A conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state

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Declaration of Authorship

I declare that this dissertation, entitled A conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state, and the work presented in it is my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly while in candidature for a research degree at the North-West University.

2. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed.

3. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this dissertation is entirely my own work.

Wynand Neethling Greffrath

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And, most significantly, Oscar and Anna-Marie, for whom my thankfulness can hardly be expressed. In my experience, the words of Horace still ring true:

DOS EST MAGNA PARENTIVM VIRTVS

The virtue of parents is a great endowment
Summary

In recent decades, the phenomenon of post-colonial state dysfunction has received increased attention, from both popular and academic perspectives. In a political world order where the existence of states are assumed as fundamentally normal, and in fact necessary for the maintenance of the international status quo, the increasing tendency for certain states of the developing world to succumb to dysfunction is viewed with some alarm. Such instances of state dysfunction have been variously and inconsistently described as failed states, weak states, collapsed states, et cetera. The aforementioned terms are currently in widespread use with the media, as well as academia.

This study demonstrates that hitherto, there has been scant scholarly attention devoted to the theoretical conceptualisation and definition of this phenomenon, which it terms the dysfunctional state – thereby dispensing with the manifold confusing terms noted in the literature, for example, failed states. Building upon a thorough and clear exposition of the meta-scientific assumptions regarding the nature and functions of science, particularly in the application of this study, the concept of state is reconstructed. This serves as the orienting feature in the theoretical landscape of state dysfunction, from which the deviant characteristics of dysfunctional states may be juxtaposed with the attributes of the ideal-typical state.

The aberrant characteristics of dysfunctional states are analysed from the works of three influential scholars, namely Joel S. Migdal, Robert H. Jackson, and Samuel P. Huntington. The insights of each author, in the guise of the scientific constructs they employ, are subsequently reconstructed, interpreted, and evaluated, whilst consistently invoking the tenets of the ideal-typical statehood in a methodologically uniform manner. What results from this process is a conceptualisation (i.e. the application of scientific constructs in the investigation of a phenomenon) of the dysfunctional state, which is subsequently presented in the form of a theoretical definitional statement.
Opsomming

Die fenomeen van post-koloniale staatsverval het met verloop van die afgelope twee dekades aansienlike aandag geniet, vanuit beide akademiese en ander oorde. In 'n politieke wêreldorde waar die bestaan van state as fundamentele aanname gehandhaaf word, en dit inderdaad noodsaaklik is vir die behoud van die internasionale status quo, is die toenemende tendens van state in die ontwikkelende wêreld se beswyking tot ernstige disfunksie dus rede tot kommer. Die voorkoms van sodanige disfunksie word tans inkonsekwent deur verskeie terme beskryf, onder andere mislukte state, swak state, en ingetuimelde state. Die bogenoemde terminologie word tans algemeen deur die media en akademici aangewend.

Die studie voer aan dat daar, tot op hede, weinig deurdagte aandag geskenk is aan die teoretiese konseptualisering en definiëring van hierdie fenomeen, wat vir die doeleindes van dié ondersoek beskryf word as die disfunsionele staat – wat gevolglik die verwarring rondom uiteenlopende terminologie uitskakel. Na 'n deeglike uiteensetting van die meta-teoretiese aannames rakende die aard en funksies van die wetenskap, word die staatskonsep gerekonstrueer. Hierdie staatskonsep dien as 'n verwysingspunt, waarvolgens die abnormale kenmerke van die disfunsionele staat gekontrasteer kan word met dié van 'n ideaaltipe.

Die afwykende eienskappe van disfunsionele state word vanuit drie bydraes geanalyser, naamlik die van Joel S. Migdal, Robert H. Jackson, en Samuel P. Huntington. Die insigte van elk van die drie skrywers (soos verpak in die onderskeie wetenskaplike konstrukte wat elk gebruik) word gevolglik gerekonstrueer, geïnterpreteer, en geevalueer aan die hand van die kenmerke van die ideaal-tipiese staat op 'n metodologies konsekwente wyse. Die eindprodukt van hierdie proses is 'n konseptualisering (i.e., die toepassing van wetenskaplike konstrukte in die bestudering van 'n fenomeen) van die disfunsionele staat, wat uiteindelik vertolk word in die vorm van 'n teoretiese definitie-stelling.
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Bibliography
Chapter 1
Introducing the theme of state dysfunction

1. Introduction

Few disciplines in the scientific realm are privileged to host a significant nexus between the spheres of esoteric academia and popular consciousness. For most people the world of physicists, mathematicians, sociologists, or anthropologists remain distant and inaccessible, largely because they have no familiar experience with which to relate to these disciplines. Political science, on the other hand (whilst possessing a rich tradition of complex scholarly thought) is an academic discipline with tangible connections to the everyday world. Political science is reflected in the casting of a ballot during a local election, or the televised uprising that topples a protracted dictatorship. However, political science is perhaps most frequently packaged for the everyman in the form of the state. Stirring anthems, proud flags, splendid capitals, maps, wars, sporting rivalries, and even number plates are all small representations that together constitute the concept of statehood in popular consciousness. The extensive discussion that follows demonstrates the extent to which a world without states is almost inconceivable, and how the few places where states have ceased to exist bear witness to overwhelming dysfunction and chaos. During the last two decades in particular, these hellish places have regularly been splashed on the front pages of newspapers or flashed across television screens. Khaki-clad reporters telling stories of genocide, civil war, famine and insurgency have mostly done so from backdrops where states have practically ceased to exist, or are incapable of regulating life within their borders. The media has subsequently come to label such places as failed, weak, and collapsed states – in other words, dysfunctional states.

Aside from their role in selling newspapers, dysfunctional states also represent a phenomenon that merits thorough scholarly investigation. The discipline of political science has in large part evolved with the concept of statehood (from Plato to NATO as the saying goes) and as such, there is a large body of knowledge that has gradually developed surrounding the state. Subsequently, any study focusing on state
dysfunction is fortunate to have a strong foundation of knowledge upon which to call. However, academics researching weak and failed states have tended to overlook this rich theoretical tradition, instead opting for predominantly quantitative methodologies. Such studies have proliferated during the first few years of the millennium, each with their own set of ‘indicators’, aiming to ‘forecast patterns’ of state failure\(^1\). Whilst these projects undoubtedly have their merits, qualitative approaches to studying state dysfunction have been largely neglected (Carment, 2003:408-409)\(^2\).

This dissertation aims to contribute toward the rectification of this quantitative bias, by evaluating and analysing state dysfunction from sources of political theory, rather than political data. The primary goal of this study is to arrive at a conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state through the application of scientific constructs. As noted previously, a wealth of knowledge has accrued through centuries of scholarly work on the concept of the state. Similarly, much has been written on the symptoms of the weak and failed state, whether it be corruption, coup d’états, insurgency, warlords, civil war, or revolution. Methodologically, this study invokes these two opposites (the ideal-typical state and the ‘broken’ state) to produce an account and conceptualisation of state dysfunction.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to orientate the reader in terms of this study. The background and relevance of the theme is elaborated upon in the next section, which introduces the problem of contemporary state failure. Subsequently, the notion of a failed state as a dysfunctional state is explored, which also represents an important paradigmatic departure point for this study. A concise literature survey is then presented, tracing the chronological development of contemporary failed state literature, from Helman and Ratner’s (1992) article in Foreign Policy to the most recent contributions in the field. Subsequently, a problem statement and central theoretical statement are posited, which are then delineated into various research objectives and research questions. Following this, the methodology and procedures employed in this study are described, in addition to introducing the three main contributions upon which the eventual conceptualisation of state dysfunction is based. Finally, the subsequent

\(^1\) Most notable in this quantitative tradition is the annual Failed States Index (FSI, 2011) compiled by the Fund For Peace, an independent non-profit research organization. Many recent publications on state dysfunction also employ quantitative methodologies considerably more complex than that of the FSI – see, for example, Maedl, Haere & Odenwald (2011); Buenger & Bethke (2010); Starr (2009); Bates (2008); Popp et al. (2006).

\(^2\) Carment (2003) specifically comments on the abundance of quantitative “contending analytical approaches” and their perceived ineffectiveness.
chapters of this dissertation are briefly outlined in the form of a chapter division overview.

2. **Background and relevance**

Since the inception of sovereign statehood in 1648, following the treaty of Westphalia, the state has become the standard ‘unit of analysis’ in contemporary political science. Accordingly, political scientists have accepted the normalcy of states as the fundamental theoretical point of departure of their discipline (Doornbos, 2005:172). Until very recently, it seemed as though the orthodoxy of a geographical world divided into states would indeed withstand the test of time, as the notion of independent sovereign statehood was eagerly embraced, even by former subjects of colonialism, who either through means of diplomacy or violent struggle attained national independence according to the doctrine of self-determination. However, since the second wave of democratisation it has become apparent that not all societies offer fertile soil for the growth of Western-paradigm sovereign states (Bates, 2008; Huntington, 1996a; Jackson, 1993; Migdal, 1988). Some have argued that the dominance of the Clausewitzian-Westphalian nation-state in history has been tenuous at best, even in Europe – the cradle of contemporary nation-statehood (Cantir & Schrodt, 2010:2). Even though the post World War II period saw a significant growth in the number of states in the world, since the 1990s an increasing number of these states have become dysfunctional, to the extent that they may be considered to have failed in the fulfilment of their primary functions. In 1977, Hedley Bull (*The Anarchical Society*) argued that the international world order would gradually undergo a transformation from the Westphalian norm to a condition of ‘new-medievalism’, in which the nation-state is augmented, perhaps even supplanted by other non-state actors: “If modern states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authorities, and on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-medieval form of universal political order might be said to have emerged” (Bull, 1977:246).

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3 Refers to the emergence of democracies in the period following Allied victory in World War II (Huntington, 1991).

4 Clausewitzian in the sense that states legitimately use violence against each other through professional militaries, supported by, and in service of the state; Westphalian in the sense that the dominant actors in the international system are sovereign, territorial nation-states exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their borders (Cantir & Schrodt, 2010:1).
Bull’s description of neo-medievalism bears an undeniable resemblance to what one might encounter when surveying many states in the developing world, especially in Africa. In these territories the notion of conventional statehood is distinctly subordinate to other forms of indigenous, non-state (and sometimes anti-state) control, culminating in various degrees of state dysfunction, and ultimately, state failure (see, for example, *Warlord Politics and African States* (1998) by William Reno).

The relevance of this study is found in two domains: practical and theoretical. In a practical sense, one may be readily convinced of the relevance of investigating the phenomenon of dysfunctional states. The international media, which are partly to blame for the inconsistent usage of the weak/failed state concepts, have latched onto these terms at least partly for sensationalist purposes. The term ‘failed state’ in media usage has developed into a concept with which the reader/viewer associates disturbing images of violence, genocide, civil war, malnutrition, and varying degrees of hell-on-earth. As such, the term has evolved into a concept, with which emotive and disturbing imagery and narratives have been connoted (Rotberg, 2002:89). The emotive and normatively ‘wrong’ nature of these descriptions and images, and the occurrences they depict, compel humans to act. As such, the injustice and inhumanity that have come to be associated with the failed state concept has inspired an urgency of action from Western institutions (scholars, think tanks, NGOs, development agencies, governments, etc.) on an unprecedented scale. Considering this, one would hardly be able to argue that the empirical phenomenon of state dysfunction is not relevant. Any activity (academic or otherwise) that aims to alleviate the suffering of suffering individuals is surely relevant, and the study of failing states has thus assumed a central role in the international humanitarian sphere (Clarke & Herbst, 1996:71).

More recently, the weak/failed state concept has also become (in the popular conscience at least) intertwined with the anti-terrorism agenda. From a Western position (exemplified by the USA), this has injected greater urgency and relevance into understanding dysfunctional states (see, for example, Starr, 2009:72; Stanislawski, 2008:366-369; Piazza, 2008; Rotberg, 2002). These states, such as Afghanistan, are now seen as havens for the recruitment and harbouring of terrorists, since such states are often characterised by porous borders, lack of central government and security apparatus, and large swathes of territory over which no state control is exercised. The political environment in a dysfunctional state allows warlords to gain power based on

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5 As an example, see Dickinson’s (2011) photographic essay entitled: *Postcards from Hell.*
personal control of the gun, rather than law-based and regulated political competition (Lezhnev, 2006:7). Such territories are also referred to as ‘black spots’, areas that fall outside the ambit of effective state control, but have the potential to pose a significant challenge to the modern state and its institutions (Bunker & Sullivan, 2003:35). Thus, the study of the dysfunctional state has also become a crucial theme in the global security environment, which prompted the now famous statement in the US National Security Strategy document, subsequently quoted in Foreign Policy (2005:1): “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”

In addition to the problematic nature of the dysfunctional state in the spheres of humanitarian intervention and global security, from whence its relevancy, the phenomenon also represents a theoretical conundrum. Since the emergence of political science as an autonomous social-scientific discipline, the state has assumed a central role in the study of society and power. Theorists from Hobbes to Marx grappled with issues surrounding its emergence and hegemony. Consider any undergraduate political science textbook, and most likely the second question it aims to answers will be: What is the state? (The first usually being: What is politics?). States have been accepted as ‘normal’ in a fundamental sense, and scholarly perspectives commonly took this ‘normalcy’ as a paradigmatic point of departure (Doornbos, 2005:172). The emergence and proliferation of dysfunctional states in the post-colonial era has challenged this long-accepted ‘norm’ of statehood and, since the phenomenon has called into question conventional academic beliefs and assumptions, it merits thorough theoretical scrutiny. Since the early 1990s, when contemporary state failure first began to feature on the foreign policy radar, the spectrum of enquiry steadily expanded. However, the field of study is dissimilar to many others in the discipline of political science. Taking into account the above-mentioned security and humanitarian dilemmas that dysfunctional states present, many governmental and non-governmental role-players have entered the field, in addition to traditional avenues of scholarly enquiry. Such a diverse variety of role-players and researchers each contribute their own paradigms, agendas, and expected outcomes to the study of the phenomenon, and this is clearly exhibited through the contemporary literature dealing with the subject.
3. Dysfunction

Before discussing the various influential accounts and descriptions of state failure, it is prudent to commence with the clarification of a basic assumption from which this study is conducted. Implicit in the concept of the failed state is the notion of deviation from a norm – it is therefore a state that has ceased to operate in accordance with accepted norms, a state that cannot achieve particular goals, or a state that is found to be wanting or insufficient in certain attributes. Most writers and thinkers on the subject would agree on this, and it is therefore adopted as a point of departure for this study. However, two points of contention emerge from this. Firstly, the nature of this failure, deficiency, deviation or dysfunction is disputed. Secondly, the quantification of the above-mentioned is problematic. The former of these shortcomings has lead to the meaningfulness of the concept being compromised in the usage of the popular media and science. Virtually every publication on the subject of state failure has arrived at unique and idiosyncratic symptoms of state deficiency, each of which is described by an imaginative and original label (Englebert, 1997:768).

As a result, literature on the subject abounds with descriptions of fragile, weak, troubled, shadow, soft, twilight, hollow, para, quasi, failing, failed, and collapsed states. Whilst the authors that coined these evocative descriptors might feel they have ‘contributed’ to the debate, they have in reality only contributed to the obfuscation of a very relevant theoretical and practical issue. As discussed in the preceding section, scholars, research foundations and think tanks have rushed to conduct research on failed states, resulting in a proliferation of multiple, divergent, and poorly defined applications of the term (Call, 2008:1491). It is of course true that not all states exhibit dysfunction to the same degree, necessitating a continuum of lesser and greater descriptors to reflect this fact. Some states might be nothing but a name on a map, and would thus have failed or collapsed, whilst others maintain a semblance of statehood, and could conceivably be referred to as weak or fragile states. Nevertheless, this dissertation is concerned primarily with conceptualising the general nature of state (dys)function. Hence, this study moves from the assumption that one extreme of the spectrum is occupied by the ideal-typical Weberian notion of statehood, and the other extreme by its antithesis, or antitype, which is a terminally dysfunctional state. Detailing
the gradients of dysfunction between those poles is not the primary goal of this study, although it certainly provides fertile ground for future academic investigation. The relationship between the various concepts of state and state dysfunction is illustrated below:

*Figure 1: Identifying the ambit of state dysfunction, as applied in this study*

(SOURCE: OWN CONSTRUCT)

From the above figure, it can thus be seen that this dissertation employs the term ‘state dysfunction’ to denote deviation from the Weberian norm, culminating in terminal state dysfunction⁶ that would represent the dissolution or destruction of a state.

The second problematic aspect regarding the issue of state dysfunction is its quantification. This problem is typified by the relentless pursuit of ‘measurable indicators of state failure’. Rotberg (2004:5-10) discusses various indicators by which state failure can be identified, such as:

- Civil wars characterised by enduring violence
- Disharmony between communities
- Loss of control over peripheral regions to outside groups
- Growth of criminal violence, including gangs, and trafficking of arms
- Cessation of functioning legislatures and judiciaries
- Informal privatisation of education, health and other social services
- Corruption
- Loss of legitimacy
- Declining per capita GDP, growth in smuggling, and devaluation of local currency, ultimately being supplanted by an external currency of value

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⁶ Terminal state dysfunction plausibly could be connoted with a failed or collapsed state, in common usage.
Rotberg (2004) does not indicate whether a state has failed if all of these indicators occur, or only a selection - or phrased as a question: where is the threshold of state failure?\footnote{Finding a satisfactory answer to this question is unlikely; hence this study adopts the more inclusive descriptor of state dysfunction.} Another question can be raised regarding the relative weighting of these separate indicators in determining state failure: does the loss of legitimacy by a regime represent the same nature dysfunction compared to a state embroiled in a decade-long civil war or ruthless genocide? It is questions such as these that the quantitative, indicator-driven school of research fail to answer, or choose to ignore in their analyses of state dysfunction. Another well-known example is that of the Failed States Index (FSI, 2011), published annually by the Fund for Peace. The Index grades every state from 1 to 10 according to a set of twelve indicators, namely:

1. Mounting demographic pressures
2. Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons
3. Vengeance-seeking group grievance
4. Chronic and sustained human flight
5. Uneven economic development
6. Poverty and sharp or severe economic decline
7. Legitimacy of the state
8. Progressive deterioration of public services
9. Violation of human rights and rule of law
10. Security apparatus
11. Rise of factionalised elites
12. Intervention of external actors

This exhaustive list of indicators reflects an attempt at thorough measurement, and is a valuable tool that could complement a proper conceptualisation of state dysfunction. However, the Index does not provide a satisfactory explanation or definition of the phenomenon. Since it is a collection of indicators, it merely indicates, and does not explain. Virtually every source currently available on the subject of state failure is more than willing to offer the reader a particular permutation of indicators or circumstances, which ‘measure’ or predict state failure. None of these sources offers a comprehensive, theoretically grounded conceptualisation of the phenomenon they are measuring, predicting, and relentlessly indicating. The most elaborate definitions of a failed state consist of one-sentence statements in an introductory paragraph, usually followed by
chapter upon chapter of case studies or empirical verification. Such endeavours are doomed to be irrelevant and impotent, unless based upon a theoretically grounded and thorough conceptualisation of the particular phenomenon at hand. In this regard, Easton (1969:1052) notes that “Substance must precede technique...it is more important to be relevant and meaningful for contemporary urgent social problems than to be sophisticated in the tools of investigation.”

It is the shortage of relevance and meaningfulness, referred to above, which this dissertation aims to supplement by firstly casting a broad conceptual net over the phenomenon of state dysfunction - of which state failure is but one manifestation.

4. Development and contributions

The Coming Anarchy (Kaplan, 1994) is possibly the first and most poignant piece of writing on the broad theme of state dysfunction. Although not a scholarly publication, Kaplan’s article recounts his travels through West Africa during the mid-1990s, combined with a set of well researched scenario predictions. State failure is described evocatively in all but name, as circumstances in states such as Sierra Leone and Liberia are detailed: “Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring in West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world, the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war” (Kaplan, 1994:48).

Kaplan’s account has gained much acclaim since it was first published, as much of his descriptions of squalor in the developing world persist, and the increasing likelihood that his chilling predictions of anarchy will come to fruition. However, the first prominent scholarly publication on contemporary state failure appeared in 1992, in Foreign Policy. In this article, Helman and Ratner (1992) introduce the subject as follows: “From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, from Somalia, Sudan, and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community” (Helman & Ratner, 1992:3).

The piece continues with a contextualisation of a post-cold war global order, in which post-colonial states no longer enjoy the largely artificial prosperity that resulted from American or Soviet aid during the cold war. The authors tentatively position the United
Nations as the logical organisation to intervene in these problematic states in the developing world, through means of conservatorship (Helman & Ratner, 1992:12). Ever since this very first publication on the subject, scholarship on the failed state has been focused on intervention and structural rehabilitation, prompted by the humanitarian urgency as discussed previously. Helman and Ratner state “As those states descend into violence and anarchy – imperilling their own citizens and threatening their neighbours through refugee flows, political instability, and random warfare – it is becoming clear that something must be done” (Helman & Ratner, 1992:3).

This extract sets the tone for all the literature that was to follow in dealing with state failure. The emphasis rests entirely on the assumption that ‘something must be done’, blind to the logic that a proper comprehension of the problem will lead to more potent solutions.

In 1995, a short yet influential introduction emerged on the subject of state dysfunction, authored by Ali Mazrui, entitled The Blood of Experience (1995). It provides the reader with the preeminent African scholar’s perspective on the post-colonial chaos that typified Africa since widespread independence was gained in the 1960s, later culminating in incidents of state dysfunction. Mazrui (1995) writes on the problematic nature of sovereign statehood in the post-colonial African context, “The question that has arisen lately, however, is whether real decolonisation is not the winning of formal independence, not the changing of the guard on independence day, the raising of new flags, or the singing of new anthems, but the collapse of the colonial state itself, the cruel and bloody disintegration of colonial structures” (Mazrui, 1995:28).

Mazrui (1995) continues to consider the question whether the process of liberation after decolonisation is only truly complete after all remnants of the former colonial state has been eradicated. He therefore equates state dysfunction in Africa as being symptomatic of the process of cathartic decolonisation: “Are Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, and Burundi experiencing the death throes of the old order? Is the colonial order being washed away with buckets of blood? Or are we witnessing the agonising birth pangs of a genuinely post-colonial order” (Mazrui, 1995:28).

Optimistic interpretations aside, what makes Mazrui’s (1995) discussion of state failure significant for the purposes of this study, is the basic question he poses, which other authors repeatedly take for granted: “In order to assess whether a state has failed, we must first identify the basic functions of the state” (Mazrui, 1995:28).
Mazrui identifies six crucial functions of the state, and continues to assess state performance in Africa according to these six functions. His contribution in this article is logical, lucid and coherent, despite the fact that he did not attempt to legitimise his analysis with reams of statistical data. It is a logical exposition because he returned to fundamental, existing knowledge within political science (the functions of the state) through which he conducted a concise, yet effective analysis of the ‘new’ phenomenon of state failure.

The first major scholarly compilation on state dysfunction also emerged in 1995, when a leading scholar of African politics, William Zartman, assembled a collection of essays around the theme, entitled Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Comprised of case studies and contextual essays, this publication represents the first significant academic work on acute state dysfunction (or state collapse, in Zartman’s idiom). Since its publication, Zartman’s (1995:1-11) definition of state collapse has been adopted and modified extensively by other authors. According to him, “State collapse is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new...For a period, the state itself, as a legitimate, functioning order, is gone” (Zartman, 1995:1).

Zartman also writes: “Collapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state ... state collapse is the breakdown of good governance, law and order” (Zartman, 1995:5-6).

Even though these definitions represent a useful point of departure for understanding state failure, they are lacking in thorough conceptualisation. Zartman does not elaborate further on his definition or conceptualisation of state failure, instead leaving the task to the authors of the respective essays, each of whom offer their own insights into the causes and quantitative indicators (once again) of the phenomenon. However, none of these contributions approaches a conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Zartman’s (1995) definition is also compromised by equating normative notion of ‘good governance’ with the maintenance of order. Collapsed States is also characterised by a strong focus on state reformation and intervention (or state building, as the endeavour has become popularly known). According to this approach, the emphasis falls on

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8 For a discussion of the myriad contested definitions and terms used to describe state dysfunction, see Kostovicova & Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009:2). The abundance of different definitions is also noted by Englebert (1997:768).

9 In this regard, see Chapter 6, below.
development, and the building of institutions that can generate and manage politico-economic policies and processes, resulting in stability. This focus enjoys the lion’s share of attention in virtually all works dealing with state failure. Whilst the urgency of timely intervention and the subsequent rebuilding of failed states quite understandably enjoys primacy in the body of literature, a proper conceptualisation of the role of institutions during state dysfunction remains lacking, since the institutions of state may be complicit in perpetuating dysfunction. State institutions are not necessarily passive victims in the throes of state dysfunction.

The acute relevancy of state dysfunction has prompted various role-players (aside from academia) to become involved in the field of study. During 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) oversaw the funding and establishment of the State Failure Task Force, later renamed the Political Instability Task Force (PITF)\textsuperscript{10}. This think tank is comprised of scholars and methodologists (notably led by Ted Gurr), assigned to assess and explain the vulnerability of states around the world regarding political instability and state failure. Since its establishment, the PITF has broadened its attention from the kind of severe state dysfunction (i.e. collapse) that befell Somalia and the former Zaire in the early 1990s to include the onset of general political instability defined by outbreaks of revolutionary or ethnic warfare, adverse regime change, and genocide. More recently, the Task Force has explored matters of governance raised by research through projects that measure state capacity and model democratic transitions (PITF, 2011). The PITF has produced four reports on political instability since 1995, dealing specifically with issues of wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides. From 2001, the Task Force began focusing attention on the relationship between failed states and international terrorist organisations. These research outputs represent a predominantly quantitative investigation of the causes and indicators of political instability, utilising cross-national data sets subsequent statistical analysis. The PITF’s most recent publication (Goldstone, \textit{et al.} 2010: 190-208) details the development of a quantitative model that reportedly forecasts the onset of political instability across different states. The PITF research over the last 15 years represents the most comprehensive collection of data on issues of political instability, in which state failure features prominently. Nonetheless, the almost exclusively quantitative character of this vast inventory of research does not provide a systematic theoretical conceptualisation of state dysfunction in general, or state failure in particular.

\textsuperscript{10}The PITF website can be viewed at - http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf.
Several other governmental and NGO think tanks researching political instability and state dysfunction have been established worldwide. In 2002, the World Bank established a Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) office, which aims to provide support to a large number of fragile and conflict-affected states. This support involves all sectors ranging from public administration, community development and infrastructure to combatant demobilization, health, education and social services (World Bank, 2011). The research produced by the LICUS initiative has focused mainly on the prevention of political conflict, and post-conflict intervention and support. Research initiatives include The Landmine Contamination, Casualties and Clearance Database (LC3D), The Armed Conflict and Location and Event Database (ACLED), and the Peace and Development Project. Similar research programmes are also currently being conducted at the Carnegie Corporation and the UK-based Overseas Development Institute. It would appear that the dominant themes in current failed state research is that of quantitative prediction (with the aim of early warning) and post-conflict intervention and development (state-building).

A more recent contribution of collected scholarly essays on state failure appeared in 2004 (edited by Robert Rotberg), entitled When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Rotberg, 2004). Rotberg has been a prominent figure in the study of failed states, having also edited the 2003 volume entitled State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, which had a distinct focus on the correlations between state failure and international terrorism. Rotberg’s (2004) definition of state failure is also characterised by a rather brief cause-effect description, with virtually no theoretical depth:

Nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose credibility, and the continuing nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens. (Rotberg, 2004:1)

Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. (Rotberg, 2004:5)

From these descriptions, a further distinction is drawn between weak states and collapsed states, as opposed to failed states. According to Rotberg:

Weak states (broadly, states in crisis) include a broad continuum of states ... Weak states typically harbour ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal
tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent. (Rotberg, 2004:4).

In addition, regarding collapsed states:

A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are obtained through private and ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. (Rotberg, 2004:9)

From these descriptions, it is assumed that Rotberg places state dysfunction on a continuum, ranging from weak, to failed (or failing), to collapsed. Compared to Zartman’s (1995) definition of state collapse, it would appear that ‘collapse’ as a label is associated with a status of terminal dysfunction. This creates conceptual confusion, since this would imply that failed states have failed, but are not collapsed. Surely a failed state represents a collapsed state, and vice versa? This type of terminological pluralism is unnecessary and baffling. Nonetheless, these definitions (Zartman’s and Rotberg’s being the most cited definition of state failure/collapse) do offer a point of departure in the quest to conceptualise state dysfunction writ-large. This point will be revisited after the discussion of the remaining important contributions to the field.

*When Things Fell Apart* (Bates, 2008) presents a stimulating distillation of the occurrence of state dysfunction in post-colonial Africa. Although this work relies in large part upon statistical and quantitative data (Bates being a prominent contributor to the PITF initiative), the author manages to depict effectively the circumstances in which states fail in Africa. The multidimensional role of violence assumes primacy in Bates’ interpretation of state dysfunction, both as governments lose their monopoly of legitimate violence, and as more powerful non-state challengers (so-called ‘specialists in violence’, commonly known as warlords) emerge to vie for power. Although an excellent discussion on the symptoms and causes contributing to state failure, *When Things Fell Apart* offers no satisfactory theoretically grounded descriptive conceptualisation of state dysfunction.

Martin Doornbos, in the introduction to his chapter in Burnell and Randall’s *Politics in the Developing World* (2005), presents an objective account of the current state of research on state failure. He underscores the point (closely connected with the

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11 Although this dissertation does not explicitly limit its conceptualisation of state dysfunction to an African context, many of the theoretical perspectives that follow are rooted in the continent.
problem statement of this dissertation) that in examining the incidence of state failure, two central themes predominate: one concerned with the search for causalities, and the other concerned with appropriate responses (Doornbos, 2005:171). These foci, which largely characterise the literature discussed above, provides no scope for ‘fitting’ state failure into theory (i.e. a conceptualisation of state dysfunction), since its concern is exclusively empirical, not theoretical. It is important that Doornbos also distinguishes between the concepts of state collapse, and state failure. Concerning state collapse, the author argues that the collapse of a state (which implies the absence of a state) does not necessarily equate to disorder (as Zartman’s definition posits), as other non-state actors or entities may provide order in such instances. Similarly, disorder has historically been a feature of certain societies where the state has remained intact, and such disorder has often occurred because of states. According to Doornbos (2005):

For definitional clarity, therefore, it is helpful to limit the notion of ‘state collapse’ to the kind of situation in which a functioning state system ceases to exist – whatever the situation might imply in terms of ‘order’. (Doornbos, 2005:174)

State collapse occurs at the final end of complex and conflict-ridden processes of deterioration, decline, and erosion of state functions. (Doornbos, 2005:176)

Taking into account the above definition of state collapse, Doornbos (2005) argues that “The term ‘state failure’ is more appropriate for situations of less than complete collapse” (Doornbos, 2005:174).

From his definitions, it would appear that Doornbos views state collapse as the termination of a state, after a period of state failure.

The body of literature surrounding themes of state dysfunction is continually expanding. The contributions mentioned above represent a general chronological progression of noted works on the subject, intended to illustrate the disparity in conceptualisation regarding state failure, weakness, and collapse, in addition to the predominantly quantitative approach to studying these topics. The purpose of this dissertation is to conduct a theoretical investigation into state dysfunction in general (which incorporates themes of weakness, failure, collapse etc. – see Figure 1) in order to achieve conceptual clarity regarding the phenomenon in general. From the discussion on the relevancy and deficiencies of research in the field of state dysfunction, a problem statement is subsequently constructed, which motivates the purpose of this study.

12 The issue of political order and its relation to state institutions is discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
5. Problem Statement

From the preceding literature review, certain conclusions must be noted. Firstly, the contemporary notion of the failed state first emerged in literature during the early 1990s. This would suggest that, although having its genesis in the years subsequent to decolonisation (specifically in Africa), the end of the Cold War accentuated this particular issue of state dysfunction in the developing world. In turn, this would suggest that the Cold War powers and their proxies artificially maintained (and in some cases undermined) state function. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this tenuous equilibrium ended, and state failure became a prominent concern to foreign policy practitioners and political scientists alike. The urgency and relevancy of this agenda was given further impetus after 11 September 2001, as links between international terror and state failure were hypothesised.

Secondly, weak, failing, failed or collapsed states are states experiencing varying degrees of dysfunction. This represents a general point of consensus in the literature on the subject, and a point of departure for this study as well. However, through a comparison of the various definitions and descriptions found in the literature, it can be seen that these various terms are not employed synonymously or consistently. At one extreme the terms of ‘collapsed state’ and ‘failed state’ are conceivably used to denote a state with no capacities or capabilities to perform its functions. States that approach this extreme, but retain some state capabilities, are described as ‘weak states’ or ‘failing states’. In order to eliminate potential terminological confusion, this dissertation employs the term state dysfunction in reference to any adverse deviation from an ideal state.

Thirdly, the body of literature discussed above exhibits a predominantly quantitative, empirical orientation, concerned with the indicators of state dysfunction, predicting instances of state failure, and formulating appropriate responses. Yet, as demonstrated, there exists a lack of proper theoretical conceptualisation of state dysfunction as phenomenon. The descriptions considered above exhibit various contending definitions, sometimes overlapping in meaning, often too brief to constitute an acceptable theoretical basis for enquiry. This study aims to supplement the theoretical deficiency in the field of study concerned with state dysfunction.
Therefore, noting the acute relevance of the subject of state dysfunction, both in theory and practice, and further noting the bias towards empirical investigation of instances of state dysfunction, which has resulted in a lack of theoretical conceptualisation of weak, failed and collapsed states, the following problem statement will serve to guide this study: **an investigation to determine the theoretical content of an observable phenomenon, referred to as state dysfunction, through a process of conceptualisation, resulting in a sound conception of the dysfunctional state which may be consistently applied in theory and practice.**

The successful resolution of this research problem and the realisation of the posited outcome will depend upon the attainment of several key research objectives, discussed below.

### 6. Research objectives

The following progressive research objectives have been identified as central to addressing the research problem. The primary research objective of this dissertation is to:

6.1. **Arrive at a theoretical conceptualisation of state dysfunction through the application of scientific constructs.**

The attainment of the primary research objective will be facilitated by secondary research objectives, namely:

6.2. **The exposition of theoretical and meta-theoretical assumptions underlying the study.** This exercise will include the discussion of scientific constructs such as concepts, definitions, typologies, theories, and paradigms, employed in the process of conceptualisation. The outcome of this chapter will be the development of an analytic tool, to be employed in subsequent chapters of the study.

6.3. **Conceptualising the state as a point of departure.** Since this dissertation works on the assumption that state dysfunction represents a deviation from an ideal-type, it is necessary to elucidate assumptions regarding the state that underpin this investigation. Whereas the Weberian notion of statehood represents the *ideal-type* of the state, the increasing state dysfunction represents its *antitype*. 


6.4. A reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of prominent, inter-paradigmatic contributions dealing with the nature of deviant statehood (as a departure from the Weberian ideal-type) by authors Samuel P. Huntington, Robert H. Jackson, and Joel S. Migdal. This is fully discussed under Methods and Procedures, below.

6.5. Synthesising and integrating the theoretical contributions of the above-mentioned authors regarding state dysfunction, against the attributes of the Weberian ideal-type employing applicable scientific constructs, culminating in a conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state.

These research goals will be attained by answering related research questions.

7. Research questions

The following research questions are extrapolated from the research objectives listed above:

7.1. The primary research question is an enquiry as to what constitutes a theoretically sound conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state.

In pursuance of the primary research question, the following secondary research questions will be considered:

7.2. What are the theoretical and meta-theoretical assumptions that underlie this study?

7.3. Since state dysfunction represents a deviation from functionality, what are the attributes of the ideal-typical state?

7.4. What theoretical insights into dysfunctional, deviant and abnormal state circumstances may be obtained from inter-paradigmatic contributions on the subject?

7.5. When relevant scientific constructs are synthesised and evaluated against the attributes of the ideal-typical state using an analytic tool developed for this purpose, what is the resulting theoretical nature of the dysfunctional state? (in other words, a conceptualisation of state dysfunction)
8. Central theoretical statement

The existing body of literature on the subject of state dysfunction exhibits a strong empirical character. Firstly, the literature is primarily concerned with formulating indicators for the prediction and identification of state failure. A second dominant focus is that of practical intervention to return stability to troubled states. Although these foci are justifiable, given the relevancy of state dysfunction as a phenomenon and the urgency of action it inspires, it has resulted in an acute lack of theoretical conceptualisation. Such a thorough conceptualisation of the phenomenon is required, firstly to eliminate ambiguity regarding the concept, and secondly, to inform better practical responses and policy, thereby benefitting both scholars and practitioners concerned with the investigation of the phenomenon of state dysfunction.

9. Method and procedures

Research was conducted utilising existing literature on the subject of state dysfunction. This lends the research an almost exclusively qualitative character. Since this dissertation does not move from the premise of testing a hypothesis, it cannot be considered correlational (in other words, requiring and understanding the relationship between two variables) nor explanatory (demonstrating that one variable causes a change in another variable) (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2006). Rather, it is classified as being exploratory and descriptive (being a conceptualisation). The proposed research will transverse three levels of theory, since it includes a meta-theoretical dimension (third-order theory), a second-order theoretical analysis, and concludes with a conceptualisation which may be applied in the political sphere (first-order theory).

The theoretical and conceptual deficiencies of existing literature on the subject of state dysfunction have been demonstrated and discussed previously. It is clear that no unanimous, clear, useful or unambiguous concept of the dysfunctional state (including its constituent variations) is found in the literature. As such, this study will employ broader perspectives than those represented in the current body of literature surrounding state dysfunction. Influential works on state dysfunction, abnormality and deviance will be employed (providing a broad contextualisation), from which selected relevant scientific constructs will be identified and applied in the conceptualisation of
state dysfunction. This will be achieved by defining the concept of state as a point of departure (in other words, the ideal-type) and comparing the selected contributions on state dysfunction with the attributes of the ideal-type. This will result in a systematic description of the attributes of: (a) an idealotypical state; (b) a dysfunctional state; and ultimately (c) a conceptualisation of state dysfunction.

Before proceeding to a brief outline of the selected authors and contributions to be reconstructed, interpreted and evaluated, it must be reiterated that this study will incorporate an inter-paradigmatic approach to conceptualising the dysfunctional state. The selected authors thus represent a broad coherence in the focus of their subject matter but a divergence of paradigms and approaches. A key criterion in selecting the particular authors to be evaluated is their respective levels of analyses. Whilst Migdal (1988) employs a localised sociological/anthropological approach by focusing on networks, groups and individuals in society, Huntington (1968) chooses to analyse institutions and political order and stability on a broader level of analysis. On the other hand, Jackson (1993) adopts an international relations approach with a strong juridical perspective. As a result, a combination of these perspectives casts a broad theoretical net, covering issues in the entire hierarchy of state dysfunction – from the tribal chief to the United Nations. None of the works cited in the preceding literature review have demonstrated such scope, and it is anticipated that this cross-pollination of paradigmatic departure points and approaches will add a theoretical depth to the phenomenon being scrutinised, hitherto absent in any other study of this nature. The choice of authors is consequently motivated below, followed by a brief outline of their contributions employed in this study. Chapters 4 to 6 of this dissertation will offer an extensive reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of each contribution discussed below.

9.1 Joel S. Migdal

Joel Migdal has conducted some of the strongest research on deviant and dysfunctional states, particularly the role of non-state actors in society and how they contribute to, and maintain, state dysfunction (Elkus, 2009). His influential work entitled *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (1988), investigates the relation between states and the societies in which they rule. This work represents one of the most stimulating and thought-provoking

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13 See Chapter 2, Section 6.
evaluations of the state in the developing world (Goodwin, 1991:217; Stubbs, 1989:895) and is noted for its innovation in moving beyond the simple accounts of state dysfunction posited by modernisation and dependency theorists (Bradshaw, 1990:1061). Since its publication, the book has been noted as one of the most important additions to the body of literature on the state in the developing world (Orugun, 1991:672) and is therefore of acute relevance to a conceptualisation of state dysfunction.

The central problem statement in *Strong Societies and Weak States* is a frequently posed question, and one that is of particular relevance to this study: “Why have so many third world states been so ineffective in accomplishing what their leaders and others had so eagerly expected of them, while a few others have done so much better in developing capabilities in social planning, policy and action?” (Migdal, 1988:9).

Migdal argues that the answer to this question lies in the degree to which a state is able to exercise control over the society in such a manner that it can effect intended changes. The book develops, from this assumption, a strong focus on the nature and characteristics of societies, and how these societies, in turn shape states. The author uses this approach to illustrate that established networks or webs of social control within societies often counteract the activities of consolidating post-colonial states. Drawing upon the experience of states in the developing world, such as India, Egypt, Mexico and, in particular, Sierra Leone, the author effectively demonstrates the often-conflicting nature of rural and capital city politics, which manifests as a result of fragmented social control (Migdal, 1988:93). In such societies, newly created government bureaucracies often compete for legitimacy and influence with entrenched social arrangements and conventions, such as tribal authorities, ‘strongmen’, or in some cases, warlords. Migdal’s contribution is of value to this study, not only because of its quality and merit, but because it represents certain distinctive paradigmatic departure points, absent in many other works on the dysfunctional state in the developing world. Migdal rejects the oversimplification of modernisation theory and dependency theory in explaining the state dysfunction, focusing instead on societal considerations. According to Migdal, the complexity of societies cannot be meaningfully simplified to dichotomies such as the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’ (Migdal, 1988: xv). Instead, he argues, societies represent a melange of social organisations, which include ethnic groups, religious groups, villages, families, economic institutions, and the state. Therefore, the state represents but one actor among many others, that aim to exert social control in
society. In the first chapter of *Strong Societies and Weak States*, Migdal develops a model of state-society relations. This is followed by a case study of Sierra Leone (as an example of a weak state). Subsequent chapters focus on the impact of a conflicted environment on state and society, explaining how social conflict undermines states, leading to dysfunction. *Strong Societies and Weak States* remains a valuable and provocative contribution to the body of literature on the state and state dysfunction in the developing world, thereby justifying its inclusion in this study.

9.2 Robert H. Jackson

Robert H. Jackson’s *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (1993) largely redefined the notion of sovereignty as it is applied in the post-colonial era. The work is noted as a landmark of literature on the developing world (Harshe, 1995:90). At the time of its publication, certain commentators described the work as pessimistic (Pierre, 1991:182) and reactionary (Nardin, 1991:887); however, the central thesis of *Quasi-States* has since been vindicated by continued post-colonial state dysfunction and the work is frequently cited in studies assessing the nature of state sovereignty in the developing world.

State sovereignty is a peculiar concept. All modern states make claims to it, and thereby pretend to have equal status in a global system of states. It is therefore a crucial attribute of statehood, and a necessary qualification to be part of an international community. As with other aspects of statehood however, not all states share an equal measure of demonstrable sovereignty. This is especially true of dysfunctional states in the developing world. In such states, sovereign identities and capacities are always eroding and reconstituting, leaking and shifting in relation both to each other and to those dynamics of economic, technological and cultural life that make it so difficult to fix any claim to sovereign identity to an entity like the territorial state (Walker, 1992:804). In *Quasi-States*, Jackson demonstrates how the notion of sovereignty, as a state’s right to self-determination, has evolved and changed to represent the maintenance of colonially demarcated entities as independent states (Jackson, 1993:82). The author continues to provide an account of how states in the developing world were incorporated into the international system after decolonisation, and how a new type of sovereignty is maintained by that system. Jackson’s central thesis is that the

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14 Jackson’s concept of “quasi-states” is employed in many introductory and advanced books in the field of International Relations. Recent examples include Chandler (2010:47), Thomson (2010:177), Lake (2009:39), and Nexon (2009:58).
developing world consists of a new class of states, most born out of decolonisation, which manifestly lack the attributes and characteristics of statehood. Such states cannot successfully claim positive sovereignty, but rather a new form of post-colonial negative sovereignty that has emerged – largely unconcerned by the viability of these dysfunctional states (Jackson, 1993:1). Jackson’s notion of negative sovereignty therefore implies that instead of states in the developing world making good their own claims to sovereignty, it is the international community’s bestowal of sovereign rights that maintains and sustains ‘quasi states’. The author devotes attention to the nature of sovereignty, with particular focus on variations of sovereignty, decolonisation, development, human rights and international relations theory. Jackson has also authored various scholarly articles on the issue of sovereignty in the developing world, which are drawn upon in this dissertation where applicable.

9.3 Samuel P. Huntington

Of the three authors selected for this study, Samuel Huntington is likely the best known. His long career as a political scientist included copious research on political instability in the developing world, and he is considered one of the most influential figures in the discipline (Putnam, 1986:837). Notably, Francis Fukuyama commented that few thinkers in the discipline have been able to rival Huntington’s ability and insight (Fukuyama, 2006:xvii).

First published in 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies made a seminal contribution to the understanding of political instability and dysfunction in changing societies (Pei, 2009). Rapidly changing societies often exhibit marked increases in urbanisation, literacy and education, industrialisation and the expansion of the mass media. This process of modernisation undermines traditional political institutions whilst at the same time mobilising new groups into the political arena (Huntington, 1968:33). Huntington argues that unless sound political institutions are developed to mediate the impact of newly awakened political aspirations, the process of modernisation will give rise to growing instability. Such instability will eventually manifest in political decay: cycles of unrest marked by military intervention, strikes and a tug-of-war for power between contending groups, as institutions are unable to accommodate the nature and extent of political activity (Huntington, 1968:4). As such, Political Order in Changing Societies can be considered a valuable contribution to the understanding of state dysfunction, especially regarding the growing pains of modernisation. Of particular
interest in this book is Huntington’s observation and description of ‘praetorianism’ (Huntington, 1968:192). The praetorian society is one of direct action by groups aiming to achieve their goals, reflecting each group’s particular nature and capabilities (the wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike, mobs demonstrate, and the military conduct coups). Huntington consequently elaborates on the influence of praetorianism in politically unstable societies, which may be linked to state dysfunction. Further chapters also evaluate the potentially stabilising role of political parties, and the destructive effect of revolutions in changing societies.

From this brief introduction of each author, it becomes clear how their respective contributions bear relevance in investigating state dysfunction and their role in constructing a holistic conceptualisation of the phenomenon. The place of each of these authors, as well as other key aspects of this dissertation, will now be clarified by means of a chapter division, below.

10. Chapter division

Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the study. In this chapter, a brief overview of the structure of the dissertation is provided, along with its objectives and methods. The development of the notion of state failure (as the most popular descriptor of dysfunctional states) is recounted, describing how and when the concept emerged, along with discussing the notable contributions in the field. Combined with a discussion on the relevance of the topic, the reader will begin to comprehend the problematic nature of the current conception (or lack thereof) of state dysfunction. This contextual introduction leads to the formulation of a problem statement, which motivates this study. The problem statement is then broken down into research objectives and research questions, after which the methods and procedures used to achieve these goals is discussed. Chapter 1 concludes with the demarcation of the study into separate chapters.

As this study represents an exclusively theoretical endeavour, Chapter 2 provides an exposition of meta-scientific and meta-theoretical departure points that underpin this investigation. This is of particular importance since the outcome of the investigation will be a conceptualisation. The nature of science and scientific constructs are thoroughly discussed, providing the reader with a clear picture of the study’s theoretical departure
points. The nature of scientific constructs such as paradigms, theories, models, concepts, typologies and concepts are analysed, in addition to the role they fulfil in this dissertation. Additionally, a theoretical tool of analysis is developed which will be employed in the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of various contributions on state dysfunction that follow.

Having established in the introduction that all writings on state failure view the phenomenon as a manifestation of state dysfunction, Chapter 3 consists of a conceptualisation of the state. The ideal-typical Weberian state is viewed as a benchmark against which state (dys)function can be measured. It represents the one pole on a continuum of ‘stateness’, with terminal state dysfunction representing the other. By this, it is not implied that the Weberian notion of statehood is normatively good, or superior; its attributes are merely employed as a theoretical benchmark, in order to provide context and to conceptualise the dysfunctional state. An outcome of this chapter is the construction of a definition of statehood which is employed throughout the dissertation.

Given that the meta-theoretical perspectives underlying this study are analysed in Chapter 2, and having established the ideal-typical attributes of statehood in Chapter 3, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 explore the theoretical nature and characteristics of state deviance, abnormality and dysfunction. Chapter 4 consists of a reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of Joel S. Migdal’s contribution, with *Strong Societies and Weak States* (1988) as primary source. Robert H. Jackson’s contribution will be reconstructed, interpreted and evaluated in Chapter 5, with *Quasi-States: International Relations and the Third World* (1990) being the primary source. Chapter 6 will reconstruct, interpret and evaluate the contribution of Samuel P. Huntington in the form of *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968).

In Chapter 7, the scientific constructs employed in the above-mentioned contributions will be synthesised and integrated. The influence of these constructs in relation to the attributes of the ideal-typical state will be evaluated using the analytic tool developed in Chapter 2. This application of scientific constructs represents a process of conceptualisation, resulting in a coherent description of the dysfunctional state. In conclusion, avenues for further investigation and research will also be identified.
11. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to orientate the reader and elaborate on the research objective pursued in this dissertation, namely, a clear and theoretically grounded conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state. This was achieved by contextualising the background and relevance of contemporary state failure, and subsequently relating state failure to a more general notion of state dysfunction. As a means of further contextualisation, a chronological literature review was conducted in which notable contributions were discussed. The deficiencies cited in this literature review, as well as the preceding background discussion, subsequently informed the problem statement which serves to motivate this investigation. From this problem statement, research objectives and research questions were identified, each of which contribute to the systematic construction of a concept of the dysfunctional state. A methodological overview was also provided, including chapter outlines which briefly introduced and motivated the choice of authors whose works form the core body of theory from which state dysfunction will be conceptualised. Each of these authors’ contributions are discussed extensively in the chapters that follow. However, before such a project can commence the scientific assumptions upon which it is based must be clearly accounted for. As a result, the dissertation now moves towards clarifying the meta-theoretical assumptions and scientific framework that underpin this study, in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2
A meta-theoretical framework for conceptualising state dysfunction

1. Introduction

As the title of this dissertation explicitly indicates, the goal of this study is to conduct a conceptualisation. This goal is achieved by applying a scientific methodology in the investigation of a given observable phenomenon, thereby constituting a process of conceptualisation. According to the methodology of this study, this involves the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of theoretical contributions by three authors focusing on the subject of state dysfunction, conducted in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, finally culminating in a conceptualisation of the phenomenon from the application of scientific constructs encountered in these contributions (Chapter 7). However, without a scientific framework with which to order and integrate divergent sets of information, this study will be unable to achieve its goal, since a concept, and the concomitant process of conceptualisation, must both form part of a coherent scientific method.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a qualitative, theory-driven account of the scientific framework that is employed in this dissertation. In pursuance of a conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state, this chapter has two goals. Firstly, the meta-scientific points of departure employed in this study will be fully accounted for, thereby contributing to the study’s overall methodological integrity. Secondly, being a theoretical exercise, an exposition of the scientific constructs used in evaluating the contributions of Migdal, Jackson and Huntington will provide conceptual parity in attempting to formulate a concept from their respective theoretical contributions. As such, this chapter provides the scientific framework of this study, whilst simultaneously being a scientific route map for the journey towards a conceptualisation as the end destination.

In following the analogy of a scientific route map, this chapter initially identifies several orienting landmarks, for example, discussing the nature of scientific and lay knowledge, in addition to disciplines, traditions, and paradigms. It also identifies scientific route markers that are present in all subsequent chapters in the form of scientific constructs,
aiding the reader in navigating the theoretical landscape of state dysfunction. These constructs include theories, models, typologies and concepts, all of which are also employed by Migdal, Jackson, and Huntington in their respective contributions. As outcome, an analytic tool is developed which facilitates the analysis and integration of the various authors’ accounts of state dysfunction.

2. Orientation: meta-science

Various influences in the personal and external dimensions of one’s being infiltrate one’s perceptions and studies of reality. Sometimes one is aware of these influences, whilst often such preferences and proclivities manifest subconsciously. Just as a person’s emotive reaction to contentious issues such as the death penalty or abortion is rooted in, say, moral or religious persuasion, so too the practice of science is characterised by choices and decisions, made through preference or conviction. Thus, any scientist is guided, at least in part, by irrationality (judgements and attitudes emanating from the pre-scientific realm) apart from the scientific method itself. Babbie and Mouton (2001) describe the process of gaining perspective on these aspects that influence scientific research: “Whenever we as researchers stand back and distance ourselves from the practice of social research and begin to reflect on what we are doing, we enter into a different mode of thinking – meta-science” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:xxiii).

It is important for a researcher or scientist to gain such perspective, as described above. Taking account of the influences that shape scientific practice enables the anticipation of shortcomings and critique. Furthermore, for the purposes of this study it becomes relevant to gain perspective and once again survey the goals, methods, content and meaning of science.

The scientific world is constituted by a multitude of disciplines – for example, chemistry and biology in the natural sciences, anatomy in the medical sciences, and politics in the social sciences. In turn, within each discipline a variety of traditions and paradigms compete for relevance and legitimacy. Depending on which paradigm or tradition a political scientist adheres to, his/her scientific observation and interpretation of reality will be significantly influenced by the considerations which that paradigm accentuates, and the aspects it disregards or ignores. Hence, even the relatively simple act of
conceptualisation is influenced by a range of scientific considerations and pre-scientific factors, and it is therefore necessary to account for these influences.

Thus, the chapter will be constructed as a progressively focused delineation, commencing with the broadest of themes (the subjective pre-scientific realm) and concluding with the various scientific constructs. This process is illustrated below:

3. Knowledge

Popular perceptions of science vary significantly. Many people associate science with men and women wearing white overcoats, studiously performing experiments in laboratories. Others may associate science with notions of cutting-edge technology. Either way, science enjoys unparalleled prestige in our modern society (Ladyman, 2002:2). As Chalmers (1999: xix) points out, new products are routinely advertised as being 'scientifically proven' to be better, faster or stronger compared to rival products.
This is done to attribute the claims about that product with a measure of legitimacy (since these claims are now supported by a scientific authority) and to assert that they are well founded and beyond dispute. However, what is science, and how is scientific knowledge distinguished from 'normal' or everyday knowledge?

3.1 Ordinary knowledge

Babbie and Mouton (2001:1-17) and Babbie (1998:16-20) explain the nature of science and the scientific process by distinguishing between lay and scientific knowledge. Lay knowledge represents the knowledge possessed by ‘ordinary’ people, based on personal experience and observation. Such knowledge is often synonymous with terms such as wisdom, common sense, practical knowledge or ‘know-how’, and represents the stock of knowledge used to cope effectively with everyday life. This type of knowledge is characterised by several distinctive features.

Firstly, lay knowledge is based on personal or first-hand experience, derived from interaction with other individuals and reality in general. Thus, experiential knowledge is derived from experience, which in turn is highly contextualised. It would be difficult to replicate the experience of an interaction with person A in a situation where one is interacting with person B. One’s interaction with person A was experienced in a specific context, and subsequently has little purchase and general applicability outside that particular context.

Secondly, the accumulation of lay or ordinary knowledge usually occurs in an unsystematic and haphazard manner. The experiences through which one accumulates knowledge (for example, the above-mentioned interaction with person A) are rarely the result of planned activities or intentional investigations. Whilst one might gain valuable knowledge from such experiences, these insights are rarely deliberately integrated into a coherent and systematic knowledge system, rendering them relatively isolated and context bound.

Thirdly, much of lay knowledge is based on the personal authority of another individual. Often, in everyday life, the opinions and judgements of individuals one considers to be ‘experts’ or authoritative in their fields are accepted as true. Lacking specific knowledge (and thus deferring to an ‘expert’ in his/her field) one trusts the diagnosis of a faulty vehicle, provided by a mechanic. Even though one possesses no knowledge about the
general field, or the particular problem, the authority and expertise of the mechanic is sufficient for one to accept his opinion as the truth.

Fourthly, lay knowledge is based on secondary sources, such as the media, books, the Internet, and other people. For example, oral traditions of storytelling typically continue by word of mouth from one generation to the next, and with the passing of time, the actual subject of the story becomes increasingly further removed from its original occurrence, and one’s knowledge of that particular story is derived from (at best) a secondary source. The media can also be described as a secondary source; one which is often criticised for habitually including inaccuracies. The nature of this type of knowledge is such that it is never attained through first-hand observation or experience.

