| dc.description.abstract | This study furnishes some results of an investigation to
ascertain whether the possibility of a Christian logic can be
maintained as a meaningful question. This problem seems to be
enmeshed in a complex encompassing the problem of Christian
science* as such. Whether the possibility of a Christian logic
is maintained or denied, at any rate this implies a positive
standpoint towards the problem of a Christian logic. Some
general remarks having been made in an introductory chapter,
the main aspects bearing on the background of different
points of view towards logic are presented in Chapter II.
<1> The general philosophical conception adopted seems
to be of importance with a view to the formation of a
conception of logic in at least and especially two respects.
<a> Philosophical trends have a marked influence on the view
taken of logic. As far as modern philosophy is concerned, one
can point to the differences appertaining to logic, its
character, and the domain accorded to logic as science, its
place in the cosmic reality, etc., differences which become
evident in the conceptions of, for example, Descartes,
Arnauld & Nicole, Kant, Opzoomer, Heymans, Bolland, Dewey,
Bergson and Heidegger. Whereas Dewey, Bergson and Heidegger
move in an irrationalistic direction, the first mentioned
six philosophers bear evidence of a rationalistic point of
view. The idealistic conception of Kant differs from the
scientialism of a Descartes and the practicalism of the
writers of The Port Ro*al Logic; the difference can be traced
to the fact that Kant lends .the divergent solutions furnished
by scientialism and practicalism to a unity, which ascribes to
the ~ human perceptive faculty two functions, a theoretical
and practical; theoretical reason and practical reason are
autonomous, each in its particular sphere. The more recent
rationalism of an Opzoomer, Heymans and Bolland, keeps to the
rationalistic main lines but takes the a priori's of
autonomous reason in a dynamic-active sense by laying stress
on the scientific methods. Positivism advanced the first
solution in this direction, overestimating scientific theory
in a scientialistic spirit, with the result that the
practical existence is viewed in the light of science. The
positivism of a Comte and Opzoomer finds an antipode in the
neo-positivism of, for instance, Dilthey, Wundt and Heymans,
laying stress on the practical aspect. And then the neoidealism
of Cassirer, Bosanquet, Bolland and others bridges
the opposition between the positivistic and nee-positivistic
conceptions. The far-reaching influence of rationalistic
conceptions encountered a serious set-back on account of the
increasing importance attached to the se-called critique of
science and especially the rise of irrationalistic conceptions.
Irrationalism accepts reason in a rationalistic sense, but
limits its validity and importance to a specific sphere. The
pragQatism of James and Dewey, for instance, supports science
only in so far as it furthers practical purposes: one has to
obey reason in order to experiment, but the important point
is exactly the fact that one is busy experimenting on account
of a need bearing on practical life. A second trend, the
"philosophy of life" which had an eminent exponent in Bergson,
emphasizes the importance of "life" (taken in an organicpsychovitalistic
sense) instead of practical utility, and
therefore accentuates intuition in contrast to the symbolic
operational method of intelligence (which "belong to the
domain of logic). And finally existentialistically-minded
philosophers champion the cause of human existence, of the
individual concrete situation. It is pointed out that these
differences in philosophical conception result in different
points of view taken of logic. <b> Secondly the specific
type of philosophical point of view is an ontological factor
of supreme importance in the realisation of a conception of
logic. Kant and Hegel, for instance, both advance an
idealistic conception, but differ as to the type of
philosophical point of view; for Hegel attaches himself to a
contradictory type whereas Kant propounds an "ennoetic"
conception which regards the sensations as furnishing the
material for the forms of the intellect, that is to say, the
intellect has the sensations as contents of the mind.
Moreover I may refer to the interaction-theory of a Descartes
and the instrumentistic point of view of a Bergson or the
psychomonistic type represented by a Heymans, etc. Each
particular type of philosophical conception involves a
specific cosmology and anthropology, and results in a
particular conception of logic and the problems of this branch
of science.
<2> In addition to the above mentioned ontological
matters, it is necessary to point separately to the importance
of epistemological factors for one's conception of logic.
