). Through the experience of mis-understanding, self:other get an opportunity to confront beliefs, opinions and meta-narratives (Du Preez, 2009:108).

In facing difference, the immediacy of an experience situates self:other in a disruptive space where prevailing understandings do not apply, as the experience is still unconnected to prior meanings and understandings (Ochs & Capps, 1996:29). Meanings and understandings about self:other rely on human cognitive processes, which prefer order. Shared meanings and understandings communicated by societies about self:other over time follow order, scalability, systematic, connectivity, and relevance. The repetitive nature of meanings and understandings are structured and processed according to systematic and pre-existing cognitive patterns (Malley & Knight, 2008:51-56).

Mis-understanding disrupts the ordered and pre-existing patterns of meanings and understandings. New patterns of knowledge are constructed when meanings and understandings are disrupted and reconstructed in spaces of togetherness. When self:other reconstruct meanings and understandings after disruption, new meanings and understandings can propagate across societies and communities (*ibid*:57). New meanings and understandings therefore spring from the difference confessed between self:other during intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness. By reconstructing new possible understandings, previously not regarded as possible or probable, self:other and identity are revolutionised (Ochs & Capps, 1996:30). The discomfort and dissonance resulting from difference confessed between self:other are of great importance in constructing new meanings and understandings in teaching-learning (Du Preez, 2009:108; Jansen, 2009:266).

In an article on the value of epistemic relativity for students studying Religion in Education, Du Preez (2009:91) uses the findings from a case study to explore the valuable role of intra-dialogue in disrupting meanings and understandings. In the case study in question, she constructed and deconstructed a written narrative from the letters written to her by a student during the course of a year. Du Preez (*ibid*:106) describes the constructed narrative as an illustration of the interrelated dialogue between self:other following disruption of meanings and understandings. The interrelated dialogue also describes the search for balance between openness to other views and the commitment to find and anchor self:other in truthfulness to own *doxa* (*ibid*:108).

Du Preez (*ibid*:102) argues that the biographical information drawn from the letters that were voluntarily written by the student indicate that the student conducts her intra-dialogue within the ethical relation self:other in a space of togetherness. The student thus trusted the relation self:other and the space of togetherness enough to confess her *doxa* truthfully. The student acknowledges difference as “normal, healthy and correct” and states “it just seems that people are so different and everybody interprets things differently – it is so relative” (*ibid*:103-104). The questioning of own *doxa* moving constantly between the inside-of-self and the outside-of-self is thus premised on an acknowledgement of the value of difference. The student actively explores difference by discussing her thoughts about religion in education with other people in order to gain various viewpoints (*ibid*:104).

During the course of a year the student, although situated in a specific time and space, explores multiple individual and collective past, present and future expected meanings and understandings related to religion and religious difference. This student started her revolutionary questioning of own *doxa* regarding religion during adolescence by examining the difference between Christian denominations – an indication of the revolutionary nature of intra-dialogue concerning meanings and understandings as a continual process (*ibid*:103). During her written narrative the student connects own and other past, present and future meanings and understandings regarding religion in order to revolutionise own *doxa*, while balancing own *doxa* between openness and commitment.

Using the voices of this student and lecturer, I will illustrate the ethical, relational and revolutionary nature of intra-dialogue. I will also attempt to illustrate the value of dissonance and disruption in balancing commitment to one’s own views with openness to other views.

The continual search for meaning and understanding regarding religion is expressed by the student in her letters and in her biographic background provided by the lecturer:

She did some church-hopping

Du Preez, 2009:103

The student intuitively considered epistemic relativity long before she was introduced to it

Du Preez, 2009:106

I wondered why we are Dutch Reformed and why this denomination is more correct in its way of interpreting the Bible than other denominations

Du Preez, 2009:103,

When the process started I wasn't able to stop it. And if questions arise now, I cannot just leave them-I have to pursue them

Du Preez, 2009:105

It is clear from the above, that deconstruction and reconstruction of meanings and understandings may start intuitively before any dissonance or disruption is present (*ibid*:106). Arendt (1990:101) refers to this as “the pathos of wonder.” To wonder about knowledge and life is inherent in the human capacity to question. All humans are question-asking beings. Asking ultimate and (un)answerable questions is the beginning of philosophy and science. It is also the beginning of epistemology and the quest for ontological meaning and understanding (*ibid*:98-99). Asking the question ‘why’ sparks dialogic revolutions enabling becoming (Freire, 1993:67). In the human capacity to question and wonder lies the inevitable and unpredictable continual revolution of self:other and the quest for new beginnings and new understandings of what a meaningful life would entail.

This narrative illustrates the value of discomfort and disruption sparking dialogic revolutions enabling becoming. Du Preez (2009:101) explains: “learning often takes place when we are taken beyond the borders of comfort.” Bauman (1994:147) takes a similar view: “It is the mis-understanding that requires explanation, makes us pause and think, sets minds moving, triggers the process of conscious knowledge-building.” Constructing knowledge about epistemic relativity was clearly a very discomforting process for the student (Du Preez, 2009:105) as the following from the article show:

Relativism is just as problematic, I am a black and white person

Du Preez, 2009:105

That she hated it in the beginning

Du Preez, 2009:105

Facing self:other in epistemic relativity, the experiences in the classroom and the discomfort it brought sparked the student's dialogic revolution by means of intra-dialogue in search of own truth, meaning and understanding. Illustrating the relational character of intra-dialogue the student states:

I wonder what knowledge is and what could be viewed as knowledge,
Du Preez, 2009:105

If you truly want to have a thorough understanding of something, you must
get as many other perspectives as possible.

Du Preez, 2009:105

One cannot just individualistically interpret things because everything is
relative-one has to search more widely for other perspectives in order to
justify oneself

Du Preez, 2009:104

The student was able to articulate, structure, understand and connect her own past, present and future viewpoints, after investigating and considering many other religions (viewpoints and opinions) and writing reflexive letters in trying to structure and possibly integrate her own and other viewpoints. She also took a position on epistemic relativity, which balanced her own position with openness to the views of others (*ibid*:106-107). During the course of the year she was able to construct her *doxa*, share her *doxa* and reconstruct and justify her *doxa*. Her dialogic revolution revealed *who* she was in that specific space and time and hoped to be in future. Her commitment to her own *doxa* was her act of foundation from which she could re-enter a new dialogic revolution. As she states:

Because I am sure about my beliefs and why I believe as I do, I feel free and
open towards investigating other religions. I also feel that I do not have to let
go of my religion or beliefs

Du Preez, 2009:107

I realise that relativity is a reality, but this does not mean that I hold fast to all
that is relative. I have to understand something as thoroughly as I can. I
discover different perceptions and opinions, but eventually I construct my own

Opinions and knowledge - so, obviously my questions are instigated by relativism

Du Preez, 2009:105

The relation self:other, premised on compassionate responsibility *for* self:other liberates self to continually question meanings and understandings (in the context of this narrative, the meaning and understanding of epistemic relativity related to religion). During this intra-dialogue both student and lecturer are liberated to search for, deconstruct and reconstruct own meanings and understandings. Du Preez (*ibid*:107) concludes: "Relativity could introduce the questions that dialogue requires and thus assist students to engage in dialogue and to construct knowledge."

The facing of self:other sparking the disruption of own meanings and understandings was mediated by compassionate responsibility and an acknowledgment by the lecturer and class "that one's autobiography matters" and a search for "how it matters." (Reilly, 2009:383). The student's lived experiences of relativism and knowledge regarding religion shaped her existential nature (Du Preez, 2009:103), aiding her to commit to own *doxa* while acknowledging that there "might be more than one foundation" to religion (*ibid*:107).

3.9 IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

The concept "self" as a prefix in self-determination or self-realisation, first appeared in the English language during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The study of "self", long central in the study of social psychology, has become fashionable in the study of international relations and humanities during recent years (Jacobson, 2004:220).

3.9.1 Self and identity

Recently, "Identity studies" (Bauman, 2001a:140) has become a thriving industry as well as the prism through which many aspects of contemporary life are examined and understood. The *what* and *who* humans are defined by, is thus crucial to our understanding of self:other. Discourse relating to the analysing, understanding and interpretation of society and community is shaped to fit around the 'identity' axis. Justice and equality are discussed in terms of 'recognition' (*ibid*:140), culture in terms of the categorical individual or group difference and the political process is examined and related to issues concerning human rights and the individual (*ibid*:140).

The post-modern individual is not a unitary subject. The post-modern individual is decentred, differentiated and open (Quicke, 1996:366). During post-modernity it becomes increasingly difficult for self to hold an individual narrative going. The fragmented self, in trying to connect *who* he/she is, how they became what they are, and who they expect themselves to be in future needs an inner personal space to understand and connect the many different interpretations of self (*ibid*:366).

Self can only attempt to answer the question 'who am I.' An autobiography answering the question 'who am I' is not possible (Berger, 2010:34). It remains a political, philosophical and linguistic impossibility (*ibid*:34). Berger (*ibid*:34) in reference to Eakin (in Berger, 2010:34) therefore describes self not as an entity but as an awareness in process. Narrating the continual changing awareness of *who* I am in the relation self:other is a continual narration of individuation. This autobiographic narration is confessed in the relation self:other as identity. In contrast to traditional societies, identity in modern and post-modern societies is not regarded as a given.

Arendt argues that self as two-in-one, is changeable and somewhat equivocal (Arendt, 1990:88). The ever-changing potentialities of self:other, represent the changing expectations self has in the relation self:other. In this sense, Arendt (1958:246; Arendt, 1990:88) agrees with Booth (1999:35) that change is the only constant in all human affairs. Identity construction, as the awareness of self, is only possible in continual new beginnings within the relation self:other and spaces of togetherness.

3.9.2 Identity construction rooted in the ethical and revolutionary relation self:other

Arendt (1958:9,11,175,) links identity to the human conditions of plurality and natality. Identity rooted in natality and plurality is constructed by self in the relation self:other, confessing *who* we are in equal difference and in human life understood as continual new beginnings (*ibid*:175). Identity constructed in the revolutionary relation self:other, individuates self as equal in difference and responsible *for* self:other. Identity is constructed when we confess *who* we are through speech and action in the relation self:other (*ibid*:179).

Revolutionary construction of individual identity in the relation self:other, happens when all views and *doxas* are questioned and answered equally. This is made possible by the ethical nature of intra-dialogue (3.6.1). When self chooses to accept responsibility *for* self:other, self is liberated from predesigned moral rules. This liberation entails *I am for* self:other (Bauman, 1994:76). Facing self:other as *I am for*, self chooses responsibility

for self:other in spaces of togetherness. This choice is the origin of continual identity construction. It is the awakening to being, the birth of the self as the unique *I*, the irreplaceable *I*, answering to the responsibility for self:other (*ibid*:77).

3.9.3 Identity construction as an ethical responsibility to *what* and *who* we are

Identity construction is the continual revolutionary expression of individuation, confessing “who” someone is in spaces of togetherness. It relies on both belonging and togetherness in the relation self:other. Sameness and otherness, manifesting in belonging to a structured group, be it ethnic, consumer driven, religious or cultural is an important aspect of plurality and identity. (Arendt, 1958:176) Belonging reveals *what* we are. In belonging individuals find security, stability and order. Meaning-giving and understanding are collectively pre-designed, socially achieved and constructed.

Difference confessed in the relation self:other is not relevant to belonging to a socially achieved structure. The awareness of self as unique and different thus becomes possible by individuating confessions in spaces of togetherness transcending sameness and otherness. Individuating self:other relies on the human condition of plurality in which self:other are defined by *who* they are in their unique distinctness (*ibid*:176).

3.9.3.1 Responsibility for self:other mediating *who* we are

Responsibility for transcends and precedes the relation self:other (Bauman, 1994:71). Self constructs identity in responsibility for self:other, before he/she is together *with* self:other. The fluxing nature of identity construction is a manifestation of its revolutionary character, continually starting a-new. Identity construction in responsibility for self:other transcends all duties and rules regulating the relation self:other. Duties and rules make humans a-like but “moral responsibility exists solely in interpolating the individuals and being carried individually.” (*ibid*:54). Moral responsibility for self:other is not the consequence of the ethical relation self:other, but the beginning of the ethical relation self:other and the construction of identity (*ibid*:57).

Moral responsibility defines self as both singular and together in self:other. Self is alone and singular as a morally responsible person but also together *for* and *with* self:other. When self:other face each other in spaces of togetherness the encounter is unequal and unbalanced. Responsibility for self:other does not demand reciprocity or balancing up. It is not ‘I versus Other’ (*ibid*:48-49). It transcends the contractual rules and obligations, means and ends prescribed in belonging. The ‘we’ in the relation self:other cannot be a plural ‘I’ (*ibid*:49). Self is responsible for self:other, irrespective of the choice self:other

make concerning responsibility. Respecting the possible choice made by self:other, to not be responsible *for*, is intrinsic to the self's choice to be responsible *for* self:other (*ibid*:50). Responsibility *for* self:other remains a singular choice, demanding continual deconstruction of the moral self. Self does not choose responsibility *for* self:other when deconstructing *what* he/she is categorised to be or to which group he/she belongs, but in the continual deconstruction of the singular *who* he/she is and could be.

3.9.3.2 *Who* we are rooted in human rights values freedom, dignity and equality.

Responsibility *for* self:other, mediating the construction of the moral self and spaces of togetherness roots the relation self:other in the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality. The natural school regards the relation self:other as contractual. The social contract between self and other is concerned with the claims of individuals relating to their natural rights and is regulated by duties, obligations and contractual penalties if not adhered to (Howard & Donnelly, 1986:803; 3.3.1). The deliberative school regards the relation self:other as a 'consensual relationship' resulting in a code of conduct regulating politics and peace (Dembour, 2010:6,8; 3.3.2).

Concluding from the previous section that the responsibility *for* self:other not only precedes the relation self:other but also transcends all rules, obligations and duties, I would argue that both the natural and deliberative schools' views on the relation self:other is not premised on the ethical relation self:other realising freedom, dignity and equality in spaces of togetherness. In the ethical relation self:other, self is free to be "I am I as I am for the Other." (Bauman, 1994:78). Human rights values rooted in responsibility *for* self:other, is not a contractual responsibility as I am responsible *for* self:other before I am *with* self:other. The responsibility of self thus precedes the calculation of reciprocity, means and ends, contractual duties as well as the calculation of possible penalties. The singular choice to be responsible *for* self:other also precedes the answer of self:other concerning responsibility *for* self:other. Ethical togetherness can therefore also not be consensual as self:other is free to choose not to be responsible *for* self:other. Choosing responsibility *for* self:other, does not demand equal responsibility. I am *for*, irrespective of the answer from self:other. Responsibility *for* is the beginning of the relation self:other; it is embedded in human rights values and is not the consequence of these (*ibid*:57)

The protest school (2.5.3; 3.3.3) regards the relation self:other as defined in a common human ontology and the equality of difference (Arendt, 1958:181; Derrida, 2005:37). Although the relation self:other does not demand equal reciprocity of responsibility, it implies equality of difference. Arendt (1990:81) defines the irreplaceable value of the self

to be in his/her unique difference. Bauman (1994:77) defines the unique and irreplaceable *I* as the moral self being responsible *for self:other*.

I would therefore argue that the continual (re)construction of identity, defining the unique and irreplaceable *I*, should be regarded as a fundamental human right as it precedes the choice to be responsible *for self:other*, enabling the realisation of human rights values in the relation *self:other*. Only in the birth of the moral self, in choosing to be *for self:other*, can self be dignified, equal, irreplaceable and unique.

Teaching and learning *about* human rights may realign teacher:child to changing contexts and ideologies. It will not revolutionise individual meanings and understandings regarding identity and human rights values (Jansen, 2009:171). Individual meanings and understandings are revolutionised, when the moral self and identity are continually (re)constructed in responsibility *for self:other*.

3.9.3.3 *Who* we are and hope to be facilitated by forgiveness and promises

Narratives confessing *who* we are link past, present and future expected life-experiences to the subjective awareness of individual experiences in a specific time and space. Although consciousness, as a subjective awareness of self is related to personal ontological experiences – the situated self – past experiences as background awareness influence both present and future consciousness of self as unique and irreplaceable in the relation *self:other* (Rivage-Seul, 2003:100).

Linking subjective past, present and future background awareness concerning meanings and understandings, *self:other* narrate multiple stories confessing *who* we are and *who* we hope to become. Identity construction, continually moves from *is* to *ought*. Moving from *is* to *ought* is an intentional revolutionary process towards becoming. *Self:other*, continually and intentionally revolutionise themselves while constructing identity. *Self:other*, in his/her quest to move from *is* to *ought*, is conscious of *being in relation*, intent on revolutionising *self:other* (Freire, 1993:60). Identity construction is always premised on a perceived ideal of *who* an individual envisage him/herself to be (De Ruyter & Conroy, 2002:512).

Becoming our envisaged future self is continually derailed when unexpected and irreversible consequences resulting from the confessing of difference, disrupt the relation *self:other* (Arendt, 1958:300). If a teacher, for example, claims to have chosen responsibility *for teacher:child*, he/she implicitly makes a promise to take responsibility *for teacher:child* in a classroom. This promise regards her/his own revolutionary and

continual identity construction, individuating him/herself as responsible *for* teacher:child. It also regards him/her answering the confessing of equal difference by teacher:child irrespective of other choices to responsibility. In confessing difference, the relation teacher:child are disrupted by mis-understanding, sparking dialogic revolutions. The consequences of the confession of difference are mediated by continual forgiveness and promises (De Ruyter & Conroy, 2002:515).

During intra-dialogue teacher:child articulate, structure, understand and connect own past, present and future viewpoints confessing *who* they are and would hope to become. Intra-dialogue reveals *who* we are but also *who* we wish to become. While being conscious of ourselves as unfinished and incomplete in an unfinished and incomplete world, continual dialogic revolutions aid us from what *is* to what *ought* to be.

3.9.3.4 Masking difference in belonging

The masking of difference results from an accentuation of *what* humans are. Our preoccupation with sameness and otherness is illustrated by our defining of self:other in reference to one another. Self:other should transcend sameness and otherness in confessing their unique distinction during intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness (Arendt, 1958:176). When humans are unable to transcend sameness and otherness it results in a distortion of self:other. Collective and individual past, present and future narratives are then presented as single stories categorising self:other in belonging (3.6.1.1).

Categories of ethnological identities and the ontology underlying identity in liberal and neoliberal democracies is a manifestation of global socio-political imagination acting as an “identity machine” designing fluxing belonging (Leve, 2011:517; 3.4.2.1). Market rationality and principles structure social and political environments in which individuals have to engage with neoliberal concepts of agency and identity (Gershon, 2011:538). Completing the neo-liberal circle, individuals active in a neo-liberal constructed political and social environment, adapt to a neoliberal concept of agency and identity in order to stay competitive (*ibid*:539).

Individual identity, in a neo-liberal frame of reference, is conceptually tied to collective identities. It is assumed that collective identities and individual identities are constructed a-like (Ree in Leve, 2011:519). The unique difference of individuals in belonging is masked by the conception that collectives have common histories and expectations of the future (for example “what women want”) (Leve, 2011:519; 4.6.4).

Neo-liberal identity constructed within collective belonging does not individuate the self as unique but as a proprietor of individual capacities marketable as a commodity (*ibid*:520). Only after calculating the risks and gains involved with connecting to others the individual enters into social contracts with others (Gershon, 2011:540). The neo-liberal consciousness of *having* and not *being*, although making ample use of dialogue, results in both self and other perceived as a means to an end. Self is perceived as a corporate entity with skills and assets, which can be utilised as a means to a profitable end. All others are perceived as objects with whom the self can enter into contracts, profiting his or her pursuit towards a socially designed end: “to be is to have.” (Freire, 1993:40).

The human rights value freedom is strongly emphasised by neo-liberals. Freedom of choice is regarded as paramount in constructing identity, entering into social contracts and in taking responsibility for success and failure (Gershon, 2011:540). The fluxing engagement between the individual, market rationality and consumerism results in fluxing identification within designed spaces of sameness and otherness. Human life and human identity in the consciousness of marketisation and consumerism are an open-ended and a never-ending process of compulsive self-creation in a quest for the security of belonging to socially constructed or achieved spaces (Bauman, 2001a:148; Gershon, 2011:540).

Individuals use their power as consumers to freely choose an identity affording them the security or stability of belonging to a solid frame of category or class (Bauman, 2001a:148). By means of identification they anchor their identity in a stabilising and solidifying social, economic, cultural, religious, and ethnic or gender frame of belonging. They are not interested in *who* (transcending sameness and otherness) they are, but coerced into a continual search for *what* they are and where they fit in. Identity becomes a designed and achieved state continually shifting to meet demands and needs (*ibid*:147).

Free choice, proclaimed by neo-liberals as being available to self:other when designing identity, happens between predetermined options. Critique of neo-liberalism’s limited choices reveals an ignorance of the structural reasons for limited choice (Gershon, 2011:540). Freedom of choice in this context actually describes freedom to act on the calculation of risk and opportunity involved within predesigned choices (*ibid*:540). Predesigned choices aimed at profit and prosperity always involve actions which disadvantage someone in an unequal playing field, with a concomitant increase in the inequality between rich and poor (*ibid*:540; 3.4.2.1).

The masking of difference by the consciousness of sameness and otherness in belonging makes the confessing of *who* individuals are impossible. Furthermore, it pre-designs self:other related to the consciousness of objects and having. Everything and everyone are perceived as static, contained and autonomous objects mastered by “knowledge about.” (Holloway in Leve, 2011:523). Individuals with different *doxas*, constituting self:other and spaces of togetherness are swallowed by meta-narratives and no dialogic revolutions are possible.

3.10 THE DIALOGIC NATURE OF THE RELATION SELF:OTHER

Intra-dialogue is the anthropological, ontological and epistemological experience of dialogue in the relation self:other. By means of intra-dialogue self:other revolutionise meanings and understandings, construct identity and, in the consciousness of being unfinished and incomplete, continually re-imagine what ought to be in responsibility *for* self:other. In spaces of togetherness, intra-dialogue is the lived experience of revolutionary becoming, consciousness and identity construction.

By means of intra-dialogue, self:other confess *who* they are and revolutionise identity towards *who* they hope to become. Confessing *who* we are regards equality of difference. *Who* we are regards the narration of autobiographies consisting of multiple stories, situated in the present but also in historical and future time and space. The origin of identity construction is in the choice of self to be responsible *for* self:other. During the making of this choice the moral self is constructed and the self is bound to all others in compassionate, non-reciprocal responsibility.

Non-reciprocal responsibility demands self to stay responsible *for*, irrespective of the choice of self:other. Responsibility *for* roots the relation self:other in the human rights values of freedom, dignity and equality. By choosing responsibility *for*, self:other are liberated to be equal and irreplaceable partners in free spaces of togetherness. In equality of difference self narrates his /her autobiography and, by his/her confession, becomes a dignified someone.

3.11 SUMMARY

The revolutionary search for the ethical premise of the relation self:other has been a quest since the beginning of humanity. In the relation self:other, self and other are simultaneously singular and together. Self is singular in his/her unconditional

responsibility *for*, but also bound to self:other in responsibility. Unconditional responsibility *for* self:other is the beginning of the moral self and identity construction and results in the ethical relation self:other, realising freedom, dignity and equality.

What we are in belonging is an important aspect of plurality, while *who* we confess to be in spaces of togetherness, defines plurality in difference. The relation self:other and spaces of togetherness include all of humanity sharing as purpose the intent to disrupt meanings and understandings towards dialogic revolutions moving humanity from what *is* to what *ought* to be. Free spaces of togetherness are characterised by unpredictability, mis-understanding, dissonance and disruption. By means of intra-dialogue, following disruption, dialogic revolutions constructs new ways of knowing and being responsible *for* self:other.

Curriculum should provide spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue in which teacher:child continually (re)construct identity, conscious of self:other as equally free and dignified in difference. In curriculum spaces of intra-dialogue, self:other are constituted, continually revolutionised and (re)constructed. In curriculum spaces of intra-dialogue, teacher:child will move education and society from what *is* to what *ought* to be. The possible re-imagining of society, education and curriculum in spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue are discussed in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER FOUR

CURRICULUM AND INTRA-DIALOGIC SPACES: RE-IMAGINING SELF:OTHER

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The understanding and the re-imagination of the relation self:other continually problematises and is continually problematised by changing understandings of human rights values. Referring to Socrates' question (2.1): "How should one live?" (Williams, 2011:1), I would like to rephrase this question in Chapter Four as: How should one live curriculum? This question asked in a teaching-learning context goes beyond the question of what the teacher and child should do. It is related to the question posed by Ruiz (2004:271): "Is the pupil a mere object of knowledge or *someone* with whom it is necessary to establish a moral relationship?"

Ruiz (*ibid*:272) argues that education and the curriculum have its origin in the moral relation teacher:child. This relationship manifests itself in teaching-learning as the meeting between teacher:child "obliged to give answers in their situation of alterity", transcending *what* they are in the continual search for *who* they are (*ibid*:274). Receiving and answering related to teacher:child in the context of identity construction lies in equality of difference. Teacher:child receive an other as *someone* – "valued in his [*sic*] irrefutable dignity as a person" (*ibid*:275). This would imply that the invitation and reception of an other into the relation teacher:child in the teaching-learning context happens during the continual search for *who* we are in spaces of togetherness.

Searching for self as a dignified and valued someone in curriculum spaces requires a deconstruction of 'how we know what we know' (Cary, 2006:134) of self:other and human rights values. Curriculum spaces are not abstract spaces. In curriculum spaces conflicting experiences, intersecting in categories of knowing such as class, race, ethnicity, gender and religion, are confessed. The conflicting experiences within the relation teacher:child in classrooms result in dissonance and the disruption of knowing and meaning-making. The deconstruction of difference within self and difference within the relation self:other is done by means of intra-dialogue. Intra-dialogue is the revolutionary and simultaneous deconstruction of difference within self and between self:other. By inviting an other into intra- dialogue, deconstruction moves between inside-of-self and outside-of self in search of the dignified and valued self as an equal partner in the relation self:other.

The disruption and analyses of categories of knowing is a moral act. It originates in the construction of the moral self and in the choice to take responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other (Bauman, 1994:77). This is a responsibility *for* self:other in non-linear time and space:

I am not yet born: forgive me
 for the sins that in me the world shall commit, my words
 when they speak me, my thoughts when they think me.
 My treason engendered by traitors beyond me,
 my life when they murder by means of my
 hands, my death when they live me.
 MacNeice, 1944: *Prayer before birth*¹⁰

The first section of this chapter explores the *South African Constitution and Bill of Rights* focusing on the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality and the balancing of these rights. The second section focuses on the conditions needed for the construction of identity, rooted in human rights values. The last section concerns a curriculum inquiry and the conceptualisation of curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces in which identity construction is situated in the consciousness of responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other.

4.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS: SOCIO-HISTORIC CONTEXT

During the years 1994 to 1996 the Constitutional Assembly drafted and adopted the *South African Constitution*. The thirty four constitutional principles became the framework for the construction of a democratic state protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of all South African citizens (Currie & de Waal, 2009:6-7). The basic principles of the *South African Constitution* (1996), underlying the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution (including the *Bill of Rights*) (1996) are: constitutionalism; the rule of law, democracy and accountability; separation of powers and checks and balances; co-operative government and devolution of power (*ibid*:6-7)

Although the *Bill of Rights* (1996), which was adopted as part of our constitutional democracy, is perceived by many South Africans as the first official introduction of

¹⁰ Louis MacNeice (1944): *Prayer before birth* is one of the suggested poems for Literary studies Grade 11 and 12 English First and Second Additional Language NCS-CAPS (2011). See addendum 1: p 283

human rights in a South African context, the ANC¹¹ claims a long tradition of advocating human rights. On 16 December 1943 the ANC adopted a *Bill of Rights* at their annual conference (Asmal, Chidester & Lubisi, 2005:5). The ANC's original *Bill of Rights* (1943) is characterised by inclusiveness and the expansion of human rights. Claiming that the ANC's vision of human rights is not derived from Western interpretations of human rights, the Bill stated that the idea of human rights arises whenever and wherever there is oppression (*ibid*:5). The 1943 *Bill of Rights* was rooted in the resolve that the ANC would not only be a liberation movement but an alternative power to white minority and will therefore represent the urge for self-determination and democracy of the majority of South Africans (Motlanthe in Asmal *et al.*, 2005:ix). The 1943 *Bill of Rights* deals in a concrete manner with all discriminatory and restrictive laws and resulting oppression (Asmal *et al.*, 2005:5-6).

Human rights fall into three classes namely first, second and third-generation rights. First generation rights include the right to life, to freedom, to equality, to dignity, property, free speech, assembly and association (Juta Pocket Statutes, 2008:vi). Second generation rights are rights to proper socio-economic conditions and third generation rights are rights for people or group rights. First-generation rights limit state power while second and third-generation rights place an obligation on the state to make these rights a reality (*ibid*:vi). The historical and revolutionary construction of the three classes of rights has been extensively explored in Chapter Two with reference to the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, the First and Second World Wars and Globalisation. The influence of the accentuation of any of the three classes of rights to the detriment of other rights is explored in section 2.5, while the effect on the relation self:other is explored in section 3.3.

4.2.1 The South African Constitution and Bill of Rights (1996): freedom, dignity and equality

The *Constitution of South Africa* and *Bill of Rights* (1996) describe the South African society as founded on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom (Currie & de Waal, 2009:272). The *South African Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996) are prescriptive in nature concerning the role of the state regarding the realisation of human rights values, but narrow in their description of freedom, dignity and equality. They place explicit responsibility on the state to institutionalise human rights values. Citizens might interpret this as meaning that the realisation of freedom, dignity and equality is the

¹¹ The African National Congress was a liberation movement during apartheid. Since winning the first democratic election in 1994, the ANC has been the majority and ruling party in South Africa.

responsibility of the state, NGOs and the global community. A brief exploration of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality as set out in the *South African Constitution* (1996) will follow next.

4.2.1.1 Dignity

Reflecting on human dignity as central to the *South African Constitution* and *Bill of Rights* (1996), Chief Justice Chaskalson (in Currie & de Waal, 2009:272) concludes: “The affirmation of (inherent) human dignity as a foundational value of the constitutional order places our legal order firmly in line with the development of constitutionalism in the aftermath of the second world war.” The attack on human dignity during the Second World War and the influence thereof on the UDHR (1948) were explored in section 2.4.4. The South African Constitution should thus be contextualised within the post-war European constitutionalism tradition, the UDHR (1948) and the South African socio-historic context and revolutionary processes preceding the *Constitution* and *Bill of Rights* (*ibid*:272). In the light of the confessions of apartheid atrocities, the right to life is regarded as paramount in the *Bill of Rights* (1994) (*ibid*:280). The right to life is regarded as interrelated to the right to dignity and requires the state to play a leading role in the protection of life and dignity, preserving respect for the value and worth of humans (*ibid*:280-281)

Human dignity is ranked on a par with freedom and equality. This implicitly and explicitly explains the role of rights in South Africa. Rights are not merely a protection of individual liberty against state power, but require a commitment from the state to protect dignity and equality (*ibid*:272). The *Bill of Rights* (Juta Pocket Statutes, 2008:54) defines human dignity as inherent in every human and states that human dignity should be protected and respected. Like international human rights declarations and treaties, the South African *Bill of Rights* (1996) is rooted in the liberal conception of human dignity inherent in human nature with natural rights as entitlements (2.5.1). Dignity defined in the essentialist perception of human nature can be traced to the Kantian moral philosophy, which concludes that human dignity is related to human value and worth (Currie & de Waal, 2009:273; 2.5.1). In this view, the expression of the inner moral nature and value of humans is only possible in a liberal regime adhering to the moral values of equality, freedom and autonomy (Howard & Donnelly, 1986:802-803).

4.2.1.2 Equality

“Equality is a difficult and deeply controversial social ideal.” (Currie & de Waal, 2009:230). In its most basic and abstract understanding, equality means that humans “similarly situated in relevant ways” should be treated equally. The controversy regarding this conception of equality concerns two issues. In the first instance it is problematic to determine the similarity in the situation of different humans. Secondly, the question is what similar treatment entails? The *Constitution of South Africa* demands that the state not only continually explore these issues but also actively achieve equality in the South African society (*ibid*:230). Section 9(2) of the *Bill of Rights* commits the state, by law, to provide equal enjoyment and benefit of rights and freedoms to all South Africans (*ibid*:230,231).

The obligations of the state in order to achieve equality are prescriptive in the South African *Bill of Rights* (1996). This Bill includes “legislation and other measures designed to protect and advance persons and categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination” and demands that “national legislation ... be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.” (Juta Pocket Statutes, 2008:54). Full equality is defined as the “equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms” and “equality before the law” (*ibid*:54). To achieve full equality, a distinction is made between formal equality and substantive equality. Formal equality refers to sameness of treatment and substantive equality requires the law to ensure equality of outcome, tolerating disparity of treatment to achieve equality of outcome (Currie & de Waal, 2009:233). Formal equality refers to all persons as equal bearers of rights (*ibid*:233). The *South African Bill of Rights* (1996) thus defines formal equality in the modern metaphor of an inclusive human ontology based on sameness. It refers to the conception of human rights grounded in human nature and ‘the natural rights of man’ originating during the Enlightenment period .

The *Bill of Rights* (1996), however, moves away from the traditional liberal interpretation regarding first generation rights by its explicit and prescriptive attention to the achievement of formal and substantive equality. It places obligations and duties on the state in order to institutionalise substantive equality (Currie & de Waal, 2009:233). It places a duty on the state to examine the socio-economic disparities of the South African society and address this in order to achieve formal equality. This would include legislative and other measures protecting and advancing categories of persons disadvantaged by discrimination (*ibid*:233).

Defining equality in terms of non-discriminatory behaviour and entitlements to rights implicitly makes the state responsible for equal treatment in its regulation of the

behaviour of its citizens. The prescriptive nature describing the measures that the state ought to take in order to achieve substantive equality creates the illusion that the citizens of South Africa can expect the state to bestow equality upon them as long as they refrain from discriminatory behaviour and claim unqualified equal enjoyment of rights.

4.2.1.3 Freedom

The *South African Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996) describe and interpret freedom in the narrow (qualified) sense of the word (Currie & de Waal, 2009:292). This is best illustrated by the interpretation of the Constitutional Court of Section 11(1) of the Constitution. The section states that every person has the right to freedom and security of person, including the right not to be detained without trial. Ackermann (in Currie & de Waal, 2009:292) argues in *Ferreira v Levin NO*¹² that the right to freedom should be interpreted in the sphere of individual liberty. Furthermore, the section implies that the state is constrained from imposing restrictions on the conduct of the individual without sufficient reason. The Constitutional Court rejected this argument and concluded that the primary purpose of 11(1) of the Constitution is the mere protection of the physical integrity of the person (*ibid*:293).

The *Bill of Rights* (1996) defines the different rights to freedom as follows; freedom of persons (regarding imprisonment, torture, slavery and treatment received from the state and others) (Juta Pocket Statutes, 2008:54-55), freedom of opinion, religion and belief (*ibid*:55), freedom of expression (including freedom of speech) (*ibid*:56), freedom of association (*ibid*:56), freedom of movement (*ibid*:57) and freedom of trade, occupation and profession (*ibid*:57). The *South African Bill of Rights* (1996) thus oblige the state to protect individual freedom to movement, opinion, physical integrity, occupation and association and also limits state interference with these rights to freedom. This perception is a remnant of the Enlightenment revolution when the nation-state replaced the feudal systems and the existence of the nation-state was dependant on the protection of its citizen's rights (2.4.2).

Apart from needing to abstain from war propaganda, incitement of violence and the advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion (*ibid*:56), the individual has very limited prescriptive responsibilities towards self:other regarding the realisation of freedom, equality and dignity. With regard to the rights of humans to revolutionise their world by acting in, on and with the world in spaces of togetherness (Freire, 1993:63-64), the rights and responsibilities of liberated individuals are explicitly

¹² *Ferreira v Levin NO* 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) paragraph 54 in Currie & de Waal, 2009:292

prescribed in the *South African Constitution* (1996). Section 57(1) (b) of the *South African Constitution* (1996) recognises the importance of participation in any lawmaking process by citizens of South Africa. It states that the National Assembly may make “rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement.” (Currie & de Waal, 2009:15).

4.2.1.4 Balancing freedom, dignity and equality

The diverse interpretations of human rights influence the accentuation of one or more of the human rights values as well as the balancing of rights (2.4). The normative understanding of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality furthermore has an impact on the holistic interpretation of all three generations of rights and the balance of power and sovereignty in the relation self:other (Mihir, 2009:178). Liberal regimes, because of their essentialist grounding and interpretation of human rights often emphasise first generation rights to the detriment of second and third generation rights (*ibid*:178). Socialist regimes, because of their interpretation of human rights as rooted in community, becoming and their emphasis on moral rights, regard the realisation of second and third generation rights, as mandatory for the realisation of first generation rights, often to the detriment of individual freedom (*ibid*:178).

Although the South African Constitution is explicit in the equal reciprocal balance between human rights values (Currie & de Waal, 2009:272), the Bill of Rights is based on a liberal conception of human rights as rooted in human nature. It therefore implicitly emphasises individual rights *a priori* to community and society (2.5.1). In the South African context, partly because of our history, there is a growing demand for the realisation of second and third generation rights. The realisation of these rights, because of the prescriptive nature of the Bill of Rights on equality, is furthermore regarded as the obligation of the state, NGOs and the global community (4.2.1.2). The *de facto* interpretation of human rights, is therefore rooted in the tension between socialist and liberalist understandings of human rights: second and third generation rights are claimed from the state while a liberalist individualist emphasis on rights as entitlement, places no responsibility *for* self:other on citizens (4.2.1.3).

The realisation of second and third generation rights remains an area of contention in many African countries, not only in South Africa (2.5.4.). The conception that second and third generation rights can only be realised by the state reduces humans to victimhood and objecthood (Neocosmos, 2006:365,376). In many African countries, citizens become dependent on the state, international aid organisations and local NGOs for the

realisation and institutionalisation of the three generations of rights. In such a context, power and sovereignty gradually shift away from the people to the state, global organisations and NGOs (*ibid*:358). Humans become objects hoping for their rights to be bestowed upon them instead of choosing to act as free, equal and dignified in spaces of togetherness.

4.3 DEFINING THE HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES FREEDOM, DIGNITY AND EQUALITY

In a search for understanding of the concepts of freedom, dignity and equality, it is necessary to de-politicise human rights values. Derrida (2005:105) describes such a process as a deconstruction of different positions, different experiences and *doxas*, explored in search of a heterogeneity of understandings. De-politicisation, however, does not imply an indifference to social bonds or community (*ibid*:104). It entails an exploration of the relation self:other rooted in the values of freedom, dignity and equality and the a-political and political manifestations of these values between self:other.

