

Ethnic mobilization and the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement of the Sudan (2005–2011)

B.M.T. KHABA

Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in Political Studies

at the Vaal Triangle Campus of the North-West University

Supervisor: Dr H.J. van der Elst

October 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To God be the glory, for the ability He has bestowed in me to complete this research.

I wish to thank the following person(s) for their contribution towards my research:

- My study supervisor and mentor, Dr Herman van der Elst, for his assistance, guidance and ongoing encouragement;
- My loving parents Gladys and Johannes Khaba who have supported me in my education and endeavours;
- My siblings: Vuyisile, Bonginkosi and Bongumenzi Khaba, and Mandla Ngwenya; and
- Lebo Mogoane for his support and motivation.

ABSTRACT

The current socio-economic and political landscape of Sudan and South Sudan can be described as one that is war-ridden and deeply divided by religion, culture, ethnicity and ownership over oil. It has been more than twelve months since the secession of Southern Sudan from the North (See Map 1). Despite the secession, general instability continues. To deal with this turmoil, Sudan declared a so-called “state of emergency” in 2012 along its border with South Sudan. The reason for this was the ongoing tension between North Sudan and South Sudan over ownership of the oil-rich Abyei area. This conflict over oil is furthermore fuelled by diverse internal divisions among the Sudanese population (North and South).

Sudanese diversity is characterized by two opposing antagonistic religious groupings, namely the Arabic North, whose main religious belief is Islam, and the so-called “black Africans” in the South, whose religious belief is mainly Christianity or Animist. In addition to this primary division there are also over 570 ethnic groups in Sudan (North and South). Conflicts and tension between the different ethnic groups is furthermore caused by disputes over natural resources such as water, livestock and land as well as political power and economic gains.

Despite the continued conflict the assumption in this study was that the signing and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005–2011) represented a potential step towards eventual stability. This dissertation therefore focuses, as a case study, on an analytical description of the CPA and its outcomes. Specific reference was made to the role and impact of political mobilization by using an instrumental approach as a framework for analysis. In the above regard, research centred on the following three themes:

- Ethnic mobilization as a factor in the political destabilization of Sudan since independence and towards the implementation of the CPA;
- Ethnic mobilization as a guideline in the structuring of the CPA; and
- Ethnic mobilization and the eventual outcome of the CPA.

By addressing the above themes, the study attempted firstly to provide a balanced perspective on the causes of continued instability and conflict in Sudan. Secondly, an attempt was made to provide a future scenario for the possible unfolding of socio-economic and political developments in Sudan and South Sudan.

OPSOMMING

Die huidige sosio-politieke landskap in Soedan en Suid-Soedan word gekenmerk deur oorlog en verdeeldheid rondom religie, kultuur, etnisiteit sowel as konflik rakende die besitreg van olie. Suid-Soedan is nou reeds langer as twaalf maande 'n onafhanklike staat (Sien Kaart 1). Desondanks duur politieke onstabiliteit voort. In bogenoemde verband het Soedan in 2012 'n noodtoestand op die grensgebied met Suid-Soedan verklaar. Die rede vir die voortgesette konflik word toegeskryf aan beide state se aanspraak op besitreg van die olieryke Abyei area. Hierdie konflik oor olie word verder aangevuur deur die diverse verdeeldheid binne die Soedanese bevolking (Noord en Suid).


Die diversiteit binne Soedan word gekenmerk deur twee opponerende antagonistiese groeperings naamlik die Arabiese noorde wat die Islam aanhang teenoor die swart Afrikane in die Suide wat Christenskap of Animisme aanhang. Voorts is daar meer as 570 etniese groeperinge in Soedan. Ander oorsake van konflik word verbind met dispute oor hulpbronne soos water, vee en eienaarskap van grond sowel as politieke wedywering en aansprake op ekonomiese voordele.