This point is illustrated by enumerating some basic problems
of a theory of knowledge and explaining a few points in
greater detail, for instance, <a> the possibility and
suppositions of knowledge; <b> the analysis of knowledge
(including the essence, character and kinds of knowledge),
the formation of knowledge, the purpose of knowledge and the
unity of knowledge (including limits and scope of knowledge,
the partial nature and coherence of knowledge); and <c> the
validity of knowledge (including knowledge and law, knowledge
and value, as well as the reliability of knowledge).
<3> In yet another respect different points of view may
arise, viz. according to the opinion held as to logic as
science, its character and domain, and the investigation of
the logical field. There is, for instance, a trend in logic
which attempts to approach the field of logic from that of
mathematics, and on the other hand some logicians undertake
the task of studying the basic principles of mathematics with
logic as the starting-point. Moreover, also the points of
view of psychologism in logic (Sigwart) and Husserl’s
reaction against this trend, tend to show that the scientific
determination of the field of investigation bears testimony
to the fact that the logician cannot afford to neglect matters
which can be traced to <a> different attitudes in theory of
science, and <b > different points of view in regard to the
field of investigation.
<4> Lastly the suggestion may be offered that one-sided
stressing of one or more of the different factors of
importance (mentioned above) as such, may also result in
different conceptions of logic.
* * * Up to this point no attention has been paid to the
possibility of the Christian conviction, the Christian "life and
world-view", etc., as an important factor in the
formation of a conception of logic. Chapter III gives a
general survey of the points of view taken on logic in a
Christian atmosphere.
<1> A Christian logic is an utter impossibility; this
is the first standpoint taken as to this problem. This, point
of view comprises, however, various subordinate solutions of
the problem. <a> Some argue that as far as the importance
and implications of Christianity are concerned, Christianity
is confined to divine worship and this does not bear on
logic in any way whatsoever. <b> Others acknowledge the
importance of Christianity for divine worship, and add:
for daily practical life too --- although in no wise for
science and therefore not for logic. <c> A third solution
accepts the significance of Christianity for a section of
science, for instance <i> as far as theology is concerned,
<ii> and also for philosophy, <iii> and perhaps in some
respects for other branches of science (e.g. sociology,
ethnology, the science of history, etc.) but at any rate not
as far as logic is concerned.
<2> On the other hand some scientists, inspired by the
reformational concept of Calvin, maintain that Christianity,
that the Christian view of cosmos and man, the Christian
approach to scientific matters, etc., must be esteemed a
factor of importance so far as the conception of science as
such is concerned, and that moreover it is imperative that
all scientific investigations be undertaken in the light of
the revelation (in Holy Scripture); for this reason among
others the idea of a Christian logic is not absurd. This
thesis can be elucidated by mentioning some contributions to
a Christian logic, for instance, <a> A. Kuyper's opinion
that science is of two kinds because humanity is of two kinds,
those regarding the cosmos as normal and those who take into
account the reality of the fall of man in Adam, and therefore
acknowledge the fact that an act of interference on the part
of God is necessary to put the cosmos again in a correct
relation to Him. On account of this difference Kuyper
therefore maintains the existence of a Christian and non Christian
science. As the fact of sin dit not affect the
formal activity of thinking, according to Kuyper, he states
that the palingenesis does not cause any difference in this
respect; therefore only one kind of logic exists --- a
Christian logic. <b> S.O. Los indicates the necessity of a
Christian logic by stating that the Calvinistic principles
ought to find application in every section of science, not
excluding logic. A Christian logic takes into account the
principles of Holy Scripture and brings them to bear upon
scientific studies. <c> H.G. Stoker's conception of the cosmos
as a created coherent diversity implies i n t era 1 i a
that the field of logic has an irreducible, unique character
of its own, but the logical sphere is part of a comprehensive
totality in which all diversity is given in a coherent complex.