As with democracy, the question would thus be whether human rights are still viable if it was not conceptually tied to citizenship, nation-state or global structures. Derrida (*ibid*:104) poses the following question in this regard: “Would it still make sense to speak of democracy [*human rights*] when it would not be a question (no longer in question as to what is essential and constitutive) of country, nation even of State or citizen – in other words, if at least one still keeps to the accepted use of this word, when it would no longer be a political question?”

Human rights are a crucial part of humanity’s quest for an ethical code guiding self:other from what *is* to what *could* be. “If we accept Sigmund Freud’s proposal that all dreams contain at its core a wish” then the revolutionary capacity of human rights and human rights education could be regarded as a wish to end human suffering (Sliwinski, 2005:219). Human rights are not a final end in themselves but they cannot be a means to an end, such as emancipation and liberation (1.3.1). The historical revolutionary disruption and re-imagination of the values freedom, dignity and equality between self:other in spaces of togetherness have been explored in Chapter Two. These revolutionary disruptions and continual new beginnings have influenced and still influence the ethical and dialogic relation self:other rooted in human rights values. This was explored in Chapter Three.

The ontological, epistemological and moral commitment of self:other to the values of freedom, dignity and equality, originates during the (re)construction of the moral self as responsible *for* self:other. During the continual (re)construction of the moral self, meta-

narratives are disrupted and customs, laws and predesigned morality are transcended. Responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other is irrational and non-reciprocal (2.3.2). The ethical and dialogic relation self:other affords self the opportunity to realise the values of freedom, dignity and equality in spaces of togetherness while (re)constructing identity by means of a process of disruption and intra-dialogue (3.9.3.2).

After reflection and reflexion on the different views on human rights values and self:other explored in Chapters Two and Three, I define human rights values and the conditions necessary to continually constitute and revolutionise these values in curriculum spaces in the next section.

4.3.1 Freedom, equality and dignity as revolutionary, normative, dialogic and relational responsibilities *for* self:other

In my view and in reference to scholars such as Neocosmos (2006:358), the values of freedom, dignity and equality are not inherent in human nature and cannot be claimed from the state, NGOs or global human rights watchdogs. Human rights values are primarily a revolutionary, relational, ethical and dialogic process of becoming realised between self:other. The realisation of human rights values has its origin in the ethical, dialogic, relational and revolutionary individuation of self in the relation self:other. Human rights and the realisation of human rights values start with the continually changing moral self in responsibility *for* self:other.

Freedom is not an entitlement but brings with it an ethical responsibility to revolutionise the equality and dignity of self:other. The responsibility for realising human rights values is an active responsibility. A free world is possible when self:other in spaces of togetherness disrupt meanings and understandings and spark dialogic revolutions. Freedom, equality and dignity are realised in the actuality of action and speech and are a continual process of renewing the world and self:other, relying on the human and worldly conditions of natality and plurality (Arendt, 1958:178,207). The values of human rights are in essence an ethical, relational and revolutionary choice made by self:other, following the choice to continually (re)construct the unique and irreplaceable moral self.

4.3.1.1 Freedom

Both Arendt (*ibid*:11,177-178; 1960:44) and Freire (1993:29) regard freedom as a characteristic of human existence in the world and not an inner human disposition or inherent to human nature. Freedom is a continual revolutionary, relational and dialogic process. Every individual birth is symbolic of a new beginning, interrupting history and

creating new possibilities for the liberated self:other to construct freedom in the world (Arendt, 1960:43). Arendt (*ibid*:33) and Freire (1993:31) link humanity's gift for freedom to the human capacity for action and new beginnings. Liberated humans act in and on the world with self:other towards continual freedom, new beginnings and continual becoming (*ibid*:63-64). Dialogic revolutions towards freedom, dignity and equality are never complete – “no single event can ever once and for all deliver and save a man [*sic*], a nation, or mankind [*sic*].” (Arendt, 1960:45).

All revolutions have freedom as purpose (Arendt, 1965:29). Freedom has its origin in moral liberation and follows a revolutionary process towards becoming. This process is sparked by the continual deconstruction and reconstruction of the moral self. The self is liberated from prescriptive and predesigned consciousness when choosing responsibility *for* self:other. In responsibility *for* self:other, the self leaves behind the security and stability of predesigned interpretations of human rights values which direct self:other towards reciprocal claims and entitlements. Liberation to freedom is the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in the world, in order to transform it from what *is* to what *ought* to be within the relation self:other (Freire, 1993:60-62). Freedom constructed between self:other therefore does not concern the free-will of self to act in self-interest, but the freedom to continually deconstruct the boundaries set by predesigned interpretations of human rights values towards the continual becoming of self:other.

Since the Enlightenment revolutions, the free-will of humans and freedom have been conceptually tied (Arendt, 1960:37). The conflict originating from the conceptual tying of free-will and freedom should be balanced in the consciousness of *being for* self:other (Arendt, 1960:37; Bauman, 1994:79). The revolutionary construction of freedom in responsibility *for* self:other is ontologically rooted, it happens between self:other (Arendt, 1958:246). The deconstruction and reconstruction of the free self during intra-dialogue needs to be balanced in an openness and responsibility *for* the freedom of self:other (Arendt, 1960:79; Du Preez, 2009:108).

The responsibility and compassion, which hold self to others in spaces of togetherness, liberate self to acknowledge and continually revolutionise his/her equal difference and identity. The continual deconstruction and reconstruction of freedom relies on the sharing of different *doxas*, regarding each as equally meaningful in spaces of togetherness (Arendt, 1958:58). The human capacity for continual new beginnings renders self:other simultaneously free *to* be who they are but also free to be responsible *for* self:other.

Freedom, constituted in and through difference, is both a burden and a source of immense power (*ibid*:233-235). The burden of freedom lies in the irreversible and unpredictable consequences of exercising it. Self:other are free to disrupt life – to act in and on the world – and free to start a-new from the consequences of confessing difference. In new beginnings, relying on forgiveness and promises, self:other can continually act free in their difference (*ibid*:241,244). Herein is the immense power of freedom – the power to create and recreate self:other (*ibid*:233).

4.3.1.2 Equality

Equality is an ethical, revolutionary, relational and dialogic process. This process presupposes the ethical liberation and freedom of self in responsibility *for* self:other. Derrida (2005:37) defines equality as a normative process relying on respect and responsibility. The responsibility towards becoming equal, concerns respect for our shared humanity and our difference. Becoming equal thus requires an ethical relation self:other in spaces of togetherness rooted in a common human ontology and difference.

In spaces of togetherness relying on difference, un-equals become equal partners by means of intra-dialogue in a quest to construct the irreplaceable self and re-imagine self:other (Arendt, 1958:214-215; Arendt, 1990:83). Only when we confess our unique difference, revealing *who* we are and accept responsibility for *who* self:other confesses to be, can we become equals. In spaces of togetherness we become equal partners of irreplaceable value in transforming self:other. The construction of the unique and irreplaceable self is therefore crucial to becoming equal.

Humans cannot become equal in passivity or in singularity (Arendt, 1958:214-215). Becoming equal partners requires us to speak and act in and on the world (Arendt, 1990:83; Freire, 1993:63-64). This is only possible in the relation self:other and in free spaces of togetherness. Equality in difference becomes possible when self:other choose to confess equal difference truthfully in spaces of togetherness and self:other become equal partners in continual new beginnings (Arendt, 1958:178; Arendt, 1990:83).

4.3.1.3 Dignity

Human dignity presupposes freedom and equality in difference. Humans have dignity when they are valued for *who* they are – a unique individual. To be a ‘nobody’ *en masse* is to be without dignity (Arendt, 1958:181). Human life is (logically) always about the life of *someone* (Masschelein, 2001:10). Dignity is constituted when liberated humans in free spaces of togetherness, confess *who* they are as equal partners in difference. In the

responsibility and respect for *who* we are, we acknowledge self:other as *someone* worthy of dignity (Arendt, 1958:180-181).

As with freedom and equality, dignity can only be constituted in ethical, dialogic and revolutionary relations. Confessing difference in the relation self:other, acknowledges equality of difference and realise human dignity. In revealing *who* we are, self:other receive an other as *someone* in his/her irreplaceable value and dignity (Arendt, 1958:181; Ruiz, 2004:275). Human dignity are related to *who* self:other confess to be. The unique essence of each individual self, continually confessed as autobiography in free spaces of togetherness continually (re)constitutes human dignity. Responsibility and respect towards human dignity would thus entail the protection of the continual and revolutionary construction of individual identity in free spaces of togetherness and in equality of difference.

4.4 THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO REVOLUTIONISE IDENTITY ROOTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES

Identity concerns self in the relation self:other, transcending *what* she/he is and individuating him/herself as *who* they are by confessing difference. Freedom in responsibility *for* self:other, allows self:other, in equality of difference, continually to (re)construct the unique and dignified self in spaces of togetherness. It includes the responsibility *for* self:other to be protected from:

those who would freeze my humanity,
 would dragoon me into lethal automaton,
 would make me a cog in a machine,
 a thing with One face, a thing, and against
 all those who would dissipate my entirety
 MacNeice, 1944: *Prayer before birth*

The two conditions relevant to the construction of identity rooted in human rights explored in this section are the ethical relation self:other and the constitution of spaces of togetherness. The conditions for identity construction, by means of disruption and intra-dialogue, rooted in human rights values are related to the anthropological, ontological and epistemological concerns discussed in Chapter One (1.7). It concerns responsibility for multiple ways of 'how we know what we know' (Cary, 2006:134-144) within multiple contexts of knowing regarding the unique self:other. The deconstruction and reconstruction of how we come to know what we know and the continual re-imagination of future knowing, depends on the active disruption of meanings and

understandings by means of intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness between self:other.

4.4.1 The ethical relation self:other as condition for intra-dialogue and identity construction

Identity cannot be constructed or explained outside the relation self:other (Ruiz, 2004:287) but paradoxically also cannot be constructed or explained in relation *to* self:other. Self remains singularly unique within the relation self:other. The essence of *who* we are can never be explained by means of generalisations or the generalised concepts or categories of sameness and otherness (3.5). Self and other remain equally different in the relation self:other. The ethical relation self:other pre-supposes a moral commitment towards the equal difference within self and the difference between self:other (McCall, 2005:1778).

The ethical and dialogic relation self:other constitutes ontological and epistemological spaces in which self:other, by means of the narration of multiple different *doxas*, confesses what *is*, revealing the nature of society, curriculum and the conditions for being. It is also an epistemological space in which self:other disrupt what *is*, deconstruct *how* and *what* we know and re-imagine new knowledge and meaning-making through intra-dialogue. In an ethical and non-reciprocal space of simultaneous difference and togetherness, multiple ways of knowing can be deconstructed and re-imagined.

4.4.2 Spaces of togetherness as condition for intra-dialogue and identity construction

Spaces of togetherness are rooted in the complexity of the human condition defining self:other as equal in difference in an inclusive common human ontology (Arendt, 1958:196-197). Within spaces of togetherness and by means of intra-dialogue, personal transformation, the deconstruction of what *is* and the re-imagining of what could be, escaping the means-end rationale become possible. Before exploring spaces of togetherness as ontological, epistemological and ethical, I shall discuss the structural boundaries preventing the constitution of spaces of togetherness and explain the concept of free and safe spaces.

4.4.2.1 Structural boundaries preventing the constitution of spaces of togetherness

Spaces of togetherness do not automatically exist. The constitution of spaces of togetherness is an act of the will. In order to reflect on and disrupt the complexities and contradictions in the relation self:other, spaces of togetherness need to be intentionally

created (Avest ter, 2011:17). Opening up spaces of togetherness requires the courage to rupture boundaries and barriers, to allow the unpredictable to unfold and to shift the dominating rhetoric from *I* to *we* (Bernhardt, 2009:61,63). Slattery (2006:33) argues that structural and epistemological barriers in society such as racism, sexism and classism render us incapable of deconstructing our own complicity in oppression and reinforce our inability to revolutionise self:other.

Spaces of togetherness can only be constituted and stabilised by a deconstruction of *how* we know and *what* we know and in an acceptance that knowledge of self:other and the world is partial and evolving (Slattery, 2006:33). Ellsworth (1989:324) quotes a student's comment on the conditions for structuring spaces of togetherness: "If you can talk to me in ways that show you understand that your knowledge of me, the world and the 'Right thing to do' will always be partial, interested and potentially oppressive to others, and if I can do the same, then we can work together on shaping and reshaping alliances for constructing circumstances in which students of difference can thrive". Spaces of togetherness are thus dependent on liberation *for* self:other *from* predesigned conceptions and reciprocal entitlements.

In acknowledging and deconstructing structural and epistemological barriers and boundaries, epistemological spaces of togetherness are continually constituted, barriers are 'cleaned' and 'opened' to make allowance for reflective, reflexive and interpretive practises allowing personal becoming and continual identity construction (Bernhardt, 2009:61). Within spaces of togetherness, a search for 'who am I' by means of autobiography, embraces different voices, encourages care, compassion and responsibility in an ethical relation self:other and in a continual search for understanding and meaning (*ibid*:62).

4.4.2.2 Spaces of togetherness as free, safe and risk accommodating

As Du Preez (2012:58) points out, safe spaces as metaphor for classrooms emerged during the 1990s. Teacher:child regard themselves as safe from an un-safe outside world. However, there is an inherent irony in the notion that classrooms are *safe* because *safe* spaces are essentially about risk and danger: they are also contentious and risky spaces of being with self:other (*ibid*:59). The conceptual tying of safe spaces with 'play' and 'freedom' clouds the understanding of safe spaces as ontological experience. Bauman (1994:170) describes the yearning for play in liquid society: "Play is free. It vanishes together with freedom. There is no thing as obligatory play, play on command. One can be coerced to obey the rules of the game, but not to play" (*ibid*:170). Play and playfulness are protected behind its temporal spatial walls and borders.

Individuals can stop play or detach themselves from play as and when they wish – an impossibility for humans in ontological reality (*ibid*:171). Teacher:child cannot detach themselves from classrooms in which experiences of being gay, lesbian, poor, of colour, white, rich, able or unable result in vulnerability, resentment, oppression and confusion (Ellsworth, 1989:315-316). Spaces of togetherness can never be unconditionally ‘safe’ and ‘free.’ Spaces of togetherness are rooted in life as unpredictable, uncertain and uncomfortable and not secured by predesigned rules. This includes violations of human rights, war, poverty, starvation and genocide (Morrison, 2004:490).

Arendt (1958:236,244) regards the risks of freedom to be the irreversible and unpredictable consequences of free speech and action in spaces of togetherness. Freedom, based on difference when humans act in, on and with the world, continually disrupts the relation self:other and spaces of togetherness. The power of freedom is rooted in the human capacity to start a-new, to continually revolutionise spaces of togetherness and the relation self:other (*ibid*:241,244). Herein lies the immense power of freedom and safety in spaces of togetherness – the power to continually create and recreate spaces of togetherness and within these spaces to continually re-imagine self:other.

Free and safe spaces of togetherness are premised on risk accommodation: acknowledging the inherent risks and mediating and facilitating these inherent risks. Confessing *doxas* in difference have unpredictable and irreversible consequences (Arendt, 1958:236; Jansen, 2009:261). Risk accommodating spaces are spaces in which self:other can freely, safely and truthfully confess *doxas* in equal difference without being despised or judged (Jansen, 2009:276). It should be noted that it takes courage to risk confessing conflicting *doxas*, disrupting the relation self:other (Arendt, 1958:186; Jansen, 2009:275; 3.2.1). As the confessing of difference implies an expectation of disruption, self:other may choose not to take part in intra-dialogue or may choose to be deceitful during intra-dialogue. However, the courage to risk disruption is strengthened by the moral precepts of forgiveness and promises. Forgiveness relies on non-reciprocal responsibility *for* self:other, and is not a reaction to the consequences of speech and action but a new action, starting something new (Arendt, 1958:241). Forgiveness continually sparks the revolutionary understanding of freedom, dignity and equality in compassionate responsibility *for* self:other. Promises stabilise new spaces of togetherness and make it possible for humans to continually risk disruption in spaces of togetherness.

Spaces of togetherness can thus, paradoxically be continually revolutionised and stabilised as safe and free, when constituted by the ethical relation self:other .

4.4.2.3 The anthropological and ontological nature of spaces of togetherness

The anthropological premise (1.7.1) of this study describes humans as distinctly unique and equally different in their shared humanity. In the ethical relation self:other, self constructs identity as “a distinct and unique being among equals“ (*ibid*:178). Ontology describes what *is*: the nature of being, society and curriculum. Reflecting on the multiple confessions regarding ways of being (the nature of being, society and curriculum) concerns ontological considerations and questions (Cary, 2006:15).

An autobiography confessed in spaces of togetherness narrates the unique life experiences of the situated self as well as the biography of humanity in its full complexity in non-linear time and space. During the confessing of lived experiences as what *is*, self:other are framed within a specific time and space as the situated self:other. However, the situated self:other is also positioned within non-linear, socio-historic time and space of a shared humanity. The anthropological and ontological positioning of the situated self:other will therefore always be in equal difference within a situated, shared and inclusive humanity.

The confessing of autobiography within the relation self:other concerns multiple individual fragmented and conflicting stories, not shared by any other, and are linked in past, present and future time and space (Jansen, 2009:258). In the relation self:other, self confesses the multiple unique and different stories related to a single life and (re)construct identity in difference. Intra-dialogue is the (re)construction of identity in difference confessed within self and between self:other (Pitt, 1998:540,544). The analysis of “the discourses of the self” (Cary, 2006:10) reveals that self is not fixed or static but constantly and actively created by multiple analysis of multiple different and complex experiences (Weiler, 1991:467). By means of intra-dialogue, self narrates multiple stories as his/her fluxing autobiography confessing *who* he/she is and hopes to be.

4.4.2.4 Epistemological spaces of meaning and understanding

Epistemology describes the multiple ways of knowing self:other and what we know about self:other. It regards questioning and reflecting upon meaning-making and different understandings regarding the relation self:other. Any discussion on epistemology and epistemological spaces, in which we deconstruct ‘how we know what we know’, would

often blur the boundaries between knowing (epistemology) and being (ontology) (Cary, 2006:15).

During the confessing of ontological being (the confessing of autobiography), the epistemological process of meaning-making and understanding is sparked. Self:other, situated and positioned in different and shared socio-historic and personal spaces of knowing and being, start questioning, deconstructing and reflecting on 'how they know what they know' (*ibid*:15) concerning self:other.

a) *Ethical responsibility concerning what we know of self:other*

The legitimising and validating of *what* we assume to know of self:other have historically resulted in "the practical enactment of man's [*sic*] inexhaustible capabilities of inhumanity to man [*sic*]." (Gordimer, 2011:641). In order to oppress, knowledge regarding *what* others (not like us) are assumed to be is validated and legitimised. The validated image of *what* others are, becomes the premise of oppression (*ibid*:641). Such legitimising of knowledge about others, results in myths regarded as 'truth' (what we know of others) enabling the mapping of positions from which the powerful speak and the powerless are silenced (Cary, 2006:16; Gordimer, 2011:641-642).

In conceding that categories of *what* self:other are assumed to be are socially constructed, we need to consider the meaning and consequences of socially constructed categories (Crenshaw, 1991:1296-1297). The consequences of categories result from the processes of categorising and the values attached to categories, which create social hierarchies (*ibid*:1297). The process of categorising concerns the 'naming' of individuals and groups. 'Naming' is not always a unilateral process. It, however, creates spaces of power, inequality, resistance and identity construction (*ibid*:1297). No freedom, equality or dignity is possible when self:other are imprisoned in categories, 'naming' them as *what* they are perceived to be. Gordimer (2011:642) for example, argues that "For the coloniser, the colonised is a nobody." Being unable to confess *who* self:other are, the categorised oppressed remain a nobody, robbed of all dignity (Arendt, 1958:181; 3.4.2).

Transcending categories and facing difference and disruption in spaces of togetherness is a courageous act (*ibid*:186). The self as interpreter of personal responsibility *for* self:other (Bauman, 1994:80) is constantly confronted with her/his difference in self as two-in-one and the difference between self:other (3.8). Self has to answer questions regarding *what* he or she knows of self:other and *how* he/she knows self:other.

b) *Ethical responsibility regarding how we know self:other*

How we know in spaces of togetherness regards the ethical and epistemological demands posed by the significant other when he/she is invited into spaces of intra-dialogue. The choice to include an other into cognitive spacings is often inhibited by what we know about self:other. In moral spacings the invitation to self:other is an open invitation and the knowledge constructed of self:other lies in responsibility for self:other (ibid:165-166; 3.4.1). In inclusive moral spacings, self:other are not categorised and our responsibility for self:other is not regulated by rules of conduct.

Du Preez (2011)¹³ argues that categories of knowing in cognitive spaces can be transcended in moral spaces by means of intersectionality. Intersectionality explores and analyses the relationships between multiple dimensions and modalities of complex and partial human relations categorised in terms of race, class, gender and religion (McCall, 2005:1771). Intersectionality as theoretical framework of analysis, gives rise to complexity as subjects of analysis expand over multiple dimensions of social relations and categories of analysis. Analysing the complexity of intersecting categories in a reductionist way restricts the scope of knowledge to be deconstructed and reconstructed (ibid:1772). The categorical complexity resulting from exploring intersectionality in the relation self:other demands a deconstruction of analytical categories (ibid:1773).

McCall (ibid:1773) poses three approaches to the demand of categorical complexity and analysis. The first approach concerns the deconstruction of categories in the anticategorical complexity approach. Considering social life as irreducibly complex, social categories are regarded as social fictions reproducing inequality. This approach, McCall (ibid:1773) regards as the most successful in answering the demand of complexity. The second approach, intercategorical complexity, uses existing categories to analyse and document relations of power and inequality (ibid:1773). The third approach, intracategorical complexity, analyses the boundary-making and boundary-defining processes inherent in categories. This approach focuses on identities neglected at points of categorical intersections (ibid:1774). Ellsworth (1998:317) explains how overlapping affinity groups formed within a classroom provide marginalised students entry into classroom discussions, which they previously did not have. Within these

¹³ Du Preez, P. 2011. Narratives captured in the irony of nostalgia: toward a curriculum for the past, present and future. Paper presented at the *United Kingdom Forum for International Education and Training*, September 2011, Oxford University, UK.

multiple, shifting and contradictory intersecting groups, unequal weight and legitimacy of voices could be analysed by means of intracategorical complexity analysis.

The ethical responsibility to *how* we know, will in my view demand an analysis of the anticategorical and intercategorical complexity of the intersecting relation self:other. This analysis would include the processes of categorising or 'naming' self:other as well as the meanings and values attached to categories (Crenshaw, 1991:1297). The inviting of an other into spaces of intra-dialogue and spaces of togetherness requires a recognition of self:other as a dignified *someone* in equal difference. This recognition and reception of self:other is not the reception of an abstract individual (or a group), but a person who is valued in his/her irrefutable dignity as a human being (Ruiz, 2004:275). An other received in spaces of intra-dialogue and togetherness is *someone* with a past, present and expected future, *someone* who has and is continually experiencing life as complex and uncertain (Morrison, 2004:490).

Imagining future knowledge as well as multiple possible ways of knowing and being requires a pause or interruption in the meaning-making process (Avest ter, 2011:17). It requires a space in which 'how we know' and 'what we know' can be intruded upon (Brinkmann, 2007:1136) and disrupted (Jansen, 2009:266). In an epistemological space requiring us to step out of known and comfortable spaces of knowing (Du Preez, 2009:101) and embrace dissonance (Jansen, 2009:266) sparked by mis-understanding (Bauman, 1994:147), the process of deconstructing categories and new meaning-making regarding 'how and what we know' of self:other becomes possible. Confessing difference and disrupting meanings and understandings in the relation self:other, however risky, remains crucial to the revolutionary (de)stabilising of the relation self:other and free spaces of togetherness.

4.4.2.5 What and how we know self:other in the South African society

Jansen (2009) explores the value of the disruption of beliefs, attitudes and prejudice and the dismantling of boundaries in a classroom context. He argues that the teaching and learning of human rights values are not enough to re-imagine the South African society (*ibid*:171). Many South Africans have pragmatically re-aligned themselves to a new value system while deep-seated meanings and understandings and spaces of belonging stay intact (Jansen 2009:171; Jansen, 2011a:190). South Africans need to disrupt the binary opposite ways of knowing 'us' and 'them' in spaces of belonging and togetherness in South Africa (Myambo, 2010:98).

What we know of self:other in South Africa, has to move beyond the Rainbow Nation Ideology¹⁴. Post-apartheid South Africa, in a quest to change a formerly unjust society, has adopted “a radical sense of all-inclusive metaphorical rainbow-belonging” (*ibid*:95). Myambo (*ibid*:95), however, argues that metaphorical ownership of an abstract Rainbow Nation cannot be enough for the disenfranchised masses still crammed together in ‘squatter camps.’ Metaphorical belonging to spaces of radical multiculturalism presented in technicolor as a rainbow nation does not change the original format, it only changes the way we see it (*ibid*:94). Metaphorical belonging does not change the experiences of hunger, poverty, humiliation and dehumanisation, which millions of South Africans have to live with on a daily basis.

Apartheid was characterised by circumscribed spaces dividing humans between categories of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Post-apartheid South Africa has a new version of this sameness and otherness project. Freedom has brought with it a new ‘communal introspection’ by which liberated communities can now freely explore and express their own histories and agendas (Irlam in Myambo, 2010:98). This has resulted in the South African version of the global phenomena described as ‘identity’ politics, emphasising spaces of sameness and otherness (*ibid*:98). Culture has become the coercive power in ethnic politics in post-apartheid South Africa (Jansen, 2009:250). This is a reproduction of categories of ‘naming’ and socially constructed identity categories for South Africans.

Freedom is never risk-free and the stabilising and mediating of these risks are normatively and legally structured by the *South African Constitution and Bill of Rights* (1996). Human rights have as their aim to normatively structure and legalise the relation self:other. By accepting human rights, South Africans implicitly agreed that human rights should protect communal belonging and sharing – the *what* of human life (Becker, 2012:84). The diverse meanings and understandings of belonging and sharing carry both the risk of opposition in categories of sameness and otherness (defining humans only as *what*) and the responsibility *for* self:other (defining humans as *who*) (Arendt, 1958:180; Derrida, 2005:80). There is a distinction between claiming rights rooted in *what* we are and claiming rights protecting *who* we are. Collective sameness and otherness, constituted by coercive identification with categories of culture or any other meta-narrative, define humans as a collective *what*. Collective difference constituted in equality of difference, define humans by *who* they are and describe the coming together of humans without ceasing to be *who* they (singular and together) are destined to be

¹⁴ South Africa as the “rainbow nation” was coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and later adopted by President Nelson Mandela. The concept “Rainbow Nation” is used as metaphor to indicate the development of multicultural diversity after apartheid.

(Derrida, 2005:54). In such a context, human rights would protect the relation self:other departing from the notion that equal difference is as worthy of protection as equality through sameness (Becker, 2012:84).

4.4.3 Intra-dialogic spaces and identity

Intra-dialogic spaces are ontological and epistemological spaces in which the dialogic deconstruction and reconstruction of 'how we know what we know' (Cary, 2006:15) in the relation self:other are possible. The deconstruction and reconstruction of *how* we know and *what* we know of self:other requires the truthful deconstruction of *doxa* and the positioning and (re)presenting of self:other in difference. This includes the deconstruction of structural and epistemological barriers resulting from socially constructed categories and 'naming', which make us complicit in oppression and render us incapable of revolutionising self:other (Slattery, 2006:33).

The process of categorising humans is in essence an exercise in 'naming' and meaning-making (Crenshaw, 1991:1297). When the intersecting of categories is analysed, the boundaries of 'naming' and socially constructed identities are opened to be deconstructed. The meaning and values attached to categories and the process of categorising demonstrate power on two levels. In validating and legalising *what* we know of self:other, humans are categorised and the premise for oppression is cemented (Crenshaw, 1991:1297; Gordimer, 2011:641). The second level of consequences relates to the social and material results of categories. Categories of humans constitute social hierarchies and subordination is constituted by socially constructed identities (Crenshaw, 1991:1297).

Intra-dialogue is an ethical, revolutionary, relational, dialogic and individuating ontological and epistemological experience. It is aimed at deconstructing and reconstructing own difference and the difference within self:other. It is not concerned with consensus or the validation of categories regarding what self:other assume to know about self:other. It remains impossible for self to '(re)present' the meaning-making processes of self:other (Cary, 2006:26). Self:other can only be partially known when he/she is free to, in equal difference, confess *who* they are (Arendt, 1958:186).

Confessing difference, disrupting knowledge and the meaning-making process is always an active process (Arendt, 1960:33,44; Jansen, 2009:264,267). The disruption of meaning and the meaning-making process deconstructs and reconstructs knowledge related to self:other and knowledge validated by meta-narratives as 'truth,' influencing identity construction (Jansen, 2009:261). Self is free to continually revolutionise *who*

he/she is in the relation self:other that is rooted in human rights values. Disruption and intra-dialogue are crucial to continual identity construction rooted in human rights values (3.8; 3.9.1).

Before exploring curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces, an exploration of the diverse understandings of curriculum is done.

4.5 CURRICULUM INQUIRY

Curriculum theory needs to move beyond a utopian means-end circular conceptualisation (1.5). Curriculum theory needs to be able to dismantle the structural and embedded boundaries of society (Slattery, 2006:33) and re-imagine the relation self:other rooted in human rights values, transcending categories of knowing self:other. Both Jansen (2009; 2011) and Alexander (2011) propagate a re-imagination of curriculum and South African society. Alexander (2011:42) contends that this re-imagination of the South African society would necessitate a disruption of comfort zones and radical changes in beliefs, prejudice, attitudes and everyday practises from all South Africans. A circular means-end conceptualisation of curriculum towards a rainbow utopia does not only reinforce meta-narratives, categories and boundaries but also masks ontological life experiences and renders the continual construction of identity by confessing *who we are impossible* (3.9.3.4). Without disrupting and dismantling these boundaries, multiple new ways of knowing and being with self:other cannot be imagined. Curriculum theory should be able to conceptualise this process.

The questions of curriculum (i.e. what the nature of curriculum entails, the elements and practice of curriculum), is dealt with next (Dillon, 2009:351).

4.5.1 The nature, elements and practice of curriculum

Questions asked by curriculum theorists also concern and is interrelated to the broader field of questions regarding the nature, elements and processes of education (*ibid*:351). This study focuses on questions specific to the conceptualisation of curriculum interrelated to education and society. In order to discuss curriculum theory and practise in search of understanding, the many possible questions regarding the nature, elements and practise of curriculum are posed first.

Questions regarding curriculum should include the nature, elements and process of curriculum. Dillon (*ibid*:344) poses his questions regarding curriculum in three categories. Regarding the nature of curriculum he asks: what is it?; what is at the bottom of it? and what is it like? In exploring the elements of curriculum, questions regarding

teacher:child, subject matter, the where and when of teaching-learning, the why (purpose of teaching-learning), the activities involved in teaching-learning and the result of teaching-learning are posed. The practice of teaching is explored by means of questions focusing on how to think and act 'the curriculum' (*ibid*:344).

The nature of curriculum is explored by questioning the definitions, conceptions and theories regarding curriculum. The conceptualisation of the nature of curriculum is done mainly in four paradigms: empirical-analytical, hermeneutic, critical and postmodern (Schubert, 2008:400). Cary (2006), in using post-structuralism, psychoanalytical and post-colonial theories, pleads for an ethical lens through which the nature, elements and discourse of curriculum are questioned and explored. Defining the nature of curriculum through different paradigm lenses, whether they are technical, critical, postmodern, ethical or hermeneutic, is inevitably related to the interest served, social constructs and modes of rationality (Schubert, 2008:400).

The questioning and defining of the nature of curriculum is crucial to any conceptualisation of curriculum. Questioning the nature of curriculum is a subjective and interrelated process which has a direct impact on the questions posed on the elements of curriculum and the boundaries for the discourse and processes regarding curriculum. Five perspectives on the nature of education and their concomitant influence on the elements, discourse and processes of curriculum will be briefly explored next.

4.5.2 Five perspectives on the nature, elements and process of curriculum

Schubert (2008:400) uses Bernstein's (1976; 1991) restructuring of social and political theory as a basis for charting four paradigms used in curriculum inquiry. Although curriculum inquiry can be understood by means of different paradigms, all curriculum inquiry cannot be fitted into a specific paradigm. Consequently, many curriculum inquiries are based on eclectic derivations from more than one paradigm (Schubert, 2008:401). I will add the ethical perspective to the process of defining the nature, elements and process of curriculum.

The brief discussion of the following five perspectives is not aimed at categorising curriculum inquiry or theories but aims to illustrate how the questioning of and defining of the nature of curriculum reflects on and is linked to diverse interpretations of the elements and process of curriculum.

4.5.2.1 Empirical-analytical paradigm: Technical perspective

The empirical-analytical paradigm serves technical and market-related interests and requires education, schools and curriculum to accomplish and be accountable for the achievement of predesigned outcomes (Schubert, 2008:400). When curriculum is defined as technical and procedural in nature, the elements and processes of curriculum are naturally explored and conceptualised according to the defining of the technical and procedural nature of curriculum. Posner (2009:253) describes the 'Tyler Rationale' as the technical production perspective to curriculum conceptualisation. The 'Tyler Rationale' published in 1949, poses four fundamental questions to be answered in the development of curriculum (Dillon, 2009:351; Posner, 2009:253).

The four questions posed by this perspective are related to the purpose of the school, the experiences necessary to attain that purpose, the effective organisation of experiences and the effective evaluation of the attainment of set purpose(s) (Dillon, 2009:351). The nature of curriculum is defined in the technical production perspective as a production system consisting of a structured set of experiences aimed at predesigned learning outcomes (Posner, 2009:254). The conceptualisation of curriculum as a technical process in nature diminishes the teacher:child relation to a 'worker and raw-material' production system, managed by administrators prescribing the most effective methods to be used during this process (Au, 2011:27). The prescriptive and instrumental defining of the nature of curriculum thus determines the prescriptive and instrumental defining of the elements (teacher:child, subject matter, purpose, activities and the result).

The defining of the nature of curriculum poses boundaries and limitations on the questioning, discourse and deliberation regarding curriculum. A technical and instrumental defining of the nature of curriculum limit curriculum discourse to a circular conceptualisation of goal setting, structuring of experiences, subject content related to goals and the assessment of goals (Dillon, 2009:351). Such a narrow and linear defining of curriculum ignores the interrelatedness between curriculum, socio-historic circumstances, power and politics (Graham-Jolly, 2009:247,249).

The questions posed in the 'Tyler Rational' have not changed in essence during the last decades (Dillon, 2009:352) although many scholars, such as Taba and Walker, have extended or embroidered on these questions (Posner, 2009:256-257). In exploring the effects of defining the nature of curriculum as instrumental on the elements and discourse regarding curriculum, Au (2009:37) argues that 'the educational assembly line' has severely affected teacher and children and the relation teacher:child. Children are quantified as numbers denying any individual difference, while teachers are controlled

and de-skilled as deemed necessary for optimum efficiency (*ibid*:34-37). Apple (1979:111) argues that defining the sphere of curriculum decision making and discourse as 'technical' makes all subsequent questions 'instrumental' in nature to be explored by 'technical experts.' The shift resulting from such a description of the nature of curriculum implicitly, although very effectively, removes curriculum discourse from the political (power) and ethical sphere and places it firmly in the sphere of economic and cultural reproduction (*ibid*:111).

4.5.2.2 Hermeneutic perspective

The hermeneutic perspective's inquiry and questioning relate to the interaction between persons and situations and how such interactions constitute meanings and understandings (Schubert, 2008:400). This mode of rationality regards humans as subjective beings, constructing meanings and understandings by means of inter-subjective relationships (*ibid*:400). An inquiry into the meanings and understandings constructed through relations can provide insights into ontological and epistemological questions by means of the deconstruction of embedded meanings and metaphors used by individuals and society (*ibid*:400). Hermeneutics is an interpretive approach to understanding the meaning of text, laws, language, historical artefacts, curriculum and pedagogy (Slattery, 2006:115).

The dialogic and relational approach to hermeneutics undermines self-certainty, romantic individualism and social atomism towards a quest for the actualisation of the inter-subjective understanding of self and identity (Slattery *et al.*, 2007:539). The dialogic hermeneutic approach reveals the self as a complex and emerging conscious and unconscious interaction (*ibid*:540). It affirms the primacy of understanding and meaning-making as an ontological problem (*ibid*:540). The implications of this approach for curriculum is the development of a transformative pedagogy, which re-evaluates traditional understandings of self:other and teaching-learning (*ibid*:551).

There are several interpretive approaches to explore and question meanings and understandings such as phenomenology, critical literacy, semiotics, post-structuralism, heuristics, autobiography, aesthetics and ethnography (Slattery, 2006:115). In the phenomenological curriculum approach to hermeneutics, teaching-learning is regarded as an orientation towards being. It focuses on the social construction and negotiation of meaning and understandings as well as individual *doxa* and narrations of individual concrete lived experiences. The phenomenological approach to hermeneutics aims to portray individual consciousness of everyday life. Greene (1978:213) defines everyday life as our individual and social interpretive reality. In her view, an aesthetic and

imaginative approach to the hermeneutic perspective may “provoke new modes of inquiry” (*ibid*:223). Opening up new modes of inquiry by imagination and re-imagination may open new possible ways of being that are ordinarily obscured by reality interpreted by those in power (*ibid*:223).

Regarding the elements of curriculum, Slattery (2006:116) states that “the art and science of interpretation is the central enterprise of school curriculum”. Multiple interpretations of historical events, literature, methodologies and politics confessed in classrooms and communities result in complex and multilayered discourse and the deconstruction of meta-narratives regarding power, becomes possible. The fear of questioning and deconstructing unifying truth and certainty can be transcended (*ibid*:118,122). The postmodern approach to the hermeneutic perspective breaks down the boundaries of curriculum discourse as it regards the human condition and the cosmos as pluralistic, existing in a multitude of sovereign units of authority without any horizontal or vertical order. All knowledge in such an environment is emerging, contested, complex and tentative – open to be questioned and explored for embedded meaning and understanding (*ibid*:123).

Defining the nature of curriculum as interpretive of meanings and understandings constructed by subjective humans in relation, the hermeneutic perspective regards the elements of curriculum as open to multiple subjective interpretations of history, culture, politics, and society. This includes multiple possible methods of teaching and learning and methodologies in research (*ibid*:116). Within the relation teacher:child the autobiography of the situated self is emphasised. No boundaries or limits for discourse is set as knowledge is regarded as emerging and open to multiple understandings. Regarding discourse and research, the phenomenologist working from a hermeneutic perspective postulates his/her life world as central to understanding and therefore concentrates on her/his situated autobiography and subjectivity (Pinar, 2008:496). The questions regarding positionality and (re)presentation in autobiographic and ethnographic research that impact on self:other are, however, not fully deconstructed in the hermeneutic perspective. These questions will be explored in more detail in section 4.6.