In summary, lay or ordinary knowledge is knowledge that consists of unstructured first-hand experience, often appeals to the authority of other people and second-hand sources, and is usually unsystematic in nature (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:5). Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2007:1-3) broadly concur with these characteristics of ordinary (unscientific) knowledge, discussing three ‘methods of knowing’. The first method relates to the authority of another person: a prominent individual seen as possessing wisdom, and having a better grasp of their specific environment than other people (village elders, church leaders, technocrats). Closely related to authority, is the so-called mystical method of knowing. In this instance, the correctness of the knowledge is assumed to reside in a supernatural source, and the individual imparting this knowledge is regarded as authoritative due to his/her abilities to transmit the truth derived from this source. Examples of mystical authority would include religious leaders or traditional healers. Finally, conventional wisdom is cited as another method of knowing, reflecting so-called common sense understandings of the world, that are commonly accepted as being true. However, what is often accepted as common sense might not necessarily correspond with the truth, in addition to common sense often being contradictory (the saying ‘absence makes the heart grow fonder’, opposed to ‘out of sight is out of mind’ being one example of such contradiction).

In evaluating the nature of ordinary knowledge, and the methods through which such knowledge is gained, it is clear that ordinary knowledge fulfils a vital role in human existence. Lay knowledge facilitates basic interaction with reality, such as maintaining relationships with partners and family, or conducting business with clients and colleagues, in addition to forming the basis of an individual’s pre-scientific judgements.
The notion of the failed state has also come to form a part of lay knowledge, as frequently communicated by the media or common sense. The term ‘failed state’ is used indiscriminately by the media and commentators referring to instances of state dysfunction, often for the purpose of sensationalism\(^\text{15}\), which promotes neither conceptual clarity nor scientific reasoning. The problem that motivates this dissertation is a concern that the lay conception of state failure has been uncritically absorbed into popular and academic contexts, without a rigorous and methodical investigation of how state failure relates to state dysfunction. The goal of this study is therefore to integrate the concept of the dysfunctional into the corpus of scientific knowledge through means of theoretical conceptualisation. Consequently, the nature of scientific knowledge is discussed below.

### 3.2 Scientific knowledge

A sharp distinction must be drawn between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge, the latter of which is the province of this dissertation. Babbie and Mouton (2001:6) explain that, despite the differences between ordinary and scientific knowledge, these should not be seen as opposing or competing ways of knowing. Ordinary knowledge is of value to science whilst complementing and enhancing scientific knowledge. Babbie and Mouton (2001:6) note the following characteristics of scientific knowledge:

- Science is based on the collective, validated experiences of the members of the scientific community, rather than on the individual experiences and observations of any single person alone.
- Scientific knowledge is the outcome of rigorous, methodical and systematic enquiry, as opposed to the haphazard and spontaneous manner in which ordinary knowledge is acquired.
- Science rejects the value and importance of any personal authority; the only ‘authority’ that is accepted is the authority of evidence.
- Science is not based on taking second-hand sources at face value, but is inherently sceptical. It questions all claims, irrespective of the authority and origin, until they have been tested and, furthermore, stood the test of time.

\(^{15}\) See, for example, Steenhuisen (2011).
Another, similar, account of science is presented by Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2007:3), which emphasises the importance of reason and empirical observation as a point of departure. Knowledge gained through reasoning, or the rationalistic method, occurs through the human capacity for logical thought. A defining characteristic of reasoning is the ability to discover truths purely by applying one’s mind intellectually, in other words, without having to touch, feel or see an object of study\textsuperscript{16}. Mathematics serves as a good example of such reasoning, whereby mathematical laws and principles are discovered by relying solely on mathematical axioms, rather than an observable or sensory aspect of reality. As a method of acquiring knowledge, the empirical method could be considered the opposite of the rationalistic approach (these opposites partly reflect the qualitative/quantitative methodological divide). The empirical method maintains that facts observed in nature form the foundation of all true knowledge. Thus, according to empiricists, the objectivity of one’s observation of reality is paramount, and only things that are observable (perceived by our senses) can constitute knowledge. Taken in isolation, both the rationalistic and empirical methods have obvious shortcomings; theory is redundant when it becomes totally removed from reality, and facts are of little use unless a relationship between them can be established. Science is a process that combines the principles of rationalism with the process of empiricism (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2007:3). Taking into account the above-mentioned description of science, taken from Babbie and Mouton (2001:6), the following set of scientific assumptions serve to complete a description of the nature and essence of science:

1. Science assumes the existence of natural and social laws. These laws provide order and regularity to natural and social events, and exist independently from the observer.

2. Such laws are discoverable. Because human beings form part of nature, we are subject to natural laws, which in turn make these laws perceivable and discoverable. For example, biological laws determine how fast a newly born child will grow. If that child does not grow, one can assume that an abnormality has occurred in the child’s biological development.

3. Natural phenomena have natural causes. This assumption is linked to the existence of laws, and that such laws are discoverable. Thus, no supernatural

\textsuperscript{16} Accordingly, a scientist is able to effectively study a phenomenon such as state dysfunction theoretically, rather than empirically (i.e. through sensory experience in the field). In any case, it could be argued that any study, particularly purely empirical studies, must be predicated upon sound rationalist logic.
forces are needed to explain the way reality functions. On this account, science would reject that a person’s death results from vengeful or displeased ancestors, and would pursue the investigation of natural causes for an answer.

4. The accumulation of scientific knowledge occurs gradually and sequentially, meaning that scientific progress builds upon itself, which continually expands the scientific body of knowledge.

5. Knowledge and truth are founded on evidence. In order to be accepted as good science, a scientific claim must be endorsed by evidence, or else the claim remains a hypothesis (a statement yet unproved). Evidence is constituted by observations made using the senses, as well as proven relationships between relevant facts.

6. Scientific statements must be distinguished from common-sense statements. As discussed previously, common sense forms part of everyday, lay knowledge. This type of knowledge is usually context specific, and is usually not generally applicable (once again, the possibly contradictory notion that ‘absence makes the heart grow fonder’). Scientific statements, on the other hand, must take into account different contexts (variables) and emerge because of systematic observation.

7. Scientific observation must be objective, meaning that the observation and subsequent description of reality must not reflect the subjective views or opinions of the researcher. Therefore, the accuracy of a scientific observation is directly related to the objectivity of that observation.

8. Scientific observation occurs systematically. A logical method must be applied to scientific observation to ensure, for example, that relationships between variables may be accurately observed. Systematically identifying and isolating objects of study will result in an accurate study of the object itself, and the manner in which that object interacts and relates to other objects/phenomena in reality.

(Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2007:3)

What emerges from the preceding descriptions of science is an image of a systematic and rigorous activity, able to withstand scrutiny, aimed at producing valid knowledge. This methodical application of science has its origins in the overriding and initial interest of its practitioners – the search for truth (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:7). However, with the progression of time, scientists have become aware that obtaining certain and
indubitable knowledge (absolute truths) through the scientific method is highly unlikely. Instead, scientists aim to develop findings that approximate reality as closely as possible (Mouton & Marais, 1990:15). The notion of approximate truth (Putnam, 1978) is often referred to as verisimilitude; a concept developed by Popper (1963). Acknowledging that scientific knowledge does not represent infallible truths, implicitly admits that all scientific theories are not true, in other words, that all scientific theories are, in fact, false. Thus, in scientific practice, one is faced with a variety of competing, false theories, that all approximate reality (or the truth) to varying degrees. The problem of verisimilitude is thus how to determine which theories and hypotheses closest approximates reality. The debate surrounding scientific realism will not be entered into here, the important point being that science is engaged not in determining absolute and indubitable truths, but rather knowledge that is valid and reliable (Duvenhage, 1993:20). The pursuit of valid and reliable knowledge represents the epistemological dimension of science and scientific research, concerned with determining what knowledge is, as opposed to mere belief (Ladyman, 2002:5). In contextualising the place and role of ordinary knowledge versus scientific knowledge for the purposes of this dissertation, consider the following diagram:

*Figure 3: The roles of ordinary and lay knowledge in a conceptualisation of state dysfunction*

Having distinguished between ordinary (lay) knowledge and scientific knowledge, and having provided an overview of the scientific method, this chapter now turns its attention to the social sciences, as the branch of scientific practice within which this study is conducted.

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17 In this regard, see Weston (1992).
4. Social Science and Social Science research

Historically, science has bifurcated along two intuitively different streams of subject matter. Natural science comprises the study of natural environments and motion, whilst social science is the study of human structures and behaviour, in other words, social phenomena (McErlean, 2000:252). Social science traces its origins back to natural science, during a time where the excitement and enthusiasm created by Newtonian physics, advances in chemistry and various other domains of natural science enjoyed its zenith (the Enlightenment). Various thinkers suggested that the logical progression in the development of science would be the application of the same proven methods to the discovery laws that governed human behaviour and the ways in which societies functioned (Ladyman, 2002:65). The promise of the Enlightenment was that human life in society would be made more meaningful (and would be wholly understood) if humans could organise themselves on a rational basis, in accordance with a legitimate ‘science of society’. Theories such as Engels’ (1892) ‘scientific socialism’ and Freud’s (1949) principles of psychoanalysis have attempted to stake their claim as scientific truths, universally applicable to humans and society. Needless to say, the general applicability and absolute certainty of such theories have been widely critiqued and discussed, proving such claims to be fallible and false.

Arriving at accurate, replicable and predictable conclusions such as those that typify the natural sciences is a daunting task for the social scientist. The scientific method of natural science is premised on absolute control over variables, conducting observation and experimentation in optimal laboratory conditions. This enables the physicist or bacteriologist to isolate and observe specific elements of an experiment, thus enabling him/her to observe directly and accurately the relationship between variables. For the social scientist (whose objects of study are humans and society), such precise control over experimentation is impossible, as certain experiments cannot be ethically conducted on human subjects and certain variables can never be controlled. The majority of elements comprising social science research are uncontrolled due to the complexity of social reality (and human unpredictability). Therefore, most knowledge in the social sciences can only be expressed as probability statements (that aim to approximate reality) which reflects a certain level of doubt. For example, a physicist can express the laws of electricity with a formula and predict with certainty when an electric bulb will glow, whilst a sociologist can only predict that, under certain
circumstances, unemployment leads to an increase in crime (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2007:12).

Having discussed the divergent paths of natural and social sciences, the discussion now turns to the characteristics of social science and social science research. In this regard, Mouton and Marais (1990:7-20) provide a model of the structure and dimensions of social science research. Mouton and Marais (1990:7) define social science research as “a collaborative human activity in which social reality is studied objectively with the aim of gaining a valid understanding of it.”

From the preceding discussion on the nature of scientific knowledge and the scientific method, elements of the excerpt above may appear familiar. This definition conceals five distinguishable dimensions, which together constitute a comprehensive approach to social science research. The emphasis on social science research as a ‘collaborative human activity’ highlights its sociological dimension. During the Enlightenment, the isolationist ideal of the sciences (prevalent in the Middle Ages and Renaissance) was discarded, in favour of co-operative and participatory scientific practice. The co-operative notion of science established itself and has remained prominent since, to the extent that the notion of undertaking an investigation in the social sciences in total isolation, is wholly unfeasible. The practice of social science research (in particular) necessitates the researcher to engage with his/her laboratory – in other words, society. Therefore, the nature of the object of study precludes isolation in social science. Related to the idea of collaboration is the fact that any scientist operates within a scientific community (sometimes referred to as ‘invisible colleges’) or a distinctive paradigm (argued by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). These groupings or communities of scientists share common paradigmatic departure points, networks and information in an attempt to gain greater scientific knowledge. Such scientific communities also become structured to the extent that they develop mechanisms of control – rewards and status (publication of research, accolades, prestige) and sanction for aberrant members (rules regarding plagiarism, ethical requirements, academic discipline). Perhaps the most pertinent implication of the sociological facet of scientific research is the notion that science is public. It is public in the sense that it is communicated from one scientist to another, and open for scrutiny by the scientific community. Thus, whatever is private to the individual scientist/researcher, for example his/her motivations, value judgments, etc., do not formally belong to the province of science (Doby, 1954:8).
The investigation of the domain of social reality (the paramount preoccupation of social science) reflects the ontological dimension of social science research (ontology referring to the study of being or reality). The elements that comprise this domain are varied and diverse, including human activities, characteristics, institutions, culture and behaviour. This diversity is similarly reflected in the domain assumptions held by scientists. Such domain assumptions are explicit beliefs regarding what is real and what is not, and as such, these assumptions have a marked influence on the definition of research problems. This influence is most pronounced when the scientist decides what part of his/her reality is to be observed; he/she can study an individual or a group, employ qualitative or quantitative methodologies, draw realist or positivist conclusions. Often, such considerations are influenced by the sociological dimensions of research, whereby scientists collaborate on grounds of a shared paradigm or worldview (see section 6 below). Thus, the variety of ontological approaches encountered in social science results in scientists differing as to the definitive research domain of the social sciences. One of the concerns that motivate this study is the predominantly quantitative nature of scholarly work on the theme of failed states (Reus-Smit & Snidal, 2008:494; Carment, 2003:408-409). As a result, this study therefore analyses the field of state dysfunction from an inter-paradigmatic qualitative perspective, in an attempt to gain different insights.

Previously in this chapter it was noted that science is a systematic and objective endeavour. Conducting any activity in a systematic and objective manner suggests that the practitioner is gradually and carefully labouring towards the attainment of a goal, since if an activity was merely frivolous, no systematic approach would be required whatsoever. Science, therefore, is an activity which progresses to the attainment of a specific end – representing the teleological dimension of social science research (telos being an Aristotelian concept, meaning that everything in reality has a final end, purpose, aim or goal) (Mouton & Marais, 1990:13). When considering the goals and aims of social science, one is once again faced with a variety of differing approaches. Certain schools of thought approach social science research with theoretically defined research goals, such as discovering laws that govern society and human interaction, or the theoretical clarification of ill-defined and ambiguous concepts (as this study aims to achieve). In contrast, other scientists would regard practical goals as more important, such as the resolution of labour disputes, drafting corporate social responsibility policies, or counselling young delinquents. Mouton and Marais (1990:13) emphasise
that such disparate goals and aims should be seen as representing two ends of the same continuum, and not as competing or mutually exclusive approaches. Indeed, it is easy to conceive of instances where ‘theoretical’ or abstract science and pragmatic (or practical) science function hand in hand. This dissertation could be considered a theoretical project, as its goal is to gain a clearer theoretical understanding of a phenomenon in reality.

The epistemological dimension of science has been referred to previously, when it was noted that science was initially considered a process whereby truthful knowledge of the world could be acquired. Contemporary science, however, is concerned with discovering knowledge that is valid and reliable, approximating the truth as closely as possible. Because of the complexity of the domain of social science research, and the inherent inaccuracy and fallibility involved in human observation, it is necessary to accept that complete certainty and absolute truths are unattainable (Mouton & Marais, 1990:15). Once again, this introduces Popper’s (1963) criterion of verisimilitude in the search for valid and reliable knowledge.

Lastly, the methodological dimension of social science research must be addressed. Methodology has its origins in the Greek word *methodos*, meaning ‘a system of investigation in pursuit of knowledge’. The meaning of the term has changed remarkably little, especially in the scientific context in which it is applied here. Previously it was mentioned that science aims to achieve a valid and reliable (epistemological) understanding of reality (ontology). Noting this, methodology is defined as the application of scientific methods in the investigation of phenomena (Mouton & Marais, 1990:16). Methodology is of particular importance to science, since the process of scientific investigation is (in essence) a series of decisions, made in order to realise a specified outcome. Applying sound methodology assists in making these decisions rationally, thus increasing the validity and reliability of the outcome. Implicit in the methodological choices a scientist makes are certain concealed sociological influences, which prompt one methodological option to be acceptable, in favour of another. Applied within a macro context, methodological paradigms such as positivism, logical positivism, critical theory, scientific realism, etc., feature prominently. At an operational level, methodology may represent choices surrounding a qualitative/quantitative approach, or inductive/deductive reasoning.
It is evident that the five dimensions discussed above form part of an integrated model, overlapping in content and meaning, or in the words of Mouton and Marais (1990:8) “five aspects of the same process”. Hence, this model provides the reader with a relevant and complete account of social science research, and by extension social science itself.

*Figure 4: The five aspects of social science research*

![Diagram showing the five aspects of social science research: METHODOLOGY, EPistemology, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, TELEOLOGY, ONTOLOGY, and SOCIOLOGY.]

(Source: Adapted from Mouton & Marais, 1990:8)

The domain social science is in turn constituted by various disciplines, each focused on a particular aspect of that domain (see Figure 2). Political science features prominently as one such discipline.

5. **Disciplines, traditions and political science**

An academic discipline is a specific branch of knowledge and learning. Different disciplines are identified through distinguishable traditions or lineages (composed of historical, methodological and, in particular, terrain foci) tasked with the teaching and research of reality, particular aspects of that reality, and/or the relationship between those aspects (Duvenhage, 1993:30). An academic discipline is further characterised by the following elements:

1. Disciplines emerge autonomously and independently of, but in conjunction with, other disciplines, to constitute science.
2. A discipline focuses on specific aspects of reality (or the manner in which different aspects interact/relate to each other). A unique ontological tradition, differentiating its focus from other disciplines, is important to a discipline. For example, in the discipline of political science, Easton (1971:143) would consider this focus to be “the authoritative allocation of values for a society”.

3. Disciplines are comprised of a variety of sub-disciplines, which are not duplications of other disciplines, but distinct in their own right. These sub-disciplines may differ in focus, theory, or methodology, but are conjoined to a common central focus, and should thus contribute to a more complete understanding of that focus. Examples of sub-disciplines include political theory, political development, international relation, and comparative politics.

4. Furthermore, a discipline is characterised by a distinct body of knowledge, differentiable from other disciplines. This body of knowledge is organised and systematised in terms of underlying connections, relationships and common ground. The systematic and methodical nature of science thus manifests itself in disciplines and sub-disciplines, facilitating the expansion of existing disciplinary knowledge that is valid and reliable.

5. Concerning this body of knowledge (discussed above), the development of theory and theoretical constructs unique to a discipline is of great importance. The search for valid and reliable knowledge is best conducted in a systemised manner, in which strong conceptual frameworks play an important role, especially in the context of discipline-focused academic investigation. By applying theory and theoretical constructs to an unordered reality, structure and regularity (and thus functions of description, explanation or prediction) can be achieved. In the context of this study, the search for conceptual structure and order, referring to the phenomenon of state dysfunction, requires the determination of a set of criteria through which this phenomenon can be investigated. This is achieved through a process involving scientific constructs and conceptualisation, unique to the discipline of political science (see section 7 below) (Duvenhage, 1993:30-32).

Taking the above-mentioned characteristics into account, Duvenhage (1993:32) defines an academic discipline as “a demarcated, autonomous, and exclusive teaching/research tradition, possessing a certain measure of theoretical and
methodological sophistication, oriented towards the expansion of a body of knowledge with reality, or aspects of reality, as its focus.”

The term ‘social sciences’ acknowledges the pluralist nature of social science, in playing host to numerous disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, cultural and ethnic studies and gender studies. Of particular relevance to this dissertation is the discipline of political science, as it is within the ambit of this discipline that the phenomena of the state and state dysfunction are most effectively studied. Political science has been referred to as the ‘junction subject’ of the social sciences (Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008:9) originally born out of history and philosophy, drawing on the insights of economics and sociology, and to a lesser extent the study of law, psychology and geography. The distinguishable discipline of political science is a relatively new addition to the repertoire of social science, as it is only after the 1920s that a distinctive field of study developed. Traditionally, the study of politics was conducted from a legal/historical approach, where the study of institutions and constitutions was perceived as representing the pinnacle of the political reality - a time when history meant primarily political history, and when political science relied almost exclusively upon historical analysis (Almond, 1962:417). However, the dramatic failure of the German institutional and constitutional order between two World Wars and the emergence of fascism necessitated a departure from the formalistic and legalistic academic approaches to politics (which had failed to anticipate these events), and prompted the need to develop novel paradigms and methodologies in the discipline.

After World War II, behaviouralism emerged as a result of this discontent with the formal, legal and historical emphasis of ‘old institutionalism’, which was occupied with the formal structures of government (Burnham et al., 2008:19). The new behaviouralist approach was excitedly pursued in the USA, where it reinvigorated the relevance of political science. However, behaviouralism never enjoyed this ascendancy outside the United States, and the development of political science as a discipline in other countries retained a strong indigenous character. Such examples include Eastern Europe, where the discipline was split along communist and post-communist lines; Australia, where political science developed a unique identity due to geographic isolation and the proximity to the pacific rim states; and Italy, where the discipline is relatively underdeveloped, as law is still viewed as the ‘science of the state’ (Burnham et al., 2008:9-14). Since the 1960s the dominance of behaviouralism has subsided, as other traditions developed and gained intellectual momentum. In concluding this short
discussion of academic disciplines, Ricci (1984) best captures the essence of political science as a discipline:

Some academic disciplines deal with precise and marketable knowledge, such as that which enables them to train physicists. Political science belongs to another group of learned disciplines, embracing most of the humanities and social sciences, which impart a more general understanding of their subject to students among whom only a few will work at a job based solely on the acquired knowledge. Immediate vocational payoffs aside, such disciplines are responsible for investigating immense realms of social phenomena, for translating the findings of their research into coherent teachings, and for conveying to all who would listen, be they students or the public, a sense of what constitutes reasonable behaviour toward their fellow man. (Ricci, 1984:7)

During the development and growth of political science as discipline, it has played host to various different ideas and convictions related to its practice. These ideas can collectively be referred to as traditions within the discipline. In general terms, tradition refers to customs, beliefs or principles that are passed on, and persist, over time. Similarly, in an academic disciplinary context, tradition refers to certain philosophies (usually relating to the nature of science and reality), methodologies, approaches, and general orientations (Duvenhage, 1993:33). In political science, prominent philosophical (or philosophical-ideological) traditions include conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism. Each philosophical tradition further devolves into applications that are more specific, for example, liberalism encapsulates classical, contemporary, pluralist and utilitarian approaches, whilst the radical philosophical tradition incorporates Marxist and existentialist approaches. Parallel to these philosophical traditions, runs a distinct methodological current. Major methodological traditions include universalism, institutionalism, behaviouralism (mentioned earlier), rational choice, critical theory, and more recently, interpretivism (Burnham et al., 2008:28).

Chapters 4 to 6 of this dissertation represent the contributions of three authors on the subject of state dysfunction. In each chapter, a discussion of the author’s orientation within the discipline of political science is conducted. As a result, the reader will be able to accurately contextualise the author’s contribution with reference to a given political scientific tradition and paradigm (discussed below), whilst being able to compare and contrast the three authors. This methodological feature contributes to the theoretical pluralism and diversity that underpins this study.
In conclusion, a specific tradition represents certain methodological and philosophical preferences and convictions, through which scholarly activity within an academic discipline is conducted. These individual preferences and convictions about reality, science and methodology that manifest in traditions are rooted in broader frameworks of reference, known as paradigms.

6. Paradigms

Several approaches and orientations towards science, and the discipline of political science, have thus far been discussed. Pre-scientific beliefs, one’s conceptualisation of science (and social science) and disciplinary traditions are all elements of the scientist’s being that are formed through convention and socialisation within society (in general) and the scientific community (in particular), as the discussion of the sociological dimension of science has demonstrated. Referring back to Figure 2, it can be seen that, for the purposes of this dissertation, paradigms along with theories, models, typologies and concepts, are described as scientific constructs. In contrast to the psychological and personal philosophical (pre-scientific) nature of one’s own view of science, adherence to a scientific tradition, and pre-scientific convictions, scientific constructs serve as objective analytical ‘tools’ - instruments with which the scientist is able to make sense of the phenomenon that is being investigated (Mouton & Marais, 1990:125). As emphasised previously, personal and philosophical views have an undeniable influence on any scientist, as these views serve to orientate the practitioner relative to reality and the practice of his/her science. Scientific constructs, however, are ‘practical’ tools, used to sort (concepts), isolate (variables), specify (definitions), postulate (hypotheses), classify (typologies), predict (models), and explain (theories). The point of intersection between normative philosophical views on the one hand, and the practice of science on the other, is a paradigm. From this perspective, Chalmers (1999) offers a concise description of the relationship between a paradigm and a scientist:

Even though there is no complete, explicit characterisation, individual scientists acquire knowledge of a paradigm through their scientific education. By solving standard problems, performing standard experiments and eventually doing a piece of research under a supervisor who is already a skilled practitioner within the paradigm, an aspiring scientist becomes acquainted with the methods, the techniques and the standards of that paradigm. (Chalmers, 1999:111)
Emphasising the intersection (described above) between the scientist’s gradual sociological conditioning within certain conventions, and the practice of science using scientific constructs, Chalmers (1999:112) notes that “The aspiring scientist will be no more able to give an explicit account of the methods and skills he or she has acquired than a master-carpenter will be able to fully describe what lies behind his or her skills. Much of the normal scientist’s knowledge will be tacit.”

Hence, it becomes clear that a paradigm is the nexus between scientific philosophy and scientific practice. The above example provided by Chalmers pertinently notes unobtrusive, tacit nature of paradigmatic knowledge. This state of paradigmatic equilibrium can be equated to what Kuhn (1996) termed ‘normal science’. As no discussion of the paradigm concept would be complete without reference to Kuhn’s contribution, his view of the nature of knowledge-growth and development in the sciences (and the central role of paradigms) will now be discussed.

Drawing on the historical development of the natural sciences, Kuhn (1996) proposes that it is possible to identify theories or theoretical systems that can be regarded as the origin of a specific discipline, for example Franklin’s theory of electricity, Newton’s theory of optics, or Darwin’s theory of evolution. Such theories have at one time or another served to define a scientific discipline, offering satisfactory solutions to real empirical problems. Such theories and theoretical systems subsequently become dominant paradigms within a discipline and the practice of science. During such times of paradigmatic unanimity, scientists practice ‘normal science’, which is scientific research utilising the frame of reference supplied by a dominant paradigm, in other words, from a collection of mutually accepted achievements (for example, theories, exemplary solutions, predictions, laws) (Mouton & Marais, 1990:145-146). The paradigm therefore presents scientists with a set of definite problems together with methods that they are confident will be adequate for the solution of those problems. Normal science (conducted from a dominant paradigm) is characterised by the following ‘rules’, according to Kuhn (1996):

1. Scientists commit themselves to certain theories and laws of the dominant paradigm. These theories and laws stand central to the specific paradigm, and form the core point of departure for normal scientific practice within the paradigm. Referring to this commitment, Kuhn (1996:41) notes, “The most obvious and probably the most binding is exemplified by the sorts of generalisations we have
just noted. These are explicit statements of scientific law and about scientific concepts and theories. While they continue to be honoured, such statements help to set puzzles and to limit acceptable solutions.”

2. Secondly, just as the scientist is committed to a seminal theory of a given paradigm, he/she also commits to a certain methodology, espoused by that paradigm: “At a level more concrete than that of laws and theories, there is, for example, a multitude of commitments to preferred types of instrumentation and to the ways in which accepted instruments may legitimately be employed” (Kuhn, 1996:41).

3. A paradigm necessitates a scientist to be committed to a specific view of reality (the object of research), i.e. an ontological commitment. Using the example of the impact Descartes’ scientific writings (positing a corpuscular conception of the universe) had on science in the 17th century, specifically the new paradigmatic commitments it brought about, Kuhn (1996:42) writes, “That nest of commitments proved to be both metaphysical and methodological. As metaphysical, it told scientists what sorts of entities the universe did and did not contain ... More important still, the corpuscular conception told scientists what many of their research problems should be.”

4. Finally, paradigmatic science requires an epistemological commitment, one which drives the scientist to discover increasingly more valid and reliable knowledge: “Finally, at a still higher level, there is another set of commitments without which no man is a scientist. The scientist must, for example, be concerned to understand the world and to extend the precision and scope with which it has been ordered. The commitment must, in turn, lead him to scrutinise, either for himself or through colleagues, some aspect of nature in great empirical detail.” (Kuhn, 1996:42)

Taking into account these features, Kuhn describes the paramount function of normal paradigmatic science as that of “puzzle solving” (Kuhn, 1996:36-40). During times of normal science, the scientist has an opportunity to perfect the finer details and mechanics of a theory. This opportunity is facilitated by a dominant paradigm, since it provides certain fundamentals which may be conveniently taken for granted during scientific practice, enabling the scientist to approximate his/her theory ever closer to reality. Thus, it is through their confidence in the adequacy of a paradigm that scientists are able to devote their energies to attempts to solve the detailed puzzles presented to
them within the paradigm, rather than engage in disputes about the legitimacy of their fundamental assumptions and methods. Indeed, it is necessary for normal science to be (to a large extent) paradigmatically uncritical. If all scientists were critical of all parts of the framework in which they worked all of the time, no detailed work would ever be done (Chalmers, 1999:118). Normal science therefore approximates puzzle solving in the sense that the paradigm provides the rules, pieces, and example of the puzzle to be solved. It is left to the ingenuity of the scientist to put the pieces together. Thus, paradigms fulfil three main functions during normal science (Mouton & Marais, 1990:147):

1. Establishing appropriate facts
2. Matching facts and theory
3. Articulation of the theory

Kuhn (1996:92) explains that scientific progress is made through “non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one”, in other words, by means of a scientific revolution. Such a radical break in the normal course of scientific practice has its origins in a growing awareness of the existence of a contradiction, or anomaly. When new empirical facts are discovered that are not predicted by the paradigm, or that are entirely surprising in terms of paradigmatic expectations, one is confronted by such an anomaly (Mouton & Marais, 1990:149). These “new and unexpected phenomena” (Kuhn, 1996:52) often undermine the core functions of a paradigm (referred to above) to such an extent that the paradigm is unable to self-correct in order to accommodate these anomalies. This requires the replacement of the now-obsolete paradigm, with a new paradigm. Kuhn (1996) describes the implications of such a process: “Because it demands large-scale paradigm destruction and major shifts in the problems and techniques of normal science, the emergence of new theories is generally preceded by a period of pronounced professional insecurity. As one might expect, that insecurity is generated by the persistent failure of the puzzles of normal science to come out as they should. Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones” (Kuhn, 1996:67).

This period of crisis leads to what Kuhn (1996:89) terms “extraordinary research”, science conducted without the rules and commitments of the previously dominant paradigm. Often, the shape of a new paradigm is reflected strongly in the way extraordinary research is conducted by the scientist, and can thus be anticipated in
advance. However, as Kuhn (1996:90) rather evocatively suggests, “More often no such structure is seen in advance. Instead, the new paradigm, or a sufficient hint to permit later articulation, emerges all at once, in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man deeply immersed in crisis.”

This new paradigm would then resolve the crisis brought about by the previous paradigm’s inability to accommodate certain anomalies. Over time, this paradigm will consolidate its validity in the scientific community, leading once again to the practice of normal science, thus completing a scientific revolution. Kuhn’s (1996) account of scientific progress has been an influential contribution to the philosophy of science and, as such, has stimulated vigorous debate. Amongst other issues, this debate has centred on Kuhn’s description of a largely haphazard description of scientific change. Anomalies arrive suddenly and unexpected, as it were, and quickly render a dominant paradigm meaningless, giving rise to unstructured and unguided research, until (hopefully) an embryonic new paradigm emerges. Notable amongst Kuhn’s critics was Imre Lakatos, who provided an alternative account of scientific progress to Kuhn’s theory (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). According to Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), scientific progress cannot be gauged by examining the successes and failures of single theories. Rather, a series of successive theories, sharing the same core assumptions, should be employed to evaluate progress, which he refers to as a ‘research programme’. A research programme consists of a ‘hard core’ of assumptions, insulated by a ‘protective belt’ of related theories, which act as a shield and protection mechanism to the hard-core assumptions, from which theoretical constructs emerge. In Lakatos and Musgrave’s (1970) account, when anomalies emerge, adjustments to the protective belt are made accordingly, whilst protecting the hard core of the research programme. The ability of the hard core to remain intact and undisputed (resulting from skilful adjustments to the programme’s protective belt) is a measure of the research programme’s survivability (and thus, scientific relevance). Such successful adjustments are referred to as ‘progressive problem shift’ (content increasing shifts), as opposed to ‘degenerative problem shift’, which occurs when adjustment to the protective belt are content diminishing and undermine the hard core of the research programme (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970:133). In his insightful comparison between the views of Kuhn and Lakatos, Ball (1976) describes a Lakatosian research programme through the following analogy:
A good research programme is a good swimmer – mainly because its “protective belt” serves as a life belt, keeping the hard core afloat on an ocean of anomalies. So long as this belt can be adjusted in “progressive” (i.e. content-increasing) ways, the research programme is in no danger of sinking. But, by the same token, a research programme begins to list and take on water when its protective belt can no longer be adjusted in progressive ways – when, that is, adjustments amount to no more than content-decreasing semantical ones and/or when they fail to anticipate new facts. Only then is the research programme itself – hard core and all – in danger of sinking. (Ball, 1976:165-166)

To emphasise Lakatos’ more gradual view of scientific progress, he also maintains that theories are never falsified absolutely, but only relatively – i.e. they are superseded by better theories. According to Lakatos, “There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory” (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970:119).

Taking into account the views of both Kuhn and Lakatos regarding scientific progress and the role of paradigms/research programmes, Duvenhage (1993:42-43) highlights the following important aspects:

1. The development of valid and reliable scientific knowledge in the discipline of political science can occur cumulatively (Lakatos) and through revolutions (Kuhn); however, in most cases, progress constitutes a balance between these two views.

2. A change in paradigm occurs only when the core assumptions (hard core) of a paradigm are adjusted. Therefore, a scientific revolution only occurs when the hard core is redundant.

3. In contrast to the natural sciences, political science exhibits a complex continuum of traditions, sub-traditions and approaches. This, in turn, indicates the existence of a number of competing and concurrent paradigms.

The latter of these aspects is of particular relevance to this study. Having demonstrated that the practice of science is influenced by various dimensions (for example, pre-science, view of science, discipline and traditions specific) that culminate in a paradigm, it is logical to assume that different paradigms exist through which the problems of political science are engaged. As a phenomenon in reality, which has in the last two decades gained heightened empirical profile (and thus enticed scientists to study it), state dysfunction represents one such problem. This study will approach the challenge of conceptualising the state dysfunction through means of a multi-paradigmatic approach – i.e. making use of more than one paradigm. This involves dissecting the
contributions of three different authors, writing from different paradigms on the same subject matter. The merits of this approach are endorsed by Barnsley (1974):

But is it not possible for political scientists to develop a single paradigm which thoroughly integrates all fundamentally different viewpoints? It is certainly possible for political scientists to engage in a responsible, constructive and fruitful confrontation between such viewpoints, and bring about a partial reconciliation of them. Indeed, there is an urgent need for this kind of work ... political science can and should attain a multiparadigmatic condition.

(Barnsley, 1974:60)

However, this study is also inter-paradigmatic in nature (in other words, combining more two or more paradigms to create new knowledge) since such an approach can only serve to enhance an integrated and more complete understanding of the phenomenon of state dysfunction. Consider the depiction of the inter-paradigmatic method, below:

*Figure 5: An inter-paradigmatic method of conceptualising the dysfunctional state*

(Adapted from Salmons & Wilson, 2007)

As a meta-theoretical route marker, the paradigm is thus of instrumental importance to this study. Identifying paradigms in the works of influential thinkers enables a researcher to gain greater insight into the assumptions that the thinker holds, and the conclusions reached as a result. Consequently, each of the authors discussed in Chapters 4 – 6 will be reconstructed, interpreted and evaluated with particular reference to their respective paradigmatic departure points, and will also be integrated into a comparative assessment of their contributions.
7. Scientific constructs

Having earlier described paradigms as that juncture where philosophical convictions converge with practice, the most important scientific constructs will now be discussed. Regardless of a scientist's pre-scientific or paradigmatic assumptions, these constructs provide structure to the scientific quest for valid and reliable knowledge. They are employed by all scientists, and are of particular relevance to this study, given its goal of theoretical conceptualisation. Mouton and Marais (1990:125) depict the hierarchical relationship between scientific constructs as follows:

*Figure 6: The relationship between scientific constructs*

According to this representation, concepts combine to form scientific statements, such as definitions and hypotheses. Statements are sentences that make specific knowledge (epistemic) claims concerning an aspect of reality (Mouton & Marais, 1990:131). When combined, such statements constitute conceptual frameworks, which include theories, models and typologies. Ultimately, these conceptual frameworks form part of a paradigm, along with pre-scientific/philosophical assumptions, discussed previously. This discussion of the constructs of science will commence with concepts, since they represent the “primary building blocks of scientific knowledge” (Mouton, 1996:181).
7.1 Concepts

The notion and usage of concepts is obviously not confined to science. Concepts play an equally important role in the communication of lay knowledge as it does in the context of scientific knowledge. For instance, describing someone as a 'good man' in everyday dialogue relies on invoking the concept of a 'good man'. Common sense and experience informs one of the content of this concept of the 'good man' (compare Babbie, 1998:118-120). However, the difference between common and scientific concepts can be demonstrated with reference to 'mass'. For the layman, the concept 'mass' implies nothing more than bulk or size, but the physicist attaches a different meaning to this concept. For the scientist, the concept mass involves weight, force, acceleration, inertia and gravity. Furthermore, the scientist is particularly interested in the relationship between these factors (Doby, 1954:21). As discussed earlier, the pursuit of valid and reliable scientific knowledge in large part rests upon the scientist’s ability to interpret accurately and correctly his/her observations of reality. In this regard, theory aids the scientist in ordering, explaining and predicting observations. It would thus follow that, since theory is based upon the use of concepts, valid and reliable concepts lead to valid and reliable scientific knowledge – hence the fundamental importance of concepts and conceptualisation in science.

The individual, in adjusting himself in his environment, uses his sensory capacity to become aware of certain aspects of the world that confront him (Doby, 1954:22). This process forms the essence of scientific observation, as the scientist employs his/her senses to perceive empirical reality. The acts of observation and perception in itself already represent a method of selectivity, since certain features of reality are ignored, whilst others receive attention. Of course, perception alone is not a sufficient condition for gaining a complete understanding of reality, and gaining valid and reliable knowledge. There are many situations where perception is insufficient, or one is not able to perceive all the relevant elements in a situation, necessitating one to act on the basis of conception by making certain assumptions (Doby, 1954:22). For example, a person attempting to understand the mechanism of a clock perceives its operation (he sees the hands moving on the dial, he hears ticking, he might even feel the pulse of clockwork – all this occurs through his senses), yet he has no way of perceiving how

18 Here, again, the preceding discussion (section 3) of ordinary and scientific bears relevance.
19 In this regard, John T. Doby’s enlightening chapter entitled Science and Concepts (Doby, 1954) will serve as background to this discussion.
this clock works, since the mechanism is contained within a closed case. Yet, if he is
ingenious, he could form a mental picture (conception) of the mechanism responsible
for the things his senses perceive, which could explain what he sees, hears and feels
when observing the clock. Thus, a concept aids in perception, which aids further
conception, giving old precepts a new perspective (Doby, 1954:23). In science,
concepts therefore aid our understanding of the existence of something that is not
directly perceivable through our senses (the enclosed clockwork mechanism). The
most important concepts in science may serve as examples; electricity, the atom,
power, the state, and in the pages that follow, the dysfunctional state. Consider this
passage from Blumer in Doby (1954):

...on the basis of given tangible perceptual experiences which were puzzling,
certain individuals fashioned constructs which would give these experiences an
understandable character. As far as I can see, scientific concepts come into
existence in this way. They refer to something whose existence we presume,
but whose character we do not fully understand. They originate as conceptions
occasioned by a series of perceptual experiences of a puzzling character which
need to be bridged by a wider perspective. I hasten to add that the concept does
not merely suppose the existence of something which bridges perceptual
experiences, but implies that this thing has a nature or certain character. (Doby,
1954:23)

Doby (1954:23) notes that concepts are not only a way of conceiving, but also have
distinct content. The concept therefore enables one to capture and hold some content
of experience. In this regard, one can consider the example of a small child, learning to
identify and differentiate between animals such as cats, dogs, horses, cows, etc.
Even though the child can tell various animals apart, it does not yet understand the
unifying concept of animal. The process of abstraction enables the child to group
objects (dogs, cats, etc.) according to an isolated common property or
characteristic (being animals). However, for a conception to be meaningful (and not
just limited to personal experience) it must be given a name, sign, or identifying symbol
(Doby, 1954:24). Three features of the process of abstraction and subsequent concept
formation are of crucial importance to science:

1. The common content conceived out of the multitude of objects may become
the object of separate investigation and study (in other words, instead of

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20 This would concur with the rationalistic method, discussed earlier, whereby one applies logic to solve a mental problem that
cannot be observed by sensory means.
21 In this regard, see Chapter 3, section 2.
merely studying cats and dogs and horses separately, one can now study animals as a new conceptualised object, created by abstraction).

2. The concept may become the experience of others, since it may be identified by a language or symbols, which are the common property of others, making collective action and common investigation possible.

3. The concept makes possible the unity and systematic nature of science by linking together the particular elements and ideas in a pattern.

Thus, science derives its systematic nature through the coherence of its concepts (Doby, 1954). At this point, it is appropriate to return to the problem statement of this dissertation, which is “An investigation to determine the theoretical content of an observable phenomenon, referred to as state dysfunction, through a process of conceptualisation, resulting in a sound conception of the dysfunctional state which may be consistently applied in theory and practice” (Doby, 1954:24).

Relating this problem statement to the three points regarding concept formation in science, above, it follows that the weak/failed/collapsed state is a concept employed generally (in the experience of others, see point 2 above) since it has acquired prominence in scientific and popular literature. However, collective action (point 2) surrounding the conception is difficult, since different users ascribe different content to the concept. This undermines the unity and systematic nature of science (point 3) – an unacceptable condition that must be rectified – hence, the titular focus of this dissertation as conceptualising the dysfunctional state. Meehan’s (1971) observation in this regard is particularly relevant: “The worst sin in conceptualisation is ambiguity – uncertainty about the meaning or the application of a concept. Since concepts are the basic patterns or building blocks for organising perceptions, ambiguity has disastrous consequences, however well an enquiry might be conducted” (Meehan, 1971:32).

This ambiguity or ‘conceptual confusion’, where different users attribute differing content to the same concept, may emerge for various reasons. In the case of the popular media and everyday dialogue, concepts are frequently employed in ignorance. Instinctively equating the concept of the failed state with ‘abnormality’ or ‘dysfunction’, the media uses the term to refer to a multitude of incongruous countries across the world. Therefore, they are either ignorant of the term’s definitive content and use/abuse it at will for purposes of sensation, or, more plausibly, because no definitive content exists. Whilst this explains conceptual confusion in terms of lay usage of the term, it
does not sufficiently apply to the academic/scientific fraternity, for whom ignorance is unacceptable. Here, this dissertation would posit, conceptual confusion arises because of paradigmatic issues. Increasingly, various scholars and academics employ the failed state concept in their work in labelling an observable phenomenon in reality (this phenomenon is generally perceived as a state which, to *varying degrees*, no longer resembles the ideal-type). However, collectively these scholars represent a divergence of paradigmatic departure points, which necessarily influence their ontological and epistemological assumptions when observing reality (in this case, when observing the phenomenon of state dysfunction). Therefore, each scholar will, according to his/her paradigm, choose to investigate certain perceivable features of the phenomenon, whilst ignoring others, resulting in many meanings being attributed to one concept. Doby (1954) reiterates the importance of conceptual consistency (as opposed to conceptual confusion) regarding individual scientists: “This development of concepts in science prevents the work of individual scientists from being just a series of discrete and separate studies by providing organic connection between studies through the organisation and reorganisation of experience which without the aid of concepts to represent the previous experience would not be possible” (Doby, 1954:24).

This aspect will be the subject of further elaboration in later chapters, as three separate authors with divergent paradigmatic departure points are discussed with regard to their contributions in the field of state dysfunction. A significant motivating factor behind selecting the three authors employed in this study centres around their respective use of particular concepts and related scientific constructs. Subsequent chapters will reveal how constructs such as the Weberian state, a web-like society, fragmented social control, negative sovereignty, political decay and praetorianism play an integral role in conceptualising state dysfunction. Furthermore, the diversity of the above-mentioned concepts relates to the paradigms from which they emanate, hence the necessity of accounting for each author’s paradigmatic point of departure in an inter-paradigmatic study.

This brief aside was necessary to contextualise the importance of concepts and paradigms to this study, and to elucidate the aims of the study, given the research problem. Returning now to the discussion of concepts as scientific constructs, Doby (1954) summarises the ‘psychological aspects’ or characteristics of concepts as follows:

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22 See Figures 2 and 6.
1. The scientific concept, as a way of conceiving, enables one to picture and present that which cannot be seen or directly perceived. In other words, it enables one to circumvent problems of perceptual experience.

2. The content of the scientific concept consists of an abstracted relation, which becomes the subject of additional study.

3. The concept, because of its verbal or symbolic nature, may be shared, thus it permits collective or serial activity in scientific procedure.

4. The interrelations of scientific concepts make possible the systematic structure of science. (Doby, 1954:24)

Finally, a distinction must be made between the connotative and denotative meaning of concepts. Copi (1972) explains:

In one sense the meaning of a term consists of the class of objects to which the term might be applied. This sense of the meaning, its referential sense, has traditionally been called extensional or denotative meaning. A general or class term denotes the objects to which it may correctly be applied, and the collection or class of these objects constitutes the extension or denotation of the term ... the collection of properties shared by all and only those objects in a term's extension is called the intension or connotation of the term. (Copi, 1972:125)

This implies that most concepts fulfil two functions. For example, when referring to a fighter aircraft (as a concept), the connotation of the term includes characteristics that are unique to that type of aircraft, in other words, speed, manoeuvrability, attack capabilities. On the other hand, the denotation of the concept fighter aircraft includes examples of the class of phenomena (for example, a Spitfire, MiG, Mirage). Similarly, when the term ‘failed state’ is understood in a connotative sense, it conjures up pictures of corruption, starvation, violence, civil war, et cetera (features that generally connote state dysfunction). In a denotative sense, the term also denotes places which could be considered failed states: Somalia, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, et cetera. The relevance of distinguishing between connotative and denotative meanings will become clear in the section that follows, dealing with definitions.

Having explored the role of concepts as the basic building blocks of science, and the importance of concepts in this study, the discussion now ascends a step in the hierarchy of scientific constructs (compare Figure 6, above). Scientific statements combine concepts in a meaningful way, in order to more accurately describe phenomena. One such scientific statement is a definition.
7.2 Definitions

Mouton and Marais (1990:131) describe a definition as a statement through which the meanings (connotative and denotative) of concepts are specified. A further distinction is drawn between theoretical definitions (of a connotative nature), and operational definitions (of a denotative nature). Mouton (1996:188) explains that the specification of a connotative meaning of a concept, namely the general intention or ‘idea’ it incorporates is usually referred to as the theoretical (connotative) definition. Through a theoretical definition, the relationships between a given concept and a broader conceptual framework (i.e. model, theory and paradigm) are clarified.

Throughout this chapter, influences have been accounted in order to direct a scientist’s observation. These influences culminate in a paradigm, which represents the meeting point between the personal beliefs/convictions of the scientist, and scientific practice. Scientific practice is thus subject to paradigmatic influences. This reality is, once again, pertinent in determining the content of theoretical definitions, since these definitions relate an isolated concept to something more integrated and cohesive, such as a theory, which is in turn derived from a paradigm. Noting the problem statement of this study, and the notion of conceptual ambiguity mentioned earlier, the following statement by Mouton (1996) bears relevance:

...theoretical definitions of highly abstract concepts vary across larger frameworks and paradigms. The same word will have different connotations, both positive and negative, depending on the theoretical framework. This does in fact lead people to look at the social world differently and interpret seemingly similar events differently. The social scientist still has a responsibility to ensure that his/her definitions are as clear and unambiguous as possible! (Mouton, 1996:189)

The variations of theoretical and paradigmatic viewpoints described above necessitates a scientist to account clearly for: (a) the meta-theoretical and meta-scientific assumptions underlying his/her view of science and scientific constructs, and (b) the theoretical and paradigmatic departure points that guide his/her scientific observation. For this dissertation, regarding point (a), this chapter fulfils the function of explicating the meta-science upon which this study is based. In the next chapter, point (b) will be thoroughly explored, that is, the Weberian paradigm and scientific constructs which are employed in studying the state. Additionally, paradigmatic departure points are also identified in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in the reconstruction, interpretation, and evaluation of respective theoretical contributions.
Since this study moves from the assumption that a dysfunctional state represents a deviation from an ideal, the next chapter focuses on conceptualising and defining the state (as an ideal-type) against the background of this chapter’s discussion of scientific constructs. Subsequently, equipped with a notion of what a state ‘should’ ideally look like (a theoretical definition of the state) the theoretical contributions of Joel Migdal, Robert Jackson and Samuel Huntington are reconstructed, interpreted, and evaluated to arrive at a conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state.

Returning now from this brief aside regarding the study as it unfolds in future chapters, attention is refocused on the discussion of definitions. Theoretical or connotative definitions thus refer to the features one connotes with a certain phenomenon (state dysfunction) and concept (the dysfunctional state). Mouton and Marais (1990) explain that, in an attempt to find a counter measure to the problems associated with variance in meanings encountered in theoretical definitions, research tends to emphasise the use of denotative definitions (also referred to as operational definitions: “An operational definition of a concept describes certain operations (usually some type of measurement) under which the use of the concept is valid. In other words, an operational definition presents specific conditions for the appropriate use of a specific concept – conditions that state that the execution of certain operations will result in specific results.” (Mouton & Marais, 1990:132).

When compared with theoretical definitions, operational definitions represent a clear shift from an abstract notion towards something more concrete and measurable. Therefore, operational definitions often specify measurable and quantifiable empirical criteria, which (if present) denote a certain phenomenon. Babbie (1998:124) illustrates this relationship through the following diagram:

*Figure 7: Theoretical and operational definitions*

![Diagram showing the relationship between conceptualisation, theoretical definition, operational definition, and measurement in the real world.](image-url)

(Babbie, 1998:124)
An operational definition builds upon a theoretical definition in the sense that it assigns quantifiable (measurable) indicators to the denotative content of a theoretical definition (Babbie, 1998:124). For example, if a part of the denotative content of a theoretical definition of state dysfunction is violence, an operational definition would aim to make violence measurable (for example, homicides per annum, casualties of war, deaths as a result of ethnic cleansing). Such indicators can be measured in the real world (see Figure 7) to indicate to an observer whether the phenomenon approximates state dysfunction or not. In other words, if violence is measured above a certain threshold, the phenomenon exhibits that specific characteristic of state dysfunction. Currently, this is the dominant method in studying dysfunctional states. Lists of measurable indicators are compiled and applied to various case studies. If the quantitative data reveals high levels of indicators $x$ and $y$, and low levels of indicators $a$ and $b$, a state may be classified as strong; conversely, the state is labelled as a failed state (or some other descriptive adjective of dysfunction). Whilst such operational definitions are undoubtedly important in making sense of reality, they must be based firstly upon sound conceptions, and secondly, sound theoretical (connotative) definitions. As noted in Chapter 1, this study contests that the existing conceptual and theoretical base is inadequate to conduct accurate operationalisation and measurement, and aims to address that deficiency (since denotative indicators are primarily dependent upon connotative meanings). In relation to Babbie’s (Babbie, 1998:124) illustration, this dissertation is concerned with bolstering the levels of conceptualisation and theoretical definition of state dysfunction (the attainment of valid and reliable knowledge) from which operational definitions may subsequently be constructed to identify and study dysfunctional states.

A significant research outcome of this study will thus be the construction (through means of conceptualisation) of a theoretical definition of state dysfunction. However, such a theoretical definition may form part of broader scientific constructs relating to state dysfunction, since when concepts, statements, hypotheses and definitions are arranged and combined in an attempt to classify, explain or predict reality, new scientific constructs are created, namely typologies, models and theories. These constructs primarily serve as heuristic mechanisms, since they aid the scientist in the understanding and discovery of reality.

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23 See, for example, the benchmark Failed States Index, published annually by Foreign Affairs Magazine.
7.3 Typologies

A typology, according to Mouton (1996:195), can be described as a conceptual framework in which phenomena are classified in terms of characteristics that they have in common with other phenomena. The natural sciences exhibit many such classifications or taxonomies that have become an integral part of scientific knowledge, such as the classification of the elements, or the classification of species. In social science, too, classifications abound: ideologies are classified as reactionary or radical, political convictions as liberal or conservative, party systems as one party, two party, dominant party, or multiparty, and states as strong or weak. Since typologies are constructed from concepts, they necessarily involve a measure of abstraction, in that certain realities are accounted for whilst others are ignored. Weber’s (1947) concept (or ideal-type) of the state is nowhere to be found in the empirical reality, since it represents a theoretical ideal. Similarly, in the domain of the natural sciences, one will never encounter a perfect vacuum in nature. Nevertheless, it is the predictive schema of the vacuum that makes empirical approximations comprehensible and comparable (McKinney, 1954:146). A typology focuses on uniformity, and it is through this notion of uniformity that variation and deviation can be understood, since any deviation is a departure from an given ideal. This concurs with the assumption held in this study that the dysfunctional state is a deviation from the ideal-typical state, hence the investigation of the ideal-type in the next chapter. McKinney (1954:147) delimits a typology (or constructed type, as he refers to it) as follows:

1. It is not a hypothesis in the sense that it is a proposition about concrete reality that is concretely verifiable, and to be accepted in this sense as true of verified. In contrast to this sense of concreteness, it is abstract.

2. It is not a description of reality, if by this is meant a concretely existing thing or process to which it corresponds. In this sense, it is also abstract.

3. The constructed type does not refer to the most common form of a phenomenon, but to the most significantly representative form. For instance, it makes sense to talk about the ‘economic man’ despite the fact it is doubtful that rationality (which forms part of this particular typology) is the most common form of economic behaviour. It is through the notion of rationality as the outstandingly representative form, that the non-rational forms of economic behaviour are then apprehended.
4. The constructed type is not a stereotype in that the stereotype often lacks an empirical referent, and is an unmethodical exaggeration that is not empirically useful because of a lack of explicit criteria that make it comparable to concrete cases – in other words, a stereotype is a construct of lay knowledge.

5. The constructed type is a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination and accentuation of criteria that have empirical referents, and that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases.

It is specifically the latter of these points that illuminate the role of typology and methodological choices in this study. By employing the Weberian concept of statehood as typological anchor reference, the conceptualisation of state dysfunction (i.e. deviation from the ideal) becomes purposive, planned and structured, eventually resulting in a valid and reliable description of the phenomenon. Thus, the theoretical content of this study may be depicted as representing a continuum of state dysfunction, with the established ideal-type of the state anchoring one end (functional), and a conceptualisation of the terminally dysfunctional state at the other extreme (as anti-type). Having delimited the continuum to two extremes (functional and terminally dysfunctional, or failed) graduations could be added to the continuum. This is where adjectives such as soft, weak, hollow, collapsed, and failing states may be distributed, each representing a departure from the antitype, or an approximation of the ideal-type. Such a typology of state dysfunction could, by means of illustration, be represented as follows:

![Figure 8: A simple typology of state dysfunction expressed as a continuum](Source: Own construct)

Although plotting the various permutations of state dysfunction on a typological continuum of statehood is not the primary aim of this study, it may nevertheless emerge as a desirable side effect, or as an opportunity for further research. Purposefully constructing such a typology would necessitate the formulation of operational definitions of each degree of dysfunction, which would lend itself to empirical measurement.

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24 Also see Figure 1.
However, the utility and relevance of the typology depicted above would depend upon a sound theoretical conceptualisation of the phenomena it purports to represent, namely state dysfunction. It is this theoretical conceptualisation which constitutes the primary goal of this study.

From the preceding sections, it is evident that the theoretical ambit of this study largely falls within the domains of conceptualisation and definition, with typologies fulfilling a peripheral role. Even though the development of advanced scientific constructs such as models and theories are beyond the scope of this study, a concise discussion of these aspects will be presented next. Clarifying the roles and functions of these scientific constructs will aid in the reconstruction, interpretation, and evaluation conducted in subsequent chapters.

7.4 Models

Models are scientific analogies or metaphors. They are created when phenomena are observed of which little or no knowledge exists, and then clarified through analogy with another phenomenon of which thorough knowledge exists (Duvenhage, 1993:49). Giere (1979) further illustrates this:

The use of models in science can best be described in general terms as follows. There is a type of system, such as atoms, about which not much is known. However, there are others systems such as solar systems, about which a lot is known. In 1900 there were already good theories of solar systems (e.g. Newton’s). Someone then suggests that maybe the unknown type of system is like the known one in certain important respects. This in turn suggests questions that one should ask about the unknown system: How fast are the electrons moving around their orbits? Are the orbits circular or elliptical? and so on. The model also suggests ways of answering the questions ... So it is clear that models as the basis of analogies do play an important role in scientific research – that is, in the creation of new theories. (Giere, 1979:197)

Mouton (1996:197) explains that in the example above, an established theory of the planetary system was used as the source for the construction of a model of the relatively unknown phenomenon of atomic activity. The assumption is thus made that similarities or analogies exist between unknown phenomenon A and known phenomenon B, through which A is subsequently clarified. Phenomenon B is thus used as model, through which A may be better understood. For example, one of the best-known models in the social sciences is that of Easton's (1953), which represents a
political system as a delimited and dynamic sequence of decision-making. Mouton and Marais (1990:141) identify the following key characteristics of models:

1. Models identify central problems or questions concerning the phenomenon that ought to be investigated.
2. Models limit, isolate, simplify and systematise the domain that is being investigated.
3. Models provide a new language game or universe of discourse within which the phenomenon may be discussed.
4. Models provide explanatory sketches and the means for making predictions.