Ondanks voortgesette politieke onrus was die aanname in hierdie navorsing dat die ondertekening en implementering van die Omvattende Vredesooreenkoms (2005–2011) 'n potensiële stap nader is aan uiteindelike stabiliteit. Derhalwe is die navorsing vernou tot 'n analitiese beskrywing van die aanloop, aard en uitkomste van die Omvattende Vredesooreenkoms as 'n gevallestudie. In hierdie verband is spesifiek gefokus op die rol en impak van politieke mobilisasie deur gebruik te maak van 'n instrumentalistiese benadering as teoretiese raamwerk. In bogenoemde verband is daar rondom die volgende drie temas gesentreer:

- Etniese mobilisasie in die politieke destabilisasie van Soedan sedert onafhanklikheidwording;

- Die effek van etniese mobilisasie as riglyn vir die strukturering en implementering van die Omvattende Vredesooreenkoms; en
- Etniese mobilisasie en die uiteindelike uitkoms van die Omvattende Vredesooreenkoms.

Deur bogenoemde temas aan te spreek is eerstens gepoog om 'n gebalanseerde perspektief rakende die oorsake van die voortgesette onstabilitet in Soedan te verskaf. Tweedens is gepoog om 'n toekomscenario te skets vir die moontlike ontvouing van sosio-ekonomiese en politieke verwikkelinge in Soedan en Suid-Soedan.



MAP 1 SUDAN GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION IN AFRICA

Source: Patrick (2010)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
ABSTRACT	ii
OPSOMMING	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiv
LIST OF TABLES	xv
LIST OF MAPS	xvi
<u>CHAPTER ONE</u>	
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 ORIENTATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT	1
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	3
1.3 HYPOTHESIS	5
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	6
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	6
1.6 METHODOLOGY	7
1.6.1 Qualitative research	7
1.6.2 The dimensions of research	8
1.6.3 Levels of research	9
1.6.4 Search of databases	9

1.6.5	Literature analysis	10
1.6.6	Ethical considerations	11
1.6.7	Challenges encountered and possible contributions of the study.....	11
1.7	CONCLUSION	11

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND SECESSION.....	12	
2.1	INTRODUCTION.....	12
2.2	THE ESSENCE OF ETHNICITY AS A GLOBAL POLITICAL PHENOMENON	12
2.2.1	Linking an ethnic group and ethnic mobilization.....	13
2.2.2	The essence of an ethnic group	15
2.3	IDENTIFYING THE MAIN APPROACHES TOWARDS THE ANALYSIS OF ETHNIC ORIGINS AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION.....	16
2.4	THE INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH AS FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH	17
2.4.1	Different types of ethnic mobilization.....	17
2.4.2	Sources of ethnic mobilization in Africa.....	18
2.4.3	The influence of tribalism on ethnic mobilization	18
2.4.4	The impact of rising nationalism on ethnic mobilization.....	19
2.4.5	The impact of religious aspirations on ethnic mobilization.....	19

2.4.6	The impact of language as a source of identity on ethnic mobilization.....	20
2.5	ETHNICITY AS A METHOD OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN SUDAN	21
2.5.1	The relevance of utilizing ethnicity as a method of political mobilization	21
2.5.2	The advantages of utilizing ethnicity as a method of politicalmobilization in Sudan	22
2.5.3	The disadvantages of utilizing ethnicity as a method of political mobilization in Sudan	24
2.6	DEFINING SECESSION IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT.....	25
2.7	ESTABLISHING AND UNDERSTANDING THE LEGITIMACY OF SECESSION.....	26
2.7.1	Theoretical approach to secession: the normative theory	27
2.7.2	The “Remedial Rights Only” theory	28
2.7.3	The international right to secede	30
2.7.4	International law on the right to secede.....	33
2.8	CONCLUSION	35

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION TOWARDS THE CPA AND SECESSION OF SOUTH SUDAN	36	
3.1	INTRODUCTION.....	36
3.2	THE PRE-COLONIAL TIMEFRAME: SUDAN AS AN ISLAMIC (MAHDIYA) STATE (1895–1898)	37