The questions of curriculum asked from a hermeneutic perspective will thus be about multiple interpretations of meanings and understandings constructed in relation but also implicit or embedded meanings and understandings constructed by means of power obscuring individual and specific life experiences. The elements and process of curriculum will be structured in order to enable teacher:child in this search, opening new

possible ways of inquiry, teaching, learning and the construction of new possible ways of being with self:other.

4.5.2.3 Critical perspective

The critical perspective views social constructs such as education and curriculum as only profiting dominant groups and therefore actively serves emancipatory interests (Schubert, 2008:401). Conceding that dialogue and deliberation are essential elements in curriculum and the processes of curriculum, the critical perspectives maintains that power relations render authentic dialogue an impossibility (*ibid*:401). The questions regarding curriculum posed by critical theorists such as Apple (1999:3) are: who benefits from the structuring of education?; whose knowledge is legitimised?; what is the relation between school and society? and how is power constituted in education, curriculum and schools?. Apple (*ibid*:4) argues that the posing and answering of these questions requires a deep understanding of the relationship between economy, politics and culture.

The critical perspective rejects the conceptualisation of both education and curriculum as a neutral instrumentality (*ibid*:11). The nature of curriculum in the critical perspective is defined as political and ideological (Posner, 2009:259). Curriculum is organised, controlled and paid for by government. The curriculum is therefore, as part of a set of political institutions, very valuable in the reinforcement and reproduction of meta-narratives and ideologies (Apple, 1999:13). From the critical perspective the result of curriculum cannot be preordained as curriculum itself is regarded as a result of constant struggle and compromise on uneven playing fields (*ibid*:11). Curriculum, in this perspective, is regarded as being emancipatory and it is argued that curriculum should by means of praxis aim to overcome false consciousness, repression and oppression of ideologies (Schubert, 2008:401). (The emancipatory means-end conception of education and curriculum has already been critiqued in section 1.3 and will not be repeated in this section).

The nature of curriculum defined as the result of political, ideological and power struggles influence the structuring and the understanding of the elements of curriculum. The relation teacher:child is envisaged as a democratic process in which teacher:child reflects upon power, knowledge, ideology and schooling (Posner, 2009:259). Programmes are chosen for its potential to develop critical consciousness among children and aim to sensitise them to the ills of society and how to alleviate it and not reproduce it (Eisner, 2009:283). Curriculum content is thus drawn from critical social problems and the purpose of selection of curriculum content is social reconstruction. Emphasis is on the problems humans face every day affecting their lives (*ibid*:284).

Teaching and learning by means of the 'banking concept' is critiqued by scholars, such as Freire (1993:52). He argues that such teaching methods minimise children's creative power and reproduce oppression (*ibid*:54). In order to change the 'banking concept' of teaching-learning, Freire (*ibid*:53) proposes that the relation teacher:child must be conceptually reconciled to a relation in which teacher: child simultaneously teaches-learns.

Discourse related to curriculum and education is severely limited in the critical perspective by the defining of curriculum as primarily related to, or in nature being, a result of political and power politics. The emancipatory purpose of curriculum sets circular boundaries for discourse focusing on predesigned utopian ends. Apple (1999:16) proposes that discourse and theorising about curriculum should combine questioning 'about' and 'across' economy and culture in its complexity. The conceptualising of the nature of curriculum, however, influences the scope of the questions as mainly concerning politics, economy, culture and power which in itself poses boundaries and the danger of reproduction. Discourse does not reflect reality but constructs reality (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:463); any mapping or limiting of the boundaries of discourse is in itself an act of power (*ibid*:465).

4.5.2.4 Post-modern and post-structural perspective

The postmodern perspective to curriculum inquiry rejects any empirical-analytical inquiry of curriculum and questions master-narratives and epistemological premises (Schubert, 2008:401). Cary (2006:134) describes *Curriculum Spaces Research Theory* as reflecting a postmodern epistemological crisis in curriculum conceptualisation. This crisis concerns the inability to transcend static understandings of how and what we know to more fluid and multilayered, complicated ways of knowing (*ibid*:134). The nature of curriculum is envisaged to be counter hegemonic, interrupting and disrupting modernist assumptions (*ibid*:6). The interruption of hegemonic understandings, Slattery (2006:3) defines as: "Reveal[ing] the sedimented preceptors – deeply held prejudices and their unconscious roots – and forc[ing] the reader/viewer/listener to pause and reconsider these assumptions."

By the confessing of multiple narratives, the delineation and interrogation of multiple meanings and understandings are deconstructed. From this perspective the relation between signifier and signified is understood to be unstable and uncertain (Schubert, 2008:401). Intertextuality (Pinar, 2008:503) and intersectionality (Du Preez, 2011), revealing multilayered, complicated ways of knowing, are important modes of inquiry in the postmodern and deconstructive perspective to curriculum. Pinar (2008:502)

understands intertextuality in curriculum as a “complex, multidiscursive academic discipline devoted to understanding educational experiences, focused on, but not limited to, the encoding of such experiences in the school curriculum.” Intersectionality is related to an ethical understanding of curriculum and the complex ethical relations constituting and constituted by curriculum (Du Preez, 2011).

Du Preez (*ibid*) defines three levels of intersectional deconstruction. It concerns the deconstruction of the complexity of curriculum theory explored from intersecting paradigms, the deconstruction of the intersections of complex categories such as class, ethnicity, gender, nationality and religion and the deconstruction of the non-linear intersections of time and space. In an understanding of curriculum, discourse and the resulting deconstruction of knowledge as non-linear and fluxing between signifier and signified, intertextuality and intersectionality break down boundaries which may hinder us from arriving at intersections of different and competing narratives (*ibid*). Intertextuality and intersectionality are crucial to the interruption, disruption and deconstruction of hegemonic understandings. Individual different narratives confessing conflicting meanings and understandings rely on intertextual and intersectional complexity analyses.

The nature of curriculum from the postmodern perspective is therefore understood to be a compassionate and aesthetic engagement between teacher:child in search of multilayered understanding. Teaching and learning as interpretation of text is dialogic, complex and multilayered and includes teacher-child-community-society in the hermeneutic circle (Slattery, 2006:281). The elements of curriculum which include the relation teacher:child and the relation curriculum-society are structured to emphasise the many possibilities of becoming. Human consciousness and becoming are understood to be fluent and non-linear. Indeterminacy and dialogic ambivalence are the focus of engagement with text used in teaching-learning (*ibid*:282).

Discourse and inquiry are interpretive processes from shifting points of intersecting and competing voices. The process of becoming reveals the non-linear eternal value of each moment (*ibid*:283). Discourse is thus an open and infinite process including intersecting voices in non-linear past, present and future time and space. The postmodern and deconstructive perspective to curriculum has opened new ways of understanding and inquiring into curriculum. This perspective can, however, not answer questions regarding subject, agency, autobiography and the text of autobiography, fully (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514-515). The questions: “What does curriculum have to do with my life?” and

“How can curriculum be self-transformative?” have not been fully explored or answered in the postmodern curriculum perspective (*ibid*:514-515).

2.5.2.5 Ethical perspective on curriculum inquiry

The ethical turn in curriculum inquiry and conceptualisation has developed parallel to the countermovement in postmodernist philosophy expressing concern with the instrumentalising and politicising of society, education and curriculum (Cary, 2006:137; Du Preez, 2011). Curriculum conceptualisation in the postmodern era rely on philosophical investigations as philosophy provides access to historical grounding, reflective understanding, sensitivity, reflexivity and praxis understood as open-ended. Philosophy is the vehicle for exploring self-transformation, compassion, critical thinking and social justice (Slattery, 2006:198). Both post-structuralism and deconstructionism are reactions to Enlightenment rationality giving rise to liberalism, socialism and radicalism (*ibid*:194).

An ethical perspective to curriculum inquiry regards the nature of curriculum as the continual and open-ended invitation to the ethical inclusion and knowing of an other in the curriculum, school, classroom and discourse on curriculum. The assumption is that curriculum as spaces of knowing have a direct impact on the lives of self:other (Cary, 2006:134). ‘How and what we know’ of self and others is regarded to be a curriculum issue (*ibid*:135). The question posed by Pinar *et al.*, (2004:514) as to what curriculum has to do with my life can thus be explored within an ethical perspective to curriculum inquiry. Du Preez (2011) argues in this regard that curriculum, more than any other document, has a direct impact on the lives of people.

The instrumental separation of self and other as binary opposites, I versus the Other, is one of the core inquiries of postmodern philosophy (Slattery, 2006:4). This dualism, with its pervading influence on society, is critiqued and challenged by postmodern philosophy. Binary opposites are evident in the elements of curriculum, dividing children in categories of sameness and otherness according to race, learning styles, social class, gender, religion, giftedness and remedial needs (*ibid*:4). The relation self:other envisaged in an ethical orientation to curriculum is a relation of equal difference. In spaces of togetherness, compassionate responsibility *for* self:other transcends I versus the Other and questions such as: how can curriculum help to create a peaceful society? (Du Preez, 2011) and how can curriculum be self-transformative? (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514) can be posed.

Du Preez (2011) argues that the ethical turn in curriculum could be defined in terms of intersectionality (4.5.2.4). Oppressive structures resulting from the intersections between racism, classism, sexism, ableism and many other oppressive 'isms,' can be analysed in intersecting spaces by means of anticategorical, intercategorical or intracategorical complexity approaches. (Ellsworth, 1989:303; McCall, 2005:1773). Intersectionality implies moral 'spacings' in which teacher:child confess their intersecting and conflicting autobiographies. Spaces in which the intersection of different paradigms and categories of class, race, gender, religion and non-linear time and space are narrated as situated autobiographies, inevitably result in possibilities for conflict, interruption and disruption of competing narratives. The deconstruction following such disruption explores these competing narratives normatively on an ontological and epistemological level (Du Preez, 2011).

The disruption of essentialist assumptions provides possibilities for new ways of knowing, teaching and learning (Cary, 2006:7). Cary (*ibid*:131) argues that rather than avoiding undecidability and uncertainty we should embrace the canonical and the deviant. Postmodern ethics poses the inclusion of an other, as neighbour "into the hard core of the moral self" (Bauman, 1994:84). It professes the restoration of the autonomous moral significance of self:other in the construction of the moral self (*ibid*:84). This becomes possible when 'how we know what we know' is deconstructed in responsibility to the knowing self:other, framed by social, historical and political discourse (Cary, 2006:137). The non-reciprocal inclusion of an other has ethical significance and disrupts the relation teacher:child and spaces of knowing.

The questions Ruiz (2004:271; 4.1) pose regarding the elements and process of curriculum from an ethical perspective regards the relation teacher:child. He asks: "Is the pupil a mere object of knowledge or *someone* with whom it is necessary to establish a moral relationship?" (*ibid*:271). He answers this question by arguing that the "most radical and original relationship between teacher and student in an educational situation is a moral relationship" and concludes that this moral relation defines education and constitutes educational action (*ibid*:272). Teaching-learning is a meeting between two individuals, "obliged to give answers in their situation of alterity." (*ibid*:274). The relation teacher:child from this perspective is understood to be primarily ethical, meeting an other as *someone* in his/her dignified alterity in a quest to deconstruct 'how I know what I know' of self:other.

Furthermore, Ruiz (*ibid*:273) argues that educational discourse should continually question the *what*, *why* and *how* of teaching (*ibid*:273). He argues that the emphasis in

discourse on *how* we teach should be opened to include *what* and *why* we teach (*ibid*:273). This would include discourse on the epistemological spaces and awareness of ‘how we know what we know’ explored by Cary (2006) and du Preez (2011, 2012¹⁵) and discourse on curriculum affecting the lives humans live in a complicated, tension-ridden, uncertain, contradictory and messy world (Morrison, 2004:489; Du Preez, 2011).

The nature of curriculum conceptualised from an ethical perspective emphasises the ethical relational aspect of curriculum. The ethical relations constituting curriculum are multilayered and complex (Ruiz, 2004:272). It includes teacher:child truthfully reflecting and deconstructing own epistemological positions of meaning and understanding regarding the ethical relation self:other (meaningful societal relations) and the epistemological responsibility for knowing self:other and the world (the ethical relation self:other to knowledge) (Du Preez, 2012b). In intersecting epistemological spaces, teacher:child deconstruct how their respective epistemological positions implicitly and explicitly contribute to oppression and set boundaries on new ways of knowing self:other (Slattery, 2006:33).

If, as Du Preez (2012a:56) argues, the ontological understanding of curriculum is that curriculum has a direct influence and impact on the quality of life of humans through meaningful socialisation, the conceptualisation of the ethical relations constituting curriculum opens new possibilities for teaching-learning and knowing. An ethical relation teacher:child will make individuation and self-transformation possible as it emphasises *who* self:other are and hope to be in difference (Ruiz, 2004:274). The interest of epistemological spaces is on the subject – on self:other as knowing subject (Cary, 2006:15,137). The ethical relation self:other to knowledge makes a peaceful society possible when meaningful societal relations are constructed with self:other *known* as a unique and irreplaceable *someone* (Ruiz, 2004:274; Du Preez, 2011).

Du Preez (2012a:58) questions and explores the nature of ‘spaces,’ in which ethical relations constitute curriculum. She argues that ‘safe spaces’ are spaces in which risks can be taken, autobiographical confessions can be made and dialogue regarding human complexities between self:other are possible (*ibid*:59). Cary (2006:134) regards curriculum as an epistemological space in which theories of knowing directly impact on the ontological life experiences of self:other. Slattery (2006:34-35) agrees with Cary

¹⁵ Du Preez, P. 2012. Unpacking images and metaphors of female curriculum leadership through memory and nostalgia as narrative nuances. Paper presented at the *American Education Research Association* conference, April 2012, Vancouver Convention Centre, Canada.

(2006) that the deconstruction of theories of knowing are both an epistemological and a curriculum issue. He argues that new curriculum spaces should be investigated (Slattery, 2006:35). This could include outdoor spaces, inviting different speakers into the classroom, introducing documentary films and autobiographical reflections (*ibid*:35). The spaces in which ethical relations constitute curriculum are thus both physical and metaphorical fluxing, cognitive and moral spacings of proximity and distance, openness and togetherness, in which self:other is free to, through intra-dialogue individuate self, construct ethical relations and choose responsibility *for* self:other.

Dialogue and reflection are paramount in the understanding of an ethical perspective to the conceptualisation of curriculum. The constituting of the ethical relation teacher:child and the exploration of new ways of knowing happens by means of dialogue and reflection (Du Preez, 2012a:56-57). Dialogue, understood from an ethical perspective is not a moral or cognitive deliberation, setting rational argument against the “irrational Other” (Ellsworth, 1989:301). Placing ethics at the core, dialogue becomes an epistemological awareness and positioning through the sharing of autobiographical journeys in curriculum spaces (Du Preez, 2011). Dialogue makes lived experiences visible and is a “reality check” of what *is* (Ellsworth, 1989:302,313). It makes an exploration of what *should* be happening in classrooms and society possible (Ellsworth, 1989:299).

Discourse in and about the nature, elements and processes of curriculum opens the parochial curriculum debates beyond structural and legal issues to include local communities and society in responsibility *for* self:other (Slattery, 2006:108). In an ethical perspective to curriculum inquiry schools are viewed as dynamic communities striving to ecological sustainability, aesthetic sensitivity, social justice and compassion (*ibid*:108). Curriculum discourse includes an anticipatory view of history, which is multilayered and interdisciplinary (*ibid*:108-109). Such an inquiry focuses on new understandings and new ways of knowing self:other, interdependence, spirituality, values, ethics and morality.

In the next section, intra-dialogic curriculum spaces are conceptualised in reference to the ethical, postmodern and post-structuralist perspectives to curriculum inquiry.

4.6 CONCEPTUALISING INTRA-DIALOGIC CURRICULUM SPACES

Many questions have been asked of curriculum and curriculum theories during the last decades. One of the important contributions to the questioning of curriculum and curriculum theories is the post-modern message that “totalising theories simply don’t work.” (Morrison, 2004:488). Morrison (*ibid*:493) argues that the questioning of

curriculum should result in a hundred thousand theories. One could indeed ask why curriculum theory is assumed to be singular (*ibid*:498).

“Where is the conscience of curriculum theory?” Morrison (*ibid*:490) asks. Curriculum theorising cannot be a spectator activity. When questioning and theorising about curriculum, the curriculum theorist, researcher and teacher:child are participants in the “acting and thinking” process of curriculum (Morrison, 2004:490; Dillon, 2009:351). Acting and thinking about curriculum concerns the life of *someone*. This is not a sterile process but is fluxing, complex, multilayered and often rife with pain and suffering (Morrison, 2004:490). Morrison (*ibid*:492) adds that curriculum is a site of social engineering and it is therefore impossible to theorise curriculum without touching on values. Curriculum-theory can never be value free. Curriculum is an embedded text encoding beliefs, prejudices, values and (un)accepted behaviours validated by society (Jansen, 2009:172). Referring to the discussion regarding the Reitz incident in section 1.1, curriculum plays a crucial role in the shaping and reproduction of meanings and understandings. Curriculum however also has a responsibility *for* self:other in the construction of new meanings and understandings – of new ways of knowing self:other and being with self:other (Jansen, 2011a:13-14).

Although there are many possible questions which could and should be asked of curriculum, mine are related to the following questions posed and discussed in sections 4.5.2.4 and 4.5.2.5:

- “What does curriculum have to do with my life?” (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514,515)
- “How can curriculum be self-transformative?” (*ibid*:514,515)
- “Is the pupil a mere object of knowledge or *someone* with whom it is necessary to establish a moral relationship?” (Ruiz, 2004:271)
- How do we know self:other and what do we know of self:other in curriculum spaces? (Cary, 2006:135)
- Can curriculum help to create a peaceful society? (Du Preez, 2011)

The above questions all concern the relational, ethical and revolutionary aspects and capacity of curriculum. The gap in curriculum theorising, identified in 1.5, concerns the revolutionary capacity of curriculum to re-imagine the self:other relationship as an ethical, relational and individuating experience. Can curriculum be self-transformative? (Pinar *et al.*,2004:514-515) and can curriculum help to create a peaceful society? (Du Preez, 2011).

Referencing Morrison (2004:490) and Pinar *et al.* (2004:514-515), I will add one more question:

- Is the post-apartheid curriculum concerned with the lived experiences and hopes of South Africans living in a complex and dissonant country and world?

I regard the nature, elements and process of curriculum as a simultaneous, revolutionary and interrelated process. I regard discourse, about and within curriculum as one of the most influential factors in our understanding of the nature, elements and processes of curriculum. Discourse does not reflect reality but constructs reality (*ibid*:463) and discourse within, about and related to curriculum will thus not necessarily reflect the realities regarding curriculum but will construct our thinking about curriculum. Discourse about and within curriculum influences how and what we know about curriculum. The determination of boundaries and content of discourse remain acts of power (*ibid*:465), influencing how we think and act curriculum and understand the nature and elements of curriculum. Intra-dialogue is necessary to deconstruct and re-imagine discourse, constructing curriculum.

Opening the boundaries of discourse, as an act of power, is a moral act. This occurs in the choice of responsibility *for* self:other and the constitution of spaces of intra-dialogue and togetherness results (Bauman, 1994:61). This implies that intra-dialogue, in opening boundaries, is a continual deconstruction of 'how we know what we know' of self and self:other in curriculum spaces. Bauman (*ibid*:61) argues that we make choices *for* self:other and as a result we construct society, we *are* society. In making a choice *for* self:other in the context of education, spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue are constituted, boundaries are shifted and we become curriculum, we *are* curriculum. We become the self-transformative curriculum affecting the lives of self:other. Curriculum has everything to do with my life (*cf* Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514-515). As stated, curriculum is not a spectator sport (Morrison, 2004:490) – it concerns individual choices of responsibility *for* self:other, of being together in curriculum spaces. It concerns the re-imagination of becoming curriculum and becoming society.

Apple (1999:198-199) said in reference to his relationship and many dialogues with Paulo Freire:

Paulo wanted to discuss; he made dialogue into something of an art form. However, this did not mean that he wanted to dominate. He *always* listened carefully to my arguments. He agreed or he disagreed. He didn't wear a mask of congeniality. He *wanted* to deal with the hard questions. He fully

understood that *not* dealing with the hard questions was an excuse to let the voices of the powerful work through you.

Apple (*ibid*:199) confessed that during the many opportunities he had to engage in such dialogue with Paulo Freire, “I changed – but so did he.”

Before exploring the nature, elements and process of curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces, the (un)intended curriculum will briefly be explained.

4.6.1 (Un)intended curriculum

The curriculum describes the total experience within the learning institution, which would include explicit, official knowledge and implicit and unintended knowledge construction (the hidden and nil curriculum) (Tozer, Violas & Senese, 1993:3). In any inquiry about curriculum it is thus important to include both the formal, official curriculum and the actual or experienced curriculum (Graham-Jolly, 2009:248). The teaching-learning experience within classrooms includes both constructed knowledge deemed necessary by society to master reality and the knowledge by which we understand and know self:other.

Socially constructed values, norms and beliefs, structured and communicated as meanings and understandings through the curriculum, should be viewed in historical and socio-political contexts (*ibid*:248-249). The deconstruction of meanings and understandings viewed through a historical and socio-political lens reveals both the society and education relations and the state and education. Education is never a neutral act (Msila, 2007:146). Msila (*ibid*:146) argues that education is always about politics. The political relation between state and education can be illustrated by the numerous incidences throughout western civilisation where state schools supported and communicated non-democratic governments’ ideals as meta-narratives and ideologies (Tozer *et al.*,1993:3).

Education in South Africa has often been the victim of legislators formulating educational goals with political, social or cultural agendas in mind. Colonial and apartheid education constructed identity by dividing society and preserving the master-servant relationship between South Africans from different ethnic groups (Msila, 2007:149). CNE aimed to domesticate black children and indoctrinate white children (*ibid*:149). While CNE had as goal control and the protection of power and privilege, the NCS (1996) introduced an egalitarian pedagogy (*ibid*:151). In South Africa, education is regarded by many, since 1994, as a weapon of transformation (*ibid*:146; 1.3.2). In understanding curriculum both

the intended and unintended curriculum should be considered. If we regard curriculum as a lived experience concerning individual choices of responsibility *for self:other*, curriculum cannot be a sterile, ordered and rigid process predesigned and continually assessed as to its efficiency.

4.6.2 Defining curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces

Curriculum is (un)documented revolutionary, ethical and individuating experiences of life itself (Slattery, 2006:xvi) confessed, deconstructed and re-imagined in spaces of intra-dialogue and togetherness between teacher:child. Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces are physical and metaphorical spaces of simultaneous proximity and distance, loneliness and togetherness, knowing and coming to know, being and becoming. In intra-dialogic curriculum spaces teacher:child transcend the binary opposites *what* and *who* by individuating self as irreplaceably unique in the relation self:other. In intra-dialogic curriculum spaces the situated self construct and deconstruct the fluxing *being I*, while imagining *becoming I*.

The self continually disrupts knowledge of self:other in a search for new ways of knowing and being with self:other in intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. In the consciousness of responsibility *for self:other*, self comes to know the fluxing *I*, continually (re)constructs the moral self and re-imagines self:other rooted in human rights values.

4.6.3 The revolutionary and ethical nature of curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces

Arendt (2006a:193) said of education:

And education, too, is where we decide whether we love our children enough not to expel them from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands their chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common world.

Ruiz (2004:275) translates Arendt's (2006:193) thoughts on education as follows: "one must take responsibility for the other, assuming the responsibility of helping in the birthing of a 'new reality' through which the world is constantly renewed."

The fear of not being granted the chance to start something new and unforeseen, of being imprisoned by the reproduction of inhumanity is expressed as follows by MacNeice (1944) in his poem *Payer before birth*:

I am not yet born; console me.
 I fear that the human race may with tall walls wall me,
 With strong drugs dope me, with wise lies lure me,
 On black racks rack me, in blood-baths roll me.

The revolutionary and ethical premise of intra-dialogic curriculum spaces is the love and responsibility *for* our children not to “strike from their hands their chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us” (Arendt, 2006a:193). It is furthermore an acceptance of the responsibility “to prepare them in advance for the renewing of a common world” (*ibid*:193). It is an acceptance of the responsibility to prepare them for the continual revolutionising and becoming of self:other.

The conditions for the dialogic revolutions of self:other: the ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness, have been discussed in section 4.4. The ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness are the result of the liberation from codes of conduct and the choice to responsibility *for* self:other. This is a self-transformative choice as responsibility *for* self:other is constituted by and enables the continual (re)construction of the moral self. It is a choice in search of new ways of knowing and being with self:other.

The revolutionary nature of human rights values and the influence thereof on the relation self:other and education has been discussed in Chapter Two. Conceding (2.1) that human rights could not give a full answer to the inquiry into the relation self:other, the understanding of the revolutionary and ethical nature of human rights values directly impact on our understanding of the relation self:other, education and curriculum. The ethical nature of human rights values described as responsibility *for* self:other transcends any universal moral principles, laws and codes of conduct. Human rights values become visible through singular and situated experiences of ethical and revolutionary speech and action in the relation self:other (Sliwinski, 2005:222).

The freedom of teacher:child to dismantle boundaries, to undertake “something new, something unforeseen by us” (Arendt, 2006a:193) is directed by the compassionate responsibility *for* the singular freedom, dignity and equality of each human being. If the ethical relation self:other is constituted by the responsibility *for* the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other, human rights values should inform us as to the nature of education and the curriculum.

4.6.4 The epistemological nature of intra-dialogic curriculum spaces

If we regard curriculum to be ethical, dialogic and relational in nature, the questions and focus of curriculum inquiry would then be: what do we know of self:other and how do we come to know self:other in curriculum spaces? The intra-dialogic search for meanings and understandings regarding knowledge of self:other is the central issue in curriculum spaces theory (Cary, 2006:134-135) and intra-dialogic spaces. Curriculum is one of the manifestations of our quest to understand and give meaning to the relation self:other. The understanding and (re)structuring of the relation self:other is a revolutionary quest. It cannot be pre-designed. The understanding of self:other cannot be structured by essentialist assumptions. This has been emphasised by Jansen (2011a:190), Cary (2006:7,133) and Slattery (2006:19).

4.6.4.1 Intra-dialogue: (Re)presentation and positionality in curriculum spaces

Questioning how we know others and what we know of self:other impact on the (re)presentation and the positionality of self:other in curriculum spaces. The crisis of (re)presentation has been explored since the late 20th century in social sciences. The assumption that one can come to know and (re)present self:other is paramount in many essentialist assumptions regarding self:other (Cary, 2006:4).

Anthropological scholars have been questioning the validity of ethnographic research as (re)presenting the lives and voices of others for the last decade (*ibid*:4). They have critiqued the way education has incorporated the concept of culture representing self:other into educational discourse and structures (Gonzales, 2010:S251). Cultures are systems of meaning and significance that humans apply in order for them to organise and structure human life (Parekh, 2000:143) and is “one of the most widely (mis)used and contentious concepts in contemporary vocabulary” (Agar,2006:2). Drawing on the work of Gershon and Taylor (2008), Gonzales (2010:S251), argues that schools have become spaces of classification in which cultural models are appropriated in the service of discourse and ideologies.

Culture is often defined as a closed, coherent system in equilibrium (Agar, 2006:10). Despite popular belief, cultures are not necessarily defined by a shared language, religion or ethnicity (Parekh, 2000:154). It is defined by the members’ (assumed and real) shared systems of meaning and significance of self:other (*ibid*:154-155). The view of culture as a holistic configuration of beliefs, values and behaviours has led to reductionist models such as the *culture-of-poverty* model (Gonzales, 2010:S251). Models such as the *culture-of-poverty* model categorise children and parents defined as

poor on the assumption that all poor people share systems of meaning and significance. By failing to align ethnography to socio-historic contexts of power, the lives of self:other are (re)presented through a lens of deficiencies as substandard (*ibid*:S252). However, the dominating culture is almost always viewed through the lens of positive possibilities (*ibid*:S252; 3.9.3.4).

Positioning self and (re)presenting self:other in the relation self:other are closely related. The positioning of self determines the lens through which self:other is (re)presented. Ellsworth (1989:305) argues that the narratives of teacher:child are partial, unfinished, imperfect, limited and a projection of the interest and power of one over the other. Autobiographic narratives should be disrupted, not because “they have broken the rules of rational thought” but because they hold implications for self:other (*ibid*:305). Autobiographic narratives confessed and disrupted in classrooms are a manifestation of humans in their difference, situated within a common humanity, choosing responsibility for the impact of knowledge about self:other on the lives of self:other.

The confession of narratives as autobiography is not a quick fix and should not be regarded as a relativisation or a simplification of meaning but as a multilayered and complex autobiographic narrating meaning (Ellsworth, 1989:323; Cary, 2006:50). It is a narration of multiple concrete experiences from which knowledge of simultaneous conflicting privileged and oppressive positions are (re)constructed. Facing conflicting difference requires self to confess and analyse own meanings and understandings regarding self:other by means of intra-dialogue. The shifting positioning of self:other cannot be predicted, prescribed or understood by means of conceptual frameworks or methodological boundaries (Ellsworth, 1989:323). Positionality, Cary (2006:51) argues, is more than meaning-making: it is embedded knowing. The positioning of self:other and the (re)presenting of self:other is the contextual (socio-historic) and interdependent (social) practise and process of curriculum (Ellsworth, 1989:323).

Ellsworth (1989:303) argues that oppressive structures are the result of intersections between racism, classism, sexism, ableism and many other oppressive ‘isms.’ Intersectionality explores the relationships between different dimensions and modalities of social categories, subject formations and categories of analyses (McCall, 2005:1772). By means of the analysis of intersectionality categories of sameness and otherness can be transcended and the complex and ethical relations between categories such as race, class, gender and religion can be explored (*ibid*:1772).

The complexity of intersecting conflicting autobiographies relates not only to the intersection of categories of knowing in past, present and future non-linear time, but also

to the intersecting of anthropological, epistemological and ontological premises by which knowing self:other is constructed (McCall, 2005:1772; Du Preez, 2011). It would thus concern both the process of categorising and the consequences of 'how we know what we know' in categories of knowing self:other. In an attempt to avoid the reproduction of categories the categorical complexity within these intersecting spaces should further be analysed by using the anticategorical, intercategorical or intracategorical approaches to intersectional complexity analysis (McCall, 2005:1773). McCall (*ibid*:1773) regards the anticategorical approach to be the most successful in satisfying the demands for the analysis of intersectional complexity.

The anticategorical approach regards society as fluid and irreducible complex and therefore refutes the validity of categories (*ibid*:1773). Categories are regarded as having no foundation in reality and are thus acts of power re-producing inequality (*ibid*:1777). Intersecting categorical complexity is deconstructed in this approach by crosscutting the disciplinary divide between social sciences and humanities, by using genealogy in historical contexts, by using deconstruction in literature studies and by using ethnography in anthropological studies (*ibid*:1777-1778). Crenshaw (1991:1297), however, argues that such a disabling of categories distorts the possible exploration of the power relations inherent in inequality and the meanings and values inherent in categories, which are of great significance in the deconstruction of power clustered around categories and are continually used against self:other. I concede that categories of knowing self:other have meanings and understandings attached to them and that the construction of such categories is an act of power often used to oppress self:other. However, I posit that the possibility of identity construction as *who* we are in inclusive spaces of togetherness would require the deconstruction of categories as not grounded in the human condition but as socially constructed – the anticategorical approach.

The intersecting relation self:other in curriculum spaces of intra-dialogue needs to deconstruct the positionality of self as well as the (re)presentation of self:other. Arendt (1990:87) and Bauman (1994:77) argue that a deconstruction of positionality and (re)presentation of self:other in the responsibility *for* self:other, should originate in the continual deconstruction of the moral self. Self, by means of intra-dialogue, deconstructs not only the difference within self but also the difference between self:other. In responsibility *for* self:other this *double* difference cannot be deconstructed within the boundaries set by categories of sameness and otherness. The regulating force of prescribed rules of conduct regarding categories of sameness and otherness does not apply to the responsibility *for someone* (*ibid*:79). During intra-dialogue, self remains his or her own interpreter in the simultaneous intra-dialogue self as two-in-one regarding

own difference and the intra-dialogue between self:other regarding the difference within self:other (Arendt, 1990:88; Bauman, 1994:80).

During intra-dialogue, the self narrates his/her changing awareness of own difference and identity to self:other in an attempt to understand his/her shifting positionality. The shifting and often unsettled positionality of self during intra-dialogue shifts discourse to “what is possible to know?” of difference confessed within and between self:other and the questioning of the origin of action towards an envisaged utopia of knowing (Ellsworth, 1989:323). Awareness of own shifting positionality focuses teacher:child on the danger of (re)presenting self:other. (Re)presentation can only be a possible interpretation of self:other within the shifting positionality and power of self (Cary, 2006:52). I pose that deconstruction of teacher:child positionality is crucial to the defining of the nature, elements and process of curriculum. It is also crucial to the construction and the constitution of the relation teacher:child because it impacts on how and what we know of self:other in curriculum spaces.

In my view, packaged curriculum knowledge (re)presenting the unique and different self:other and the whole of humanity in its complexity is a reproduction of the oppressive structuring of knowledge about self:other. This would entail, as Arendt (1958:10) argues, our being able to speak about a “*who* as though it were a *what*.” The unique difference of individuals is often masked, as discussed previously, by the conception that collectives (cultures and categories of sameness and otherness) have common histories, expectations of the future and shared systems of meaning and understanding (Leve, 2011:519; 3.9.3.4). Individuals are turned into abstract and categorised entities (Dlamini, 2010:153). The masking of difference in categories of sameness and otherness positioning and (re)presenting self:other, predesign self:other, and the world. Everything and everyone are perceived as static, contained and autonomous objects mastered by “knowledge about.” (Holloway in Leve, 2011:523).

In intra-dialogic curriculum spaces the awareness of the shifting positionality of self:other happens when the self opens him/herself to self:other in difference (Du Preez, 2009:106-107). When self chooses to open him/herself to the confessions of self:other, self becomes aware that his/her knowledge of self:other is “partial, interested and potentially oppressive to others” (Ellsworth, 1989:324). Intra-dialogue is the continual search for own meaning and understanding regarding self:other. It does not have as purpose the (re)presentation of self:other. However, self:other remains crucial to the ethical, revolutionary and relational journey by which self constructs identity and positions him/herself in the relation self:other. In that sense the deconstruction of the

(re)presentation of others remains an essential element in the continual (re)construction of identity, positionality and (re)presentation.

4.6.5 Intra-dialogue: Who am I?

There is multiple understandings of the concept 'self.' Self is defined in metaphysics as "whatever it is whose persistence accounts for personal identity over time." (Brison, 2007:366). This persistence over time includes bodily continuity, memory, character traits or psychological characteristics. The poststructuralist perspective is that the self is a narrative, which Brison (*ibid*:366) argues, is similar to the metaphysic view that psychological continuity constitutes self. Brison (*ibid*:366) from her own experience of trauma, argues that these views cannot fully describe self. Trauma, such as rape, distorts the continuity of the embodied self and disrupts personal narrative in such a violent way that any continuity becomes difficult (*ibid*:367). The "naked monstrosity" (Arendt, 1994:745; 3.6.1[c]) of such trauma leaves humans unable to narrate a continuous autobiography. In ethics, self is regarded as the locus of the autonomous and responsible person. The neo-liberal understanding of the autonomous self is that the self is constituted unrelated to social context and the relation self:other (Brison, 2007:366; Gershon, 2011:539; 3.9.3.4). This individualistic view masks difference and reproduce social categories of inequality by means of sameness and otherness.

Arendt (1958:178) regards the constitution of self "the disclosure of who someone is" as inherent to the human conditions of plurality and natality. "If action as beginning corresponds to the fact of birth, if it is the actualisation of the human condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualisation of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among equals." (*ibid*:178). Self, as distinct and unique, is thus continually constituted in new beginnings and in relation with self:other. Self is similarly regarded in the feminist framework as being constituted in relation and sustained in social context (Brison, 2007:366). I define self as continually (re)constituted by means of a revolutionary construction of autobiographic narratives in the relation self:other .

The impact of curriculum on the continual reconstruction of self and the narration of autobiography is confined by the formalised and embedded knowledge offered in the curriculum regarding self:other (Pitt, 1998:539). Embedded and prescribed knowledge limit the continual reconstruction of self in the relation self:other and our limited and assumed understanding of self:other furthermore directly impacts on the (re)construction of identity (Ellsworth, 1989:305; Cary, 2006:134). An inquiry into the formalised and embedded knowledge regarding self:other offered by curriculum concerns the two

questions asked by Pinar *et al.* (2004:514-515) regarding the capacity of curriculum to be self-transformative and the impact of curriculum on a single life. Autobiographical narratives used in a classroom can shift boundaries by providing a context for self-reflection, sharing live experiences and exploring the meaning-making process (Bernhardt, 2009:61). Formalised and prescribed knowledge categorising self:other, compulsory assignments and predesigned standards and assessments however, make the use of autobiographical narratives and intra-dialogue in the classroom difficult and risky (*ibid*:63).

Bernhardt (*ibid*:62) embarked on a project which he named “Who am I?” with his students, exploring the use of autobiographical narratives in a classroom context. The project aimed to create a curriculum space “which values and embrace student voice, encourages an ethic of care and understanding between students, and embodies both the lived and living experiences.” (*ibid*:62). The teacher and the children did not have a well-defined structure or step-by-step instructions (*ibid*:62). They explored the project through three lenses; reflecting on how past experiences, present life situations and future intentions shaped their relationship with the world; an exploration of self including research, shared learning experiences and personal reflections; and finally by preparing a presentation documenting the diverse journeys undertaken during this exploration (*ibid*:62).

One of the first questions raised by a student during the “Who am I?” project was: “do our stories and personal experiences really matter? It is not like other people really care.” (*ibid*:63). This question echoes a statement made by another teacher, Mr Krantzman (in Reilly, 2009:382) in his quest to engage autobiographical narratives in teaching creative writing: “There [was] no place for the kids inside the curriculum. Everything had been determined.”

When curriculum offers predesigned categorised knowledge of self:other, it is impossible for the unfinished and partial self to find or (re)constitute him/herself in the curriculum. “When someone with the authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and saw nothing.” (Rich in Schneider, 1997:115). Distinctions resulting from categories of knowing self:other in curriculum spaces afford or deny teacher:child membership on a predesigned continuum of value in and to society and curriculum (Cary, 2006:103). Identity construction is normalised and framed along the socially accepted structures and understandings of categories such as race, gender; ‘good child,’ ‘good citizen,’ ‘good teacher,’ oppressor and oppressed (*ibid*:104).