Regarding the latter of these characteristics, models are said to provide preliminary or prototypical explanations for unknown phenomena (hence explanatory sketches). Although models provide explanations, purely by virtue of bringing variables and concepts into relation with each other, the task of more comprehensive explanation is left to theories.

7.5 **Theories**

Kerlinger (1973) defines a theory as “A set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations between variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena” (Kerlinger, 1973:9).

This definition combines those elements of typologies (interrelated concepts) and models (specifying relations between variables), with the addition of explanatory and predictive functions, characteristic of theories. Such a definition would thus suggest a hierarchical heuristic relationship between typologies, models and theories. Each progression requires the presence of the former, upon which is elaborated to constitute more advanced scientific function. Therefore, it is reasonable to posit that a good theory originates from a good typology, and that a good typology presents a useful classification of phenomena between which relationships may be modelled. Returning to the above-mentioned definition, Mouton (1996:199) elaborates on the explanatory nature of theories in social science. Firstly, in the social sciences (in contrast to the natural sciences) theories explain through constructing stories or narratives of phenomena. Such causal stories are more or less plausible (valid and reliable) to the extent that they identify the real causal processes or mechanisms that produce certain
states of affairs or events. Secondly, even though these causal stories might include empirical regularities (such as statistical generalisations) they do not necessarily assume the form of universal or deterministic laws. Thirdly, because explanatory theories typically explain phenomena in open systems, prediction is not an essential requisite for theories in the social sciences. Mouton’s (1996) elaboration on the explanatory character of theories in social science clearly correlates with the earlier discussion on the nature of social science research, namely that the nature of social scientific theories (as outcome) closely resembles the nature of social science practice (as process).

8. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to account for the meta-theoretical framework that underpins this conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state. Accordingly, it accounted for the nature of pre-scientific influences, the nature of ordinary and scientific knowledge, as well as the constructs that constitute science and enable scientific practice. Given the discussion of meta-theory and scientific methodology, this dissertation defines the process of conceptualisation, as it pertains to the research methodology and goals of this study, as the application of scientific constructs (not necessarily limited to concepts) in the investigation of a phenomenon.

Exploring the foundations of science and scientific research lays a solid base upon which the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of contributions pertaining to state dysfunction may be conducted. By virtue of their nature as scientists, the authors included in this study employ a scientific methodology characterised by the use of scientific constructs. For example, in a theoretical account of state dysfunction, an author will write from within a particular paradigm, employ certain key definitions and elaborate upon certain concepts, which may then be combined to form descriptive typologies or explanatory models. The presence of these scientific constructs represents a common denominator of all good science and, as such, enables the comparison of various thinkers according to their use of scientific constructs. In an attempt to identify and evaluate the various constructs employed by an author, they could conceivably be integrated into an analytic tool, in the form of a rubric which enables cross-reference. Such a rubric makes it possible both to identify each

individual author’s use of key scientific constructs, whilst facilitating comparison between different authors, remaining true to the inter-paradigmatic methodology of the study.

From a comparative perspective, a conceptualisation of the state is a logical point of departure for evaluating state dysfunction, since it represents a point of reference according to which state dysfunction may be determined. The next chapter deals solely with the formulation of a concept of ideal-typical statehood, which will be consistently employed in this study in the form of a definitional statement. In integrating this concept of the state with each author’s contribution on state dysfunction, consider the rubric below which accounts for each of the definitional elements of statehood:

*Figure 9: Comparing multiple authors’ contributions on state dysfunction using a single concept of state*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept of State (Chapter 3)</th>
<th>Element 1</th>
<th>Element 2</th>
<th>Element 3</th>
<th>Element 4</th>
<th>Element 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author 1</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author 2</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author 3</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Own construct)

From this, a more sophisticated tabulation of each respective author’s contribution may be constructed. Such a tool may account for an author’s paradigmatic points of departure and use of scientific constructs, in addition to the definitional elements of statehood, as illustrated below:

*Figure 10: Reconstructing an author’s contribution on state dysfunction*
The example above accounts for an author’s paradigm, in addition to identifying the concepts, typologies and models used by that author. The use of these scientific constructs is then related to a concept of state according to its area of applicability. Additionally, symbols may be employed to indicate the relation of a given scientific construct to state functionality. A concept that contributes to state dysfunction may be indicated with a $\downarrow$ symbol to indicate a negative or undermining effect upon an element of statehood. Conversely, a scientific construct that relates positively to state functionality may be indicated with a $\uparrow$ symbol in the applicable space. Furthermore, certain constructs employed by authors may have a destructive or terminal effect on state functionality, and are accordingly illustrated with a $\Box$ symbol.

This analytic tool serves to summarise a theoretical body of knowledge and to facilitate comparison between different authors, by identifying key aspects of their contribution. It is, however, important to note that such an analytic tool cannot replace a thorough reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of literature, which is why it will be employed as a means of concluding such a discussion, not as a substitute. Accordingly, the analytic tool is operationalised in concluding all subsequent chapters.

From the discussion conducted in this chapter, it becomes evident that this study prioritises scientific methodological soundness. As a continuation and extension of this ethos, the Weberian conception of state is systematically reconstructed in the following chapter as an anchor reference for the subsequent discussion and conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state. The Weberian concept of state represents a common denominator in the inter-paradigmatic makeup of the contributions assessed in this study, and its clarification and definition is therefore of methodological and conceptual importance.
Chapter 3
Conceptualising the functional state

1. Introduction

Having accounted for the meta-theoretical architecture employed in this study, it is once again useful to consider its title, *A conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state*. The previous chapter dealt with the meaning of concepts and scientific constructs and, in particular, the process of conceptualisation employed in this study of state dysfunction. The focus of this chapter concerns the next relevant aspect in this dissertation, namely the state.

The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualise the state. As noted in the introductory chapter, this study moves from the premise that a failed, or otherwise deficient state, is essentially a state that has become dysfunctional. Therefore, in order for the nature of state dysfunction to be successfully conceptualised, a theoretical benchmark of statehood must be identified and consistently employed. The outcome of this chapter is such a theoretical benchmark. Methodologically, this is achieved through a deductive, qualitative literature study focused on the definition and conceptualisation of the state in political science and international law, within which the dominant paradigmatic tradition remains the Weberian state. This culminates in a definitional statement of statehood, which will also serve as this study’s conceptualisation of statehood and will be employed in subsequent chapters evaluating state dysfunction.

The chapter commences by considering the concept of state as a scientific construct, thereby applying the theoretical discussion of the preceding chapter. Subsequently, the prominence and profile of the state concept is contextualised in political terms, both popular and scientific. The conceptualisation of state developed in this chapter begins by investigating the origin of the state, namely the state’s original and founding purpose. Subsequent sections elaborate upon this original foundation (the universal drive for protection) and the concomitant discussions demonstrate how the state developed in response to need for protection and stability. The key attributes of the modern state are identified, drawing on the work of Max Weber, whose conceptualisation of state remains dominant in the discipline. Perspectives from other authors are also considered and
distilled into a set of five primary attributes of state (also referred to in this dissertation as the Weberian core, or primary attributes) which are applied to the tool of analysis developed in Chapter 2. Each of these five attributes is discussed separately, after which they are once again combined in the form of a definitional statement. The conceptualisation of state dysfunction will be conducted from this definitional statement, which serves as the benchmark of ideal-typical statehood for this study. Furthermore, the constituent elements of the definition will be deployed in the analytic tools described in the previous chapter (Figures 9 and 10) and employed in all the chapters hereafter.

2. The state as a concept

This dissertation works from the assumption that a dysfunctional state is one that has ceased to perform some or all of its key functions. Therefore, a logical point of departure would be to assess what the concept of state entails, and what its most important attributes are.

A concept (such as the state) is a scientific construct, used to consider, criticise, argue and explain phenomena encountered in reality. Concepts assist in making sense of the world, because they impose meaning on the empirical reality one observes (Heywood, 2002:21). Mouton and Marais (1990:128) describe a concept as the most elementary lingual (symbolic) constructions through which man classifies and categorises reality. Furthermore, they add that concepts act as pigeonholes in which one can place elements of an unstructured and confusing reality, in order to achieve systematised order. Concepts are thus the primary tools used to make sense of reality.26

The term ‘state’ does exist, i.e. as a word. According to Babbie (1998:119), we can measure the number of letters the term contains, and agree that there are five. We can agree that it is monosyllabic and that it starts with the letter S. A similar observation could be made of the term ‘failed state’. However, the existence of the term does not automatically translate into the undisputed existence of the concept. Two people might agree upon the term ‘failed state’, yet they differ in their conception of what the term entails27. Babbie (1998:118-119) explains that concepts are like sheets of paper in our mental file drawers. Each ‘sheet of paper’ (concept) contains several keywords and phrases that, when combined, create a meaningful picture of the concept. For

26 See Chapter 2, section 7.1.
27 This was established in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, and is also reflected in the problem statement.
example, on my ‘sheet of paper’ is written ‘automobile’ (which by itself is only a term). However, numerous phrases are also written on this sheet in order to give meaning to my concept of an automobile: it has four wheels, a steering wheel, an engine, a gearbox, et cetera. When these words and phrases (Babbie refers to them as ‘indicators’) are combined, we are conceptualising. The result of this process of conceptualisation is the creation of the concept, which one can subsequently study. According to Babbie (1998:119), “In the big picture, language and communication work only to the extent that you and I have considerable overlap in the kinds of entries we have on our corresponding mental file sheets. The similarities we have on those sheets represent the agreements existing in our society.”

The challenge surrounding the term ‘weak/failed/collapsed state’, is that even though its existence cannot be denied, there is no consensus surrounding the meaning of the concept, since the term is employed by different individuals each of whom have differing entries on their ‘mental sheets of paper’ on a conceptual level. In essence, this forms the problem statement of the dissertation: a single term is used to refer to multiple realities. This leads to confusion when the term ‘failed state’ is employed in popular discourse, the media, and even academic circles – the sin of conceptual ambiguity. Taking this problem statement into account, the objective of this dissertation is methodically to achieve conceptual clarity concerning state failure or collapse by relating it to the broader phenomenon of state dysfunction.

3. Contextual orientation

No concept is more central to political discourse and political analysis than that of the state (Hay, Lister & Marsh, 2006:1), and politics is often understood as the study of the state (Heywood, 2002:85). The state has risen to prominence to become the major locus of power and authority in every modern society (Goodwin, 2007:333). Most of modern human activity is regulated, facilitated, or supervised by the state; it mobilises populations in defence of its borders, polices conduct in civil society, intervenes in the economy and even regulates the flow of information in the public sphere (Hay, Lister & Marsh, 2006:1).

The current global geographical landscape is divided into almost 200 states, many of which are relatively new additions. Only 30 of the states currently in existence were
independent states possessing their own governing systems over a unified territory in 1800. Most of the existing Latin American countries were established as self-governing states in the nineteenth century, after gaining independence from Spanish and Portuguese empires. After World War II, many new states were created in Africa and Asia in the process of decolonisation. In 2010, 17 African countries celebrated their 50th anniversaries of independence, from the largest, such as Nigeria and the former Belgian (now Democratic Republic of) Congo, to the vulnerable, like Niger and Somalia. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia resulted in the formation of more than 20 new states within the same region formerly occupied by the above-mentioned three states. The addition of the youngest internationally recognised state, namely the Republic of South Sudan, occurred in 2011.

The international community of states is therefore a fluid system, where states continually proliferate and, increasingly, become dysfunctional. Recently, it has become fashionable to posit the demise of the state as a relevant concept in political science28 (Green, 1990:64). Much has been written on the growing dominance and influence of multinational corporations (MNCs), nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and supranational entities, arguing that they might in the near future subordinate the state as the central point of departure when studying the international system (Grigsby, 2005:54). The object of this chapter is not to become embroiled in vindicating a certain pro- or anti-state agenda. However, this dissertation is written from the assumption that the state remains an important (probably the most important) conceptual instrument in political science. This assumption is supported by asserting that the number of states in the world has, in fact, consistently increased ever since the birth of contemporary statehood. As a result of this proliferation, the dynamics of the international system of states have also become more complex, leading to new challenges in theory and practice – one such problem being state dysfunction.

This chapter does not aim to make a contribution to the state-discourse in political science. The objective is to construct a concept of state that will be consistently employed in this dissertation, from which the dysfunctional state may be conceptualised. Since the concept of state is of such importance to the discipline of political science, it has been the subject of long-standing debates, rival theories and vast volumes of written opinion. Thus, extracting a concise and useable description of

28 For a summary of the different philosophical and theoretical dimensions of this viewpoint, see The Authority of the State (Green, 1990).
the state from this daunting body of collective knowledge runs the risk of becoming a controversial exercise. However, the elements that have been chosen as representative of the state are common denominators, present in most authoritative descriptions of the state. Controversy is thus avoided as far as possible in exchange for conceptual and definitional consensus.

4. The origin of the state – the universal drive for protection

Before the chapter proceeds to considering various descriptions, definitions and conceptions of the state (with the aim formulating this study’s own, useable conceptualisation) it is important to explore briefly the origin of the state as a form of collective human organisation. When surveying the various contributions of writers in the state discourse, it is useful to keep at least one paramount commonality in mind: the state’s original task of providing protection.

If it is true that groups of people organise themselves in response to a specific need, an organisation with the scope of the state must have been formed to respond to a need common to all individuals in society. The nature of this common need becomes clear once one dissects the various functions of the modern state. These functions are manifold and diverse – whereas some have only recently begun to be executed by states, others have been part and parcel of statehood for much longer. One can refer to the earliest of state functions as primary (or original functions) as opposed to secondary (or derivative) functions, which manifested more recently in history (Lipson, 1997:45). In an attempt to identify the state’s paramount, original and primary function, one could pose the question: “What is the essential, indispensable function which a state must perform in order to be considered a state?” The primary common concern of all human beings is the desire for security of life and limb, and foremost in every individual’s mind is seeking guarantees from physical harm. This is especially true when, according to Hobbes, “The condition of Man ... is a condition of war of every one against every one” (Hobbes, 1851:598).

It is this ‘condition’ that has, from earliest times, necessitated man to defend himself, or associate and arrange for defence. Initially, humans relied only upon themselves for protection. Through much of history, and almost certainly prehistory, personal weapons were kept in the home and carried on long journeys to defend against malicious
aggression against one’s person or possession (a custom which still persists in our modern society, for exactly the same reasons). Protection therefore lay in one’s own strong arm because, even if protection was summoned or offered from elsewhere, it might arrive too late. But how does one arm for a danger that is constant and unrelenting, or so well-organised and superior in numbers that no measure of individual preparation could be sufficient? Practical realities such as these brought man to the realisation that in order for security to be effective, it had to be collective. The protection that people could not obtain as individuals had to be found through cooperation with others. When a need (like the need for protection) remains constant, humans adapt and develop methods and strategies to satisfy the need, and these are continually repeated. At some stage, through continual repetition, these methods become accepted and subsequently endowed with a measure of formal organisation – they become institutionalised. Thus, it could be posited that the nucleus of the state is formed when a group of persons has institutionalised its own protection (Lipson, 1997:46) or, in the words of anthropologist Melville Herskovits, “...primitive political organisation is essentially an organisation for war and peace – war without, and peace within. Attacks on human life outside the political unit are conceived of as legitimate warfare and entail no sanction... Within the unit, such attacks are branded as crime...” (Herskovits, 1948:330).

History provides ample testimony which demonstrates that a direct relation has always existed between the type of organisation a group adopts for its defence on the one hand, and its government on the other. Similarly, contemporary experience also confirms the notion that the state is primarily concerned in guaranteeing the defence of its inhabitants. One need only consider the major conflicts of the twentieth century to realise that when communities are imperilled, everything becomes subordinate to the struggle for survival – the need to organise for defence and attack takes precedence over all other activities. The process of producing weaponry and armour is accelerated, and the means to achieving this end are expanded and guarded. Entire economies mobilise to achieve greater industrial output in order to wage effective war. Citizens are conscripted by the military for the common good, regardless of individual preference or proclivities, and the uniformed soldier becomes a ubiquitous feature in towns and cities. Thus, bearing in mind that the original and all-encompassing function of the state is

29 An institution is a social practice that is regularly and continuously repeated, sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and has a major significance in a social structure (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2006:200). The value of institutions and the process of institutionalisation is thoroughly evaluated in Chapter 6.
providing protection, one can continue to explore its other definitional elements, which are understood better when this universal function of protection is taken into account.

5. Constructing a concept

In order for a concept to be of use, it needs to depict effectively and accurately the phenomenon upon which it is applicable. To conduct a conceptualisation of a dog, for instance, one would have to identify the key generic features of a dog – features that would most unambiguously describe it. Thus, describing only the features observed in one dog, or even one breed of dog, would not be sufficient as it would not result in the construction of a useful and generally applicable conceptualisation, since it would only be a conceptualisation of one breed of dog. In order to construct a conceptualisation of a dog, one would therefore need to identify key commonalities and features across all breeds of dogs, features that are essential to the dogdom, as it were. Such features would include being four legged, mammalian, coated, et cetera. Yet this list of features could describe any four legged mammal with a coat, such as cats and squirrels. One would therefore need to include features that would distinguish dogs from animals that are not dogs. Such features might include the configuration of the paw, size and quantity of teeth, physical dimensions and other anatomical peculiarities. This process of inference reflects Locke’s well-known approach to generating ideas through a process of abstraction from specific examples, discussed in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke, 1690).

Similarly, in constructing a conceptualisation of the state, one must identify:

a) the features that define the state as a form of political organisation; and

b) the features that distinguish the state from other forms of political association.

As alluded to in the above-mentioned example, the utility and accuracy of such a conceptualisation would largely depend on the diversity of its origins. During the last 200 years many writers have developed conceptualisations and definitions of the state. Many of these definitions share common features, whilst some emphasise the addition or omission of certain features. The point is, that in order for a relevant and useful conceptualisation of the state to be conducted in this chapter, various preeminent definitions must be evaluated, compared and synthesised. Rather conveniently, the
mainstream of political science has over the last century employed a relatively stable and universal conception of the state – that of Max Weber’s.

In 1919, Weber was invited by the student organisation of the University of Munich to participate in a series of lectures on intellectual work as a vocation. He delivered his lecture, “Politik als Beruf”30 in January 1919 and it was subsequently published in various forms. The English translation used in this chapter is that of Gerth and Mills (1947:78). It was during this lecture that Weber first articulates his conception of the state. An expanded quote is provided, since Weber’s contextual description is of special importance for this chapter:

‘Every state is founded on force’, said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed right. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of ‘state’ would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as ‘anarchy’, in the specific sense of the word. Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state – nobody says that – but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions – beginning with the sib – have known the use of physical force to be quite normal. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to other individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. (Gerth & Mills, 1947:78)

In this extract, Weber introduces arguably the most crucial attribute of statehood: the ability to claim successfully a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. For Weber, and many other political scientists, the force, violence or coercion that states employ in maintaining their statehood is of paramount importance. If a state does not possess a monopoly of coercive force in society, there can be no law (for law is backed up by sanction) and by extension no order - this particular aspect is thoroughly discussed later in this chapter. Weber further elaborates on his core conception of the state in *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, which was translated into English by sociologist Talcott Parsons in 1947. Weber’s updated conception of the state reads:

30 “Politics as a vocation”.

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Since the concept of the state has only in modern times reached its full development, it is best to define it in terms appropriate to the modern type of state, but at the same time, in terms of which abstract from the values of the present day, since these are particularly subject to change. The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organised corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also regulated by legislation, is oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a large extent, over all action taking place in the arena of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory association with a territorial basis. Furthermore, to-day, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it ... The claim of the modern state to monopolise the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction. (Parsons, 1947:156)

From these two related definitions, it becomes clear that Weber does not conceptualise the state primarily in terms of its functions (the ends of statehood) but rather in terms of its *modus operandi* (the means of the state). Two aspects of Weber’s latter definition are particularly noteworthy, as they provide a basis and point of departure for many subsequent descriptions and conceptualisations of the state (Hay, Lister & Marsh, 2006:8). Firstly, Weber regards the modern state as wielding a monopoly of authoritative rule making within a boundaried territory. This is in turn backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence (force or coercion) within the same territorial space. Secondly, the state is regarded by Weber as a set of institutions with a dedicated personnel. Migdal also reiterates these characteristics in his definition of the state, as used in his book *Strong Societies and Weak States* (1988): “In short, following Max Weber, I use an ideal-type definition of the state: it is an organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way” (Migdal, 1988:19).

According to Migdal, understanding differences in states’ capabilities in reality requires more than a simple definition of the state as simply a political organisation that is the basis for government in a given territory. He argues that differences among states are related to the variations in certain key attributes or elements of ‘stateness’ that political

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31 The theme of institutionalisation features prominently in the contribution of Huntington, evaluated in Chapter 6.
leaders strive for. Firstly, leaders aim to hold a monopoly of force over the principal means of coercion in their societies by maintaining firm control over standing armies and police forces, while eliminating non-state controlled armies, militias and gangs.

Secondly, by enjoying autonomy from both external and domestic interference, state officials have sought to act upon their own preferences, making decisions that reshape, ignore or circumvent the preferences of even the strongest social actors. Thirdly, leaders have aimed for considerable differentiation of the state’s components, meaning that numerous agencies can take on the specialised and complex tasks of governing the peoples’ lives. Fourthly, state builders have sought to coordinate these components, allowing co-operation between the parts of the state and shared goals in individuals working in the various agencies of the state (Migdal, 1988:18-19). It is with this perspective that Migdal employs a concept of statehood similar to that of Weber, but warns that the predominance of the empirical state varies considerably in relation to the ideal-type (this is a significant remark that is of central importance to this dissertation).

Charles Tilly, who is arguably the leading author on the genealogy of the state and early state formation, also adheres to a distinctly Weberian conception of state. In the introductory chapter of The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Tilly, 1975) he introduces the following characterisation of the state: “An organisation which controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state insofar as (1) it is differentiated from other organisations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralised; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another” (Tilly, 1975:70).

Gianfranco Poggi employs Tilly’s conception (which clearly owes its origins to Weber) in his important work The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Poggi, 1990:19) as a basic interpretation of what statehood entails. Importantly, Poggi notes that the above-mentioned conception of the state comprises the fundamental and abiding features of the modern state, upon which many additional (secondary) features have developed during the last 200 years. Poggi’s comment is of relevance to the outcome of this chapter, since at its conclusion a conceptualisation of the primary attributes of the state (i.e. the generic and universal tenets of statehood) will be presented. Such a conceptualisation excludes the large variety of secondary functions and characteristics that states have assumed through development and modernisation, for example, social

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32 The role of the military establishment in dysfunctional states (praetorianism) is also discussed in Chapter 6.
welfare functions and economic intervention. As a concluding remark regarding Tilly’s conception of the state, it is interesting to note that he introduces the notion of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy can be considered as synonymous with sovereignty, which means that the state claims, and if necessary is willing to prove, that it owes to no other power its control over its population, and it exercises that control on its own account, sharing it with no other entity, internally or externally (Poggi, 1990:21). The aspects of sovereignty and self-determination are further elaborated upon in the discussion of Jackson’s contribution in Chapter 5.

Indeed, there is no shortage of scholars who employ Weber’s description of statehood, or variations thereof. Another of the foremost authors on the modern state, Patrick Dunleavy, also employs a Weberian concept of state. His conception commences with a classical institutionalist description (Weber being the first to characterise the state as a set of interrelated institutions) and then proceeds with a more elaborate functional characterisation, once again squarely positioned in the Weberian mould. Dunleavy’s description is quoted below:

The state is a complex, multi-criteria concept. In the contemporary era it refers to:

1. A set of organised institutions with a level of connectedness or cohesion, justifying shorthand descriptions of their behaviour in ‘unitary’ terms.
2. Operating in a given spatial territory, inhabited by a substantial population, organised as a distinct society.
3. These institutions’ socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of that society.
4. Their existence creates a ‘public’ sphere differentiated from the realm of ‘private’ activity or decision making.

Each state (ensemble of institutions) must also:

5. Claim sovereignty over all other social institutions and effectively monopolise the legitimate use of force within a given territory.
6. Be able to define members and non-members of the society, and control entry to and exit from the territory.
7. Make strong ideological/ethical claims to be advancing the common interests or general will of members of the society.
8. Be accepted as legitimate by significant groups or elements in the society.
9. Command bureaucratic resources so as to be able to collect taxation and order governmental affairs effectively.
10. Substantially regulate societal activities by means of a legal apparatus, and government activities by means of a constitution.
11. Be recognised as a state by other states. (Dunleavy, 2007:793)

In this description of the state, Dunleavy concurs with the core Weberian view of the state but elaborates with several additional features. This is regarded as a suitable conceptualisation of the state for the purposes of this dissertation, as it distinguishes between the Weberian core (points 1-5 presented earlier in the chapter), which will henceforth be referred to as primary attributes, and additional functions (points 6-11) which will be referred to as secondary attributes. The rationale for distinguishing between primary and secondary attributes is to conceptualise the state both in its essence and in its totality. For the purposes of this study, a state lacking or deficient in any of the primary attributes of state is considered to be dysfunctional. Accordingly, the level of dysfunction would logically escalate with the measure of deviance from these primary attributes. Consider the following diagram:

*Figure 11: Conceptualising the attributes of statehood*

The diagram above distinguishes between three levels of attributes, namely primary, secondary and tertiary attributes (it can also be described as first, second, and third order attributes, which is used interchangeably with the former nomenclature). The three levels of the diagram are arranged in a hierarchical order, commencing with the primary, first order attributes of statehood at the base, which progresses to third order
tertiary attributes at the apex. Much like Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, this portrayal of the attributes of statehood represents the progression from the most fundamental tenets of statehood to its most developed modern features. This diagram aids in the conceptualisation of the state (and therefore state dysfunction) since it enables one to differentiate between variations of the same concept (i.e. a typology). For instance, if ‘State X’ exhibits the first, second and third order attributes, it can be called a strong state\(^{33}\) (or self-actualised, in the Maslowian theme) which approximates the ideal-type. Many Western European and Scandinavian states exhibit all these features and are generally seen as role models of ‘strong’ statehood (Rotberg, 2004:4). ‘State Y’, on the other hand, might not exhibit any second or third order characteristics, but only a few of the first order’s. Such a state will not be as strong or developed as ‘State X’. Accordingly, such a state might be described in terms of its dysfunction – i.e. weak, soft or failing. But, importantly, it remains a state.

6. **Constructing a definitional statement**

This dissertation argues that if a state exhibits all of the primary attributes of statehood (the Weberian core) it is a state. It might not be a highly developed or successful state, but it is a state nonetheless. This premise is supported by the plethora of scholars who employ the Weberian core definition as a minimum requirement of statehood in their work, as demonstrated previously. Thus, using the conceptualisation of the state developed in this chapter and as it is employed in this dissertation, an entity could be considered a state if it possesses:

- an *administration*, of which the different parts are coordinated,
- is a *compulsory association*
- which can claim *binding authority* over all that occurs and
- exists within its *territory*, being able to do so through
- possessing a *monopoly on the legitimate use of force*.

These are considered the essential requirements for statehood. For the purposes of this study, if a state fails to exhibit any of these requirements it cannot be considered a functional state and may then warrant a description referencing degrees of dysfunction. The table developed in Chapter 2 (Figure 10) can now be completed accordingly:

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\(^{33}\) Depending on its goals, such highly developed states are often referred to as developmental states, or welfare states.
Figure 12: Comparing multiple authors’ contributions on state dysfunction using the Weberian concept of state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weberian Concept of State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Own construct)

Having formulated a conception of state and a definitional statement of ideal-typical statehood to be utilised in this dissertation, subsequent chapters will progress to a discussion on the antithesis, or dysfunctional state, which figures centrally as the focus of this study. The scientific constructs encountered in the contributions of each of the authors evaluated in Chapters 4 – 6 will be compared with this definitional norm.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to discussing each of the primary attributes from the above definitional statement of the state.

6.1 Administration

It was established earlier in the chapter that, from a sociological and anthropological point of view, the state is essentially a form of human organisation. This statement is uncontested by political scientists and is in fact implicitly or explicitly present in each of the descriptions of the state discussed in the preceding section. Because the state is an organisation, its power must be vested in, and exercised through, a set of purposefully structured arrangements (institutions), namely a body of rules, a series of roles, a pool of resources, all of which are committed to a distinctive, unified and unifying set of interests and purposes (Poggi, 1990:19). Moreover, since the state is a form of political organisation, it would lead that all political activities must either emanate from it, or refer to it as the preeminent political authority. The state can therefore also be described as a unitary organisation (see Dunleavy’s conception of the state above, point 1). Of course, individually or collectively, members of the population may exercise or be subject to other forms of power (such as the family or church), but

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34 This section is largely based on two excellent works that describe the organised administrative/bureaucratic character of the state, namely The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Poggi, 1990) and Essays in Sociology (Weber, 1947).
they cannot exercise *political* power. Some associations in society may exercise aspects of political power, but they do so only because they derive these aspects from the state and not of their own accord. This notion is also soundly integrated with this dissertation’s conceptualisation of the state, since the use of force can therefore be considered legitimate only in so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it (Weber, 1947:156).

Because of the unitary nature of the state, its distinguishable parts are (ultimately) centralised. This centralised quality ensures that:

1. the various parts of the organisation are at least nominally interconnected, or dovetail, so that each part has defined and differentiated tasks and responsibilities, but also work in conjunction and not opposition to each other; and
2. combined authority of these different parts eventually have their origin in a single source of executive authority.

Nonetheless, despite the centralised character of state organisation, a contrast emerges between the state as a unitary entity, and the diverse parts of which it is comprised. The various bureaux and institutions that embody the state administration differ greatly in the activities they authorise and conduct, and as a result they become relatively autonomous35. Each seeks to maximise the specific resources of the state it commands, and aims to assign priority to its own concerns above those of other parts of the administration. Bureaucracy is a relatively effective means of controlling these tendencies (Poggi, 1990:30). In his seminal description of ‘modern officialdom’, Max Weber (1947:196) provides the defining characteristics of bureaucracy:

1. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.
2. The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties.
3. The authority to give commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of officials.

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35 In this regard, see Chapter 6, section 4.1.
4. Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfilment of these duties and for the execution of the corresponding rights; only persons who have the generally regulated qualifications to serve are employed.

5. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.

6. The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (‘the files’) which are preserved in their original and draught form.

Needless to say, Weber’s (1947:196) characterisation of bureaucracy typifies the ideal and elaborates further on the nature of office management and document storage in subsequent points. The essential aspects of an organised administration can be extracted from this description. The first is the notion of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which is closely related to territoriality. Implicit in this point is the requirement that the administration (as executive instrument of the state) be operational over the entire geographical area of the state, which may further divided into sub-national districts where different parts of the administration enjoy jurisdictional authority. These fixed and jurisdictional areas also contribute to the stability of the administration, since it clearly delineates the spheres of responsibility of the various interconnected parts of the state organisation. The second important notion is that the activities of these interconnected parts are governed by rules (laws or administrative regulations). This ensures that the coercive power wielded by the administration is applied in an even-handed and predictable manner.

Weber also mentions the continuous nature of a bureaucratic structure (point 4 above), which would suggest that the state is a continuous venture, unlike the intermittent phenomena of governments and regimes. The continuous nature of the state, and the administration through which it controls and coerces within its territory, thus requires agents qualified in the ‘continuous fulfilment of these duties’ – an administrative corps. This group (who are variously referred to as bureaucrats, civil servants, public managers, et cetera) occupies itself with the activities necessary for the effective maintenance and prolongation of the state’s existence. Heinrich Popitz concisely describes the result of a successful bureaucratic-administrative order in the Weberian mould:
First, there is the growing *depersonalisation* of power relations. Power no longer stands or falls with one particular individual who at any given time happens to have a decisive say. It connects progressively with determinate functions and positions which transcend individuals. Then, there is growing *formalisation*. The exercise of power becomes more and more oriented to rules, procedures and rituals. A third aspect of the institutionalisation of power is the growing *integration* of power relations into a comprehensive order. (Popitz, 1992:38)

As has been mentioned previously, Weber’s typology is an ideal. In reality the administrative bureaucratic character of various states differ markedly in terms of levels of institutionalisation and capacity, or as Huntington would put it, not a state’s form of government but rather its *degree* of government (Huntington, 1968:1). What elements of administration are therefore relevant when evaluating the administrative order of dysfunctional states? What critical mass of administration must be present in a state for it to possess a bureaucratic order? Many state administrations in the developing world are far from exhibiting the criteria described above by Popitz. Yet the conceptualisation of the state formulated in this chapter does not require an administration to reflect the ideal, it merely requires the existence of an administration. As the dissertation develops in subsequent chapters, selected empirical references will exhibit the nature of administrations in the context of dysfunctional states and how they function (or not) within those contexts. Of particular relevance in this regard is the work of Huntington (Chapter 6) which explores the role of institutions in modernising societies. For now, it is sufficient to conclude this section with the statement that a state must be capable of projecting the coercive power vested centrally (in a ruler or government) in a diffuse manner so that it effectively governs the entire territory – the means through which this is achieved is an institutionalised administrative order.

As an additional remark concerning the administration of the organised state, it is desirable for the purposes of accountability and transparency, that the institutions of state are recognisably public, in contrast to the ‘private’ institutions of the rest of society. In other words, public institutions should execute public functions, for the benefit of the public in general. Charles Tilly (1975:70) describes this as a “process of differentiation”, a process which is at its maximum when the state administration performs *all* and *only* political activities. Perhaps the most well-known manifestation of this process of differentiation has been the process of secularisation. A state is secular to the extent that it disclaims any responsibility for fostering the spiritual well-being of its citizens. It thus regards the religious beliefs of citizens as private and irrelevant for its purposes.
Another example of differentiation is the divide between the state and civil society. This divide, when permitted and tolerated by a state, conveys the state's recognition that the individuals subject to its authority also have capacities and interests of a *non-political* nature. This has specific relevance for citizens' economic activities, since the production and distribution of wealth in society are largely assigned to private institutions (businesses) and the market. As a result of differentiation, the state will act as an 'outside guarantor' (serving public interests) rather than as an interested party (Poggi, 1990:21). When the state's administrative organisation is described as being public in nature, it implies that the machinery of state be utilised to perform functions in the public interest. The debate on what exactly constitutes 'public interest' is a long-standing one, and will not be entered into in this chapter. However, the public interest is in essence *not* the private interests of the executors of state power and authority (members of government and political leaders).

As discussed previously the original function of the state is to provide protection to all citizens within its territory – arguably the paramount public function. Thus, a state is compromised when:

a) its administration provides public functions selectively (for example, choosing to extend the function of protection only to certain groups, defined ethnically, religiously or otherwise;

b) uses its monopoly of force to impose private functions not in the public interest (for example, corruption, cronyism, nepotism, resource extraction for personal gain); or

c) its administration has become unable to fulfil public functions (for example, due to civil war, insurgency, natural disaster, economic collapse or incompetence and incapacity). The latter of these examples is a common occurrence in many states that are considered dysfunctional, which receives attention in subsequent chapters.
6.2 A monopoly of force

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the Weberian conception of the state is that it must successfully lay claim to a monopoly of physical violence\(^{36}\) within a certain territory. It is interesting to note that even prior to Weber, political thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes noted that fledgling states should prioritise the monopolisation of violence and that centralising this function (discussed in the preceding section) was a driving force in statecraft. According to Weber, the requirement of monopolising violence in society emphasises *means*, not *ends*. He notes that:

\[T\]he state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those associations which are designated as political ones: today the state, or historically, those associations which have been the predecessors of the modern state. Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific *means* peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force. (Weber, 1990:69)

What Weber is, in essence, saying is that the state is not fulfilling a new or novel function in human existence. Several other societal institutions and political associations throughout history (for example, the feudal system or the Greek city-state) have existed that fulfilled such an array of diverse functions that they cannot be defined by merely analysing their functions alone, in addition to employing violence as a means to reach their ends. Consider the family as a form of association, compared to the state as a form of association. Both the family and the state possess authority, and can coerce a member of its association to conform to its will. Yet only the state has the means to apply its authority *universally*, since (if it as a functioning state) it possesses a 'monopoly of force over a territory and its population'. The family as a form of association does not possess this universal authority; one family cannot allocate binding values to another family, or all other families in a society. Thus, according to Weber’s definition, in reality the most essential test of the existence of a state is whether or not it can lay claim to a monopoly of force in the territory under its jurisdiction (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:3), and it is probably the single most important characteristic that distinguishes it from other forms of human organisation in society. However, in order to understand this conceptual element completely, one also needs to

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\(^{36}\) In the context of this discussion, the term violence and force are used synonymously. The German term used by Weber is ‘gewalt’, which does not differentiate between force and violence.
explore the other part of the twofold requirement posited by Weber, since he refers to a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. In the words of Lipson (1997:62) “power is naked; authority is power clothed in the garments of legitimacy”.

The state is an exercise in legitimation, since its decisions are considered binding on the members of society. These decisions are considered to be binding, because the state possesses the coercive power (monopoly of violence) to enforce them. If a citizen does not obey, he/she is punished. But when can the exercise of this power be considered legitimate, or authoritative? What is legitimacy? To use a hypothetical example, consider a nomadic tribe. Under the excellent leadership of a specific chief, this tribe manages to conquer other neighbouring tribes, thus expanding its territory, gaining grazing pasture, riches and slaves. Most members of this tribe recognise that, were it not for the leadership of their chief, these achievements would not be possible. The chief (as a leader) has managed to attract adherents through his capacity for leadership, and thus gain a following. Because of the support from his tribe, the chief becomes powerful (i.e. he is able to achieve results through concerted action). The claims of his power hold sway only for those who consent to it (his supporters) but not by all individuals in the tribe. Three groups can be identified in this scenario:

1. The chief (leader);
2. Those who support the chief;
3. Those who oppose the chief.

The ‘rightness’ of the chief’s power is therefore only acknowledged by groups 1 and 2. Group 3 may be violently coerced into submission, and the chief’s raw power may secure compliance, but compliance is not the same as allegiance. The point is that although the chief possesses power, he does not necessarily exercise authority. Authority is a rule which all accept as valid (Lipson, 1997:61). The exercise of authority is accepted and approved by those who approve of the leader (group 2) but also tolerated by those who oppose the leader (group 3). Confronted with power, the individual has a choice: whether to support or oppose. However, when confronted with authority, the only option is to obey.

From a juridical point of view, power is a de facto construct, which concerns facts and actions, whilst authority is a de jure construct, concerning right. The primary aim of any successful political institution (and in particular the state) is to transform its coercive
might (power) into authority, by invoking legal and moral concepts to establish its legitimacy in society, thereby gaining compliance and co-operation from its citizens (Goodwin, 2007:328). Thus, a state’s authority rests both on its legal validity and on the people’s acknowledgement of political obligation, which in turn ensures their loyalty and obedience to the laws of state. Coercion (naked power) creates obedience, but at a high cost in manpower and capital, whilst through possessing authority a state can control both the minds and the behaviour of individuals at a very low premium, providing it is established and accepted in society. In this regard, Binder et al. (1971:142) explain that “…once power has been transformed into authority by the process of Legitimation it requires less physical input to achieve the same effect. Thus it is that out of excessive power struggles leaders seek to transform their naked power into an acceptable form of legitimacy.”

Goodwin (2007:329) notes that Weber’s well-known analysis of power represents an account of the sources of authority. Weber (1947:78-80) identifies three types of power, which he qualifies with additional requirements, and which essentially convert that power into authority. Firstly, he identifies the authority of the ‘eternal past’\(^{37}\), where power held by a group or individual is sanctified through its ancient recognition or the habitual orientation to conform. The patriarchs, kings or patrimonial rulers of centuries past exercised this ‘traditional’ legitimation of power. Secondly, there is the authority of an extraordinary personal gift of grace or charisma. Legitimacy emanates from the ruler’s ability to project qualities of heroism or great individual leadership and wisdom. According to Weber, this charismatic authority is the tool of the prophet, the plebiscitarian ruler, the party leader, the demagogue, and (notably) the warlord. Thirdly, there is legitimacy by way of legality, when there is an absolute belief in the validity of the law and the rationally created rules that govern society. Notably (again in reference to the previous section) this is the type of authority exercised by the ‘servant of the state’ in executing his duties as part of the state’s centralised administration. Thus, the requirements of an administration and legitimate violence are intimately linked and mutually reinforcing. This does not, however, discount the other two bases of authority and legitimacy, namely tradition and charisma. The three types of legitimate power may be summarised as follows:

\(^{37}\) In fact, Weber uses the term ‘ewig Gestrig’, which is directly translated as the “eternal yesterday”. 

1. Patriarchal or traditional power supported by traditions and myths;

2. Charismatic power, which rests on the leader’s personality and is the antithesis of permanent, rule-bound authority;

3. Bureaucratic power, resting on a legal structure and characterised by impersonal rules in regularities, and authority attached to offices.

By applying Weber’s three-part conceptualisation of authority, one can easily identify the sources of authority for various types of political association. Tribal and monarchical systems rely heavily on patriarchal powers supported by tradition, prevalent in feudalistic, web-like, societies (see Chapter 4). Liberal democracies acquire authority through bureaucratic power and rational legal institutions, while fascist states often look to the charisma of a leader (führer) as the sole source of authority.

Some may argue that patriarchal and charismatic authority is less tenable and as a result less desirable in achieving stability within a state. For the purposes of this discussion the important factor is that a state possesses authority and that, by extension, the exercise of state power is authoritative. However, it is worth remarking that legitimacy is less enduring and more transient when vested in individuals compared to institutions.

A state can ensure compliance from individuals through raw power alone, but at great cost. Such states usually construct elaborate intelligence networks and all-powerful security establishments in order to ensure compliance from citizens, resulting in the state assuming a praetorian character. In such cases, a lack of legitimacy leads to the emanation of state dysfunction from within, rather than from societal influences – in other words, states are threatened less by warlords and guerrillas and more by endemic corruption and dysfunction within the institutions of state. History has proved repeatedly that such states are not sustainable, as the discussion of Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies* will demonstrate in Chapter 6. However, a state that possesses authority in the eyes of its citizens is seen as legitimate and obedience is realised not through fear and coercion, but a sense of obligation.
6.3 A compulsory association with binding authority

The notions of the state as a compulsory association exercising binding authority in society are two aspects that will be discussed under one heading, as they are in fact mutually reinforcing in practice, and slightly tautologous in theory. The reader will notice that these twin aspects are closely integrated with the state’s maintenance of a monopoly of legitimate force. Once again, reiterating Weber, the monopoly of force is the means the state employs to secure compulsory association from citizens, whilst at the same time maintaining binding authority within its territory. Note the use of the term ‘binding authority’. As was established in the preceding section, a successful state exercises its power with legitimacy, thus converting it into authority. Whilst a state can maintain a ‘binding power’ (as opposed to binding authority) over its citizens and territory, it might eventually prove to be a difficult situation to maintain indefinitely. This leads one to the conclusion that the exercise of power is a labour- and cost-intensive endeavour, whilst exercising authority is largely tacit and subliminal, and thus much cheaper to maintain than a perpetual show of might.

Describing the state as a compulsory association entails that one is automatically subject to its jurisdiction the moment one enters its territory, until exiting. In other words, an individual cannot exercise a choice relating to whether he is subject to, say, the Republic of Brazil’s jurisdiction once he/she is in Brazil. The individual has no choice in the matter. One might be a permanent resident of Brazil or merely a tourist visiting the state; it is of no consequence, since one happens to be within the demarcated territory of a state, wherein that state controls the monopoly of legitimate force that constitutes the means through which this notion of compulsory association is enforced. Thus the state exercises binding authority upon all who happen to be in its territory (Raphael, 1976:43). If a person finds himself within Brazilian territory he is necessarily bound by its laws, and if he disobeys them he will be punished accordingly, based upon the supposition that he is bound by them through the compulsory association with the state and (by extension) the compulsory jurisdiction it exercises over him.

For much of history, a person or group of people who preferred not to be subject to the laws of their native state could leave and start a new community elsewhere where rules and laws of their own choosing could be instituted (laws that, perhaps, they considered to be more legitimate). In the contemporary world order, however, all habitable parts of
the earth have been claimed and incorporated into the approximately 200 states currently in existence. One option is to emigrate to another state, where one will obviously form part of that state’s compulsory association. Another more extreme route is to secede from the state under which one resides, or to challenge the monopoly of force that the state claims over its territory. This is not uncommon, and has been the motivation behind many intra-state conflicts across the world, including Angola, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Indeed, the monopoly of force of most (if not all) dysfunctional states has been challenged, with varying degrees of success. If a secessionist or separatist movement succeeds in substantially compromising the state’s monopoly of force, it manages to undermine the compulsory association that state lays claim to, since through means of force it follows its own will, rather than that of the state. In such instances, a state will temporarily lose control over parts of its territory, now occupied by the dissidents. In cases of secession, the state loses total control over that territory, since it is appropriated by political groups seeking independence and, by definition, a single state ceases to exist and is supplanted by two entities.

6.4 Territory

“The state does not have a territory, it is a territory.” (Romano, 1947:56)

Thus far, four of the primary attributes (Weberian core) of statehood have been discussed, namely an organised administrative order, which serves, claims and enforces a monopoly of legitimate force that in turn manifests a compulsory association which claims binding authority. These elements receive a capstone through means of a fifth attribute, namely a defined locus for these characteristics to occur, a defined territory.

Geographical territory itself is probably the most obvious (and empirically self-evident) aspect of the state’s requirements (Caramani, 2008:87). Typically, a state’s territory is continuous, has no enclaves and is relatively large. The most visible aspect of the development of the modern state in Europe, for example, was the drastic simplification of the continent’s political map, which circa 1500 comprised some 150 independent political entities and by 1900 only 25 (Poggi, 1990:22). Indeed, it is by territory that one recognises a state on an atlas, and it is over territorial disputes that many international and civil conflicts have erupted in history. The point may even be posited that territory

38. The emergence of non-state actors who challenge the binding authority of the state is analysed by Migdal (See Chapter 4).
39. For example, areas controlled by the LTTE in Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka up to 2009.
largely defines and shapes the character of a state, regardless of the degree of government occurring within its borders. Territories (i.e. states) with rich mineral, precious metal or oil deposits may become host to a lucrative mining industry, or conversely, devastating civil and international conflicts over the possession of diamond fields (Sierra Leone) or oil (Angola), manifesting what is often referred to as a ‘resource curse’.

To be regarded as a state, a polity must police a specific demarcated portion of the earth, being able to overwhelm any internal challenges through exercising legitimate force – a competency upon which it must maintain a secure monopoly. It must also claim that portion territory against any and all other states, be able and willing to protect and defend it, patrol its boundaries, confront and repulse encroachment by other states and protect the resources in its geographical ambit. It is thus clear that the relation between state and territory is an inextricable one. However, a demarcated territory is not merely a location for the activities of the state. Rather, it represents a physical dimension of the state’s own symbolic identity, the very ground of its existence and of its historical continuity which has resulted in it being referred to as the ‘Motherland’ or ‘Fatherland’ by various nations. Closely linked to the territorial ambit of the state and the monopoly of force it exercises within it, is the concept of sovereignty.

6.5 Sovereignty

Sovereignty finds a dual application with regard to the state. Firstly, in the context of international relations, states as sovereign units have a right to be independent or autonomous with respect to other states. In reality, states may differ in their abilities (to project power) but as sovereign entities they are all legal equals in the international realm. Secondly, sovereignty is the attribute of the state that refers to its right to exercise complete jurisdiction over its own territory and conduct its own affairs (self-determination). In other words, domestically the state represents the supreme, independent and final authority in society (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993:593). The state thus claims, and must be able to prove (via the monopoly of force it possesses), that no other power compromises its domination over the population and territory over which it presides. The domination it exercises exclusively by the state’s own account, in that it activates its own resources through its organisational and administrative capacities (whether natural or manmade) unconditionally, and this domination is not shared with any other entity (Poggi, 1990:21).
Although other power-wielding entities exist within all states (for example, trade unions, universities, municipalities) the state overrules any and all of these associations by the means particular to it. This domestic sovereignty (as opposed to the international sovereignty also mentioned above) is of particular concern when one considers the occurrence of state dysfunction and is intimately linked to the preceding discussions on the monopoly of force and the state’s territory. It is a distinctive feature of dysfunctional states such as Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia that various groups operate within the defined territory of the state whilst undermining the state. These insurgent groups often exercise absolute control over substantial swathes of territory where the state, in turn, has virtually no influence. This occurrence clearly undermines the domestic sovereignty of a state, compromises the state’s ability to protect its citizens and in some cases even leads to the loss of legitimacy as popular warlords and well-governed insurgent groups gain support and popularity in society. Yet in the contemporary world order, certain states exist that maintain internal sovereignty, but are not recognised as sovereign by other states. States such as Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, Somaliland, Taiwan, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Palestine enjoy limited or no de jure recognition by other states, yet empirically they embody all the primary attributes of statehood discussed previously. It would thus appear that from a practical, de facto point of view, external sovereignty is not necessarily a fundamental requirement of statehood. The reader will notice that the requirement of external sovereignty is regarded as a secondary attribute (see Figure 11), in other words, it is not a prerequisite for statehood and a state cannot be considered to be dysfunctional solely because other states do not recognise it as a peer in the international community. Furthermore, internal sovereignty is not indicated as a primary attribute, since it is regarded to be the collective result of the primary attributes when combined. An extended discussion on sovereignty in the developing world is conducted in Chapter 5, through a reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of Jackson’s (1993) Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World.

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41 In the same manner that sovereignty and international recognition has been denied to certain empirically viable states, the post-colonial period has witnessed the granting of sovereignty to many dubious and unviable states, many of which are not considered to be dysfunctional. In this regard, see Chapter 6, section 5.
7. Conclusion

This chapter commenced with a contextualisation of the prominence of the state as a concept in the discipline of political science (theory) and the continuing prominence of statehood in reality (practice). Several conceptualisations of statehood were discussed, amongst which Max Weber’s was demonstrated to be preeminent. By adopting Weber’s conceptualisation as the theoretical point of departure and augmenting it with elements contributed by other writers, a three-tier typology of statehood was constructed, as depicted in Figure 11. The first level of this typology represents the primary attributes of statehood, or the Weberian core. Upon this foundation, other attributes of the state may develop through processes of modernisation and political development. These attributes are described as secondary and tertiary attributes. However, what is of pertinent relevance to this dissertation are the primary attributes, since without them, a state cannot be considered truly functional (in other words it is dysfunctional).

The five primary attributes identified in this chapter will be employed as a ‘measurement of statehood’ when assessing the various contributions by authors in the field of state dysfunction, and therefore collectively constitute the concept of state as it is henceforth consistently employed throughout this dissertation (see Figure 12). Together, the primary attributes may be expressed in the form a definition statement, namely that a sovereign state is an entity possessing an administration, of which the different parts are coordinated, it is a compulsory association which claims binding authority over all that occurs and exists within its demarcated territory, being able to do so through possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. From the discussion of each of these attributes, the reader will have noticed that these are in fact inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. It would be unlikely for one attribute to exist without the presence of the remaining four (it would indeed indicate the presence of state which is dysfunctional). Consider the following diagram:
Figure 13: The mutually reinforcing relationship between the primary attributes of state

Figure 13 illustrates the relationship between the various elements of the definitional statement, which together constitute the concept of state developed in this chapter. Each of the elements is both reinforcing of – and dependent upon – one another. However, in functional terms, each of these elements is empowered by a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in society. The maintenance of this monopoly acts as a keystone, which incorporates the other attributes and unifies them to realise sovereign statehood. Significantly, the necessity of maintaining a monopoly of legitimate force must be balanced and tempered by legitimacy. Without legitimacy, state institutions incur the wrath of oppressed or dissident groups in society, whilst rendering themselves vulnerable to internal dysfunction such as corruption and maladministration. Both the societal and institutional drivers of state dysfunction are equally potent in contributing to state dysfunction, as subsequent chapters will illustrate. The next chapter particularly emphasises the societal influences that contribute to state dysfunction, through an evaluation of Migdal’s *Strong Societies and Weak States* (1988).

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42 According to Migdal and Huntington’s analyses, respectively.
Chapter 4
Dysfunctional societies: the contribution of Joel S. Migdal

1. Introduction and contextualisation

In the preceding chapter, a tentative conceptualisation of state dysfunction was arrived at, namely, that it represents the absence of certain primary attributes of statehood. The primary attributes, in addition to secondary and tertiary attributes, were identified through conceptualising of the state according to the Weberian ideal-type. This ideal-typical conception is used as a barometer of sorts, since it depicts an idealised and fully functional state, in other words, a state bearing no dysfunctional characteristics. It is, therefore, the ‘thesis’ of which the failed state represents the ‘antithesis’.

This chapter, and the two chapters that follow, will investigate the theoretical nature of state dysfunction. The goal of each chapter is to analyse the work of a scholar on the subject, from which insights will be gained into states, societies, or political systems that represent significant deviations from the ideal-typical norm. These analyses will subsequently be combined and synthesised to construct a comprehensive conceptualisation of state dysfunction.

The multi-paradigmatic nature of the study, mentioned earlier, is achieved through the particular emphasis each of the three selected contributions place on state dysfunction. This chapter will consider the influential work of Joel S. Migdal, specifically his 1988 book entitled: Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. His work is of great utility for this investigation since, firstly, Strong Societies and Weak States investigates the phenomenon of weak states (in other words, dysfunctional states), and secondly, he conducts this investigation from a point of departure that emphasises the Weberian concept of statehood. Migdal describes the purpose and theme of Strong Societies and Weak States as follows:

This book offers a set of tools – a model and a theory – for approaching the difficult question of why some states succeed more and some less in realising the visions of their leaders. (Migdal, 1988:xiii)
Why have many Third World states had such difficulty in becoming the organisation in society that effectively establishes those rules of behaviour? (Migdal, 1988:xx)

These two extracts respectively serve as mission statement and problem statement to Migdal’s book. Migdal investigates what factors have prohibited states in the developing world from becoming the dominant, functional and capable institutions that are encountered in the developed, so-called first world. His analysis focuses on the nature of state-society relations in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and how these two competing entities (state vs. society) influence each other’s capabilities to achieve its goals. To achieve this, Migdal adopts a magnifying lens, focusing on the detailed social arrangements in societies of the developing world, from prior to the arrival of Western civilisation (usually the form of colonialism) until after the achievement of independence from colonial masters. This almost sociological perspective enables the reader to identify the societal patterns that maintain state weakness and inhibit the development of state autonomy. Central to Migdal’s analysis is the notion of fragmented social control in dysfunctional states, whereby various socio-political actors compete for primacy and allegiance. Thus, whereas the state should be the paramount wielder of social control and sanction, it has to share this function with other (sometimes equally influential) actors in society.

As a point of departure for this chapter, the concept of state to which Migdal adheres is described, following which his paradigmatic approach is analysed. The chapter then begins a discussion on social upheaval in traditional societies caused by Western infiltration, and the subsequent social fragmentation that results. Themes relevant to this discussion include the expansion of the world economy, changes in land tenure patterns in the developing world, taxation, transportation and colonialism. Next, attention is focused on Sierra Leone, a case study employed by Migdal as a state influenced by the factors above, and which has come to be seen as an example of state dysfunction in Africa. Finally, the vicious cycle of politics in dysfunctional states (known as the politics of survival) is discussed, demonstrating how states caught in the grip of chronic weakness find it almost impossible to break the established power relations in society. This methodology is summarised as follows:
2. Migdal’s view of the state

Migdal’s specific view of the functional (ideal-type) state is of particular importance to this study. In this regard, his point of departure resembles that of the previous chapter in this study, the Weberian tradition. Migdal clarifies his view of the state as follows: “Our view of the state, then, corresponds to Max Weber’s notion of the state as institutional – an organisation – enforcing regulations, at least in part through a monopoly of violence. States vary in the degree to which they actually approach such an ideal type” (Migdal, 1988: xii).

