Abstract:
South Africa entered a new political dispensation in 1994. Prior to 1994 South Africa had a
parliamentary governing system, which was based upon the British Westminster system. The
electoral system, which was in place at the time, was a majoritarian electoral system of
winner-takes-all, also known as the constituency system. The whole of South Africa was
divided into different constituencies and the candidate in a constituency who received the
majority of votes in an election, became the representative in Parliament. As in other
Western democracies, floor crossing of parliamentary members in the parliamentary
governing system was a common feature.
Since 1994, in the new political dispensation, South Africa has accepted a mixed governing
system with a proportional electoral system. The objective of a proportional electoral system
is that parliament, in its political party composition, has to be a true reflection of the
proportion of votes which each party received in a national election. Voters therefore vote for
political parties and not for individual candidates, as is the case in a constituency system. In
the proportional electoral system, a candidate becomes a representative in Parliament if
his/her political party has nominated him/her. Within this proportional electoral system a
problem arises with floor crossing. Floor crossing creates a potentially un-democratic
situation, which could lead to a disruption of the balance of power. The existence of a
defection clause could therefore exchange the votes of the electorate. The implication is that,
if the electorate's vote is exchangeable after it had been cast in favour of a particular party or
candidate, political power may transfer from one party to another, certain parties may be
strengthened or weakened and existing parties may disappear and new parties my come
about without an election having taken place.
The aim of this study is to address the problem of floor-crossing in South African party
politics. The study entails a literature overview and an empirical investigation into the
defection clause, in an effort to determine the nature and impact of floor-crossing within the
South African political system.
From the study it appears that the majority of South African political parties perceive floor crossing
to be a legitimate political activity, but the parties are opposed to unconditional floor crossing.
The perception exists that the voting choices of the electorate are being flouted.
Floor-crossing furthermore only favour the ruling party many times, as the majority of floor crossers
join the strongest party which has the most resources, funds and advantages. Floor
crossing is therefore not always an accurate reflection of the choices of voters and could lead
to voters becoming apathetic and negative with regards to politicians and politics as a whole.
It could furthermore lead to voters not wanting to vote again or see the usefulness of voting
and has the potential to create an un-democratic situation in a changing society, such as that
of South Africa. It is clear that floor crossing could have a negative impact on South African
party politics.