Analysing meanings and understandings in a classroom through formal categories in a context of either/or, results in oppressive reproduction and the denial of difference. Rivage-Seul (2003) relates how lecturer-student, following the Freirian pedagogy, deconstructed the meaning-making processes leading to and following Black Tuesday or 9/11. The students had to reject neutrality and take sides either for or against the oppressed on the assumption that their choice would open up possibilities to deconstruct these events from different perspectives (Rivage-Seul, 2003:100-101). This, however, implicitly rendered the voices of students who positioned themselves 'wrongly' as of no value. As one student remarked, "I felt like my personal beliefs and opinions were under attack." (*ibid*:106).

This process of meaning-making related by Rivage-Seul (2003) was thus rooted in the single stories of either oppressor or oppressed. The complexity of the human condition and the equality of human difference in its many and multilayered contexts were disregarded. In the South African context, a post-conflict pedagogy demands an ethical relation teacher:child in spaces of togetherness, enabling all to "speak without feeling they will be judged or despised for what they say"(Jansen, 2009:276).

Autobiography is crucial in the teaching-learning context. By narrating autobiography teacher:child explores how we construct meaning and understanding, share meanings and understandings and continually deconstruct the (re)presentation of own and other meanings and understandings (Bernhardt, 2009:64). Autobiography affects the relation teacher:child, the (re)presentation of self:other, and the positionality of self in the relation self:other. By means of the narration of autobiography the revolutionary self confesses and deconstructs own multiple stories in non-linear past, present and future time and space while (re)constituting self. Constituting self and 'knowing' self happens through partial and fragmented reflective awareness of fragmented experiences (Depalma, 2010:438). Autobiography is never finished. It is continually becoming (*ibid*:438). In a classroom, autobiographical narratives require teacher:child not simply to share stories but to open themselves to multiple readings and understandings (Bernhardt, 2009:64). An openness to multiple understandings result in doubt, uncertainty and feelings of dissonance following the colliding of different understandings (Depalma, 2010:448). The purpose of disruption of meanings and understandings should be new understandings and new meaning-making (Bauman, 1994:148).

4.6.6 Constructing identity: searching for self in spaces of intersection

The relation teacher:child is defined as an ethical educational relation by the mutual moral receptivity between teacher:child in teaching-learning (Ruiz, 2004:275). The child is not seen as an object of knowledge, a subject who has to be understood to guarantee success, an empty space to be filled with knowledge or as a prolongation of the teacher (*ibid*:275). The child is received and recognised as a dignified and unique *someone*. The child is received in full acknowledgement of the responsibility towards unforeseen and unexpected new beginnings (Ruiz, 2004:275; Arendt, 2006:193). Teacher:child are not viewed in the abstract in teaching-learning. Both teacher and child within the relation teacher:child are received as human and cultural beings. Their past and present are inseparable from the act of reception (Ruiz, 2004:276). Ruiz (*ibid*:278) states “Reception in education is the recognition of the radical alterity of the pupil and his inalienable dignity.” Reception is the individuation of teacher:child as irreplaceably unique. “It is refusing to be repeated or cloned in another person, in order for the other person to have their own identity.” (*ibid*:278).

Reception in the teaching-learning context results in the intersection of the teacher:child relation to knowledge. Teacher:child mediate the processes of meaning-making and knowledge construction in spaces of intersection. The complexity of the intersection of teacher:child and knowledge should be analysed by means of intra-dialogue as to the difference within self and the difference within self:other. Analysing difference at this point of intersection should also explore the intersection of the situated self in socio-historic time and space. The exploration of the intersection between ontology (what is), epistemology (knowing) and axiology (what should be) (Du Preez, 2012b), can move curriculum theory from the descriptive and reproductive to normative, and assist self in revolutionising identity and becoming.

Competing narratives at points of intersection result in dissonance and disruption (*ibid*). The pedagogic goal of the intersection teacher:child and knowledge is to create a space of doubt, uncertainty and disruption (Depalma, 2010:448). Such a space can be intentionally constructed but the result of such intersections can never be predicted or pre-designed (*ibid*:448). The confessing of different narratives and experiences in disrupting spaces of intersection can be enhanced by inviting “voices from beyond the classroom” (Slattery, 2006:35; Depalma, 2010:443) into intra-dialogue. This could include guest speakers, documentaries, literature and art. This provides a broad encounter with different past and present perspectives and opposing voices (Depalma, 2010:441).

The teacher mediates between child and knowledge not only in what she/he teaches but also *how* he/she teaches and *who* he/she is (Ruiz, 2004:275). In receiving children, the teacher needs to confess own autobiography: she/he should offer the same self-disclosure the children offer during intra-dialogue (Depalma, 2010:444). Teacher:child need to reflect critically on partial and contradictory own positions conflicting within the relation self:other (*ibid*:443). Teaching-learning as reception is a shared moral response and experience between teacher:child. The child also needs to recognise and respond to the teacher as *someone* for whom he/she is responsible (Ruiz, 2004:279). Reception in spaces of intersection and disruption defines self:other in togetherness making all responsible for self:other and the affairs affecting us as a society (*ibid*:279).

I would like to use the narrative of Dimpho to illustrate the search for self in spaces of intersection (Du Preez, 2012b). Dimpho is a white girl who grew up in the rural parts of South Africa and was enrolled in Grade 1 during 1993, one year before the first democratic elections and final repeal of apartheid legislation (*ibid*). Her narrated experiences should thus be understood as intersecting within the socio-economic context of a country in transition. Dimpho confesses her narrative in the third person: "Dimpho's heart is torn into pieces. She does not know who she is. Shouldn't she perhaps have been coloured or perhaps black? Why was she born into this white skin?" (*ibid*).

Dimpho's narrative confesses the intersection of categories of race, religion, morality, gender, language and class. The intersection of her own narrative with other meta-narratives are confessed with statements such as; "My grandfather kept me white," and "the only reason she was part of this group was because she was white" in conflict with her identification with many black friends and her admiration for a coloured teacher (*ibid*). When she changed schools – from a 'black' school to a 'Christian' school – she experienced discrimination because of her parent's social class (*ibid*). She confesses this loss of dignity as: "Those people are too good for us.... How do you look white people in the eyes if you are not sure if you are white or not?" (*ibid*).

Du Preez (*ibid*) explores this search for self at points of intersection in reference to the process of self:other consolidation. The search for self, the continual re-imagination of self and the reconstruction of identity is a relational experience (Brison, 2007:370-371). Self:other consolidation and socialisation are thus influenced by the larger narratives of society and community (Du Preez, 2012b). However, self is not a fixed and final construction in the relation self:other; it is constantly and actively being (re)created in the relation self:other in the search for new ways of knowing self and being in the world with

self:other (Weiler, 1991:467). This is evident in Diphó's search: "Who am I?" (Du Preez, 2012b)

Dimphó's narrative is also a powerful illustration of the power inherent in categories of knowing self:other and the reproduction of categories (Crenshaw, 1991:1297). The experiences narrated by Dimphó explain the classroom, the intended and unintended curriculum as a reproduction of social relations as it is lived in the classroom and school (Pitt, 1998:540). The categories available to Dimphó such as whiteness have meaning and consequences attached to them, which she does not understand nor can she find herself in these categories. She questions her own whiteness: "How does a person become part of a culture if they don't even know what the culture is about?" (Du Preez, 2012b). Dehumanising is not only in social categories as such but in the way these categories systematically keep humans subordinate (Crenshaw, 1991:1298). Dimphó's search for self illustrates the difference within self and self:other related to her experiences of whiteness. It remains a search for belonging – a search for *what* she is: "Shouldn't she perhaps have been coloured or perhaps black? Why was she born into this white skin?" (Du Preez, 2012b). She is unable to transcend the categorical assumptions of *what* she is and embrace her difference by searching for *who* she is.

I pose that intersections of teacher:child and knowledge in a search for 'how and what we know' of self:other can only be understood by means of an anticategorical analyses. Intra-dialogue focusing on difference in a space of ethical togetherness can transcend categories of *what* we are and where we are 'assumed' to belong and spark the search for *who* we are.

4.6.7 Liberated to constitute the ethical relation self:other and construct identity rooted in human rights values

Reception in spaces of intersection make the revolutionising of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality possible. Teaching-learning about and in freedom, dignity and equality in spaces of intersection does not rely on case studies of oppression involving distant people and distant places (Sliwinski, 2005:221). It directly concerns the lived experiences of the consequences of categorising and the meanings and understandings attached to categories (Crenshaw, 1991:1298). It concerns the search for '*who am I,*' transcending categories of knowing. In the simultaneous proximity and distance of spaces of intersecting togetherness the continual construction of identity and becoming *who* we are, in our equal difference, effectively constitutes a human right.

Human rights education, conceived in tandem with the UDHR (1948) and in the South African context, the *Bill of Rights* (1996), takes the rights of individuals in the context of humanity as its point of departure (Sliwinski, 2005:221). In January 1995 the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education. Resulting from this, the field of Human Rights Education has been globally institutionalised and developed by means of internationally produced curriculum and methodology (*ibid*:221). Global human rights education emphasises the affective and cognitive understanding of human rights as global interconnectedness (Davies *et al.*, 2005:84). However, linking human rights education and citizenship education to ethnicity, nationality or the ideologies of the nation-state is exclusionary in nature and endangers human dignity (2.4.4.1; 2.4.5.2).

Global human rights curricula focus on the cognitive understanding of human rights, the acquisition of a rights language and engagement with moral activism (Sliwinski, 2005: 219). The assumption is that a just and humane society will be achieved through the personal development of children by means of human rights education (*ibid*:219). Unfortunately, human rights education has resulted in an institutionalised and instrumental view of human rights that focuses on the global effectiveness of human rights (*ibid*:220-221).

Although conceding that education is by nature a moral endeavour (Ruiz, 2004:271), I would argue that there is a difference between human rights education and education rooted in human rights values. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Arendt (2006b:294) explores the distinction between meeting our legal responsibility and our distinguishing between right and wrong even when our choices might be at odds with all those around us. History is documented proof of the many examples where humans have obeyed the law but still failed to distinguish between right and wrong. The assumed effectiveness of human rights as a global legalised moral system does not necessarily reflect our choices stemming from a moral response or responsibility to curb the continual loss of human dignity (Sliwinski, 2005:230). It is not enough for children to be fluent in the language and legalities of human rights; a just and humane society is dependent on their capacity to distinguish between 'right and wrong' in the consciousness of responsibility *for self:other*.

Being liberated to freedom, self:other is free to open and constitute new spaces as well as perspectives on human rights values (Greene, 1988:5). Creating something new in spaces of togetherness with self:other is an ethical and revolutionary choice. The choice to be responsible for the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other is a liberating choice

for human rights as an ethical relational open-ended normative quest. It shifts the focus from the individual in the context of nation-state towards self:other in the context of humanity.

Slabbert and Hattingh (2006:716) argues that curriculum is life itself and living life becomes education. Slattery (2006:xvi) similarly regards curriculum as an experience of life itself. Bernhardt (2009:62) defines curriculum as “a body of experiences with no owner to be shared by all those who seek to encounter its living being.” Curriculum rooted in human rights values is the continual deconstruction and re-imagining of daily experiences of living a human life in freedom, dignity and equality with self:other.

Curriculum should be the living and breathing text, continually documenting fluxing and intersecting life experiences from which identity is constructed, rooted in human rights values. Education should be about the lived experiences of self:other being and becoming in responsibility for the human rights values of self:other. The continually revolutionised nature, elements and process of curriculum becomes the revolutionising power in the continual reconstruction of identity and the normative re-structuring of self:other rooted in human rights values.

4.7 SUMMARY

This chapter has been an attempt to answer the question: how does one live curriculum? Curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces, identity construction, the relation self:other and human rights values are intimately connected when curriculum is regarded as an ethical, relational, revolutionary and intra-dialogic experience. The continual construction of identity relies on the ethical and dialogic relation self:other in spaces of togetherness in which the intersecting of *what* we are assumed to be are transcended and analysed by an anticategorical complexity approach. Categories of knowing self:other manifest power in the meanings and values attached to them. The process of categorising is an act of power dehumanising and subordinating humans (Crenshaw, 1991:1297). An anticategorical approach to the analysis of intersectional complexity does not deny the power inherent in categorising but attempts to transcend those categories.

In transcending categories the intersecting spaces of togetherness can be deconstructed and the irreplaceable and unique *I* can be continually reconstructed. In an educational context the unique *I* is received in the ethical relation teacher:child. In receiving teacher:child in the teaching-learning context, teacher:child are recognised as a dignified and valued *someone*. The realisation of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality do not happen in empty or abstract spaces or in metaphorical spaces of

promised belonging to a Rainbow nation (Myambo, 2010:94). It happens within an ethical and dialogic relation self:other when self is individuated as *someone*. Rephrasing Derrida (2005:104) and answering his question: Human rights values should matter, even if they are no longer a political or constitutional question. Human rights values are a dialogic, relational, ethical and revolutionary question, answered in and between self:other.

The intended and unintended curriculum is a reproduction of social relations as it is lived in the classroom and school (Pitt, 1998:540). Curriculum should thus analyse and disrupt the binary opposite ways of knowing 'us' and 'them' in the South Africa context (Myambo, 2010:98). Teaching-learning of human rights is not enough to re-imagine South African society and transcend opposites (Jansen, 2009:171). Knowledge about human rights values does not realise freedom, dignity and equality nor constitute an ethical relation self:other in spaces of togetherness. Intra-dialogue can open boundaries in a continual deconstruction of 'how we know what we know' of self:other in curriculum spaces (Cary, 2006:134).

Society and curriculum are constructed in the ethical and intra-dialogic relation self as two-in-one and self:other. In constructing the moral self, in making choices in the consciousness of responsibility *for* others we *are* and continually become society and curriculum (Bauman,1994:61). The moral relation teacher:child is the radical and original relationship which defines and constitutes education and curriculum (Ruiz, 2004:272). In this relation, teaching-learning is the meeting between teacher:child "obliged to give answers in their situation of alterity," transcending *what* they are in a continual search for *who* they are (*ibid*:274). In the ethical, revolutionary and intra-dialogic relation teacher:child, curriculum finds its origin and concerns itself with the ontological experiences and hopes of South Africans living in a complex and dissonant country and world.

Teacher:child are invited and received into intra-dialogic curriculum spaces of intersection. In intersecting spaces, autobiography does matter, and individual stories and personal experiences do matter (*cf* Bernhardt, 2009:63). In the relation teacher:child, both teacher and child care about autobiography in compassionate responsibility *for* each other (*ibid*:63). Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces open a place for both child and teacher in curriculum (*cf* Reilly, 2009:382). Such opening up of curriculum spaces is undetermined and inclusive. As stated before, it is curriculum spaces in which we choose to "love our children enough not to expel them from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands their chance of undertaking

something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common world.” (Arendt, 2006a:193). Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces are thus capable of transforming self and society (*cf* Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514-515; Du Preez, 2011).

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS OF THE POST-APARTHEID CURRICULUM

5.1 INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s, curriculum scholars and educationalists positioned themselves to draft a new post-apartheid curriculum for South Africa. They hoped to construct a new society and collective identity rooted in the *South African Constitution* and *Bill of Rights* (1996) by means of an inclusive curriculum. The purpose of the post-apartheid curriculum is to balance the continual hope of re-imagining a new South African society and the fear of growing inequality and poverty (Skinner, 1999:119; cf Popkewitz, 2009:305). Two decades and many revisions to the post-apartheid curriculum later, however, Jansen (2011a:41) concludes: “Desperation is an emotion I seldom feel, except in relation to education.”

Education and curriculum is always positioned within societal, political and historical contexts in which the relation self:other are structured and from which the relation self:other should be questioned and challenged (Ruiz, 2004:284). The post-apartheid curriculum remains a manifestation of the conflict between a neo-liberalist frame of reference serving commercial and political interests and a possible re-imagination of the South African society rooted in human rights values.

The post-apartheid curriculum explicitly states that it is rooted in the values expressed in the *Constitution of South Africa* and *Bill of Rights* (1996). Teaching and learning of human rights values, however, will not re-imagine the relation self:other or realise the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other, as the Reitz incident clearly illustrated (1.1). The instrumental approach to the post-apartheid curriculum imposes boundaries on what is (im)possible in curriculum and in the re-imagination of the relation self:other. In order to realise the hope of a new society such boundaries need to be opened and disrupted.

In my view and from an ethical perspective on curriculum, the origin of educational purpose and action rooted in human rights values is the ethical relation teacher:child. Spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue constituted by the ethical relation teacher:child in which difference is confessed, result in meanings and understandings being disrupted. In spaces of togetherness in which intra-dialogue is used, the re-imagination of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values becomes possible.

The analysis of the post-apartheid curriculum is done in three sections. In the first section, I analyse the notions of simultaneous proximity and distance manifesting in the

'internationalisation' of the South African education system and curriculum from colonialism to OBE. The nation is used as unit of analysis in this section (Pinar, 2010b:2). The historical remnants of the construction of the South African 'nation' and how it is expressed in the curriculum are analysed.

In the second section, I explore the intersections of curriculum/politics/economics and history. The defining and structure of curriculum remain relative to these intersections, the interest served by curriculum and the social constructs and modes of rationality inherent in curriculum (Schubert, 2008:400; 4.5.1). Curriculum intersections encircle interests, modes of rationality and the relationships deemed (im)possible in curriculum spaces. Such intersecting spaces position curriculum in its local context and define the positioning and the (re)presentation of self:other in curriculum.

In the last section of this analysis, I explore the nature, elements and process of the post-apartheid curriculum. My purpose is to ascertain what the effect that defining the nature, elements and process of the South African curriculum has on the understanding of the relational, revolutionary, individuating and dialogic nature of intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. These understandings will also point to the boundaries restricting or opening the possibilities for spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue in the post-apartheid curriculum.

5.2 A NARRATIVE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATION

Every autobiography confessed as narrative embraces all of human life over time and space but also situates self in a specific time and space (Bauman, 1994:41). Individual narratives are in this regard multiple stories stretching over the limited span of a beginning (birth) and end (death) of a specific and unique human life. Every individual narrative, however, ultimately also includes and becomes the storybook of history without beginning or end (Arendt, 1958:184). A narrative of the South African nation would embrace many South African narratives in past, present and future space and time confessed through many ends and new beginnings within a set geographical place. Since February 1488 when a Khoe herder threw the first stone at the Portuguese buccaneers (Alexander, 2011:28), many South Africans have repeatedly questioned and revolutionised the relation self:other.

The continual quest to (re)structure the ethical relation self:other is a universal and historical quest, as Gordimer (2011:517) states: "Human beings will always have the imperative to believe in the possibility of a better world of their own making." (2.4.1). This

quest has its roots in the conceptual tying of human rights and the sovereignty of the nation-state during the Enlightenment period when the rights of humans became the rights of the people (Parekh, 2008:22-23; 3.4.2.2: 3.4.2.3). The nation-state premised on genealogical roots still has severe implications for both citizens and non-citizens today. In South Africa, tribal lines remain drawn and mindless patriotism leads to xenophobia, hatred and stereotyping (Jansen, 2011a:189,210).

The concept 'nation' will be used in the following sections as a unit of analysis when questioning the South African curriculum. I will explore whether the post-apartheid curriculum has the capacity to aid the historical and continual quest of South Africans to (re)structure the ethical relation self:other and realise human rights values. In South Africa, the quest for an inclusive relation self:other has been voiced since 1911 by South Africans such as Seme (in Asmal *et al.*, 2005:viii): "We shall have to come together to bury forever the greatest block to our security, happiness, progress and prosperity as a people. We shall have to come together truly, as we are, the children of one household to discuss our home problems and the solution of them."

The distortion of the relation self:other has been part of the South African landscape since colonialism (*cf.* Harrison, 1981:48). When the National Party won the elections in 1949, the oppressed Afrikaner became the oppressor (Freire, 1993:27) and separation and apartheid was confirmed Afrikaner ideology (Harrison, 1981:170). "Men [*sic*] are not born brothers [*sic*]; they have to discover each other, and it is this discovery that apartheid seeks to prevent..." (Gordimer, 2011:62). During colonisation and apartheid, South Africans were defined by socially constructed categories of *what* they are, around which power clustered. Even when the violent protests against apartheid and oppression during the 1970s gained momentum, and strong criticism of government from newspapers and prominent Afrikaners were voiced, the apartheid government clung to power (*ibid*:268). In 1994 South Africans went to the polling booths and an overwhelming majority of them said yes to a new beginning. Our new democracy was a resurrection from the tomb, not only of apartheid but also of decades of colonialism (*ibid*:498). For the first time in history, the majority of South Africans believed that they could humanise themselves and all live together as free, equal and dignified (*ibid*:498).

The new beginning in the aftermath of the 1994 elections was to be premised on the moral concepts of forgiveness and promises (3.2.2). Forgiveness and promises transcend any laws of morality in responsibility *for* self:other and stabilise new beginnings (Arendt, 1958:241,243). During 1996, South Africans by means of the TRC, attempted to connect and understand individual and collective past narratives, in search

of forgiveness. This was done in the hope of constructing a narrative of reconciliation and a new beginning (Krog, 1998:278). For its many failures the TRC (1996) burned the torch for a common human ontology and hope (*ibid*:278). When the *South African Constitution and Bill of Rights* (1996) became law it structured and legalised our promises to self:other to live in responsibility for the continual realisation of the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other.

Although Krog (*ibid*:278) believes that “the country no longer lies between us but within us”, Dlamini (2010:163) takes a different view. He states that South Africans ‘suffer’ from nostalgia because of their inability to connect their past, present and future narratives (*ibid*:163). This he argues, is partly because the rich individual narratives of South Africans that not even apartheid or colonialism could destroy are now silenced by the coercive power of meta-narratives concerning political entrepreneurship, racial nativism and dispossession masking deep class, ethnic and gender issues (*ibid*:156). Silencing the past and present individual narratives and histories in an attempt to construct a new collective South African identity erases our collective history which was and is constructed out of the interaction between the many and diverse past, present and future narratives (Mda in Kani, 2001:ix). Multiple different past narratives shape and connect our present with the future. South Africans do not experience a neat and collective distinction between “a merry pre-colonial Africa, a miserable apartheid South Africa and a marvellous new South Africa in which everyone is living democratically ever after.” (Dlamini, 2010:12).

The euphoria that powered South Africa during and after 1994 with the notion of a united South Africa is fading fast (Alexander, 2011:27; 4.4.2.5). The rhetoric expressing the exclusionary nature of the South African consciousness, identity and society destroys any possibility of structuring the ethical relation self:other and of spaces of togetherness in which self:other can become equal and dignified. The meta-narrative of exclusion is still expressed in categories of *what* we are deemed to be. Dlamini (2010:20) laments the fact that in South Africa political entrepreneurs and racial nativists define all black South Africans in categories of sameness or otherness. This categorisation has no respect for local histories and difference, claiming that if all blacks suffered the same during apartheid, any black person can replace or stand for all black people in South Africa (*ibid*:21).

The intersection of categories of sameness/otherness, poverty/affluence, unemployment/employment, producers/consumers and a disregard for difference results in millions of South Africans regarding themselves as easily replaceable or of no unique

value. When describing South Africans as to *what* we are (rich, poor, employed, unemployed, ethnicity, race, gender) and not in the individual rich complexity of *who* we are (unique and irreplaceable), everybody becomes a nobody, replaceable and with no dignity or worth. To re-imagine the relation self:other in South Africa, the dehumanising effect of categories defining South Africans by *what* they are needs to be disrupted and reconstructed. Education and the curriculum should and could play a crucial role in this endeavor.

Categorisation needs to be purposely and disruptively confronted and challenged in classrooms by intra-dialogic curriculum spaces and the pedagogy of dissonance (Jansen, 2009:264-266; 4.4.3). Teacher:child could then, through moments of dissonance and intra-dialogue, understand and re-imagine the frailty, vulnerability and power of self:other.

5.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CURRICULUM FROM COLONIALISM TO NCS-CAPS

Questions related to the conceptualisation of curriculum in social settings such as South Africa, in which issues such as race, class, gender, religion and language take on specific dynamics and become contentious (Soudien, 2010:21). Soudien (*ibid*:20) argues that issues of social difference in the South African education system and curriculum, such as race and class, arose during key periods in the making of the South African curriculum over the last 350 years. Globalisation has brought many changes to human rights, education and curriculum in both interpretation and content. The cosmopolitan view on the interconnectedness of a global human community accentuates the continual questioning of the relation self:other and leads to concerns about neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism as means of oppression (2.4.5.2).

Although the effects of globalisation and internationalisation on education and curriculum are regarded as contemporary phenomena, South Africans had their first experience of internationalisation during the seventeenth century under Dutch rule (*ibid*:25). The intersections of history/politics/economy/society starting at the birth of South Africa during colonisation laid the foundation for *who* and *what* we perceive ourselves to be and how we position and situate ourselves in the process of developing an internationalised curriculum.

5.3.1 The internationalisation of the South African curriculum: 'The best from the West'

The NCS-CAPS (2011:4) states that “the curriculum promotes knowledge in local contexts, while being sensitive to global imperatives”. In all curriculum conceptualisation and reform, nation (local) is a primary unit of analysis. Nation remains the primary space in which self:other ‘retreat’ from threats such as globalisation and in which self:other experience daily life (Pinar, 2010b:2). In balancing local and global, the understanding of local curriculum contexts can be aided by the distance between local and global but also crippled by the self-referential problem of proximity (*ibid*:2). Curriculum scholars are not representatives of government. They should seek to understand local curriculum contexts through critical and difficult conversations with scholars from different contexts (*ibid*:2). Le Grange (2010:244) argues that although academic freedom was enjoyed during the early years of transition in South Africa, in recent years, the state has moved towards having a more authoritarian and regulatory role in both schools and universities.

Pinar (2010b:2) focuses on ‘internationalisation’ rather than ‘globalisation’ as the next stage in curriculum studies. “Internationalisation denotes the possibility of nationally distinctive fields in complicated conversation with each other.” (*ibid*:3). The focus in such difficult conversations is not comparative but on understanding the singularity of the local context in dialogue with international contexts explored with scholars working elsewhere (*ibid*:3). Understanding ‘nation’ as the specificity of local remains problematic as nationalism mainly destroys specificity and the indigenous (*ibid*:3). The personification of specificity remains the unique individual, who is the “lived site of remembrance and reconstruction” (*ibid*:3). Situating self is the first step in any curriculum dialogue on internationalisation (Pinar, 2010a:231). This is not an act of self-enclosure but acts as a bridge between self:other in local and global contexts (*ibid*:240).

The difficult conversations in curriculum spaces start with intra-dialogue questioning curriculum in spaces of local and international proximity and distance. In the first instance, it concerns, an exploration of the local positionality and (re)presentation of self:other in curriculum. The unique self as the “lived site of remembrance and reconstruction” (Pinar, 2010b:3) positions and (re)presents self:other in curriculum spaces according to her/his embedded knowing (Cary, 2006:51) The positioning and (re)presenting of self:other is contextual (socio-historic) and interdependent (social), in the difficult conversation of curriculum (Ellsworth, 1989:323; Pinar, 2010a:231; 4.6.4.1).

The year 1994 will remain a defining point in the shaping of South African society, history, politics, education and curriculum. It is significant in that it formally and

constitutionally constituted a new beginning (Soudien, 2010:40). Curriculum reform was an immediate priority. The 2011 amendments to the post-apartheid curriculum follow a line of revisions and policies attempting to break with South Africa's colonial and apartheid past. The post-apartheid curriculum, however, still carries the baggage of the past (*ibid*:44).

I next explore the historical context of curriculum development in South Africa and the effects of internationalisation on this development. In section 5.4 the intersections of politics, economy, society and history with the post-apartheid curriculum will be explored in an attempt to 'situate' the South African curriculum. Thereafter the influence of the curriculum on the relation self:other, spaces of togetherness, identity construction, consciousness, becoming and human rights values will be explored in section 5.5 and 5.6.

5.3.2 Colonialism

Since the seventeenth century, education and curriculum change in South Africa have developed parallel to the political and economic forces shaping South African society (Johnson, 1982:215). During the seventeenth century, under Dutch rule, there was no formal education system for either the settler or indigenous children of South Africa. Schools were limited to a few church-run elementary schools and two slave schools (*ibid*:215). These schools were a collaborated effort between the state and the Reformed Church. The church appointed teachers, decided on content taught and could close a school if they were not satisfied with the education provided (Steyn, Steyn, de Waal & Wolhuter, 2011:15-16).

Colonialism constituted the conditions and ways in which the local and the global manifested in South Africa. In Europe the influence of the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial period gave rise to the massification of education, which introduced children to learning and social morality in a structured way (Soudien, 2010:22). At the heart of mass education was Enlightenment humanism and the liberation of individuals (*ibid*:23; 2.4.2). Humanist discourse during the seventeenth century remained anxious about *who* and *what* humans are. The confrontation with 'otherness' in colonised countries led Europeans to conclude that the 'native' was a lesser human being (*ibid*:23; 2.4.3.1). Indigenous children were regarded as identity-less and indigenous knowledge and identity were de-legitimised and displaced (*ibid*:22). The boundaries of the Enlightenment European white and western text excluded the 'natives'. Excluding the 'native' from the white and western text also served as a solution to the Enlightenment focus on equality and the manifestation of inequality in colonised

countries (*ibid*:23-24). The subordination of the 'natives' was justified and within a strong ethic of 'rescue,' the 'natives' were educated to be Christians, drink VOC brandy and read and write (*ibid*:22-24). The coupling of the idea of equality and whiteness was established (*ibid*:45).

The first formal attempt at mass education in South Africa came about under British rule during 1806. This was not only due to the work of missionaries who taught children to read and write so they could take part in the western way of life and in religious and church activities (Msila, 2007:148), but was also due to the British coloniser's attempts at social control (Johnson, 1982:215). The mission schools aimed to educate Africans to take part in the western way of life. Education was thus used as a means of political, religious and economic control; Africans were 'educated' to be "useful servants, consumers of our goods and contributors to our revenue" (Grey in Msila, 2007:148). Education was a very useful tool as it aided the colonial quest for economic and political expansion during and after the Industrial Period by increasing the production and consumption of goods and aiding the economic development of imperialist countries (Arendt, 1966:125; 2.4.3.1). The English system of free schools, introduced during 1812 and the *Cape Education Act* (1866), which compelled English as language used in first and second class schools, was an attempt to anglicise children in South Africa (Johnson, 1982:215). In an attempt to resist this kind of social control, Afrikaners established their own private schools (Johnson, 1982:215; Steyn *et al.*, 2011:16).

The competition for wealth and power after the discovery of diamonds intensified conflict between the British and Afrikaners and led to the South African Wars in which the British were victorious (Johnson, 1982:216). Urbanisation and industrialisation not only resulted in conflict between the two white ethnic groups, but also in conflict between white and black. The new economic and power relationships needed social order, so social stratification emerged based on ethnic competition and the vested economic and political interest of the British government (*ibid*:216). Education was the means to this end. British authorities withdrew financial support for Black education as part of a process of promoting segregated education. When the Union of South Africa came about in 1910 the ratio per capita was R333 per white child and R1 per black child (*ibid*:217). During the 1920s and 1930s the relation between education and social stratification patterns became even more evident. White children were educated to have exclusive access to the rewards of a wealthy society and black children were denied access to these rewards by a lack of educational opportunities (*ibid*:217).

The influence of the discourse of the Enlightenment and Industrial periods in Europe on South African society and education regarding freedom, equality, dignity, identity and the construction of the relation self:other during colonialism is evident. Racism, which Arendt (1966:184; 2.4.3.1) argues was a powerful tool to justify the economic imperative of imperialism and colonialism, and classism was firmly embedded in the relation self:other by the time apartheid education was introduced. Colonialism also set the discursive frame in which education and curriculum was/is understood. Discourse regarding curriculum is still framed within the boundaries, which those with the most power set (Soudien, 2010:33).

5.3.3 Apartheid: Christian National Education

The rise of Afrikaner nationalism during 1948 culminated in an election victory for the National Party and Afrikaners moved systematically to consolidate their key power bases of which education was one (Johnson, 1982:217). White hegemony became a structural and institutional power (Soudien, 2010:35). The *Bantu Education Act* (1953) centralised African education and the *National Education Policy Act* (1967) centralised white education (Johnson, 1982:218-219). The *National Education Policy Act* (1967) stipulated that education would be Christian and nationalistic in nature. It emphasised mother tongue as language of learning and professed to be structured to balance the needs of children as well as the country (Steyn *et al.*, 2011:20).

The 'needs' of the country, which the *National Education Policy Act* (1967) professed to serve were in fact the 'needs' of apartheid (Johnson, 1982:219). Both the structure and the content of education and the curriculum reflected and legitimised an ethnically-based social stratification system (*ibid*:219). While education for white children was compulsory and free, education for black children was neither compulsory nor free. Access to certain skills and knowledge were limited for African children. Education was designed to enforce and legitimise racial segregation (*ibid*:220). Africans were educated for lower-grade occupations while white education was structured to educate children for leadership positions (Steyn *et al.*, 2011:21).

'Bantu Education' was critiqued for stifling critical thinking, free expression and active participation in political, economic and social spheres of life in South Africa (*ibid*:21). However, this was also true of white education as white children were indoctrinated by programmes designed to enforce nationalism and Christianity (Msila, 2007:149). CNE was a destructive educational system affecting all South African children in complex ways (*ibid*:149).

The Apartheid discourse was sophisticated in its usage of cultural language masking racism. Science (2.4.3.1) was used to provide empirical evidence defining the original 'Bantu' to be classified, categorised and studied (Soudien, 2010:36). The curriculum unfolding from this research, mediated relations of subordination and inferiority (*ibid*:36). The resulting discourse developed around radicalised race, white supremacy, and white liberalism (*ibid*:37). Within the boundaries of this discourse as acts of power, the relation self:other was constructed in categories of *what* South Africans were assumed to be (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:463-465; 4.6.4; 4.6.4.1).

Seeing self:other in opposition relating to *what* they are perceived to be is the baggage with which South Africans entered the post-apartheid era (Soudien, 2010:39). Framed ways of 'knowing' self:other became the model for integration and the curriculum. Race was firmly established during colonialism and apartheid as underpinning the way of being with and knowing self:other (*ibid*:39-40). The post-apartheid understanding of 'United in Diversity' manifests as a mere tolerance and accommodation of diverse race, ethnic, religious and gender categories. The remnants and boundaries set by imperialism, colonialism and apartheid distort the relation self:other and the perceived 'rainbow' multiculturalism in South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006:372; 4.4.2.5). Posing 'the other', as a self-enclosed cultural unit in comparison to self, often defined in a universal truth context, distances self and other in opposition (Nealon, 1997:129; 3.4.1).

This exploration of South Africa's colonial and apartheid past would not be complete without mention of the moments in which the emergency of complex forms of acting in, on and with the world disrupted this homogenous and oppressive narrative. It started with the Khoi-Khoi mission station in Baviaan's Kloof during Dutch rule. This community used the limited education at their disposal to their advantage and to keep their community intact (Soudien, 2010:28). A second example is that of Kadi Abdus Salaam who established the first *madrassah* in the Cape during 1793. In weekly meetings, these slaves developed their own interpretations of the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other by means of dialogue (*ibid*:28-29). During apartheid groups such as the Spartacus, Leninist Club, Non-European Unity Movement and the Cape Town Teacher's Movement emerged as an internationalisation of the socialist struggle (*ibid*:37). Teachers from these groups introduced a non-racial curriculum into their classrooms and as mediators of knowledge disrupted apartheid knowledge (*ibid*:38). These moments remind us that the relation self:other in South Africa is/was not constructed along the single stories of subordination and oppression but in multiple and complex narratives of self:other acting in, on and with the world, disrupting meanings and understandings and sparking dialogic revolutions (Freire, 1993:63-64; Soudien, 2010:29;).

5.3.4 Outcomes-based education

The expected fundamental reconstruction of education and curriculum was set in motion after the first democratic election in South Africa in 1994 (Steyn *et al.*, 2011:23). This process of reconstruction, however, actually dates back to 1990. Pre-1990, South Africa had a predictable, centralised and uniform curriculum policy reinforcing racial segregation (Jansen, 1999a:4). During 1990 the political landscape changed in South Africa and in the Southern African region (*ibid*:4). The end of the Cold War brought ideological and political re-alignments in the Southern African region and in South Africa, forcing the apartheid government to unban political organisations and release political prisoners (*ibid*:4). These political changes also brought about a significant and critical turning point in curriculum debates in South Africa. Within South Africa, competing social movements and political actors staked out their curriculum positions in anticipation of the democratic elections and the inevitable curriculum reconstruction. Heated debates regarding the nature and purpose of curriculum started during 1990 and continued during the next decade (*ibid*:4,10).

The anticipated curriculum reconstruction started immediately after the 1994 elections (Chisholm, 2005:193). The curriculum was immediately ‘cleansed’ of racist, gender stereotyped, outdated and controversial content (Hoadley & Jansen, 2009:142). In 1997, the national Department of Education launched Curriculum 2005 in Cape Town with balloons in the colours of the new national flag. As Jansen (1999a:10) remarks, “curriculum and patriotism were firmly linked”.

Jansen (1999b:64) argues that OBE¹⁶ in South Africa was uncritically introduced as a result of political pressure during and after 1994. He describes OBE as context-blind, de-linked from the realities and complexities of classrooms and schools, teacher development, textbook development and grassroots participation (*ibid*:64). The political, social and economic pressures from various interest groups, during the early stages of curriculum development set the tone for future curriculum development in South Africa (Jansen, 1999a:14). The disparate influences affecting the coherency of OBE were external, internal, historic, economic, political and educational (*ibid*:14). OBE was influenced by competency debates in labour, the Spady version of OBE in the United States, apartheid legacies, claims for redistribution, reconstruction and reconciliation, performance based learning and global economic demands (*ibid*:14). However, OBE and Curriculum 2005 should also be viewed in the context of a set of policies adopted by

¹⁶ Since the inception of NCS-CAPS (2011), many curriculum scholars have questioned whether OBE is still the theoretical underpinning of the current post-apartheid curriculum as government insists.

the post-1994 government in order to transform apartheid education and training (Christie, 1999:279).

The central document framing the South African society, education and the curriculum, is the *Constitution of South Africa* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996). Soudien (2010:40) argues that while it is clear that the intention of the Constitution is to be inclusive, the diverse and contradictory interpretations of this document make exclusions possible. He states that the Constitution sociologically misrecognises the South African child (*ibid*:40). Referring to the interpretation of Judge Kathy O'Reagan on the starting point of the Constitution, Soudien (*ibid*:41), concludes that the Constitution regards a human being as a "conscious and deliberative individual whose subjectivity is derived from his/her engagement with the world of meaning in a fully responsible way". This would underscore the reality of 'subjectivity' in South Africa, in which "engagement with the world of meaning" (O'Reagan in Soudien, 2010:41) is classed, raced, gendered, and cultured. As a result of this, key curriculum reforms derived from this understanding of the *Constitution of South Africa* (1996) do not engage with the lived experiences of South African children (Soudien, 2010:41; 4.6.4.1).