This statement concurs with the assumptions underlying this dissertation which were developed in Chapter 3. However, Migdal acknowledges that in reality states vary in their capabilities, such as enforcing regulations and maintaining a monopoly of violence. This would then underwrite the assumption held by this study that state functionality can be placed on a continuum, either approaching the ideal-type or terminal dysfunction (see Figure 1). Elaborating upon the variance in state capabilities and functionality, Migdal explains that understanding the phenomenon of state dysfunction requires more than a simple definition of the state as a political organisation that is the basis for government in a given territory. He explains that differences among states have related
to variations in certain key attributes of ‘stateness’, which represent the ultimate goals of the leaders of these states.

Firstly, leaders aim to hold a monopoly over the principal means of coercion in their societies by maintaining firm control over armies and police forces, whilst eliminating challengers such as private armies, militias and gangs. Secondly, state officials have sought to act upon their own preferences through state autonomy from domestic and external forces, making decisions that reshape, ignore or circumvent the preferences of even the strongest actors in society. Thirdly, state leaders have aimed for significant differentiation of its components, resulting in numerous agencies being tasked with governing inhabitants’ lives. Fourthly, state leaders have sought these components to be clearly coordinated, resulting in coherence and a shared purpose for all governing authorities (Migdal, 1988:18-19). Thus, according to Migdal’s view of the state, the most fundamental aspect one needs to comprehend regarding state dysfunction is that these attributes are not exemplified equally and consistently in all states. The state, therefore, is not something to be taken for granted. As a reiteration of his view of the state, Migdal explains that:

In short, following Max Weber, I use an ideal-type definition of the state: it is an organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way. Real states, it is important to remember, vary considerably in how closely they fit the ideal-type. (Migdal, 1988:19)

However, Migdal warns against adopting the Weberian concept of statehood as an isolated monolith, arguing instead for an integrated analysis combining both the state and the society in which it exists – the so-called state-in-society approach (Migdal, 1997:208-231; Migdal, 2001:3-38).

2.1 The state-in-society approach

According to this approach, Migdal argues that a successful state in the Weberian mould is shaped by two key elements, namely image and practices (Migdal, 2001:16).

Firstly, the image a state projects relates to perception, in other words, how the state is perceived by members of society in general. A successful state projects the image of a dominant, integrated, autonomous entity that controls all rulemaking in a given territory,
and (importantly) is perceived by society as such. Maintaining this perception of dominance requires that the state is separated from society (the public/private divide) but also that it remains elevated and clearly distinguished from other entities in society (Migdal, 2001:18). State administrations that are corrupt and susceptible to undue influence are unable to maintain the status of being separate from – and elevated above – the interests of groups and individuals in society. Thus, compromising a state’s positioning in society also compromises its autonomy.

Additionally, Migdal notes, *practices* serve to recognise, reinforce and validate state control as well as its separation from other organisations in society (Migdal, 2001:18). Ritual and ceremony serve as practices that reinforce the image of the state described above. The practice of conducting legal affairs in a courthouse, for example, reinforces the image of a state that is distinct from society. The courthouse represents the domain of the state, where adjudication of matters occurs on neutral ground and based on impartiality and rationality – an arena where the public/private divide is maintained and enforced. However, when practices fail to observe this divide or undermine this divide, it weakens the image of an elevated and dominant state. The practice of nepotism, corruption, using the power of public office for private gain, all contribute to the decay of the Weberian ideal-type state. Such actions not only undermine the Weberian monolith as distinctly public and impartial in the eyes of society (i.e. image), but also contributes the state’s constituent parts each pursuing separate agendas, where agencies and institutions often have competing and conflicting interests. In this regard, Migdal’s perspective is complemented by Huntington’s (1968:24-71) account of public institutions amidst conditions of political decay, discussed in Chapter 6. Thus, the state runs the risk of not being perceived as the only rule maker in society (if it allows other actors in society to usurp that role) and it turns on itself (as each administrative agency and each administrator pursues its own interests).

Migdal explains that understanding the state-in-society approach requires understanding that in certain instances the state may also be a contradictory entity which acts against itself:

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43 Regarding the issue of practices undermining the cohesion of state administration, Gupta’s (1995) article entitled *Blurred Boundaries* remains an influential contribution.
The state-in-society model focuses on this paradoxical quality of the state; it demands that students of domination and change view the state in dual terms ... as if it were a single, centrally motivated actor performing in an integrated manner to rule a clearly defined territory...and as the practices of heaps of loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the officials state borders and often promoting conflicting sets of rules with another and with 'official' Law. (Migdal, 2001:22)

Migdal’s explicit articulation of the state-in-society approach, as recounted above, dates from the 2001 publication entitled *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute Each Other*. Nevertheless, the tacit beginnings of this approach are already present in *Strong Societies and Weak States* (1988), as the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, and its clarification is thus of value to the discussion which follows. Furthermore, the state-in-society approach finds a good fit with Huntington’s views regarding state dysfunction and political decay, which are evaluated in subsequent chapters. Having clarified Migdal’s view of the state, the next section considers his paradigmatic approach, evident in *Strong Societies and Weak States*.

### 3. Migdal’s paradigm

Migdal clearly states that his view of the inner workings of political domination and change rests upon the axiom that no single, integrated set of rules for guiding peoples’ lives exists anywhere; he posits that understanding political change is dependent upon understanding the conflict between different sets of rules, competing for dominance (Migdal, 2001:11). What becomes clear from the preceding discussion of Migdal’s view of the state and its concomitant state-in-society approach, is that the key to comprehending change (and by extension, state dysfunction) lies in viewing society as a melange of social organisations, rather than the dichotomous structure that practically all models of macro-political change had employed up to that stage (for example, centre/periphery, modern/traditional, great tradition/little tradition, input/output). This approach therefore stands in contrast to the works of influential behaviouralist authors such as Almond and Coleman (1960), Easton (1953) and Parsons (1951).

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44 In fact, Migdal (1997:220) credits Huntington with reintroducing to prominence the state in political science, and as such endorses much of his institutionalist perspective.
Migdal describes his college years during the 1960s as the formative period of his lifelong preoccupation with how authority and power are established, maintained and transformed – not primarily for reasons of academic development as much as for the tumultuous domestic and international climate of the period (Migdal, 2001:4). During that period the domestic civil rights movement, the US involvement in Vietnam and colonial independence challenged established perceptions of power and authority in society, in addition to posing new problems to scholars of political science. His account of this period is worth quoting:

...I witnessed during my high school and college years an epic revolution in the world map. The crumbling of the great European empires led to the appearance of dozens of new states in Africa and Asia. New political leaders made all sorts of bold claims about the prospects for social change inside their borders as well as their intention to break the stranglehold of outmoded forms of authority internationally. It was a moment of great optimism. (Migdal, 2001:4)

Like many political scientists of his generation, Migdal’s early work was influenced by the likes of D. Easton, G. Almond, T. Parsons and E. Shils. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the theoretical perspectives developed by these thinkers lacked an explanation for the deviant path of development that had become all too common in the post-colonial, developing world. Migdal’s difficulty with these perspectives was that they obscured or overlooked the importance of the locus of authority in society, since notions such as elites, institutions and shared values appeared to be taken for granted in these approaches (Migdal, 2001:7). As a postgraduate student Migdal was influenced by the thoughts of scholars such as S.P. Huntington45 and J.P. Nettles, who regarded the sources of power in society to be located in political institutions. The institutionalist perspective would eventually stimulate the resurgence of the state in political science, and place it at the centre of questions regarding domination and change. Yet the Weberian concept employed by state oriented scholars left Migdal somewhat disillusioned, particularly as a result of his time spent in Israel where he taught at the Tel-Aviv University. He explains that “Despite the almost mythical power of the Israeli state, especially after its resounding six-day victory against three Arab states in 1967, I found that the situation in the Palestinian villages that it occupied bore only slight resemblance to its carefully designed policies” (Migdal, 2001:9).

Migdal posed the question to students during his seminars as to whether domination and change were indeed best understood in terms of the outcomes of a purposeful,
goal-oriented state with overpowering resources and ideals (such as Israel) as found in prevailing theories of the time. Perhaps, he suggested, one should look at multiple sites to understand domination and change, as well as the failed outcomes of state action (such as the situation in Palestine and the West Bank, and conflict in Israeli society itself)\textsuperscript{46}. His fundamental conclusion was that “States (or any other integrated site of resources and ideas) engaged in pitched battles with other powerful figures and groups with entrenched ways of doing things. Sometimes, the power of these other social formations is obvious...sometimes it is veiled... In either case, the struggles over revenues, other goodies, and which ideas should prevail are fierce and real” (Migdal, 2001:10).

This notion matured into what became the state-in-society approach discussed previously, which also informs the reconstruction and evaluation of \textit{Strong Societies and Weak States} in the remainder of this chapter. Migdal argues that a meaningful evaluation of the limited role states play in certain societies must combine the insights of institutionalism with a culturalist perspective (1997:231). In this regard, he draws upon the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who remarked that “One of the things that everyone knows but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that a country’s politics reflect the design of its culture (Geertz, 1973:310).

It is with this sensitivity towards culture that Migdal attempts to combine the oft-separated analytical arenas of state and society. In his conceptualisation of state dysfunction, Migdal therefore evaluates how culture influences institutions, which in turn influence states. Such a nuanced perspective is a valuable asset to a thorough conceptualisation of state dysfunction.

Given this culturalist emphasis, Migdal describes society in the developing world as both highly \textit{complex} and \textit{fragmented}, from which he subsequently establishes two ontological points of departure for his investigation. Firstly, the groups actually exercising social control in a society may be heterogeneous both in their form (for example, a small family or a sprawling tribe) and in the rules they maintain (for example, founded on personal loyalty or economic considerations). Secondly, the distribution of social control in society may be among \textit{numerous} autonomous groups rather than being concentrated in the state (Migdal, 1988:28). Consider the diagram

\textsuperscript{46} See \textit{Palestinian Society and Politics} (Migdal, 1980) for his insights in this regard.
below, illustrating a traditional Weberian approach to state and society, compared to the state-in-society approach employed by Migdal:

*Figure 14: Social control: Assuming state dominance vs. the state-in-society approach*

The figure above demonstrates how *assuming* that a state is dominant in society (depicted left) can lead to a misconstrued perception of the relationship between state and society. This will render attempts to investigate state dysfunction fruitless. The reality in a given society (depicted right) is frequently that various social organisations (sometimes with web-like overlapping interests/identities) compete for dominance in society. Amongst these organisations, the state is neither the most dominant nor the most relevant.

Thus, according to Migdal’s model, a high level of authority can exist in society but the exercising of that authority may be highly fragmented, with the state being only one such fragment, usually in conflict with others. Migdal notes that many approaches to understanding social and political change in the developing world have either downplayed the aspect of conflict (the modernisation theory approaches) or overlooked specific types of conflicts (as in Marxism, where conflict is usually assumed to be class-based). In some cases these have ignored domestic dynamics altogether (for example, dependency theory and much of international relations theory) (Migdal, 1988:31). Thus, he suggests that focusing on these struggles within society, between the state and other societal actors such as clans, tribes and language groups will provide new insights into the processes of social and political change, which influence state abilities.
The most significant patterns of socio-political change often emerge as a result of interaction and accommodation between the state and other powerful organisations in society, particularly in the developing world. Migdal subsequently states and demonstrates that the realpolitik of many underdeveloped countries is reflected in the state’s inability to achieve predominance as a result of tenacious and resilient organisations present in society (Migdal, 1988:32). Continuing the line of thought positing that state predominance is preceded by social control, Migdal (1988) argues that levels of social control are reflected by three important indicators:

1. Compliance: The most fundamental requirement for maintaining a strong state is gaining conformance from the population. Compliance can be acquired and perpetuated through the use of force, provided the state maintains its monopoly on the use of force. Migdal notes that in many dysfunctional states, control of the local police force relates directly to compliance. The ability to bribe and manipulate the enforcers of state authority therefore erodes citizens’ compliance to the wishes of the state. Furthermore, the ability to control the dispersal of an array of basic services and resources also determines the measure of compliance a state can demand from society.

2. Participation: As mentioned previously, states consolidate their strength through organising a given population for specialised tasks, according to the requirements dictated by a state’s administration47. Citizens must be taxed and armies conscripted to defend borders. Participation, however, extends this idea of state interaction with a given population. In this sense, participation denotes the repeated, voluntary use of state-run or state-authorised institutions. For example, rural communities should visit state clinics rather than traditional healers, and peasant farmers should sell their produce at the state co-operative.

3. Legitimation: The most potent factor contributing to social control is an acceptance, and even endorsement, of the state’s rules of the game. Compliance and participation by citizens should therefore occur not because of the ever-present threat of state force, but rather because from each individual’s conviction that it is the right thing to do. Legitimacy therefore

47 The Huntingtonian approach similarly emphasises the crucial role of participation and the mobilisation of society, albeit in a slightly different idiom – see Chapter 6.
indicates a voluntary acceptance of the survival strategies offered by the state; it signals peoples’ approval of the state as the dominant, and most desirable, form of social organisation in society.\(^{48}\) (Migdal, 1988:32-33)

The ability of states to achieve predominance in society (based on the elements of social control described above) has been problematic, and according to Migdal, an important cause of state dysfunction. He contends that the lack of state capacity, especially relating to the ability to implement policy and mobilise the public, can be attributed to the way in which society is structured (Migdal, 1988:33). The preceding discussion, which aimed to summarise Migdal’s particular view of the state-society dynamic serves to highlight the necessity of first comprehending a society’s broader social structure, of which a state is only one component. The diffuse (yet strong) nature of social control exercised by non-state organisations and affiliations in dysfunctional states contrasts starkly with the hierarchical and centralised structure of control encountered in, say, Western European states (where the state is positioned at the apex of power and more closely resembles the Weberian ideal-type). Migdal illustrates this point by referring to societies in the developing world as ‘web-like’:

Numerous third world societies have been as resilient as an intricate spider’s web; one could snip a corner of the web away and the rest of the web would swing majestically between the branches, just as one could snip centre strands and have the web continue to exist. Although there certainly have been connections between the parts and some parts have obviously been more important than others, often no single part has been totally integral to the existence of the whole. (Migdal, 1988:36)

Web-like societies characteristically host a multitude of autonomous social organisations, making it difficult for state leaders to define the place and role of the state in such societies, in addition to establishing social control and predominance. This difficulty is largely due to the fact that even in places where the state is absent, people are frequently not ungoverned. Other social organisations are dominant in such places, but the allocation of values is not centralised (as in the case of state predominance) and social control is highly fragmented. Migdal argues that scholarly analysis has, for a long time, been unable to realise that the absence of a state does not equate to the absence of governance. Such analyses have focused on politics of the capital city, in an attempt to discover who wields power while ignoring the reality that in strong societies, politics in the capital city bear little relevance in the external

\(^{48}\) This perspective underscores the cost-efficiency of legitimacy, as opposed to coercion.
reality, and that often no single manager of power exists. In reality, such instances indicate that there has been very limited penetration of society by the ‘national’ centre.

From the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that Migdal’s paradigmatic point of departure emphasises the study of societies as much as states, and in this regard, he borrows equally from institutionalism and anthropological culturalism. This combination of traditions makes Migdal unique among the authors in his field and provides a differentiated insight into the conceptualisation of state dysfunction. Although subscribing to a Weberian conception of statehood, Migdal thus makes it clear that a state’s viability will depend upon a receptive society, in other words, a society where the state can achieve predominance and realise social control. In many instances the nature of fragmented social control in society (i.e. a web-like society) relegates the state to one among many organisations vying for power. Furthermore, a state may also be in conflict with itself, as various agencies pursue their own agendas rather than labouring for the common good. As a point of departure, Strong Societies and Weak States (1988) surveys the coming of independence in the developing world (and Africa in particular). It was during this period that post-colonial optimism reached its zenith, albeit that the cracks that would later undermine states in the developing world had already begun to appear.

4. Newly independent states in the developing world

After former colonial states shrugged off the shackles of servitude imposed by their European masters, many newly formed governments and administrations had high expectations about what could be achieved through means of the state. Coinciding with this spirit of anticipation in the developing world, the social science of the 1950-1960s thought of politics (or policy and planning, reflecting the discipline’s predominant subject matter) as a subject of almost boundless possibilities (Migdal, 1988:10). Policy interventions and planning, true to the empiricist spirit of the time, dominated political scientific discourse and there was a tacit conviction that any society could be remediated through the proper implementation and operationalisation of planned policy. According to Migdal (1988:11), this fervent optimism resulted in the capable limits of states becoming blurred, as scholars lost sight of what states could, and could not, effectively achieve. There was a confidence in the decade following the wave of decolonisation that state institutions would consolidate and develop into modern
national societies. This excitement about policies, planning, political engineering and institutions that were put forth as cure-alls, created a great sense of expectation surrounding the capabilities of what states could achieve, not only in the West but also in the developing Third World49.

Also contributing to this optimistic post-colonial zeitgeist was a collection of influential international norms and institutions (Migdal, 1988:12). The United Nations in particular enumerated various goals for the transformation of society in newly independent states50. These agendas of social change and transformation explicitly cited the state as vehicles of development, and were increasingly regarded as norms for states. The Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human rights both cite lofty objectives, such as the promotion of social progress and better standards of life for the citizens of member states. Subsequently, the constitutions of newly independent states also began to reflect this emphasis. Whereas earlier independence documents and constitutions of the developing world focused on the formal arrangements of power and authority and the relationships between former colonial rulers, new post-colonial constitutions began to stress substantive issues such as development and social justice. The implementation of these goals, inspired by the influence of the UN, was always going to depend on strong state capabilities. The UN obliged, with endless streams of resolutions and actions that specified norms for states in the international community, intent on strengthening the domestic and international role of newly independent states (Jackson, 1990:102-108). According to Migdal (1988:13):

The United Nations, it can be said, canonized the paradoxical view of change in the contemporary world. On the one hand, it hallowed the status quo by making the large territorial state, a political form of a limited period of human history, inviolable. States were to be the building blocks of the United Nations, while the United Nations, in turn, would attempt to safeguard them from aggression. At the same time, the United Nations was elaborating comprehensive plans for undermining the status quo through economic and social programs promoted by states. Little concern was exhibited for the near impossibility of undermining the status quo in one realm without also disturbing it in the other and the very real possibility of social and economic change bringing domestic and international political instability.

49 Migdal employs the term “Third World” consistently throughout Strong Societies and Weak States. For the purposes of this chapter the terms “Third World” and “developing world” are used synonymously.
50 A discussion of the international legal and diplomatic climate during the era of African independence is conducted in Chapter 5.
This ‘paradoxical view’ regarding post-colonial statehood forms the core of Robert Jackson’s (1990) evaluation of state dysfunction, which is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5. The UN assumed that its state driven goals were the ‘right thing to do’, and therefore also assumed that populations in newly independent societies would embrace the ever growing presence of the state. This assumption of the normatively good role of the state has culminated (over several hundred years) in the acceptance that the state should provide the predominant set of ‘rules of the game’ for each society. These rules include much more than overarching constitutional principles; they include written and unwritten laws, regulations and decrees, which the administration of the state is willing to enforce through the coercive means at its disposal (Migdal, 1988:14). As a collective, these rules often (at least in the view of state leaders) had as their aim the rather vague concept of modernity. These rules therefore serve as instruments that enable the state (steered by post-colonial leaders) to develop a colonial society into a modern one. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of post-colonial states has been a willingness and urgency to effect deep social change in societies (Migdal, 1988:15). During the tide of independence in the 1960s, conferences and summits of states in the developing world committed to the herculean tasks of national development, accelerating economic growth, skills training, universal health, education and welfare, and agricultural reform. However noble and ‘modern’ such goals, they presuppose the existence of a state with overpowering dimensions and capabilities. Migdal suggests that the assumption that all states have such potent capabilities is symptomatic of the Western experience where, unlike the developing world, the state has evolved to be the single dominant force of rule in society: “The danger in taking the state for granted is that we begin to assume states in all times and places have had similar potential or ability to achieve their leaders’ intentions; the varying roles states have played in different societies may be lost” (Migdal, 1988:17).

This realisation undoubtedly acts as an influence toward the state-in-society approach that suggests that the dominant role of the state should be viewed with a measure of circumspection. Therefore, even though the goal of creating a state organisation that makes all the rules in society has been universal among state leaders, the ability to achieve such a goal has been varied and many instances marked by failure. Migdal explains that this universal drive for state predominance emerged from a state system where, historically, threats to stability emerged both from within and without. Therefore, by asserting state dominance through the ‘rules of the game’, state leaders ensured
that internal populations (society) were controlled and threats eliminated (that is, warlords, militias and gangs). Equally important, is that because of these imposed rules, the state has a significant advantage over any other political entity in mobilising and organising men and resources for war, offering defence from external threats by other states: “A prime motivation for state leaders to attempt to stretch the state’s rule-making domain within its formal boundaries, even with all the risks that has entailed, has been to build sufficient clout to survive the dangers posed by those outside its boundaries” (Migdal, 1988:21).

Historically, a state’s ability to survive has been dependent upon a number of factors, such as geography, the size of its population, natural resources, or gifted leadership. However, none has been more important in marshalling strength for the state than the ability to mobilise a society’s population. Mobilisation involves channelling people into specialised organisational frameworks that enable state leaders to complete any number of complicated tasks (Migdal, 1988:22). As Kugler and Domke (1986:40) stated, “Governments acquire the tools of political influence through the mobilisation of human and material resources for state action”.

This process of mobilisation is facilitated by three distinct institutions of state, which if functional and effective, ensure state predominance over society. Migdal describes this triad as a standing army, an effective tax-collecting system and an expanded set of judicial courts (Migdal, 1988:22). The introduction of a unitary state law, instead of fragmented feudal laws, through means of an expanded system of courts was essential in ensuring that citizens behaved according to their leaders’ wishes. Previously, various feudal lords would claim compliance from individuals and groups. The courts, therefore, were essential for shifting social control away from local forms of political organisation, toward the state. The courts acted as a means of enforcement for state priorities, the most crucial of which was (and arguably still is) taxation. Improved tax collection allowed the agencies of the state administration to expand, and enabled the state to maintain standing armies to defend from external and internal threats. Thus, through courts, taxation and a professional army, the state managed successfully to subordinate citizens’ own inclinations in favour of rules prescribed by the state. At this point, the state had successfully achieved social control, predominance in society, allowing it to further consolidate its capabilities of mobilisation. Migdal explains, “There was a driving compulsion to establish state control within society, for that was the key that could unlock the doors to increased capabilities in the international arena ... the
new state was to political-social organisation what nuclear weapons much later came to be to warfare” (Migdal, 1988:23).

From his account of the state and its path to predominance in society, Migdal tacitly endorses a Hobbesian view of the state environment: states are threatened externally by other states and face internal threats from challengers to its predominance. One could therefore posit (according to the conception of statehood developed in Chapter 3) that a dysfunctional state is one which, amongst other shortcomings, cannot effectively fend off such predations upon its territory.

Returning to the guiding question of *Strong Societies and Weak States*, namely why many states in the developing world had such difficulty in becoming predominant in their respective societies, Migdal turns his attention to state-society relations, which would later mature into his state-in-society approach discussed previously. This approach in itself is a departure from many previous traditions, which focused on a ‘perfect’ course of events through which societies evolve from traditional to modern political organisations. Such approaches were often one dimensionally linear and oversimplified complex issues of political reconfiguration in societies. Writers such as Shils (1975), Rostow (1959) and Lerner (1958) assumed an almost automatic progression to modernity. These approaches ignored the forces that resisted change in society, perhaps on the assumption that they were irrelevant or too insignificant to stem the growth of modern statehood. Migdal argues that this ignorance of resistive forces (that is, the elements that precluded fledgling states from achieving predominance) prevented scholars and policymakers from understanding how strong societies perpetuate the maintenance of weak states. In this regard, Migdal’s point of departure corresponds to that of Huntington (1968:1-6) who also argued that the process of modernisation could just as soon derail than lead to modernity (see Chapter 6).

Migdal’s supposition for modelling state-society relations is that all the organisations that exercise social control should be accounted for, as these are often significant bastions of resistance to the state:

Informal and formal organisations are the settings within which people have had structured, regularised interactions with others. These organisations have ranged from small families and neighbourhood groups to mammoth foreign-owned companies. These organisations – all the clans, clubs, and communities – have used a variety of sanctions, rewards, and symbols to induce people to behave in their interactions according to certain rules or norms, whether those
were interactions between father and son, employer and employee, landlord and tenant, priest and parishioner, and so on. These rules may include what age to marry, what crop to grow, what language to speak, and much more. (Migdal, 1988:25)

He continues to elaborate on this viewpoint by emphasising that in the period preceding state dominance in Europe (when feudal lords or clan chiefs provided protection and order), peasants were sceptical of the changes that the coming of state authority promised. The universal law and courts of the new state promised them a new status of greater equality and stability, but the fear of poverty, landlessness, isolation, and insignificance made peasants hesitant in abandoning the familiar traditional organisations that dictated their existence, and resisted the expansion of the state.

These traditional organisations commanded loyalty and support (notwithstanding state expansion) because for centuries they had offered strategies of survival to groups and individuals. Basic needs such as food and shelter, to a blueprint for belief and action amidst a Hobbesian state of nature are all provided by survival strategies. Migdal explains that these strategies provide not only a basis for personal survival, but also a link for the individual from the realm of personal identity (a personal political economy) to the sphere of group identity and collective action (a communal, moral economy) (Migdal, 1988:27). Social control therefore rests on a political organisation’s ability to deliver the key components of an individuals’ survival strategy. In this respect formal statehood clashed with traditional and archaic forms of political organisation, particularly in the developing world.

The reality is that through most of human history a multitude of strategies has been at work in areas today presided over by single states. Territories have hosted a diversity of ‘rules of the game’ (one set for this tribe and another for an opposing tribe). Social control prior to the state was rarely unified, rather being highly fragmented throughout a given territory:

The central political and social drama of recent history has been the battle pitting the state and organisations allied with it (often from a particular social class) against other social organisations dotting society’s landscape. Although state leaders have aimed for ultimate uniform social control inside its boundaries, diverse heads of these other organisations have striven fiercely to maintain their prerogatives. (Migdal, 1988:28)

In certain instances, such conflicts emerged during the period of colonisation. However, it was in the post-colonial era that the struggle for state predominance in
society became a hallmark of most newly independent states in the developing world. Many state leaders have been unable to emerge as dominant from these struggles, leading to state dysfunction.

5. Social upheaval and the fragmentation of social control

Whilst there can be no doubt that the state has struggled to maintain a foothold in post-colonial societies, an investigation into the roots of state dysfunction must delve deeper than 20th century independence. In many regions of the developing world, the strong societies and non-state actors that challenge state predominance have existed for much longer than the state. In attempting to explain when and how such non-state societal actors established their social control in opposition to the state, Migdal points to two sets of related forces.

One set involves the expansion of the world economy out of Europe, and its penetration to all levels of societies in the developing world. This process contained both economic and political dimensions, as it involved policies that undermined existing strategies of survival and social control in societies. The expansion of the world market, therefore, toppled existing social arrangements in the regions it penetrated. The second set of factors centres on the establishment and maintenance of political hegemony in such regions, mostly through means of colonialism. Through foreign political intervention, attempts were made to reconstitute fragmented social control in colonial societies (Migdal, 1988:51). Explaining how these forces influenced social control and the actors involved therein, Migdal remarks: “…they were revolutionary in the sense of creating sudden, disruptive types of political and social change and transforming substantially the character of social control in these societies” (Migdal, 1988:51).

5.1 Expansion of the world economy

The development of social structures in a particular society can be attributed largely to the unique culture, history and environment of that society. Yet, influential external forces also dramatically reshaped societies in the developing world. Since the expansion of trade routes centuries ago, the remotest corners of the globe gradually became integrated into a global economy as sturdier ships and adventurous sailors took Europeans increasingly farther from their native ports. However, up to the 19th
century, European influence in Africa, Asia and South America was mostly limited to coastal settlements and colonies. Penetration into the hinterland was limited and trade was mostly conducted through intermediaries such as tribal chiefs or strongmen (Meredith, 2006:1). Because of these sporadic interactions with the world economy, existing social organisations and strategies for survival remained largely intact: “…many non-Europeans were able to insulate themselves somewhat from the European economy through the mid-nineteenth century – able to keep the market at arm’s length… Existing patterns of social control and strategies of survival adapted in varying degrees to the new circumstances of European expansion, but it is striking how much existing social structure endured” (Migdal, 1998:54).

However, this state of affairs changed around the globe in a short space of time, since during the latter part of the 19th century capitalist production increased exponentially, escalating the demand for raw materials and foodstuffs and creating a vastly expanded world market. Traders and industrialists reinvigorated their intermittent ties with the developing world, intent on extracting maximum raw materials and produce to feed Europe’s seemingly insatiable industries. Migdal argues that these rapid and deep transformations brought about by the Industrial Revolution, have had an enduring impact on state-society relations today. Therefore, in order to contextualise the current difficulty states experience in establishing social control, one must first understand the disruptive changes that began to occur in the middle 19th century (Migdal, 1988:55). Historians have dealt with the technological and administrative achievements that accounted for the Industrial Revolution at length, yet according to Migdal, “…less frequently examined is the means by which European traders, industrialists, and investors achieved two primary goals: (1) guaranteeing access to distant markets and suppliers who could provide raw materials vital for European food needs and industry; and (2) assuring that the commodities most needed in Europe (rather than commodities simply for local consumption) would be produced, and in sufficient quantity” (Migdal, 1988:56).

In this regard, he points to the policies of Western powers, epitomised by Great Britain, and the critical role these policies played in gaining access to peasant producers in Asia, Africa and Latin America, ensuring that they produced to the demand of the international market. These policies subsequently facilitated the rapid, almost universal penetration by the European market, leaving practically no rural peasant or gatherer untouched. Migdal (1988:56) identifies three types of policy that underlay this rapid and
widespread penetration, resulting in the weakening of old social and political arrangements:

1. Effecting important changes in land tenure patterns;
2. Adopting new forms and methods of taxation;
3. Instituting new modes of transportation.

5.2 Land tenure

During the middle of the 19th century, peasants and agrarian societies across the world faced dramatic changes of the rules of landholding and land use. It was during this period that Latin and South America, the Ottoman Empire, colonial India and Egypt introduced policies and reforms that would decimate peasant agriculture, spurred on by the demands of a voracious world economy. Vastly increased demands for cash crops such as cotton, sugar, coffee and jute, coupled with new production techniques for certain crops prompted authorities to virtually abolish small scale agriculture. Agricultural production was now bound for the export market, and peasant farmers were no longer able to farm for subsistence (Schraeder, 2004:55). Economic considerations aside, Migdal points to the often-overlooked impact of this period of change:

In striking at existing land tenure patterns, the new policies hit at what was inevitably the critical set of rules of the game in agrarian societies … What better way to assure the unviability of the old ways of producing than to attack the most important property rights of all in such societies, those involving land? In doing so, successful policies would greatly affect existing social control. So many rewards, sanctions and symbols that underlay social control, after all, stemmed directly from questions of access and use of land. (Migdal, 1988:57)

Given the fact that pre-industrial societies in the developing world were characterised (both economically and socially) by agrarianism, changes pertaining to land tenure were bound to upset existing strategies of survival. Local leaders sought to consolidate the fragmented nature of land ownership in their societies in order to produce profitably for the world economy. Although in many cases, the intention might have been for peasants to benefit from this shift, in almost all instances a rich landowning class of merchant-farmers emerged, who exploited peasant ownership of land. Small plots were not viable for the cultivation of cash crops, and peasant farmers increasingly found their individual endeavours absorbed by rich landowners. In other cases, peasants
were merely swindled or coerced from their property by corrupt state officials entrusted with enforcing policies. Migdal cites Mexico as an example:

The new legislation did not achieve the aims of state leaders ... of ensuring the existence of a landed peasantry with firm title to individual holdings. Instead, the law had catastrophic consequences for the campesinos (farmers). Speculators, corrupt officials, hacendados, and others exploited the new right of the campesinos to dispose of their land freely by freely disposing them of their land. In a country already characterized by the big hacienda, the result was a rapid consolidation of former communal lands into super-haciendas and other big farms and ranches. (Migdal, 1988:62)

By 1910, less than one percent of the families of Mexico controlled 85 percent of the land (White, 1969:115). The result was that peasant farmers found themselves in a Mexico that was almost beyond recognition. To them, old strategies of survival had become redundant in the transformed landscape of the late 19th century. Yet, apart from the fact that peasant life in such circumstances was fundamentally changed, the state had in large part failed to enforce successfully its particular policies. What should have been a period characterised by the growth of state predominance in society, created instead a new type of powerful societal actor, hostile to the state, namely the wealthy landowner merchant-farmer. Migdal explains (1988:65):

The land tenure policies transformed social structure. Social control changed irrevocably as big landowners consolidated holdings and integrated themselves (and, along with them, their workers and tenants) much more fully into the world market economy. Landowners in region after region increased the resources at their disposal, which could be used to build new strategies of survival through their direct ties to the world market. Additionally these ties often made them impervious to any attempts by ambitious political authorities to bring them under control. The stage was set for the recreation of web-like societies that would characterize so much of the Third World in the late twentieth century.

Reform of land tenure in agrarian societies had therefore delivered unforeseen consequences. Whilst states had successfully initiated the consolidation of a previously fragmented agricultural sector and mobilised it for cash crop exports, this process had simultaneously spawned a new powerbase in society that was hostile to state predominance.

Although Migdal’s analysis of changes in land tenure is primarily concerned with the developing world particularly in Latin America, the phenomenon is of equal relevance for 19th century Africa. Unlike areas of Latin America (such as Mexico) at the time,
Africa possessed no semblance of centralised government over demarcated territories anywhere on the continent. Tribal associations remained the primary form of socio-political organisation, over which tribal leaders predominated. Thus, European powers wishing to gain access to agricultural produce and labour co-opted indigenous leaders through treaties and maintained power through means of a policy of divide and conquer by exploiting regional rivalries between indigenous groups (Schraeder, 2004:57-59). Notably, after the Berlin Conference of 1884, claims to African territories could no longer be made on the basis of discovery. Instead, a European power had to prove its effective occupation of a territory\textsuperscript{51}, frequently achieved by citing the treaties and agreements with indigenous leaders. Nonetheless, this practice ensured that the tribal leader enjoyed greater authority than before (albeit as a lackey to a colonial administration) and the subsequent consolidation of land for productive use under their auspices significantly strengthened their hold on society.

In any case, the fact that agriculture had become a highly profitable economic endeavour in societies of the developing world during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century created a further economic opportunity in the form of tax revenue.

5.3 Taxation

The expansion and increased efficiency of tax collection by a state serve as indicators of its growing institutionalisation and predominance. Historically, a local authority, often representative of a hierarchical feudal societal arrangement, collected taxes. However, after the consolidation of agriculture, states administered new tax policies down to the level of the individual citizen. Adopting European techniques and procedures of tax collecting, states imposed standardised taxes for individuals, and in many cases taxation was increased when compared to historical precedents. Since paying tax was now compulsory and fixed, a peasant had to produce enough income to meet his tax obligation. This necessitated his integration into agriculture of the world economy, described above, since this was the only way in which his farming might produce a profit, which would enable him to honour his taxes. In this manner, new policies of taxation driven by the state ensured that societies became fully integrated into the capitalist world economy, down to the lowest level (Migdal, 1988:70). The sanction for

\textsuperscript{51} This was prescribed in accordance with the \textit{uti posseditis} principle, which states that territory remains with its possessor (occupier) at the end of a conflict. Since it was desirable to avoid conflicts with local tribes, treaties were frequently drafted to this effect, thereby ceding territorial control to European powers. However, the validity of these treaties are of course suspect, since indigenous leaders could not possibly have understood the European language in which these documents were authored.
non-payment was usually forced labour, particularly in British and French colonies (Rotberg, 1967:253). As one French colonial administrator stated, “The idea that seems to be best for achieving the employment of native labour, would be to impose on the blacks relatively high taxes ... and in default of payment they would incur a sentence of forced labour” (Crowder, 1968:286).

In this manner the state acquired a workforce of cheap labour, since many peasants could no longer sustain viable farms. If not conscripted into forced labour, peasants from rural areas moved to the cities in search of employment, thereby stimulating the beginnings of urbanisation. For those who managed to produce enough to meet tax obligations, further compliance with the dictates of the international market was ensured through the principle of collecting tax in cash, as opposed to parting with a percentage of one’s goods or harvest (namely, paying tax in kind). New tax policies and land tenure laws thus constituted a double blow to existing strategies of survival and societal arrangements in rural areas: “The migration, forced labour, and production for export that resulted from the new tax policies took a high toll on existing social organisations and the social control they had exercised” (Migdal, 1988:70).

These two elements representative of capitalism and colonialism were truly galvanised by the rapid proliferation of new modes of transportation, particularly the tremendous expansion of rail infrastructure in the developing world.

5.4 Transportation

One could argue that, just as the Internet and telecommunications have contributed to globalisation in the 20th century, the advent of steam-powered transport had a comparatively dramatic globalising effect in the 19th century. Commencing during the 1870s, wooden sailing vessels were increasingly supplanted by steamships for standard cargo runs on the high seas. Steamships were more efficient, being faster, more reliable and stronger. This increased capacity for intercontinental trading stimulated the nascent capitalist world economy, starting a ripple effect in Europe that gradually reached the shores and eventually the hinterland of the developing world. However it was the laying of railway tracks from the mid 19th century that was the great trailblazer for the expanding world economy. Migdal aptly notes that during that period in history, the railroads were the locomotives of change (Migdal, 1988:73).

52 In certain instances, local inhabitants conducted bloody rebellions in response to poll taxes and the threat of being conscripted as forced labour (for example the Ashanti rebellion of 1900-1902, and the Sierra Leone Hut Tax War of 1898).
Trains dismantled all barriers of isolation and inaccessibility. The volume of goods they could carry, and the speed at which it was done, was unlike anything that had existed before. Previously, lumbering caravans of mules and oxen undertook perilous journeys from inland producers to coastal ports. These caravans were slow and prone to complications during the journey and incurred significant costs (for example, after four days, an ox consumed more food than it could carry). Migdal sketches a picture of the rapid growth in transportation infrastructure during the 1800s:

Expansion of the railroads continued through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, but a tremendous surge of growth that opened up the most populated and rich areas came for many countries in a relatively short period. From 1850 to 1880, rail lines worldwide increased almost tenfold, and between 1880 and World War I another threefold. By the onset of the Great War, about two-thirds of a million miles of track were in use ... Road improvements began worldwide. And, with the addition of steamships to merchant marines, the tonnage of shipping rose from 280,000 gross tons in 1850 to over 37 million by World War I. (Migdal, 1988:74)

Expanded rail networks resulted in greater exports from British India. During the American Civil War, in particular, cotton exports from India increased dramatically, stimulating further growth in rail infrastructure, thanks to British capital and administrative acumen. By 1882, Indian railways had facilitated the transportation of five thousand times more freight tonnage than in 1858. Although India stands out as a prominent example of the expansion of rail transport, virtually all parts of the developing world began the construction of railways in the late 19th century. In Latin and South America, Asia, and later in sub-Saharan Africa, railways penetrated both geography and society, as Coatsworth explains:

...railroads radically altered supply and demand schedules for agricultural products. By reducing transport costs dramatically and by connecting distant (domestic and international) markets with previously isolated rural areas, railroads made landowning more profitable than ever before ... Transport innovation was the cause of important shifts in crop structure, estate management, labour arrangements, land tenure patterns and rural welfare. Rural populations shared few of the benefits of this modernisation and frequently suffered as a result. (Coatsworth, 1974:48)

With new markets being connected, demand increased, which necessitated the increased production of various agricultural goods. Producers consolidated their land whilst simultaneously introducing more efficient means of cultivation and harvest, in the form of large-scale mechanisation. Migdal notes that, “For many small farmers, these
innovations made life an ever more desperate struggle; their ability to hold onto small plots of land slipped all the more” (Migdal, 1988:79).

Thus, the potent combination of land tenure changes, higher taxes, demands for taxes in cash and railroad construction paved the way for changes in the environment that made old strategies and solutions irrelevant to the new problems that confronted societies in the developing world (Migdal, 1988:85).

The continued spread of the Western economy into the developing world created enormous wealth for selected individuals in society. The stratification of wealth therefore became more pronounced than at any other time in history, as those with the resources to take advantage of new economic opportunities (precipitated by the policies discussed above) leapfrogged ahead of all others in their wealth and control of the productive factors in society. The continued consolidation of land under a small group of landowners (often strongmen\textsuperscript{53}), along with the demand for new manufactured products undermined old forms of survival, which were dependent on subsistence agriculture and the production of handicrafts. Migdal draws these lines together by noting that changes in agricultural production, people’s relationship to the land and their position with respect to those in other social classes devastated existing patterns of social control in third world societies (Migdal, 1988:83). It is worth quoting him at length to illustrate his point:

With all these changes in life situations – in occupation, place of residence, production, relationship to the land, and ties to other classes – people’s needs changed drastically, too. The overall weakening of societies resulted as old means of social control throughout the society crumbled simultaneously. Old sanctions, such as community ostracism or gossip, became less powerful as many commuted from village, finding new reference groups, or moved from the village altogether. Old rewards, such as the benefits of mutual work teams to harvest specific crops, became meaningless in environments where many became landless or production shifted to new cash crops. Old means, such as settling disputes through the mediation of the village headman, became more and more irrelevant as interactions grew with those who neither knew nor respected the headman. (Migdal, 1988:84-85)

Therefore, in all but the most remote areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the rapid and relentless onslaught of the world market weakened old forms of social organisation and social control substantially, and rendered existing strategies of social control

\textsuperscript{53} In the context of Migdal’s writing, strongmen are representative of traditional or informal wielders of authority, often at odds with the modern state administration or bureaucracy, and the binding authority it aims to implement.
anachronistic. This rapidity of change afforded peasants little time in which to adapt and thoroughly construct new survival strategies and social institutions. This period was, according to Migdal, a period of distinct crisis, almost revolutionary in character:

Historical crises or turning points involve wholesale changes in institutions, touching many aspects of people’s lives. Institutions weaken as their rules become irrelevant to matters at hand. Crisis means that a great proportion of these rules simultaneously become irrelevant to broad segments of the population. The model of institutional change here is not of a continuous curve representing incremental alterations at the margins; rather, it is an image of history as discontinuous, as bursting at rare moments with catastrophic suddenness. (Migdal, 1988:90)

Exploring these sudden moments of historical change can thus teach one much about contemporary society in the developing world. However, what is most important in understanding the state in such a society is the manner in which institutions and social control were recreated and reconstituted, following crisis. In this regard, Migdal concludes that:

The catastrophic changes that engulfed Latin America, Africa, and Asia, did not necessarily lead to strong, centralising states – even after independence. Sudden, eruptive changes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nonetheless, had momentous long-term effects on social organisation and social control. Such catastrophic changes prime a society for major institutional transformation ... Society is now in a plastic state, like half-melted wax out of which anything can be moulded. (Migdal, 1988:93)

The above-mentioned aspects were symptomatic of greater Western involvement in the developing world. The ambitions of Western entrepreneurs drove them deeper into the hinterland of uncharted territories. In turn, this expanded European involvement necessitated a modicum of government, with the aim of establishing a favourable and safe economic environment. These needs prompted the beginnings of colonialism.

5.5 Colonialism

It is often an overlooked fact that a strategy of governance such as colonialism would be unviable were it not for the active involvement of the colonised. Locals were co-opted or manipulated as integral parts of Western structures of rule in the African colonies. Employing this strategy, the British at one time managed to rule ten million

54 This perspective is also strongly underscored by Huntington, who regards periods of socio-political discontinuity (such as revolutions) as opportunities for institutionalisation – See Chapter 6.
Nigerians with a staff of nine administrators, and France administered the entire French Equatorial Africa with only 206 officials (Meredith, 2006:5). Accordingly, the British colonial administration in Africa was often referred to as a ‘thin white line’, albeit one that was ‘tipped with steel’ (Kirk-Greene, 1980:26). The comprehension of this relationship between the coloniser and the colonised is of crucial importance in understanding the emergence of weak states in the developing world. Put differently, the nature of social control in weak states is related strongly to which particular indigenous elements benefitted from conditions of greater European expansion, and were subsequently in a position to determine new rules of social relations (Migdal, 1988:100, 103). These changes greatly affected, until this very day, the salience of terms such as ‘class’, ‘tribe’ and ‘ethnicity’ both within and between states in the developing world in general.

Migdal describes colonialism as an intense form of political hegemony, involving the appropriation of the key decision-making posts in a society. However, no colonial regime ruled without the significant participation and assistance of the indigenous people, who in turn benefited from the modicum of authority they gleaned from the colonial state. The colonisers could allocate the right to disburse resources, opportunities, and sanctions to various indigenous groups. These groups could in turn fashion new strategies of survival for peasants in their sphere of power. In the same manner, certain groups were denied opportunities and withheld resources. These differences in privileged access to resources had an enduring impact: “They determined who could offer components as people sought to reconstitute viable strategies of survival – organisations broad and strong enough to be incipient states or scattered local organisations that could never hope to achieve countrywide control” (Migdal, 1988:105).

Western states therefore played an instrumental role in influencing patterns of social control, patterns that often remained intact even after their own rule and influence had ended. They dictated who would have the resources and authority to offer viable components for strategies of survival to a dislocated population. These could either be local strongmen or alternatively, groups and individuals who could create the basis for an eventual centralised, indigenously ruled state. The goals of colonisers, such as the maintenance of secure rule and the effective exploitation of natural or human resources, determined such relations. As a case study, the 19th and 20th century history
of Sierra Leone demonstrates how fragmented social control, reinforced by colonialism, served as prelude to modern day state dysfunction.

6. The genesis of a dysfunctional state: Sierra Leone

The permeation of British influence in Sierra Leone was a gradual, somewhat disjointed process. The slave trade had introduced natives to Europeans as early as the 16th century. However, a sustained and permanent presence of Westerners only emerged during the 18th century when entrepreneurs and traders increasingly settled along the coastal areas, establishing a base of trade into the interior. The incorporation of the Sierra Leone Company in 1791 lead to increased British influence arising from the project to resettle freed slaves in the (now capital) city of Freetown. In 1808, the coastal region became a Crown Colony and in 1896 control was extended into the interior, constituting the British Protectorate of Sierra Leone.

Maintaining order in the Colony and later the Protectorate rested mainly upon the involvement of indigenous leaders, due to the small number of British staff committed to Sierra Leone. However, this did not dampen British ambitions of indefinite rule in their West African possession, albeit through an indigenous administration, affirming Robinson’s (1986:267) description of the essence of imperialism being the “technique of collaborating elites”. Even though most European colonies were administrated through means of native elite, colonisers differed in the type of elite they favoured. The French, for example, encouraged the cultivation of an educated native elite, socialised in French culture and acclimatised to French governance. These educated, urbanised elite would in many regards be indistinguishable from metropolitan French people. However, British strategies of governance preferred the rejection of urbanised and educated native elites in favour of the exclusive support of traditional native strongmen or chiefs. Herein lies an important characteristic of social dynamics in weak states of the developing world, as Migdal explains, “…the twentieth century history of Sierra Leone and many other African and Asian countries, both before and after independence, has centred around the overt and covert struggles between strongmen and more urbane elites, who were the products of Western education and culture” (Migdal, 1988:108).
The British policy of “ruling through chiefs” sounds deceptively uncomplicated. However, the Limba traditional chiefdoms in northern Sierra Leone had very little that was traditional about them. In fact, until the establishment of the British Protectorate, the Limba people had no defined chieftains or chiefdoms at all, contrary to the assumptions held by the colonisers. It was only through dangling the proverbial carrot of British resources that several informally defined prominent tribesmen came forward who were subsequently anointed chiefs by the British Protectorate administration. Migdal explains a general picture of British disregard for existing forms of indigenous governance in Sierra Leone by highlighting three aspects.

Firstly, Western colonial rule broke the older, pre-existing hierarchy of political governance. Before colonisation, this consisted of three main overlords, who were accepted as legitimate by lesser local leaders (Meredith, 2006:6). The British disregarded this power arrangement and introduced a system of fourteen equally ranked chiefs. As a result, former subordinates came into conflict with established rulers, with disruptive consequences.

Secondly, the dominant chiefs’ power and legitimacy had previously rested upon their abilities to gain sway over subjects by offering them protection and strategies of survival. Under colonial influences, power was dependent upon British resources and delimited by the scope of artificial territorial boundaries drawn by the British.

Thirdly, in contrast to pre-colonial arrangements, chiefs now had unprecedented power through the British formalisation of their powers and privileges. Their status was written into law, they were allotted considerable resources and encouraged to maintain an administration of officials complementing their chiefdom. All these colonial influences are marked by a distinct and abrupt change in the social power arrangements of pre-colonial times. As one chiefdom speaker from the Mende tribe explained, “The present chiefdoms are not traditional entities... There were then no chiefdoms [before 1896 among the Mende] as they are now termed. Great warriors had ownership over extensive areas. But after the 1898 rebellion the British Government thought it best to split up these areas into chiefdoms, thus ultimately creating a lot of chiefs” (Migdal, 1988:110).

55 Ruling through chiefs, or indirect rule, was pioneered by British colonial administrator Sir Frederick Lugard in Nigeria during the early 20th century. Indirect rule subsequently became a hallmark of British colonial administration in Africa (Rotberg, 1967:294).
The creation of chiefdoms by the British was therefore an artificial process, alien to the contemporary social arrangements, ignorant of existing strategies of survival and traditional legitimacy. The chief as a proven and respected warrior and protector of people was replaced with an administrative lackey of the Empire, wielding power only insofar as British authority permitted him.\(^56\)

The British concern with stable government in Sierra Leone also led to chronic and constant reforms, and reforms of reforms. British colonial officials laboured administratively in the creation, demarcation and redemarcation of districts and chiefdoms, alternately expanding and contracting the powers they bestowed upon the chiefs (Migdal, 1988:113). Even so, the Paramount Chiefs’ roles in finance, revenue collection, legislating, social services and development provided them with unprecedented access to resources and opportunities for accumulating power. As a result, old foundations of social control withered and old strategies of survival crumbled, as colonialism provided the basis for new bonds of dependency. The new social control of a chief far outstripped what he had maintained before. These new bonds of dependency were further strengthened by the British regarding the population as members of social organisations led by chiefs, rather than citizens with individual rights and needs (Migdal, 1988:116). Thus the tribe became a key organisational ally of the colonial state, and as a means of social control.\(^57\) According to Migdal, “In addition, the symbolic importance of the tribe was stressed by chiefs as they sought to build the basis of enduring social control. The tribe catapulted forward as a key structure in the modern world” (Migdal, 1988:116).

But why did the British colonisers not merely seek to centralise social control through means of a strong colonial state administration instead of fragmented chiefdoms? According to Migdal, this question has multiple answers. Firstly, the British were looking to ensure security and stability of their rule in Sierra Leone in what they thought would be the least costly manner (Migdal, 1988:121). This desire for ‘tranquil rule on the cheap’ represented a typical strategy of colonial administrators, who tried their utmost to maintain order in the colonies with the least amount of expenditure, ostensibly in order to impress their superiors in the Colonial Office in London. By means of

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\(^{56}\) Similar practices of “inventing” chieftainships were also followed by the Germans in Togo, and the French in their colonies (Rotberg, 1967:295).

\(^{57}\) Migdal’s perceptive analysis of tribalism is corroborated by the work of Bratton & van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (1997), which deals extensively with the phenomenon of neo-patrimonialism.
illustration, Iliffe (1995) quotes a veteran native commissioner in Southern Rhodesia who remembered his duties as follows: “Get to know your district, and your people. Keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for God’s sake don’t worry headquarters” Iliffe (1995:196).

Similarly, the establishment of a strong, and therefore disruptive, British influence in Sierra Leone would result in conflict and in turn reflect poorly on the competence of colonial administrators to govern effectively. Personal ambition could therefore be added to the reasons for maintaining indirect rule through the chiefs, as officials viewed local political and social stability as necessary for their own advancement through the civil service. Additionally, aside from the expediency of maintaining tranquillity in the Protectorate, there were simply too few colonisers to devise and enforce their own effective ‘rules of the game’ by exercising social control through centralised institutions (Migdal, 1988:126). Migdal summarises the situation as follows:

The extensive state resources local officials could call upon from outside in a local crisis, as evidenced in the Hut Tax War, assured local rulers that the costly, possibly destabilising recourse to consolidation of social control within the ruled territory was unnecessary, perhaps even dangerous. Their goals of stability and security could be better achieved through policies that created and perpetuated a fragmented, weblke society with numerous poles of power, even though such a society posed formidable constraints in mobilisation of human and material resources. (Migdal, 1988:127)

The socio-political disruption brought about by British colonialism in Sierra Leone was to endure and escalate after the Colony achieved independence.

6.1 Sierra Leone: post-independence

When the Protectorate became independent in 1961, its people had come to be organised into eighteen different ethnic groups. In sub-Saharan Africa, where colonial boundaries often lacked firm historical or cultural relevance, inhabitants faced a flood of new experiences that presented them with new group interactions and upset old patterns of social stratification. As a result, Sierra Leone, and the African continent as a whole, became a crucible of shifting relationships and changing identities. With the resources the colonialists poured into particular administrative arrangements, favoured

58 For an excellent discussion on post-colonial power relations in Sierra Leone, see Warlord Politics and African States by William Reno (1998). The dominance of warlords according to Reno’s account corresponds to Migdal’s position on the fragmentation of social control. Also see Geldenhuys (2004, 328-25) for a discussion of “non-state deviant actors”.

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leaders and organisations, they held great sway over the emerging structure of social life, the changing boundaries of tribes and the identity of individuals (Migdal, 1988:130). By supporting the viability of certain strategies of survival at the expense of others, colonialists fundamentally influenced how individuals would order their universe. Therefore, just as the spread of the capitalist world economy undermined old strategies of survival, the purposeful policies of colonialism helped shape the new distribution of social control by directing the flow of authority, force and material resources in societies. Tribalism remained an obstacle to the reform of local government in Sierra Leone (Fanthorpe, 1998:55) and decades after independence the fallout of colonial policies were still present in Sierra Leone: “Twenty years after independence the rancour of tribalism has persisted in posing an undue obstacle to the integrated efforts for national development” (Roberts, 1982:9).

After independence, the educated urban elite (no longer marginalised by colonial officials), specifically the Creoles, emerged as dominant role-players in the capital of Freetown, and came to constitute much of the government’s administrative corps. Yet as the first independent Prime Minister, Milton Margai, soon realised, even though central government in Freetown had gained a fair degree of leverage, social control of the population still resided with strongmen, in the form of the colonially entrenched chiefdoms (Reno, 1997:494). Margai, however, became very adept in the manipulation of chiefs, either by promoting them to more prestigious paramount chiefs or by showering them with other symbols of status or resources. His manipulation of individuals prevented the strongmen from forming a united front capable of unseating central government – an effective post-colonial manifestation of divide and rule. Thus the chiefs remained a fragmented agglomeration of actors with few ties to each other and only instrumental allegiance to a centralised state. Nevertheless, realising that the chiefs represented the only avenue towards effective social mobilisation, Freetown continued to manipulate, appease and court these tribal strongmen. As a result, when Margai died in 1964, political competition for control of the state turned into little more than a series of factional disputes in which the upper hand sometimes was with one group of leaders courting chiefs and followers from one set of tribes, and sometimes with another (Migdal, 1988:133). According to Migdal:

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59 Creoles are individuals of mixed ancestry, often being a combination of African slave heritage and European influence.

60 A scenario resembling that of praetorianism, discussed in Chapter 6.
State control proved inadequate to undertake policies that could transform the lives of the vast majority of the population. Moreover, it was insufficient to mobilise a good portion of the population, which in turn could have provided a basis for far-reaching policy changes, because the continuing and persistent social control of the chiefs made the conduit to the rural masses, even as their power in the capital city waxed and waned. (Migdal, 1988:133)

Even the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP), which was the dominant nationalist force during the colonial era, did not possess the organisational and institutional wherewithal to mobilise support, particularly in the countryside. The SLPP merely enjoyed (at best) a mediated relationship with the population, much like the British had, since they too were dependent upon the social control exercised by the chiefs (Arnold, 2005:124). Therefore, in Sierra Leone, the chiefs had the mechanisms to demand the population’s compliance and participation, even if they were unable to gain widespread support and legitimacy beyond the territorial scope of their individual chiefdoms (Migdal, 1988:134). The relationship between the state and strongmen became paradoxical, since whilst the chiefs were from the outset dependent upon state resources to maintain their social control, state leaders had become more dependent on the chiefs, who employed those resources in a manner inimical to state rules and laws (Migdal, 1988:141). The fragmented nature of power in society provided these non-state actors with a measure of autonomy, which was used to either circumvent, or undermine the predominance of state power. In certain instances, these non-state actors were benign traditional leaders with a largely symbolic presence. However, in many instances they were powerful and wealthy warlords with greater capacities for mobilisation than that of the state. In concluding his analysis of Sierra Leone, Migdal notes that, “In short, then, our preliminary answer to why some Third World states have been at such pains to increase capabilities is that colonial rule helped induce a fragmentation of social control, an environment of conflict, during that historical window of opportunity when the population sought new strategies of survival” (Migdal, 1988:141).

