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dc.contributor.authorVenter, Francoisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-04T15:36:54Z
dc.date.available2010-08-04T15:36:54Z
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.citationVenter, F. 2008. Arms deals, bribery and political interference: How (im)potent the (rule of ) law? South African law journal, 125(4):633-643. [https://journals.co.za/content/ju_salj/125/4/EJC53851]en_US
dc.identifier.issn0258-2503
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10394/3429
dc.identifier.urihttps://journals.co.za/content/ju_salj/125/4/EJC53851
dc.description.abstractWhat can be done in law when a government prevents one of its own law-enforcement agencies from pursuing an investigation into alleged corruption and bribery? This question was raised in the judgment of April 2008 by the Administrative Court of the Queen's Bench Division in R (Corner House Research & another) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin) (the BAE case) per Moses LJ with Sullivan J. The implications of the judgment are also highly topical in the context of contemporary South African politics and law. (The judgment incidentally also demonstrates the increasing permeability of the boundaries between various disciplines of the law, as the arguments range seamlessly through administrative law, public international law, criminal law and constitutional law.)
dc.publisherJuta Law
dc.titleArms deals, bribery and political interference: How (im)potent the (rule of ) law?en_US
dc.contributor.researchID10057358 - Venter, Francois


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