OBE and Curriculum 2005 are excellent examples of internationalisation (*ibid*:41). OBE came to South Africa under the flag of 'best-practices' across the world (*ibid*:41). Even in the language and terminology, as symbols of change in the new curriculum, internationalisation is apparent (Chisholm, 2005:196). Naming and renaming are an important symbolic process in reframing hope and a re-imagined future. Naming the world and self:other is a dialogic process between humans in a quest of meaning-making (Freire, 1993:69). Renaming in the post-apartheid curriculum, however, was done using imported assessment-driven terminology from the USA, New Zealand and Australia (Chisholm, 2005:197). Children became 'learners,' teachers became 'educators,' subjects became 'learning areas' and textbooks became 'learning support materials'(*ibid*:196).

If situating-the-self is the first step in difficult conversations regarding internationalisation, the development of the new South African curriculum, driven by haste to break with apartheid, skipped the first step (*cf.* Pinar, 2010a:231). The narrative of how colonial and apartheid curriculum and education influenced inclusion and exclusion in the South African society pre-1994 had not been deconstructed (Soudien, 2010:19). Curriculum 2005 was premised on a misunderstanding of the constituting power of apartheid and colonialism (*ibid*:44).

There were never such fierce debate and controversy in the previous history of South African education and curriculum developments as those since the inception of OBE and Curriculum 2005 in the 1990s (Jansen, 1999a:3). Jansen (*ibid*:11) rightly argues that in light of the history of curriculum development in South Africa such a fierce public debate is very encouraging.

5.3.5 Revised National Curriculum Statement

Asmal (2011:262-268) describes the stages of curriculum development resulting in the RNCS (2004) through his personal experiences as Minister of Education (1999-2003). When Asmal (*ibid*:263) took office in 1999, the first stages of implementing OBE, which was originally planned to be fully implemented in 2005, were in full swing. During 1999, the Van Rensburg report indicated that there was less resistance from teachers to OBE but that implementation was crippled by a lack of resources, professional development and support personnel (*ibid*:264). A Review Committee was established to prepare a report on what was needed to ensure the successful implementation of OBE (*ibid*:264). The emphasis was on infusing stronger human rights content, simplifying the complexity of the curriculum and strategising its implementation (Chisholm, 2005:196). The intention of the ministry was never to abandon OBE, but to ensure the successful implementation of OBE (Asmal, 2011:264,266).

The report from the Review Committee was finished in 2000 and recommended changes to the structure and design of Curriculum 2005 in order to facilitate successful implementation (*ibid*:266). However, the recommendations were sufficiently radical to halt implementation in order to focus on problem areas such as teacher development and textbook preparation (*ibid*:266). After much debate within government and the ANC, Cabinet endorsed the need for the development of a *Revised National Curriculum Statement* on 25 July 2000 (*ibid*:267). The RNCS (2004) was approved by the Council of Education Ministers in April 2002 for implementation in 2004 (*ibid*:268). During 2003 the *National Curriculum Statement FET grades 10-12* was published and at the end of 2008 the first Grade 12s wrote the new outcomes-based National Senior Certificate examination (Hoadley & Jansen, 2009:142). Ongoing implementation difficulties prompted a second review of the RNCS (2004) in 2009. Asmal (2011:267) argues that the 2011 changes to the NCS-CAPS made few changes to the RNCS (2004). In my view however, the NCS-CAPS (2011) indicates a clear shift away from constitutional and human rights values towards an instrumental and market-orientated emphasis in the curriculum.

The conflict between interpretations of the RNCS (2004) as being rooted in an egalitarian pedagogy and human rights values and interpretations of the RNCS (2004) as being behaviouralist and instrumentalist in nature, has been prevalent since the inception of the post-apartheid curriculum (Kraak, 1999:21). The RNCS (2004:6-7) explicitly states that the curriculum is rooted in the *Constitution of South Africa* (1996) and that the curriculum therefore aims to heal divisions of the past, establish a democratic society, improve the quality of life for all South Africans, lay the foundations for a society in which each citizen is equal before the law and build a united and democratic South Africa. Jansen (1999b:146-152), however, raises epistemological and political objections to the inappropriate use of an instrumental curriculum such as OBE in a democratic context. Soudien (2010:41) argues that the mis-representation of subjectivity in the post-apartheid curriculum favours older forms of privilege and continues to discriminate against black and poor children. This is partly because teachers and children are not the autonomous subjects that the constructivist lens of the post-apartheid curriculum assumes them to be (*ibid*:42).

5.3.6 NCS-CAPS

In 2009, a Ministerial Committee (Curriculum Implementation Review Committee) was tasked with reviewing curriculum implementation difficulties. In 2010 the Minister of Education conceded that Curriculum 2005 had resulted in a number of problems, two of which were teacher overload and the difficulty of implementing the curriculum (Motshekga, 2010:1). The recommendations of the Ministerial Committee focused on areas in need of improvement such as: making the curriculum accessible to teachers, clear mapping of assessment standards, changes in curriculum terminology, the reduction of learning areas, and the development and distribution of textbooks (*ibid*:2-3). Mother-tongue as language of learning in the early grades, and externally set assessment in grades 3, 6 and 9 were recommended (*ibid*:2-3).

As in the rest of the world, economic thinking has become the mode of rationality in South African education (Skinner, 1999:125). This is not only reflected in the perceived nature and purpose of education: alleviating poverty and aiding economic growth but also in the emphasis on mathematics and science to the detriment of social sciences and the arts (Atmore *et al.*, 2011:176). It furthermore manifests in the growing instrumentalised rhetoric of the curriculum such as; the curriculum “aims to *produce* learners.” (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5). This shift towards market-orientated education can be illustrated by the shift in the articulation of the aim or purpose of the curriculum in the

RNCS overview document (2004) and the overview to the NCS-CAPS documents (2011):

The curriculum aims to develop the full potential of each learner as a citizen of a democratic South Africa. It seeks to create a lifelong learner who is confident and independent, literate, numerate and multi-skilled, compassionate, with a respect for the environment and the ability to participate in society as a critical and active citizen.

(RNCS, 2004:8)

as opposed to:

The National Curriculum Statement Grades R-12 serves the purpose of:

Equipping learners, irrespective of their socio-economic background, race, gender, physical ability or intellectual ability, with the knowledge, skills and values necessary for self-fulfillment, and meaningful participation in society as citizens of a free country;

Providing access to higher education;

Facilitating the transition of learners from education institutions to the workplace; and

Providing employers with a sufficient profile of a learner's competencies.

(NCS-CAPS, 2011:4)

The shift towards an economic imperative in defining the purpose and nature of education and the curriculum is clearly illustrated in the overview of the NCS-CAPS (2011) documents. The tension between the assumed transformative nature of education by 'People's Education' movements and a narrow commercial definition of education have since 1994 continually shifted towards the commercial (Skinner, 1999:120).

The socio-historic milieu in which curriculum is situated, Dillon (2009:346) argues, is often neglected in the questioning of curriculum. This element of curriculum should form the backdrop of curriculum activities and situate curriculum and self:other in time and space (*ibid*:346). The post-apartheid curriculum is situated in spaces of multiple intersecting forces shaping and driving it (Ramrathan, 2010:121). The intersections

between the curriculum, society, economy, history and politics will be explored in the next section.

5.4 SPACES OF CURRICULUM INTERSECTIONS

Education is never a neutral act (Msila, 2007:146). The post-apartheid curriculum is positioned in complex spaces of intersections. Within these intersecting spaces are the past (apartheid and colonialism), the present (democracy, human rights, social justice) and the hope for a peaceful re-imagined society. Taking account of these intersections of non-linear past, present and future time in curriculum spaces, I would like to explore the economic, social, political and historical intersections within curriculum spaces.

Oppressive structures, influencing identity (re)construction, becoming and the constitution of the relation self:other, are the result of intersections between racism, classism, sexism, ableism and many other oppressive 'isms' (Ellsworth, 1989:303). However, these 'isms' are social constructs resulting from political, economic, historical and social interests and power relations. The exploration of the intersection of historic/social/political/economic interests in post-apartheid curriculum spaces might reveal the diverse understandings of human rights values, the relation self:other, and identity construction in South Africa (4.6.4.1).

5.4.1 Intersections of politics and curriculum

The genealogical discourse concerning belonging has been central to the categorisation of self:other in South Africa since colonialism (*cf.* Derrida, 2005:91; 3.4.2.2). Belonging is in essence experiences of exclusion and inclusion. During apartheid and colonialism all human experiences of inclusion and exclusion were framed against the hegemony of the white experience (Soudien, 2010:38-39). Asmal (2011:271) states that much of his work on the Manifesto (2001) and the RNCS (2004) was inspired by his personal experiences of exclusion and his antipathy towards humans being excluded from humanity. Both the Manifesto (2001) and the RNCS (2004), place the promotion of constitutional inclusive values at the centre of its vision. It is assumed that educating *for* these values will ensure a national South African identity and promote nation-building (Chisholm, 2009:316). Nation building and the construction of the national identity of the 'good citizen' are some of the main purposes of the post-apartheid curriculum (RNCS, 2002:6-8; NCS-CAPS, 2011:1,5). Discourses on nation building and identity, however, often mask the nature of political and power relations (Chisholm, 2009:316).

The 'nation' is a pivotal concept in curriculum development, since the ideology and constitution of the nation-state influence the nature and content of education (Davies *et al.*, 2005:68). Every democratic society accepts the challenge and responsibility to develop and educate future generations to adhere to its national ideologies and constitution (Schoeman, 2006:130). The very concept of education 'producing' 'good citizens' in a nation-state, however, is exclusionary in nature and fuels opposition (2.4.5.2 [c]). The conceptual linking of constitutional and human rights values to the collective South African 'good citizen' reproduces categories of knowing and being.

The realisation of freedom, dignity and equality in the relation self:other rely on the individuation of the unique self in the relation self:other rooted in equality of difference. Although 'nation' presumes a collective space and experience, it remains in essence the space in which humans in their singularity experience life in all its complexities (5.2; 5.3.1). The specificity of nation remains the unique individual who is the "lived site of remembrance and reconstruction" in nation-building (Pinar, 2010b:3; 5.3.1). Nation-building should thus be a balance between the singular experiences of self as a specific of nation and the experiences of the collective self in the relation self:other. The ethical relation self:other is (re)constituted in spaces of difference and categorisation and opposition manifests in spaces of sameness (2.4.4.1).

Nation-building, however, conceptually tie identity construction and the realisation of human rights values to a pre-conceived idea of the 'good citizen' in the South African curriculum (RNCS, 2002:8-9; NCS-CAPS, 2011:5). The good citizen is "knowledgeable, skilled, responsible and ethical." (Asmal, 2011:287; NCS-CAPS, 2011:4-5). The good citizen knows "what it means to be South African" (Asmal, 2011:287). Human rights education in South Africa concerns 'civic education' and is narrowly focused on citizenship and nation-building: the political nature of the individual (Du Preez, 2008:5). It is premised on the individualistic liberal and deliberative views on human rights (2.5.1; 2.5.2). Human rights education in South Africa has a dual purpose; the structuring of a political landscape on 'agreed upon values' (2.5.2) and the restructuring of the economic landscape by an individualistic neo-liberal, market-orientated interpretation of human rights (2.5.1). It regards human rights and collective identity as political and economic reformative tools and disregard the relational, dialogic and revolutionary nature of human rights.

Returning to subjectivity, belonging and their influence on identity construction, Soudien (2010:44) argues that the new state fails to acknowledge the importance of subject formation. The baggage of whiteness and blackness from colonialism and apartheid

remains an issue in the “country’s identity landscape.” (*ibid*:44). Middle-class identity properties have always been regarded as white virtues. In a neo-liberalist landscape in which desirable goods are produced and consumed, the link to past images of identity in South Africa is/has not been challenged in the curriculum (*ibid*:44). This has led to new categories of how we know others reflected in concepts such as ‘coconuts’ which categorise young black people wanting to succeed in a new environment (*ibid*:44; 4.4.3).

The transition to democracy since 1994 did not only entail democratisation and deracialisation of institutions but also the adoption of neo-liberal policies and the global economic ideology, which supports it (Chisholm, 2009:316; Skinner, 1999:122). South Africans did not only accept the link between human rights and consumerism (3.4.2.1; 3.9.3.4) but also the link between market rationality and education (Waghid, 2010:202; 3.4.2.1). The unique individual’s experience of neo-liberal education and nation-building in South Africa is the entrenchment of the existing freedoms of the already empowered (Skinner, 1999:122).

Identity construction premised on belonging and its effect on spaces of togetherness was explored in section 3.9.3.4. Products consumed and produced sell identities and membership to groups to which individuals can belong. (Bauman, 2001a:150-152). The employed are assessed on and valued for what they contribute to the production of goods, the economy, society and the nation. The irreplaceable role of the poor is in keeping the employed in step (*ibid*:117; 3.4.2.1). Individuals experiencing powerlessness and insecurity guard their status of belonging to a frame, social class or category through identification with groups which can be political, economic or cultural (*ibid*:147).

In intersecting curriculum spaces of politics/neo-liberalism/human rights/education, I agree with Arendt (2006a:173-174): “the word ‘education’ has an evil sound in politics; there is a pretence of education, when the real purpose is coercion without the use of force.” The inclusion of human rights in the post-apartheid curriculum (RNCS, 2004; NCS-CAPS, 2011) is a means to economic, social and political restructuring, which disregards the subjective experiences of individuals in the ‘nation’ (Du Preez, 2008:3).

5.4.2 Intersections of economic interests and curriculum

Reducing poverty in the South African society was one of the key goals of the ANC when they assumed power in 1994 (Verwey, 2011:107). Externally, the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations also set explicit targets for the halving of poverty in South Africa to the new government (*ibid*:107). The reduction of poverty and

unemployment is crucial to the democratic society, which South Africans envisaged after 1994.

The link between poverty and a democratic society rooted in human rights values is twofold. Poverty disables the ability of self:other to actively participate in the social and political spheres of life (*ibid*:106). Active citizenship is replaced by continual and growing 'victimhood.' A society defined in victimhood in turn encourages passive citizens dependent on power for its existence (Neocosmos, 2006:357; 4.2.1.4). The second link between poverty and democracy concerns disillusionment with the ability of democracy to 'deliver a better life.' Democracy in such a context is perceived to be interlinked with growing poverty, unemployment and inequality (Verwey, 2011:108).

Skinner (1999:119) argues that both representatives of commercial interests and government regarded the solution to South Africa's economic problems as the primary function of education in 1994. Education has historically served economic needs in providing human capital for power structures during colonialism and apartheid and it was re-introduced in OBE (*ibid*:117). This is reflected by the skills and competencies that 'critical outcomes' in the OBE support (*ibid*:119). Nearly twenty years after the inception of the post-apartheid curriculum and despite education being afforded the biggest slice of government expenditure, there is growing unemployment and poverty (Jansen, 2011:99; Verwey, 2011:108). Many scholars such as Verwey (2011:108) therefore argue that education remains a sector where not enough value for money spent is achieved.

Competency-based education and training had its South African origin in 1985 during apartheid (Kraak, 1999:38). The tainting of 'competency-based education' by apartheid led to a shift towards a more progressive reading of 'outcomes' in policy documents such as *A Framework for Lifelong Learning* (1993) and *A Policy Framework for Education and Training* (1994) produced by the ANC and COSATO¹⁷ (*ibid*:39). Jansen (1999a:9) argues that the shift from 'competencies' to 'outcomes' was also an attempt to escape the behaviourism implied in 'competencies' by replacing it with the more educationally accepted 'outcomes'. However, at the heart of OBE there is still a predesigned set of performance objectives that serve as criteria for assessment and competency (Kraak, 1999:40).

Conceding that positivistic and behaviouristic approaches to knowledge and teaching have been rejected by the majority of educationalists, these approaches are now

¹⁷ COSATO: Congress of South African Trade Unions. COSATO played a significant role in the early formulation and interpretation of the post-apartheid curriculum.

globally re-introduced into the curriculum as pragmatist 'market imperatives' (Skinner, 1999:121). Positivism and behaviourism have returned within an individualistic framework influenced by market thinking and neo-Darwinism (*ibid*:121; 3.3.1;). Market rationality is an institutionalised power constructed by means of powerful economic and political interventions (Gershon, 2011:538; 3.9.3.4). The influence of the institutionalised power of market rationality on the relation self:other has already been explored in Chapter Three and will be further explored in section 5.6.1 and 5.6.2

Globally, education plays a pivotal role in securing market rationality and its institutionalised power. Since 1994, education in South Africa has been burdened with the responsibility of being an instrument in the reduction of poverty. Harley and Parker (1999:196) argue that no consideration was given at the inception of the post-apartheid curriculum of how it would affect a strongly differentiated education system. In the preface to the RNCS (2004), Asmal (in RNCS, 2004:3) explains the role of schools and the curriculum in South Africa after apartheid as, "the expression of our idea of ourselves and our vision as to how we see the new form of society being realised through our children and learners." He thus regards the curriculum as an expression of what the South African society *is* but also the expression of what the South African society *hopes* to become by means of education. The presumed existence of a middle-class society on which the curriculum was premised, has no relation to the daily experiences of millions of poor and divided South Africans (Soudien, 2010:41,43).

Harley and Parker (1999:196) foresaw that OBE would eventually benefit previously 'white' schools most. This projection seems to be accurate. Jansen (2011b:101) illustrates the 'racialised inequality' reproduced by OBE with statistics from the Grade 12 results of 2007. Of the 9 079 A-aggregates for mathematics (HG), 1 303 were black and 5 046 were white. Half of the 1 303 black children achieving A-aggregates attended previously 'white' schools (*ibid*:101). The new curriculum has amplified the major vectors of discrimination from apartheid and colonial education (Soudien, 2010:43). Soudien (*ibid*:43) contends that the national curriculum has now given a macro-character to discrimination. The rich purchase education that will expand the future choices and possibilities opening to their children (Bridges & Jonathan, 2003:128). The growing gap in the quality of education provided to poor and rich children in South Africa has resulted in South Africa having two school systems; rich and functional schools and poor and disfunctional schools (Jansen, 2011b:112). This severely affects the realisation of human rights values in South Africa. Although the millions of South Africans living in

poverty perceive themselves as politically free, they remain voiceless and powerless to become equal and live a dignified life (Verwey, 2011:115).

The structural changes in the South African society after 1994 have resulted in an increased labour force and only a moderate growth in jobs (*ibid*:122). Furthermore, the growth in jobs has been in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy while the South African labour force remained relatively unskilled and uneducated. (*ibid*:123). In standardised international learner assessments South African scholars do poorly and FET colleges cannot provide technically skilled graduates (*ibid*:124). Paradoxically, the vocabulary of national policy on education remains centred on economic growth and development without addressing the root of our educational problems and how they intersect with South Africa's economic difficulties (Atmore, Wray & Godsell, 2011:176).

5.4.3 Intersections of curriculum and society

Arendt (1958:46) claims that most modern societies, are trapped in the consciousness of biological existence and the activities of labour. Biological existence in her terms is organised mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else – a continual cycle of human activities pursuing production and consumption as an end; a neo-liberal market-orientated society. A society driven by consumption and production, demands commitment and conformity, which in the metaphor of *labour*, are described as a manifestation of equality (*ibid*:46).

The assumptions about the relation education and society in South Africa inherent in the post-apartheid curriculum have been contentious from its inception. Asmal (2011:262) concedes that many South Africans felt that government imposed an alien educational philosophy on them. He further states that there was heated debate within government whether OBE was appropriate in the South African context (*ibid*:263). During 1994, the ANC in its policy document on education very clearly stated that the curriculum for post 1994 would be democratic, non-racist, non-sexist and working towards national unity in diversity (*ibid*:263). This commitment is reiterated in the preface to the RNCS (2004:1) stating that the curriculum is an expression of the post-apartheid society we hope to construct through education.

The post-apartheid curriculum hopes to create a new society but assumes that the characteristics of the society it hopes to create already exist (Harley & Parker, 1999:193). It assumes a consciousness and identity which does not exist but on which the success of OBE depends (*ibid*:193). After 1994 the interdependence and relations between South Africans were institutionalised and structured as contractual relations

based on rights and duties (*ibid*:189). The *Bill of Rights* and the *Constitution of South Africa* (1996) is assumed to be the glue of social cohesion (*ibid*:189). The success of the post-apartheid curriculum thus depends on a society, which acknowledges the relation self:other as interdependent, structured on consensus and committed to contractual human rights duties (*ibid*:189-190,197).

However, this conception of the South African society as it *could* be does not equate with the lived experiences of South Africans and the relational, dialogic and revolutionary nature of human rights values. South Africans are still defined in categories of *what* they are perceived to be; classed, raced, gendered and culturally framed (Soudien, 2010:41). This is further complicated by a misrecognition of the personal identities and histories of self:other. In order to compensate for experiences of loss; a loss of structure, continuity and order, due to societal, economic and political shifts, self:other need to reconstruct identities and understandings of *who* they are and what their shifting positionality within the South African society is (Harley & Parker, 1999:197). This would require interpersonal skills, self-reflection and an openness to other views – the very skills which were never encouraged during apartheid (*ibid*:198). The curriculum thus assumes the non-existent skills needed for the successful implementation of the post-apartheid curriculum.

The understandings of constitutionalised values and expected behaviours are reflected in the intended curriculum as the values of democracy, human rights and social justice (RNCS, 2004:7-8; NCS-CAPS, 2011:4-5), but the diverse interpretation and realisation of these values happen through the identities, histories and autobiographies of teacher:child in the classroom. Human rights employed as an economic and political means to an end, disregard the first article of *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* stating that all human beings “should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (Ishay, 2004:19). Although teacher:child might re-align themselves to the political and economic demands set by the curriculum, deep-seated meanings and understandings regarding self:other stay intact (Jansen, 2009:171; Jansen, 2011a:190). Conditional pragmatism and bureaucratic responsiveness must not be mistaken with a process of self-reflection and intra-dialogue in a search for ‘how we know what we know’ of self:other (Cary, 2006:136; Jansen, 2009:171). Re-imagining self:other in the South African context would require self:other to actively and continually realise the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other. This is a non-reciprocal and irrational choice based not on contractual or agreed upon relations but on the disruption of understandings and intra-dialogue shifting the boundaries of knowing and being with self:other (3.9.3.2).

The inclusive constitutional language of RNCS (2004:7) focuses on a united and democratic society and reconciliation. This is reiterated in the NCS-CAPS document (2011:4) stating that one of the aims and principles on which the curriculum is based is inclusivity. Jansen (2011a:197), however, points out that racial divides between self:other in South Africa have deepened since 1999. He also argues that recurring 'racial' incidents are representations of currents of racial discontent threatening the relation self:other and democracy (*ibid*:197). Since 1994 the rhetoric describing self:other has changed from being inclusive to being exclusive and there has been a moral shift in the relation self:other (*ibid*:198). The assumptions made about society and education regarding what *is* and what we hope *could* be are also becoming evident in the assumptions about official and constitutional directives and the emotional understanding of these by South Africans (*ibid*:198).

The intended and unintended curriculum are social constructs situated within a specific societal, political and historical context (Graham-Jolly, 2009:250: 1.2; 4.6.1). The lived curriculum is an expression of the relation self:other as it is reproduced in the classroom and school (Pitt, 1998:540; 4.6.5; 4.6.6). The South African society assumed by the post-apartheid curriculum is an inclusive and democratic society which the *Constitution of South Africa* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996) glues together. This, unfortunately, does not describe the lived experiences of millions of South Africans. South Africans do not live democratically happy ever after since 1994 (Dlamini, 2010:12).

5.4.4 Intersections of history and curriculum

South Africa, like the rest of Africa, has only begun to write its own history. This is a reconstruction of the past, which was buried under colonial and apartheid versions of *who* and *what* we are (Gordimer, 2011:734). The reconstruction of history is crucial to the hope of re-imagining society, because as the proverb goes: "Until the lions produce their own historian, the story of the hunt will glorify the hunter" (*ibid*:734).

Our *Constitution* (1996) demands that South Africans work towards a non-racist, non-sexist and democratic inclusive society. Against our colonial and apartheid histories, this constitutional mandate will take generations to achieve (Alexander, 2011:37). The question posed to the post-apartheid curriculum (and all the national programmes of redress and transformation) would thus be: Does it construct a new historical community? (Alexander, 2011:39). Returning to Pinar's (2010b:3) notion of the unique individual being the "lived site of remembrance and reconstruction" and manifestation of

the specificity of nation, I conclude that the constructing of a new historic nation should start with self.

To live historically in the present requires self to critically reflect on how past, present and future lived experiences are consolidated and narrated in the relation self:other and (re)presented in the curriculum (Du Preez, 2012b). Social and individual identities in South Africa have been and are still shaped by historical, social and political contexts, interests and powers (Alexander, 2011:41). The re-imagination of these identities would require a disruption of the historical boundaries framing the relation self:other such as categorising, stereotyping, beliefs, values, and everyday practises (*ibid*:42; 4.6.4.1).

Teaching and learning are not only about skills and content, they concern individual and unique human beings carrying the baggage of their past histories into the classroom. The majority of teachers, who are teaching today, grew up during the apartheid era (Atmore *et al.*, 2011:179). They were victims of apartheid education, dehumanising oppressor and oppressed, emphasising obedience and uncritical thinking (*ibid*:179). The question of how teachers who were either victims or supporters of apartheid teach the new values of the *South African Constitution* (1996) has not been answered by the curriculum (*ibid*:179). Soudien (2010:44) argues that the curriculum misrecognises and mis-represents South Africa's colonial and apartheid past. In doing this, the curriculum remains a-historical and speaks to a South African landscape as if it is empty (*ibid*:44).

Within these 'empty' and (a)historical curriculum spaces, teacher:child find it very difficult to face their individual and collective past histories and link it to their present and future expectations. This would require a deconstruction of self in difference and the individual and collective historical/social/economic and political intersections which influenced how self knows self:other and what self knows of self:other (4.6.4.1). Within an intra-dialogic framework, self needs not only to deconstruct the multiple different past and present experiences within self, but also the multiple different past and present experiences confessed between self:other. Such deconstruction should furthermore account for the projection of interest and power in the relation self:other (Ellsworth, 1989:305; 4.6.4.1).

Autobiographies linking past, present and future, narrated in a classroom as a space of togetherness, should be disrupted, because they hold implications for self:other (*ibid*:305). Such disruptions are also a manifestation of humans in their difference, situated within a common humanity, choosing responsibility *for* the impact of knowledge of self:other on an other when they live historically. The choice to be responsible *for* the effects of historically embedded knowledge about self:other has its origin in the

construction of the moral self. The self becomes his/her own interpreter of historical knowledge of self:other and how it effects the (re)construction of identity and the relation self:other (Arendt, 1990:87; Bauman, 1994:80). In responsibility *for* self:other historically constructed boundaries of categories of sameness and otherness can be deconstructed. Historical and socially prescribed rules of conduct regarding how and what we know of self:other do not apply in such a deconstruction (Bauman, 1994:79; 2.3.2).

The historical positioning of teacher:child is the first step in constituting the ethical relation teacher:child and influencing how, why and what we teach. This is illustrated by the programme *Facing the past – Transforming our Future*; a partnership between *Shikaya*, the Western Cape Education Department and *Facing History and Ourselves* (based in Boston, USA) (Atmore *et al.*, 2011:179). This project supports teachers through workshops, community events and seminars to deconstruct their identities, prejudices and how they treat people in a democratic society (*ibid*:180). The following extract is a comment from a teacher during a workshop:

I had to look in the mirror and had to face, yet again, the atrocities committed by my people to my people. It made me realise again how important my role is to be an agent for human rights – not only in my classroom but also in my community.

(*ibid*:181)

5.5 CURRICULUM AND INTRA-DIALOGIC SPACES

Freire (1993:111) argues that there cannot be any historical reality, which is not human. There can be no history *without* humans, *for* humans or *of* humans. We are the makers of history (*ibid*:111). We are also society in the singularity of the moral self and in the relation self:other, resulting from being moral (Bauman, 1994:61). In deconstructing past knowledge and reconstructing self:other, we are the makers of history and a new society.

The relation self:other envisaged in an ethical orientation to curriculum is a relation of equal difference in togetherness. Questions regarding, how can curriculum help to create a peaceful society? (Du Preez, 2011) and how can curriculum be self-transformative? (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514), cannot be posed within a technical perspective (4.5.2.5). By means of intra-dialogue and within an ethical frame of reasoning, South Africans can live historically and re-imagine a future society. Curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces is (un)documented revolutionary, ethical and individuating spaces in

which lived experiences are confessed and deconstructed (4.6.2). Deconstruction and reconstruction of what and how we know self:other are experienced with self:other during intra-dialogue.

Curriculum is situated in spaces of intersection between local (nation) and global and the intersections of non-linear past, present and future time, manifesting and represented in the relation self:other. Intra-dialogue happens in the simultaneous proximity of self as two-in-one and the distance between self:other in classrooms as spaces of togetherness. The simultaneously singularity and togetherness of self:other is reflected within curriculum spaces of proximity and distance.

The various intersections of difference are inherent components of intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. This includes the difference within self as the specificity/representative of nation, the difference within self as two-in-one and the difference between self:other as representing local and global. Intra-dialogue starts with the continual (re)construction of the moral self positioning self in the relation self:other in curriculum spaces. The positioning and specificity of self, intersects in intra-dialogic curriculum spaces with society/politics/economy/history. Self thus deconstructs unique positionality and specificity in terms of difference within self as two-in-one, difference within the relation self:other and difference between local (situated self) and global (situated self:other). Self, from his/her fluxing position in the relation self:other, opens him/herself to the confessions of difference between self:other in responsibility *for* self:other (Du Preez, 2009:108). Openness to other views reflects the revolutionary and ethical premise of intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. It implies the expectation of something new, "something unforeseen by us" (Arendt, 2006a:193) and the responsibility of preparing teacher:child for the continual revolutionising and becoming of self:other. The revolutionary, individuating and ethical nature of intra-dialogue informs the continual questioning of the positioning of self and the (re)presentation of self:other.

An unpredictable and unforeseen new beginning is sparked when conflicting narratives result in mis-understanding (3.2). Mis-understanding demands knowledge of how we know self:other and what we know of self:other in order to be disrupted (Bauman, 1994:147). It requires the questioning of positioning and (re)presentation in the relation self:other. By means of intra-dialogue all narratives are reflected upon, questioned, deconstructed and reflexively reconstructed. The construction of new knowledge resulting from disruption is the beginning of new ways of knowing and being with self:other. During intra-dialogue the positioning and (re)presentation of self:other shifts

continually (4.6.4.1). New understandings, new ways of being and knowing is continually re-imagined.

Intra-dialogue is an individuating experience. During intra-dialogue self confesses by means of autobiography *who* he/she is. By means of the continual deconstruction of autobiographies, individuating self:other in unique and equal difference, human freedom, dignity, equality and identity construction are realised (4.6.7). Self continually becomes the unique *I* – someone defined as irreplaceable and dignified in the relation self:other (3.9.3.2; 4.6.6).

In intra-dialogic curriculum spaces, the curriculum as specificity of the internationalised curriculum is contextualised, deconstructed, reconstructed and 'individuated'. By deconstructing the intersections in the narrative curriculum/self:other, curriculum can be a co-constructor to a new historical community (Alexander, 2011:39). In the words of a teacher who attended a *Facing the past* workshop:

And if we're not critically looking at how it is that who we are influences how we teach then we're just perpetuating either hatred, maybe indifference towards the other, whoever they are, and how do we possibly create a new way of being.

(Atmore *et al.*, 2011:181)

Identity construction, the relation self:other and the realisation of human rights values are intimately connected to intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. Within intra-dialogic spaces, curriculum is regarded as an ethical, relational, revolutionary and individuating experience (4.6.2). The continual construction of identity and the realisation of human rights values rely on the ethical and intra-dialogic relation self:other in spaces of togetherness (4.4.3). However, the construction of the relation teacher:child in the classroom is always influenced by categories of knowing self:other and embodies the systems of reason of what is seen, thought about and acted upon in curriculum development (Popkewitz, 2009:303). It also sets the boundaries for what is (im)possible in knowing and being with self:other (*ibid*:303).

Globally, all formal schooling is framed within the epistemological script of the Enlightenment (Soudien, 2010:45). Education and curriculum are evidence-based disciplines (Biesta, 2009:13). While it is always advisable to use factual information in decisions about what *ought* to be done, we can never derive what *ought* to be done by only using factual information (*ibid*:35). The *is-ought* problem in education implies the making of value judgments. In evaluating data and constructing knowledge from data, we are always engaging with values (Brinkman, 2007:1123; Biesta, 2009:35; 1.7). This

calls in question the technical validity in relation to the normative validity of data analysis in curriculum development. Knowledge, when validated and referenced in normative spaces of reasoning, should prompt us to differentiate between measuring what we value and valuing what we measure (Brinkman, 2007:1123; Biesta, 2009:35; 1.7.3.1 [c]).

The conditions for intra-dialogue and identity construction in curriculum are the ethical relation teacher:child and spaces of togetherness (4.4). The nature, elements and process of curriculum as expressed by the concepts used in the post-apartheid curriculum, are explored in the next section. This will focus on the framing of self:other and the kind of relationships the post-apartheid curriculum envisages. The boundaries influencing the constituting of the conditions for intra-dialogue and the realisation of human rights values, identity construction, consciousness and becoming are questioned and deconstructed.

5.6 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, ELEMENTS AND PROCESS OF THE POST-APARTHEID CURRICULUM AND INTRA-DIALOGIC SPACES

Questioning curriculum is concerned with the interrelated process of the nature, elements and process of curriculum (4.5.1). I will explore the nature, elements and process of post-apartheid curriculum documents and related policy as well as other documents published by the Department of Education since 1996 to 2012 (Dillon, 2009:343). This will be done in order to ascertain how defining the nature, elements and process in the South African curriculum impacts on the understanding of the relational, revolutionary and dialogic nature of the ethical perspective on curriculum.

Analysing the nature of curriculum will include questions regarding the essence and character of curriculum (*ibid*:344; 4.5.1). In exploring the elements of curriculum, questions regarding teacher and child, epistemology, the where and when of teaching-learning, the why (purpose of teaching-learning) and the activities involved in teaching-learning, will be attended to (*ibid*:344; 4.5.1). The process of curriculum is analysed by questioning how we think and act curriculum in South Africa (*ibid*:344; 4.5.1). The process of curriculum will include analysing discourses such as 'learnification' (Biesta, 2009:36), life-long learning and the learning society (Masschelein, 2001:2). Concepts used in curriculum are not sterile. All concepts used in curriculum are value laden and position and (re)present self:other in the curriculum (*cf.* Popkewitz, 2009:307; Biesta, 2009:35).

In addition to the questions regarding the nature, elements and process of the post-apartheid curriculum, the questions posed in section 4.6 will be asked during analysis. The questions are:

- “What does curriculum have to do with my life?” (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514,515)
- “How can curriculum be self-transformative?” (*ibid*:514,515)
- “Is the pupil a mere object of knowledge or *someone* with whom it is necessary to establish a moral relationship?” (Ruiz, 2004:271)
- How do we know others and what do we know of others in curriculum spaces? (Cary, 2006:135)
- Can curriculum help to create a peaceful society? (Du Preez, 2011)
- Is the post-apartheid curriculum concerned with the ontological experiences and hopes of South Africans living in a complex and dissonant country and world?

5.6.1 Defining curriculum: the nature of curriculum

In seeking to define the essence and character of curriculum, we cannot rely on abstract and distant policy and curriculum statements. Taking the view that curriculum is a lived experience, I will argue that curriculum should “build in people, in all their diversity, humanity, and flesh-and-blood imminence.” (Morrison, 2004:488). When curriculum becomes about life (*ibid*:490), it becomes ‘messy,’ uncomfortable and difficult (*ibid*:488). Attempts to structure ‘complicated conversations’ regarding curriculum (Pinar, 2010b:3) and disruptive and dissonant experiences in the classroom (Jansen, 2009:266) using predesigned aims, experiences and outcomes will not solve the “curriculum craze in South Africa” (Ramrathan, 2010:107). Difficult and ‘messy’ curriculum characteristics call for reflexive practices not “as clarity, honesty, or humility, but as practices of confounding disruptions – at times even a failure of our language and practices” (Pillow, 2003:192). Disruptive and uncomfortable reflexivity is not about better methods in research or teaching, it is about the ethical responsibility for how we position and (re)present self:other in the curriculum (Pillow, 2003:193; Cary, 2006:137).

The South African curriculum has shifted between 1994 and 2012 towards a technical perspective on curriculum (5.6.3). Economic thinking has become the mode of rationality in South African education and curriculum development (Skinner, 1999:125). The post-apartheid curriculum was constructed in order to create a “South Africa which is prosperous, truly united and democratic.” (Msila, 2007:150). The intended purpose of the post-apartheid curriculum has been to change the education system and to transform society (*ibid*:150). The transformational discourse regarding the curriculum, however, is

saturated with instrumentalised and technical rhetoric (1.3.2; 5.4.2).

Since 1994 the labour market became an integral partner in the shaping of curriculum and the defining of the nature of curriculum (Ramrathan, 2010:122; 5.4.2). Schools are regarded as 'delivery' and 'production' systems (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5; Motshekga, 2011:1). The questions framing curriculum development within a technical frame of reference regards the following: the purpose of education, the experiences needed to serve the predesigned purpose, the organisation of planned experiences and the effective assessment of purpose, experience and outcome (Graham-Jolly, 2009:247,249; 4.5.2.1). This linear and closed conception of curriculum is clearly illustrated within the South African curriculum by the focus on technical efficiency and assessment of outcomes (Government notice 752 of 2010 [hereafter Delivery Agreement]:10-11; Motshega, 2010:2,4). The post-apartheid curriculum requires South African education, schools and curriculum to accomplish and be accountable for the achievement of predesigned outcomes (Delivery Agreement, 2010:19-20; Schubert, 2008:400). When curriculum is defined as technical and procedural in nature, the elements and processes of curriculum would be conceptualised according to the defining of the technical and procedural nature of curriculum (4.5.1).

Conversely, the ethical turn in curriculum proposes an open-ended, multilayered and complex curriculum. The focus shifts from outcomes and efficiency to the lived experiences of self in relation. Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces, framed within the ethical and post-modern perspectives on curriculum, define the nature of curriculum as embracing the ethical, dialogic, individuating and revolutionary relation teacher:child.

5.6.2 The elements of curriculum

The elements of curriculum describe the relations, activities, purpose and knowledge constructed in curriculum. The elements, discussed in this section are the purpose of curriculum, teacher, child, the relation teacher:child, spaces of togetherness, knowledge about self:other and the activities of curriculum.

5.6.2.1 The purpose of the curriculum

In answering questions on what we should value in the curriculum, we should consider what the aim and purpose of education and curriculum in a democratic state is. There are a wide variety of views on this (Biesta, 2009:39). Biesta (*ibid*:39) argues that education in a democratic state performs three functions namely: qualification, socialisation and subjectification. Questions about the purpose of education and

curriculum in a democratic state should be about the intersections between these three functions (*ibid*:41).