This environment of conflict has endured in many developing states, including Sierra Leone. After Margai’s electoral defeat at the hands of rival Sakai Stevens in 1967, Margai military loyalists lead a coup to reinstate him as prime minister. A counter-coup ensued two days later, after which a military government headed by a Colonel Juxon-Smith ruled until 1968, when it too was deposed in a military coup. Since then, violence and dysfunction has marked Sierra Leonean politics and society, resulting in civil war and severe state dysfunction.
Migdal’s societal analysis that accounts for situations of dysfunction (such as that encountered in Sierra Leone) is complemented in Chapter 6 by the institutionalist perspective of Huntington, contributing to this study’s eventual conceptualisation of state dysfunction. However, in his analysis of state dysfunction, Migdal also investigates the relationship between leaders and the state institutions which they are supposed to maintain and strengthen, discussed below.

7. The politics of survival

It has been demonstrated how web-like societies, which contain fragmented social orders, are inimical to the creation of institutionalised states which are able to achieve predominance in society (that is, the Weberian ideal-type). But what are the political dynamics that perpetuate this state of affairs? In this regard Migdal identifies the practice of the ‘politics of survival’ (Migdal, 1988:206) in explaining why state leaders have been unable to effect a turnaround in state capabilities, or at the very least maintain stability and a modicum of functionality within state institutions. He argues that in societies that host dysfunctional states, an environment of perpetual conflict has dictated a particular pathological set of relationships within the state organisation itself, between the state leadership and the various agencies of state. These institutional relationships have influenced, in turn, the manner in which state institutions develop in societies of the developing world.

As discussed in Chapter 3, effective state action rests upon the ability of the state to mobilise the population through coercion, but ideally through legitimate authority. Furthermore, as demonstrated through the example of Sierra Leone, societies that exhibit a multitude of social organisations (many with their own capabilities of rule making and mobilisation) have resisted state leaders’ efforts to use the centralised state as a means of political mobilisation. Migdal argues that for states to be successful in the mobilisation of its citizenry, they require the creation of circumstances whereby citizens feel that the state’s symbols and codes of behaviour are essential to their wellbeing (Migdal, 2004:3-23). Additionally, states must then provide the population with institutionalised channels to express their support. In short, state leaders can seek sustained and effective political mobilisation once they have proffered viable strategies of survival to the population (Migdal, 1988:208). However, the creation and maintenance of strong institutions presents the state leader with a problem of realpolitik:
In societies in which social control has rested with a panoply of heterogeneous organisations, however, state leaders have been caught between Scylla and Charybdis, facing a baffling paradox: If domestic and international dangers can be countered through political mobilisation, gained by constructing state agencies and viable strategies of survival, strengthening those state agencies may at the same time hold its own perils for leaders. (Migdal, 1988:208)

Migdal explains this problem by referring to centrifugal and centripetal relationships within the state organisation.

The establishment of institutionalised, effective and autonomous state agencies creates centrifugal energy. In other words, as agency or ministry leaders seek to create clout for their bureaux by constructing a base of power, or fostering internal loyalty among its bureaucrats, it becomes further removed from the sphere of control which is exercised by the centralised state (the office of the President or state leader). As a result, the particular views and practices of a given agency could emerge (if strong enough) as a threat to the coherence and overall stability of the state.

All state leaders then, must find centripetal forces to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of their agencies if they are to keep the state organisation as a whole intact, acting cohesively (Migdal, 1988:209). Should a particular agency become too adept at social and political mobilisation, it could challenge and displace the state leader (in praetorian societies, the military or security establishments habitually assume such a role). As a result, many states in web-like societies have historically had to dispense with major institution building and instead focus on lessening existing and potential centrifugal forces. A top priority has therefore been the prevention of autonomous concentrations of institutional power from arising, especially those with effective capabilities of mobilisation (Migdal, 1988:213). This trend prompts state leaders to engage in ‘politics of survival’, rather than effective governance through institutionalisation, should they wish to remain in power.

Migdal discusses three tactics that state leaders employ in their game of political survival. These tactics have become all too familiar in dysfunctional states and are implicit in the weakening (and ultimately failure) of the state as organisation. The first, and probably most frequently utilised, tactic involves state leaders exercising their official powers of appointment and removal as a tool in preventing organs of state from becoming threatening bases of power. Migdal refers to this tactic as the ‘big shuffle’, whereby leaders use their official powers to prevent loyalties and potentially threatening
groups from emerging in the first place (Migdal, 1988:214). In this elaborate game of bureaucratic musical chairs, top officials are deployed, removed and subsequently redeployed, continuously, at the whim of the state leader. In this manner, no influential official serves in one location long enough for him/her to consolidate a loyal power base. As a result, the state leader may rest assured that no agency within his own state organisation will emerge as a rogue challenger to his leadership. However, the price these leaders have paid for the constant shuffling of government officials has been continuing turmoil in ministries and bureaux, wasted time in acclimation to new posts and the preoccupation of bureaucrats and civil servants with fixing their next post and future security (Migdal, 1988:217). As Migdal explains, “The big shuffle is neither a one-time event, nor is it reserved for enemies; it is a mechanism of deliberately weakening arms of the state and allied organisations in order to assure the tenure of the top state leadership. The executive leadership protects itself through ample use of its most manifest power, the ability to appoint to and remove from office” (Migdal, 1988:217).

The power of appointment has however, entailed more than the deployment and redeployment of the officialdom. Appointments have also constituted the most important sources of patronage to loyal followers of the state leader. Subsequently, most top agency officials are not selected based upon merit for the position, but on the basis of deep and proven personal loyalties toward the state leader. Only individuals with the proper credentials (whether it be class affinity, regional or ethnic backgrounds or a liberation struggle pedigree) are deemed eligible for selection, regardless of actual technical competence\textsuperscript{61}. Especially in societies where centrifugal forces are strong (that is, drawing the base of power away from the central state leadership) appointments made on the grounds of personal loyalty have been a method of creating centripetal political energy, thereby consolidating power with the leader: “Allocations of posts ... have reflected the loyalty of particular groups, the threat of other groups, and the importance of specific state agencies. State leaders have assigned the most loyal elements, often the tribe or ethnic group of the leaders themselves, to the agencies, such as the military, potentially most threatening to state leaders and exercising the most control in society” (Migdal, 1988:222).

\textsuperscript{61} The practice of cadre deployment by the African National Congress in South Africa is an example of this phenomenon. Cadre deployment has become institutionalised to such an extent that it has gained normative acceptance (Business Report, 2011).
This practice is also a prominent characteristic of neo-patrimonial regimes, often encountered in the developing world (Clapham, 1997:48). In the tradition of neo-patrimonialism, one individual (the ‘big man’ or strongman) dominates the state apparatus and stands above its laws. Relationships of loyalty and dependence influence the political system and institutions and officials occupy bureaucratic positions less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997:62). In the contemporary world, this big man is often an all-powerful executive figure (that is, a ‘president for life’) who subverts rational-legal norms in favour of patron-client relationships, thereby consolidating his position of power.

Non-merit appointments have however, severely limited the ability of states to make the binding rules in society and exercise effective social control. The contemporary dysfunctional state in the developing world has remained hamstrung by many of the same limitations that bound historical patrimonial and tribal regimes. Yet, as Migdal points out, these limitations have developed in the contemporary context of a remarkable growth in the size and complexity of state organisations, potentially permeating all parts of society (Migdal, 1988:223).

Often, when the shuffling and tactical appointments of staff have failed to shore up power with the state leader, the politics of survival necessitates the use of ‘dirty tricks’ (although, in certain states it has become more of a standard operating procedure than a last resort). Such actions typically include illegal imprisonment and deportation, strange disappearances, torture and the use of death squads. In these instances, the difference from other forms of survival politics has been that state leaders transgress the very laws that could serve as the basis for instituting social control through the state; it entails direct attacks on the state’s rules of the game, its legal codes and established modus operandi, by none other than the leaders themselves (Migdal, 1988:223). Examples of such abuses of power in the developing world are too numerous to mention, and have been employed in various guises of authoritarian rule, from the African one-party state to the South American military junta.

The above-mentioned tactics employed in the politics of survival all reflect an acute suspicion and distrust of autonomous state institutions, resulting in wholly irrational methods of administration, often characterised by paranoia. Since the goal of political survival has taken precedence over any rational notion of governance, state institutions become weakened, society remains fragmented, but state leaders strengthen their hold
on power regardless of the collateral damage incurred, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle of chronic dysfunction. Migdal aptly concludes that “As long as the fragmentation of social control has continued, rulers have been reduced to ruses and stratagems; they must build and rebuild coalitions and balances of power and wealth in society. Such mechanisms...do not create a more capable, autonomous state” (Migdal, 1988:237).

Of course, the state leadership is only one, relatively small, component of a sprawling state administration. The vast majority of any bureaucratic corps consists of middle- and low-level officials, responsible for implementing the policies formulated by their political leaders and administrative superiors. These officials pose little danger of creating autonomous power centres that could threaten the position of state leaders, as discussed above. Nonetheless, they are instrumental in determining whose authority and rules will take hold in a region; either the state’s, or the strongman’s. Grindle (1980) describes these ‘implementers’ as:

A corps of middle-level officials who have responsibility for implementing programs in a specific, relatively constricted area...and who are held responsible for program results by their superiors. This corps of individuals – the first and second ranks of the field administration – maintains frequent contact with national or regional superiors, but also has occasion to interact with the clients of government agencies and with opponents of programs at local levels. These middle-level officials may have considerable discretion in pursuing their tasks and, even when it is not defined as part of their formal duties, they may have a decided impact on individual allocation decisions. (Grindle, 1980:197)

Migdal argues that these implementers are placed strategically between the top policy-making elements of the state (the domain of the state leader) and most of the country’s population (the domain of the strongman). They are therefore the conduits of resources and policy from the capital city, to the countryside. Without these implementers, the state leadership have no chance of establishing and enforcing their prerogatives in society. Consequently, the bureaucrat is sandwiched between two powerful actors: supervisors from above and strongmen from below. Such an official therefore faces a complicated sum of personal profit or loss, since the rigid implementation of state policy will antagonise local strongmen, whilst the appeasement of strongmen at the expense of policy implementation will invoke the wrath of administrative supervisors. Migdal, however, makes a perceptive conclusion regarding this conflict of interests: “We have seen how a society with fragmented social control leads to the politics of survival. In turn, I hypothesise, the politics of survival lessens backing and threats of sanctions from
supervisors, thus making the implementer more attentive to possible career costs involving strongmen and peer officials” (Migdal, 1988:241).

He further notes that in any state administration, there occurs a ‘leakage of authority’ as policy descends the institutional hierarchy. However, in the weakest of states, where accountability and control have been crippled by the politics of survival, this leakage can turn into a gushing haemorrhage. It would therefore appear that the weaker a state’s administrative capabilities, the greater the likelihood that localised non-state actors will influence the implementation (or non-implementation) of state policy at grassroots level.

Migdal refers to the relationship between leaders, implementers and strongmen as the ‘triangle of accommodation’. Within this arena of accommodation, the state leadership deals with threatening concentrations of social control or power centres, discussed earlier. Another area of accommodation manifests at the local level, where implementers and strongmen accommodate each other in a web of political, economic and social exchanges (Migdal, 1988:247). It is once again worth reiterating Migdal’s central argument, which posits that this dynamic of accommodation of power is caused by fragmented social control in society. Had the state been able to consolidate a monopoly of social control, no accommodation would be necessary and its policy could more effectively permeate society. The triangle of accommodation, with all its bargaining and tradeoffs, has had a similarly debilitating effect on the state as have the politics of survival, since the allocation of state resources that results from the accommodation between officials and strongmen serves only to perpetuate societal fragmentation (Migdal, 1988:256). In the fragmented societies that play host to dysfunctional states:

…the strongmen have been wedded to state resources and personnel to maintain their local control and to gain new resources to enhance that control. Yet their most basic purposes have been antithetical to the norms of what a modern state should do. These norms have depicted the state as a mechanism to create a single jurisdiction – a rule of law in which the rules are the same from border to border; this is the desideratum of the modern state. (Migdal, 1988:255)

In such societies, one therefore encounters a highly perverse power arrangement, whereby the state is in fact sustaining the very element that undermines its potential efficacy. This vicious cycle of state weakness has become reinforced to the extent that it is almost unbreakable. Insufficient state capacity, which necessitates it reliance on
other social actors, renders state-driven initiatives at change largely ineffectual. Conceivably, it is only through dramatic social disruption and upheaval (such as the erstwhile expansion of the world economy, colonialism, or indeed, revolution) that a window of opportunity will emerge to consolidate fragmented social control and establish the state as predominant institution in society.\footnote{Indeed, Huntington identifies revolutions as windows of opportunity for political development and institutionalisation (Huntington, 1968:308).}

From Migdal’s evaluation of political strategy and tactics in political institutions in the developing world, it becomes clear that the Weberian ideally of a coordinated administration is undermined systematically from above and below. From above, political leaders construct elaborate patron-client networks through means of non-merit appointments and continuous shuffling of key posts. They also undermine the very rules they purport to promote in society, by employing dirty tricks to eliminate opposition and consolidate loyalty. From below, state administrations are crippled by a web-like society with fragmented social control, where non-state actors make their own demands upon bureaucrats. These demands are not in themselves indicative of state dysfunction, but when the apparatus of state does not \textit{predominate} in society, they are subject to reaching accommodations with local strongmen and the like. Therefore, given the immense pressures administrative and bureaucratic structures face in the developing world (from above, below and within) it is little wonder that they have become ineffective and burdensome institutions, often contributing to dysfunction rather than fulfilling the functions of statehood.

8. Conceptualisation and conclusion

Migdal’s paradigmatic approach to understanding state capabilities in the developing world differs markedly from prior contemporary research into the subject. His approach accounts for more than purely the formalistic aspects of political organisation and institutions. Rather, his point of departure reflects a justifiable concern with the societies within which these organisations and institutions develop.

In surveying the theoretical landscape which \textit{Strong States and Weak Societies} transverses, several important landmarks are visible which aid this conceptualisation of state dysfunction. Firstly, and perhaps most significantly for Migdal, the state is influenced by society. The brevity of this notion belies its significance. If the problem of
dysfunctional states in the developing world has taught scholars anything, it is that a Weberian ideal-typical state cannot be superimposed on any society and be expected to function according to preconceived norms. In other words, Migdal turns the traditional analysis of states on its head; not pondering the characteristics of weak states but rather the characteristics of strong societies. His analysis is conducted through the state-in-society approach, whereby the state is identified as an actor in society, and not the actor. His state-in-society model reveals how states in the developing world are not predominant in their societies (see Figure 14), and he employs this as a point of departure in evaluating state dysfunction.

Secondly, the societal emphasis Migdal employs necessitates an historical and contemporary evaluation of socio-political development in the developing world, which is a paradigmatic point of departure in his work. In this regard, escalating Western influence since the 18th century was the single most important factor driving societal change in the modern history of the developing world. Initially, this involvement occurred through informal means, often because of commercial activity or exploration, prompted by the expediencies of the nascent international economy. Later this interaction was formalised on a legal-rational basis, resulting in colonialism and the establishment of an institutionalised state. Thus the pre-colonial and colonial influences are seminal factors that contributed to the nature of post-colonial dysfunctional societies and, according to Migdal’s approach, post-colonial societies spawned post-colonial states, the locus of the majority of contemporary dysfunctional states. According to Migdal’s evaluation, these societies are characterised by fragmented social control which results in web-like power relations. Therefore, instead of power and authority being concentrated primarily in the state, it is diffuse and shared among many (non-state) actors in society. This fact constitutes the main onslaught upon the viability of the Weberian ideal-typical state. Since the state is not predominant in society it:

- Does not act as a compulsory association, since certain non-state actors are evidently not compelled to associate with it. Furthermore, citizens may associate with a particular warlord or strongman rather than the state, thereby rejecting the state’s ‘rules of the game’;
- Does not maintain binding authority, due to the fact that power is fragmented amongst numerous actors in society, who may provide more viable
strategies of survival. In other words, state authority is only binding upon those individuals who concede to it;

- Does not possess a monopoly of legitimate force in society, since it lacks legitimacy, coercive means or both. Non-state actors may be more legitimate and better equipped with the tools of coercion than the state;

- Does not maintain territorial integrity, nor sovereignty, since non-state actors may lay claim to and command large geographical areas, representative of their spheres of influence, for the reason mentioned above;

- Does not possess a coordinated administrative order, since government institutions are predated by leaders, and pressured by society. State administrations thus become corrupted vehicles for personal enrichment, whilst the notion of fulfilling state functions is dismissed.

Thirdly, it becomes apparent that the interactive dynamic between these aspects are of a cyclical nature,—a vicious cycle of dysfunction. For example, in web-like societies with fragmented social control, states need to negotiate and compromise with non-state actors, since the state does not enjoy predominance in society. However, these acts of accommodation further reinforce state dependence on strongmen, whilst simultaneously undermining attempts to establish state predominance in society. Similarly, the politics of survival employed by state leaders serve only to weaken state institutions, gradually whittling down state capabilities (and therefore prospects of survival) which reinforces leaders’ paranoia regarding the consolidation of their own positions. Once again this prompts them to manoeuvre tactically for their own survival, thereby perpetuating the cycle. Thus, just as the collective primary attributes of the Weberian ideal-typical state are mutually reinforcing in functional terms (see Figure 13), the elements of Migdal’s evaluation of weak states mutually reinforce and perpetuate dysfunction. This would suggest that the longer this cycle of dysfunction continues, the less likely it is for a state to adopt a remedial course towards establishing state functionality.

Migdal’s evaluation bears pertinent relevance to all the attributes of statehood identified in Chapter 3. In reconstructing his contribution to the conceptualisation of state dysfunction, the above-mentioned aspects are integrated with the analytical tool developed in Chapter 2, as illustrated below. Concepts employed by Migdal that exert
a negative or undermining effect upon the attributes of statehood, thereby contributing to state dysfunction, are indicated accordingly with the ↓ symbol.

Figure 15: Reconstructing Migdal’s contribution to the conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state

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<tr>
<td>Historical, sociological, and institutionalist, according importance to both the development of society and the development of state. Regarding the former, pre-colonial and colonial interaction between Europe and the developing world is NB. Regarding the latter, the nature of post-colonial institutionalization is NB.</td>
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By integrating Migdal’s paradigmatic point of departure and the scientific constructs he employs with an analytical tool, certain conclusions become evident. In attempting to identify a cause-effect relationship regarding state dysfunction, it is clear from Migdal’s approach (and its concomitant application through a state-in-society model) that the roots of state dysfunction may be buried deep in a given society’s historical development. It appears that the concepts employed in this approach are all descriptors of society rather than of state (with the possible exception of the politics of survival), which together constitute a scenario of fragmented social control. It would therefore be logical to posit that, according to Migdal’s perspective, a dysfunctional society is more likely than a functional society to sustain a dysfunctional state. Therefore, in a society where social control is not fragmented but unified through a predominant state, that state will likely be functional (that is, strong state). Whilst this might appear to represent a logical fallacy in the form of circular reasoning, (that is, one establishes a predominant state through a predominant state) it invites a closer evaluation of societies instead of states in conceptualising the phenomenon of state dysfunction. In the prologue of Strong Societies and Weak States, Migdal notes that,
“Focusing merely on the direct impact of states on societies, however, would give us only a partial view of the relationships between peoples and states and would miss important aspects of why some states are more capable than others. Societies also affect states” (Migdal, 1988:xiv).

Therefore, identifying the factors that shaped a fragmented social order in society will provide insight into the nature of a dysfunctional state. Migdal cites these factors as being the cumulative involvement of Europe in the developing world, and its consequences.

Thus, the manner in which historical externalities shaped societies in the developing world is crucial to conceptualising instances of state dysfunction. An investigation into a dysfunctional state must account for the nature of that particular society, and consequently the factors that influenced that society’s development. However, this does not imply that the officers of state are not accountable for their actions. In other words, state dysfunction cannot be palmed off conveniently on a vague notion of upheaval in society or the legacy of colonialism. Some states manage to consolidate social control after disruptive societal influences (such as colonialism, economic disruption, or revolution in the cases of the USA and Russia), whilst others exacerbate patterns of fragmented social control and continue on the path of state dysfunction. Corrupt politicians contribute to state dysfunction, as do the politics of survival and other forms of deliberate malpractice (about this there can be no doubt). Therefore, just as post-colonial leaders cannot be held responsible for the manner in which societies developed under colonial domination, in the same manner they cannot ignore their complicity in the continuing political decay since independence in the developing world.

Considering this evaluation, it becomes tempting to appropriate blame for the plight of the state in the developing world; however, this is neither productive, nor the task of science. Any evaluation of state dysfunction should be conducted with the purpose of gaining valid and reliable knowledge about the phenomenon, the true teleological purpose of scientific research.63

What this evaluation of Migdal’s work suggests is that in attempting to understand these deviant practices that characterise dysfunctional states, one should cast a broader glance at society in general. The configuration of social control, ethnic pluralism, colonial and post-colonial history, and the presence of viable strategies for survival

63 This dictum forms a fundamental meta-theoretical underpinning of the conceptualisation of state dysfunction conducted in this dissertation, as discussed in Chapter 2.
apart from that of the state’s may tell us more about the nature of a dysfunctional state than any NGO index of governance or simplistic measurement of state failure.

Migdal’s contribution and its evaluation in terms of the analytical tool above will form part of this dissertation’s conceptualisation of state dysfunction. His perspective, reconstructed above, will be combined with those of two other authors, in the process of conceptualisation. The next chapter will consider the ideas of another scholar of state dysfunction, namely Robert H. Jackson.
Chapter 5
Sovereignty and dysfunctional states: the contribution of Robert H. Jackson

1. Introduction and contextualisation

The preceding chapter constitutes a reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of Joel Migdal’s contribution towards this study’s conceptualisation of state dysfunction. His perspective emphasised the nature of societies in the developing world, noting in particular the manner in which these societies developed before and during colonialism, and how this influenced the place and role of the state in the developing world. This chapter continues the process of conceptualising state dysfunction by introducing the work of Robert H. Jackson, most notable of which is *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (1993).

Whereas Migdal analysed the colonial and post-colonial features of the developing world at a societal level, Jackson sets his sights on the arena of international relations in assessing state dysfunction. Therefore, in this chapter the conceptualisation of state dysfunction shifts from the domestic sphere, to the international community of states. In *Quasi-states* Jackson essentially provides an account of the emergence of dysfunctional states in the international community following World War II and decolonisation. His work is of particular relevance since, amidst the theoretical perspectives on state dysfunction “Nowhere ... is much attention given to international legitimacy and law.” (Jackson, 1993:2)

As a result, Jackson develops a typology for assessing the problem of state dysfunction in the context of international law, with a particular focus on its most revered institution – sovereign independence. His typology consists of two types of sovereignty, namely negative and positive. Corresponding to each type is a set of rules, according to which sovereignty ‘games’ are conducted in the international sphere. Historically, the positive sovereignty game was dominant in shaping states and their capabilities. However, in the last fifty years the rules of negative sovereignty have come to characterise
international relations in a post-colonial world64. These rules of negative sovereignty, so Jackson argues, are instrumental in sustaining the existence of contemporary dysfunctional states. Jackson coined the term ‘quasi-states’ in referring to those entities characterised by negative sovereignty.

Jackson’s book essentially redefined the notion of sovereignty in the discipline of political science and is noted as a landmark of literature on the developing world (Harshe, 1995:85). At the time of its publication, certain commentators described the work as pessimistic (Pierre, 1991:182) and reactionary (Nardin, 1991:887). The central thesis in Quasi-states has, however, since been vindicated by continued post-colonial state dysfunction and remains a much-cited theoretical resource in assessing the nature of state sovereignty in the developing world65. The durability and versatility of his insights regarding statehood in the developing world is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that his views have permeated other academic disciplines, notably law (for example, Kreijen, 2004). Currently, Robert Jackson is a professor of International Relations at Boston University, and was previously attached to the University of British Columbia in the same capacity66.

Following the methodology employed in the preceding chapter, Jackson’s view of the state is described and related to the Weberian concept of state developed in Chapter 3, following which his paradigmatic departure points are evaluated. The period of international change that led to the creation of post-colonial states is discussed, as well as the prevalence of dysfunctional (quasi) states during this period. Subsequently, the concepts of positive and negative sovereignty are analysed and related to the current international sovereignty regime of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In explaining the mechanics of this new sovereignty regime, the aspects of decolonisation, international affirmative action (as a form of redress) and international human rights are discussed. Finally, Jackson’s perspectives are evaluated and integrated using the analytical tool developed in Chapter 2, in order to contribute to a conceptualisation of state dysfunction. This methodology is summarised as follows:

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64 A complete account of negative and positive sovereignty is provided in Sections 5 & 6.
65 Jackson’s concept of “quasi-states” is employed in many introductory and advanced books in the field of International Relations. Recent examples include Chandler (2010:47), Lake (2009:39), Nexon (2009:58) and Thomson (2010:177).
66 During 1968-1970, Jackson was a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies in Nairobi, Kenya.
## 2. Jackson’s view of the state

Jackson explains that the primary notion which underlies *Quasi-states* is the realisation that post-colonial states of the developing world are creatures of a particular time in history, characterised by a particular international morality (Jackson, 1993:ix). Thus, states in the developing world were created through a revolutionary process, as opposed to emerging and consolidating through political evolution (as was predominantly the case in the developed world). This notion was first theoretically charted in 1982 by Jackson and Rosberg in an article entitled *Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood*[^67], which culminated in the eventual publication of *Quasi-states* in 1993.

Analysing Jackson’s view of the state is essential to understanding his interpretation of state dysfunction, since the variable nature of modern statehood stands centrally in the distinction between states and quasi-states. Jackson’s conceptualisation of statehood resides in two different but complementary spheres. The first sphere concerns the sociological conception of the state. This conception rests upon the definition of state posited by Weber (Kreijen, 2004:44), and is essentially the same conception of statehood developed in Chapter 3 of this study. Jackson reaffirms that Weber’s definition is one of *means* and not *ends*, and that the particular means of a state resides in its monopoly of force in a given society (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982:2). Consequently,

[^67]: The two authors later again collaborated on *Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis* (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986).

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because this monopoly of force represents the defining hallmark of a functional state, the Weberian conceptualisation is firmly grounded in the empirical realm (that is, the realm of means). According to Jackson, it is this empirical anchor that has made Weber so popular with political scientists in particular, since his definition focuses on the ‘furniture and equipment of statehood’, for example, institutions which lend themselves to empirical analysis (Kreijen, 2004:46; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:2). Migdal and Huntington’s analysis of state dysfunction is also predominantly situated within this tradition.

The second sphere concerns a conceptualisation of state that gives priority to juridical rather than empirical attributes of statehood, that is, a normative conception of the state. Highly normative scholars such as Kelsen (1945:181) argue that the state is the personification of the national and therefore a purely legal phenomenon, not an empirical manifestation. He argues that, because Weber’s sociological concept of state is predicated upon the oriented actions68 of individuals, the true nature of the state lies not in the action itself, but rather the normative framework that guides that action. According to Kelsen, this guiding normative framework is a juristic legal order: “The state is that order of human behaviour that we call the legal order, the order to which certain human actions are oriented, the idea to which individuals adapt their behaviour. If human behaviour oriented to this order forms the object of sociology, then its object is not the state. There is no sociological concept of the state besides the juristic concept” (Kelsen, 1945:188).

Therefore, at one extreme of the normative tradition the idea of an empirical state in the sociological sense is wholly rejected. Scholars in the Weberian tradition challenge this position on the grounds that any set of rules, or legal order, must emanate from a given human context and is therefore essentially sociological69. However, most adherents of the normative tradition concede that a conception of state must account for empirical attributes and therefore adopt a more moderate normative view of state. For example, noted legal scholar Ian Brownlie (1979:73-76) describes the state as a legal person, recognised by international law, with the following attributes: (a) a defined territory, (b) a permanent population, (c) an effective government, and (d) independence, or the right to enter into relations with other states. Although this definition is largely legal-

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68 It is also this notion of action which underscores state function, and accordingly the wrong type of action or no action whatsoever underlies state dysfunction – at least in the Weberian concept of state.

69 Similarly, Migdal would argue that a dysfunctional state (as a legal order) emanates from a dysfunctional society (web-like/fragmented), underscoring a sociological conception of state.
formalistic, it makes reference to the requirement of effective government, which is not a legal fact but rather an empirical variable\textsuperscript{70}. This reinforces an assumption central to this study, namely that statehood in the developing world cannot be taken for granted. It would also, once again, point toward the durability of Weber's concept of statehood.

In his analysis of state dysfunction, Jackson positions his conception of state in the overlapping area of the above-mentioned sociological and normative spheres. He explains that the Weberian sociological concept of state that emphasises empirical attributes is informed exclusively by European history and experience: “The modern states of Europe, and their successors elsewhere, were built with the use of force under strong pressure for disintegration – both domestic and international. Even after internal consolidation and the subordination of regions to the centre, external pressures from other states remain” (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986:4).

Subsequently, from these empirically viable and powerful states, there emerged a formal-legal system to regulate and govern interaction between them. Rules, practices and conventions were created and observed by political leaders as long as it was to their states’ mutual advantage. Thus, according to Jackson’s view of the state, “The law of nations complemented the balance of power [between states], but was never a substitute for it” (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986:4).

Jackson’s particular view of state therefore incorporates both the sociological (Weberian) and normative (legal-formalistic) conceptions of statehood, and accordingly emphasises the importance of sovereignty as the focus of investigation. As with Migdal, Jackson’s concept of state is well suited to the level of analysis at which he investigates the perpetuation of state dysfunction. Where Migdal’s societal focus was well-served by his state-in-society approach, so too Jackson applies his particular conception of state to the international-legal realm. This conceptual relationship is depicted in the diagram below:

\textsuperscript{70} In the vocabulary of this study, the requirement of effective government may be interpreted as a compulsory association with binding authority achieved through means of a coordinated administration.
In the illustration above, the sociological and normative conceptions of state are represented, in addition to the ambit of the international legal order. Jackson’s conception of state, as well as his theoretical level of analysis, is located in the area of overlap between these spheres, which constitutes the aspect of sovereignty – represented diagrammatically by the $S$ symbol. Sovereignty becomes a significant intersection in the quantitative and qualitative study of statehood, since it is the fundamental building block of the international politico-legal order, a manifestation of constitutionally independent \(^{71}\) normative statehood and an empirical attribute achieved through state capacity. The aspect of sovereignty is therefore a keystone in Jackson’s view of the state and the typology he employs in analysing state dysfunction. According to Jackson (1993:1), “I am concerned not with all aspects of Third World states or even most aspects but only with one: their sovereign aspect.”

Consequently, a discussion and analysis of sovereignty is conducted later in this chapter. Having identified Jackson’s conception of state as taking account of sociological and normative approaches to the state, with particular reference to sovereignty and the international legal order, the next section will account for his paradigmatic points of departure.

\(^{71}\) Constitutionally independent in the legal sense that a state’s constitution does not form part of, nor is it subservient to, that of another sovereign state (i.e. sovereign independence).
3. Jackson’s paradigm

From the preceding discussion outlining Jackson’s view of the state, it is evident that he adheres to a broadly orthodox paradigm characterised by Weberian, liberal and constitutional elements prevalent in the history of Western political scholarship. However, despite the overarching orthodoxy of Jackson’s scholarly foundations, his paradigm is nuanced to differentiate itself from being a stereotypical frame of reference. In this regard, Harshe (1995:77) notes that Jackson’s paradigm, evident in Quasi-states, signifies a trend away from the two dominant paradigms of enquiry that characterised political science at the time, namely behaviouralism and radicalism (embodied by neo-Marxism). Towards the end of the twentieth century, behaviouralism (and eventually post-behaviouralism in the tradition of Huntington and, to a certain extent, Migdal) and neo-Marxism (particularly in the form of dependency theory) had dominated the academic discourse centred around post-colonial states and societies.

The behaviouralist paradigm (particularly during the 1960s) was promoted by modernisation theorists, who endeavoured to analyse and interpret the progress of traditional societies (the developing world) towards modernity. Modernisation theory borrowed several important theoretical perspectives from sociology, which it applied to the political study of state and society (Bealey, 1999:215), and it is likely that the Weberian ideal-type (being originally a sociological construct) owes its prominence at least in part to the period of behaviouralist hegemony. Later, the inadequacies of behaviouralism were identified and analysed by the likes of Easton (1971), which prompted the emergence of post-behaviouralism72.

In the quest towards understanding underdevelopment in the developing world, neo-Marxism represented a contending paradigm of academic thought. Dependency theorists diagnose underdevelopment (and concomitant dysfunction) as the result of an economic imbalance between wealthy industrialised states and the developing world, whereby wealthy states are dominant and often exploitative in the course of North-South state relations (Bealey, 1999:101). As a result, the underdevelopment of states in the developing world can be attributed to the historically dominant states of the developed world73.

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72 See Chapter 6.
73 Refer to Migdal’s discussion of Western influence in the developing world, Chapter 4 (albeit that Migdal’s perspective is not grounded in neo-Marxism, it does represent an interpretation of historical North-South interaction).
Neither the behaviouralist/post-behaviouralist nor neo-Marxist paradigms are definitively indicative of Jackson's analysis of state dysfunction contained in *Quasi-states*. However, this is not to say that the issues central to these paradigms are not relevant to his analysis, but rather that his *particular conceptualisation* of state dysfunction emphasises other factors. Having established in the preceding section that the aspect of sovereignty is central to his view of the state, Jackson explains that (in reference to the dominant paradigms): “Nowhere in these schemes is much attention given to international legitimacy and law, however. For Marxists this is a second order phenomenon denoted by the term ‘superstructure’ while for behaviouralists it is merely ‘formal legality’... Neither can say whether or not sovereignty is important because it is insignificant by definition and excluded from analysis by and large” (Jackson, 1993:2).

Instead, Jackson propagates a paradigmatic mode of analysis that calls attention to the international normative and legal order that sustains contemporary state dysfunction (Jackson, 1993:2). It is this paradigm which Jackson employs in *Quasi-states*, and which he delineates according to three main tenets.

Firstly, continued from the preceding section, the aspect of sovereignty is central to Jackson’s mode of analysis, and is viewed in dual terms, namely sociologically (empirically) and normatively (legally). The inclusion of a normative conceptualisation of statehood, and sovereignty in particular, is justified on the grounds that the international realm of states is, to a significant degree, governed by rules. These rules include formal law, but also principles, standards, conventions, practices and customs that constitute and perpetuate international ‘community’ or ‘society’74 as an institution. Yet, Jackson notes, “Institutions and the rules and offices of which they consist do not have the ontological status of natural facts: they are made and manipulated by men. Convention and nature are different categories” (Jackson, 1993:3).

This perspective forms a lynchpin of Jackson’s arguments in *Quasi-states*, namely that the state and the expression of statehood, in addition to interaction between states in the international realm, are all activities guided by human conception and human action. In contrast to the neo-Marxist paradigm, Jackson explains that: “My approach...is accordingly based in human will and not structural-functional analysis, class analysis or any other methodology which discounts choices and their consequences or suggests

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74 Both the concepts of community and society are underscored by common customs and rules which ensure their existence. Hence the application of these concepts to the international arena, where rules and customs ensure the stability and continuing of a international system of states.
that international relations somehow operate over the heads of statesmen” (Jackson, 1993:4).

Jackson therefore views politics as an activity conducted through human volition and not a process resigned to the dictates of deterministic dialectical change. This perspective represents a common denominator between the perspectives of Migdal, Jackson and Huntington, and is therefore an important component of this study’s conceptualisation of state dysfunction. Thus, rules are created, maintained and broken by man. One either chooses to abide by a community’s normative framework or one chooses to ignore it, whether the contexts be domestic or global. Such a paradigmatic orientation holds political decision makers accountable for their actions and would suggest that state dysfunction is, at least partially, the result of specific actions and omissions by state leaders, and therefore not the result of unfortunate happenstance.

Closely related to the perspective described above (that normative factors such as rules guide political action, and that such action is the product of human will) is a second tenet of Jackson’s paradigmatic frame of reference, namely idealism. Jackson describes this notion of idealism not as being the opposite of rationalism (a conventional interpretation) but rather that ideas and realities are not separate categories, but form a single indivisible whole75 (Jackson, 1993:6). According to this approach, reality is shaped by ideas, since empirical reality is the result of human action (which is by their nature idea-driven). Thus, Jackson would argue, in order to understand aspects of reality, one must comprehend the ideas that underlie them. Similarly, if one wishes to understand the phenomenon of state dysfunction and its perpetuation in the developing world, one must understand the ideas that sustain the international status quo. According to Jackson, “The human world is composed significantly of ideas and the world of state is no exception. We cannot meaningfully study international relations without investigating the operative ideals which gave shape to them whether intentionally or inadvertently” (Jackson, 1993:8).

Hence the importance Jackson accords to sovereignty (and his subsequent analysis of the concept) as an idea of both state and international system, since it is a concept of fundamental importance to understanding both spheres.

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75 This concurs with the meta-theoretical exposition conducted in Chapter 2 of this study, and serves as a guiding principle in this conceptualisation.
Thirdly, Jackson explains that concerning the international community of states, his analytical frame of reference is essentially that of liberalism (Jackson, 1993:10). However, this orientation is not motivated by subjective value judgements on the part of the author, but rather the inherent architecture and evolution of the international system. The cardinal value of this system is sovereign independence which forms the foundation upon which the entire scheme rests, and virtually all practices and principles (including the rules discussed earlier) derive either directly or indirectly from this fact. According to Jackson (1993:10), “The logic of such a system is the international expression of liberalism: sovereign states are the equivalent of free individuals.”

Thus, the author argues, an analysis of liberalism is implicitly present in any analysis of the international system of statehood, and does not constitute an explicit paradigmatic or ideological outcome. Jackson’s (often critical) appraisal of liberal virtues that uphold the order of international statehood (such as unconditional independence and self-determination as a fundamental right) may thus appear to be anti-liberal, or paternalistic. He disclaims any such motivations and argues for strict value neutrality which, according to him, has been conspicuously absent in evaluations of post-colonial states in the developing world\textsuperscript{76}. It is from this position of objective value neutrality that Jackson asks the most incisive questions which contribute toward this conceptualisation of state dysfunction. Nevertheless, the forthrightness with which he approaches the issue of accountability of dysfunctional states has led some to criticise his ‘ironic’ and at times ‘disparaging’ tone (Thornberry, 1992:730).

Therefore, in conclusion, Jackson’s paradigmatic point of departure emphasises the confluence of human ideas and human conduct, as they pertain to politics. Neither of these two aspects occurs spontaneously, as they are subject to human conception and interpretation. The next section begins to evaluate Jackson’s theoretical approach to state dysfunction by discussing the period of international change during which most of the world’s currently dysfunctional states achieved independence.

\textsuperscript{76} Rigorous analysis of the failure of states in the developing world has been obstructed through doctrines such as cultural relativism, socioeconomic determinism and antiracism, indicative of the neo-Marxist paradigm (Jackson, 1993:11).
4. **International change during the 20th century**

It would have been almost inconceivable prior to World War II that the colonial empires of the Western imperial powers would be completely dismantled before the end of the twentieth century. Several reasons may be put forward for the rapid demise of colonialism. It could be argued that the war severely weakened the military capabilities of both France and Britain, which were the two major colonial powers at the time. Additionally, the post-war rivalry between the USA and the USSR significantly hampered the ability of the colonial powers to maintain their empires amidst a ‘cold war’ (Hobden, 2005:45). During that period in history, the international environment became receptive to the ideas of anti-colonial ideologies (spurred on significantly by the success of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States) amongst which the notion of self-determination featured prominently (Jackson, 1993:16). The United Nations, in particular, played a pivotal role in discrediting the premise of colonialism through the promulgation of its Charter (1945), and documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which acquired significant moral and legal momentum. As a result, European colonial powers were unable to sustain widespread belief in the legitimacy of colonialism. The growing tide of international criticism and resentment forced these powers to begin a process of decolonisation that, once initiated, snowballed as dozens of colonies clamoured for immediate independence, citing the newfound international morality.

The pre-war framework of international law and legitimacy drew a sharp distinction between Europeans (or people of European descent) and non-Europeans. It was taken for granted that only Europeans were entitled to rule themselves via sovereign statehood. Non-Europeans and colonial subjects were assumed not able to govern themselves effectively, and the burden rested on them to prove otherwise, in terms of the standards upheld by Western civilisation (Jackson, 1993:16). Therefore, sovereign (Western) states shared equal relations with other sovereign states, whilst manifestly unequal relations were the norm between the metropolitan powers and their colonial possessions. The post-war normative framework radically changed this arrangement, and assumed the exact opposite of its pre-war configuration, namely that all colonial peoples are entitled to be independent regardless of their culture, race, wealth, geography or any such criterion (Jackson, 1993:16). Put differently, no prerequisite of political viability prevented colonies from attaining independence, since self-
determination became a fundamental norm, that is, a right. Where there previously existed a clear distinction between sovereign states and dependencies, the current world order is levelled into only one constitutional category, that of sovereign states, inspired by the doctrine of equal rights and equal dignity of all humans. Jackson summarises this shift in the international order by adding that “The crucial principle of the contemporary international constitution as it applies to formerly dependent areas of the world is universal and categorical self-determination of the indigenous people” (Jackson, 1993:17).

States who refused to accede to these new values faced ostracism and sanction, as evidenced by the cases of Israel (Zionism) and South Africa during apartheid.

However, the abolition of the international hierarchy of states and its subsequent replacement with egalitarianism has failed to bring an end to differentiation between states. The persistent stratification of states, even after colonialism, is most acutely emphasised by the different adjectives that have emerged to describe various tiers of state capacity. Formerly, the world was divided into metropolitan powers and colonies or dependencies. These two categories have largely continued to exist (albeit clad in the vocabulary of political correctness) as developed, developing and less-developed states. The sphere of less-developed states can be further differentiated into dysfunctional states (the broad term employed by this study), of which some are often described as weak- or failed states. Jackson explains, “Today in addition however there is a North-South gap between states disclosed by profoundly unequal standards of living which cannot be altered fundamentally by international agreements and diplomacy. The division is likely to persist indefinitely regardless of international decisions to the contrary because it is rooted in deep-seated cultural, material, and even psychological conditions of sovereign states” (Jackson, 1993:18).

Jackson’s opinion is corroborated by Migdal’s analysis of social fragmentation and control in dysfunctional states, discussed in the previous chapter. One need only conduct a cursory comparison of developed and developing states, using statistical data supplied by institutions such as the World Bank or the United Nations, to realise the vast size of this North-South divide. At the ‘good’ end of this spectrum the modern, developed and industrialised states of the West predominate. Their position is juxtaposed by the poor performance of former colonies, many of which were decimated in the process of modernisation and subsequently exhibit signs of severe dysfunction.
As a result, even though the formal hierarchy between states has been abolished (in principle), an informal ranking of a very significant kind (in practice) has been established:

In one respect everything has changed: there are no longer any significant dependencies in the world but only equal sovereign states. In another respect, however, there has been far less change: the world’s population remains divided along more or less the same North-South lines as previously. What has basically changed therefore are the international rules of the game concerning the obligation to be a colony and the right to be a sovereign state. (Jackson, 1993:21)

This, then, is the central premise of Jackson’s viewpoint: the notion that an international order of strong and weak states is being perpetuated, with little empirical change in state capabilities and government, merely repackaged in an egalitarian manner. The thought of a post-colonial international order contributing to the alleviation and eradication of state dysfunction in the developing world must therefore be fundamentally reconsidered.

5. Dysfunctional states and sovereignty

At the dawn of the 21st century the multitude of ex-colonial states has been juridically elevated to sovereign statehood – the capable and weak alike. Yet many of these states exhibit only the de jure characteristics of stateness, entirely lacking in its substantive empirical attribute. According to Jackson, their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in political will, institutional authority and authoritative power (the means of state, emphasised by Weber) with which to protect human rights and provide socio-economic welfare. The concrete benefits that have historically justified the undeniable burdens of sovereign statehood are often limited to narrow elites and not yet extended to the citizenry at large whose lives are little improved by independence and are perhaps even adversely affected by it, judging by the political decay exhibited by many post-colonial states77. These states are primarily juridical, meaning that their existence is maintained by international law (de jure), and not

77 According to the United Nations Human Development Index (United Nations, 2010) the vast majority of states categorized as exhibiting low levels of human development are former colonies. The ten lowest ranking states are all in Africa, and were all former colonies, with the exception of Liberia. The lowest ranking state is Zimbabwe, with a human development score of 0.140, whilst the highest ranking state is Norway, with 0.938. South Africa has a human development score of 0.619.
through their inherent capabilities or empirical attributes (*de facto*). They cannot be considered functional states, as substantive empirical statehood in large measure remains to be built (Jackson, 1993:21). These are what Jackson refers to as ‘quasi-states’. His description undoubtedly reflects the circumstances in dysfunctional states, which may be either weak or failing, and therefore bears pertinent relevance for this study. Jackson notes that these former colonies were in many instances granted independence, without possessing substantive freedom and that a lack of one negates the other. These quasi-states therefore enjoy equal sovereignty, but they lack established institutions capable of constraining and outlasting the individuals who occupy their offices, and reflect little respect for binding constitutions or acceptance of the rule of law (Jackson, 1993:22).

Discrepancies between the capabilities of strong- and quasi- or dysfunctional states are not new. Certain states have always possessed greater capabilities domestically and internationally. History offers many examples of strong states and derelict weak states, even in the now-developed world. Inequality between states is thus a persistent feature of international relations and something that is unalterable. In fact, much of world history can be interpreted using the narrative of the survival of strong political entities and the submission or destruction of weaker ones. This is the essence of ‘power politics’ as put forward by Morgenthau (1949): the realist notion that the system of states represents a balance of power where strong states conquer the weak. The empirical conditions of strong and weak states continue to exist, but under the new post-war international legal dispensation the traditional balance of power has been disturbed. Weaker states are no longer party to the competitive dynamic of survival in the international sphere, as Jackson explains “…the traditional balance of power system has been interfered with and subjected to new normative regulations: weak, marginal, or insubstantial states are now exempt from the power contest at least in part and treated as international protectorates…The weakness or backwardness of countries is no longer a justification for conquest or colonialism” (Jackson, 1993:23).

The fact that inequality and underdevelopment exists between states is not new, but the way that this inequality and underdevelopment is conceived, evaluated and responded to has changed. Dysfunctional states are no longer easy targets for conquest or

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78 A comparison of the territorial boundaries agreed upon in Europe during the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the territorial configuration of the same geography on the eve of the First World War (1913) reveals few similarities. This 250 year period saw significant European political upheaval, with many weaker states being annexed by greater powers under suzerainty (as was the case with Moldavia, Transylvania, and Wallachia) or absorbed in their totality (in the case of Savoy).
annexation, as the historical theories of realist international relations would purport: “Ramshackle states today are not open invitations for unsolicited external intervention. They are not allowed to disappear juridically – even if for all intents and purposes they have already fallen or been pulled down in fact. They cannot be deprived of sovereignty as a result of war, conquest, partition, or colonialism such as frequently happened in the past. The juridical cart is now before the empirical horse [own emphasis]” (Jackson, 1993:23).

This new international sovereignty regime acts as an insurance policy for the dysfunctional states that are maintained by these non-competitive norms (Kreijen, 2002:93). Therefore, instead of conceiving political weakness and dysfunction as threats to sovereignty and statehood, they are now considered reasons for exemption from the more strenuous classical international competition between states (Jackson, 1993:24). The new rules of the sovereignty game are much more accommodating and tolerant of dysfunctional states than ever before. As Jackson notes, this shift in the conceptualisation of sovereignty justified the independence of every colony that desired it, thereby establishing a radically different basis of sovereign statehood in the developing world. It was now possible to possess juridical statehood while as yet disclosing little evidence of empirical capability. It was also possible (as it had never been in the past) to make demands on international society for assistance to become developed, and it became difficult to ignore such demands without denying the real problems and difficulties of the new members of an expanded international community of states (Jackson, 1993:25).

5.1 Positive and negative sovereignty

Embedded in Jackson’s description of quasi-states are the notions of positive and negative sovereignty79, and the argument that dysfunctional states often possess only the latter. This interpretation of sovereignty is modelled on Berlin’s (1969) influential cognate ideas of negative and positive liberty. Berlin defines negative liberty as the area within which an individual can act unobstructed by others (1969:122). Negative liberty provides individuals freedom from interference, and thus presupposes self-determination. Interference with an individual’s negative liberty is only justified when

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79 The theoretical differentiation of sovereignty has also notably been conducted by Stephen Krasner (1999), who identifies four variations of sovereignty (1999:3-4). Several of Krasner’s insights are based upon Jackson’s analysis of quasi-states.
he/she harms or threatens to harm others – the so-called harm principle (Mill, 1859:21).

Similarly, negative sovereignty (as applied to states) can be defined as freedom from outside interference, in a formal-legal sense. In this application, possessing sovereignty and being free from outside intervention represent two sides of the same coin. It is also the central principle upon which the law of nations and the Weberian conception of statehood is premised – the notion that each state has exclusive legal jurisdiction in its own territory, free from incursion by other states. According to Jackson, “Negative sovereignty as regards quasi-states primarily involves decolonisation: it is the distinctive liberty acquired by former colonies as a consequence of the international enfranchisement movement ... It is a formal legal entitlement and therefore something which the international society is capable of conferring” (Jackson, 1993:27).

Negative sovereignty could be described as a passive attribute, since it is not dependent on any conditions or positive actions by the sovereign state. Rather, it rests on the observance and forbearance of other states in the international community of sovereign states.

In contrast, positive liberty (as described by Berlin) consists of being one's own master. Thus, where negative liberty is interpreted as freedom from, positive liberty is freedom to: being active, self-directive, exercising choice, and pursuing and realising goals (Berlin, 1969:131). Positive sovereignty likewise presupposes capabilities that enable governments to be their own masters (Marshall, 1965:5) and is, therefore, a substantive (empirical) rather than a formal condition or status that may be conferred – it is not a legal, but a political attribute. According to Jackson (1993:29), a positively sovereign state is one that not only enjoys rights of non-intervention and other international immunities, but also possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens: “It is the distinctive overall feature of a ‘developed’ state. Consequently, it is a stronger characteristic of some states than of others” (Jackson, 1993:29).

Although all internationally recognised states enjoy the rights which negative sovereignty guarantees, such as autonomous diplomatic relations and non-intervention, only some possess the capabilities to maximise the advantage of their independence. Importantly, Jackson notes that the ability to achieve substantive positive sovereignty is

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80 Marshall’s (1965:5) description of sovereignty is predicated especially upon the capabilities of states, and serves as a good example of the classical (positive) conceptualisation of sovereignty. Whilst its length prohibits its quotation here, Marshall’s conceptualisation captures the essence of classical positive sovereignty (which Jackson employs in his own work).
not a function of a particular state’s size or power (Jackson, 1993:30). Strong small states and dysfunctional large states have existed throughout history. Economically and geographically, Denmark is dwarfed by a state such as Germany, and has historically suffered under German invasions and occupations. Yet the Danish government is able to provide for its population as well as any state and better than most\(^8\). Jackson (1993:30) explains, “It is not a question of being a dwarf or a giant among states. Rather, it is a question of being a state in organised domestic reality and not merely by international law.”

Through their domestic incapacity, dysfunctional and quasi-states therefore lack positive sovereignty and many of the concomitant positive (empirical) attributes of statehood. They exist merely because their inherent rights, enshrined in negative sovereignty, maintain them. Jackson further argues that the very deficiencies that characterise quasi-states are now employed as legitimate grounds for international assistance. Incapacity and inequality have therefore been turned into international claims to additional international support, where previously it would have been seen as \textit{prima facie} grounds for denying a state membership of the international community of sovereign states (Jackson, 1993:30-31).

5.2 Old and new sovereignty games

In terms of international law, sovereignty implies constitutional independence from other states, which means that a state’s constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement (James, 1986:25). There can be no half-measure, or semi-sovereignty – a state is either wholly sovereign or subject to a measure of control by another sovereign state and therefore not sovereign. Historically, various types of non-sovereign entities existed that were maintained by imperial powers such as protectorates, colonies, mandates, trust territories or condominiums (Grossman, 2001:858; Fawcett, 1949:86-107). All the afore-mentioned political-constitutional arrangements entailed legal subordination to a foreign power, effectively the denial of sovereignty. This was the \textit{status quo} before the end of World War II, and constituted what Jackson refers to as the ‘old sovereignty game’. He explains his use of metaphor accordingly: “Since sovereignty is essentially a legal order defined by rules it can very

\(^8\) Denmark has maintained a historically high level of human development, with an HDI measurement of 0.895 (15\textsuperscript{th}). Despite their territorial size, other geographically small states such as the Netherlands, Belgium and South Korea have managed to provide high living standards and political stability to their citizens. In contrast, the USSR (the world’s largest state) proved to be largely dysfunctional at the time of its eventual dissolution.
appropriately be understood in terms of a game. One can intelligibly employ the metaphor only in the analysis of rule-articulated political orders: games are activities constituted and regulated by rules” (Jackson, 1993:34).

The rules of the sovereignty game are influenced by the unavoidable and undeniable reality of a plurality of states in an international system. Collectively, these rules maintain the constitutional independence of states, observing legal equality between states, mutual recognition, jurisdiction, non-intervention, entering into and honouring treaties, diplomacy, and a broad framework of international law that even regulates violent conflict between states in a rule-bound playing field protecting non-combatants and other spectators82 (Jackson, 1993:35). Thus, the aforementioned rules include every convention and practice of international life that moderate and civilise the relations of states83. The classical international game of sovereignty is therefore essentially a game of liberty, as discussed in a previous section. It represents the overarching central institution in a political world of liberalism, as Jackson explains: “The classical sovereignty game exists to order the relations of states, prevent damaging collisions between them, and – when they do occur – regulate the conflicts and restore peace” (Jackson, 1993:34).

Thus, apart from being positively capable entities, states are also viewed as intrinsically valuable and worth protecting and preserving, since they provide the necessary conditions of the good life to their citizens. Consequently, each sovereign player aims to achieve advantage and gain through the pursuance of its foreign policy, mindful of the fact that irreverence towards rules will destroy the game itself, including the valuable political goods and independence that derive from it. Ultimately, then, the national interest of sovereign states is the protection and preservation of their own way of life, through preserving the rules of the game. The players of this old sovereignty game were strong, empirically sovereign, typically Western states. In the old sovereignty game, efficacy in government was a supporting pillar of sovereign statehood, whereby the supreme authoritative power resided in a particular territorial unit and evolved from ‘within’. Demonstrable capacity for survival and self-government created credibility and respect that warranted recognition beyond one’s borders – sovereigns therefore preceded sovereignty (Jackson, 1993:34). Kelsen (1945:29) effectively summarises the requirements of players participating in the old sovereignty

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82 Such rules would include, for example, The Hague (1907) and Geneva (1949) Conventions.
83 A notion first arrived at by Hugo Grotius (1625), upon which the rationalist conception of international relations is largely based.
game as “A national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has become, on the whole, efficacious, and ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this efficacy.”

If Kelsen’s test of validity continued to be applied today, many states in the developing world would not be regarded as sovereign. Jackson explains that the original players of the old sovereignty game were governments that had successfully asserted sovereignty in the past, had never surrendered sovereignty or succumbed to another state, and consequently had a strong historical right to play the game. When the United States achieved freedom from the British Empire through its War of Independence or when Japan avoided Western imperialism, empirical statehood and the accompanying positive title to sovereignty was demonstrated (Jackson, 1993:39). The players of the old sovereignty game therefore excluded the various less significant colonies and dependencies that existed at the time. It was, in essence, a game for the ‘big boys’ (Kreijen, 2004:51).

After World War II, the constitutional-political strata of dependencies were eliminated from the international legal vocabulary, as discussed previously. Sovereignty was now granted to any entity, based on the normative moral criteria of self-determination. Whilst the philosophical notion of self-determination had been part of liberal thought since the eighteenth century, it was Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points that incorporated it as part of a normative framework for international relations (national self-determination). Consequently, Jackson notes, “International society now contained one and only one official class which masked enormous differences and variations in the substance and credibility of statehood around the world. This change understandably had an impact on how the sovereignty game is played” (Jackson, 1993:40).

