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dc.contributor.authorStander, A.L.
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-10T10:45:17Z
dc.date.available2017-04-10T10:45:17Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationStander, A.L. 2015. Die toepassing van verskillende teorieë vir die beoordeling van die regsposisie van versekerde skuldeisers in 'n oorgrens insolvensieprosedure. Journal of South African Law = Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg( TSAR), 2015(1):105–124. [http://journals.co.za/content/ju_tsar/2015/1/EJC167062]en_US
dc.identifier.issn0257–7747
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10394/21288
dc.identifier.urihttp://journals.co.za/content/ju_tsar/2015/1/EJC167062
dc.description.abstractDie voorkeurorde is die hart en kern van enige insolvensieregstelsel. Hierdie orde bepaal die hiërargie onder skuldeisers in 'n finale likwidasie. Woods noem dit die prioriteitsleer (ladder of priorities) en dit is hierdie leer wat bepaal hoe groot die risiko is wat 'n skuldeiser neem. Bo-aan die voorkeurorde of prioriteitskema is daardie skuldeisers wat in rem sekuriteitsregte oor 'n skuldenaar se bates gevestig het. Diesulkes behou die effektiwiteit van hul sekuriteit gedurende en ten spyte van enige formele insolvensieprosedure wat die skuldenaar ondergaan. Elke insolvensieregstelsel in enige jurisdiksie maak voorsiening vir die "groot prioriteit" ofte wel versekerde skuldeisers. 'n Versekerde skuldeiser is dan wel daardie skuldeiser wat 'n sekuriteitsbelang in 'n spesifieke bate van die skuldenaar het. Daarenteen is 'n preferente eis 'n onversekerde eis wat uit hoofde van wetgewing voor ander onversekerde eise uitbetaal word - dit is statutêre voorkeure. Die term "voorkeurskuldeisers" sluit die versekerde skuldeisers sowel as die preferente skuldeisers in omdat albei hierdie groepe voorkeur bo die gewone, konkurrente skuldeisers in 'n insolvente boedel geniet. ABSTRACT: The different theories, old and new, are investigated because the submission is that these theories as currently applied, underlie the recognition or non-recognition of the rights of the preferential creditors of a specific jurisdiction in the case of a cross-border insolvency procedure. The author takes the view that neither modern universalism nor cooperative territoriality offers a proper solution to the problems that may occur in cross-border insolvency cases. It is submitted that the best solution would be to create a fair, just and effective set of rules on the example of the American Law Institute's and the International Insolvency Institute's Principles of Cooperation, to get accepted in any given case and this should be applied universally. However, it is recognized that to be internationally or universally implemented, such an approach will undeniably take too long. The proposal is therefore that, until such rules are established the theory of universal proceduralism with its virtual territoriality linked to reciprocal comity is the most acceptable and fair model to apply. It supports the principle that territorial claims should be respected by limiting the scope of the lex concursus, ensuring that the distribution to creditors in a cross-border insolvency procedure reflects the distribution that creditors would get territorial. This way the relevant distribution scheme is determined by the assets of the estate and the claims against the estate and not by the debtor/insolvent. Universal proceduralism is procedurally global and substantively territorial. This means that a centralised insolvency procedure occurs within the debtor's centre of main interests that controls all procedures relating to the insolvency. However, the choice of law should be decentralized, whereby the substantive aspects of the insolvency proceedings are determined by the ordinary choice of law principles.en_US
dc.language.isootheren_US
dc.publisherJuta Law Publishingen_US
dc.titleDie toepassing van verskillende teorieë vir die beoordeling van die regsposisie van versekerde skuldeisers in 'n oorgrens insolvensieprosedureen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.researchID10190465 - Stander, Anita Leonie


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