The qualification function of curriculum is to provide skills, knowledge and understandings which would allow children to “do something.” This could be specific (preparing for a profession) or general (teaching life skills) (*ibid*:39-40). The qualification function of the South African curriculum is market orientated and the NCS-CAPS (2011:4) clearly stipulates that the curriculum aims to ‘produce’ learners with the competencies required for placement in the workplace and/or tertiary education.

The socialisation function of education is concerned with the way in which children become part of particular social, cultural and political orders (Biesta, 2009:40). This broader socialisation is influenced by the meta-narratives of society and community (Du Preez, 2012b). In the overview of the NCS-CAPS (2011), Motshekga (in NCS-CAPS, 2011:i) reiterates that the South African curriculum aims to promote our constitutional values, heal the divisions of the past and improve the quality of life for all South Africans. Since 1994, the South African curriculum has aimed to ‘produce’ citizens “who know what it means to be South African” (Asmal, 2011:287) in a “truly united and democratic” country (Msila, 2007:150). Thus the individual teacher and child have been subsumed in the narrative of neo-liberal and market-orientated nation-building (Skinner, 1999:122). Identity construction and the relation self:other are conceptually tied to a pre-conceived idea of the ‘good South African’ (5.4.1).

The subjectification function of education is concerned with the ways in which education impacts on the individual (Biesta, 2009:40). Subjectification is not about ‘slotting in’ individuals into existing cultural, political and social orders but about resisting such orders (*ibid*:40). Subjectification is about the freedom to individuate self and disrupt embedded knowledge in continual new beginnings, not thought possible by us (Arendt, 2006a:193; 4.6.3; 4.6.5). The subjectification function of the curriculum requires an ethical turn and focus on the self in relation. The child in relation is not seen as an object or an empty space but is received and recognised as *someone* – dignified and unique (Ruiz, 2004:275; 4.6.6). Subjectification happens within intersecting political, economic, societal and historical spaces constructing larger narratives. In these spaces of intersection, intra-dialogue is the shared moral response and experience of disruption between teacher:child. The search for self, the continual re-imagination of self and the reconstruction of identity is an ethical and relational experience within spaces of intersection and conflict (Brison, 2007:370-371).

The three functions of curriculum need to be balanced in a democratic curriculum (Biesta, 2009:41). The emphasis on qualification competencies and predesigned socialisation in the post-apartheid curriculum does not allow for subjectification, disruption and intra-dialogue.

5.6.2.2 The teacher

The overview document to the RNCS (2004:9) regards teachers as key contributors to the transformation of education and society in South Africa. Teachers are envisaged as being qualified, competent, dedicated and caring (*ibid*:9). The emphasis on the qualification function as the main purpose of the post-apartheid curriculum necessarily has an impact on defining *who* and *what* teacher:child are and *why* and *what* they teach and learn.

The *National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996* (hereafter NEPA 27) describes the roles and competencies of educators. The three applied competencies: practical, foundational and reflexive competencies should be demonstrated in the subject and phase specialist role of educators (*ibid*:47). The roles of educators are described as learning mediator, interpreter and designer of learning programmes and materials, leader, administrator and manager, scholar, researcher and lifelong learner, citizens and pastors, assessor and learning area/subject/discipline/phase specialist (*ibid*:48-49). There are at least two concerns about the combination of very specialised roles that teachers are expected to fulfil. The first concern is related to the availability of specialised teachers in South Africa (Harley & Parker, 1999:193), Both Soudien (2010:42) and Jansen (2011b:107) underline the national concern about the lack of knowledgeable teachers in South Africa. The second concern is related to the historical baggage, which teachers inevitably carry into the classrooms. Historical baggage influences the identity of teachers and influences *how*, *why* and *what* they teach and their interpretations of their 'roles' (5.4.4).

The language used in the NEPA 27 to define teachers is directly related to the analysis of curriculum concepts and the resulting relationships envisaged in the curriculum. The "cornerstone of this Norms and Standards policy is the notion of *applied competencies* and its *assessment criteria*". (NEPA 27, 1996:47). "Providers" of teacher education are responsible for designing a "learning programme" after establishing the particular "nature of the clients" (*ibid*:47). "Teaching practice is seen as a mode of delivery." (*ibid*:47). The language of this document expresses the core principles of an underlying factory production model of education (Au, 2011:26). Assessment criteria are predesigned and teaching is the mode of delivering outcomes and products. Teachers are disempowered

and deskilled as their teaching are pre-structured in an efficient way to attain the best results (Au, 2011:30).

The efficiency of teachers is an important aspect in the post-apartheid curriculum. Efficient teaching is a global concern and much research is conducted in order to identify the variables making teaching effective (Biesta, 2009:34). Efficiency plays an important role in movements arguing that education outcomes should be continually measured in order to develop input and outputs in curriculum (*ibid*:34). While conceding that effective teaching-learning should be of concern to teacher, child, researcher, parents and government, there are attendant dangers. Efficiency has a value – an instrumental value (*ibid*:35). A measure of a teacher's efficiency within an instrumental system of reasoning would be a teacher's contribution to the production system. Teachers are categorised and 'valued' as 'good' or 'bad' teachers in terms of the products (children) they produce (Au, 2011:27)

The curriculum revisions published in NCS-CAPS (2011) are prescriptive about how and what teachers should teach. It provides: "details on what teachers ought to teach and assess on a grade-by-grade and subject-by-subject basis" (Moshekga, 2010:2; *cf.* Au, 2011:31). Aims, content and assessment requirements are "spelt out more clearly" and aligned to "available time allocations per subject." (Moshekga, 2010:2).

5.6.2.3 The child

Renaming in the post-apartheid curriculum is part of the global rise of the concept of 'learning' in curriculum and education (Chisholm, 2005:196). Children are referred to as 'learners'. The concept 'learner', reflects the emphasis on the efficient pedagogical competence expected of teachers (Ruiz, 2004:274). The 'learning' concept, on the other hand, reflects the emphasis on curriculum development and measurement of *how* to teach (*ibid*:274). Pedagogical literature therefore speaks about a learner as someone who has to acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, skills and abilities. These knowledge, skills and values are selected with a view to providing what is considered necessary for placement in the employment market (*ibid*:274).

The growing instrumental and technical view in the post-apartheid curriculum on teacher and child can be illustrated by a comparison between the RNCS (2004) and the NCS-CAPS (2011). The overview in the RNCS (2004:8) states that the kind of learner envisaged by the South African curriculum is "one who is imbued with the values and act in the interest of a society based on respect for democracy, equality, human dignity, life

and social justice". The RNCS (2004:8) further states that the curriculum aims to develop each learner as a citizen of South Africa to his/her full potential. The curriculum sets out to create life-long, literate learners who are confident, critical, compassionate, numerate, multi-skilled, respectful of the environment and active citizens (*ibid*:8). These aims express a transformative, critical perspective on education and the curriculum (4.5.2.3).

While the RNCS (*ibid*:8) hopes to *create* learners, the aim of NCS-CAPS (2011:5) is to *produce* learners. The general aim of NCS-CAPS (*ibid*:4) is to equip learners with knowledge, skills and values for self-fulfilment and meaningful participation in society as free citizens. Furthermore, it explicitly states that the curriculum aims to 'produce' learners for higher education and the workplace. Employers should also have a clear indication of the competencies that learners who have completed Grade 12 (*ibid*:4) can be expected to have. Learners who are produced would therefore be 'good citizens' and marketable in the workplace. Learners are the 'raw-material' managed by administrators and teachers by the most effective methods during a delivery process (Au, 2011:27). This instrumental framing reduces the child to a marketable object.

In order to achieve the above, the Delivery Agreement for 2014 (2010:10) introduced, universal and standardised testing in grades 1, 6 and 9 that is "in line with the best practices in other developing countries". Standardised tests are based upon an inter-related process of decontextualisation, objectification and commodification (Au, 2011:36). The underlying assumption is that standardised tests can be applied universally, fairly and objectively to individuals (*ibid*:36). The validity of standardised tests thus denies individual difference (*ibid*:37). The learner is reduced and quantified as a number and assessed on a scale between normal and deviant (*ibid*:36,37). Children are objectified and reduced to "decontextualised numerical objects for comparison" (*ibid*:27). In thus denying individual and unique difference, the post-apartheid curriculum nullifies its subjectification function (5.6.2.1).

Teacher:child are reduced to being a part in an efficient scientific management and delivery system. Sameness is presumed and assessed by means of standardised and objective tests. The increased control over teacher and child and the disregard for equal difference results in a distortion of the relation teacher:child.

5.6.2.4 The relation teacher:child

Ruiz (2004:271) asks the question: "Is the pupil a mere object of knowledge or *someone* with whom it is necessary to establish a moral relationship?" This question is concerned with the nature and the essence of the relation teacher:child (4.1; 4.6.6). The

development of the post-apartheid curriculum within an instrumental and neo-liberal market orientated framework and accompanying systems of reason influences the relation teacher:child and also how the purpose and nature of education in South Africa is defined.

Drawing on his experience of working with students, Waghid (2010:202) argues that students have become “consumed with a market-orientated ‘logic’ of learning”. Formal qualifications are linked to some external gain such as opportunities to earn a better salary or opportunities for better employment prospects. Students want to be marketable in the workplace. Consequently, teaching and learning in South Africa are driven by a consumer and market related logic and the relation teacher:child is reduced to a producer-consumer relation (*ibid*:202). It is a contractual agreement governed by means and ends.

The nature of education defined within intra-dialogic curriculum spaces, defines education and educational action as constituted by the ethical relation teacher:child in equality of difference (Ruiz, 2004:272; 4.6.3). This requires teacher:child to receive an other as a unique “*someone*, valued in his irrefutable dignity as a person.” (*ibid*:275; 4.6.6). The quest to deconstruct how we know others and what we know of others implies the hope and fear to re-imagine the relation self:other (Popkewitz, 2009:301). In order to re-imagine self:other, teacher:child must risk misunderstanding, dissonance and disruption resulting from the confessing of difference in classrooms. Disruption and re-imagination cannot happen within a predesigned means-end rationale.

The unbalanced relation between hope and fear affects re-imagination in the South African curriculum and has a negative impact on the relation teacher:child. In the hope of attaining equality in a market-related frame of reference, policy makers are continually tabling multiple policies and revisions to the curriculum and standardised tests have been introduced to aid efficiency. Fears that many children and teachers do not fit into the categories, predesigned by benchmarks or achievements are managed by holding education accountable (Delivery Agreement, 2010:11). The culture and rhetoric of accountability prescribes that the education process should adapt to the principles of an auditing process (Biesta, 2004:235). Inputs are strictly controlled in the hope that the outcomes will reflect the restructuring of the South African society.

Accountability in a democratic society, however, should be concerned with responsibility (*ibid*:242). The technical-managerial approach to accountability produces economic relationships, which undermine the hope of democracy and the ethical relation teacher:child (*ibid*:240). The culture of neo-liberal accountability in education makes the

ethical relation teacher:child impossible (*ibid*:250). Responsibility does not rely on pre-conceived rules of accountability. It is a non-contractual and non-reciprocal choice made by each individual teacher and child (Bauman, 1994:79; 2.3.2)

The relational boundaries set by a managerial accountability approach are structural and epistemological. An instrumentalised curriculum framework, such as OBE, assumes knowledge regarding self:other to be value free and objective (Slattery, 2006:235). In not deconstructing the historical 'baggage,' which the post-apartheid curriculum carries, the search for new ways of knowing and being with self:other is not possible (Soudien, 2010:45). The post-apartheid curriculum perpetuates historical forms of discrimination and makes teacher:child complicit in exclusionary practises exasperating racial and class inequality (Soudien, 2010:43; Au, 2011:30,39). The very policies and revisions which target teacher:child for inclusion, differentiate, divide and cast out the teacher and child who cannot, through historical and present positioning and (re)presentation, inhabit the spaces provided for the 'good' teacher:child (Popkewitz, 2009:305). In outcomes based education knowledge are fragmented and restricted to content contained in standardised tests (Au, 2011:31). Knowing self:other and re-imagining self:other are restricted to test results.

The process of categorising humans is implicit in the managerial approach to curriculum. Categories are in essence a project in 'naming' and meaning-making (Crenshaw, 1991:1297). The fear of 'others' which the curriculum is unable to manage, results in the 'alien' teacher:child being shifted to categories of 'otherness.' (Bauman, 1994:150). The (re)constitution of the relation self:other in spaces of togetherness and the construction of identity becomes (im)possible because teacher:child are unable to be "a distinct and unique being among equals" in the classroom and confess *who* he/she is in the relation self:other (Arendt, 1958:178).

5.6.2.5 Spaces of togetherness

A classroom as a space of togetherness is not fixed and cannot be predesigned. Such spaces are continually (re)constituted within the ethical and revolutionary relation teacher:child (3.4.2; 3.5). In spaces of togetherness teacher:child confess own meanings and understandings and all narratives have equal value. It is an inclusive space premised on equality of difference. Spaces of togetherness are inclusive in nature, because they are embedded in equality of difference and voice. It is the free spaces in which teacher:child confess autobiography and revolutionise self:other. In spaces of togetherness, teacher:child are defined by *who* they are (3.5; 4.4.2.3; 4.4.2.4).

The NCS-CAPS (2011:4) states under general aims that the curriculum aims to equip learners for meaningful participation in a free country. The Manifesto (2001:13) places democracy as one of the fundamental values expressed in our constitution. The Manifesto (*ibid*:3) further states that education is the key to the realisation of democracy because “it empowers us to exercise our democratic rights and shape our destiny, by giving us the tools to participate in public life, to think critically, and to act responsibly.” A predesigned outcomes driven curriculum in a neo-liberalist frame of reference is rightly questioned by Jansen (1999b:150) as a rationale for transforming apartheid education into a democratic school system.

The purpose of the post-apartheid curriculum, which is described by the Minister of Education as delivery-driven (Motshekga, 2011:1), is the ‘enskillling’ of learners (Motshekga, 2011:2). It aims to ‘produce’ learners who will be able to organise and manage themselves effectively (NCS, 2011:5). Gordimer (2011:501) argues that “Democracy is not an on-off affair; it has to be learned, day by day”. Democratisation is an open-ended process of continual becoming. Intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness does not have predesigned means and ends. It happens in actuality, transcending means and ends (Arendt, 1958:206; 3.5). All human action resulting in new beginnings are characterised by unexpectedness and unpredictability (*ibid*:178).

The reality of the life experiences of teacher:child in South Africa is not the middle-class experience that the curriculum presumes (Soudien, 2010:43). The society on which the post-apartheid curriculum is premised misrecognises and misrepresents South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past (*ibid*:44). Categories of knowing self:other, in(ex)clude teacher:child from classrooms as spaces of togetherness (4.6.4.1). The realisation of the values of democracy and human rights initialised through acting with self:other in spaces of togetherness is only possible when the social order and the presumptions concerning society made by the curriculum, are challenged (Slattery, 2006:230). This becomes possible in classrooms as inclusive spaces of togetherness in which it is expected that all would confess their unique autobiographies in order to truly reflect the reality of the South African society in order to reconstruct self:other in equality of difference.

Dissonance and disruption do not automatically lead to the construction of new knowledge or becoming (Jansen, 2009:266). Disruption is the spark to intra-dialogue and dialogic revolutions in spaces of togetherness. When teaching and learning are set within a ‘delivery system,’ dissonance, disruption, intra-dialogue, dialogic revolutions and the continual constitution of spaces of togetherness are threatened. There is no ‘space’

or 'time' for intra-dialogue and spaces of togetherness constituted by the ethical relation teacher:child in the post-apartheid curriculum.

The instrumentalised and managerial frame of any technical curriculum requires principles of control and certainty in classrooms (Slattery, 2006:235). Improved time management in classrooms is essential in such a 'delivery system'. Teacher:child is required to "Ensure a credible outcomes-focused planning and accountability system" (Delivery Agreement, 2010:19). The NCS-CAPS (2011) therefore aligns aims, content and assessment requirements clearly to "available time allocations per subject." (Moshekga, 2010:2). Time management, content, teaching and learning are carefully aligned with the delivering of predetermined outcomes. The delivery of 'products' (children) 'produced' by the curriculum are then measured by standardised, universal and objective tests.

5.6.2.6 Epistemology: Ethical and relational

The defining of the relation teacher:child to knowing and coming to know, is influenced by what we regard as the nature and the purpose of curriculum. Value judgments are always implied in any analysis of the relation teacher:child to knowledge in curriculum spaces. The question asked from the post-apartheid curriculum and the relationships resulting from it is: 'Does the curriculum measure what we value or value what we measure?' (Biesta, 2009:35).

The historic quest to understand and give meaning to the ethical relation self:other rooted in human rights values, should be continually questioned in curriculum spaces (2.4.1; 4.6.4). Questioning the relation teacher:child in terms of how we come to know others and what we know of self:other is a curriculum issue. (Cary, 2006:134-135; 4.6.4). The complexity of conflicting autobiographies intersecting in categories of knowing self:other in curriculum spaces needs to be continually deconstructed, because it holds implications for the relation teacher:child to knowledge (Ellsworth, 1989: 305; McCall, 2005:1772; Du Preez, 2011; 4.6.4).

Deconstructing how we know and what we know of teacher:child, is a moral act. It happens in the choice of responsibility *for* self:other in spaces of intra-dialogue and togetherness (Bauman, 1994:61; 4.4.2.4). Bauman (*ibid*:61) argues that in making the choice to be *for* others, we construct society. In making a choice *for* others in teaching-learning, spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue are constituted, boundaries are dismantled and we become curriculum, we *are* curriculum. We become the

transformative curriculum affecting the lives of self:other, aiding self-transformation and the transformation of society (*cf.* Pinar. *et al.*, 2004:514-515; Du Preez, 2011; 4.6; 5.5).

The Manifesto (2001) is a call to all South Africans to embrace the spirit of democracy, non-racialism and non-sexism (Asmal in Manifesto, 2001:ii). It states: “The one thing that transcends language, or the outward expression of culture, our physical appearance, our age and sex or belief, is the values that we cherish and live by” (Manifesto, 2001:9). I find the notion expressed by the Manifesto regarding the universal acceptance and consensus on the meaning of human rights values problematic (2.5.1; 3.3.1). The perception that human rights are conceptually tied to democracy and that human rights values are premised on consensus does not result in ethical relations but in contractual or consensual relations. It cannot constitute spaces of togetherness. Spaces of togetherness presuppose conflicting understandings, dissonance and disruption.

Education *for* values should be based *on* values (Ruiz, 2004:277). Although the NCS-CAPS (2011:5) states that the South African curriculum is premised on constitutional principles and has as general aim the “infusion of human rights” and the “principles of social and environmental justice,” it is structured within an instrumental market orientated system of reason. Teaching and learning *for* the values of human rights and democracy are thus not based *on* the values of human rights and democracy. It is premised on a market-related system of reasoning.

For education to realise the values of freedom, equality and dignity, teacher:child must, in spaces of togetherness, deconstruct categorisation relating to *what* they know of each other and allow each teacher and child to individuate themselves by *who* they are. The continual realisation and revolutionising of human dignity and equality is only possible in spaces of togetherness in which liberated humans freely confess their difference and become equal partners in the realisation of human rights values (3.9.3.2). Human dignity is realised when self in the relation self:other individuate him/herself as an irreplaceable unique *someone* and continually deconstruct and reconstructs identity (3.9.3.2). The freedom to deconstruct and reconstruct *who* we are directly concerns the lived experiences and the consequences of categorising (Crenshaw, 1991:1298).

The assumed universal understanding of human rights values as a global legalised moral system by the Manifesto (2001:9) does not reflect South African’s choices for moral responsibility *for* self:other (Sliwinski, 2005:230). Adhering to legal responsibilities does not indicate the human (in)capacity to distinguish between right and wrong (Arendt, 2006b:294). Even if South African children are fluent in the language and legalities of

human rights, a just and humane society is dependent on the continual revolutionising of the moral self and the choice to be responsibility *for* self:other. The (re)construction of the moral self escapes all moral and legal codifications. Its only authority is the responsibility *for* self:other (Bauman, 1994:124; 2.3.2). Liberated from externally enforced 'good' conduct, the self is free to choose non-reciprocal responsibility. This is the ultimate freedom (*ibid*:124). It is the freedom resulting from the liberation from knowing the legalities of human rights to choosing the continual responsibility for realising the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other with self:other (*ibid*:81).

In 2001 the Manifesto (2001:vi) stated that "effective education, is precisely founded in human rights, not any form of totalitarianism masquerading as moral regeneration." In 2010, Soudien (2010:43) states that "at a macro level, the national curriculum is perpetuating older forms of discrimination." The hope of reconstructing categories of knowing self:other by means of infusing the curriculum with human rights values (Manifesto, 2001:vi) has not been successful. The disruption, deconstructing and reconstruction of meanings and understandings regarding self:other has been rendered (im)possible by the instrumental and procedural rationalities of a neo-liberal curriculum.

Self constructs knowledge of self:other from "sedimented, selected and processed memory of past encounters, communications, exchanges, joint ventures or battles." (Bauman, 1994:146). The knowledge of self:other we regard as a "non-reflect-upon truth." (*ibid*:146). In South Africa such 'non-reflect-upon-truths' have been enforced and reproduced in the curriculum since colonisation. In order to disrupt categorisation and sedimented knowing of self:other we need to re-imagine new ways of knowing self:other and new ways of being with self:other in freedom, dignity and equality.

5.6.2.7 The activities of curriculum: teaching-learning

Questioning the activities of curriculum is concerned with the *how* of teaching and learning (Dillon, 2009:344). It is concerned with the actions of teacher and child, the interaction between teacher and child and the relation teacher:child in the teaching-learning context (*ibid*:346).

a) *Curriculum as lived experience*

The individual is the specific of curriculum (Pinar, 2010b:5). Teacher:child are the subjects and lived site of "remembrance and reconstruction" in curriculum spaces (*ibid*:5). Teacher:child, in deconstructing curriculum, should thus continually ask the following questions: "What does curriculum have to do with my life?" (Pinar *et al.*,

2004:514-515), and “Is the post-apartheid curriculum concerned with my individual ontological experiences and hopes for the future in a complex and dissonant country and world?” Curriculum is not a spectator sport (Morrison, 2004:490) – it should concern the lived experiences and choices made by teacher:child during teaching-learning in specific societal and historical contexts. It is set within intersections of difference situating teacher:child in space and time. The boundaries set by curriculum influence the re-imagination of becoming curriculum and becoming society.

Understanding and meaning-making in a teaching-learning context is an ontological and epistemological problem (Slattery *et al.*, 2007:540). The intra-dialogic search for understanding is a quest for the actualisation of the inter-subjective self and identity (*ibid*:539). This search is conducted in the relation self:other, working as a community of interpreters (*ibid*:541). The abstract solutions to concrete problems predesigned by an instrumental approach to curriculum makes the understanding of the complexity of multiple lived experiences and identities confessed in a classroom very difficult (*ibid*:551). The conflicting experiences of historical events, society, economics and politics confessed in South African classrooms result in complex and multilayered discourse disrupting static understandings and resulting in anxiety and fear (*cf. ibid*:553).

Dialogue within the boundaries of an instrumental curriculum aims at structuring and ordering fear and anxiety through categorisation and regulation (Bauman, 2001a:151-152). The strategic use of concepts and words in the curriculum and in curriculum discourse impacts directly on the lives of teacher:child and the understanding of the relation self:other (Cary, 2006:134). Dismantling the effects of the boundaries and categorisation set by curriculum concepts and discourse on self:other, the ‘authoritarian monologue’ of instrumental outcomes must be disrupted (Slattery *et al.*, 2007:550-551). New ways of being and knowing self:other can then be imagined.

The hope of new ways of being and knowing is expressed in the RNCS (2004:11) and the NCS-CAPS (2011:5) by concepts such as problem-solving.

b) Problem-solving the future

Teaching and learning skills associated with a competitive market advantage involve skills such as problem-solving (Skinner, 1999:118). Problem-solving, however, can also be a transformative skill creating a society which can transcend itself and not reproduce itself (*ibid*:119). The questioning of concepts such as problem-solving, critical thinking and the managing of self, which the NCS-CAPS (2011:5) regards as useful competencies, should be about the need for these skills but also about the reasons why

these skills are regarded as useful competencies. Solving problems, using critical and creative thinking (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5; RNCS, 2001:11) may involve commitment to solve the problems of society or a competence in solving commercial or technological problems (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5; Skinner, 1999:119).

Problem-solving competencies embody salvation themes of hope for the future (Popkewitz, 2009:304). The problem-solving abilities of a child are presumed to play a role in his/her future but also society's collective future. This implies that the themes surrounding problem-solving are cultural and societal themes relating to a perception of what such success in a future constructed society will entail (*ibid*:304). Popkewitz (*ibid*:304) argues that the notion of problem-solving is not about the hope of new beginnings but the hope of combating fear by structuring order and classifying conduct.

Problem-solving abilities embrace notions of agency. They are concerned with conceptions and choices of how an individual should live and what choices an individual should make in order to live a predesigned life (*ibid*:304). The problem-solving skills and notions of agency, an instrumental, market orientated curriculum would envisage are thus a manifestation of market rationality and principles structuring social and political environments in which individuals have to engage with neoliberal concepts of agency and identity (Gershon, 2011:538; 3.9.3.4). Difference is masked by the marketing of collective identities and belonging. The problem-solver is a child who calculates, orders and directs actions into an envisaged future (Popkewitz, 2007:304). Problem-solvers regard themselves as a marketable commodity and "organise and manage themselves and their activities responsibly and effectively" (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5; *cf.* Popkewitz, 2007:304; Leve, 2011:520; 3.9.3.4).

The prescribed character qualities associated with the problem-solver divide and differentiate the problem-solvers from the dangerous others who are not problem-solvers and a threat to the envisaged future (Popkewitz, 2007:305). The dehumanising of such categorisation is in the way these categories systematically keep the non-problem-solver subordinate (*cf.* Creshaw, 1991:1298). "Working effectively with others" requires teacher:child to carefully calculate engaging others (fellow problem-solvers) as means-end alliances (*cf.* Gershon, 2011:539; 3.9.3.4).

The construction of the moral self, identity and the constitution of the ethical relation teacher:child is not the starting point of teaching-learning in the South African curriculum. Economic, social and political demands, wants and needs are emphasised in activities such as problem-solving and managing self:other. Learning becomes a process aimed at satisfying the demands, needs and wants of life defined in market rationality and

consumerism (Becker, 2012:91; 2.4.3.2). Questioning, critical thinking, reflexivity, problem-solving and creativity are encouraged only to contribute to an optimal organisation of life-processes, of *what* humans are, where they fit in and *what* they should be in future (Masschelein, 2001:12-14).

The neo-liberalist emphasis of the NCS-CAPS (2011) on market orientated competencies and predesigned outcomes, such as problem-solving, are not concerned with the lived experiences and hopes of South African children. Predesigned problem-solving competencies are not concerned with *who* teacher:child are, but in circular choices designed to structured *what* self:other should be. The choices for teacher:child remain within the boundaries of a predesigned neo-liberal market rationality (3.9.3.4). In this context curriculum has nothing to do with my life; it is not concerned with my subjective experiences and teacher:child cannot re-imagine identity and the relation self:other.

c) *Dissonance and disruption*

Disruption is a moral impulse, which cuts into, interrupts and questions embedded knowledge of self:other (Bauman, 1994:125). Disruption results in the questioning of how we know and what we know of self:other in curriculum spaces (Bauman, 1994:148; Cary 2006:134-135). In order to re-imagine a South African society, a process of disruption is thus essential. Disruption is an ethical, dialogic, relational and revolutionary process. It concerns meanings and understandings of teacher:child, each unique in their difference, confessing unique narratives and life experiences which they do not share with any other in a classroom (Jansen, 2009:269; 3.8).

Being *with* self:other in the classroom needs to shift towards being *for* self:other in the classroom. Being *with* others 'like me' indicates a reciprocal relation, a reciprocity of perspectives, duties and obligations (Bauman, 1994:147; 3.4.1; 3.9.3.2;). When teacher:child confess autobiographies in a classroom as a space of togetherness, misunderstanding is inevitable. Mis-understanding questioned in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other sparks conscious knowledge building (Bauman,1994:147; 4.4.2.4 [b]). New ways of knowing self:other can be re-imagined. This would require a shift away from instrumental systems of reason towards the uncomfortable and the uncontainable (*cf.* Pillow, 2003:188). Such a shift would indicate an ethical turn in curriculum (4.5.2.5). It would indicate curriculum spaces in which the interrelatedness of teacher:child manifest in "confounding disruptions – at times even a failure of our language and practices." (Pillow, 2003:192). Dissonance and disruptions cannot and should not be controlled by rules or the legalities of human rights (Bauman, 1994:60).

Bauman (*ibid*:60) argues that “The moral call is thoroughly personal; it appeals to my responsibility.” The implications of the appeal to responsibility for curriculum is the development of a transformative pedagogy, which re-evaluates traditional understandings of self:other and teaching and learning (Slattery *et al.*, 2007:551)

d) *Intra-dialogue*

Disruption sparks intra-dialogue and new beginnings. Disruption is the manifestation and inevitable result of human difference and the complexity of the human condition. Intra-dialogue is the process during which categorisation by *what* we are is deconstructed and new ways of knowing are constructed. Intra-dialogue is also the process by which self individuates him/herself as *who* they are; a unique, irreplaceable dignified and equal *someone*. In constructing the unique moral self, self is free to choose responsibility *for* self:other and the ethical relation teacher:child is constituted in classrooms as spaces of togetherness. The human rights values freedom, dignity and equality are realised by means of intra-dialogue.

Intra-dialogue is ongoing, open and unpredictable. It cannot be predesigned in a classroom context. Shifting from an authoritarian monologue inherent in an instrumental curriculum, curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces becomes a shared event. It becomes a relational and ethical event; an ongoing questioning moving from inside-of-self to outside-of-self in openness to fluxing vantage points (Slattery *et al.*, 2007:550; Nancy, 1998:438). Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces are situated in relational and revolutionary spaces of intersecting difference within self and between self:other as simultaneously singular and together (3.6).

Intra-dialogue in a classroom context relies on the teacher:child confessing autobiographical narratives (3.6.1.1 [a]; 4.4.1). Confessing different autobiographies provides the context for self-reflection, shared live experiences and an exploration of the meaning-making process (Bernhardt, 2009:61). Formalised and prescribed knowledge, categorising self:other, compulsory assignments and predesigned standards and assessments however, make the use of autobiographical narratives and intra-dialogue in the classroom difficult and risky (*ibid*:63). In an instrumentalised teaching and learning context the personal experiences of teacher:child do not matter as everything is predesigned (*cf.* Bernhardt, 2009:63; Reilly, 2009:382).

The re-imagination of the South African society requires the continual disruption and deconstruction of conceptual certainty by means of intra-dialogue to expose what we

know of self:other, and how we teach and learn about self:other (*cf.* Slattery *et al.*, 2007:548).

5.6.3 The process of curriculum: how we think and act curriculum

Concepts used in curriculum such as ‘learning’, ‘learner,’ ‘problem-solving,’ ‘transformation,’ ‘outcomes’ and ‘produce’ are not sterile. “How we think about something makes a considerable difference in how we act.” (Apple, 1999:9). During the past two decades the rise of the concept ‘learning’ led to the decline in the use of the concept ‘education’ (Biesta, 2009:37). “Learnification” (*ibid*:36) structures the ways in which we reason about curriculum. The language of curriculum, the naming and re-naming in curriculum constitute patterns and systems of reasoning which order what is said and acted upon in curriculum (Popkewitz, 2009:307; 4.4.3). Naming also implicitly and explicitly structures relationships (Biesta, 2004:234). Naming frames teacher:children within technical, instrumental, critical or ethical systems of reason.

The process of curriculum regards the ways in which such systems of reason influence “thinking-in-action.” (Dillon, 2009:349). Thinking about what kind of language is used in curriculum, in which frame of reference the curriculum is situated and in which beliefs and assumptions the curriculum is rooted, present multiple possibilities for disruption and intra-dialogue for teacher:child (*cf.* *ibid*:349). Popkewitz (2009:308) define pedagogy as “systems of recognition and enactment that are acts of creation”. Within systems of reason, pedagogy order, classify, divide and ‘see’ modes of living linked to collective belonging (*ibid*:309).

The South African curriculum thus orders, classifies, divides and makes visible meanings and understandings regarding modes of living/being, linked to collective belonging in South Africa. The process of curriculum also answers questions such as: what kind of life is (im)possible in South Africa and what characteristics would a ‘good citizen, teacher, child’ display. Most importantly, the curriculum sets the boundaries for the (re)construction of identity and the (re)constitution of the relation self:other in South Africa.

5.6.3.1 The reproduction of boundaries: 1994-2012

Concepts such as problem-solver, learner and transformation are made “intelligible and reasonable within historically-formed rules and standards that order, classify and divide what is ‘seen’ and acted on in schooling.” (Popkewitz, 2009:301; 5.4.4). Concepts used in the South African curriculum are thus complex historical patterns circulating and

ordering what is said, thought and acted upon, validating present practices as 'systems of reason' (*ibid*:307).

Curriculum spaces are spaces in which normalised and socially constructed knowing of self:other are continually (re)constructed (Cary, 2006:20; 4.6.4). The boundaries structured by the process of curriculum restrict teacher:child to 'normal' ways of being by notions such as 'the good citizen,' the 'good child,' 'a good teacher,' and a 'good education' (*ibid*:20). Since colonialism, knowledge about self:other has been concerned with *what* South Africans are categorised by. *What* South Africans are perceived to be, presented in categories of knowing self:other, has been firmly embedded in the South African education and curriculum discourse since colonialism. During colonialism and apartheid 'normalised' being and knowing was constructed in relation to white and enlightenment formed rules. These 'historically-formed rules' were carried into the post-apartheid curriculum (Popkewitz, 2009:301; Soudien, 2010:39). The post-apartheid curriculum has also adopted the global neo-liberal economic frame of reasoning in and about curriculum, resulting in new market-related categories of knowing self:other (5.6.1; 5.4.2).

Historically-formed rules and systems of reason in which curriculum is embedded set the boundaries for what is declared '(im)possible' in the 'political' of education and curriculum (Popkewitz, 2009:303; 5.4.1). Embedded understandings regarding phrases such as the redress of (in)equality, active and life-long learner and concepts such as 'learnification,' orders and structures what is said, thought and acted upon in the South African curriculum. The simultaneous fear of persistent inequality, the hope of equality and the continual restructuring of categories of inequality are embodied in concepts such as life-long learners, 'learnification' and the learning society. Although the redress of inequality is one of the principles of the NCS-CAPS (2011:4), the full complexity of the historic constitution of inequality is not engaged in the post-apartheid curriculum (Soudien, 2010:38-39).

a) The active and life-long learner

Learnification, the learning society and the life-long learner are instruments and effects of a labouring society (Masschelein, 2001:2; Biesta, 2009:36; 2.4.4,2; 3.4.2.1). In a learning society, learning is the organising principle of education and the curriculum (Masschelein, 2001:2). The learning society aims to produce a public organisation of humans defined as a learning species and the perception of permanent learning defines experiences, relationships and attitudes towards self:other (*ibid*:2).

Globally, the 'learnification' of education and society and life-long learning are presented as a discourse of transformation, flexibility and renewal (*ibid*:4; 1.3.2). Humans are described as agents of transformation and responsible for the survival of the human species. The relation of self to him/herself is emphasised, because the development of own capacities and competencies are important in the continual production and management of new knowledge and information (*ibid*:4). The development of new skills and capacities needs specific educational environments and active learners and citizens. Learning is concomitantly facilitated as a continual process in which the learner is the simultaneous consumer (optimum input from teacher, curriculum and education) and producer of new knowledge (*ibid*:5).

The concept of life-long learning, appeared in the title of the first influential curriculum statement of the democratic South Africa: *Lifelong learning through a National Curriculum Framework* (1996) (RNCS, 2002:4). The consensual educational and political predesigned 'standards' of the South African curriculum is to 'produce' children who are problem-solvers (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5), active learners and citizens (*ibid*:4) and are able to organise and manage themselves effectively (*ibid*:5). Children not meeting these 'standards' are deemed to be in need of rescue. A unitary 'whole' group, adhering to certain learning 'standards' is constructed in order to establish deviations from the 'whole' (Popkewitz, 2009:305). The marginalised child who cannot acquire the skills such as problem-solving, organising and managing needed to gain access to the labour market is to be identified and his/her problems addressed by various predesigned strategies (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5).

In structuring curriculum and educational programs to target exclusions from the learning society, it is presumed that all children will eventually be included in a unitary and predesigned equal society (Popkewitz, 2009:305). In targeting children not meeting these 'standards' for rescue programmes, the boundaries for their exclusion from the unitary group is set. The very programmes designed to bring about equality, structure and reproduce the inequality of the members of the 'rescue' groups by *what* they are: unable, poor or disabled (*ibid*:305; 4.6.4.1).

b) Learnification and self-transformation

Curriculum referenced within an ethical and post-modern perspective and emphasising disruption and intra-dialogic curriculum spaces can be self-transformative. Disruption and intra-dialogue emphasises the possibilities of becoming and new beginnings acknowledging that human identity and consciousness is not static (Slattery *et al.*, 2007:550). The freedom of teacher:child to dismantle boundaries, to embrace difference

and to undertake “something new, something unforeseen by us” (Arendt, 2006a:193; 4.6.3) is directed by the compassionate responsibility *for* the singular dignity and equality of each human being (Bauman, 1994:71).

Society defined in the sphere of labour as the ‘learning society’ loses all normative dimensions (Masschelein, 2001:10; 2.4.3.2; 5.6.1). It repudiates the notion that “human life is the life of *someone*” (*ibid*:10). Human life is about the life of a unique and irreplaceable equally different *someone*. Singular humans need to give meaning and understand own singularity in the relation self:other (*ibid*:8,9). The desire to understand and give meaning to own singularity in the relation self:other is a condition of human consciousness, indicating humanity’s brokenness and incompleteness and the desire to understand and humanise the world (Freire, 1993:25; 3.7). This is a continual singular and collective process. It is the acknowledgement of a continual inward struggle and questioning, resulting in reaching out to self:other in dialogue (Jansen, 2009:269).

New beginnings are not the beginning of new objects, knowledge and technology created or produced by humans. It is also not about transforming self to adapt to a changing environment. New beginnings are the continual new-beginning and becoming of a unique and irreplaceable someone (re)constituting self:other while constructing identity by *who* they are (Arendt, 1958:177; Freire,1993:25). In a learning society, “the capacity for revealing oneself as *someone* is in danger of being lost; the human being becomes merely a link in a process” (Masschelein, 2001:11). ‘Learnification’ even if presented as a discourse of transformation, flexibility and renewal (*ibid*:4) cannot be self-transformative or manifest in new beginnings and becoming. Learnification is an organising principle of education aiming to produce and organise teacher:child according to pre-structured experiences, relationships and attitudes towards self:other (*ibid*:2).

c) Learnification and the transformation of society.