The post-war concretisation of self-determination as sufficient grounds for sovereignty and constitutional independence prompted the emergence of a new sovereignty game. The doctrine of independence based upon the right of self-determination not only established ex-colonies’ categorical right to independence, it also cemented the permanent inviolability of these territories. Furthermore, it was no longer seen as a positive right of national self-determination (as very few modern states emerge concurrently with, or from, nations). It instead became an exclusive negative right of ex-colonies, which typically contain a multitude of ethnic and tribal entities, and rarely a

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84 Wilson’s Fourteen Points were drafted after the First World War, according to which the principle of national self-determination was applied to the breakup of the Austrian, German and Ottoman Empires. The principle of national self-determination is also embodied in the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), and in the Declaration of the Principles of International Law (1970) (McLean & McMillan, 2003:483).
homogenous ethnic nationality. The right to self-determination therefore became an instrument toward anti-colonial liberation (Jackson, 1993:41). In contrast, various nations that were not colonies argued for their right to independence based upon the doctrine of self-determination and have been denied by the rules of the new sovereignty game: “The accidents of imperial history consign them to the role of unwilling spectators even when they may actually be in effective control of territory – as in the case of Eritrea. Baluchis, Biafrans, Eritreans, Tigreans, Ewes, Gandans, Karens, Katchins, Kurds, Moros, Pathans, Sikhs, Tamils, and many other ethnonationalities are the abandoned peoples of the contemporary world of states” (Jackson, 1993:41).

Most of these nations are denied independence since geographically they form part of former colonies, of which the sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be challenged or amended in the current order of sovereign states, due to the dictates of negative sovereignty and non-intervention. These peoples are subsequently relegated to a rogue status, often being described as separatists, secessionists or irredentists. Self-determination has therefore also become a conservative right of quasi-states. Their state leaders are usually determined to prohibit ‘secessionist’ ethno-nationalities from attaining independence, since it would involve loss of jurisdiction over the territories in question and the redrawning of international frontiers, which could threaten internal and regional power relations (Jackson, 1993:42). Even though independence based upon national self-determination would most likely produce more coherent states and drastically reduce civil conflicts in dysfunctional states, the fragmentation of international society would likely expose a divided continent such as Africa to far greater risks of external control.

Apart from the right of negative sovereignty, Jackson explores a second, equally important facet of the post-war sovereignty game. Quasi-states are independent in law, yet unsubstantial in reality, lacking the tenets of empirical statehood. These dysfunctional states have subsequently grown to be dependent on other states for their economic welfare. Currently, underdevelopment in most dysfunctional states is not only a fact, it is also the basis for a claim to positive assistance from the international

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85 Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia on 24 May 1993, shortly after Jackson’s book was published. Prior to gaining independence through a referendum, Eritreans had been engaged in a destructive civil war with Ethiopia since 1961.

86 The cases of Scots, Catalans (Keating, 1997) and Gibraltarians (Azopardi, 2009) have also been cited as cases of ‘stateless nations’.

87 For example, the political involvement of the United States, USSR, and Cuba in Africa during the latter stages of the Cold War. The threat of external control once again underscores the lack of positive sovereignty of these states – i.e. absence of the empirical wherewithal to counter incursions, be they physical or otherwise, from stronger states in the international arena.
community in general and from wealthy states in particular (Jackson, 1993:43). The new type of sovereignty that quasi-states enjoy thus not only enshrines their negative liberty (freedom from non-intervention) but also grants them a *positive claim* (although not yet legally enshrined as a right) to socio-economic and material assistance, termed by Jackson as ‘sovereignty plus’. In contrast, the old sovereignty game made no such positive socio-economic provision for sovereign states which were assumed to be self-reliant, more or less equally developed and therefore authentically free agents. A state that could not effectively defend and maintain its integrity or independence was viewed as having lost its legitimacy as such (Okafor, 2000:28). Historically, inequality between states was reconciled by the colonisation of the underdeveloped, according to Jackson, “...inequality was legitimated and legalised. Contemporary norms of international democracy forbid this and so it is responded to by international efforts to establish special positive rules, organisations and possibly rights – an international development regime – for those in need” (Jackson, 1993:44).

Such an international development regime is difficult to merge with the historical liberties of sovereign statehood, since if developed states have obligations to assist underdeveloped states, they certainly have no right to ensure that their assistance is properly used by governments of underdeveloped, dysfunctional states. This, then, represents the double-edged sword of negative sovereignty in the developing world, which fiercely defends its rights of negative liberty from others, whilst simultaneously claiming from others the necessary goods to ensure positive liberty. This represents an asymmetrical relationship hitherto unbeknown in traditional international relations. The bearers of rights and the holders of obligations are differentiated in a way that contradicts the historical reciprocity and equality of states – southern governments now have only rights, and northern governments mainly duties (Jackson, 1993:44). Consider the comparison of sovereignty represented in the table below:
Table 1: Comparing the old and new sovereignty games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>SOVEREIGNTY</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed World</td>
<td>OCCURRENCE</td>
<td>Developing World (especially former colonies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolutionary (1648 - Present)</td>
<td>DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>Revolutionary (Decolonisation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power + Competition (Empirical capabilities)</td>
<td>FOUNDED ON</td>
<td>Self-determination (Moral/Legal Doctrine)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to the developing world</td>
<td>OBLIGATIONS</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largely Functional (Strong)</td>
<td>STATE PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>Largely Dysfunctional (Quasi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Own construct)

In concluding his overview of the above-mentioned sovereignty games currently operating in the international realm, Jackson summarises as follows:

Third World independence has resulted in the formation for the first time of two simultaneous games of sovereignty within universal international society: the continuing demanding ‘hardball’ game based on positive sovereignty, and a new, softer, third division game derived from negative sovereignty ... The new game is the North-South ‘dialogue’ which is the successor of Western colonialism. It is in many respects a collaborative regime fashioned to replace the imperial orders which governed non-Western areas in the past ... What is fundamentally changed, therefore, is not the geographical distribution of power in the world. Rather, it is the moral and legal framework of the states-system and the way that underdeveloped parts of the world are supported externally. (Jackson, 1993:48)

International society is therefore expected not only to be a civil association for individual states, but also a joint enterprise responsible for assisting less capable members. Self-determination has created indigenous governments in the developing world, but has at the same time subjected many populations to unstable and predatory regimes in the form of dysfunctional states, which often use their sovereign rights to neglect or abuse human rights within their borders. This ironic outcome, writes Jackson, was not supposed to happen (Jackson, 1993:49-49).
6. The impact of decolonisation

In reconstructing Jackson’s analysis of negative sovereignty, self-determination and quasi-states, it is clear that the process of 20th century decolonisation is of particular significance in the conceptualisation of state dysfunction (the same being true of both Migdal and Huntington). As discussed in the preceding section, Jackson views European disengagement from its colonies as the most important reason for the historical shift from positive to negative sovereignty in the international realm. Additionally, the termination of colonialism has spawned new international normative frameworks and practices that accommodate the existence and problems of dysfunctional post-colonial states. Migdal corroborates the significance of colonialism in the conceptualisation of state dysfunction. He similarly argued that European colonisation and decolonisation fundamentally altered the domestic social and political power relations in the developing world, thereby sustaining state dysfunction.

Jackson disputes the notion that a combination of post-war fatigue on the part of Western colonists, combined with the pursuit of aggressive anti-colonial nationalism by colonial subjects, led to a successful revolt against the West. Granted, in certain instances this positive sovereignty scenario did occur, as in India, where a credible nationalist movement existed that could assume the reins of government after independence. However, in most parts of the developing world, forceful and credible anti-colonial nationalism capable of inheriting sovereignty in accordance with positive international law usually did not develop (Jackson, 1993:82-83). In this regard, Robinson (1980:52) notes that “Whatever persuaded the British empire in 1947 to plan its own demise in tropical Africa, it was not fear of black African freedom fighters.”

There was little thought of the British having become too impoverished to continue colonial rule, nor was there any belief that colonial subjects (especially in Africa) had reached a level of capability that would warrant self-government. In most territories after the mid-1950s, the revolt against the West ceased to be a credible rebellion against colonial power, and instead became a worldwide moral campaign against the ideology and institutions of colonialism. Thus, according to Jackson, the pressures for transferring sovereignty were to an increasing extent a matter of principle, representing a major change in the perception of international legitimacy: “Independence became an unqualified right of all colonial peoples: self-determination. Colonialism likewise
became an absolute wrong: an injury to the dignity and autonomy of those peoples and of course a vehicle for their economic exploitation and political oppression” (Jackson, 1993:83).

This represents a noteworthy historical shift in international moral reasoning, since European colonialism was originally justified on legal positivist grounds, which argued that the unpreparedness of colonial subjects placed a responsibility on 'civilised' states to govern them until they were prepared to govern themselves. This doctrine was articulated as the 'sacred trust of civilisation', and its operational application became known as 'trusteeship'\(^88\). As Jackson explains: “‘Trusteeship’ was a codeword for paternalism which is a moral practice that arises whenever significant gaps in capability exist between agents, such as those between parents and children, the able and the disabled, rich and poor, and so forth. As indicated, such a gap opened between Europe and many parts of Asia, Africa and Oceania in the nineteenth century” (Jackson, 1993:71).

Particularly British colonialism operated with the idea of trusteeship, whereby colonies were held in trust by Great Britain until such a time as they were able to govern themselves in accordance with modern standards of governance\(^89\). According to the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919: Art. 22) this applied especially “[t]o those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”

This justification held great value and legitimacy in the minds of Britons and was articulated frequently by the colonial administration. In 1938, Malcolm MacDonald, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time, stated that:

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\text{The great purpose of the British Empire is the gradual spread of freedom among all His Majesty’s subjects in whatever part of the world they live. That spread of freedom is a slow, evolutionary process … In some colonies … the gaining of freedom has already gone very far. In others it is necessarily a much slower process. It may take generations, or even centuries, for the peoples in some parts of the Colonial empire to achieve self-government.} \quad (\text{Robinson, 1965:91})
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\(^{88}\) In fact, the moral weight and orthodoxy carried by “sacred trust of civilisation” was such that it is clearly expressed in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Interestingly, a variation of this clause is still present in the Charter of the United Nations (Article 73).

\(^{89}\) Most of these territories were originally League of Nations Mandate Territories, which after 1946 became known as United Nations Trust Territories. Western control of these areas was, therefore, maintained under the auspices of the UN.
Even John Stuart Mill (1861:314) noted that “England had always felt under a certain
degree of obligation to bestow on such of her outlying populations as were of her own
blood and language, and on some who were not, representative institutions formed in
imitation of her own”. Britain’s deep-rooted colonial ideology was therefore opposed to
transferring sovereignty to unconstitutional governments. This altruistic policy of
trusteeship and long-term preparation for self-governance appears to have been
consistently applied in practice, whether it represented bona fide intentions or not.
Several former colonies had already achieved dominion status through the 1926 Balfour
Declaration, resulting in them being “autonomous Communities within the British
Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their
domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and
freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations” (Marshall,

This evolutionary process (Kreijen, 2004:64-66), which held that decolonisation
precedes independence only in countries that are sufficiently politically and
economically advanced, was bound to occur faster in New Zealand, South Africa or
Australia, where governments were staffed by first of second generation Britons and
Europeans. The same could not be said of Sierra Leoneans or Fijians, who sprang
from entirely different stock. Nevertheless, after the entry of the United States into
World War II, significant pressure was placed on the colonial powers to formulate plans
for speedy decolonisation. The British in particular were faced with justifying their
longstanding policy of evolutionary decolonisation to their suspicious, if not outright anti-
colonial, US allies who as a superpower had now assumed a dominant position in world
affairs (Jackson, 1993:88-89). In 1945, Dame Margery Perham articulated British
apprehension towards rapid decolonisation, in addition to exhibiting uncanny foresight,
when she wrote that “Were they [referring to British colonies] thus cut loose, they would
probably be set up as very weak units under an experimental world organisation”

Perham’s prediction has, in large part, materialised since weakness is a chronic
symptom of many ex-colonial states. Her insights into the nature of rapid

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90 A recent paper by Easterly & Levine (2012) contends that 47% of average global development levels today are attributable to
Europeans. Furthermore, they note the positive effect of the presence of even a small minority European population during
the colonial period on per capita income today.
91 See The Coming Anarchy (Kaplan, 1994) for equally sage insights into dysfunctional states that have partly materialised over
the past two decades.
decolonisation were further articulated through four chief obstacles to the achievement of accelerated self-government. Firstly, the general populations of many colonies, if not most, were still unaware of the operations of modern, large-scale government to be capable of citizenship; secondly, most colonies as yet lacked any basis of national unity; thirdly, a number of colonies were so insubstantial that anything more than a limited form of internal self-government was possible; and fourthly, the level of economic development was still far too low to support a modern state (Perham, 1967:336-337).

These considerations exhibit a strong correlation to the requirement of positive sovereignty, according to which colonies would have to demonstrate developed capabilities of empirical statehood before claiming self-government. One would hardly be able to argue that such requirements are irrational or vindictive, since they represent the basic threshold of competency for any feasible state to come into being. It seems, therefore, that the international community had little interest in establishing strong post-colonial independent states in the process of decolonisation. Joining the US in its demand for expedited universal decolonisation were official pronouncements by the Soviet Union and its allies, Latin American governments, and the UN General Assembly, whose anti-colonial voice grew stronger with the admission of every former colony. Kreijen (2002:69) explains, “By the end of the 1950s the atmosphere in the UN had turned virulently anti-colonial. The nature of the debate had become highly politicised, ideological, and at times overtly irrational.”

Furthermore, given the requirement of attaining a modicum of empirical statehood prior to independence, the collective of anti-colonial voices began asking pertinent questions of the colonial powers: Precisely what level of development was necessary for independent statehood? What criteria were appropriate to reliably determine readiness? When and where in the past was independence granted on such basis? The British Colonial Office and its continental counterparts could provide no consistent or satisfactory answers to these questions.

It subsequently became clear that international sentiment would no longer tolerate the doctrine of evolutionary decolonisation, and the transference of sovereignty based upon empirical conditions began to be undermined. In numerous British colonies, therefore, plans were accelerated to engineer the institutional framework of a modern constitutional democracy, complete with legislative, electoral and juridical institutions, in
addition to the existing colonial administration. The British approach to attaining independence constituted a graded process, resulting in the culmination of (1) the formation of a legislature if one was not already in existence; (2) the creation or expansion of the electorate; (3) electoral control of the legislature; (4) legislative control of the executive; and (5) independence from British government (Jackson, 1993:96). Even though the Colonial Office persisted dutifully in adhering to the aforementioned graded institutionalisation, political pressure dictated that the process had to be completed speedily, rather than thoroughly. Jackson (1993:36) cites 1957 as the year in which British decolonisation accelerated, concurrent with Ghanaian independence. By the early 1960s, almost all former colonies had been granted independence, including even the most marginal of the High Commission territories such as Lesotho and Swaziland. Jackson concludes that:

Decolonisation had ceased being a substantive enterprise aimed at state-building and had become a formal activity to transfer negative sovereignty ... Decolonisation in its final stages was separated not only from considerations of development and leadership but from almost any empirical considerations whatsoever. Of the Commonwealth’s 49 members in 1985, 27 had populations under 1 million and 14 occupied land areas of less than 1,000 square kilometres. (Jackson, 1993:97)

Rapid, unconditional decolonisation had gained unstoppable momentum. Yet the leaders of newly independent states claimed that decolonisation would only be complete once the international economy was reformed to give less developed countries an equal opportunity to become developed (Jackson, 1993:104). This position has since become the orthodoxy in North-South relations, and articulates dysfunctional states’ positive claim to assistance that accompanies negative sovereignty.

From serving as an agency of civilisation less than a century before, colonialism had become not only morally repugnant but also a crime against humanity. Colonial practices in states such as Rhodesia and South Africa were unjustifiable, and the Rhodesian government’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence was universally denied recognition based on the NIBMAR principle. In concluding the discussion on the course of decolonisation, Jackson notes that “The proposition that statehood must

92 On 14 December 1960, UN resolution 1514 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) was passed with overwhelming support. Kreijen (2002:69) refers to this resolution as “the legal crowbar that was to wrest the colonial dependencies from the hold of their metropolitan States”. From about this time arguments to delay independence on grounds of circumstance were considered morally inferior to universal claims to self-determination.

93 NIBMAR – No independence before majority African rule.
always be equated with effectiveness is not supported by modern practice...a new rule has come into existence, prohibiting entities from claiming statehood if their creation is in violation of an applicable right to self-determination. That rule is negative sovereignty.” (Jackson, 1993:108)

7. International affirmative action

Jackson rightly points out that the way we think about international relations today is strongly influenced by a picture of the world as sharply divided between a rich and technologically developed North, juxtaposed to a poor, backward and underdeveloped South (Jackson, 1993:109). Despite the enormous amounts of financial and economic aid that have been designated and invested in states of the developing world, the status quo remains wholly unchanged. The expected positive outcomes attached to international aid presuppose performances from dysfunctional state governments that cannot be guaranteed (Smith, 2005:167; Burnell, 2005:197). Such governments are themselves underdeveloped and therefore perpetuate and exacerbate the problem of underdevelopment, since there could be no assurance that the transferred resources would be put to use efficiently and for the proper purposes. The North-South development divide, notes Jackson, is therefore likely to persist indefinitely since it is a condition deeply rooted in economic, social, cultural and even psychological facts that are exceedingly difficult to alter, regardless of the quantity of good will or economic aid. This perspective concurs with Migdal’s analysis of the entrenched patterns of social fragmentation and political dysfunction in the developing world.

Leaders of the developing world often point to colonialism as the root cause of the current developmental discrepancy (the legacy of colonialism), in attempting to occupy the moral high ground in negotiating for economic aid or international assistance. In this regard, Jackson remarks, “During the colonial era, however, development and underdevelopment was a domestic rather than an international issue, if it was an issue at all. Decolonisation therefore did not create the North-South gap

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94 For an excellent analysis of the development regime that has aimed to redress underdevelopment, especially in Africa, see The Trouble with Africa: Why foreign aid isn’t working (Calderisi, 2006).
95 Compare Migdal’s analysis of the politics of survival, Chapter 4.
96 See Historical legacies: A model linking Africa’s past to its current underdevelopment (Nunn, 2007) for an enlightening political-economic discussion of this standpoint. A concrete legacy of colonialism is also advanced by dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank (1975).
which has been in evidence for several centuries. Instead, it internationalised it just as a century ago Western imperialism internalised it” (Jackson, 1993:110).

The lack of development in former colonies and the developing world in general is not, therefore, a consequence of colonialism. The African continent was, without exception, economically undeveloped prior to European infiltration. It could also be argued that what measure of subsequent development occurred came as a result of an organised Western presence\textsuperscript{97}, and not the administrative and economic acumen of indigenous rulers. Underdevelopment in many dysfunctional states continues to persist after decolonisation; this reality has consistently been viewed as morally reprehensible and unconscionable from a normative perspective. Moreover, underdevelopment is considered to be a problem not merely of the underdeveloped states themselves, but at least partially of the international community as well (and in particular its richest members\textsuperscript{98}) (Jackson, 1993:111). As elaborated upon previously, such assumptions form part of a new practice of international and economic relations, since in the past sovereign states were responsible only for their own wealth and welfare, and international law merely acknowledged their freedom to promote it without external hindrance. Thus, as Jackson explains, the current differentiation of sovereign states in categories of developed and underdeveloped has impacted on both the theory and practice of international relations. As a result of expedited decolonisation, the notions of sovereignty and developing state capability have been divorced from each other, with development changing from a domestic issue to an international expectation and goal. States in the developing world publicise their poverty and demand that the international community assist them in developing their economies and improving the living standards of their populations. The latter dutifully respond with financial and technical aid or debt relief believing in many cases that they are under a moral obligation to do so. To reiterate, sovereignty has now assumed a novel character, whereby every sovereign state possesses negative rights of non-interference, but some assert additional positive rights (sovereignty plus), or at least demands of external material support (Jackson, 1993:111-112). Negative sovereignty has also attributed to many dysfunctional states a status and influence far beyond their positive abilities, as Wight

\textsuperscript{97} Whilst underdevelopment and inequality relative to the developed world cannot be blamed on colonialism, the strategies of rule implemented by the West during colonialism (as discussed in the preceding chapter) did little to stimulate the autonomous development of colonies.

\textsuperscript{98} Even a state such as Canada, which was never a colonizer and at one time was itself a possession of the British Empire, contributes large sums of financial aid to the developing world as a result of its wealth and developed status, according to the normative dictates of the negative sovereignty regime.
notes: “The existence of the United Nations has exaggerated the international importance of the have-not powers, enabling them to organise themselves into a pressure group with much greater diplomatic and propaganda weight than they would otherwise have had” (Wight, 2002:238).

Many of the economically least-developed states, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, are unable to attract substantial foreign direct investment with which to stimulate growth. If international development assistance were not forthcoming, these states would have no external sources of income whatsoever, a prospect which is morally unacceptable in a globalised and interdependent world. Here, then, is a novel type of state whose prospects of development are determined significantly by international handouts and bailouts. Whilst dependency upon the West is a significant symptom of ex-colonial dysfunctional states, so too is the economic mismanagement and poor governance of their leadership (Calderisi, 2006:21; Jackson, 1993:116) – an aspect often overlooked by proponents of structural dependency theory.

Does the ostensibly 'special' treatment expected by quasi-states, in contrast with the historical norms of sovereign statehood, amount to a form of international affirmative action? In this regard, Jackson notes that “A domestic analogy may be suggestive. Within some Western countries ... extra socioeconomic entitlements and assistance are provided to certain people who qualify for ‘affirmative action’ programmes. This is a form of preferential treatment by the state targeted at citizens who are members of particular ‘disadvantaged’ categories, such as blacks or women” (Jackson, 1993:132).

The central idea of affirmative action is therefore the extension of a special corrective opportunity or benefit to some individual or group who otherwise would not qualify for it, in compensation for historical disadvantages (McLean & McMillan, 2003:4). This is usually justified on the grounds of repairing injustice or disadvantage brought about by such membership in the past and in the hope of enabling the beneficiary to exercise greater self-determination in the future (Jackson, 1993:132). In keeping with the domestic analogy, affirmative action argues that negative rights (freedom from) are not sufficient to overcome the adverse consequence of past discrimination. Affirmative action is therefore a kind of citizenship plus: temporary dependency in the form of preferential treatment for the sake of future positive freedom (Jackson, 1993:133).

A similar cognate idea can be applied to international relations, whereby dysfunctional states in the developing world that experienced colonialism are the international
equivalent of racial minorities whose ancestors suffered under slavery or were otherwise economically exploited. Both instances reflect victimhood of past institutionalised discrimination and therefore merit special consideration and assistance. Even though negative sovereignty was instrumental in removing colonial domination, it is not a sufficient attribute in realising complete self-determination (that is, a strong state). Thus, according to an affirmative action argument, dysfunctional states have a doubly legitimate claim to international assistance and compensation, based not only on the retrospective grounds of colonial exploitation but also on the future expectation that they have a right to developed capabilities of positive sovereignty (Jackson, 1993:133-134). In this regard, Jackson explains that “International affirmative action therefore presupposes that the global economic playing field is not level for all states and to be made level certain rules and actions of positive discrimination in favour of the currently disadvantaged is required until such a time as they are in a position to play the great game of international economics by the classical rules” (Jackson, 1993:134).

Even though the notion of de jure international affirmative action is not explicitly referred to in relations between the developed and underdeveloped world, the concept is present in practice and entrenched in the discourse on development aid (Calderisi, 2006:15; Kreijen, 2002:93). In theory, this special affirmative arrangement is considered to be only temporary, after which the general (classic) rules of reciprocity and non-discrimination are to be reapplied, once dysfunctional states have been remediated to functional states. Jackson opines that this projected self-sufficiency is an unlikely outcome, and in many cases such arrangements could last indefinitely if the beneficiaries are unable to respond positively with better levels of domestic socioeconomic and political governance and accountability. Yet, even stubbornly dysfunctional states that do not reciprocate with accountability may prove reluctant to forego their special entitlements, which they could conceivably come to regard as their permanent rights99 (Jackson, 1993:135).

Jackson rightly indicates that the current normative position regarding assistance to dysfunctional- or quasi-states was entirely unknown to classical international relations, which assumed that all sovereign states were more or less capable of benefitting from a liberal international economic order based on reciprocity. As previously indicated, political independence and socioeconomic wellbeing were two sides of the same

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99 In spite of Robert Mugabe’s constant and virulent denouncement of the West, Zimbabwe is absolutely dependent upon the approximately $900 million contribution in foreign aid from the international community (Duval, 2012).
empirical coin and sovereignty was indivisible according to this doctrine (Jackson, 1993:136). These classical rules of the game run into difficulty in an international society partly constituted by dysfunctional states, whose underdevelopment is considered normatively and morally wrong. Such states accordingly receive large amounts of nonreciprocal financial and technical assistance, and may also benefit from other types of protection from the international economic order. But the willingness of the beneficiary government to utilise such grants for domestic development remains a problematic link in the chain of international generosity, as Jackson illustrates:

A government may invest international assistance productively or redistribute it in accordance with need but there is no lawful international way of guaranteeing this once the foreign resources are on its soil. It depends on the ability and willingness of its officials to do so. It they are prone to mismanagement, corruption or other kinds of incompetence or indiscipline foreign grants or loans may end up feeding the system of waste and abuse. (Jackson, 1993:137)

This would indicate that even though capable and responsible government might not, in itself, be sufficient condition for development in dysfunctional states, it most certainly is a necessary condition. To quote a former vice president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Robert Gardner, “Good use of foreign aid requires antecedent characteristics in a society and its government” (Marshall, 1965:273).

State dysfunction cannot, therefore, be remedied purely by committing money or resources to the problem, since neither will ensure accountability and good governance. In this regard, Huntington’s analysis of the role of political institutions (Chapter 6) is of particular relevance, since in practice they constitute the ‘antecedent characteristics’ that will determine whether aid enhances functionality, or perpetuates dysfunction in a given state. However, the problem of ensuring accountability and reciprocity in dealing with dysfunctional states stretches further than the issue of development assistance. It also affects human security and human rights in these troubled states.

8. **International civility and human rights**

The prevailing negative sovereignty regime described by Jackson also has important domestic consequences for those living in quasi-states. Just as the sacred right of non-intervention prohibits donors of economic and technical assistance in dictating the application of such assistance, the international community is similarly constrained in
preventing abuses of human rights in dysfunctional states (Kreijen, 2004:97). Buzan (1983:3) describes this situation in weak states as the 'paradox of the state', in which governments become a source of threat to their citizens, rather than security. As discussed previously in Chapter 3, the universal drive for protection and security in the state of nature was the most important impetus in conceiving the modern state as a form of human organisation. In forsaking this function a state abandons its fundamental raison d'état. Today, however, citizenship in dysfunctional states is often scarcely more than a nominal status with little or no real purchasing power because, according to Jackson, such states are usually the possessions and instruments of elites who act as if sovereignty is a licence to exploit their population: “In the past century the image of the Third World accordingly has become one not only of poverty and underdevelopment but also of incivility and repression. This regrettable reality is in marked contrast to the time of independence when the Third World was ‘a vital new force in international affairs’ ” (Jackson, 1993:140).

He also argues that the expansion of the community of states brought about by decolonisation has not resulted in a corresponding extension of human rights protection, but instead increased opportunity for human rights violations (Freeman, 2005:243-245). Such violations have come to be vividly publicised by international humanitarian organisations, such as Amnesty International. As a result, public perceptions relating to human rights abuses are more acute than ever, especially in the developed world where, according to Jackson, “The comparative civility of Western states and the corresponding expectations of their populations have undoubtedly created heightened awareness of inhumanity everywhere” (Jackson, 1993:141).

With the invocation of the concepts of civility and civilisation, Jackson draws upon the ideas of Collingwood (1944), who investigated the philosophical foundations of civilisation, motivated by the atrocities of World War II committed by the Nazis. His conception of civilisation primarily entails refraining from the arbitrary use of force and obeying the rule of law that forbids it. According to Collingwood, behaving civilly towards a person means respecting his feelings, abstaining from shocking, annoying, frightening, or arousing in him any passion or desire which might diminish his self-respect, which includes threatening his consciousness of freedom. The ideal of civil behaviour is therefore the ideal of refraining from the use of force towards an individual. The first constituent of civilisation is a system of conduct that determines the relations of its members so that each refrains from the use of force in dealing with another
(Collingwood, 1944:291-292). This is a position which reaffirms the importance of the state, and not other actors, the state possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in society. The rule of law is that public standard of civil conduct that eliminates arbitrariness and establishes due process based on formal equality. Yet, as Jackson (1993:142) notes, both civility and the rule of law presuppose the capacity not only to obey, but also the means to enforce the law (in other words, a state monopoly of the function).

Furthermore, a community that becomes relatively civilised also becomes relatively good at exploiting the natural world in a scientific or intelligent way (Collingwood, 1944:318). This additional notion of civilisation refers to a corresponding process whereby the comforts and enjoyments of human life are attained by the application of science and industry to natural resources. This is the civilisation associated with technological and economic development, resulting in increased capacity and ability (Jackson, 1993:142). In relating the notion of civility to human rights, Jackson notes that “A government which has mastered technology but not the rule of law is the most dangerous of all organisations” (Jackson, 1993:142).

His opinion represents the reality in many dysfunctional states, since the diffusion of technology and particularly arms and weaponry (instruments of violence)\(^{100}\) has far superseded the diffusion of civility and respect for human rights in the developing world. Since colonialism was, at least in part, an attempt to bring civilisation to the developing world, the concept of civilisation as a benchmark has fallen out of favour in international relations since decolonisation. As discussed previously, classical international law was configured to confer a status of statehood only upon states that exhibited positive sovereign attributes and evolved standards of civilisation. Subsequently, the endeavour of exporting civilisation to the uncivilised (savage) undeveloped world formed part of the core doctrine of Western (especially British) colonialism. Currently, the once commonplace notions of the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ and ‘civilised state’ have been erased from international law and the dialogue between states carefully avoids these terms (Jackson, 1993:143). Yet even though the notion of the civilised state has been replaced with that of the sovereign state, the essence of civilisation as an important component of functional statehood persists.

\(^{100}\) Although not necessarily dysfunctional states, consider, for example, the international problematique of pariah states such as Cuba (historically), North Korea and, potentially, Iran possessing nuclear weaponry, coupled with often bellicose overtones towards other states in the international community.
Reflecting upon Collingwood’s twofold conceptualisation of civilisation, civility is now more commonly referred to as ‘human rights’ and ‘non-discrimination’, whilst the advancement of material civilisation is couched in terms of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’\(^\text{101}\) (Jackson, 1993:143). Modern international human rights law is therefore an important acknowledgement that sovereign states cannot automatically be considered civilised – the poor human rights record of many post-colonial states would attest to this. Yet, according to Jackson (1993:145), even if the common law of mankind cannot be enforced without the co-operation of the states involved in human rights violations, which is obviously difficult to secure, it nevertheless constitutes not merely a moral but a legal standard for attempting to bring them to some accountability. Conversely however, the dilemma of enforcing human rights in quasi-states is compounded by the rights of negative sovereignty and non-intervention by such states, and in certain notable cases the fact that human rights violations are condoned and executed by the state itself. Therefore, the dubious status of human rights in dysfunctional states could largely be attributed to the current post-colonial negative sovereignty regime, which entrenched and perpetuates incapable and uncivil rule in these states.

In echoing Collingwood’s analysis of civilisation, and the primacy of the rule of law as a criterion of civility, Jackson comments that neither colonialism by democratic powers nor international trusteeship under the League or United Nations was fundamentally inconsistent with the rule of law (Jackson, 1993:147). Whilst democratically legislated colonial policies had obvious imperfections and were by nature undemocratic in their implementation, it nevertheless provided a framework to discourage offences against the human rights of colonial subjects: “Most colonies of democratic powers were in their own terms peaceful, orderly, and lawful places by and large. Inter-tribal warfare was abolished. Slavery was suppressed if not eliminated. The imperial powers created far larger domains than existed previously for the growth of unhindered migration, travel, trade, and commerce” (Jackson, 1993:147).

The passage quoted above reflects the notion of the civilising mission Western powers conducted in the undeveloped world, which was perhaps exemplified by the British insistence that sovereignty only be transferred after the establishment of sound constitutional and institutional processes in its colonies, discussed earlier. However, following independence, newly independent incumbent governments and opposition

\(^{101}\) See Huntington’s (1968) contrasting descriptions of political development and political decay – Chapter 6.
movements were no longer constrained by an imperial referee and the maintenance of constitutionalism and the rule of law locally proved unsuccessful more often than not (Jackson, 1993:148). Political frameworks were constructed which practically legalised authoritarianism and the one party state, judges and courts came to be mere instruments of political rule, the ambit of political crimes were enlarged to detain any opposition to government. Resorting to absolute rule through emergency powers and the like became the norm, rather than the exception. These instances highlight the widespread phenomenon of the praetorianism\textsuperscript{102} in the developing world, aimed not at defending states from external threat but at maintaining government power. Praetorianism is often necessitated by civil discord between governments and ethnic, religious or regional opponents, conflicts which have also come to characterise post-colonial dysfunctional states: “Countries such as Chad and Uganda amounted to little more than violent arenas where rival ethnic warlords preyed upon innocent bystanders and laid waste to the countryside in perennial struggle to seize control of a nominal state represented by the capital city” (Jackson, 1993:149).

In the contexts of these politically unstable states, civility (perhaps civilisation) and the rule of law appear to be largely absent, at least according to Collingwood’s criteria. There is no shortage of additional examples that could be cited in demonstrating the fundamentally uncivil nature of most dysfunctional states. It could perhaps serve as an indictment of the current international sovereignty regime that even in extreme instances of incivility (ethnic cleansing) such actions did not affect the international legitimacy of the governments involved. In many instances the perpetrator governments are condemned yet tolerated, by the international community, whilst they continue to resemble personal empires more than constitutional states. Jackson explains that “Political, social, and economic conditions common to many Third World countries reinforce this state of affairs: the nationalising imperative of autocratic governments, militarisation of the state, political rebellion, widespread ethnic or racial prejudice, and sharp inequalities of wealth, among others” (Jackson, 1993:151).

He further notes that, ironically, decolonisation was not only an act of liberation but also an act of enclosure. It confined populations within ex-colonial frontiers and subjected them to indigenous governments that often were not only untried and inexperienced but also unable or unwilling to operate according to international humanitarian protocol.

\textsuperscript{102}The place and role of praetorianism in dysfunctional states is extensively discussed in Chapter 6. For the purposes of providing a brief definition, Nordlinger (1977:3) describes praetorianism as a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force.
It seems, therefore, that the rules of the negative sovereignty game uphold safe and unsafe jurisdictions alike, apparently unconditionally.

9. Realist, rationalist and radical approaches

Having evaluated Jackson’s paradigmatic departure points in section 2 of this chapter, and having further described the contemporary negative sovereignty regime in the sections that followed, this section interprets negative sovereignty according to realist and radical theoretical perspectives.

The existence of dysfunctional states poses a challenge to the realist conception of sovereign states as free, competitive and sometimes combative egoists, or international individualism (Jackson, 1993:165). This represents, in large part, a conception of politics according to Machiavelli, whereby the prince must continuously conduct himself with the ‘strength of a lion’ and the ‘cunning of a fox’ in order to ensure his own survival, amidst a playing field of challengers and potential usurpers, or as Jackson concisely states, “the entire Machiavellian toolkit of instrumental wisdom is calculated to serve the exclusive purpose of the will to rule” (Jackson, 1993:167).

Even though Machiavellian instrumentality was conceived for the benefit of the ruler and not states as collectivities, its emphasis on personal rule is nonetheless a particularly useful starting point for theorising dysfunctional states. Indeed, the domestic political climate of many such states represent places of acute insecurity, but also opportunity, where ambitious political actors struggle and conspire to gain or maintain control of the levers of power. In this regard, contemporary dysfunctional states represent reversions to Machiavelli’s early sixteenth century city-states. However, Jackson notes, the quasi-state ‘prince’ must worry about losing his head, but he need not be concerned about losing his ‘principality’ (Jackson, 1993:167).

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103 Perhaps the most poignant example illustrating this point is Somalia, where for 14 years (1991-2004) there existed no form of stable and continuous government. Three UN interventions (UNISOM I & II, UNITAF) have largely failed to restore stability to the state. Despite the fact that Puntland and Somaliland now operate as (internationally unrecognized) autonomous secessionist regions in Somalia, the Somali state continues to exist (albeit in name only) and is recognised by the international community.

104 Other leading contributors to the realist intellectual tradition include Thomas Hobbes (1851), Hugo Grotius (1625), and Carl von Clausewitz (1832). More recent exponents of the tradition include E.H. Carr (1939), Hans Morgenthau (1948), and Martin Wight (1946).

105 This struggle is not only conducted over governmental office (i.e. control of the state) but also by non-state actors aiming to claim portions of territory and population in spite of the state. The most prominent example of this is the prevalence of warlords in many dysfunctional states who, through means of clientelism, maintain conflict in order to stimulate their makeshift economies (usually based on resource extraction, often diamonds). See Lezhnev (2006) and Reno (1998).
contemporary community of states underwrites the survival of dysfunctional states through negative sovereignty, offering an unconditional failsafe, the convenience of which Machiavelli could only have dreamt. In referring to the leaders in quasi-states, Jackson explains, “Although he must often be a lion and a fox domestically, he has an external insurance policy which permits him to be a statesman internationally” (Jackson, 1993:167).

Whereas Machiavelli’s realist approach centres on the ruler and his survival, that of Hobbes offers a realist conception of sovereign statehood. According to Hobbes, sovereign states exist in the same condition as men in the state of nature: “...in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereign authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed one another” (Hobbes, 1651:98).

The task of defence from attack forms part of the domestic social contract related to the external world, which is to protect subjects from foreign threat (the universal drive for protection). If the sovereign fails and the enemy invades, the contract is dissolved and domestic society will revert to state of nature of war of each against all. Thus, according to this Hobbesian perspective, a state’s sovereignty is based on the sovereign’s performance of his duty under the covenant, which is essentially positive sovereignty (Jackson, 1993:168). This realist view is therefore challenged by the maintenance of sovereignty without capability or performance, in other words, negative sovereignty. Furthermore, Jackson explains that although many dysfunctional states possess arms and the means of defence, in true praetorian fashion they are usually pointed inward at subjects rather than deterring external threats:

Looking outward there can be no balance of power or international equilibrium based on the credibility of sovereigns. Quasi-states by definition are deficient and defective as apparatuses of power. They are not positively sovereign or naturally free. Instead, they are constitutionally independent which is a formal and not a substantive condition. Looking inward, there can hardly be a social contract since the ruler is threatening (at least some of) his subjects and evidently they him. (Jackson, 1993:168)

Unlike Hobbes’ realist scenario of failure, a dysfunctional state cannot collapse into a state of nature since its sovereignty is not derived internally (positively) from empirical attributes of its own achievement, but rather externally (negatively) from the community of states, of which the members have decided that such unviable jurisdictions shall not
disappear. Jackson describes this as “Quasi-states turn Hobbes inside out: the state of nature is domestic, and civil society is international” (Jackson, 1993:169).

However, despite the apparent incongruence of negative sovereignty and realpolitik, the continued existence of quasi-states can be explained from a realist perspective. Such an explanation rests upon the assumption that the continued existence of dysfunctional states merely reflects an indifference toward them on the part of the world’s strong states. Juridical statehood is therefore a façade and dysfunctional states are consequently tolerated by dominant powers only because nothing of value is at stake (1993:169). However, in situations of importance to powerful states, the independence of dysfunctional states are undermined at will, as in Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq in the case of the United States; Lebanon and Syria in the case of Israel; and Angola and Mozambique by apartheid South Africa. One might also posit that NATO involvement in Libya could be interpreted along these lines. Similarly, dysfunctional states that are of no consequence to the international arena are ignored, regardless of the humanitarian crises that emerge within their borders (examples of Rwanda and Zimbabwe spring to mind)\(^{106}\). Thus, most of the time powerful states will tolerate the existence of dysfunctional states since they essentially pose no credible threat to the international status quo, or more powerful states have no interest in them (economic or otherwise). Regarding this apparent ambivalence toward dysfunctional states, Jackson notes that:

> In a democratic age, non-intervention is less inconvenient than colonialism, giving states a place in the UN is easier than denying it, providing foreign aid costs little in national terms and might promote one’s interests with the recipients, writing off the debts of the most impoverished countries is less disruptive than trying to collect them, and generally dealing courteously with marginal states is likely to work better than dictating to them or dismissing as of no real consequence. (Jackson, 1993:170)

Jackson also evaluates the continued existence of quasi-states from a rationalist viewpoint, drawing upon the classic ideas of Grotius who argues that states are not a law unto themselves, nor is their sovereignty absolute. Grotian rationalism contends that interaction between states is regulated by natural law, according to which the dictates of reason and morality bind all actors (a ‘society of states’) (Dunne, 1998)\(^{107}\).

\(^{106}\) This would raise the question whether the current international human rights regime is, in fact, concerned with international human rights at all.

\(^{107}\) The rationalist tradition in political science is represented by the so-called “English School”, of which the prominent contributors include Hedley Bull (1977), Martin Wight (1946; 2002), Adam Watson (1992), and indeed Robert Jackson himself.
States are therefore free to pursue their interests, subject to the international rule of law, and have no licence to disregard the legitimate interests of other states: “The key to Grotius is the idea that international relations constitute a realm governed by law and morality and are not merely a cockpit of rival interests” (Jackson, 1993:171).

This order is maintained by the legal maxim of *pacta sunt servanda*\(^\text{108}\), whereby the natural relations between states constitutes reciprocity rather than hostility. In analysing the compatibility of the rationalist paradigm with the empirical existence of quasi-states, Jackson notes that dysfunctional states generally conduct themselves with as much civility as others (at least internationally), acting as champions of the law of nations, often advocating the expansion and deepening of international obligations\(^\text{109}\). It is, of course, understandable why such states eagerly comply with the spirit of international rationalism, since their very existence is maintained by the international order itself, and not by their own efforts of statecraft. Nevertheless, underscoring a point made earlier regarding human rights and development aid:

> However, they may not have to bear the burden of reciprocating because they are often in no position to do anything else. Their good conduct internationally may therefore spring more from necessity than virtue and indicate only the appearance of civility and not the reality ... although they respect the rights of other sovereigns they often exercise only limited forbearance and civility in their relations with domestic rivals and subjects. (Jackson, 1993:172)

Additionally, rationalism in the twenty-first century views states as more than free agents that are subject to certain negative and prohibitive moral and legal restrictions. Contemporary international society in addition gives expression to rationalism in a positive sense\(^\text{110}\), whereby states act as collaborators in common engagement in joint pursuit of various purposes (Jackson, 1993:173). The inability of dysfunctional states to reciprocate in international affairs significantly undermines this collaborative, positive rationalism.

Lastly, Jackson considers the radical viewpoints, such as neo-Marxism and structuralism (see, for example: Amin, 1974; Wallerstein, 1974; Frank, 1969; Prebisch, 1950) and their theoretical accommodation of quasi-states. Jackson notes that a cursory evaluation reveals that the existence of dysfunctional states appears consistent

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\(^\text{108}\) Agreements must be kept.

\(^\text{109}\) Hence the irony and hypocrisy of leaders such as Robert Mugabe making prolific use of the United Nations General Assembly to attack and berate the West (New Zimbabwe, 2011) whilst simultaneously chastising the developed world for imposing economic sanctions on his government and withdrawing development aid (AFP, 2009).

\(^\text{110}\) A notion developed by Oakeshott in *On Human Conduct* (1975).
with many elements of structuralism, for example, the socioeconomic division between the rich North and the poor South; the penetration of such states by large multinational corporations (or formerly colonialism); the dependency of many dysfunctional states on economic decisions taken beyond their borders by developed states of the global capitalist order; and the vast inequality that persists within dysfunctional states between the ruling elite and the general population (Jackson, 1993:177). Accordingly, from a neo-Marxist perspective, following decolonisation the levers of power and control remained exactly where they were during colonialism, in the hands of powerful capitalist states that transferred sovereignty merely in order to appease indigenous colonial elites (Frank, 1969).

The radical/neo-Marxist paradigm therefore views the current negative sovereignty regime and the continued existence of dysfunctional states as a symptom of neo-colonialism. However, Jackson suggests that on closer inspection, quasi-states exhibit a version of international relations which is far removed from viewing colonial independence as a smokescreen for continued structural dependency (Jackson, 1993:177). From a formal-legal perspective, dependency theory is of course redundant, since decolonisation did not grant conditional or partial independence, but total sovereign independence. No higher authority can overrule any state, as would have been the case during colonial rule, as a result of the rights of negative sovereignty and non-intervention. In this regard, Jackson explains that “the theory of negative sovereignty, however, understands it as a condition of authentic liberty which although obviously restricted by socioeconomic and other circumstances leaves room for responsibility by post-colonial governments” (Jackson, 1993:177).

Thus, according to Jackson, the economic underdevelopment and technological backwardness of a dysfunctional state does not result in its leaders not being able to make certain decisions. It does, however, mean that leaders of dysfunctional states have far fewer means and resources with which to implement and enforce their decisions, making their decisions more difficult. He explains that scarcity makes it harder for leaders to achieve their goal, and there is much less room for error. Having less room does not mean one has no room; scarcity is therefore a relative concept. Furthermore, the responsibilities of applying good governance and respecting human rights (civility) are not altered by scarcity: “At the end of the day independence is not freedom; but it is not slavery either. The term ‘neo-colonialism’ conflates the distinction
between the right to decide (authority) and the capacity to act (power) which is crucial in the theory of the state” (Jackson, 1993:178).

The fact remains that the transnational capitalist game (most evident in the activities of multinational corporations) cannot overrule the sovereignty game. Corporations can only gain access to a dysfunctional state (or strong state, for that matter) with the consent of its government. The passive status that structuralism and neo-Marxism ascribe to quasi-states is inaccurate, since all states possess equal independent political choice (Jackson, 1993:179).

This cursory evaluation of international relations theory as it relates to quasi-states reveals certain useful conclusions. It would appear whilst the existence of dysfunctional states poses a theoretical challenge (as they do in practice) to extant theory, their existence and conduct of such states may still be interpreted meaningfully through theory. Admittedly, this dissertation does not aim to analyse the role of dysfunctional states in international relations theory. Yet, it is apparent that such states also have realist Machiavellian goals, albeit domestic rather than internationally. It is also similarly evident that the negative sovereignty game has shifted the parameters of the classical sovereignty game. Therefore, interaction and relations with dysfunctional states requires a unique toolkit which is fundamentally different and unsuited to the study of empirically sovereign and developed states.

10. Conceptualisation and conclusion

In evaluating Jackson’s approach to understanding state dysfunction in the developing world, it becomes clear that he initiates a conceptual shift in how contemporary sovereignty and statehood should be understood. His approach consists of combining two disciplines, namely political science and law, in order to achieve a coherent understanding of the current configuration of international relations, and particularly, how this configuration legitimises and maintains dysfunctional states.

Undoubtedly, the most significant landmark in Jackson’s conceptualisation of state dysfunction is the typology and juxtaposition of sovereignty. The notion of an authentically sovereign state can be equated to the Weberian ideal-type, that is, a substantively free and independent entity with the means to pursue its goals domestically and internationally. Only a state that exhibits the Weberian core attributes,
discussed in Chapter 3, can be thought of as truly sovereign. Yet the existence of dysfunctional states, which also claim sovereignty, exposes the need for a conceptual shift regarding how the construct should be applied in studying state dysfunction. Consequently, Jackson discriminates between positive and negative sovereignty. By means of the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that a positively sovereign state can, for the purposes of this study, be broadly equated to the Weberian ideal-type. Conversely, there exists a relationship between dysfunctional states (or quasi-states, in Jackson’s idiom) and negative sovereignty (the absence of positive sovereignty). In illustrating this juxtaposition, the suggested typology of state dysfunction, presented in Chapter 2, can be employed:

*Figure 17: Sovereignty and state dysfunction*

![Diagram of Sovereignty and State Dysfunction](source: Own construct)

The particular state ‘labels’ employed in the above typology are of little consequence, and their purpose is purely to illustrate that according to this chapter’s interpretation of Jackson, negative sovereignty correlates with state dysfunction (Jackson would, no doubt, have added quasi-states to such a typology). In contrast to Migdal’s analysis of strong societies, Jackson’s conception of negative sovereignty and quasi-states does not include a causal relationship. Whereas Migdal demonstrates how fragmented social control can cause state dysfunction, Jackson demonstrates how negative sovereignty maintains state dysfunction. Therefore, it cannot be said *per se*, that negative sovereignty causes states to become dysfunctional. Rather, the negative sovereignty regime (as the collective customs and practices that surround negative sovereignty) acts as a life-support system for dysfunctional states. The term life-support is used intentionally, since the negative sovereignty regime will most likely not lead to the development of positive sovereignty, just as a life-support machine is intended as a last resort to keep a patient alive who would otherwise die. In reference to the diagram above, negative sovereignty is thus deliberately positioned below the
A sovereignty regime therefore acts as a mechanism that supports a given international status quo (see Figure 17). Positive sovereignty serves to maintain the existence of empirically viable states, whose sovereignty emerged from proven power in their relations with other states in addition to their success domestically. In contrast, negative sovereignty serves to maintain dysfunctional states that are sovereign only according to law (not ability) following rapid decolonisation in the 20th century. The negative sovereignty regime therefore also maintains and perpetuates the characteristics of state dysfunction, in relation to the Weberian conception of state. Consider the diagram below, representing a reconstruction of Jackson’s contribution, integrated with the analytical tool developed in Chapter 2. Once again, symbols/description are used to indicate the effect various concepts have upon state capabilities. An adverse influence is indicated with the ↓ symbol whilst an enhancing influence is indicated with the ↑ symbol:
Figure 18: Reconstructing Jackson’s contribution to the conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEBERIAN CONCEPT OF STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARADIGM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal, combining sociological and normative perspectives on the state and international relations. Emphasizes manner in which law regulates political interaction. Anti-structuralist, arguing that human action, not dependency, creates political reality. Influence of revolutionary decolonisation is NB.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **TYPOLOGY** | A typology of sovereignty consisting of the classical positive sovereignty regime (dictating the conduct of strong states) and negative sovereignty (supporting dysfunctional quasi-states). See Table 1 & Figure 17. |
| **CONCEPTS** |
| - Negative sovereignty (spawned by rapid decolonisation) |
| - Self-determination + non-intervention (unconditional rights) |
| - International affirmative action |
| **Contrasts with:** |
| - Positive sovereignty (approaching Weberian idealtype) |

| | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| MAINTAINS | MAINTAINS | MAINTAINS | MAINTAINS | MAINTAINS | MAINTAINS |

The negative sovereignty regime, which maintains contemporary state dysfunction, does not bear specific relevance to any particular attribute of state, represented above. Rather, through its passive supporting role of dysfunction, it tends to undermine state attributes in toto, whilst simultaneously obstructing any prospects of change. Through the doctrine of self-determination, interference with dysfunctional states is categorically forbidden, which makes dysfunctional states physically and politically inviolable – often notwithstanding uncivil conduct within their borders. Furthermore, a steady flow of economic assistance and other forms of aid ensures that dysfunctional states are sustained, albeit with no realistic hopes of development (in other words, creating and consolidating viable political institutions). Donors also have no authority to allocate these resources once they are accepted by the beneficiary state, since the political accountability of leaders is often undermined by state dysfunction. The negative sovereignty regime therefore:

- maintains dysfunctional state administrations through the rule of non-intervention. In turn, these administrations misappropriate and/or waste development aid.

- maintains the de jure compulsory association the state exercises – yet many dysfunctional states are no longer political associations, nor binding ones.
- maintains the problematic territorial divisions created by colonialism, which continue to be the source of conflict and political instability between/in dysfunctional states (the doctrine of self-determination is not extended to nations and ethnic groups).

- maintains the use of force (rarely legitimate) in dysfunctional states, often at the expense of citizens whose human rights are violated and are frequently subjected to crimes against humanity by agents of the state/the state administration.

In contrast to this stands positive sovereignty, according to which states approach the Weberian ideal-type as authentically independent, self-directing and capable entities.

This chapter represents the second substantive theoretical contribution in the field of state failure evaluated in this study. It is therefore important at this juncture to contextualise the contribution Jackson makes in *Quasi-states*, along with Migdal’s contribution, evaluated in the preceding chapter. Consider the diagram below:

*Figure 19: Positioning the contributions of Migdal and Jackson in conceptualising the dysfunctional state*

The diagram above illustrates the role negative sovereignty (Jackson’s contribution) fulfils in maintaining dysfunctional states. The various components of the negative sovereignty regime act as *external* safety net, which ensures that the international status quo is not disturbed by the dissolution of terminally dysfunctional states. Also
depicted is Migdal’s contribution\textsuperscript{111}, emphasising the pressure a fragmented/dysfunctional society exerts upon the state \textit{from within}. The immense pressure and political instability that dysfunctional states face domestically, which would conceivably cause them to disintegrate, is therefore counteracted by the negative sovereignty regime internationally (hence the use of supportive pillars by means of illustration).

Having thus far evaluated the societal (Migdal) and international (Jackson) dimensions of state dysfunction, it now remains to investigate the structures of the dysfunctional state itself, and the apparatus and institutions (that is, means of state) which characterise it, as a third dimension to this study’s conceptualisation of state dysfunction. The theoretical integration of this third component will take the form of a reconstruction, evaluation, and interpretation of the work of Samuel Huntington, with particular reference to \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies} (1968), presented in the next chapter. In this seminal work, Huntington charts the phenomenon of political decay (closely related to state dysfunction) of states and societies in the developing world, providing valuable insights into the roles of political institutionalisation and participation in modernising societies.

\textsuperscript{111}Strictly speaking, a depiction of Migdal’s contribution should reflect his state-in-society approach, whereby the state is located within society (not vice versa, as depicted above). However, having thoroughly accounted for his approach in Chapter 4, I hope that I may be forgiven for the slight misrepresentation in order to achieve diagrammatic clarity in illustrating the relationship between various separate theoretical contributions.
Chapter 6
State dysfunction as political decay: the contribution of Samuel P. Huntington

1. Introduction and contextualisation

The purpose of this chapter is to reconstruct, interpret and evaluate Samuel Huntington's contribution to the central theme of this study, namely the conceptualisation of state dysfunction. This goal is achieved by analysing Huntington's work in the field of political development, primary among which is Political Order in Changing Societies (1968). Furthermore, due to the depth and scope of Huntington's contribution to the field, reference will also be made to relevant secondary works by other authors with the purpose of complementing the primary source. Methodologically speaking, this chapter will therefore consist of a qualitative, analytic literature review, with pertinent reference to the overarching theme of state dysfunction, followed by a conceptualisation of state dysfunction (stemming from Huntington's perspective). An inductive approach will thus be adopted whereby, through means of reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation, a theoretical construct is posited. Noting the primary theme of the dissertation, this chapter analyses Huntington's views on state dysfunction with specific reference to the following themes:

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112 The core of Political Order in Changing Societies was developed in an earlier article entitled Political Development and Political Decay (Huntington, 1965). In this chapter, reference is mostly made to Huntington (1968).
From these themes, a conceptualisation of state dysfunction according to Huntington is drafted and integrated with the analytical tool deployed in Chapters 4 and 5.

Of the three authors employed in this study, Huntington could arguably be considered the most influential in the discipline of political science (Putnam, 1986:837). Rising to prominence in the 1960s, Huntington became an influential scholar in the fields of political development and comparative politics, focusing on issues of (amongst other) power, revolution, political stability, political participation and corruption. In doing so, he presented important theoretical linkages and commonalities in these areas between states in Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin- and North America (Groth, 1979:203). The relevance and incisiveness of his work led to him being regarded as one of the foremost political scientists\textsuperscript{113} from the 1970s to his death in 2008. Huntington was one of few scholars in the discipline of political science who gained wider appeal beyond the academic fraternity, after the publication of *Clash of Civilizations* (1996b), a book which captured the public’s imagination with a thesis for a new world order following the demise of communism.

Notably, during 1977 and 1978 Huntington worked at the White House as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council, having conducted extensive research in the areas of civil-military relations, security and strategy. The influence of his exposure to the security establishment features strongly in Huntington’s writing, both

\textsuperscript{113} See Roettger (1978:7-12).
explicitly\textsuperscript{114} and implicitly; as demonstrated by his strong emphasis on political order and his views on praetorianism, discussed later, as well as his political conservatism\textsuperscript{115}. The primacy of political order in Huntington’s thinking (as opposed to liberalist considerations of democracy or legitimacy) have often been criticised as condoning authoritarianism and the erosion of liberty (Kesselman, 1973; O’Brien, 1972), and are considered later in this chapter. Nevertheless, his analysis of political decay and its causes are of acute importance to a conceptualisation of state dysfunction, as will become demonstrated in this chapter. As a point of departure, the next section will assess Huntington’s view of the state.