3.2.1	The North (Muslim) /South (non-Muslim) division as a consequence of (British) colonization (1898–1947)	38
3.2.2	The entrenchment of South Sudan and Sudan	38
3.3	THE CURRENT CAUSES OF DIVISION AND INSTABILITY BETWEEN NORTH SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN.....	40
3.3.1	Oil production as a source of division in the Sudan.....	41
3.3.2	Islam versus Christianity as a source of division in Sudan and South Sudan	43
3.4	ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN AS A SOURCE OF DIVISION	43
3.5	THE VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN	44
3.5.1	The Arab ethnic group.....	45
3.5.2	The Missariya ethnic group	46
3.5.3	The Dinka ethnic group	47
3.5.4	The Beja ethnic group	47
3.5.5	The foreigners	48
3.5.6	The Nuba ethnic group.....	48
3.5.7	The Nuer ethnic group.....	49
3.5.8	The Shilluk ethnic group.....	49
3.5.9	The Zande ethnic group	49

3.6	THE DIVERSITY OF ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND THE COMPLEXITY OF ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN.....	50
3.7	ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SUDAN	51
3. 7.1	The influence of Arabism on the Sudanese political landscape.....	52
3.7.2	The Islamization of the state and society	52
3.7.3	The entrenchment of patrimonial leadership	54
3.7.4	Arabic as an official language	56
3.8	ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SOUTH SUDAN	57
3.8.1	The ethnic-based formation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)	57
3.8.2	The African influence on society	58
3.8.3	Christianity and Animist beliefs	59
3.8.4	The impact of ethnicity on political mobilization towards the CPA in the Sudan.....	60
3.9	CHALLENGES FACING THE SUDAN IN THE POST-COLONIAL DISPENSATION	61
3.10	CONCLUSION	63
CHAPTER FOUR		
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 SUDAN COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT.....		65
4.1	INTRODUCTION.....	65

4.2	AGREEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE CPA.....	66
4.2.1	The Addis Ababa Accord.....	67
4.2.2	The Machakos agreement as foundation for the CPA.....	68
4.2.3	Agreement 1: The Machakos Protocol	69
4.2.4	Agreement 2: Power sharing as an integral part of the CPA	72
4.2.5	Agreement 3: Wealth sharing in the Government of Unity	73
4.2.6	Agreement 4: The agreement on the oil-rich Abyei region	74
4.2.7	Agreement 5: Resolution of the conflict in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states	76
4.2.8	Agreement 6: Security arrangements as part of the CPA.....	79
4.3	ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM SUDANESE GOVERNMENT OF UNITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOUTHERN SECESSION	79
4.4	THE 2010 NATIONAL ELECTION AND ITS OUTCOME	81
4.5	THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY: A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE	83
4.5.1	Southern secession as a consequence of the perceived failure of the Government of Unity.....	85
4.6	OUTSTANDING AND/OR UNRESOLVED FACTORS OF THE CPA AS CAUSES OF CONTINUED INSTABILITY.....	87
4.6.1	The failure to demarcate the border between Sudan and South Sudan effectively.....	87

4.6.2	The absence of popular consultation on the purpose of the CPA.....	87
4.6.3	No resolution on how to repay Sudan's outstanding debt	89
4.6.4	No clarity on citizenship.....	89
4.7	CONCLUSION	89
<u>CHAPTER FIVE</u>		
	RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS	91
5.1	INTRODUCTION.....	91
5.2	THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS STUDY	92
5.3	METHODS USED TO ACHIEVE THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.....	93
5.4	THE REALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	94
5.5	OTHER KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	95
5.6	SUMMARY.....	98
BIBLIOGRAPHY		100
WEBIOGRAPHY		102
INTERVIEW.....		108