Reconciliation was a national and political priority during 1994, influencing the new inclusive curriculum. This is reflected in the RNCS (2004:7) and the NCS-CAPS (2011:i) which refer to the preamble to the *Constitution of South Africa (1996)* and emphasise the role of the curriculum in the realisation of our constitutional values. The question posed by Du Preez (2011; 4.6): ‘Can curriculum transform a society?’ is thus assumed to be not only possible but also to be the purpose of the post-apartheid curriculum by both the RNCS (2002:7) and the NCS-CAPS (2011:i).

The transition of South Africa to democracy in 1994 was not only a political, economic and social transition but also a pedagogical transition. Post-conflict educational contexts,

however, do not present clear and uncontested moral and pedagogical positions (Jansen, 2009:107). The assumption that a revised curriculum and new knowledge about self:other will construct a democratic society have proved to be impossible (*ibid*:107). Pre-1994 teacher:child lived on both sides of a conflicted society and thus carry knowledge about their different histories into the classroom (*ibid*:107).

The hope of a transformed future for South Africa is expressed in the curriculum by concepts such as problem-solving skills, working together and active citizens (NCS-CAPS, 2011:5; 5.6.2.6 [b]). Within the discourse of 'learnification,' teacher:child are described as agents of transformation, responsible for the survival of the human species and the environment (*ibid*:5). The stipulated skills needed for the survival of the human species and the environment include skills such as efficiency, managing self and the environment and critical and creative thinking (*ibid*:5). These skills are packaged under general and specific aims and continually assessed (*ibid*:5). The emphasis on aims and the attainment of them implicitly encapsulates the hope of a transformed equal and dignified society in a pre-packaged curriculum.

Arendt (2006a:171) describes the essence of education as natality. Each child entering the educational system is a representative and manifestation of a new beginning. The world children are introduced to in the classroom and by means of the curriculum is a pre-existing world. The revolutionary and transformative capacity of curriculum lies thus in each new beginning, represented by every singular unique child entering curriculum (*cf.* Arendt, 2006a:173-174; 4.6.3). The transformative capacity of curriculum is not in documents and policies but in the self-transformative potential in curriculum spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue, for each child. The continual deconstruction and reconstruction of the moral self and self:other during intra-dialogue result in the self-transformative and transformative potential of curriculum.

In curriculum spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue teacher:child are free to re-imagine the transformation of South Africa in ways not though possible before (Arendt, 2006a:193; Waghid, 2010:209). Freedom implies the capacity to imagine new beginnings in spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue. In classrooms as spaces of togetherness, teacher:child are free to question, reflect upon and contest the re-imagination of self:other. This is done with an openness and in responsibility for the *doxas* confessed by self:other (Du Preez, 2009:106-107; Waghid, 2010: 212).

The revolutionary capacity of curriculum becomes possible when teacher:child are invited into curriculum spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue. Self-transformation

and the resulting transformation of society is a dialogic, relational and ethical experience. In curriculum spaces of inclusive togetherness teacher:child constitute a “community of conversation and interdependence” but more essential for continual new beginnings, also a “community of disagreement” (Waghid, 2010:216).

5.7 SUMMARY

The construction of the post-apartheid curriculum after the first democratic elections in 1994 was an expression of the hope of the South African nation to humanise themselves and (re) construct the relation self:other rooted in human rights values by means of an inclusive curriculum. Nearly two decades later this hope has been replaced by the growing fear that the post-apartheid curriculum is actively reproducing and institutionalising inequality, discrimination and new forms of categorisation (Soudien, 2010:43-44; Jansen, 2011b:101). In an attempt to combat and control this fear, the revisions to the post-apartheid curriculum in the NCS-CAPS (2011) documents have positioned the curriculum firmly within a technical and neo-liberalist frame of reference. The fear of re-producing dehumanised forms of discrimination is now countered by the hope that efficient and controlled predesigned inputs will lead to outcomes such as the restructuring of a democratic, non-racist and non-sexist South African society (*cf.* Asmal, 2011:263).

A curriculum hoping to transform the South African society, which was ‘moulded’ by colonialism and apartheid, into a society rooted in democratic and human rights values is not possible within a technical frame of reference. In order to teach *for* democratic and human rights values, the curriculum should be rooted *in* democratic and human rights values (Ruiz, 2004:277). The contradictory pairing of un-democratic, technical and neo-liberal systems of reason with the values of democracy and human rights in the curriculum does not root the curriculum in democratic and human rights values. The curriculum, premised within a technical frame of reference stays rooted in neo-liberalist and technical values. Teaching and learning *for* the values of human rights and democracy within the post-apartheid curriculum are thus not rooted *in* and *on* the values of human rights and democracy. It is rooted in a market related system of reason.

The technical and neo-liberal concepts in the post-apartheid curriculum such as learner, problem-solver and life-long learner, relate to the global trend replacing education with learnification (Biesta, 2009:36). The South African education system and curriculum has a long history of internationalisation. Since the seventeenth century education expressed socially constructed categorisation of *what* South Africans are (Soudien, 2010:25).

These embedded representations of self:other in curriculum spaces, have been carried over into the post-apartheid curriculum and make it easy for South Africans to uncritically accept the neo-liberalist categories of knowing self:other in curriculum spaces representing *what* we are expected to be and become.

The hope of curriculum aiding self-transformation and a transformed, peaceful society (cf. Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514-515; Du Preez, 2011) remains closely related to the questioning of the relation teacher:child in curriculum spaces (cf. Ruiz, 2004:271). The ethical relation teacher:child premised on the unique, irreplaceable dignity of teacher:child as *someone* is the starting point of all educational action in the ethical perspective to curriculum. Within this ethical relation, teacher:child need to construct spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue in which disagreement, dissonance and disruption continually question how and what we know of self:other in South African curriculum spaces (cf. Cary, 2006:135). Within these spaces, the individuation of self:other deconstructs what and how we know self:other, identity is continually (re)constructed and the ethical relation teacher:child (re)constituted. When the ethical relation teacher:child is rooted *in* and *on* the human rights values of freedom, dignity and equality, education *for* democratic and human rights values becomes possible. The search for the historic, present and future self, the continual re-imagination of self:other and the reconstruction of society are a relational experience within curriculum spaces of intersection and conflict (cf. Brison, 2007:370-371).

The post-apartheid curriculum has very little to do with the lives of South African teachers and children (cf. Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514-515). It presumes a middle-class society that does not exist (Harley & Parker, 1999:193), it misrecognises the subjective life experiences of children (Soudien, 2010:41) and it speaks to an empty and a-historical South African landscape (*ibid*:44). Based on erroneous assumptions, the post-apartheid curriculum constructs a predesigned envisaged future for South African children, which is premised on *what* they are supposed to become. It does not allow for the continual revolutionising of *who* teacher:child are and their capacity to continually start new, re-imagining the continual becoming of self:other.

CHAPTER SIX CONCEPTUAL CONCLUSIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

My questioning of curriculum, intra-dialogic spaces, identity, consciousness, becoming and human rights values was sparked by the very public disruption of South African meta-narratives resulting from the Reitz incident (1.1). The technical and instrumental approach to the post-apartheid curriculum assumes that teacher:child can be 'workshopped' to effect a pre-designed 'mind shift' so that South Africans would embrace human rights and democratic values (Gumbo, 2001:240). Jansen (2009:171) strongly disagrees with this assumption and argues that any 'mind shift' achieved by means of an instrumentalised process only results in individuals adhering to the law out of pragmatic self-interest while deep-seated meanings and understandings stay intact. Teaching children to adhere to rules and regulations pragmatically will not disrupt, deconstruct and reconstruct embedded knowledge.

Education and the curriculum are assumed to aid human emancipation but is in fact a reproduction of society as a process of instrumentalised progress within a technical perspective to curriculum. The instrumental character of society and curriculum structures the boundaries in which categories of identities rooted in *what* humans are perceived to be, is (re)presented and reproduced. The human capacity to continual new beginnings, (re)constituting the relation self:other in singularity and togetherness is disabled by the boundaries within which we reproduced *what* humans are perceived to be.

Drawing on Cary (2006:137), the *how*, *what* and *when* of knowing, positioning and representing self:other in curriculum spaces have been questioned, deconstructed and reconstructed in this study. I conceptualised intra-dialogic curriculum spaces as spaces of togetherness in which we can disrupt, deconstruct and reconstruct *how* and *what* we know of self:other. These intra-dialogic curriculum spaces consist of three elements: the relational element self:other rooted in human rights values, spaces of togetherness situating self:other in specific and non-linear space and time, and intra-dialogue as revolutionary action. Revolutionary action by means of intra-dialogue is only possible in spaces of togetherness that are constituted by the relation self:other. Intra-dialogue in turn continually (re)constitutes the ethical relation self:other, spaces of togetherness and individual identity.

6.2 QUESTIONING: THE BEGINNING OF THE SEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING

The purpose of this reflexive conceptualisation is to revolutionise and reconceptualise own understandings regarding human rights, curriculum, intra-dialogue, identity construction, consciousness and becoming. The revolutionising of meanings and understandings starts with questioning. Questioning is the beginning of epistemology, the quest for ontological meaning and understanding. This sparks disruption and dialogic revolutions enabling becoming and continual identity construction (Arendt, 1990:98-99; Freire, 1993:67; 3.8). The following research questions were asked in Chapter One.

- To what extent, if any, can curriculum aid the re-imagination of self:other in continual identity construction and becoming?
- To what extent, if any, can curriculum accommodate continual identity construction by accommodating teacher:child to define *who* they are and not only *what* they are?
- To what extent, if any, can curriculum accommodate spaces of togetherness aiding the continual constitution of the ethical and dialogic relation teacher:child rooted in human rights values?

The questions posed in Chapter One concern the ethical and dialogic relation self:other, identity construction, becoming, curriculum, spaces of togetherness and human rights values.

By means of the literary study, reflexivity and deconstructing and reconstructing my own view and the views of other scholars to these questions, I explored the revolutionary nature of human rights values and how these values influence our understanding of the relation self:other in Chapter Two. In Chapter Three, I conceptualised the ethical relation self:other, intra-dialogue, spaces of togetherness, identity construction, becoming and consciousness. My understanding of these concepts in an educational context is developed in Chapter Four. This is done with reference to additional questions posed by different curriculum scholars concerning the relational, ethical and revolutionary aspects and capacity of curriculum (4.6). These questions concern the gap in curriculum theorising (1.4.3), regarding the revolutionary capacity of curriculum to aid self-transformation and to re-imagine the relation self:other as an ethical, relational and individuating experience.

- “What does curriculum have to do with my life?” (Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514,515)

- “How can curriculum be self-transformative?” (*ibid*:514,515)
- “Is the pupil a mere object of knowledge or *someone* with whom it is necessary to establish a moral relationship?” (Ruiz, 2004:271)
- How do we know self:other and what do we know of self:other in curriculum spaces? (Cary, 2006:135)
- Can curriculum help to create a peaceful society? (Du Preez, 2011)

Based on Morrison (2004:490), Pinar (*et al.*, 2004:514,515) and Du Preez (2011), I asked one more question from the post-apartheid curriculum:

- Is the post-apartheid curriculum concerned with the lived experiences and hopes of South Africans living in a complex and dissonant country and world?

In Chapter Five the above questions are posed in an analysis of the South African curriculum. The conceptual development of curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces, the ethical relation self:other, spaces of togetherness, the revolutionary nature of human rights values, identity construction, consciousness and becoming are explained in the next section.

6.3 REFLEXIVE CONCEPTUALISATION

The need for dialogic curriculum spaces in the post-apartheid curriculum has been extensively explored by many South African scholars such as Jansen (2009), Du Preez (2009, 2011, 2012), Roux (2012) and Ferguson (2012). Both Jansen (2009) and Du Preez (2012) regard dialogic spaces as essential to the re-imagination of self:other but argue that dialogic spaces are in fact unsafe and risky and that there should be certain conditions in place to accommodate the risks of disruption and dialogic revolutions.

Jansen, (2009:260-276) advocates having dialogic spaces in classrooms in which teacher:child can constitute an ethical relationship and disrupt embedded knowledge. He also explores the conditions for such dialogic spaces in which teacher:child can deconstruct what and how they know self:other, position and represent self:other in curriculum spaces. He regards the conditions for dialogic spaces as: acknowledging the importance of indirect knowledge, the importance of listening, the disruption of received knowledge, the significance of dissonance, the reframing of victors and victims, the acknowledgment of brokenness, the importance of hope, the value of demonstrative leadership and the establishing of risk-accommodating spaces (*ibid*:260-276). However, he does not describe or explore the process of disruption and reconstruction of the relation self:other in dialogic curriculum spaces.

In my own view, which has been informed by the theories of Arendt (1990:87) and Bauman (1994:72), I regard the continual (re)construction of the moral self as the origin of the constitution of the ethical relation self:other in dialogic curriculum spaces, disrupting meanings and understandings and sparking dialogic revolutions. I found Jansen's conceptualisation of dialogic spaces in the classroom lacking in the absence of a clear description of, and emphasis on self-transformation (the continual construction of the moral self) as the origin of the ethical relation self:other and the disruption of embedded knowledge. Although self-transformation is implied in his conceptualisation of dissonance and the disruption of embedded knowledge (Jansen, 2009:264,269), Jansen (*ibid*:261) focuses on the collective and shared characteristics of meanings and understandings and their influence on the relation self:other and identity construction. I regard the continual revolutionising and becoming of self as the starting point in any disruption and deconstruction of embedded knowledge. The focus of my own conceptualisation is therefore on the possibilities of disrupting individual and unique meanings and understandings constructed from life experiences in the relation self:other.

My conditions for intra-dialogic curriculum spaces are the ethical relation teacher:child and spaces of togetherness. The ethical relation teacher:child includes the conditions which Jansen (*ibid*:260-276) poses for dialogic spaces namely listening, hope and an acknowledgement of the importance of deconstructing embedded knowledge of how and what we know of self:other. The ethical relation teacher:child is premised on inclusive and equal difference and I thus regard dissonance and disruption as inevitable within the relation self:other. Spaces of togetherness are conceptualised in full acknowledgement of the risks involved in confessing difference. In spaces of togetherness, risk is accommodated in the continually (re)construction of the moral self in responsibility *for* the ethical relation teacher:child. Spaces of togetherness are inclusive and have as their purpose the deconstruction and reconstruction of meanings and understandings during and after disruption. In spaces of togetherness the intersections of categories of *what* we are defined as (oppressor/oppressed) is continually deconstructed and reconstructed.

Although the ethical relation teacher:child and spaces of togetherness thus include many of the conditions which Jansen (*ibid*:260-278) pose for dialogic curriculum spaces, an exploration of the nature of curriculum from an ethical perspective indicates to me that any conditions for dialogic spaces should be rooted in the revolutionary capacity of self:other to continually start a-new. The ethical relation self:other includes an acknowledgement of our shared humanity as incomplete, but also an acknowledgement of our power to continually start a-new. Arendt (2006a:193) sees the revolutionary

capacity of self:other to continually start new as the essence of curriculum and education. The merging of human brokenness and power is manifested in the human capacity to continually re-imagine self:other, curriculum and education. The continual (re)construction of self:other depends on ethical and dialogic spaces of togetherness in which continual new beginnings between self:other are possible. New beginnings are open, unpredictable and have no means-end rationale (Arendt, 1958:178).

The conceptualisation of the conditions for intra-dialogic curriculum spaces will be explained next.

6.3.1 The conditions for intra-dialogue

The conditions for intra-dialogue are the ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness.

6.3.1.1 Ethical relation self:other

The ethical relation teacher:child is the beginning of all educational action (Ruiz, 2004:272) and would therefore be the origin of and a condition for intra-dialogue as revolutionary action in curriculum spaces. My anthropological premise for the conceptualisation of the relation self:other is that humans are equally different in a shared humanity (1.7.1). The ethical relation self:other is premised on equal difference in simultaneous singularity and togetherness; difference and shared humanity. Within the relation self:other, difference intersects within self as two-in-one and between self:other (3.6). Self:other is a manifestation of all of humanity in contextual and infinite time and space, but remains singular in difference and specificity. Self is individuated as singular in difference and together in a shared humanity with self:other.

My conceptualisation of the ethical relation self:other draws on Arendt's (1958:175-178; 1990:82-90) conception of human plurality. Human plurality describes the individuation of self as singular and unique in togetherness with self:other. Arendt (1958:178) describes the relation self:other as that of humans: "living as a distinct and unique being among equals". Each individual human, Arendt (1990:88) argues, manifests human plurality, in the relation self as 'two-in-one'.

Within the relation self as two-in-one, the moral self is constructed, which Arendt argues (*ibid*:87) is the origin of ethics. Bauman (1994:72) similarly defines the construction of the moral self as the origin of the ethical relation self:other. Bauman (*ibid*:74) regards the relation self:other as a relation rooted in responsibility. Self assumes responsibility *for* an other before meeting an other or being with an other (*ibid*:71). Self invites and receives

an other into entering the relation self:other. Ruiz (2004:274) argues that self receives an other in difference as a unique *someone*. Self:other is thus a manifestation of human plurality, a relation originating in the construction of the moral self and continual identity construction. It is continually (re)constituted by the invitation and reception of self:other in intra-dialogue.

By continually individuating self in the relation self:other, self becomes an equal but unique and distinct partner in the relation self:other. Furthermore, the distinction of self is continually (re)anchored in the confessing of *who* he/she is in speech and action with self:other (Arendt, 1958:178). Individuation of self is not anchored in predesigned categories or any universal truth about self:other. The individuation of self happens in the relation self:other but can never be defined in relation to self:other (Ruiz, 2004:275).

The continual realisation and revolutionising of the relation self:other rooted in freedom, dignity and equality is possible within and between teacher:child in classrooms as spaces of togetherness. The ethical relation teacher:child is then continually (re)constituted in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values.

6.3.1.2 Spaces of togetherness

Du Preez (2012:58) has explored the irony in viewing classrooms as safe spaces. She rightly observes that classrooms as (unconditional) dialogic spaces can neither be safe nor risk-free. Disruption in dialogic spaces in which difference is confessed results in doubt and uncertainty (Depalma, 2009:448). Dialogic spaces in a classroom are also not necessarily inclusive. Power structures resulting from the intersections between racism, classism, sexism, ableism and many other oppressive 'isms' in classrooms marginalise teacher:child in dialogic spaces according to *what* they are categorised to be (Ellsworth, 1989:303). In this regard, Du Preez, (2011) argues that the ethical turn in curriculum should be concerned with the analysis of the intersections of such oppressive 'isms' in dialogic spaces. Curriculum spaces are not sterile and knowledge regarding self:other in curriculum spaces is not objective (Morrison, 2004:490; Slattery, 2006:235).

a) Spaces

In conceptualising spaces of togetherness, it is necessary to first question the concept spaces in a social and educational context. Cary (2007:134) argues that curriculum spaces are epistemological spaces of knowing self:other. Bauman (1994:147,150) argues that epistemological or cognitive spaces are structured in categories of others

'like us' or 'alien to us'. Cognitive spaces are regulated by rules of conduct in order to construct ways of acting with others 'like us and alien to us' (*ibid*:146). A safe social distance is constructed between us and 'alien others' – we do not know the 'alien' other, we know *of* the 'alien' other (*ibid*:146-151). Cognitive and epistemological curriculum spaces can, in my view, thus only describe and reproduce *what* we know of self:other. The choice to in(ex)clude others into cognitive curriculum spaces is inhibited by *what* we know of self:other.

When disrupting *what* and *how* we know self:other in dialogic curriculum spaces, Du Preez (2011) argues that categories of knowing in cognitive spaces must be transcended in ethical spaces by means of intersectionality. In ethical spaces the invitation to self:other is an open invitation. Ethical spaces of togetherness are inclusive spaces. *What* we know of self:other is not relevant in spaces of togetherness. The knowledge (de)constructed by self:other in spaces of togetherness follows the continual (re)construction of the moral self and happens in responsibility *for* self:other (Bauman, 1994:165-166; 2.3.2; 3.9.2). In inclusive ethical spaces self:other are not categorised and our responsibility *for* self:other is not regulated by rules of conduct.

The disruption and deconstruction of what and how we know self:other in intra-dialogic spaces of togetherness is thus rooted in a merging of epistemological and ethical spaces of togetherness. Acknowledging the intersections of categories of knowing self:other in cognitive spaces, what and how we know self:other, can be analysed and deconstructed by an anticategorical approach to intersectionality in spaces of togetherness (McCall, 2005:1773; Du Preez, 2011).

Curriculum and curriculum spaces are influenced by socio-historic and political contexts. Knowing self:other in curriculum spaces, Cary (2006:134) argues, also includes the *when* of knowing: self:other as situated humans within specific and non-linear time and space. Spaces of togetherness therefore also provide opportunities to analyse the *when* and *where* of knowing self:other in space and time (Cary, 2006:134). Ruiz (2004:275) argues that during reception in curriculum spaces, self:other are received as a situated *someone*. The inclusive nature of spaces of togetherness that are premised on equality of difference demand the reception of self:other as *someone* with a unique socio-historic, cultural and political past, present and future.

b) Togetherness

My conceptualisation of togetherness developed from a deconstruction of Arendt and Bauman's conceptions of belonging and its effects on equality of difference and identity construction. Both Arendt (1966:297-302) and Bauman (2001a:240-152) explore belonging in great depth. Arendt (1966:297) regards belonging to "some kind of organised community" as a prerequisite to the construction of the relation self:other and the realisation of the human rights values of freedom, dignity and equality. Arendt's (1966:269-302) concern with humans being denied the right to belong should be contextualised as relating to the World Wars and the creation of millions of stateless people and the resulting plight of minorities and refugees. In the South African and African context stateless people, refugees and minorities have resurfaced as a growing concern. Refugees are not only denied the right to belong but are also increasingly subjected to xenophobic attacks (Jansen, 2011a:208-212). Arendt (1958:9,11,175) conceptualises identity construction and the continual revolutionising of human rights values as dependent on belonging. In my view, however, identity construction and the revolutionising of human rights values cannot be realised in belonging since belonging results in the categorisation of self:other.

Humanising and the realisation of human rights values premised on categorisation is also prevalent in the theory of Freire and many critical theory scholars. Gottlieb and La Belle (1990:3) in treating Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, as a 'discursive text' or 'founding text,' contextualise his text in the meta-theoretical context of new social science agendas. Their analysis concludes that his discourse is abstract (history, human, oppression, humanising, liberation) in addressing the teacher:child context. Although Freire emphasises the relational and revolutionary aspects in transformation (*ibid*:5), his theory maintains that humanising is only possible through pedagogy by and for the oppressed (*ibid*:6). Treating teacher:child as an abstract concept and not as unique and equally different humans constructing relations and identity through unique and subjective life experiences means that the oppressed are lumped together on the assumption that they can be defined and transformed as a single story of oppression.

Bauman (2001a:140-152) extensively explores the concept of belonging and its influence on human relations, society and identity. Abrahamson (2004:171) has subsequently analysed the contribution of Bauman to post-modern theorising. He concludes that Bauman, while using the term post-modernity frequently in his works dating from 1989 to 1997, used the concept of 'liquid modernity' to define contemporary society. Liquid modernity describes the lack of any stable conditions: everything is

regarded as in process (*ibid*:171).

Bauman's concern with the influence of globalisation on liquid society is multilayered. He discusses the consequences of globalisation as altering our concept of time and space, and feeding consumer driven definitions of humans (Bauman, 1994, 2001, 2005; Abrahams, 2004:171-172). Bauman (2001a:151) argues that humans in liquid society are continually searching for groups to which they can belong so that they can find security, certainty and anchor themselves. By means of identification and sharing communal identities, humans attempt to "conjure up the self-same community" (*ibid*:151). In belonging, humans erase proximity and difference – they feel equal and free. Belonging, in such a context, however feeds the sameness and otherness project of modernity disregarding difference and denies responsibility *for* self:other (Bauman, 1994:130-131).

In my view, belonging remains concerned with *what* humans are categorised by. Although I regard belonging to a community and society – be it national, local, global, ethnic or religious – as of great importance to the construction of identity rooted in human rights values, I contend that humans have the need and capacity to transcend belonging and the categorisation of *what* they are, when confessing *who* they are. The exclusionary effect of belonging to a predesigned group masks difference and cannot aid revolutionary new beginnings or identity construction. The disruption sparking dialogic revolutions and new beginnings is only possible when difference is voiced in spaces of inclusive togetherness. In constructing identity confessing *who* we are, humans transcend belonging to categories of sameness and otherness and also the quest to resurrect community by means of identification.

Spaces of togetherness are thus conceptualised as inclusive epistemological and ethical spaces in which self:other deconstruct and reconstruct *what* and *how* we know self:other (Bauman, 1994:146; Cary, 2006:15,135). In curriculum, spaces of togetherness include teacher:child in equal difference, continually defining *who* they are, situated in specific socio-historic space and time but also representing self:other in non-linear space and time.

6.3.2 Intra-dialogue

Intra-dialogue is the revolutionary action towards continual identity construction, the constitution of the relation self:other, becoming and the realising of freedom, dignity and equality. Intra-dialogue is an intentional action with and between self:other in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other as incomplete but also of the power

inherent in the human capacity to continually start new. Embedded knowledge affecting self:other that is confessed in spaces of togetherness is wilfully disrupted during intra-dialogue. Disruption of meanings and understandings demands questioning, deconstruction and reconstruction. During the dialogic revolutions sparked by disruption and deconstruction, new knowledge is constructed (Bauman, 1994:147). In the (re)construction of new understandings, becoming, identity construction and the realisation and revolutionising of human rights values is possible.

The conceptualisation of intra-dialogue was sparked by my exploration of Arendt's (1958:176; 1990:83-84) understandings of human plurality and natality. Arendt (1958:178) relates all speech and action to the human conditions of plurality and natality. She argues that human plurality and natality manifest themselves as a multilayered dialogue in search of meaning-making and revolutionising the world we share (Arendt, 1958:178; Arendt, 1990:83). She describes this dialogue as the dialogue between self as two-in-one and the dialogue between self:other. The dialogue between self as two-in-one and self:other is premised on the confession of equal difference (Arendt, 1990:83-85).

Arendt (1990:87) regards the dialogue between self as two-in-one, when it is truthful, as the beginning of morality and ethics. She thus places the responsibility for deconstructing the epistemology of knowing self:other and morality and ethics in the hands of self. Bauman (1994:35,72) similarly argues that the construction of the moral self is a personal and pre-ontological choice. It happens before meeting or being with self:other. This implies that the relation self:other is a result of the dialogue between self as two-in-one during which the moral self is (re)constructed.

I also explored the theories of Cary (2006:10) and Pitt (1998:543) on the dialogue between self as two-in-one. Their conceptualisation of the dialogue between self as two-in-one happens within the psychoanalytical framework. Within the psychoanalytical framework this deconstructive dialogue is defined by both Cary (2006:10) and Pitt (1998:543) as the continual dialogue between conscious (self) and sub-conscious (authoritarian other). I find the role of an other as representative of prescribed rules of conduct problematic. In my view, this assumes that an other represents a consensual universal view of human rights as an universal ethical code structuring pre-conceived identity and the relation self:other in the context of this study.

Within my conceptualisation of the ethical relation self:other, an other is invited and received in difference and as *someone* (Ruiz, 2004:274) in intra-dialogue between and with self:other. The regulating force of prescribed rules of conduct regarding categories

of sameness and otherness does not apply to the responsibility *for someone* (Bauman, 1994:79). This implies that an other is not the authoritarian voice of prescribed rules, duties, obligations and behaviour. An other is a voice of equal difference to self in the relation self:other. Intra-dialogue relies on the confession and narration of different *doxas* and non-reciprocal views in order to disrupt and (re)construct identity and the relation self:other. An other confesses own difference and during this confession, self has the opportunity not only to deconstruct the difference within self but also the difference between self:other with regard to knowing and being with self:other. The deconstruction of own difference, continually moves from the inside-of-self to outside-of-self (Nancy, 1998:438-439) in an openness to the *doxas* confessed by others (Du Preez, 2009:106-107). During the narration of *doxa* and autobiography, self:other are individuated by *who* they are in equal difference and identity is continually (re)constructed.

Intra-dialogue as intentional revolutionary action is linked to the human capacity of natality. Natality, Arendt (1958:178) argues correspond to human birth. Natality describes the human capacity to continually start new. Dialogic revolutions have new ways of thinking and acting as purpose (Arendt, 1965:29; Arendt, 2006a:193). During dialogic revolutions, self:other are liberated from prescribed duties and rules of conduct and are free to, in responsibility for self:other, re-imagine new ways of being with and knowing self:other.

Intra-dialogue is thus the deliberate action of disruption, deconstruction and reconstruction of what and how we know self:other. Self:other are simultaneously singular and together during intra-dialogue. In singularity self:other become equal and unique moral partners during intra-dialogue but remain responsible for self:other in their singularity as a dignified and unique *someone*.

6.3.3 Identity construction

Confessing *who* we are in spaces of togetherness and by means of intra-dialogue requires courage (Jansen, 2009:275; Arendt, 1958:186). Bauman (2001a:151) argues that the lack of certainty in liquid/postmodern society renders 'identity' into a constant field of ambiguity, uncertainty and contestation. Paradoxically 'identity' also acts as a crutch towards the constant search for spaces of belonging providing stability and security. "Identity owes the attention it attracts and the passions it begets to being a *surrogate of community*: of that allegedly 'natural home' which is no longer available in the rapidly privatised and individualised fast globalised world." (*ibid*:151).

In my view, identity construction is a relational, dialogic, disruptive and revolutionary

process (3.9.2). The presentation of *what* we are in social and curriculum spaces needs to be disrupted in a search for *who* we are in equality of difference. *Who* we are cannot be confessed as a single story (3.6.7.1.1 [a]) or in an a-historical curriculum (5.4.4). Identity is constructed during the narration of multiple and multilayered fractured stories, linking past, present and future subjective experiences in non-linear space and time.

Arendt (1958:175) understands identity construction as related to the human conditions plurality and natality. Brison (2007:366) similarly argues that identity is constructed and sustained in relation. I find the emphasis Arendt (1958:178) puts on the human condition natality in identity construction as of great importance. Identity construction linked to the human condition natality explains identity construction as continually revolutionary new beginnings (3.9.2). Arendt (*ibid*:177-178) also emphasises the unexpectedness and unpredictability of all new beginnings. This implies that identity related to belonging and predesigned categorisation defining *what* we are cannot aid revolutionary new beginnings.

Confessing *who* we are and hope to be is a moral act (3.9.3.3). It happens in responsibility *for* self:other and requires courage, truthfulness and the receiving of an other as equally different to self (Arendt, 1958:186; Arendt, 1990:83). During the construction of identity self:other are received as *someone* unique, irreplaceable and dignified (Ruiz, 2004:274). Meta-narratives and oppressive structures can silence confessions of *who* we are (3.6.1.1 [c]). Dlamini (2010:153) argues that meta-narratives such as calling all black South African PDI's (previous disadvantaged individuals) turn self:other into abstract entities. For South Africans to truly confess *who* they are in their unique and equal difference, historical, social, economic and political boundaries defining *what* we are need to be disrupted and revolutionised.

The dialogic, revolutionary and relational nature of becoming and liberation to freedom in responsibility *for* self:other is similarly posed by Freire (1993:68). Freire (1993:65) argues that humans, in the consciousness of being incomplete and unfinished, are in a continual quest to become. Becoming, Freire (1993:68) argues, is dependent on the right to name the world in reflection and action. Naming the world has change and liberation as purpose and is an *a priori* act of love and faith in humankind (Freire, 1993:71). Freire (*ibid*:70) argues: "No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause – the cause of liberation".

Conceding that self is conscious of his/her own incompleteness and responsibility to become and revolutionise the world, I will argue that such change can only start with the

disruption of the boundaries of *what* he/she is categorised by, in order to continually revolutionise *who* he/she is in becoming. Premising becoming and revolutionary action in opposing categories of *what* we are (oppressor/oppressed) cannot result in a search for understanding or change. Becoming is the dialogic and revolutionary disruption and (re)construction of identity when we confess *who* we are in the relation self:other. Within the relation self:other, self continually mediates and stabilises own identity construction by means of intra-dialogue in responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values.

Constructing the moral self, confessing *who* we are, revolutionising *who* we are, and continually disrupting the boundaries of *what* we are, are the processes of identity construction and the beginning of the relation self:other and the continual revolutionising of human rights values.

6.3.4 Human right values

Arendt (1965:25) regards the human capacity for revolutionary new beginnings by means of speech and action as one of the possibilities by which humanity could re-imagine a guarantee for human dignity. The influence of societal, historical and political changes and the accentuation of specific human rights values on the relation self:other is explored with reference to the four periods starting with the Enlightenment in Chapter Two. The conceptual tying of human rights to citizenship, genealogy, liberalism and neo-liberalism influence the realisation of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality in the relation self:other.

The diverse understandings of human rights values, mapped into four schools of thought by Dembour (2010), are a manifestation of the complexity of the human condition and the relation self:other rooted in human rights values. The natural school understands human rights values as universal and given and emphasises individual freedom (Dembour, 2010:2), while the deliberative school understands human rights values as deliberated and emphasises the potential of human rights regarding political tolerance and consensus (*ibid*:3). The protest school regards human rights values as revolutionary and relational (*ibid*:4-5) and the discourse school advocates a reconceptualisation of human rights values aiding better processes to address inequality and power relations (*ibid*:8-9)

My understanding of human rights values is conceptualised with reference to Bauman's thoughts on morality and ethics (1994) explored in *Postmodern Ethics*, and Arendt's (1960:43; 1965:25; 1990:83) emphasis on the relational and revolutionary realisation of human freedom, dignity and equality. Bauman (1994:10) argues that postmodern

individuals are morally ambivalent and that no rationally coherent moral code can be imposed upon humans to resolve this. We have to live with post-modern ambivalence: no choice that we make in the relation self:other can be defined as objectively good or bad (*ibid*:10).

For Bauman (*ibid*:13), morality is furthermore “bound to be irrational”. To act in a moral fashion is to assume moral responsibility: “being for the Other before one can be with the Other” (*ibid*:13). To be a morally responsible person in the relation self:other rooted in human rights values means acting in an unselfish way, in responsibility *for* self:other – expecting no reciprocity (*ibid*:147). Thus, in my view, constructing the moral self and the choice to be responsible *for* self:other is the origin of the construction of identity, the constitution of the relation self:other and the realisation of freedom, dignity and equality.

Bauman (*ibid*:74) argues that the question whether an other accepts the invitation to construct the relation self:other rooted in human rights values as a willing participant is irrelevant to the choice to be responsible *for* self:other. The choice to be responsible *for* self:other is irrational and non-reciprocal (*ibid*:13). In terms of the realisation of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality, self remains responsible *for* the realisation of the freedom, dignity and equality of self:other, irrespective of the choice made by an other to enter the ethical relation self:other. Imagining human rights values in the moral framework defined by Bauman (1994), I conclude that human rights values are not claims or reciprocal duties, given, rationally grounded or deliberated, nor universal or universalisable (3.9.3.2). Human rights values are a moral, non-reciprocal choice, and are a continual responsibility *for* self:other (before being with others).

Arendt (1990:90) similarly disregards the notion of any universal given truth advocated by scholars from the natural school. She furthermore finds the notion of consensus problematic as she argues that notions of universal truth or persuasion to accept one opinion destroy *doxas* and with it equality of difference (*ibid*:80,84; 3.9.3.2). This indicates that the realisation of human freedom, dignity and equality is only possible in spaces of togetherness between self:other premised on the equal value of different *doxas* confessed.

The revolutionary process of realising freedom, dignity and equality will never be completed as each victory is followed by new forms of oppression and dehumanising (Bauman, 1994:228; 2.1). Bauman (*ibid*:228) argues that: “No victory over inhumanity seems to have made the world safer for humanity.” In natality and plurality the hope and

frailty of humanity come together, enabling humans to continually start a-new, revolutionising self:other rooted in human rights values. The dialogic revolutions concerning human rights values are stabilised by forgiveness and promises. Dialogic revolutions, forgiveness and promises are intentional actions enabling self:other to continually start new (Arendt, 1958:241,244). Promises, as acts of foundations such as declarations, treaties and the *South African Bill of Rights* (1996), stabilise new beginnings and make it possible to act a-new in the relation self:other. The unconditional choice to be responsible for self:other disrupts meta-narratives and ideologies, sparking new revolutions and new acts of foundation. This is clearly illustrated by means of the many human rights revolutions since the Enlightenment (2.1). Human rights and human rights values can thus never be self-evident, universal or predesigned. They are continually deconstructed and reconstructed in the relation self:other.

In my view, freedom, dignity and equality are not inherent in human nature and cannot be claimed from the state, NGOs or global human rights watchdogs. Human freedom, dignity and equality are primarily relational, revolutionary, ethical and dialogic processes of becoming. The realisation of human rights values have its origin in the ethical, dialogic and revolutionary individuation of self in the relation self:other. The realisation of human rights values start with the continually changing moral self in responsibility *for* self:other.

6.3.5 Curriculum

The transformative capacity of curriculum and education has been questioned and explored since the 1920s (1.4). During postmodernity the emphasis shifted to the self-in-relation (Slattery, 2006:19; 2.4.5.1; 4.5.2.4) and the capacity of curriculum for self-transformation and the transformation of society are continually rephrased and explored (Pinar *et al.*, 2004: 514-515; Blake & Masschelein, 2005:42; Du Preez, 2011).

Ruiz (2004:275) and Arendt (2006a:193) regard education and the curriculum as revolutionary in nature. The revolutionary nature of curriculum, Arendt (*ibid*:182) argues, has nothing to do with new educational and curriculum policies or structures but with the human condition of natality (5.6.3.1 [c]). Children, in a process of continual becoming, enter a pre-existing world and educational structure and start something new, something unexpected (*ibid*:182,193). Ruiz (2004:275) argues that the revolutionary capacity of education and the curriculum lies in the responsibility for teacher:child in assisting in the “birthing of a ‘new reality’ through which the world is constantly renewed.” The revolutionary capacity of curriculum is thus dependent on the ethical and revolutionary nature of the relation teacher:child.