2. Huntington’s view of the state

Unlike the authors discussed in the preceding chapters, Huntington does not explicitly define a conception of state to which he adheres. However, it would appear that implicitly, he regards the Weberian conception of statehood as taken for granted with his readers. Central to the thesis of \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies} is the notion that political violence and instability are in large part the product of rapid social change and the mobilisation of new groups into politics, coupled with the slow development of political institutions (Huntington, 1968:4). It therefore becomes clear in the early stages of his book that a functioning state, one that is neither unstable nor plagued by violence, will possess viable political institutions, that is, high levels of \textit{political institutionalisation}. Huntington notes that modernising states (those being states that exhibit symptoms of political instability and dysfunction as a result of change) suffer from “a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government ... where the political community is fragmented against itself and where political institutions have little power, less majesty, and no resiliency – where, in many cases, governments simply do not govern” (Huntington, 1968:2).

Several of the terms Huntington employs in the extract above points to his implicit views of the state. Requirements such as effective, legitimate government imply that (in Huntington’s view) a good government is one that has capacity, and is subsequently capable of achieving its desired outcomes in society, in addition to the requirement of

\textsuperscript{114} See \textit{The Soldier and the State} (1957) and \textit{The Common Defense} (1961).

\textsuperscript{115} This conservatism is evident from his earliest work in \textit{Conservatism as an Ideology} (1957) through to \textit{Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity} (2004).
legitimacy. Huntington’s ideal-typical state is therefore a place where, more than anything else, there is order. He defines this order as the absence of violence, coups, insurrections and other forms of instability (Huntington, 1968:xix). Just as the Weberian ideal-type represents perfection in terms of states and their functionality, so too “The ‘political order’ referred to in the title of this book is a goal, not a reality” (Huntington, 1968:xix).

It is therefore reasonable to equate the Weberian functional state (as it is employed as a benchmark in this study) to Huntington’s idealised state where order, functionality and effectiveness predominate. Conversely, in a Huntingtonian paradigm, a weak or failing state will be a polity marked by disorder, violence and instability (that is, increasing levels of state dysfunction). His subscription to the notion of a strong state as a functional state (a corollary of the assumption upon which this study is premised) is encapsulated in the very first sentence of Political Order: “The most important political distinction among countries is not their form of government but their degree of government” (Huntington, 1968:1).

Huntington therefore emphasises the elements of functionality, institutionalisation, stability and, particularly, order. These are all hallmarks that are commensurate with the Weberian core of the ideal-typical state, as used in this study, supplemented by a strong (often controversial) emphasis on political order.

2.1 The primacy of political order

O’Brien (1972:352) notes that after World War II, and especially during the height of behaviouralist dominance during the 1960s, political scientists (Huntington being a prominent example) were theorising according to the world that confronted them at that stage. During that period in history, the political agenda was topped firstly by political instability in post-colonial states, secondly the US policy of active counter-revolutionary containment in the developing world, and thirdly the climate of domestic political instability in the US. The collective remedy for these circumstances was usually an increased emphasis achieving stability and order in these politically troubled contexts, and O’Brien (1972:351) notes that “…democracy as a goal for developing polities has been gradually displaced by another ideal, that of institutional order.”

However, Kesselman (1973:142) points out that since (from a Huntingtonian viewpoint) order prevails when established authorities exercise control effectively, the concept
obscures the relationship between legitimacy and the means governments employ to maintain power. Thus, the danger is ignored of a government being too strong (perhaps repressive), whilst all ‘disorder’ is seen as deviant, even when that disorder is a reaction against state repression or authoritarian government institutions. In this regard, Kesselman notes: “The concept political order is not neutral: it places the burden of disorder on subordinates who challenge elites. Decay refers only to disruptions of the status quo by subordinates” (Kesselman, 1973:143).

From this perspective it would appear that Huntington places great emphasis on the role of the state as the cumulative embodiment of institutions that ensure order in society. This gravitates towards a distinctly Hobbesian conception of society, where might makes right, and unless order is enforced from above (whether legitimate or not) a state of nature will re-emerge and plunge society into chaos. Huntington continually reinforces the primacy of state-imposed order, and it becomes clear that political order is considered *sine qua non* for the realisation of other political goods. Huntington explains that “Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order” (Huntington, 1968:7).

Just as Hobbes argued for the creation of a viable, centralised government that could maintain order (a Leviathan state), so too in *Political Order in Changing Societies* Huntington propagates a highly institutionalised state capable of maintaining order and promoting political development against the disruptive backdrop of modernisation. Huntington furthermore creates a strong link between authority and order, particularly in dysfunctional states, stating that “...it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernising countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students” (Huntington, 1968:8). Subsequently, in reaffirming the primacy of order above other political goods, Huntington opines regarding communist governments, “They may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority: they do create governments that can govern” (Huntington, 1968:8).

In contrast to his contemporaries, Huntington regarded the organisational model of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union as effective and highly institutionalised and therefore well-suited to tackling the challenges of modernisation (Huntington, 1968:137-

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116 Insightful in this regard is Huntington’s (1968:7) paraphrasing of James Madison, who noted that: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” (Madison, 1788:1).
138). Whilst Huntington was no socialist, it is evident that he regards a functional and capable state, particularly one that is capable of maintaining order in society, as the basis of a strong state. This outcome corresponds to the Weberian core\(^{117}\) (primary attributes) of statehood, which are:

1. Maintaining a monopoly on the use of legitimate force
2. A defined territory
3. A compulsory association
4. Claiming binding authority
5. Possessing an organised and interconnected administrative order

The above-mentioned five attributes all contribute to constitute a state that is capable of realising the Huntingtonian ideal of political order. However, Huntington would most likely differ from this conception of state from the perspective that power alone (and not necessarily the legitimate use of force) can also create order, and that the condition of legitimacy is preferable, but not essential. Therefore, the primary attributes of statehood can guarantee the creation of political order in the short term, whilst the addition of legitimacy can reduce the effort required to maintain it. Huntington’s conception of the state may be expressed through means of a triad of its most important elements, namely the Weberian ideal-type, effective political institutions and political order and stability. Together, the presence of these interrelated elements represents a high degree of government, and therefore constitutes a viable state in Huntingtonian terms. Consider the diagram below:

\(^{117}\) See Chapter 3.
The purpose, however, of this preliminary discussion on Huntington’s view of the state is not to elaborate in detail on the content of his conception of strong/weak and functional/dysfunctional states, but merely to demonstrate that his assumptions regarding statehood concurs with those employed in this dissertation, as developed and operationalised in the preceding chapters. The substantive nature of Huntington’s view of state dysfunction will become clear as this evaluation of Political Order in Changing Societies progresses.

3. The Huntingtonian paradigm

When Political Order in Changing Societies was first published in 1968, it had a momentous impact on the discipline of political science. Huntington’s seminal work marked a departure from the dominant paradigm in two important aspects. Firstly, the previously unquestioned political ideal of democracy was replaced with another ideal, that of political order (O’Brien, 1972:351). Secondly, effective political order was not viewed as the outcome of a consensus process, but rather the application of political power (Kesselman, 1973:141).

Prior to Political Order, the prevailing paradigm was that of liberal-economic modernisation theory. This school of thought was developed and refined by American
political scientists during the Cold War, and was based largely on the fear that unless economic progress and stability were encouraged by the United States, many parts of the world would turn to communism. This doctrine dictated that foreign aid was essential in providing the developing world with a source of income and relative affluence, which would in turn obviate the necessity of courting the Kremlin\(^{118}\). Indeed, during this period, the notion of political development was understood to mean anti-Communist, pro-American political stability (Packenham, 1966:213). By adhering to the liberal-economic development paradigm, the work of authors such as Lerner (1958), Lipset (1960), Apter (1955), and Almond and Verba (1963) had achieved an untouchable status by the mid-1960s. These authors exhibited a strong consensus that development toward modernity was driven by political participation (democracy) on the one hand, and economic modernisation on the other (Duvenhage, 1993:7-8). It was assumed that in combination these two factors would produce, as an almost inevitable outcome, automatic political stability.

As the colonial era drew to a close during the 1960s, disturbing symptoms began to appear in the developing world, suggesting that economic and political development were not the foregone conclusions theorised by many political scientists. In many newly independent states the heady combination of foreign aid, rapid urbanisation and the dramatic expansion of state capabilities in the form of military and bureaucratic establishments all seemed to have the opposite effect to earlier predictions. Riggs (1970:3) sums up the discrepancy between political science and political reality at the time: “...the assumption that countries in the third World, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, were developing was as much a wish as an empirically determined fact.”

The problem was promptly diagnosed as a lack of skilled administrative personnel in these troubled parts of the developing world, and the subsequent remedial focus came to constitute the field of development administration (Kesselman, 1973:140). Development administration focussed on how bureaucratic decisions were made, in addition to who made them (Kasfir, 1969:95). Consequently, this new focus largely ignored the fluid and unstable nature of political participation and instability in the developing world (what should have formed the main focus) in favour of a formalistic and administrative approach which, at best, provided one dimensional insights.

\(^{118}\) Compare Jackson’s analysis of negative sovereignty, Chapter 5.
Political Order in Changing Societies represented a concern with the generalised capacity of rulers, thereby drastically expanding the scope of investigation into political instability in the developing world (Kesselman, 1973:14)\(^{119}\). In stark contrast to the formerly held paradigm that political stability and development were outcomes of modernisation, Huntington suggested firstly that political development is distinct from modernisation, secondly that political development is not inevitable (as was previously contended), and thirdly that modernisation in fact serves to impede political development in many cases (Fukuyama, 2006; Kesselman, 1973: 141). Huntington argued that “A theory of political development needs to be mated with a theory of political decay. Indeed...theories of instability, corruption, authoritarianism, domestic violence, institutional decline, and political disintegration may tell us a lot more about the “developing” areas than their more hopefully defined opposites” (Huntington, 1965:393).

He therefore emphasised that the process of modernisation did not necessarily develop in an automatic fashion towards the normatively ‘good’ endpoint of modernity. Particularly the increased degree of social mobilisation that modernising societies experienced, and the accompanying inability of political institutions to accommodate such participation led Huntington to the conclusion that modernisation theory was conveniently ignorant of the real political circumstances in developing states.

Huntington initiated a shift in focus from the developmental administration approach, being less concerned with the ability of authorities to successfully complete projects than with their ability to successfully maintain hegemony and limit political demands by their subordinates and society in general. Whilst his analysis still rested upon institutions in society, Huntington differed from earlier historical institutionalists in contending that historical progression will not necessarily conclude with development as its outcome\(^{120}\) (for example democracy) but could deviate and conceivably regress from expected outcomes. Political Order in Changing Societies could therefore be viewed as a precursor to a new institutionalist tradition\(^{121}\) in political science, which is interested less in describing formal structures and constitutions, and more in exploring the deeper

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\(^{119}\) Another notable work which appeared shortly after Political Order and Changing Societies was that of Binder, Colman, LaParombara, Pye, Verba and Weiner entitled Crises and Sequences in Political Development (1971), which also prominently contributed to a reconceived analysis of political change in the developing world.

\(^{120}\) In this sense, Huntington’s treatment of history also differs from the Marxist school of thought, which dictates that history develops along a predetermined trajectory driven by dialectical factors in order to reach an inevitable outcome.

\(^{121}\) Along with other influential works such as Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Moore, 1967) and later States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Skocpol, 1979).
structures that dictate the 'rules of the game' which influence political behaviour, whilst still exhibiting a respectful deference to the historical (Lowndes, 1996:182). This notion of unpredictable progress (that is, open to influence) differed markedly from the unilinear approach prevalent at the time, prompting Huntington to substitute the loaded term of 'political development' with a more neutral and open-ended description of 'change', as prominently reflected in the title of his book (Kesselman, 1973:141). Instead, Huntington argued, political order (not necessarily legitimately attained through means of consensus) is crucial to achieving positive economic and social development in modernising societies. Societies that lacked sufficient political order would instead suffer from decay, from which a condition of praetorianism would emerge leading to insurgencies, military coups and chronically dysfunctional governments. Herein lies the acute relevancy of Huntington’s contribution to this study. As Fukuyama explains, “Political Order was clearly prescient in focusing on political decay as a special object of study. The post-Cold War world has been subject to substantial political decay, from the collapse of the former Soviet Union to series of weak and failing states such as Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan” (Fukuyama, 2006:xv).

Thus, Huntington’s account of political decay, as contained in Political Order in Changing Societies, serves as a synonym for the process of state dysfunction, which is central to the research problem and outcome of this study.

4. Political order and decay

Huntington notes that many of the most economically underdeveloped and politically unstable states are to be found in Asia, Latin America and Africa, referring to them as 'modernising countries'. Most of these states were grouped into the three worlds' typology under the 'third world' during the Cold War, after which the term 'developing world' became more acceptable. Some of the circumstances of Huntington’s modernising countries have improved markedly since Political Order in Changing Societies was published in 1968. States like Thailand, Vietnam, India, South Korea and China have progressed toward relative political stability in the last forty years, aided in no small measure by extraordinary economic growth between the 1970s and the 1990s (the so-called Asian Miracle). Yet other states typified by Huntington as 'modernising' have arguably remained stranded at the starting gate in the progress toward socio-

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122 See Section 5, below.
political modernity. Here one encounters states such as Uganda, the Congo (as it was then known), Burundi, the Sudan, Ruanda, Haiti, in addition to several names that no longer appear on atlases, such as Upper Volta (now known as Burkina Faso) and Dahomey (Benin). Whilst the names of some of these states might have changed, empirically they remain the dysfunctional states Huntington connoted with his concept of political decay.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the years immediately following colonial independence proved to be a tumultuous period for the (now) post-colonial developing world. Huntington explains that “During the 1950s and 1960s the numerical incidence of political violence and disorder increased dramatically in most countries of the world ...in 1965, 42 prolonged insurgencies were underway; ten military revolts occurred; and five conventional conflicts were being fought” (Huntington, 1968:3-4).

Indeed, the issues surrounding decolonisation have already been highlighted in the preceding chapters discussing Migdal and Jackson. These contributions have stressed both the disruption that colonisation and its demise caused on a social level domestically, as well as in the international community of states. Huntington concurs that during the period after decolonisation, “Throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America there was a decline in political order, an undermining of the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy of government...Not political development but political decay dominated the scene” (Huntington, 1968:4).

Assuming a line of argument not far removed from that of Migdal’s, Huntington posits that the violence and instability experienced by the developing world was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilisation of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions (Huntington, 1968:4). He explains that social and economic change (characterised by urbanisation, expansion of the media, industrialisation, increases in literacy and education) serve to extend political consciousness, multiply political demands and broaden political participation. Such changes undermine existing sources of political authority and traditional political institutions (as accounted for by Migdal). They furthermore complicate the challenge of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions that combine effectiveness and legitimacy. Simply put, the rates of social mobilisation and the expansion of political participation are high, whilst the rates of political organisation and institutionalisation are low. These two ingredients can yield only one result, namely
political instability that promotes political decay (Huntington, 1968:5). Huntington regards institutions as the most significant factor in determining the nature of a changing society’s modernising trajectory, leading to either political development or political decay and state dysfunction.

4.1 Political institutions and institutionalisation

Modernising societies are challenged by social change and mobilisation resulting in the multiplication of social forces present in society. Such forces include groups and movements defined by ethnicity, religion, territory, or economic class and status. According to Huntington, the proliferation of social forces during modernisation is usually tempered by institutions, which he defines as an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders and promoting community among different social forces (Huntington, 1968:8). Therefore, the more complex a society, the greater the role which institutions play in the achievement and maintenance of political community. Huntington explains that “In a society of any complexity, the relative power of the groups changes, but if the society is to become a community, the power of each group is exercised through political institutions which temper, moderate, and redirect power so as to render the dominance of one social force compatible with the community of many” (Huntington, 1968:9).

This formation of community in society is, for Huntington, a reliable indication of political development and an obvious ingredient of political stability. Yet it is precisely this type of development that has failed to materialise in the developing world after decolonisation, when social forces were strong and political institutions weak, that is, when the development of the state lagged behind the evolution of society (Huntington, 1968:11). It can therefore be argued that, from Huntington’s perspective, a dysfunctional state is one that (amongst other things) exhibits low levels of institutionalisation and high levels of political instability as a result.

The strength of any political organisation is determined by two variables, namely the measure of support the organisation enjoys, and the measure to which the organisation has become institutionalised (Huntington, 1965:394)\textsuperscript{123}. Gaining widespread support is an obvious requirement for building a strong organisation and requires little elaboration.

\textsuperscript{123} Similarly, one could suggest that the strength of a state can also be gauged by the measure of support it has (in the form of legitimacy) in addition to its level of institutionalisation (in the form of an administrative-bureaucratic establishment, representing the \textit{means} of state).
Huntington defines institutionalisation as the process through which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability. Similarly, he describes institutions as stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour (Huntington, 1968:12). A strong institutionalised organisation is therefore one that enjoys a broad scope of support, in addition to becoming a stable, valued and predictable actor in society. The level of institutionalisation that a political system has attained can be measured by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of the organisations that constitute that system (Huntington, 1968:12, Huntington, 1965:394-405).

The adaptability (or, conversely, the rigidity) of an organisation develops both as a result of its age and the environmental challenges it encounters. The more challenges it has negotiated in its environment and the greater its age, the more adaptable it is. Dealing effectively with one challenge increases the likelihood of dealing with future challenges equally, or more effectively as time progresses (Huntington 1968:13). Similarly, the older an organisation is, the more likely it is to continue its existence. For example, an established business celebrating its centenary is infinitely more likely to continue its existence for another year, compared to a start-up venture in its first year of existence. Yet, Huntington notes, there may be several measures of an organisation’s functional age apart from a purely chronological measure, as explained above.

Another measure of adaptability is generational age. As long as an organisation is still led by its founding leaders, and as long as a given procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability remains in doubt. In this sense, the dominance of long-serving leaders in the developing world’s liberation movements may disguise an acute lack of organisational adaptability124. Thirdly, an organisation’s adaptability may be measured in functional terms. Huntington (1968:15) explains that an organisation is created to perform a particular function. When that function is no longer needed, the organisation faces a crisis, in that it must either conceive of a new function, or face its demise into irrelevance. Thus, an organisation that has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principle functions is more highly institutionalised than one that has not (Huntington, 1968:15). By means of

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124 Even in the 21st century, examples may still be found on the African continent. Robert Mugabe has been leader of the ZANU liberation movement since 1975. This movement was renamed as the ZANU-PF party in 1987 and has controlled government in Zimbabwe for 32 years. In Huntingtonian terms, as an institution ZANU-PF would possess a low generational age, casting doubt on its organisational adaptability. Since independence, a total of 13 African heads of state have served (ruled) continuously for at least three decades, the most enduring being Muammar Gaddafi who ruled for 42 years and 49 days. The longest serving head of state in the world was Fidel Castro (52 years and 62 days), whose Communist Party of Cuba can also be considered a liberation movement which is still lead by its founding members.
illustration, Huntington notes “A nationalist party whose function has been the promotion of independence from colonial rule faces a major crisis when it achieves its goal and has to adapt itself to the somewhat different function of governing a country. It may find this functional transition so difficult that it will, even after independence, continue to devote a large portion of its efforts to fighting colonialism” (Huntington, 1968:17).

The developing world exhibits many examples of liberation movements becoming governments. The inability of such movements to adapt effectively to the new role of government indicates a weakness, both as credible political institutions and credible governments. This, in turn, contributes substantially to state dysfunction. Once again, it is not the form, but the degree of government that matters, to reiterate Huntington’s perspective (1968:1).

Secondly, the more complex an organisation is, the more highly institutionalised it is (Huntington, 1968:17). An organisation comprised of a variety of specialised sub-units and structures is able to assume more specialised functions, in addition to offering more avenues for maintaining the loyalties of its members. By means of illustration, one can cite the pejorative description of ‘Banana Republic’, which refers to many states in the developing world that rely upon one primary export commodity. Banana Republics are by their nature notoriously unstable places, since their economic wellbeing is reliant upon the export of cash crops such as sugar, coffee, or indeed bananas. When these commodity prices fluctuate in the world market, such states are faced either with explosive prosperity or with crippling economic depression. As Huntington (1968:18) explains, a diversified corporation is less vulnerable than that which produces one product for a single market. Similarly, primitive and simple traditional political systems are usually overwhelmed and destroyed in the process of modernisation. The simplest political system is one that depends on one individual; these systems are also the least stable (most of history’s ‘Presidents for Life’ did not successfully complete their life-terms as leaders). In contrast, a complex and diversified political system often possesses within itself the means to renew itself and adapt. Complexity therefore produces stability (Huntington, 1968:19-20).

A third measure of institutionalisation is autonomy, that is, the extent to which political organisations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behaviour (Huntington, 1969:20). Achieving autonomy requires the
development of organisations and procedures that avoid expressing the limited interests of particular social groups. According to Huntington (1969:20), a political organisation that serves as the instrument of a particular social group such as a family, clan or class lacks autonomy and institutionalisation, since the organisation is therefore subordinate to extraneous influences. According to Huntington, “As with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is measured by the extent to which they have their own interests and values distinguishable from those of other institutions and social forces” (Huntington, 1968:20).

In this manner, the autonomy of political procedures is also important in averting violence and corruption and achieving political stability, as Huntington explains:

A highly developed political system has procedures to minimise, if not eliminate, the role of violence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence of wealth in the system. To the extent that political officials can be toppled by a few soldiers or influenced by a few dollars, the organisations and procedures lack autonomy. Political organisations and procedures which lack autonomy are, in common practice, said to be corrupt. (Huntington, 1968:21)

Furthermore, where political systems are deficient in autonomy, newly mobilised social groups can gain entry into the political arena without heeding established procedures. This contributes significantly to the inherent volatility of a system, as new individuals, groups and viewpoints replace each other at the core of the system with “bewildering rapidity” (Huntington, 1968:22).

Fourthly, the more unified and coherent an organisation is, the higher its level of institutionalisation. Huntington explains that unity, esprit de corps, morale and discipline are needed in governments just as they are needed in military regiments. Numbers, weapons and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline (Huntington, 1968:23). Strong unity and coherence means that individuals are more likely to bridle personal impulses for the sake of attaining a collective goal. Organisational discipline is therefore a significant driver of focused development.

Huntington ranks effective bureaucracies as the most important institutional characteristic of developed states, and therefore of importance to modernising states wishing to develop (Huntington, 1968:1). The hallmarks of institutionalisation and their
relationship to a functional and dysfunctional administrative-bureaucratic order may be represented as follows:

*Table 2: Institutional characteristics of an administrative-bureaucratic order*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEBERIAN CORE – ATTRIBUTE 1</th>
<th>Coordinated Administration / Bureaucracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FUNCTIONAL (High Institutionalisation)</td>
<td>DYSFUNCTIONAL (Low Institutionalisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptable</td>
<td>Inflexible / Rigid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Unsophisticated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Subordinate to private interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherent / Unified</td>
<td>Factionalised / Fragmented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Adapted from Huntington, 1968:13-24)

Having clarified the requirements for institutionalisation, Huntington proceeds to conclude that a society with dysfunctional political institutions will lack the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires (Huntington, 1968:24). Indeed, many developing states are also dysfunctional states as a result of despotic rule and personal enrichment. Huntington would argue that such rule is perpetuated by the absence of strong, institutionalised, counterbalancing political organisations. In these dysfunctional states, the dominant ‘political organisation’ is more often than not the expanded personal political network of the ruler. Such power arrangements are significantly, if not wholly, lacking in the hallmarks of institutionalisation, and may therefore be prone to instability and disintegration. He further argues that a society’s public interest is the interest of public institutions (that is, the state administration), and that the public interest is therefore created through the institutionalisation of public organisations (Huntington, 1968:25). Institutional interests (as opposed to personal interests) operate through time, promoting the indefinite existence and welfare of the institution. This, in turn, is an important contributor towards the long-term stability of a political system. According to Huntington, “The existence of political institutions ... capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from underdeveloped ones. It also distinguishes moral communities from amoral ones. A government with a low level of institutionalisation is not just a weak government; it is also a bad government” (Huntington, 1968:28).
In Huntington’s view, those societies deficient in stable and effective government are also deficient in mutual trust among citizens, in national and public loyalties, and in organisational skills and capacity (Huntington, 1968:28). Distrust among individuals causes loyalty to be limited to intimate structures, such as the family or tribes, strongly reminiscent of Hobbes’ state of nature. Huntington explains that “In a society lacking political community, however, loyalties to the more primordial social and economic groupings – family, clan, village, tribe, religion, social class – compete with and often supersede loyalty to the broader institutions of public authority” (Huntington, 1968:30).

This description, in fact, encapsulates perfectly Migdal’s (1988:34-35) notion of a web-like society, where social fragmentation leads to a state being unable to assert its authority, or effectively exercise power. These are chronic symptoms of ‘backward’ societies where, because of an acute lack of institutionalised organisations, leaders and groups pursue their own interests without any consideration of the broader public interest.

Huntington notes that the crucial distinction between a politically developed society and an underdeveloped one is the number, size and effectiveness of its organisations, and that the ease with which traditional societies have adapted their political systems to the demands of modernity depends almost entirely on the organisational skills and capacities of their citizens (Huntington, 1968:31). It would therefore follow that, without functional institutions, a given society would succumb to the instabilities of modernisation, contributing to state dysfunction. Indeed, both Migdal and Jackson would argue that during the colonial period, the colonial administration in many instances represented the only viable institution in most regions of the developing world (especially in Africa). Hence, after decolonisation, newly independent states were left without any institutions to provide political stability.

4.2 Modernisation and political participation

The second important variable of modernisation, which acts as a determinant of political development or decay, is that of political participation. Huntington (1968:32-33) notes that the process of modernisation involves more than the concrete outcomes or characteristics usually cited, such as urbanisation, industrialisation and secularisation. According to Huntington (1968:33) the aspects of modernisation that are most relevant to politics can be grouped into two general categories.
Firstly, *economic development* refers to the growth in total economic activity and output of a particular society, measurable through indicators such as increased GDP, industrialisation, and quality of life. Secondly, a concurrent process of *social mobilisation* can be identified, whereby major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and individuals become available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour. Social mobilisation therefore means a change from the attitudes, values and expectations associated with the traditional world, toward those that characterise the modern world (Huntington, 1968:33). This shift requires the broadening of personal loyalties and associations from defined, immediate groups (the family, clans and villages) to larger and more impersonal groups (such as class or nation). In clarifying the relationship between the two facets of modernisation, Huntington explains that “Social mobilisation involves changes in the aspirations of individuals, groups and societies; economic development involves changes in their capabilities. Modernisation requires both” (Huntington, 1968:34).

Huntington distils his description of general societal modernisation into a more defined account of *political modernisation*, that is, the progression from a traditional polity to a modern polity, by highlighting the following aspects (Huntington, 1968:34–36). Firstly, political modernisation involves the *rationalisation of authority*. This reflects the process of societal modernisation, whereby a single, secular national authority replaces traditional structures of authority. Concerning the emergence of such an authority Huntington notes, “Political modernisation involves assertion of the external sovereignty of the nation-state against transnational influences and of the internal sovereignty of the national government against local and regional powers” (Huntington, 1968:34).

Huntington hereby clearly subscribes to conception of the state that defends its sovereignty against internal and external threat/influence (concurring with the Weberian conception of statehood employed in this study). Jackson (discussed in the previous chapter) would perhaps have qualified Huntington’s statement that political modernity (as opposed to the backwardness of quasi-states) would be characterised by the assertion of not merely sovereignty, but *positive* sovereignty. Nevertheless, both authors concur that sovereignty is essential to the existence of a modern polity (that is, a state). Huntington further posits that rationalisation of authority implies the

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125 As discussed previously, Huntington differs from the liberal-economic paradigm in his view of modernisation (Huntington, 1965:389). For Huntington, a clear distinction must be made between modernisation and development, since the latter can only be realised through adequate levels of *institutionalisation* (i.e. the progression toward being modern and developed is facilitated by functional political institutions).
accumulation and centralisation of power in recognised lawmaking institutions, returning to his dominant theme of institutionalisation.

Secondly, political modernisation involves the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialised structures to perform those functions. Once again, the necessity of institutionalisation is seen as fundamental to the establishment and maintenance of a bureaucratic-administrative order where, ideally, power is distributed according to merit and ability. Here, once again, Huntington demonstrates a Weberian conception of state, whereby specialised competencies become separated from politics and subsequently institutionalised in their own right as complex and autonomous bureaux with their own functions.

Thirdly, political modernisation involves increased participation in politics by social groups throughout a society. This occurs partly due to social mobilisation of groups into politics, but also because of the increased scope and size of the state itself. In this sense, Migdal refers to the level of penetration the state achieves in society (in a modernised polity, the power of the state would extend beyond merely the capital city) and the ability to permeate every level of society both demographically and geographically (that is, manifesting a binding and compulsory association). According to Huntington, then, “Rationalised authority, differentiated structure and mass participation thus distinguish modern polities from antecedent ones” (Huntington, 1968:35).

Yet Huntington notes that the standards of political modernity represent an ideal (one which has not achieved widespread realisation in the developing world). With regards to the developing world he remarks that:

In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently encompassed in the concept ‘political modernisation’ characterised the ‘modernising’ areas ...Instead of stability, there were repeated coups and revolts. Instead of unifying nationalism and nation-building, there were repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Instead of institutional rationalisation and differentiation, there was frequently a decay of the administrative organisation inherited from the colonial era ...Only the concept of political modernisation as mobilisation and participation appeared to be generally applicable to the ‘developing’ world. Rationalisation, integration and differentiation, in contrast, seemed to have only a dim relation to reality. (Huntington, 1968:35-36)

Huntington notes that this political mobilisation and participation prevalent in the developing world produced a surprising side effect, especially in Africa, closely related
to Migdal’s analysis of fragmented social control. He notes that in pre-modernisation, the notion of tribal political consciousness was an almost unknown phenomenon in traditional rural life\(^\text{126}\) (Huntington, 1968:38). The virulent tribalism that has come to characterise post-colonial Africa was thus a product of modernisation and the Western impact on traditional societies (that is, colonialism) (Arnold, 2005:71). He explains that loyalty to a tribe was in many respects a response to modernisation, being a product of the very forces of change which colonial rule brought to Africa (and perhaps reinforced by the doctrine of divide and rule). For Africa, then, the trajectory of modernisation towards political participation and mobilisation often proceeded along tribal/ethnic lines of group consciousness. This proved to be a major obstacle in the creation of effective political institutions: “Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in traditional society become aroused to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the tensions, the inequalities generated by social and economic modernisation” (Huntington, 1968:39).

It would therefore appear that both traditional (backward) and modern (advanced) societies are generally stable. The symptoms of political instability emerge during the process of modernising from being backward to becoming advanced: “…modernity breeds stability, but modernisation breeds instability …It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political instability …A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable. By the mid-twentieth century, however, all traditional societies were also transitional or modernising” (Huntington, 1968:41).

From this premise, Huntington challenges the commonly held notion that poverty (backwardness) exclusively gives rise to instability in the form of violence. His discussion on the corroborating statistics (Huntington, 1968:39-47) will not be recounted here, but for selected insights. Huntington explains that according to World Bank data, 48 out of Africa’s 50\(^\text{127}\) states and territories were classified as poor in 1966. Of these countries, eleven were suffering from insurgencies. However, these insurgencies were not conducted in reaction to widespread poverty, but rather against continued colonial rule (such as Angola and Mozambique) and as a result of ethnic and tribal conflict (such as Nigeria and the Sudan). Compared with Asia and the Middle East, 10 out of the 22

\(^{126}\) See Migdal’s (1988:107) account of indirect British rule through tribalism in Sierra Leone. A similar strategy was adopted in Nigeria, where British colonial rule was maintained indirectly through tribal administrations. After independence in 1960, ethnic tribalism was a main driver of conflict in Nigeria, the results of which still impede effective federal government in that state (Meredith, 2006:582).

\(^{127}\) At that time, South Africa and Libya were the two exceptions to the rule of African poverty.
countries classified as poor were experiencing insurgencies (again motivated by ethnic conflict and opposition to colonial rule), but so too were three out of the four richest countries (Iraq, Malaysia, Cyprus and Japan) (Huntington, 1968:42). This would suggest a weakness in the direct correlation between poverty and violence. Instead, Huntington concludes that “Colonialism and ethnic heterogeneity would seem to be much better predictors of violence than poverty” (Huntington, 1968:42). It therefore seems that a commonality emerges between Huntington, Jackson and Migdal, since all three authors essentially trace the root cause of state dysfunction back to colonialism and its aftermath.

A further indicator of instability cited by Huntington is the rate of speed at which the process of modernisation occurs. Political instability was widespread in the developing world because the rate of modernisation was so much faster than it had been previously in the states regarded as ‘early modernisers’ such as Britain and the USA. This premise is supported by Black (1966:90-94), who notes that the first modernising state (Britain), required 183 years (from 1649 to 1832) to consolidate its modernised leadership. It took the second moderniser (the USA) 89 years to achieve consolidated modernity. Similarly, the average period toward consolidation for states that modernised during the Napoleonic era was 73 years. But, for 21 of the 26 countries which began modernising during the first quarter of the twentieth century and emerged during the 1960s, the average period was only 29 years. These states were forced to modernise more quickly because of the increased drive for social and economic development in the years following World War II, which in turn led to increased disruption of societies resulting in political instability and violence.

Additionally, modernisation also leads to increased social mobilisation (discussed previously) and economic development. However, these twin aspects of modernisation may not develop equally over time, and consequently a gap develops between aspiration and expectation (want formation and want satisfaction) which leads to social frustration (Davies, 1962:5). Subsequently, political instability arises particularly in societies where opportunities for socio-economic mobility and strong political institutions are absent (Huntington, 1968:54). Upward mobility therefore serves as an outlet for social frustration, which along with strong political institutions (such as political parties) serve as a vent for heightened political participation. Unfortunately, Huntington points out, societies engaged in the process of modernisation are by their inherent nature rarely characterised by either socio-economic mobility or strong political institutions.
(Huntington, 1968:54). The relationships between the various aspects of modernisation may be represented as follows (note the relationship between participation and institutionalisation):

Figure 21: The dynamic relationship between aspects of modernisation

4.3 Modernisation and corruption

Corruption represents an almost universal symptom of state dysfunction. Huntington argues that the prevalence of corruption can also be related to the process of rapid social and economic modernisation. Additionally, corruption is a reflection of the low level of institutionalisation in a society, since corrupt officials lack autonomy and coherence and routinely subordinate their institutional role to external demands or private interests (Huntington, 1968:59). This means that corruption not only undermines the institutional capabilities of a state’s administrative-bureaucratic apparatus, it also undermines the legitimacy of government in the eyes of citizens. The relationship between corruption and modernisation is threefold.

Firstly, modernisation involves changes to the basic values of society, as previously discussed. Authority becomes rationalised and legitimate, based upon universalistic

128 A cursory glance at the Corruption Perceptions Index, compiled annually by Transparency International, reveals that the most corrupt states are also some of the most dysfunctional, i.e. Chad (169th), DRC (170th), Sudan (177th) with Somalia (182nd) considered as the most corrupt (Transparency International, 2011).
norms of achievement and merit. Personal allegiance shifts from the tribe or clan to the state or nation. Similarly, behaviour that was considered acceptable according to traditional norms comes to be considered as unacceptable and corrupt. Huntington explains that “New standards and criteria of what is right and wrong lead to a condemnation of at least some traditional behaviour patterns as corrupt ...The calling into question of old standards, moreover, tends to undermine the legitimacy of all standards” (Huntington, 1968:60).

This discrepancy manifests particularly where the distinction between public welfare and private interest does not exist, notably in traditional societies. Huntington (1968:60) notes that if a particular tribal culture does not distinguish between the chief’s role as a private person and his role as a chief, it is impossible to accuse the chief of corruption in the use of public funds. Modernisation, therefore, casts existing and accepted traditional practices in a new light, from whence they are perceived as corrupt. The degree of corruption prevalent in a society is, therefore, a function of the nature of the traditional society as well as the nature of the modernising process.

Secondly, modernisation also contributes to corruption by creating new sources of wealth and power, the relation of which are not accommodated by traditional norms, whilst modern norms may not yet have gained widespread acceptance. In this sense, corruption is a direct product of the rise of new groups with new resources and the efforts of these groups to make them effective within the political sphere (Huntington, 1968:61). McMullan (1961:9) notes that in post-independence Africa, corruption bridged the divide between those who held political power and those who controlled wealth. This enabled the two classes (who were distinctly separate during the initial stages of African nationalist governments) to assimilate each other. Huntington (1968:61) explains that just as the rich use their financial capital to buy themselves positions in government or the legislature, so too do poor peasants buy jobs and favour with rulers by using their enfranchisement as capital, and using the power of the ballot: “There is thus the corruption of the poor and the corruption of the rich. The one trades political power for money, the other money for political power. But in both cases something public (a vote or an office or decision) is sold for private gain” (Huntington, 1968:61).

Additionally, as a post-independence state expands its influence by growing its governmental authority, along with the number of activities subjected to governmental
regulation, new opportunities for corruption emerge. As Huntington (1968:62) notes, the proliferation of laws multiplies the possibilities of corruption. The extent to which this statement is true, depends in large part upon the extent to which laws carry the support of the general population, the ease with which the law can be broken undetected, and the potential profit that can be made from breaking the law. Thus, strict laws affecting trade and customs might encourage smuggling, just as liquor prohibition or banning gambling will lead to profitable, illegal and corrupt activities. Huntington (1968:62) explains: “...in a society where corruption is widespread the passage of strict laws against corruption serves only to multiply the opportunities for corruption.”

Huntington notes that the functions, as well as the causes, of corruption are similar to those of violence; both are encouraged by modernisation, and both are symptomatic of weak political institutions. Furthermore, both violence and corruption are means through which groups relate themselves to a given political system (that is, participation) in ways that violate the rules and norms of that system (Huntington, 1968:63). However, violence as a means of political participation poses a much greater threat to the existence of a political system than corruption does, according to Huntington (1968:64): “Both corruption and violence are illegitimate means of making demands upon the system, but corruption is also an illegitimate means of satisfying those demands. Violence is more often a symbolic gesture of protest...it is a symptom of extreme alienation. He who corrupts a system’s police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who storms the system’s police station.”

From this perspective, corruption thus plays a functional role in perpetuating a dysfunctional political system. Huntington therefore contends that corruption is one of many avenues through which political participation takes place in modernising societies lacking effective institutions. He notes that the prevalence of corruption in African states (as examples of modernising societies) may well be related to the general absence of historically established class divisions. Thus, the rapid mobility from poverty to wealth and from one occupation to another during modernisation has prevented the development of hereditary status or class-consciousness. The very same mobility, however, multiplies the number of opportunities for corruption (Huntington, 1968:65). In such societies, politics come to be seen as the road to wealth, especially when business and financial interests are controlled by foreign capital, as it is in much of the developing world. Huntington (1968:65) contends that in such circumstances “...those
enterprising ambitions and talents which cannot find what they want in business may yet do so in politics.”

This tendency is perhaps best exemplified in Taylor’s (1964) account of politics in the Philippines, a state that also modernised during the 1960s: “Politics is a major industry for the Filipinos; it is a way of life. Politics is the main route to power, which, in turn, is the main route to wealth ... More money can be made in a shorter time with the aid of political influence than by any other means” (Taylor, 1964:157).

Of course, the perception of political office as a way to achieve wealth disguises the implicit notion that political goals become subordinate to private economics. Accordingly, the principle purpose of politics is no longer the achievement of public goals, but rather the promotion of individual interests (Huntington, 1968:67). Widespread corruption, specifically in the topmost tiers of government, point to a low level of political institutionalisation, since the highest offices in any political system should be the most autonomous and independent from outside influence. Furthermore, although the presence of corruption may, in certain instances, lubricate economic development, it tends to contribute to and perpetuate the decay of government bureaucracy (Huntington, 1968:69). The nature of this chronic dysfunction in government and leadership results in an acute lack of authority in the political system as a whole. Subsequently, power and authority becomes less unified and more fragmented (as diagnosed by Migdal) splintering according to individual interests into many forms and small quantities (Huntington, 1968:196). In these dysfunctional states where levels of institutionalisation are low and simultaneously compromised by corruption, praetorianism often emerges as a unique form of power relations.

5. Praetorianism and political decay

Few aspects of political modernisation are more striking and common than the intervention of the military in politics (Huntington, 1968:192)\(^{129}\). Military rule became an almost permanent feature of the Latin American political landscape in the late 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries\(^{130}\), where states were ruled by means of juntas. Similarly, military dictatorships have been frequent and widespread in post-colonial Africa, home to many

\(^{129}\) Also see After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment (Huntington, 1973).

\(^{130}\) A count by the author identified 67 distinct periods of military rule in 21 Latin American states between the period 1838 and 1993.
of the world’s most dysfunctional states. According to Nordlinger (1977:3) praetorianism refers to a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force. Similarly, Perlmutter (1974:1) describes a praetorian state as one in which the military has the potential to dominate the political system due to its key role in political structures, combined with illegitimate and dysfunctional civilian government.

Huntington contends that an explanation for the tendency of militaries to intervene in government should not be sought in an analysis of the armed forces, but rather an analysis of society. In this sense, military intervention represents one example of a more general phenomenon in underdeveloped societies undergoing modernisation, namely the general politicisation of social forces and institutions (Perlmutter, 1974:5; Huntington, 1968:194). Such general politicisation leads to various and diverse groups becoming directly involved in everyday politics, and Huntington (1968:194) notes that “Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions and political corporations.”

Of course, the involvement and activity of specialised social groups in politics occurs in all societies. However, in dysfunctional political systems marked by praetorianism, no effective political institutions exist that are capable of mediating and moderating political action by groups\(^{131}\) (Huntington, 1968:196). Thus, according to Huntington (1968:196) in a praetorian society social groups confront each other nakedly and unrestrained. Neither political institutions nor professional political leaders are recognised or accepted as legitimate intermediaries between the conflicting interests of groups. Problematically, apart from the absence of institutions and leadership, no legitimate or authoritative methods exist for conflict resolution amongst the groups *themselves*. This leads each group to employ methods peculiar to its nature and capabilities in an attempt to realise its goals: “In a praetorian society...the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup” (Huntington, 1968:196).

These groups therefore interact directly with each other and make little effort to relate their private interest to a broader public good, as they compete for power and influence. As competing groups proliferate and viable institutions remain absent from the system, the process of modernisation in such polities increasingly comes to resemble chaos (Huntington, 1968:198).

\(^{131}\) See subsequent discussion on the role of political parties as a means to institutionalisation.
Huntington identifies three phases of praetorianism, representing a sequence of progression, namely oligarchic, radical and mass praetorianism\(^{132}\). **Oligarchic praetorianism** is characterised by the dominance of wealthy landowners, prominent clergy, and the military, all still traditional and rural in nature. At the early stages of modernisation, during which oligarchic praetorianism usually emerges, social institutions are still relatively undifferentiated, enabling members of the ruling class easily to combine various leadership roles. This results in politics becoming a Machiavellian enterprise in pursuit of power, wealth and status (Huntington, 1968:199). The praetorian oligarchy itself is marked by frequent *coup\(\text{'}\)s d\(\text{'}\)état, but these usually represent only palace revolutions in the sense that one member of the oligarchy is merely replaced by another member of the same ruling clique. The top leadership is therefore relatively fluid, whereas few changes are made to the scope of government authority or the extent of political participation and institutionalisation (Huntington, 1968:201). Huntington explains that the dominant figure in such a society is usually a military general, but additionally “...he is also a landowner, an entrepreneur and a highly personalistic leader... he, in fact, uses all the political tactics – bribery, force, cajolery, threat, popular appeal – which in a more complex praetorian society become the distinctive tactics of particular groups” (Huntington, 1968:201).

The classic pattern of oligarchic praetorianism emerged in 19\(^{th}\) century Latin America after the demise of the Spanish and Portuguese empires on the continent. Imperial rule inhibited the development of autonomous political institutions, and after independence most new states sought to replicate the constitutional arrangements of the USA and France domestically. Inevitably, Huntington explains, these liberal-democratic constitutions failed to take root in societies that were still essentially feudal (Huntington, 1968:198). It could also be argued that the aftermath of African decolonisation produced a period of oligarchic praetorianism resulting from the fragmented social control in many African societies, described by Migdal. Such praetorianism would, however, be less identifiable by the involvement of a national institutional military presence, than by a multitude of localised strongmen and warlords that thrive in web-like societies.

Inevitably, the process of modernisation continues, even in oligarchic praetorian societies. Subsequently, as Huntington (1968:201) explains, middle-class officers and

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\(^{132}\) Perlmutter (1981:13) also presents a three-part typology of praetorianism, consisting of autocratic, oligarchic and corporate praetorianism. His description is, however, lacking in sophistication and predictive qualities when compared to that of Huntington.
other related groups (such as teachers, civil servants and technicians) become alienated and disgusted by the corruption, incompetence and passivity of the ruling oligarchy. In due course “officers and their civilian allies form themselves into cliques and secret societies to discuss the future of their nation and to plot the overthrow of its rulers” (Huntington, 1968:201).

This signals the early stages of the shift towards *radical praetorianism*, prompted by accelerating urbanisation, an expanding middle-class and frustration with the political *status quo*. According to Huntington (1968:209), the social roots of radical praetorianism lie in the gap between the city and countryside. During urbanisation brought about by modernisation, the city becomes the new locus of political activity. This urbanised political activity, combined with a growing middle-class consciousness leads to increasing instability in cities and urban areas, which subsequently become hotbeds of political dissent. Huntington notes that during such periods of urban instability, the ruling regime will often try to mobilise support in the rural countryside, in an attempt to counter growing instability in the capital:

If the countryside is passive and indifferent, if rural elite and rural masses are both excluded from politics, then government is caught in an urban prison of instability and functions at the whim of the city mob, the capital garrison, and the central university’s students ... The distinctive characteristic of radical praetorianism is urban instability. The stability of that instability depends upon the exclusion of the countryside from politics. (Huntington, 1968:209)

A government will therefore attempt to mobilise a traditional support base, perhaps calling upon the very web-like society that often undermines it, in order to counter the modern threat emerging in the cities. Yet eventually, the ruling praetorian oligarchy will be overthrown by a more progressive, or radical, middle-class faction of officers, who in turn open doors for hitherto excluded groups to engage in politics, such as the intelligentsia (specifically students), industrialists, lawyers, engineers and other urban professionals (Huntington, 1968:210). Under radical praetorianism, political participation is therefore broadened, entailing a corresponding increase in political activity. However, true to the fundamental character of a praetorian society, political activity is not institutionalised in the form of a political party system, but retains its hallmarks of direct and unmediated action by dissenting groups. In the absence of political institutions that channel deviant participation, direct action and violence is not seen as a deviation from the norms of the political system, rather, the use of violence *is* the system (Huntington, 1968:212). This instrumental use of violence is inimical to the
cultivation of culture of political civility and the maintenance of a functional state, and it therefore becomes likely that a praetorian society will also host a highly dysfunctional state. Yet, amidst the (often violent) political activity of social groups, the military remains the gatekeeper in a praetorian society, and usually represents the closest approximation of a durable institution in such societies. Whilst the armed forces are almost never neutral or autonomous, they continue to be the arbiter in a society of directly competing interests, since they alone have the means to exercise effective power amidst political instability. Huntington explains that the political tactics employed by the military reflects their inherent organisational coherence and the reality that, while other groups can pressure government, the military can replace government: “Monks and priests can demonstrate, students riot, and workers strike, but no one of these groups has, except in most unusual circumstances, demonstrated any capacity to govern” (Huntington, 1968:217).

When not executing coups the military can, therefore, maintain at least temporary order in radical praetorian societies, facilitating the political participation of middle-class social groupings. From the relative expansion of political participation experienced in a radical praetorian society, greater participation gradually begins to permeate the political system. Eventually, the middle class co-opts and expands its support base to the lower and working classes. Huntington cites this expansion of political participation as the beginning of mass praetorianism (Huntington, 1968:224). It is important to bear in mind that even though political participation has been gradually expanded due to societal modernisation, a praetorian society (even at this stage) still lacks effective political institutions. This creates an atmosphere of untenable political instability, since during the mass praetorian phase, political participation reaches new heights (in the absence of institutions to moderate such participation). Consequently, the military (who remain the most powerful element in a praetorian society) adopts a more conservative stance regarding the political participation of the lower classes, as Huntington explains “Almost universally, a politicised officer corps will object to the incorporation of the urban lower classes into politics. The thrust of military intervention in these circumstances has a conservative effect: it prevents the broadening of political participation to more radical groups” (Huntington, 1968:222).

Huntington (1968:222) subsequently refers to the ‘door-keeper’ role that the military performs in praetorian societies, their historical role being to open the door to the middle class and to shut it on the lower classes. Due to the high levels of cross class
political participation (in both rural and urban areas) the possibility of revolutionary demands and revolution itself becomes a distinct possibility. In addition to acting as doorkeeper, the military fulfils a ‘guardian role’ (Huntington, 1968:225) with regard to maintaining the political system. During times of mass praetorianism, when levels of political activity are at their most volatile, this guardianship role becomes the most prominent feature of a praetorian society, as the military establishment intervenes decisively to maintain evolutionary stability and avoid revolutionary instability. This tactic has most recently been implemented in Egypt, following the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011. After the dissolution of the Egyptian government, the armed forces have moved to fill the vacuum of power (guardian role). As of early 2012 the country is ruled by a military junta known as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (New York Times, 2011). It is relevant to note that during Mubarak’s three decades of rule political parties were stifled and the dominance of the ruling party represented a de facto one-party system. Consequently, after the demise of the Mubarak regime no viable political institutions existed which could fill the political void, prompting the armed forces to intervene. Huntington explains that an army which intervenes in this manner can choose among four courses of action, in terms of which it either retains power or returns it to civilians and also whether it permits or opposes the expansion of political participation (Huntington, 1968:233).

Firstly, the military can return power to civilians whilst continuing to restrict the rise of new groups to political power\(^\text{133}\), described by Huntington as the Aramburu Option (Huntington, 1968:233). Following this course of action, the military rulers will usually conduct a purge of undesirable government officials before returning power to a cooperative and acquiescent civilian government. However, the military invariably again intervene when civilian leaders attempt to liberalise society and facilitate wider political participation. Such was the course of action followed by Argentinean Army General Pedro Aramburu, who orchestrated the military coup against Juan Peron in 1955.

Secondly, the military can return power to a civilian government whilst expanding political participation. Social groups previously banned are allowed to participate in politics, but usually under defined conditions and new leadership (Huntington, 1968:234). This is known as the Gursel Option, based upon the Turkish General Cemal

\(^\text{133}\) This corresponds with Perlmutter’s (1981:130-131) concept of corporate praetorianism, characterised by combined military-civilian rule.
Gursel, who after a 1960 military coup insisted on conditionally returning power to an elected civilian government.

Thirdly, the Castello Branco Option entails the retention and restriction of power by the military. In such circumstances, the military necessarily becomes more repressive as it aims to retain and consolidate its position of power, whilst suppressing emerging organisations that could challenge its rule (Huntington 1968:235). This course of action was followed by the Brazilian military leader Marshal Humberto Castello Branco who, after a coup, suspended parliament, abolished political parties and imposed significant restraints on political activity and freedom of speech.

Fourthly, the military can retain power whilst permitting the expansion of political participation. This was the course followed by Juan Perón in Argentina, who led a coup and subsequently consolidated his rule by broadening his support base through the co-optation of mass based social groups other than the military establishment (Huntington, 1968:236). This strategy of seeking broader support beyond the military may lead to alienation amongst the more conservative military elements, as well as alienating the middle classes who come to view the military ruler as a demagogue attempting to woo the masses (Huntington, 1968:237).

According to Huntington, in praetorian societies the relationship between the political sphere and the social sphere is a dynamic and dialectical one, whereby social forces initially shape political arrangements, and subsequently the political sphere comes to dominate social groups and actors (Huntington, 1968:237). As a result, he notes, strong tendencies exist in a praetorian society for it to remain in that condition, since “attitudes and behaviour patterns, once developed, tend to remain and repeat themselves. Praetorian politics becomes embedded in the culture of the society” (Huntington, 1968:237).

It becomes apparent that Huntington views the soldier, and the military establishment he personifies, as the most influential actor in such societies. In the context of political instability, praetorianism can therefore be seen as a reaction to state dysfunction in an attempt to consolidate power and establish a modicum of stability. Notably, the emergence of a praetorian order is prompted by the absence of an inheritance of viable political institutions from the colonial period (Huntington, 1968:237). As discussed previously, in states such as Sierra Leone and Nigeria, colonial policy supported political institutions in order to maintain indirect rule, and as such they were never
conditioned to rule autonomously for the greater good after gaining independence. In these societies, the immediate rewards go to those who act aggressively in their own interests rather than to those who attempt to aggregate a number of general interests (Huntington, 1968:239). Within this context of disorder and dysfunction, the military establishment enjoys certain crucial advantages when compared to other actors, as Huntington explains, “The military can be cohesive, bureaucratised and disciplined. Colonels can run a government; students and monks cannot. The effectiveness of military intervention stems at least as much from the organisational characteristics of the military as from its control of or use of violence” (Huntington, 1968:239).

Thus, in dysfunctional states, the military might be the closest approximation of a well-developed institution (cohesion, bureaucratisation and discipline) within society as a whole, due to its superior organisational capacities. It is from this perspective that Huntington describes the soldier may act as an ‘institution builder’ in praetorian societies, although this is not always the case (Huntington, 1968:237). However, in the same breath it must be noted that unless the military regime develops a political structure that institutionalises some principle of legitimacy, the result will more than likely be a military oligarchy in which power is passed among the oligarchs by means of successive coups and continued instability (Huntington, 1968:242). This scenario poses a distinct danger of revolutionary overthrow by marginalised social forces that are not assimilated into the political process, due the absence of an institutionalised political system.

Military intervention, albeit initially illegitimate in its methods, may acquire legitimacy when it facilitates participation and assumes responsibility for the creation of new political institutions, according to the Perón strategy referred to earlier (Huntington, 1968:243). This often proves difficult for military leaders to achieve, since they traditionally cultivate a self-image of guardians, which by definition represents a conservative stance. In this regard, Collier (1980:36) describes the military as a corporatist, modern, large-scale organisation of the modern nation-state, a guarantor of society and politics. The guardian role often entails an aversion to political parties, or at least independent political parties, which severely limits institutionalised political participation in military regimes. Consequently, military leaders become caught in a conflict between their own subjective preferences and values and the objective institutional needs of their society (Huntington, 1968:244). These needs are threefold, as described by Huntington (1968:244-245). Firstly, political institutions are needed
that reflect the existing distribution of power, but are also capable of attracting and assimilating new social forces, thereby transcending military interests and adopting broader societal interests. Secondly, in states with military governments, bureaucratic output agencies are usually highly developed, in contrast with the disorganised nature of input agencies with the responsibility of interest articulation and aggregation. Political institutions are needed to redress this imbalance, specifically in the form of political parties. Thirdly, political institutions are required to be capable of regulating succession and providing for the smooth transfer of power without the need for coups or revolts. Huntington concludes that in functional developed polities, these three functions are performed by the political party system (Huntington, 1968:245). Huntington therefore views the political party as an important vehicle of political institutionalisation, which promotes stability and order.

6. Political parties and institutionalisation

The establishment of viable political parties is, of course, not relevant merely for societies wishing to break the vicious cycle of praetorianism, but is necessary for all societies experiencing socio-political change as a result of modernisation. The process of modernisation creates a society of greater social diversity, which eventually extends far beyond the familial or tribal ties of traditional societies. Similarly, modernisation stimulates greater social and political mobilisation and, as a result, the challenge of integrating traditional social forces into a single national political community (nation building) becomes more difficult (Huntington, 1968:297). Additionally, apart from reshaping traditional social relationships, modernisation also creates new economic, political and social forces that never existed in traditional society.

One of Huntington’s central hypotheses is that increased political participation without adequate institutionalisation leads to political instability and disorder: “...societies which have created large-scale modern political institutions with the capability of handling more extensive political participation than exists at present are presumptively stable” (Huntington, 1968:398).

Conversely, societies where participation exceeds institutionalisation are inherently unstable (Huntington, 1968:398). Thus, according to Huntington, the future stability of a society with low levels of political institutionalisation will largely depend upon the nature
of the political institutions it creates to engage the modernisation process, and its
concomitant increases in political participation. According to Huntington (1968:399),
“The principle institutional means for organising the expansion of political participation
are political parties and the party system.”