Because it is a radical diversity, it is unlike the psychical,
lingual or ethical sphere, and therefore the logical sphere
may not be reduced to any other diversity nor isolated from
the diversity with which it constitutes a totality. On account
of the fact that cosmic reality is a created diversity, it is
not autonomous nor self-sufficient; a Christian logic therefore
naturally opposes the dogma of the autonomy of thought.<d> C. Van
Til points out that whereas the facts and laws with which logic
is concerned, are not detached from their being created, the
facts and laws of logic too are not self-sufficient, but part
of created reality; accordingly it is imperative that the
Christian truths (of, for instance, creation, fall of man into
sin, and redemption in Jesus Christ in the communion of the
Holy Spirit) be acknowledged from the very beginning. Indeed,
as Van Til explains in detail, no part of Christianity remains
intact when once the Arminian logic is allowed to run its
course. <e> K. Schilder puts forward various considerations
bearing on the impossibility of a formal or neutral logic, and
states that logic has a foundation in fundamental
philosophical ideas, on account of which a Hegelian, Fiahtian
and Calvinist have different conceptions of logic; moreover,
logic is not detached from other sciences, and in no science
can one find one's way without a standpoint in faith.
<f> H. Dooyeweerd's "philosophy of the cosmonomic idea" states
and illustrates in various respects both the possibility and
necessity of a Christian logic. Especially his theory of the
nodal spheres each subjected to its own law, discloses an
insight of great depth concerning the logical sphere as a
modal aspect of cosmic reality, having the numerical and
spatial aspects, the aspect of mathematical movement, the
aspect of physical energy, of organic life and of psychical
feeling as substratum spheres and the historical and
linguistic aspects, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the moral aspects and the
aspect of faith as superstratum spheres. In its modal nucleus
each sphere enjoys a sovereignty in its own sphere and differs
from every other modal aspect; on account of retrocipations
each sphere coheres with every previous sphere in the cosmic
order and by means of anticipations with the superstratum
spheres, thus presenting also a universality in its own
sphere. The variable phenomena of each sphere function
subjected to a law of their own, for instance, in the logical
sphere judgements are subjected to the logical (analytical)
law; accordingly this subject is treated as the theory of the
spheres of law --- a really important milestone on the way
towards a Christian logic, particularly so, as it has proved
to be exceptionally useful in determining the characteristic
nature of the logical sphere. <g> D.H.Th. Vollenhoven has
established the cardinal data of a Christian logic and
acquired an insight into such various points of importance
for the problem of a Christian logic, that it is considered
necessary to treat thereof in a separate chapter.
* * *
The first section of chapter IV is given to a general
survey of the more important writings of Vollenhoven in so
far as they contributed towards his conception of a Christian
logic. An attempt is made to show how Vollenhoven arrived at
his final conception. This section is also intended to furnish
the basis for an interpretation of his conception, which
follows in the succeeding parts of chapter IV.
<1 > <a> Ontology presents an insight into the difference
in the being of God, law and cosmos. God is the Sovereign who
created the cosmos and put his law to the cosmos. Only God is
sovereign, i.e. not subjected to the law. It is only of the
law that one can say that it obtains (for that which is
subjected to the law); and the being of the cosmos exists in
its being subjected to. the law. <b > The word "law" can be
taken in three different senses: as structural (modal) law, as
the commandment of love, and as positive law. <c> The being
of the cosmos displays a diversity of created subjects,
heavenly and earthly. <d> By temporarily disregarding the
essentials in which man differs from other "things", it is
possible to investigate the being of the thing. It is necessary
to distinguish the being of the subject and the object, both
being subjected to the law, but in different respects. Both
have to be investigated as to the modal (universal) differences
and to the individual differences, as well as their particular
relations and the bonds between modal differences
(retrocipations and anticipations) and between individual
differences (coherences). An object is a complex having a
subject as the bearer of object-functions, attributes such as
colour, warmth, etc.; although being more complex than the
subject, subject and object have this in common that they are
both subjected to the law. <e> The structure of man is even
more complex. Beside modal differences and individual
differences (having this specific individual characteristic
and not that, on account of which this judgement differs from
that judgment --- although they do-not differ modally as
both are logical), the difference in direction of his functions
(good or bad) is of extreme importance as far as the being of
man is concerned. For the different modal functions constitute
the frame for the activities of man, and therefore the
logical sphere is called the logical function. The activities
of the heart of man (prefunctional) are, as it were, sent
into a specific functional channel; and this activity is
directed by the heart in a twofold exit, namely for better or
worse. <f> The structure of the realms (man, animal, plant and
mineral) brings us to the genetic bond; and <g> as to the
structure of mankind two points are worth mentioning, viz.