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Abyei Borders' Commission
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DoP	Declaration of Principles
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoU	Government of Unity
ICC	International Criminal Court
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
IDP	Individually Displaced Individuals
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
ICJ	International Commission of Justice
NCP	National Congress Party
NIF	National Islamic Front
SPLMA	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement or Army
SAF	Sudan Armed Force
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations' Mission in South Sudan

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1	The Sudanese ethnic composition throughout the North and South.....	45
Table 4.1	Cabinet list under the Government of National Unity (2005–2011)	80
Table 4.2:	The 2010 national presidential election results	82
Table 4.3:	South Sudan presidential election results.....	83

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1	Sudan geographic location in Africa	
Map 3.1	The demarcation of borders between the South and North Sudan (1956)	39
Map 3.2	The diverse ethnic groups of the Sudan	51
Map 4.1	Member states of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).....	67
Map 4.2	Geographical location of the Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains	77
Map 4.3	Contemporary map of the Republic of South Sudan after the secession of July 2011.....	86

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 ORIENTATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

The Sudan¹ has been faced with continuing bouts of unrest and civil wars since it gained its independence in 1956. This has resulted in an estimated two million people being killed, while hundreds of thousands have been displaced and have fled into neighbouring states. The root causes that prompted the civil war revolved around disputes over issues such as natural resources, self-determination of the Southerners and most importantly, ethnic and religious differences between the population of the Sudan and that of South Sudan. Sudan is dominated by Arabic Muslims whose religious beliefs are rooted in the Sharia Law,² while South Sudan is predominantly occupied by the so-called ‘black’ Africans, who are mostly Christian and Animist³ (Lokuji, 2006:14).

Continued antagonism and conflict are rooted into two underlying divisions. The first of these is the Arab slave trade in what is presently South Sudan. South Sudan was seen as a ‘reservoir’ of slave labour by the Arabs in the North. The Arabs and Muslims in Sudan consolidated themselves under the Islamic regime known as Mahdi.⁴ Secondly, the pattern of British colonial rule in the Sudan further deepened the division between people of the South Sudan and Sudan through the institutionalization of a British administrative policy. This was done to facilitate the administrative process undertaken by colonial authorities in the African states, but it served to divide the population in terms of set boundaries (Lake & Rothchild, 1998:279). This argument is further supported by Lokuji (2006:13) who states that one of the major causes of the ongoing conflicts is the divide caused by the ethnic affiliation of the people of the Sudan.

¹ “The Sudan” in this study refers to the entire region/state. “Sudan” refers to the region in the North and “South Sudan” to the Southern region.

² Sharia Law, according to (Thomson, 2004), is the basic code of conduct which Muslims should follow.

³ Animist: People who believe that nature and animals are spiritual beings (Lokuji, 2006).

⁴ Mahdi refers to those adhering to Islamic spiritual and political characteristics (Lake & Rothchild, 1998).

The Sudan became a parliamentary republic in 1956. However, democracy proved short-lived because the Southern political parties revolted against the Islamic domination exerted over them by the Sudanese (Turner, 2011:1168). In terms of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, the South Sudan was granted partial autonomy, whereby the people could govern their own administration and adopt a federal system under the leadership of one president. As a means of decentralising government and diffusing the ongoing ethnic conflicts, the first vice-president from the South Sudan was appointed in 2005 (Weissbach, 1995:2). However, despite this agreement, ethnic unrest continued (Turner, 2011:1169).

As a means of ending the ethnic conflict, a coalition government was formed under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in January 2005. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the current government of Sudan, represented by leader Al-Bashir, and the South Sudan (Sudan People's Liberation Movement – SPLM/A) under the leadership of Marang (CPA, 2005:1). One of the key outcomes of the CPA was a multiparty election held in April 2010. Al-Bashir was re-elected with a 68.2 percent margin, which prolonged his term as the president of Sudan. In the South, Kiir claimed more than 93 percent of the votes and remained the president of the region and first vice-president of the Government of Unity (GoU)⁵ (Turner, 2011:1169). Another important outcome of the peace agreement was the referendum on self-determination for the South (CPA, 2005:3). This referendum was held on 9 January 2011. Subsequent reports and analysis on the referendum have revealed that more than three million votes were cast and that 98 percent of the Southern Sudanese voted in favour of secession. President al-Bashir, who initially campaigned against the secession, accepted the results and assured the Southerners of a peaceful political transition (Dubbleman, 2011:2).