As Migdal’s discussion of pre- and post-colonial social organisation has revealed, most
late modernising societies lack durable traditional political institutions that can adapt
their roles to the demands of modernisation. The weakness of traditional political
institutions, combined with the speed of modernisation (particularly during the 20th
century), necessitates the creation of new institutions, better suited to the modernising
environment. Huntington notes that this is no mean feat, since “The distinctive problem
of the later modernising countries is that they confront simultaneously the problems
which the early modernisers faced sequentially of fairly long historical periods”
(1968:399).

He continues by explaining that early attention to the problems of political organisation
and the creation of modern political institutions makes for a less destabilising process of
modernisation. In this regard, Huntington cites the success of the Soviet Union, which
may be attributed to the priority communists gave to the concerted act of political
organisation, in the form of the Communist Party. Similarly, the development of a
political party system in Mexico during the 1930s led to the organisation and
institutionalisation of the state, subsequently tripling the country’s GDP over the next
two decades (Huntington, 1968:400-401). From this, it becomes clear that Huntington
views a ‘strong state’ as one which hosts a well-developed and organised political party
system. This is corroborated by his related description of state-building: “In
modernising society ‘building the state’ means in part the creation of an effective
bureaucracy, but, more importantly, the establishment of an effective party system
capable of structuring the participation of new groups in politics” (Huntington,

Moreover, as with any institution, the stability and strength of a political party or party
system depends upon its level of institutionalisation and its level of support (that is,
accommodating participation). Successful and consolidated parties are therefore highly
institutionalised and enjoy mass support in society. Such parties 134 consequently

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134 Once again, the primacy of political order in Huntington’s paradigm is accentuated by his espousal of the one party system
as best suited to the circumstances of a modernising polity (Huntington, 1968:422), contrary to prevalent liberal-democratic
preferences for multiparty systems.
possess the wherewithal to channel deviant or violent political participation into electoral channels, thereby contributing to political order and stability (Huntington, 1968:412). Thus, according to Huntington, strong political parties act as a stable counterweight to the destabilising political consequences of the modernisation process.

Huntington subsequently identifies four phases in the process of political party development, culminating in complete institutionalisation. Initially, the embryonic political party landscape is characterised by factionalism, exhibiting little or no trace of coherent institutionalisation. This phase follows the demise of traditional patterns of political organisation, yet frequently continues to centre around family or tribal alliances. A small number of people compete through a large number of weak and transient political groupings, with little durability and no structure (in other words, a minimal semblance of institutionalisation) (Huntington, 1968:412). Huntington also adds that during this factionalist stage, political participation is not broadened, as factions typically operate within the confines of the legislature, or the secretive meetings of the revolutionary. A crucial turning point in the evolution of a political system occurs when politics expands beyond factionalism, and participation is subsequently broadened as new social forces emerge. During this second phase described as ‘polarisation’, political parties become organised by attaching political factionalism to a broader social force (Huntington, 1968:415). This stage emerges because of a bifurcation of the political playing field, which divides various smaller groupings which subsequently consolidate into two opposing poles, each represented by a political party and each enjoying substantial support, as Huntington explains, “Once all the principal actors in the political system are committed to one side or another of a two-sided struggle, the leaders of each side are under strong compulsion to expand the scope of the struggle and to mobilise additional social forces into politics on their side” (Huntington, 1968:416).

Thus, the political party emerges from the haze of political traditionalism and brings with it much greater political mobilisation than was previously possible.

The third stage in party development is that of expansion, when a party appeals to the masses and attempts to bind mass support to it through means of effective organisation (Huntington, 1969:417). Leaders are prompted to organise party support in order to

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135 Such political groupings are also referred to as “Cadre” or “Elite” parties, and they tend to pursue personal political interests rather than representing any portion of the electorate (Heywood, 2002:249).
reach the ultimate party political goal, namely the conquest of power. In many contemporary dysfunctional states (particularly in Africa) this stage has coincided with the nationalist ideological goal of defeating colonialism and attaining independence. Huntington (1968:418) notes that this nationalist struggle against imperialism often effectively solidifies mass support in favour of the leading nationalist movement: “The expansion of participation can be lasting...only if they are the product of competitive struggle. Strong one-party systems are always the product of nationalist or revolutionary movements from below which had to fight for power.”

From this perspective, strong parties cannot be created from above (that is, manufactured by the state) but must evolve and survive through a process of struggle, thus being forged from below. Indeed, Africa abounds with nationalist liberation movements that have assumed power and become institutionalised as ruling parties, many of which either constitute a one-party system, or dominate in a dominant party system.136

Huntington describes the fourth and final phase as that of institutionalisation, during which the foundation is established upon which a party system and parties are subsequently institutionalised. In this regard, the nature of political participation influences the nature of the parties that may develop. Anti-system revolutionary or radical nationalist participation (common during the struggle against colonialism) will most likely institutionalise in the form of a one-party or dominant-party system, similar to the examples cited above. In contrast, intra-system political participation is more likely to yield the institutionalisation of a two-party or multi-party system (Huntington, 1968:420).

It is therefore clear that Huntington views the political party and the political party system as valuable institutions through which political order may be achieved. Thus, the stability of a modernising political system depends on the strength of its political parties (Huntington, 1968:408) and in Huntington’s view, a one-party or dominant-party system has the best institutionalised base for guaranteeing such stability, notwithstanding issues of legitimacy.

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136 The African continent abounds with former one-party systems that have subsequently allowed multiparty participation. These systems are however, still dominated by their respective former liberation movements. Examples of dominant-party states in the SADC region include Angola (MPLA), Mozambique (FRELIMO), Namibia (SWAPO), South Africa (ANC), Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF), and Botswana (BDP).
In societies where political parties do not exist due to suppression or marginalisation, there is usually an absence of institutionalised political avenues for participation. In such cases political discontent and instability mounts and participation may eventually assume an extra-systemic character, which is most dramatically exhibited by unprecedented spikes in participation in other words, revolution.

7. Revolution in dysfunctional states

Huntington defines a revolution as a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership and government activity and politics (Huntington, 1968:264). Revolution is, as the name suggests, a complete turnaround of the status quo. Huntington views revolution as a pertinent aspect of the modernisation process. True revolutions are thus a historically limited phenomenon, since it is unlikely that staunchly traditional societies with low levels of socio-economic complexity will provide fertile soil for revolutionaries. Revolutions are even less likely to occur in highly advanced modern societies with high levels of political institutionalisation (Huntington, 1968:265). He explains that “Like other forms of violence and instability, it [revolution] is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where the processes of political modernisation and political development have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change” (Huntington, 1968:265).

Therefore, in political terms, the cause of a revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilisation of new groups into politics at such a rate of speed that makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them (Huntington, 1968:266).

Revolutions are therefore, simply put, explosions of political participation. Indeed, an explosive moment of political participation is one of two distinct phases of a ‘complete revolution’, the second being creation and institutionalisation of a new political order. Huntington explains that the successful revolution combines rapid political mobilisation and rapid political institutionalisation, and that not all revolutions produce a new political order (1968:266). The success of a revolution is therefore measured in terms of the viability and strength of the institutions that it creates.
Huntington distinguishes and describes two main variants of revolution, namely Western and Eastern revolutionary patterns:

- According to the Western pattern, the political institutions of the old regime collapse, followed by the mobilisation of new groups into politics, and finally the creation of new political institutions. Examples include the French (1789), Mexican (1910) and Russian (1917) revolutions.

- In contrast, the Eastern revolution commences with the mobilisation of new groups into politics, followed by the creation of new political institutions and concludes with the violent overthrow of the old political order. Empirical examples are the Vietnamese (1945) and Chinese (1949) revolutions, in addition to colonial struggles against imperialist powers. (Huntington, 1968:266)

Thus, during a Western revolution, mass political mobilisation results as a consequence of the collapse of the old regime, whilst in an Eastern revolution mobilisation is the cause of the collapse of the old order. It would appear that in the context of contemporary state dysfunction, the Eastern pattern is prevalent in many troubled states, especially when ongoing insurgencies and rebellions by dissident political organisations are taken into account. However, these instances can only rarely be described as complete revolutions when measured against Huntington’s criteria of mobilisation and institutionalisation. More often than not, these struggles are examples of politically motivated violence, rather than revolutions. Huntington explains Eastern revolutions are also frequently marked by periods of dual power, during which revolutionary elements are simultaneously expanding the scope of their political participation and the authority of their political institutions, during which the old order still continues to exercise its rule (Huntington, 1968:271). Therefore, whilst the regime may rule in the capital city and other urbanised areas, the revolutionaries are consolidating their position in the rural countryside, a scenario which has emerged in many dysfunctional states, particularly in Africa. Referring to the revolutionaries, Huntington notes that:

In the Eastern revolution they withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win the support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their military operations from individual terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular
The last phase of the revolutionary struggle is the occupation of the capital. (Huntington, 1968:271)

The scenario described above by Huntington closely approximates the reality in dysfunctional states where governmental power is limited to the capital and non-state actors such as warlords control large areas of the countryside, as was the case in Angola (1975-2002), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Liberia (1989-1996 and again from 1999-2003), Sri Lanka (1983-2009). Such instances also correspond with Migdal’s description of fragmented social control, whereby no one actor (especially not the state) manages to project hegemonic authority (Migdal, 1988:37).

Huntington accounts for the difference between the origins of Western and Eastern revolutionary patterns by citing the nature of the pre-revolutionary regime. Whereas Western revolutions are motivated in opposition to a highly traditional regime (often involving a monarchy or powerful aristocracy), Eastern revolutions are directed against at least partially modernised regimes (Huntington, 1968:273). It would therefore appear that the Western pattern of revolution was the product of a particular period in history, whilst the impetus for Eastern revolutions still exist in many societies. In elaborating upon the nature of such partially modernised orders, Huntington’s description echoes many of the hallmarks of modern dysfunctional states plagued by intra-state violence:

These may be indigenous governments that have absorbed some modern and vigorous middle-class elements and that are led by new men with the ruthlessness, if not the political skill, to hang on to power, or they may be colonial regimes in which the wealth and power of a metropolitan country gives the local government a seemingly overwhelming superiority in all the conventional manifestations of political authority and military force. In such circumstance no quick victory is possible and the urban revolutionaries have to fight their way to power through a prolonged insurrectionary process. (Huntington, 1968:273)

It is therefore clear that Huntington views revolution as a condition of the dysfunctional, politically modernising (as opposed to a functional, politically developing) society, where an acute lack of institutionalisation is further exacerbated by increased demands for political participation which are continually ignored or suppressed. A revolution is the eventual end-of-the-line for a praetorian society that fails to adapt and institutionalise political participation by evolutionary means, or as Huntington concisely notes,

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137 In my estimation, the revolts of the “Arab Spring” (2011) can be meaningfully interpreted according to the Eastern revolutionary pattern.
“Ascending or aspiring groups and rigid or inflexible institutions are the stuff of which revolutions are made” (Huntington, 1968:275).

In the context of dysfunctional societies characterised by the tenets of radical and later mass praetorianism, coupled with an inflexible military presence in the form of a self-assigned ‘guardian role’, it requires only a short leap of the imagination to conceive of circumstances ripe for revolution. In such cases, a political sentiment of discontent, which is able to engage both the middle-classes of the city and the peasants of the countryside will almost certainly result in revolution (Huntington, 1968:277). Exactly such a course of events recently unfolded during the early stages of the so-called Libyan civil war. Whilst initial protests were motivated over localised housing shortages, it soon became a vehicle for venting general political frustration with the Gaddafi regime across Libya (Abdel-Baky, 2011). The subsequent uprising gained momentum in urban areas (Tripoli and Benghazi) as well as in isolated desert towns such as Bani Walid. The protesters (and later volunteer rebel fighters) comprised students and middle-class Libyans (Garcia-Navarro, 2011). The Gaddafi government was subsequently overthrown and a revolution effected, with the National Transitional Council (NTC) assuming government. However, as of early 2012 it does not appear as if the NTC has been able to achieve political stability in post-authoritarian Libya (Al Arabiya, 2012). Thus, whilst the Libyan revolution was effective at mobilising support and effecting regime change, it has proved unable to institutionalise after the revolution (an incomplete revolution, in Huntingtonian terms).

Complete revolutions are rare (Huntington, 1968:264). More often the beginnings of revolutionary discontent with contemporary regimes peter out into extended periods of political violence, repeated coups d’états, wars of independence or civil war (of which the developing world hosts many). None of the aforementioned outcomes offer any hope of creating viable institutions, in fact by their very nature these occurrences of political violence are destructive. In contrast, Huntington’s view of revolution concurs with that of Bertrand de Jouvenel’s, who opined that the true historical function of revolution is to renovate and strengthen power (de Jouvenel, 1993:218). Huntington argues that true revolutions replace weak governments with strong governments, and that strong governments are the product of both the concentration and expansion of political power in a system. Thus, the completion of the political task of a revolution depends upon the creation of new political organisations to stabilise and to institutionalise the centralisation and expansion of power (Huntington, 1968:313).
Revolution therefore present an opportunity for political development, but only if that fleeting political opportunity can be capitalised upon. However, the perpetually violent and tempestuous nature of dysfunctional states suggest that, according to this Huntingtonian analysis, a dysfunctional state is one which has modernised to some degree, but has been unable to develop politically, either by evolutionary or revolutionary means.

8. Conceptualisation and conclusion

From this discussion of Political Order in Changing Societies, it is evident that Huntington’s description of political decay and its concomitant elements bear particular relevance to a study of state dysfunction. As a point of departure, Huntington’s theoretical conception of statehood corresponds to the Weberian ideal-type, and as a result his insights regarding state dysfunction are compatible with those of the other authors employed in this study. The regression caused by political decay as described by Huntington could indeed be viewed as synonymous with state dysfunction. The central driver of this regression and decay is the inevitable and often involuntary process of modernisation, both political and economic, which undermine traditional societal arrangements in traditional societies. Modernisation serves as impetus for greater societal complexity and potential prosperity, creating expectations in society that, in turn, mobilise new social forces in the political arena, resulting in an increase of political participation.

In order for these potentially disruptive forces of participation to effect a constructive change in society (that is, to support political development) Huntington argues that political institutions must exist to accommodate, temper and manage this dynamic socio-political energy. This central theme of institutionalisation represents a leitmotif in Huntingtonian thought, and provides the student of state dysfunction with a useful instrument with which to gauge a state’s relative functionality, or viability. Paramount among political institutions is a capable administrative-bureaucratic order (that is, the means) through which a state is able to project its power in a society. Additionally, supplementing institutionalisation in society are viable political parties and a political party system, which absorb and channel socio-political mobilisation and engenders stability in the political process. Without functional political institutions, societies veer away from a path of political development onto a trajectory of political decay.
Huntington notably singles out post-colonial societies as hosts of such political dysfunction\(^\text{138}\); places which are often characterised by corruption, violence and praetorian politics. In praetorian societies, the absence of effective political institutions to mediate between socio-political actors result in groups taking unmediated, often drastic action. To reiterate, “In a praetorian society... the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup” (Huntington, 1968:196).

In such praetorian circumstances, direct action and violence are not seen as abhorrent deviations from the norms of the political system, they in fact constitute the system. Military intervention becomes a regular occurrence in an attempt to restore a semblance of order and stability to society, but this course of action carries its own contingencies of military oligarchy and autocracy. Critically, military intervention usually uses tactics of suppression to deal with demands for political participation, rather than overseeing the creation of capable institutions to accommodate and diffuse such demands.

Eventually, after a confluence of volatile circumstances, political discontent ferments to become an explosive brew that transcends social and class barriers, resulting in revolution. A revolution signals the termination of the old order, after which new opportunities exist for institutionalising a new order. If viable institutions emerge from the ashes of revolution, the outcome of the episode of political upheaval could be considered a step toward political development. However, if the revolution stalls and degenerates into sustained civil violence, a situation emerges that is endemic to many of the world’s dysfunctional states. The interrelationship between the various concepts and the dynamics of their interrelationship is illustrated below:

\(^{138}\) The same holds true for both Migdal and Jackson.
Huntington’s theoretical perspectives as articulated in *Political Order in Changing Societies* therefore contribute significantly to the goal of this study by plotting the course of state dysfunction from its roots in modernisation up to its unravelling in revolution. From the diagram above it is evident that Huntington’s neutral notion of political change progresses toward one of two avenues: decay being one and development the other. In particular, the avenue of political decay is relevant for formulating a Huntingtonian conception of state dysfunction, whilst political development would be a hallmark of a functional state. The central driver of political change is social and economic modernisation, which mobilises new groups into politics. Political decay commences when newly mobilised groups cannot be accommodated in the political system, either due to a lack of institutionalisation or the absence of institutions in general. Weak institutionalisation leads to two further significant manifestations of political decay, as free-roaming political groups take direct and unmediated action (praetorian politics) and the public interest becomes subordinate to private interests (corruption). Existing institutions are therefore simultaneously undermined by non-state actors in society, in
addition to being ‘hollowed out’ by actors within the institutions of state themselves. Both of these factors are drivers of growing disorder (state dysfunction), and neither aids in ameliorating mounting social mobilisation and discontent. Ultimately, an explosion of political participation occurs (revolution) which destroys the current order (state failure) after which chaos reigns (Hobbesian state of nature) or new institutions emerge, and the germination of political development may occur. Consider the integration of the above-mentioned aspects with the analytic tool developed in Chapter 2. Once again, symbols/descriptions are used to indicate the effect various concepts have upon state capabilities, an adverse influence indicated with the ↓ symbol, whilst an enhancing influence is indicated with the ↑ symbol. An influence that brings about the destruction of the political system as a whole (that is, terminal state dysfunction) is indicated with the ☠️ symbol:

*Figure 23: Reconstructing Huntington’s contribution to the conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state*

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<th>SCIENTIFIC CONSTRUCTS</th>
<th>WEBERIAN CONCEPT OF STATE</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordinated admin.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CONCEPTS</strong></td>
<td>CHANGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Development</td>
<td>↑</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutionalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Decay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low / lack of</td>
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<tr>
<td>institutionalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>Praetorianism</td>
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<td>Revolution (as</td>
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<td>explosion of</td>
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<td>political participation)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that within the Huntingtonian conception of political decay (state dysfunction), the absence of institutions and institutionalisation poses the most significant challenges to the state. A lack of institutionalisation refers, ultimately, to an absence of stable arrangements for maintaining order, or to such arrangements exhibiting low levels of
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and unity. Since the administrative (bureaucracy) order of a given state represents a given society’s most prominent institution, Huntington’s contribution is of particular relevance to analysing dysfunctional state administrations and bureaucracies. According to a Huntingtonian analysis, such an administration could be considered dysfunctional if it is unable to adapt to social demands, remains unsophisticated or primitive in its structure and capabilities, is dominated by private interests (corruption), or fragmented by factionalism or other divisive agendas. In his analysis of institutionalisation, Huntington therefore provides criteria for determining the levels of (dys)functionality of a state’s administrative-bureaucratic order.

The nature of a dysfunctional bureaucracy similarly stands in stark contrast to the ideal described by Weber himself (1947:196). Furthermore, Huntington (1968:194-196) notes that low levels of institutionalisation and the politicisation of institutions (subordination) causes the perpetuation of praetorianism in society: “These causes lie... in the structure of society. In particular they lie in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions” (Huntington, 1968:196).

Noting the centrality of the concept of institutionalisation in Huntington’s conceptualisation of state dysfunction, its relation to praetorianism may be represented as follows:

Figure 24: The role of administrative institutionalisation in Huntington’s conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state:

![Diagram showing the role of administrative institutionalisation in Huntington's conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state](image)

WEBERIAN CORE – ATTRIBUTE 1
Coordinated Administration / Bureaucracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTIONAL</th>
<th>DYSFUNCTIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(High Institutionalisation)</td>
<td>(Low Institutionalisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptable</td>
<td>Inflexible / Rigid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Unsophisticated / Primitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Subordinate to private int.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>Factionised / Fragmented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNDERMINES ↓
- Binding authority
- Compulsory Ass.
- Territory
- Monopoly of force

DESTROYS ⚫
- Binding authority
- Compulsory Ass.
- Territory
- Monopoly of force

PRAETORIANISM

REVOLUTION

(Adapted from Huntington, 1968)

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139 See Chapter 3, section 5.1. and Huntington (1968:1).
From the above representation, the absence of an institutionalised, coordinated administrative-bureaucratic order contributes to perpetuating praetorian politics, which may ultimately lead to revolution, thereby undermining all other attributes of statehood. Institutionalisation coupled with institutions (most notably in the guise of an administrative-bureaucratic order, but also in the form of political parties) serves as the conceptual lynchpin in a Huntingtonian conceptualisation of state dysfunction: “A government with a low level of institutionalisation is not just a weak government; it is also a bad government” (Huntington, 1968:28).

Furthermore, a state administration is the instrument through which a government is able to project its presence in a society, and a state’s ability to protect its territorial integrity, maintain binding authority whilst claiming compulsory association through the monopolisation of force all rest upon its institutional capabilities. A state lacking in administrative-bureaucratic institutions cannot collect taxes, raise armies or subject citizens to the authority of a judicial system; it cannot establish order, nor can it promote development. Thus, a state with inadequate bureaucratic institutionalisation is only able to achieve an inadequate degree of government, harking back to the opening sentence in Political order in Changing Societies: “The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government” (Huntington, 1968:1).

The reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of Huntington’s contribution to the theme of this study reveals a conceptualisation of state dysfunction in which low political institutionalisation and weak institutions feature centrally. This conceptualisation impacts directly upon the first attribute of the Weberian core, developed in Chapter 3, namely a coordinated administrative-bureaucratic order. Low levels of institutionalisation compromise the efficacy of a state’s administrative apparatus, thereby compromising all the remaining core elements of its statehood. This conceptualisation of state dysfunction may eventually regress further into extreme political instability and revolution, after which a scenario of terminal state dysfunction (state failure) becomes a distinct possibility.

Having concluded the study of the three theoretical contributions upon which this conceptualisation of state dysfunction is based, the next chapter will conclude by synthesising their insights. This will process will culminate in the formulation of a
concept of state dysfunction, in the form of a theoretical construct, according to the research goal of this dissertation.
Chapter 7
Conceptualisation and Conclusion

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to integrate the various preceding components of this study in order to arrive at a conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state. Methodologically, this will be achieved by structuring the chapter according to three main parts, namely:

1. General points of departure
2. Contributions on state dysfunction
3. Synthesis and integration

The first part is concerned with summarising the theoretical and meta-theoretical points of departure upon which this study is based. This includes an overview of the motivation and problem statement, the scientific method as it relates to this conceptualisation, and the Weberian conception of state as a typological point of reference.

The second part consists of an account of the contributions in the field of state dysfunction, as reconstructed, interpreted, and evaluated in Chapters 4 – 6. Each of these chapters concluded with an evaluative conceptualisation and conclusion of the respective author’s contribution according to the scientific constructs they employed. Thus, the most salient and relevant insights will be identified as the first step in the conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state.

The third part centres around the integration and synthesis of the scientific knowledge accrued in previous chapters, culminating in a conceptualisation, namely, the application of scientific constructs in the investigation of state dysfunction. The scientific constructs employed in this conceptualisation will be those identified in part two (above) which will be integrated using an analytic tool and subsequently discussed.
2. General points of departure

The impetus and motivation for conducting this study originates from the inadequacy with which state dysfunction as a phenomenon has been approached theoretically. An overview of the literature pertaining to state dysfunction was conducted in Chapter 1, which clearly indicated that scientific investigations have employed a predominantly quantitative and empirical methodology. Whilst it is acknowledged that empirical investigations fulfil an important role in scientific practice, it should be complemented by (and in this author's opinion, premised upon) qualitative studies of a theoretical nature. The latter provide numerous potential scientific advantages, such as the integration of several disciplinary paradigms (inter-paradigmatic method), thorough description of the phenomenon, as well as unambiguous conceptualisation and definition. Additionally, a qualitative methodology extracts valuable insights regarding human and societal behaviour, and the reasons for that behaviour, both of which are vital for identifying deeper societal causes of a phenomenon such as state dysfunction.

2.1 Problem statement

Increasingly during the past two decades, the media and other popular disseminators of information have adopted the usage of terms such as failed, weak, fragile and collapsed states. These terms are also used in scholarly works, with little clarification of their conceptual definition or their scientific provenance, as discussed in Chapter 1. This would indicate that the concepts of state failure, et al., whilst occupying a prominent (yet ill-defined) position in lay knowledge, have not been adequately integrated into the body of scientific knowledge\(^{140}\). For the purposes of this study, the term dysfunctional state (or state dysfunction) is employed as denoting a phenomenon of significant deviance from an ideal-typical state. State dysfunction serves as a broad term, which could conceivably incorporate typological graduations such as state fragility, weakness and failure.

From the above-mentioned motivating factors a problem statement is formulated, namely that this study represents an investigation to determine the theoretical content of an observable phenomenon, referred to as state dysfunction, through a process of conceptualisation, resulting in a sound conception of the dysfunctional state which may

\(^{140}\) See discussion in Chapter 2, section 3.
be consistently applied in theory and practice. The exploration of this research problem is conducted according to the scientific premises and methodology accounted for in Chapter 2. The following section serves to outline the key aspects of this method.

### 2.2 Methodological and scientific foundation

The above-mentioned research problem is essentially concerned with the creation of scientific knowledge in the form of a conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state. The nature of ordinary and scientific knowledge was analysed in Chapter 2, and it was noted that scientific knowledge is:

1. The outcome of rigorous, methodical and systematic enquiry;
2. Based on collective experience of the scientific community;
3. Supported by evidence.

In satisfying these requirements of scientific knowledge, the following elements have been incorporated in this study:

1. An account of the motivating, meta-theoretical and methodological assumptions underpinning the study (Chapters 1 – 3);
2. Scholarly contributions on the subject of state dysfunction by three regarded authors, each representing divergent paradigms (Chapters 4 – 6);
3. A systematic reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of the above-mentioned contributions, integrated by means of an analytic tool.

Regarding the first of these points, the assorted scientific constructs that are engaged in the pursuit of valid and reliable knowledge have been identified and discussed. Additionally, the role of these constructs in relation to this study has also been clarified, noting that for the purposes of this dissertation in addressing the research problem, the process of conceptualisation is defined as the application of scientific constructs in the investigation of a phenomenon\(^\text{141}\), in this case the dysfunctional state. Regarding the second point, the scientific constructs that are to be applied have been extracted from the contributions of Migdal, Jackson and Huntington. Key constructs have been identified in their work, in the form of salient concepts, models and typologies. The respective paradigmatic departure points of these contributors have also been analysed and (along with the constructs they employ) integrated through means of a purposely

\(^{141}\) See Chapter 2, section 8.
developed analytic tool\textsuperscript{142}. Also integrated into the analytic tool are the primary attributes of Weberian statehood, identified in Chapter 3. The Weberian ideal-typical state represents a common element to all three contributions, notwithstanding their paradigmatic diversity. Thus, the Weberian concept of state represents the criteria of functionality against which state deviance may be identified (in other words, an ideal-type).

2.3 The Weberian concept of state

The Weberian state, as the concept is employed in this dissertation, represents an abstract idea (and therefore also an ideal) and is therefore well suited to analysis as a scientific construct. As an ideal it is never encountered empirically, and empirical phenomena referred to as states (in practice) can only approximate that ideal. A key assumption that underlies this study is that state dysfunction represents a negative deviation from this ideal-type, and that the greater the deviation, the greater the level of state dysfunction in reality\textsuperscript{143}.

As with all constructed ideas, the concept of state has its origins in the realm of practical human experience. With regard to the state, this practical dimension was the need to create a form of human organisation to ensure collective security. This activity of organisation was historically repeated and institutionalised through convention, providing an effective arrangement with which to counteract the insecurity of man’s individual existence and being continually exposed to the predations of others (or at least the constant fear of such predations). Thus, the Hobbesian state of nature was kept at bay by nascent polities of small scale organisation that subsequently developed through the centuries to constitute the modern state, which currently functions not only to maintain citizens’ physical security, but also their welfare.

By means of a literature study conducted in Chapter 3, various attributes of statehood were identified which reflect the \textit{raison d’être} of the state, in addition to the more comprehensive contemporary attributes that have progressively emerged. These attributes were ordered into three categories, which are:

\textsuperscript{142} See Figure 10.
\textsuperscript{143} See Figure 1.
Primary attributes, also referred to as the Weberian core attributes:

1. An organised, interconnected administrative order
2. Claiming binding authority
3. Compulsory association
4. Defined territory
5. Monopoly on the use of legitimate force

Secondary attributes:

1. Constitutionalism
2. Acting in common/public interest
3. Legitimacy (democratic)
4. External sovereignty

Tertiary attributes:

1. Welfare state
2. Economic intervention (developmental state)

The above-mentioned primary attributes correspond to those identified by Max Weber, and together constitute a conception of statehood that has occupied a hegemonic conceptual position in the discipline of political science in the 20th century. The Weberian core attributes are briefly elucidated as follows:

- An administrative order represents a set of purposefully structured arrangements (a body of rules, a series of roles, a pool of resources) and institutions which are committed to a distinctive, unified and unifying set of interests and purposes (exercising the state’s political power). Although the various parts of an administration perform diverse functions, they operate in conjunction and are thus interconnected and not opposing forces. Furthermore, an administrative order is a permanent venture, unlike the intermittent phenomena of governments and regimes. Due to the significant capabilities and responsibilities of an administration, it is important that its institutions are recognisably public and not dominated or directed by private interests.

- The functional existence of a state fundamentally rests upon its ability to maintain its dominance in society by laying claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. According to the Weberian conception, the state is defined by its use of force, and it is this attribute that distinguishes it from all other entities and forms of human organisation in society. A state forfeits its monopoly and becomes compromised if non-state actors employ the use of violence to maintain
and enhance their power. Furthermore, the authority with which a state employs force should rest on legal validity (that is, legitimacy) and be reciprocated by a sense of political obligation from the citizenry.

- Through perpetuating a monopoly of legitimate force, a state ensures that it remains a compulsory association that maintains binding authority. Through its use of force, the state can ensure that all who reside within its ambit are subject to its power and authority. Through this involuntary relationship, individuals associate with the state in the sense that they are bound by its rules for as long as they remain within its jurisdiction.

- All the above-mentioned attributes must manifest and occur within a demarcated geographical territory. The continuous maintenance of these attributes will enable a state to defend its territorial integrity from internal undermining forces and external incursion.

- These attributes exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship where decay in one attribute has an adverse effect on the remainder.

- When successfully maintained and functioning in concert these attributes collectively serve to enhance collective human security.

The primary attributes are subsequently related to a definitional statement, which represents the concept of state as it is employed in this dissertation, both as a common feature in the contributions considered, but also as an ideal-type from which state dysfunction may be measured. Accordingly, an entity could be considered a state if it possesses an administration, of which the different parts are coordinated, is a compulsory association that can claim binding authority over all that occurs and exists within its territory, being able to do so through possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

This definitional statement is integrated into an analytical tool, designed to tabulate the relationship between scientific constructs (as encountered in the literature on state dysfunction) and the Weberian core attributes. This analytical tool was deployed in Chapters 3 – 6 for the purposes of theoretical interpretation, of which the respective insights are considered in the following section.

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144 See Chapter 3, section 6.


## 3. Contributions on state dysfunction

This section will consider the contributions on the subject of state dysfunction, as reconstructed, evaluated and interpreted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The scientific constructs employed by each author that are of relevance to the conceptualisation of state dysfunction will be identified and discussed, along with their relationship to the Weberian concept of state.

### 3.1 A conceptualisation of Migdal's contribution on state dysfunction

This study selected *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* as Joel Migdal's contribution on state dysfunction. This was subsequently reconstructed, interpreted and evaluated in Chapter 4. The chapter concluded with a conceptualisation of Migdal's perspective on state dysfunction, making use of the analytic tool described earlier. The prominent scientific constructs that constitute Migdal's perspective are presented below:

*Figure 15: Reconstructing Migdal's contribution to the conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEBERIAN CONCEPT OF STATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARADIGM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical, sociological, and institutionalist, according importance to both the development of society and the development of state. Regarding the former, pre-colonial and colonial interaction between Europe and the developing world is NB. Regarding the latter, the nature of postcolonial institutionalization is NB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODELS</strong></td>
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<td>State-in-society approach (Figure 14), posits that assuming state predominance in the developing world is flawed. States represent one actor amongst many others in society. Concepts central to this approach are: (see below)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CONCEPTS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Web-like society with fragmented social control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existence of competing strategies for survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presence of non-state actors (strongman / warlord)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Politics of survival (big shuffle, dirty tricks, neo-patrimonial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Triangle of accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated admin.</td>
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The scientific constructs employed by Migdal focus on the evolution of dysfunctional societies as hosts of dysfunctional states. Accordingly, his contribution defines and explores an *internal dimension* of state dysfunction. This internal dimension is concerned with the domestic factors that undermine the consolidation of state predominance, and accordingly exhibits a degree of localisation and context-bound application. In the case of *Strong Societies and Weak States*, these local contexts are represented by Latin America and in particular, sub-Saharan Africa. The geopolitical ambit of the latter has, since the mid-20th century, exhibited the most disturbing tendencies toward underdevelopment and a preponderance of socio-political problems and challenges. Four of the five key concepts highlighted in the analytic tool have societal applications, in the form of

(i) web-like societies and fragmented social control;
(ii) competing strategies for survival;
(iii) powerful non-state actors; and
(iv) the triangle of accommodation between the state leadership, its bureaucracy, and influential non-state actors (only Migdal’s conceptualisation of the politics of survival manifests in the state administration itself).

This reinforces the conceptual insight that in the context of state dysfunction, the state is one of numerous actors in society, not even necessarily being the most powerful or authoritative. Non-state actors continually undermine the projection of state authority in society, either actively (by undermining the political system through violence and other means) or passively (by maintaining strategies of survival with which inhabitants associate instead of the state’s).

As a consequence of Migdal’s paradigmatic orientation, his resultant insights into the dynamics of state dysfunction exhibit a pertinent societal focus. The contemporary dysfunctional state environment is analysed from historical and sociological vantage points, commencing at the earliest stage of Western interaction with then-unexplored areas of the (now) developing world. This presents the reader with a chronological perspective of the particular manner in these societies have evolved, which in turn reveals the period during which the state (as an institutional reality) was first introduced to society. This chronological perspective indicates three distinguishable phases in societies of the developing world, which are interpreted for the purposes of this
dissertation as pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Consider the diagram below, representing Western involvement in Africa:

Figure 25: A timeline of European involvement in Africa

![Diagram of European involvement in Africa]

(Source: Own construct)

The diagram above reconstructs Migdal’s chronological perspective of the escalation of the Western presence in Africa from the mid 16th century. It is interesting to note that although the period of formal colonisation was relatively brief (60-70 years), a European presence had existed in the developing world for several centuries prior. According to Migdal, this low intensity influence (which subsequently escalated at the behest of the expanding international economy) surreptitiously reconfigured societal power relations in the developing world. However, it was only during the period of colonisation that the state as an institutional complex was introduced, administered under the auspices of Europeans. Accordingly, the emergence of state dysfunction correlates with the post-colonial period, represented in the diagram above. Post-colonial rule generally undermined the various attributes of state, either dramatically after achieving independence, or gradually over the course of several years. According to the concepts employed by Migdal, this regression was marked by the dysfunctional state being incapable of:

- Constituting as a **compulsory association**, since certain non-state actors are evidently not compelled to associate with it. Furthermore, citizens may associate with a particular warlord or strongman rather than the state, thereby rejecting the state’s ‘rules of the game’.

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145 The colonisation of the Americas commenced in the late 15th century. The state-sponsored colonisation of South America commenced in the 16th century, lead by the Spanish and Portuguese Kingdoms respectively. Therefore, unlike Africa, South America did not experience a period of modern foreign colonisation.
• Maintaining **binding authority**, due to the fact that power is fragmented amongst numerous actors in society, who may provide more viable strategies of survival. In other words, state authority is only binding upon those individuals who concede to it.

• Possessing a **monopoly of legitimate force** in society, since it lacks legitimacy, coercive means, or both. Non-state actors may be more legitimate and better equipped with the tools of coercion than the state.

• Preserving **territorial integrity**, nor sovereignty, since non-state actors may lay claim to and command large geographical areas, representative of their spheres of influence, for the reason mentioned above.

• Sustaining a **coordinated administrative order**, since government institutions are predated upon by leaders and pressured by society. State administrations thus become corrupted vehicles for personal enrichment, whilst the notion of fulfilling state functions in the public interest is undermined.

Nonetheless, having established the state as a fundamental part of political organisation during colonialism, it was destined to endure even after decolonisation and independence was granted to indigenous groups. There was no question of reverting to a world order where parts of the globe’s geography was not demarcated according to state boundaries and, furthermore, post-colonial leaders viewed the state as a prize or reward to be acquired after a successful liberation campaign. Whilst colonial states were, generally speaking, politically capable and effective institutions (in other words, functional) they were based on undemocratic rule and blatant discrimination. Thus, even though colonial states often had *empirical* merit, they were acutely deficient in *moral* justification. The concept of state was retained in its entirety by post-colonial political leaders, often faltering in reality, through the support and enablement of the international community. Yet, even as state dysfunction escalated to catastrophic proportions in certain regions of the developing world, troubled states were maintained without external intervention, despite the lack (in certain cases, absence) of the necessary characteristics dictated by the Weberian standards of statehood. The induction and maintenance of states that would otherwise dissolve due to dysfunction forms the central focus of Robert Jackson’s contribution, discussed in the following section.
3.2 A conceptualisation of Jackson’s contribution on state dysfunction

This study selected *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* as Robert Jackson’s contribution on state dysfunction. This was subsequently reconstructed, interpreted and evaluated in Chapter 5. The chapter concluded with a conceptualisation of Jackson’s perspective on state dysfunction, once again utilising the analytic tool employed in Chapter 4. The prominent scientific constructs that constitute Jackson’s perspective are presented below:

![Figure 18: Reconstructing Jackson’s contribution to the dysfunctional state](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEBERIAN CONCEPT OF STATE</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Coordinated admin.</td>
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<td>Coordinated admin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinated admin.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Whereas the scientific constructs employed by Migdal in his contribution focused on the characteristics of societies in relation to state dysfunction (subsequently designated as the internal dimension), Jackson’s main scientific constructs find application in the realm of international relations. His contribution defines and explores the *external dimension* of state dysfunction. This external dimension is concerned with the factors that *initiated* and *maintain* dysfunctional states (or so called quasi-states) in the international arena during the post-colonial period, a unique perspective, prompted by his paradigmatic amalgamation of political science and law.

The most prominent feature of Jackson’s contribution is his typology of sovereignty, which is comprised of two opposing concepts, namely positive and negative...
sovereignty. States that are characterised by positive sovereignty have been historically capable entities, both domestically (maintaining a monopoly of legitimate force, etc.) and internationally (being able to ward off predations from other states). As such, these states tend to approximate the Weberian ideal-type, since such have proven capabilities in preserving the attributes of statehood. Conversely, negative sovereignty is a historically recent phenomenon, which emerged immediately prior to decolonisation, and currently acts as a life support system for some severely dysfunctional states whilst maintaining the existence of the majority of dysfunctional states. The chronological incidence of negative and positive sovereignty is illustrated below:

*Figure 26: A timeline of sovereignty regimes*

![Timeline of Sovereignty Regimes](source)

From Jackson’s account of the emergence of negative sovereignty in international relations after World War II, it becomes clear that negative sovereignty is a relatively recent and sudden development. This stands in stark contrast to the gradual and evolutionary development of positive sovereignty, which was underpinned by the emergence of states based upon their ability to withstand the tempestuous political climate of the previous thousand years. Furthermore, the historical concurrence of the emergence of negative sovereignty and the process of decolonisation must be noted, in which Jackson identifies a causal relationship. According to Jackson, the doctrines of self-determination (as an unqualified right of colonial peoples) and non-intervention are integral to the current post-colonial negative sovereignty regime.
Consequently, two important aspects concerning dysfunctional states are observed:

1. the moral momentum behind the tenets of negative sovereignty prompted an accelerated process of decolonisation after which post-colonial states were premised not on capabilities and preparedness, but rather a claim based on rights of non-intervention and self-determination (substituting traditional *de facto* statehood for *de jure* statehood); and

2. in the post-colonial era the existence of dysfunctional states is perpetuated by the dictates of negative sovereignty, which prohibits intervention and insulates (and therefore escalates) the dire circumstances that prevail. Additionally, the post-colonial period also bears witness to the practices of international affirmative action, whereby dysfunctional states claim economic assistance from developed states (at least partially based on retribution for colonialism) but are not prepared to be accountable for the domestic application of such assistance. This constitutes a fundamental reversal of reciprocity between states, that is, states of the developing world (that are often dysfunctional) have only rights and entitlements, whilst states of the developing world have only duties and obligations (a problematic relationship, since without reciprocity there can be no accountability).

Thus according to Jackson, the legitimising function performed by the doctrine of negative sovereignty supports state dysfunction by:

- Maintaining *dysfunctional state administrations* through the rule of non-intervention. In turn, these administrations misappropriate and/or waste development aid.

- Maintaining the *de jure compulsory association* the state exercises, even though many dysfunctional states are no longer effective political associations, nor binding ones.

- Maintaining the *problematic territorial divisions* created by colonialism, which continue to be the source of conflict and political instability between/in dysfunctional states (the doctrine of self-determination is not extended to nations and ethnic groups).

- Maintains the *monopoly of force (rarely legitimate) in dysfunctional states*, often at the expense of citizens whose human rights are violated, and are
frequently subjected to crimes against humanity by agents of the state/the state administration.

Post-colonial dysfunctional states therefore currently enjoy superficial legitimacy, protection from non-intervention, unbridled domestic power and economic assistance from developed states, all predicated and enabled through negative sovereignty, whilst in many instances deviating ever further from constituting viable states. Were conditions of universal positive sovereignty ever to be reinstated, many post-colonial states would find themselves unable to maintain sovereignty in the game of international power politics.

Having identified an internal dimension of state dysfunction pertaining to societal configurations, and having further identified an external dimension relating to the legitimisation and maintenance of state dysfunction, the following section surveys the institutional nature of the dysfunctional state, based upon the contribution of Samuel Huntington.

3.3 A conceptualisation of Huntington's contribution on state dysfunction

This study selected *Political Order in Changing Societies* as Samuel Huntington’s contribution on state dysfunction, which was reconstructed, interpreted and evaluated in Chapter 6. As with those that preceded it, Chapter 6 concluded with a conceptualisation of Huntington’s perspective on state dysfunction using the analytic tool. Accordingly, the prominent scientific constructs employed by Huntington are represented below:
Having identified internal and external dimensions in the contributions of Migdal and Jackson respectively, the scientific constructs employed by Huntington serve to designate an additional dimension of state dysfunction. Once again, it is relevant to turn to the very first sentence of *Political Order in Changing Societies*, where Huntington states that the most important political distinction between states is not their form of government, but their degree of government. The degree of government present in a given state represents an *intermediate dimension* of state functionality, which interacts domestically with the internal (societal) dimension on a continuous basis and initiates and maintains interaction with other states in an external dimension.

The emphasis Huntington places of a state’s degree of government represents a paradigmatic departure point in his thought, particularly when the importance of political institutions and institutionalisation are taken into account. Accordingly, the relative presence or absence of institutionalisation will determine the degree to which a political leadership can effectively govern a state; it therefore is also a direct reflection on the capabilities of a given state.
Political institutions play a critical role in the unrelenting process of modernisation, during which societies move from a traditional disposition towards modernity. Political institutions are the vehicles through which social and political mobilisation (en masse) may be converted into stable and progressive forces, thereby promoting political order. Political parties and other institutions of government and state provide avenues through which political participation may be channelled, aggregated and diffused. Huntington describes this integration of modernisation and institutionalisation as political development. Without such institutions, political participation will be violent and direct as political demands go unheeded, or corrupt government bureaucracies lack the capabilities to implement political change. This reflects Huntington’s conception of political decay, representing the second component of his typology of modernisation.

In contexts where political institutions are absent or levels of institutionalisation are low, political interaction (being unmediated in nature) assumes a direct and volatile character. Huntington describes this recourse to direct political action as praetorianism. In a praetorian political atmosphere, groups use whatever means they have at their disposal as expressions of political participation. As such, political participation transcends the dysfunctional political system, and political action is taken not by means of the ballot, but through the barrel of a gun. During these periods of volatility, state leaders often turn to (or are deposed by) the military as a source of stability, by virtue of their means of coercive power, but also because the armed forces often represent the closest approximation of institutionalisation in dysfunctional societies. Military coherence and discipline result in the armed forces being the only organisation capable of coordinated and coherent action in times of chaos. Thus, the armed forces come to assume a role of governance in such circumstances, signalling the failure of civilian leadership and a severe indictment of government. The subsequent trajectories of military government are also discussed by Huntington, and represent a spectrum ranging from reverting to civilian government to the emergence of a hard-core of a sustained authoritarian militarised rule. Crucially, military intervention may restore a semblance of political order in society, where sources of political instability are either appeased or suppressed. This respite of political order represents a window period during which institutionalisation may occur, and is of pivotal importance. Should institutionalisation begin to manifest and institutions emerge, a semblance of state functionality may yet materialise providing the foundation for future consolidation. However, the continued absence of channels for political participation, coupled with the
suppression thereof, may result in levels of political dissatisfaction that, upon mass mobilisation, can lead to revolution. Revolution signals the destruction of the old political order and as such strips a state of all its accrued functions and attributes. The commencement of military rule and revolution may both represent periods during which political development may commence, although it is more likely that sustained dysfunction will occur, amidst which states become meaningless in all but name and societies become brutal and chaotic arenas of survival.

Thus, according to the scientific constructs employed by Huntington, political decay results in the state being incapable of:

- Creating and maintaining a **coordinated administrative order**, since low levels of institutionalisation and corruption within the state administration preclude the establishment of effective and capable organs of state that are adaptable, sophisticated, autonomous and unified.
- Constituting a **compulsory association** with **binding authority**, since praetorianism encourages direct political participation which bypasses political institutions (if they exist) and undermines the political system in general. This represents a rejection of the institutions of state and the authority that underlies it.
- Claiming a **monopoly of legitimate force**, since praetorianism engenders a disregard for the force exercised by the state (given its diminished capabilities) and prompts the emergence of competing power bases that may employ violence as a political means. Eventually, praetorian politics may lead to military intervention in government, as a result of which a *legitimate* monopoly of force is forfeited, since the armed forces assume government not by virtue of legitimacy, but rather expediency.
- Ultimately preserving the **territorial** and symbolic integrity of the state as a form of political organisation, should political dissatisfaction and participation combine to foment revolution, which leads to the destruction of the political status quo.

The process of political decay and the phenomenon of state dysfunction is therefore closely related, as decay diminishes the degree of government functionality which in turn undermines the maintenance of the primary attributes of state. Huntington’s account of political decay can also be represented in the form of a timeline, whereby the
emergence of the concepts he employs is presented chronologically, as it applies to the developing world in particular. Consider the timeline below:

*Figure 27: A timeline of political participation and institutionalisation in the developing world*

This diagram represents a modified timeline in which the $x$-axis represents the passage of time, whilst the $y$-axis accounts for levels of political participation and institutionalisation, respectively. During the pre-colonial period, both political participation and political institutionalisation are virtually non-existent. What little participation occurs is accommodated in the social arrangements of traditional polities; however, such arrangements cannot be considered institutions in the Huntingtonian sense. It is only during the process of modernisation (as a result of growing European presence) that modern political institutions emerge (that is, institutions of state and political parties), with the potential to supersede and dislocate traditional loyalties and affiliations. Political institutionalisation is almost exclusively driven by Western influence, most notably in the form of formal colonial statehood and its accompanying bureaucratic administrative order. However, the colonial period also typically foments dissatisfaction and the formation of nationalist groups, of which the chief purpose is the attainment of sovereign independence, serving as a stimulus for increased political involvement.

In this regard, it has been shown that Migdal’s insights are of particular relevance.
participation. Subsequent to decolonisation, political institutions undergo stagnation and gradual decline, combined with escalating mobilisation and participation due to continuing modernisation and the increased political expectations brought about attaining independence\textsuperscript{147}. The resulting gap between political participation and political institutionalisation represents the ambit of political decay and state dysfunction, characterised by the phenomena detailed by Huntington and Migdal.

Having recounted the essence of the contributions considered in Chapters 4 – 6, in addition to identifying the key scientific constructs employed, the next section will integrate the three contributions with the aim of conceptualising the dysfunctional state in the form of a definitional statement.

4. Synthesis and integration

At this juncture in the study, the task of conceptualising the dysfunctional state has been virtually completed. If the presentation of knowledge and scientific constructs contained in the preceding chapters has been successful, the reader will by now have devised a general conceptual picture of the dysfunctional state. What remains is to formalise this conceptualisation through means of synthesis and integration and finally, a distillation resulting in a definitional statement.

As a means of combining the various scientific constructs that have been encountered in this study, an integrated version of the now-familiar analytic tool is presented below:

\textsuperscript{147} This is explained according to Davies’s (1962) theory of revolution (the so-called “J-curve”).
Figure 28: An integrated reconstruction of the contributions to conceptualising the dysfunctional state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARADIGMS</th>
<th>Inter-paradigmatic featuring historical, sociological, institutionalist and new-institutionalist, classic liberal and conservative, international relations, anti-structural, and post-behaviouralist perspectives from three contributions in the field of state dysfunction.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MODELS</td>
<td>State-in-society approach (Figure 14), posits that assuming state predominance in the developing world is flawed. States represent one actor amongst many others in society. Concepts central to this approach are: (see below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TYPOLOGIES | Sovereignty  
- Positive  
- Negative  
Modernisation  
- Development  
- Decay  

| SCIENTIFIC CONSTRUCTS | Envelope  
- Web-like society with fragmented social control  
- Existence of competing strategies for survival  
- Presence of non-state actors (strongman / warlord)  
- Politics of survival (big shuffle, dirty tricks, neo-patrimonial)  
- Triangle of accommodation  
- Negative sovereignty (spawned by rapid decolonisation)  
- Self-determination + non-intervention (unconditional rights)  
- International affirmative action  

| CONCEPTS | Concepts  
- Positive sovereignty (approaching Weberian idealtype)  
- Political Development  
- Low / lack of institutionalisation + political participation  
- Corruption  
- Praetorianism  
- Revolution (as explosion of political participation) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEBERIAN CONCEPT OF STATE</th>
<th>Coordinated admin.</th>
<th>Compulsory Association</th>
<th>Binding authority</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Monopoly of leg. force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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Furthermore, it was noted in previous sections that the scientific constructs employed may be further delineated according to their applicability to the respective dimensions of the phenomenon of state dysfunction. In this regard, consider the table below:

**Table 3: The multi-dimensional nature of conceptualising the dysfunctional state**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION OF STATE DYSFUNCTION</th>
<th>LEVEL OF APPLICATION</th>
<th>CONSTRUCT/CONCEPT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| INTERNAL                      | SOCIETAL            | • Fragmented social control  
|                               |                     | • Modernisation + Colonialism  
|                               |                     | • Web-like society  
|                               |                     | • Non-state actors  
|                               |                     | • Competing survival strategies  |
| INTERMEDIATE                  | INSTITUTIONAL       | • Low levels of institutionalisation  
|                               |                     | • Corruption & maladministration  
|                               |                     | • Accommodation & submission  
|                               |                     | • Politics of survival  
|                               |                     | • Praetorianism  
|                               |                     | • Revolution  |
| EXTERNAL                      | INTERNATIONAL       | • Negative sovereignty  
|                               |                     | • Self-determination  
|                               |                     | • Non-intervention  
|                               |                     | • International affirmative action  
|                               |                     | • Neglect of human rights / civility  |

Given the application of the above-mentioned scientific constructs, the dysfunctional state is therefore conceptualised as a phenomenon that:

- **On a societal level**, is encountered in societies where social control is highly fragmented resulting from modernisation via foreign colonialist means, followed by rapid decolonisation. The dysfunctional state is therefore unable to project binding authority within a given territory due to: (i) the web-like nature of society in which non-state actors (such as warlords and strongmen) challenge the compulsory association of the state and offer competing strategies of survival to citizens, and (ii) the continued process of modernisation, which stimulates high levels of political participation, mobilisation, and expectations.

- **On an institutional level**, is characterised by an administrative bureaucratic order marked by low levels of institutionalisation, leading to: (i) the erosion of state capabilities, (ii) submission to non-state actors, and (iii) the prevalence of corruption and other forms of malpractice by political leaders (such as the politics of survival). The inability of state institutions to accommodate the political participation, mobilisation, and expectations (societal level) leads to political
instability and the emergence of praetorianism, which may in turn lead to revolution and the destruction of the political system.

- On an international level, is maintained by the normative doctrine of negative sovereignty, whereby independence according to the principle of self-determination is an unconditional right, which is in turn protected by the principle of non-intervention (and not according to capabilities of state on an institutional level). Furthermore, the doctrine of negative sovereignty is employed by certain states of the developing world as a justification for demands of assistance, divorced from traditional notions of international reciprocity, which may serve to sustain otherwise bankrupt administrations and imperil human rights in those states.

Additionally, in contextualising the dysfunctional state as a temporal phenomenon, it was observed that the most pertinent explicit symptoms of state dysfunction manifest in the post-colonial period (after the attainment of independence and self-determination), whilst its origins may be implicit in nature, and emerge much earlier in the evolution of a given society.

Together, the manifestation of state dysfunction in the above-mentioned three dimensions serves not only to undermine the primary attributes of state individually, but also the founding premise of statehood, namely, a form of human organisation to ensure collective security.

In light of the conceptualisation above, whilst noting the central theoretical statement that serves to guide this study\textsuperscript{148}, and further noting that Mouton and Marais (1990:131) describe a theoretical definition as a statement in which related concepts within a conceptual framework are brought into focus, this dissertation posits the following definition of a dysfunctional state:

\textsuperscript{148} See Chapter 1, Section 8.
A dysfunctional state represents a fundamental deviation from the ideal-typical Weberian conception of state (of which the dysfunctional attributes manifest in societal, institutional and international contexts\textsuperscript{149}) that:

(i) may be represented according to a typology of dysfunction, incorporating differentiated graduations;
(ii) is often encountered as a post-colonial phenomenon;
(iii) is essentially characterised by a deficiency in the capability to predominate as a paramount, legitimate and authoritative political institution; and
(iv) is therefore not authentically (positively) sovereign in either domestic or international spheres.

Together, the related concepts that characterise state dysfunction therefore serve not only to undermine the primary attributes of state individually, but also the founding premise of statehood, namely, a form of human organisation to ensure collective security.

5. Conclusion

The conceptualisation expressed above constitutes the realisation of the primary research goal of this dissertation, namely to arrive at a theoretical conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state, through the application of scientific constructs\textsuperscript{150}. This conceptualisation is rendered in the form of a theoretical definitional statement, which conforms to the methodological and meta-scientific parameters established in Chapter 2 of this study\textsuperscript{151}. Furthermore, this research outcome is premised upon the systematic attainment of the various secondary research objectives, enumerated in Chapter 1, thereby constituting a systematic and consequential investigation.

In the process of attaining the research objectives of this study, it has become evident that the phenomenon of dysfunctional states is more complex and multifarious than can be adequately accommodated through quantitative investigations alone. In this regard, it is anticipated that the outcome of this study may serve to underpin further

\textsuperscript{149} For example, fragmented social control, low levels of institutionalisation and negative sovereignty (amongst others discussed above).

\textsuperscript{150} See Chapter 1, section 6.1.

\textsuperscript{151} See Figure 7, in addition to Chapter 2, section 7.1.
investigations into particular instances of state dysfunction, as well as the exploration of other phenomena related to dysfunctional states.

The displacement of the state by non-state actors, who assume real and symbolic control of state territories or parts thereof, is a phenomenon that was identified as being closely related to state dysfunction. However, the constraints of this study did not allow a thorough exploration of this aspect, which is most certainly an avenue for future investigation. Additionally, the enabling role that the international community fulfils, according to the dictates of negative sovereignty, represents a theme that warrants objective academic scrutiny.

Perhaps the most lucrative scholarly prospect that emerges from this study is the possibility of applying its scientific constructs and theoretical outcomes to case studies of state dysfunction. It is anticipated that applying theory in this manner will lead to a more integrated understanding of when and why certain states become dysfunctional.

As a concluding remark it is worth noting that, despite challenging the nature of the interface and configuration of states and societies of the developing world, the dilemmas presented by dysfunctional states can only be adequately resolved when those central to the problem commit to pursuing positive change and development. Justifying the continued existence of dysfunctional states upon past discriminations and injustices ignores the fundamental responsibility of political leadership, namely, striving towards a realisation of the good life.


Mantashe defends ANC cadre deployment.


Madison, J. 1788. The Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. Independent Journal:1, 6 February.