<i> the bonds of community (their character, diversity and
mutual relation) and <ii> religion as the covenant between
God, the Creator of heaven and earth, and man. <h > After the
particular relation between heaven and earth has been treated,
the bond between God, law and cosmos demands attention.
<2> Theory of knowledge is distinct from ontology but
nevertheless presupposes a close relation. <a> The theory of
human knowledge is discussed in two main sections: <i> the
structure of the non-scientific cognition (including its
suppositions; the knowable; the activity of learning-to-know;
the result of knowing; and the bond between the result of
knowing and the activity of learning, the knowable, and the
norm of learning-to-know! and secondly the development of the
non-scientific cognition), and <ii> the structure of the
scientific cognition (including firstly the cognition in
particular scientists method and the diversity of scientific
methods in particular science, the analysable for particular
sciences, and the result of scientific cognition in particular
sciences; and secondly the scientific cognition of nonparticular
sciences as, for instance, philosophy); <b> the
theory of science investigates particular sciences• and
non-particular sciences; and c > methodology studies the
problem of method as such, as well as in relation to the
different sciences, not excluding logic.
<3> Under logic is discussed <a> fundamental
philosophical questions, including those of <i> philosophy of
the logical field which discloses an insight into the logical
sphere of law --- which logic has to investigate --(
including in particular the question of what the logical
modality is and how the logical aspect is present in that
which subsists gnostically),and <ii> philosophy of logic
(including, the problem of logic as a science and that of its
relation to philosophy). <b> Under the general structure of
the analytical (logical) sphere attention is paid to <i> the
analytical law and <ii> the analytically subjected, viz. the
analytical subjects (including the analytical activity, and
the result of this activity: concept and judgment) and the
analytical objects (i.e. the• analytical aspect of all the sub analytical);
furthermore the bond between analytical subject
and object, and lastly the bond between the analytical law and
the analytically subjected, as well as the bond between God,
analytical law and the analytically subjected. Under the
concept is discussed the concept as such, the division of
concepts and the particular relations of concepts. The theory
of judgment likewise avails itself of these three themes for
treating judgment.
Chapter V investigates some problems of a more particular
nature in the domain of logic; the investigation has had to be
restricted to three subjects. <1> The analytical (logical) law.
<a> Firstly the question is considered whether an analytical
law exists, and it is pointed out that logicians who do give
attention to this question usually stress one-sidedly the
importance of either the analysable or the analytical activity
or the result of thinking (the thought). <b > As far as the
sense of the analytical law is concerned, a point of
particular importance is Vollenhoven's insight that the
analytical law is <i> specifically an analytical (and no nonanalytical,
e.g. a mathematical) law, <ii> a structural law,
1. e. a modal law, and <iii> as law, the boundary between
God and cosmos. <c> As to the contents of the analytical law,
some critical remarks are made about the conception of e.g.
Welton &Monahan, and reference is made to the importance and
consequences of Vollenhoven's synopsis of the contents of the
analytical law: "analyse well the analysable, whatever it
may be". <d> The discussion of the question whether the
analytical law can or must be considered as being formal,
touches a few facets of the problem and gives some arguments
for the supposition that it is not formal. <e> Ontology
(stating the fundamental distinction between the being of
God, law and cosmos) appears of cardinal importance also in
respect to the question whether the analytical law be
.considered a norm. <f> Finally attention is drawn to fallacies,
And the supposition is advanced that one's conception of the
analytical law determines in important respects one's view
held as to fallacies. Fallacies seem to be due chiefly to the
following three causes: <i> by disobeying the analytical norm,
<ii > by reason of the fact that the substratum-functions of
the logical function fail and <iii> on account of "wickedness of
heart".
<2> With reference to R. Robinson some points of
importance concerning the problem of definition are discussed.