The purpose of this research was to indicate how ethnic mobilization impacted and still impacts in the Sudan. This study focuses firstly on the nature of the division between the North and the South, with specific reference to the current political structure. Secondly, emphasis is placed on the outcomes of the CPA. Lastly,

⁵ Government of Unity also referred to as Government of National Unity

research was narrowed down to the rationale behind the nature and the projected outcome of the secession that is currently unfolding in the Sudan.

1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concepts of ethnic mobilization served as the theoretical foundation of this study. There are a number of competing and overlapping theories on ethnic mobilization, which can be conveniently (but not exclusively) be grouped as developmental theories; internal colonialism models; culture division of labour models; and economic models of ethnicity. These four major theoretical perspectives “converge upon the central assumption that contemporary ethnic mobilization is fundamentally a product of modernization” that is related to and legitimated by nationalism (Olzak, 1983:358–364). For the purposes of this research the theoretical perspective which was most applicable to the argument presented is the instrumentalist approach. This particular approach suggests that ethnicity can be used as an instrument of political mobilization. The theoretical perspective presented in the developmental theory is that ethnicity becomes activated during the process of development, which rekindles traditional loyalties. Thus groups are able to organize themselves around some features of ethnic identity in pursuit of collective ends (Olzak, 1983:358).

An ethnic group is defined as:

a community of people who have the conviction that they have a common identity and common fate based on issues of origin, kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a shared language (Thomson, 2004:60).

Weber (in Paglia, 2005:10) defines an ethnic group as: “A human collectivity based on an assumption of common origins, real or imagined.”

Other definitions of ethnic groups provided by political science scholars are interlinked with the concept of tribalism. However, it is widely accepted that an ethnic group is characterized by common descent and culture, while tribalism is commonly used to refer to indigenous people living together as groups or tribes (Paglia, 2005:10).

Ethnicity focuses on sentiments of origin and descent rather than the geographical consideration of a nation. A notion of ethnicity becomes pronounced and political in instances where it is used to distinguish one social group from another. Ethnic group leaders are sometimes considered in the governing elite; from cabinet to bureaucratic appointments and allocation of the local budget (Thomson, 2004:62). Rothchild (*in* Thomson, 2004:65) describes the relationship between the state and ethnic group representatives of civil society as a “hegemonic exchange”. This is a situation where some African states do not have enough political power to impose upon civil society and powerfully mobilized ethno-regional groups. This then forces the state to concede a certain degree of legitimacy to these ethnic groups. Thus hegemonic exchange is a form of state-facilitated coordination in which autonomous central state and ethno-regional interests engage (Rothchild, *in* Thomson, 2004:62).

The argument presented by Thomson (2004: 65) stipulates that ethnicity can be used as a method of political mobilization. Glazer and Moynihan (*in* Lake & Rothchild, 1998:5) calls this the “instrumentalist” approach, and describes ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites to obtain some larger, typically material end. This instrumentalist approach suggests that ethnicity can be closely linked to the political process. It can be used as a method to mobilize individuals and groups politically, whether used defensively against others or offensively to achieve a collective end.