Liberation, transformation and emancipation towards a pre-designed utopia are globally viewed as one of the primary functions of education and curriculum. However, this subjects curriculum to a functionalistic and instrumental circular logic (Blake & Masschelein, 2003:53). Regarding a pre-designed curriculum as an agent of transformation or an emancipatory destination is premised on a flawed assumption of the transformational capacity of curriculum and education. New beginnings regard the unexpected, the renewing of the world in ways “unforeseen by us” (Arendt, 2006a:193). New beginnings happen between self:other and rely on the liberation of self:other from pre-designed categories and codes of conduct to be able to freely confess *who* we are and freely re-imagine the relation self:other in continual becoming (2.3.2). The (re)constitution and the re-imagination of the ethical relation self:other is the result of the continual (re)construction of the moral self. If new beginnings and the revolutionary capacity of curriculum are dependent on the ethical relation teacher:child and the human condition natality, the question posed regarding the revolutionary capacity of curriculum and education should then not be: ‘Can curriculum be self-transformative?’ but rather: ‘How should curriculum aid self-transformation?’.

Self-transformation (the [re]construction of the moral self) and identity (re)construction, confessing *who* we are, should in my view, be the beginning of any curriculum process and action. The continual (re)construction of the moral self in responsibility *for* self:other results in the ethical relation teacher:child, whose ethical, dialogic and revolutionary nature engenders continual new beginnings. Education and curriculum viewed as revolutionary action are rooted in the human capacity for new beginnings *with* self:other through speech and action (*ibid*:193). In order to transform the world *with* others, self:other need to individuate themselves as *who* they are in their unique difference, rendering them into an irreplaceable partner in re-imagining self:other and the world which they share (Arendt, 1958:244).

Curriculum, however, is never a neutral act (Msila, 2007:146). Curriculum serves economic and political interests and is situated within specific and global socio-historic contexts. Curriculum inquiry should regard the questioning of the conceptualisation of the nature, elements and process of curriculum in local and global contexts (Dillon, 2009:344; Pinar 2010:3). In the five perspectives to curriculum inquiry explored in Chapter Four (4.5), the technical perspective to curriculum serves technical and market related interests, focusing on pre-designed outcomes (Schubert, 2008:400). The hermeneutic perspective to curriculum explores the interaction between persons and situations and how these interactions constitute meanings and understandings

(Schubert, 2008:400). The critical perspective emphasises the political interests served by curriculum and advocates emancipatory outcomes (Schubert, 2008:401). The postmodern and post-structural perspective to curriculum explores the self-in-relation and focuses on the interruption of hegemonic understandings (Slattery, 2006:3). The ethical perspective on curriculum explores the ethical, relational and subjective experiences of teacher:child in teaching-learning (Cary, 2006:137).

In order to conceptualise curriculum providing for dialogic spaces aiding identity construction, revolutionary becoming and the (re)constitution of the ethical relation self:other rooted in human rights values, I have related my exploration of the five perspectives on curriculum to the diverse understandings of the nature, elements and process of curriculum. A technical and market-orientated curriculum is concerned with predesigned learning outcomes, *what* children are and *what* children should become (Posner, 2009:254; Au, 2011:26). Critical curriculum theories focus on the intersections between education, curriculum and politics. Within this perspective, curriculum is seen as the result of struggles and compromises between political power structures and education (Apple, 1999:11). By defining curriculum as primarily related to political and power struggles, the elements and process of curriculum are limited within the boundaries of politics, power and education. Within this frame of reference, self:other are defined in categories related to political and economic acts of power. The (re)construction of the moral self in the (re)constitution of the ethical relation self:other is subsumed and restricted by the boundaries structured by powerful economic and political discourse structuring reality (*cf* Pinar *et al.*, 2004:463).

In my view, the postmodern, post-structural and ethical perspectives on curriculum provide the best possibilities for conceptualising curriculum since they make provision for dialogic spaces, aiding identity construction, revolutionary becoming and the (re)constitution of the ethical relation self:other rooted in human rights values. In order to re-imagine the ethical relation self:other, the representation and positioning of self:other in curriculum spaces need to be disrupted, deconstructed and reconstructed by means of intra-dialogue. Cary (2006:134) describes the need for such disruptive curriculum spaces as resulting from the epistemological crises in curriculum conceptualisation. The epistemological crises in curriculum conceptually demand a reconceptualisation of curriculum to embrace more fluid, multilayered and complicated ways of knowing and being with self:other in curriculum spaces (*ibid*:134). This would require a questioning of meta-narratives and epistemological premises by which, curriculum is conceptualised and constructed (Schubert, 2008:401).

Within postmodern and ethical perspectives to curriculum, curriculum inquiries emphasise the relation self:other. The postmodern critique on the separation of self and other as binary opposites and its manifestation in curriculum spaces moves curriculum conceptualisation in an ethical direction. Within the ethical perspective on curriculum self:other are acknowledged as equal in difference in a shared humanity (1.7.1; 3.5.1). In a classroom context the complexity of the human condition is revealed when teacher:child not only recognise their shared humanity but confess the unique and irreplaceable distinction of *who* they are (4.6.6). A fluxing, complex and multilayered approach to curriculum conceptualisation acknowledges the intersectionality of categories of knowing self:other and the danger of the reproduction of such oppressive categories in curriculum spaces (4.6.4.1).

Du Preez (2011) defines the ethical turn in curriculum conceptualisation in terms of intersectional analyses. The intersecting of categories of knowing result in conflict, interruption and disruption (Du Preez, 2011). During intra-dialogue, deconstructing and reconstructing intersecting categories of knowing self:other should be analysed by the anticategorical approach to intersectionality (*cf.* McCall, 2005:1773). The anticategorical approach to intersectionality regards society as fluid and complex and therefore refutes the validity of socially constructed categories of knowing self:other (McCall, 2005:1773). Given the anthropological premise underlying curriculum conceptualisation that humans are equally different in a shared humanity, predesigned socially constructed categories of knowing self:other cannot, in my view, aid identity (re)construction and the (re)constitution of the ethical relation self:other rooted in human rights values.

An anticategorical approach to intersectionality which refutes the validity of socially constructed categories of knowing self:other requires a shift away from instrumental systems of reason towards uncomfortable reflection and reflexion on the relation self:other (*cf.* Pillow, 2003:188). It would indicate curriculum spaces in which the reflexive questioning of knowing and being with teacher:child manifest themselves as “confounding disruptions” of what and how we know self:other (Pillow, 2003:192; Cary, 2007:134). Disruptions of categories of knowing self:other cannot be controlled by duties, rules or legalities (Bauman, 1994:60). Bauman (*ibid*:60) argues that “[t]he moral call is thoroughly personal; it appeals to my responsibility”. It requires continual (re)construction of the moral self in responsibility *for* self:other. The implications of the appeal to responsibility for curriculum is the development of a transformative pedagogy, which questions and re-imagines traditional understandings of self:other and teaching and learning (Slattery *et al.*, 2007:551).

6.3.6 Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces embracing becoming and identity construction rooted in human rights values

The conceptualisation of intra-dialogic curriculum spaces takes account of postmodern, post-structural and ethical perspectives on curriculum. Within these perspectives the ethical relation teacher:child defines the nature, elements and process of intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. The revolutionary capacity of identity construction, human rights values, curriculum and education manifests itself within the ethical relation teacher:child. The realisation of human rights values in a classroom becomes possible through singular and situated experiences of responsibility *for* teacher:child.

Teacher:child, in singularity and togetherness, are invited and received into curriculum spaces as significant, equal and irreplaceable partners constructing and re-imagining the relation self:other, curriculum and education (1.5.3; 3.6; 4.6.6). In classrooms as spaces of togetherness teacher:child are regarded as equal in difference and there can therefore be no reciprocity of perspectives, *doxas* or confessions. Any authoritarian monologue positioning or representing of self:other in categories 'like us or alien to us' (Bauman, 1994:147,150) is contradictory to the ethical and inclusive nature of intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness.

The individual and personal choice made to responsibility implies intentional acts of interruption and disruption of rules of conduct, moral codes and traditions when such legalities and rules reproduce and structure oppression and dehumanising in curriculum spaces. Dialogic revolutions resulting from disruption, have new ways of thinking and acting as purpose (Arendt, 1958:177-178). Bauman (1994:148), Brinkman (2007:1136), Jansen (2009:266,264) and Du Preez (2009:101) regard dissonance and disruption as crucial to the construction of new knowledge; new ways of knowing and being with self:other.

Within these inclusive spaces, autobiography and equal difference matter (Bernhard, 2009:64; Reilly, 2009:383; 3.6.1.1.[a]; 4.6.5). The ethical relation teacher:child in which each teacher and child is received as a dignified *someone* is the anchor and origin of teaching and learning and the conceptualisation of curriculum spaces (Ruiz, 2004:271). During intra-dialogue teacher:child change (*cf.* Apple, 1999:199; 4.6), curriculum becomes a lived experience deeply concerned with the life of teacher:child as a dignified *someone* and as a result, education, curriculum and society are revolutionised (*cf.* Pinar *et al.*, 2004:514-515; Ruiz, 2004:271; Du Preez, 2011:3).

The question posed by Pinar *et al.*, (2004:514-515): ‘What does curriculum have to do with my life?’ can only be answered between teacher:child in intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. Between teacher:child the search for *who* I am is not restricted to predesigned categories of knowing representing self:other in curriculum spaces, but a truthful and continual search for self by means of multiple and multi-layered own and other life stories confessed in a classroom, shifting the boundaries of *what* we know of self:other (4.6.5).

My exploration of the research questions posed in Chapter One, has led me to conclude that the extent to which curriculum can aid becoming, the re-imagination of self:other, continual identity construction and the realisation of human rights values is dependent on the frame of reasoning in which curriculum is conceptualised. Re-imagining self:other, continual identity construction, the realisation of human rights values in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other and continual becoming cannot be done in a predesigned curriculum context of means and ends, regulated by inputs and assessments. However, intra-dialogic curriculum spaces, conceptualised within an ethical and postmodern frame of reasoning, can aid the re-imagination of self:other rooted in human rights values, the constitution of the ethical relation teacher:child and spaces of togetherness in which teacher:child continually define themselves by *who* they are in a continual process of becoming and identity construction.

6.4 THE POST-APARTHEID CURRICULUM

Jansen argues (1999b:57) that changes to the curriculum during 1996 had little to do with curriculum and more to do with the crisis of the legitimacy facing the state and education in the years after the elections in 1994. The post-apartheid curriculum is based on the assumption that new curriculum and education policies transform society, institutions, teaching and learning and the relation self:other in a “rational, linear and uniform way” (Hoadley & Jansen, 2009:307). The post-apartheid curriculum is regarded as the chosen *weapon* of transformation, of *producing* the future members of an emancipated society (Msila, 2007:146). These assumptions, however, only result in the reproduction of inequality (Jansen, 2011b:101). Soudien (2010:43) argues that the post-apartheid curriculum has given a macro-character to discrimination. The post-apartheid curriculum assumes a middle class society in existence, which simply does not relate to the lived experiences of millions of South Africans (*ibid*:41,43).

Pinar (2010b:3) argues that the unique individual is the specificity of curriculum and the “lived site of remembrance and reconstruction”. The post-apartheid curriculum, however,

is not situated in that space. It does not consider teacher:child as a situated, unique and dignified *someone*. As Soudien (2010:41; 5.4.1) argues, this is partly because the curriculum misrepresents the subjectivity of teacher:child. During colonialism and apartheid society and education were structured in terms of white and enlightenment virtues. Soudien (*ibid*:44; 5.4.1) argues that the middle class identities and virtues which the post-apartheid curriculum envisages are premised on older forms of categorisation and discrimination rooted in colonialism and apartheid.

An analysis of curriculum should always concern intersections of economic, historical, societal and political contexts with curriculum. These spaces of intersection situate self:other and curriculum in specific and non-linear space and time. Within these intersecting spaces the hope and fear of society are expressed and continually (re)balanced within the boundaries of what we know of self:other and how we come to know self:other. In the post-apartheid curriculum, two central themes, belonging and transformation, which express the hope of a re-imagined South African society, reflect these intersections.

6.4.1 Belonging

One of the central themes in the intersecting spaces of the post-apartheid curriculum is belonging. The exclusionary nature of social spaces during colonialism and apartheid resulted in the conceptualisation of metaphors such as the “rainbow nation” which express the hope that post-1994 South Africans will form part of a new reconstructed society. Myambo (2010:94), however, argues that metaphorical spaces of rainbow belonging does not change South African society, it only changes the way we perceive South African society. Perceived belonging does not change poverty and dehumanising experiences for millions of South Africans (4.4.2.5).

Belonging is concerned with experiences of inclusion and exclusion from categories and groups. The post-apartheid curriculum structures the hope and expectation of belonging by means of concepts such as nation building, national identity and the “good citizen” (5.5.1). Globally and locally, the power clustering around the concept nation remains central to curriculum conceptualisation. Future generations are educated towards the acceptance of meta-narratives and ideologies of nation-states (Davies *et al.*, 2005:68). The post-apartheid curriculum aims to ‘produce good citizens’ (NCS-CAPS, 2011:1,5). The concept of citizenship and what it means to be a South African citizen is also one of the central themes of the *Manifesto* (2001), conceptually linking human rights values,

democracy and education to citizenship and belonging to the South African nation (Asmal, 2011: 287).

The wish of South Africans to belong, expressed and structured by the post-apartheid curriculum, however, has reproduced exclusion. The exclusionary consequences of the conceptual tying of human rights to genealogy have been evident since the World Wars and have been extensively explored by Arendt (1958:1966; 2.4.5.2 [b]; 3.4.2.2). In South Africa, refugees and foreigners are treated as non groups and even citizens of South Africa are categorised and excluded along tribal lines (Jansen, 2011:189). The predesigned conceptions regarding the 'production' of children displaying the characteristics of what it "means to be South African" (Asmal, 2011: 287) have turned the hope of belonging into the fear of exclusion. Identity construction premised on the hope of belonging to the predesigned group of 'good citizens' is not concerned with equal difference but with *what* we are expected to be and become in order to belong.

The democratisation of South Africa since 1994 has included the adoption of neo-liberal policies and the market related ideologies supporting it (Chisholm, 2009:316). Following the global trend to the marketisation of society and education, neo-liberal categories of knowing and being have been introduced by the post-apartheid curriculum. Since the early years of the South African democracy, education and curriculum have been regarded as a means of ending poverty and unemployment in South Africa. The trend to marketisation of the curriculum is increasing in the post-apartheid curriculum. (5.3.6; 5.4.2). The aim of the curriculum is to be market-related thus the competencies and skills that future employers would require are prioritised. Its purpose is to 'produce' learners, the curriculum is thus a 'delivery system' and accountability and standardised testing have become priorities (NCS-CAPS; 2011:4; Motshega, 2012:1).

An instrumental and marketised curriculum influences the construction of the ethical relation teacher:child, identity construction, becoming and the realisation of the human rights values freedom, dignity and equality in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other. Identity construction within a neo-liberal frame of reference is concerned with *what* we are. Categories of knowing self:other relate to means and ends, risk assessment, management skills and problem-solving. Problem-solving skills are related to societal and cultural themes of salvation and hope towards a predesigned future (Popkewitz, 2007:304; 5.6.2.7 [b]). Problem-solving and management skills regard neo-liberal notions of agency and identity (*ibid*:304; 3.9.3.4). Responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values are shifted towards managing and measuring efficiency by means of standardised testing and holding teacher:child accountable (5.6.2.4).

The fear of the 'non' problem-solver, the inefficient teacher:child and the deviations from the norm, which the 'non' performer or incapable teacher:child in standardised tests represent, are managed by new programmes and policies. Management based on the fear that the teacher:child will deviate from the standard set by policies results in the construction of new categories of knowing teacher:child and in growing exclusions and inequality (cf. Popkewitz, 2007:304; 5.6.2.4). The hope of belonging expressed by South Africans during the aftermath of the 1994 elections has been replaced by a growing fear of exclusion actively structured by the post-apartheid curriculum.

6.4.2 Transformation

The transformation of education and society by means of an inclusive curriculum has been another central theme in the construction of curriculum since 1994. The post-apartheid curriculum and the *Manifesto* (2001) are structured, referencing the *Constitution of South Africa* and the *Bill of Rights* (1996). By means of the post-apartheid curriculum, new generations of South Africans are expected to embrace the values of human rights and democracy and construct a transformed non-racial, non-sexist, equal and dignified society. Ruiz (2004:277), however, argues that one cannot teach *for* values if education is not based *on* values. As Jansen (1999b:150) successfully argued, OBE and the post-apartheid curriculum are undemocratic and can therefore not aid any transformation of education and society to include democratic and human rights values.

Biesta (2009:39) argues that curriculum and education in democratic societies should have qualification, socialisation and subjectification as their purpose (5.6.2.1). As Du Preez (2012b) explains, socialisation is influenced by the meta-narratives of society and community expressed in curriculum. Socialisation concerns the way in which curriculum represents meta-narratives in teaching and learning that assist children to be incorporated into society and communities (Biesta, 2009:40). The post-apartheid curriculum emphasises the qualification and socialisation functions of curriculum to the exclusion of the subjectification of teacher:child. Market related outcomes and skills are emphasised and the socialisation function is managed by the teaching of pre-designed conceptions of citizenship and belonging.

Drawing on the theories of Arendt (1958; 1990) and Bauman (1994) however, I would argue that the emphasis in curriculum aiming towards transformation should be on the subjectification function of curriculum. Biesta (2009:40) argues that the subjectification function of curriculum concerns the way education and society impacts on the individual. Subjectification concerns the questions asked by Pinar *et al.* (2004:514-515): 'What does curriculum have to do with my life?' and 'Can curriculum be self-transformative?.' It

would also concern the question: 'Is the post-apartheid curriculum concerned with the life experiences and hopes of South African teacher:child living in a dissonant country and world?'

A technical market-related curriculum, such as the post-apartheid curriculum, assumes knowledge to be value free and objective (Slattery, 2006:235). This would imply that what we know of self:other in curriculum spaces is assumed by the post-apartheid curriculum to be value free and objective. As Soudien (2010:44) rightly argues, the post-apartheid curriculum assumes an empty and a-historical landscape. Accepting the argument made by Ruiz (2004:275) that teacher:child should be received within curriculum spaces as a dignified and unique *someone*, situated within individual social, cultural and historic context, I would argue that the post-apartheid curriculum cannot accommodate such reception.

Reception of teacher:child within curriculum spaces would also pre-suppose the continual (re)construction of the moral self, as the relation teacher:child, the invitation to and reception of an other in curriculum spaces is a result of the (re)construction of the moral self in responsibility *for* self:other. The question posed by Cary (2006:135): 'How do we know and what do we know of self:other in curriculum spaces?' concerns what is thought (im)possible in the invitation, reception and representation of teacher:child in curriculum spaces.

Arendt (2006a:193) and Ruiz (2004:275) argue that any revolutionary action resulting in new ways of thinking and acting; new meaning-making, originates between teacher:child within the ethical relation teacher:child. Arendt (1990:87) and Bauman (1994:75) argue that the origin of ethics and the ethical relation teacher:child results from the dialogue between self as two-in-one resulting in the choice to be responsible *for* self:other. If the post-apartheid curriculum aims to transform society to embrace democratic and human rights values, this transformation should, in my view, originate in self-transformation (the continual [re]construction of the moral self) and the continual (re)construction of identity in responsibility *for* self:other.

Who teacher:child are, however, is of no concern to the post-apartheid curriculum. The proposed standardised testing (Delivery Agreement, 2010:10; NCS-CAPS, 2011) reduces teacher:child to quantified numbers: "decontextualised numerical objects for comparison". (Au, 2011:137). Equality of difference defining *who* teacher:child are is actively negated by the technical and market-related nature of the post-apartheid curriculum. Revolutionary becoming originating between teacher:child, disrupting meanings and understandings, sparking dialogic revolutions and constructing new ways

of knowing and being with self:other remain extremely difficult within the boundaries structured by the post-apartheid curriculum.

I do not regard the post-apartheid curriculum as having any revolutionary capacity. It cannot aid self-transformation or the transformation of society, because it cannot receive teacher:child as a unique and dignified *someone* in dialogic spaces. Furthermore, it is not concerned with the deconstruction of what we know of self:other and how we come to know self:other in curriculum spaces. Transformation of curriculum, education and society are sparked by self-transformation, resulting in the ethical relation self:other and continual dialogic revolutions.

6.5 CONCEPTUAL CONCLUSIONS

The research questions asked in Chapter One are concerned with the capacity of curriculum to endorse continual re-imagination of self:other by means of identity (re)construction confessing *who* teacher:child are and the capacity of curriculum to aid becoming in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other. Re-imagining self:other would pre-suppose the revolutionary capacity of curriculum to aid the (re)constitution of the ethical relation teacher:child, spaces of togetherness and intra-dialogue.

In a search for security and stability, humans categorise self:other in the quest to belong (Bauman, 2001a:145,151). Categorisation defines *what* we are and conduct and behavior towards self:other are prescribed and predesigned in categories of belonging. The power clustering around categories of in(ex)clusion to groups of belonging reproduce dehumanisation and oppression (McCall, 2005:1777). Since early colonialism, the relation self:other in South Africa has been structured by *what* we are and the rules of behavior regulating these socially constructed categories. Although categories of belonging are an important part of identity construction, in order to re-imagine self:other, categories of what we know of self:other need to be disrupted, deconstructed and reconstructed. Self:other need to be defined by *who* they are in their unique and equal difference.

The post-apartheid curriculum was constructed after the 1994 elections to give expression to the desire of South Africans to construct new ways of knowing and being with self:other after years of colonialism and apartheid. It was hoped that the teaching and learning of democratic and human rights values will aid the re-imagination of the relation self:other. Learning about human rights values, however, does not re-imagine new ways of being and knowing self:other. The values of human rights are not claims, entitlements or duties. They cannot be enforced by teaching and learning about human

rights. Human freedom is not inherent to human nature but continually realised within the relation self:other by means of free speech and action (Arendt, 1960:43; Freire, 1993:29). Human dignity cannot be claimed but is realised when we are defined by *who* we are in the relation self:other. Human dignity is realised when self is received as a unique, irreplaceable different *someone* (Arendt, 1958:181; Ruiz, 2004:274).

The post-apartheid curriculum has been critiqued since its inception in 1996 as instrumental, behaviourist, undemocratic and reproducing categories of knowing self:other (Jansen, 1999b:150; Kraak, 1999:21; Soudien, 2010:43). The post-apartheid curriculum is framed within a technical perspective on curriculum and is influenced by neo-liberalism and its underlying market-related ideologies (5.3.6). A technical perspective on curriculum is characterised by control and an emphasis on efficiency (5.6.2.4). A predesigned future is implied within a technical approach to curriculum and the skills and rhetoric such as problem-solving, managing and delivering, define what the curriculum and society expect teacher:child to be and to become (5.6.2.7 [b]).

In my understanding, becoming is the continual revolutionary action towards new beginnings. Arendt (1958:178) regards all new beginnings as characterised by their unexpectedness and unpredictability. New beginnings cannot be predesigned or controlled by curriculum policies or standardised tests. It happens between teacher:child in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other and in the consciousness that the relation self:other remains incomplete and unfinished (Freire, 1994:65). Continual revolutionary beginnings are in my view not possible within a technical frame of reference to curriculum. The boundaries constructed within this frame of reason, disregard *who* teacher:child are in equal difference, disregard the ethical relation teacher:child and render the constitution of spaces of togetherness in which revolutionary new beginnings are constructed as impossible (5.6.2.4; 5.6.2.5). Within a technical perspective to curriculum, a reciprocity of perspectives is expected and predesigned, containing dissonance, disruption and dialogic revolutions.

The fear of growing unemployment, poverty and inequality cannot be fixed with curriculum policies teaching about a metaphorical rainbow belonging and predesigned notions of what it means to be South African (*cf.* Myambo, 2010:95; Asmal, 2011:287). Market-related and technical outcomes, controlled by standardised tests cannot aid the defining of *who* teacher:child are and the confession of autobiographies constructed from lived experiences which would reveal the reality of the South African experience. In order to move from what *is* to what *could* be; the re-imagination of self:other, the realities of the South African experience need to be deconstructed. This would have to include

political, economic, societal and economic intersections and interests defining the post-apartheid curriculum.

My theory generating hypothesis posed in Chapter One for a possible post-conflict curriculum is:

Post-conflict curriculum theories in South African should re-conceptualise the premise of curriculum to describe and express South African society as a lived experience while simultaneously moving, by means of a process of disruption and intra-dialogue, towards becoming in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other rooted in human rights values. The normative process of becoming should be rooted in the human capacity for continual new beginnings in the relation teacher:child in which the unique *I* is continually (re)constructed, rooting identity in the human rights values of freedom, dignity and equality.

In order to aid the continual (re)construction of identity, the constitution of the ethical relation teacher:child and spaces of togetherness, becoming in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other and the realisation of human rights values, I have conceptualised intra-dialogic curriculum spaces. In my view of curriculum conceptualisation, the revolutionary capacity of curriculum has its origin between teacher:child in classrooms as intra-dialogic spaces of inclusive togetherness. Curriculum spaces should aid the continual (re)construction of the moral self, constituting the ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness by means of intra-dialogue. Intra-dialogue is revolutionary action, disrupting what and how we know, sparking dialogic revolutions and deconstructing and reconstructing knowledge concerning self:other.

In order to disrupt what and how we know, spaces of togetherness are premised on equal difference and the free confession of autobiography. There is no reciprocity of knowing in classrooms as spaces of togetherness. The consequences of free speech and action in spaces of togetherness are mediated and stabilised by the ethical relation self:other in responsibility for the realisation of the human rights values and continual becoming of self:other. The realisation of human rights values happens when self:other freely confess autobiography defining *who* they are, define themselves as a dignified *someone* and equal partner in the relation self:other in spaces of togetherness.

In intra-dialogic spaces knowledge *about* self:other is deconstructed and categories of knowing is regarded as socially constructed and dehumanising. Knowing self:other is

regarded as a process of continual becoming in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other. How we know and what we know is continually deconstructed and all knowledge concerning self:other is regarded as open, fluxing, multilayered and complex. In intra-dialogic curriculum spaces self:other are concerned with *who* they are. By continually deconstructing the difference within self and the difference between self:other in openness to other *doxas* and commitment to own *doxa*, identity and new ways of knowing are continually (re)constructed.

Within the postmodern and ethical perspectives to curriculum conceptualisation, curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces can aid identity construction and becoming rooted in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other rooted in the human rights values of freedom, dignity and equality.

6.6 SUMMARY

The central theme of this reflexive reconceptualisation is the hope of continual revolutionary new beginnings by which identity construction and the realisation of human rights values in the ethical relation self:other can be re-imagined. Arendt (1965:25) regards the human capacity for revolutionary new beginnings by means of speech and action as one of the possibilities by which humanity could re-imagine a guarantee for human dignity. The realisation of human dignity is dependent on the ethical relation self:other and spaces of togetherness in which self:other is received and defined as a dignified and unique *someone* and an equal partner in the re-imagination of the relation self:other in free speech and action.

The revolutionary spirit to think and act a-new by means of dialogic revolutions between self:other seems to have been lost when freedom was first equated to free enterprise during the Industrial period (*ibid*:217). The silencing of narratives by the neo-liberal masking of difference and the power clustering around categories of knowing continually reproduce *what* we know of self:other. Freire (1993:68) argues that true words spoken between self:other transform the world and, in my view, the relation self:other. The revolutionary spirit to think and act a-new, rely on 'true words' which are constituted by the two elements reflection and action, spoken between self:other (*ibid*:68). Reflexive action disrupts speech and action between self:other and aids the deconstruction and continual reconstruction of *who* we are in the ethical relation self:other.

Curriculum as revolutionary reflexive action can embrace the re-imagination of self:other. Within intra-dialogic curriculum spaces teacher:child can reclaim the revolutionary capacity of curriculum and transform self, self:other, education and society.

The construction of the moral self in responsibility *for* self:other, however, remains a personal choice. Self and an other may choose not to be responsible *for* self:other. Taking a view of personal moral responsibility as defined by Bauman (1994:78), I would argue that any choice made by an other not to be responsible remains irrelevant when self chooses responsibility *for* self:other. Responsibility *for* self:other disrupts knowledge about self:other, rules and codes of conduct concerning self:other, and reconstructs knowing and being with self:other. Choosing responsibility *for* self:other implies the quest to start a-new and the hope of continually revolutionising self:other. This is aptly articulated by the following words of Nelson Mandela (2010:i): “Never forget that a saint is a sinner who keeps on trying”.

POST-SCRIPT

All knowledge construction begins with asking (un)answerable questions (Arendt, 1990:99). The following questions are some of the many my promoter Prof P Du Preez have posed during this journey.

1. Why do you sometimes seem to avoid addressing power-relations in your arguments?

Power is a complex, multilayered and multidimensional topic. Power is also, in my view, continually reconstituted despite efforts to balance power relations. Bauman (1994:228) concludes that, “ever anew, with each shift in the balance of power, the spectre of inhumanity returns from its exile.” I therefore focus my exploration concerning power on understanding the origin and influence of (re)constructed power, such as categorisation on the relation self:other, rather than addressing power-relations as such. Categorising self:other by *what* they are, creates spaces of power, inequality, resistance and influence identity construction (Crenshaw, 1991:1297).

2. What would you describe as your contribution to the social justice project in South Africa?

Jansen (2009:264) argues that the disruption of embedded knowledge concerning self:other should be “critically engaged as a matter of social justice.” Knowledge *about* self:other directly influences the construction and the (im)possible re-imagination of self:other. Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces accommodate the continual (re)construction of the moral self and the disruption of *what* we know of self:other. A re-imagination of the relation self:other rooted in human rights values will follow from the dialogic revolutions sparked by disruption in intra-dialogic curriculum spaces.

3. You argue for individuation in the relation self:other, how would you justify this argument within the discourse of ‘ubuntu’?

Individuation is a manifestation of human difference. It is not premised on self-interest or individualisation but on unique confessions of equal difference within the relation self:other rooted in human rights values. When self confesses autobiography within the relation self:other and in spaces of togetherness, self individuates him/herself as *someone*: a dignified, unique and irreplaceable equal partner in the relation self:other.

Arendt (1958:180-181) regards the individuating of *who* someone is, as essential to the realisation of human dignity.

The African philosophy of *ubuntu* relates to human interconnectedness and the structuring of social relations. Ramphele (in Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004: 548) points to the similarity between *ubuntu* and many other humanist philosophical approaches. Individuation is only possible within the relation self:other (Arendt, 1958:180). I would thus regard the emphasis on human interconnectedness and the importance of ethical social relations advocated for in an *ubuntu* frame of reference as relevant to any society and identity construction. In the light of Arendt's (*ibid*:180-181) conceptualisation of identity construction, I however pose that the individuation of self, as singular in equality of difference, within the relation self:other remains crucial to the realisation of freedom, human dignity and equality.

4. Why do you think the language of Hannah Arendt is still relevant for theorising education today?

Jansen (2011:41) laments, "desperation is an emotion I seldom feel, except in relation to education." Hannah Arendt, although exploring the dehumanising effects of inhumane ideologies such as totalitarianism, remains optimistic about the human capacity to start a-new. After exploring the effects of totalitarianism on humans, she concludes:

But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only 'message' which the end can never produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man [sic].

(Arendt, 1966:479)

Arendt (1966:479; *cf.* Maier-Katkin, 2010:14) argues that the hope and freedom of humanity remains possible in continual new beginnings constructed between self:other. Hannah Arendt has taught me that in a post-conflict context, such as South Africa, the promise of new beginnings makes the continual re-imagination of self:other possible. In my view, the hope of continual revolutionary new beginnings should be the essence of the post-apartheid curriculum.

5. Arendt has been criticised for idealising the Greek society. How did you experience this critique and how did you transcend her narrow use of the metaphors of the Greek society?

Arendt has been criticised, even by some of her supporters such as Pitkin (1981) and Canovan (1980), for 'idealising' the ancient Greek society. Pitkin (1981:335-336) points to Arendt's description of women, labourers and the poor in the *Human Condition* (1958) and in *On Revolution* (1965) as elitist and dehumanising: denying them participation in the public sphere and the possibility of freedom, because of their attachment to a life of necessity.

Referencing Tsao (2002:98), I will argue that Arendt's preoccupation with the ancient Greek society forms part of her larger argument regarding human activities and political action. Arendt (1958:198) regards the *polis* as a metaphorical space of speech and action between humans "no matter where they happen to be". Although Arendt (*ibid*:199) argues that all humans are capable of word and deed in spaces of appearance, she concedes that many humans such as labourers, barbarians, women, slaves and the poor were/are excluded from spaces of appearance. In my view, she thus implies that exclusion from spaces of appearance is not related to any human (in)capacity for speech and action but due to the social categorising of humans defining them by *what* they are and excluding them from free participation in spaces of appearance. Arendt (*ibid*:199) argues that humans should transcend *what* they are defined by and, in spaces of appearance, confess *who* they are.

I find this view problematic, because if humans are excluded from spaces of appearance (Arendt, 1958:198) in which they can freely speak and act, how would it be possible for them to transcend *what* they are and define themselves by *who* they are? Categorisation humans by *what* they are assumed to be, is not inherent to the human condition but is socially constructed. Exclusive spaces of appearance, are thus related to acts of power and ruling. In order for spaces of appearance to be inclusive, categories of *what* we are assumed to be, should be disrupted and deconstructed.

The *polis* as a metaphor for (exclusionary) spaces of appearance between humans, limits the capacity of self:other to individuate themselves as *who* they are and (re)constitute the ethical relation self:other. The defining of *who* we are and the construction of the ethical relation self:other depend on inclusive spaces of togetherness premised on equality of difference. Acknowledging the exclusionary consequences of

categorisation (as Arendt does) is not enough. We need to actively disrupt categorisation and intentionally construct inclusive spaces of togetherness.

6. Do you consider Arendt's conceptualisation of identity construction as dependant on the validation of the other?

The ancient understanding of the public realm was that it was reserved for individuality (Arendt, 1958:41; Pitkin, 1981:332). The *polis* or public realm was characterised by a quest for the validation of individual deeds and accomplishments by members of the polis (Arendt, 1958:41). Speech and action, in the *polis* were thus a quest for glory and validation of uniqueness (Pitkin, 1981:332). One could conclude from this (and referenced to the conception held by some scholars that Arendt idealises Greek society) that Arendt's conception of identity construction is dependent on validation from others. Bonnett (2009:358) argues that the conceptualisation of identity and identity construction by Arendt "sees us constantly entering the world by the grace of others who give us meaning."

In *Philosophy and Politics*, however, Arendt (1990) explores and explains her conception of human plurality and identity construction. Human plurality, Arendt (1990:86) explains, as "I do not live only with others, as one, but also with myself." Arendt (*ibid*:85) describes the dialogue inherent in human plurality, aiding identity construction as characterised by truthfulness and constructed from individual experiences (*ibid*:87). Identity construction, confessing *who* self is, happens between self:other, is constructed from personal life experiences, and is confessed truthfully between self:other.

I therefore conclude that Arendt's conception of identity construction relies on the truthfulness of self, the dialogue between self as two-in-one (*ibid*:85) and therefore cannot be validated or be dependent on the validation from others. Identity construction, however, remains dependent on the continual (re)construction of the relation self:other as a manifestation of human plurality in which it is expected that self will confess *doxa* truthfully and construct identity (*ibid*:85).

7. What do you consider the limitations of your theory?

Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces are premised on an ethical perspective to curriculum conceptualisation. I regard intra-dialogic spaces as continually (re)constructed between teacher:child, as open, fluxing, multilayered and complex. Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces would thus be very difficult to implement within a technical or critical perspective to curriculum, such as the post-apartheid curriculum. The narrative explored by Du

Preez (2009) in 3.8, however, illustrates that intra-dialogic curriculum spaces can be constructed within a market-orientated environment.

Intra-dialogic curriculum spaces furthermore depend on the truthful confessions of self:other in spaces of togetherness. The truthful confession of *doxa* remains a choice and requires courage (Arendt, 1958:186; Jansen, 2009:275). An other might choose not to engage in intra-dialogue or to be deceitful during intra-dialogue. The choice made by an other concerning responsibility, however, remains irrelevant in the responsibility of self *for* self:other (Bauman, 1994:78). I would argue that the re-imagination of self:other is a continual revolutionary process which does not rely on coercion or acts of power. An other is free to choose not to take part in intra-dialogue. Arendt (1960:45) argues: “no single event can ever once and for all deliver and save a man [*sic*], a nation, or mankind [*sic*].”

8. What do you consider your contribution?

I consider my contribution towards curriculum conceptualisation in a post-conflict context as related to the conceptualisation of intra-dialogue and spaces of togetherness. Ruiz (2004) and many other scholars have explored the ethical relation teacher:child as the origin of educational. The notion of dialogic spaces in curriculum is also not new. It has been extensively explored by global and local scholars such as Jansen (2009, 2011a) and Du Preez (2009, 2011, 2012a). The importance of deconstructing *what* we know of self:other in curriculum spaces has been emphasised by Cary (2006). My contribution to this inquiry is in the conceptualisation of *how* we come to know self:other and *how* we deconstruct and re-construct *what* we know of self:other in curriculum spaces.

How we come to know self:other is possible by means of intra-dialogue in spaces of togetherness in which self:other individuate him/herself and continually revolutionise *what* we know of self:other, human rights values, becoming and curriculum in the consciousness of responsibility *for* self:other. My conceptualisation is premised on the equal difference of self:other in a shared humanity, rendering disruption and dialogic revolutions inevitable. Disruption and dialogic revolutions, however, have consequences and these consequences are mediated and stabilised by the ethical nature of the relation self:other.

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PRAYER BEFORE BIRTH

Louis MacNeice (1944)

I am not yet born; O hear me

Let not the bloodsucking bat or rat or the stoat or the club-
footed ghoul come near me.

I am not yet born; console me.

I fear that the human race may with tall walls wall me,
With strong drugs dope me, with wise lies lure me,
On black racks rack me, in blood-baths roll me.

I am not yet born; provide me

With water to dandle me, grass to grow for me, trees to talk
To me, sky to sing to me, birds and white light
in the back of my mind to guide me.

I am not yet born; forgive me

For the sins that in me the world shall commit, my words
When they speak me, my thoughts when they think me,
My treason when they murder by means of my
hands, my death when they live me.

I am not yet born; rehearse me

In the parts I must play and the cues I must take when
Old men lecture me, bureaucrats hector me, mountains
frown at me, lovers laugh at me, the white

waves call me to folly and the desert calls
 me to doom and the beggar refuses
 my gift and my children curse me.

I am not yet born; O hear me,
 Let not the man who is beast or who thinks he is God
 Come near me.

I am not yet born; O fill me
 With strength against those who would freeze my
 humanity, would dragoon me into lethal automaton,
 Would make me a cog in a machine, a thing with
 One face, a thing, and against all those
 who would dissipate my entirety, would
 blow me like thistledown hither and
 thither or hither and thither
 like water held in the
 hand would spill me.

Let them not make me a stone and let me not spill me.

Otherwise kill me.

LANGUAGE EDITING CERTIFICATE

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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to attest that I have edited the language of J.A. Becker's dissertation, "Curriculum and intra-dialogic spaces: consciousness and becoming in identity construction based on human rights values"



(Dr) Elaine Ridge

Freelance Editor and Translator

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