The attitude is taken that definition is a specific kind of
judgment, viz. a judgment in which the predicate does not
analyse or evaluate the subject of the judgment, but delimits
the sphere and scope of the subject, determines it, defines
it, that is to say: attributes a predicate to the subject of
a judgment with a scientific purpose. Definition can be given of
concepts, or words, or the contents of words or of concepts,
or the meaning of words. Especially important is the fact that
the theory about definition presupposes a specific category theory;
accordingly a Christian standpoint adopted in
scientific study results in a different point of view taken
towards definition. Lastly may be mentioned. that the
difference between scientific and non-scientific definition
ought not be neglected.
<3> The comprehensive problem of the division of
judgments likewise indicates that a Christian standpoint in
science (logic) does not impede or hamper the investigation of
the field of logic --- in this case the division of judgments
---- but on the contrary furthers scientific study and results
in a new perspective, opening new fields leading to hitherto
unexplored data. By comparing the divisions of judgments
furnished by Welton & Monahan, Stebbing, De Vleeschauwer and
Vollenhoven, the conclusion is reached that the point of view
presupposed by each division determines the criteria employed
in the division of judgments; the view is taken that a
Christian point of view constitutes an exceptionally liberal
and balanced conception of the subject, and in various respects
avoids one-sidedness, partiality and the limitations inherent
in some other points of view.
From this it is apparent that the consequences and
implications of the point of view taken in the study of logic
Chapter VI gives a short conclusionary view in which some
important consequences of the previous expositions are
enumerated and a few critical remarks added to illuminate some
aspects of the problem.
<1> Christian logic furnishes a particularly penetrating
insight into the philosophical basis of logic. Philosophical
matters influence in fundamental respects the scientific
investigation of the logical field and it appears imperative
that logic be based on a philosophical conception (from
whatever point of view adopted). Logic is different from
philosophy but the scientific activity in the field of logic
nevertheless presupposes a philosophical standpoint, as
Chapter II has indicated. Particularly important is the fact
that Vollenhoven could demonstrate the necessity for the
logician to keep in mind both the modality (viz. logical) and
the character (viz. as result of a previous analytical
activity) of the concept and judgment, as well as to
investigate the retrocipations and anticipations of the
logical function on sub- and superstratum spheres respectively;
logic derives from philosophy the insight that all of this, and
the analytical activity too, belong to the logical sphere. The
conception developed in logic cannot be considered to be
detached from more fundamental philosophical matters nor to
be formal nor neutral.
A Christian philosophy is especially necessary with a
view to keeping the spheres of ontology and epistemology
distinct, as well as to determine the difference between and
the relationship of logic and on the one hand cosmology and
anthropology, and on the other hand epistemology. A Christian
logic reaps the advantages of this distinction.
Besides the option of e.g. either rationalism or
irrationalism, a Christian standpoint in scientific matters is
practicable. The results of Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, Stoker,
Van Til and others have changed the possibility of a Christian
point of view in science (including logic) into a reality.
Chapter IV especially has indicated that and how a Christian
logic presupposes a Christian philosophy and in Chapter V it
has been possible to point out the importance of a Christian
approach to logic, even in its details.
<2> As regards the matter investigated by logic and its
character, the point of view is taken that logic is a science
and that no scientist can•accept his task of investigation or
execute his analysis without a determination of his field of
study and the nature of this field, as well as testing the
results obtained with this determination; moreover continued
reflection is necessary as to whether the. investigation has
succeeded in complying with the determination of the field of
investigation. The supposition is held that the determination
of the field of investigation is a distinction according to
modality, that is to say logic has to investigate the
analytical (logical) sphere of law. A Christian logic opposes
the various forms of reduction-logic which screen the logical
field down to some of the most obvious phenomena of the
logical sphere. A Christian logic results in various new finds,
as well as a new. perspective of the whole domain of logic.
<3> Logic according to a Christian point of view is not
what it is often thought to be and moreover it is different
from the traditional conception. Logic as science is not
formal nor neutral. A Christian point of view accepts the
relevance of religion and considers the Word of God to be the
guiding principle for directing scientific cognition in its
scientific investigation of the logical field. Christian
logic is no logic of religion or vice versa, no logical creed,
logical science of belief or a logic of divine worship, nor a
compilation of texts from the Holy Scriptures bearing on the
logical function, etc. A Christian logic does not investigate
the logical field from or v 1 a the function of belief.
have effects even in the most particular details of the field
of logic. | |