According to Lake and Rothchild (1998:6) ethnicity and ethnic mobilization is primarily a label or set of symbolic ties that is used for political advantage, much like interest groups and political parties. Thus ethnicity can be a mechanism for political mobilization. For instance, the Rwanda genocide which claimed over 800 000 lives in a mere three months in 1994, was a result of the Hutu versus Tutsi ethnic group conflict over resources, land economy and Tutsi domination of the state (Thomson, 2004:67). Kaplan (*in* Lake & Rothchild, 1998:5) defines ethnicity in the primordial⁶ view, as a fixed characteristic of individuals and communities, whether it is rooted in inherited biological traits or centuries of past practice, one is always perceived, for example, as a Serb, a Zulu, or a Chechen. The argument continues to assume that

⁶ Primordial refers to pre-historic times (Lake & Rothchild, 1998).

ethnic tension and conflict is “natural”. Thomson (2004:64) adds that no state is socially homogeneous. In other words, social differences like ethnicity within any society are bound to cause a certain degree of conflict, owing to differences in beliefs, interests and priorities.

Secession is also known as self-determination and is defined by Buchheit (1978:247) as the establishment of a sovereign and independent state. All people have the right to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, a right that is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (Buchheit, 1978:247). Therefore the population of the South Sudan, whose aim is to protect and preserve their “black African”⁷ identity from the dominating Arabic Sudanese, have an inalienable legal right to secede, in pursuit of their own cultural identity.

1.3 HYPOTHESIS

Ethnic mobilization was a contributing factor in the secession of the South as an outcome of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The above hypothesis is linked to the following main causes:

- The renewed civil wars between the Southern and Northern regions of the Sudan, as a result of the ethnic affiliation of the respective civilian populations;
- The formation of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLMA) in the South, which was a move in protest against the installation of the Sharia Law when Muslim law was established in 1983 by the Arabic North (Mareng, 2009: 533);
- The most recent elections of 2011 in which 99 percent of the Southerners voted in favour of the secession from the Arabic-dominated North. This was one of the outcomes of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and
- The referendum for the self-determination of the Southerners, which ultimately led to the planned secession from North Sudan.

Against the background of the above contextual analysis, the purpose of this study was to analyse the outcome of the Sudanese CPA by using ethnic mobilization as a theoretical foundation. It is argued that ethnic mobilization culminated in the outcome of the recent Southern referendum. The South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession from the Sudan.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

With reference to the problem statement outlined above, the following research questions were addressed:

- What was the essence of ethnic mobilization and secession, specifically in the African context?
- What was the relevance, and what were the advantages and disadvantages of utilising ethnic mobilization to influence the outcome of the CPA in the Sudan?
- What is the format of ethnic diversity in the Sudan?
- What was outlined in the 2005 CPA of the Sudan and what were its outcomes?
- How was ethnic mobilization used as a mechanism to influence the current outcome of the CPA in the Sudan?
- What are the challenges that Sudan and South Sudan still faces in the aftermath of the implementation of the CPA?

In order to answer these research questions, the main objectives of the research were identified.

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The research objectives this study aspired to achieve were as follows:

⁷ Black Africans is the term used to refer to the Southerners with reference to their culture, heritage and race (Lokuij, 2006).

- To conceptualize the following terms, namely: secession, ethnicity and ethnic mobilization; and further to explain how they can be used as a method of modern political mobilization;
- To outline the relevance, advantages and disadvantages of utilising ethnic mobilization to influence the outcome of the CPA;
- To discuss the format of ethnic diversity in the Sudan;
- To provide an in-depth analysis of the CPA by examining what it outlines and what its outcomes have been thus far;
- To present an analysis of how ethnic mobilization was used in the Sudan with reference to the current political outcome of the CPA; and
- To outline the challenges that Sudan and South Sudan are still facing since the implementation of the CPA.

In order to carry out these research objectives it was necessary to identify appropriate methods of research.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

The methodological dimensions of research refer to the means that the researcher employs in reaching the goal of valid knowledge (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997:29). To achieve the objectives of this study, the analysis was conducted mainly through an investigation of the relevant literature. To substantiate and test the hypotheses, the researcher employed a qualitative approach, which was deductive in nature.

1.6.1 Qualitative research

Qualitative research is defined by Leedy and Ormrod (2010:136) as a “method of research which encompasses several approaches”. The first is a focus on phenomena that occur in natural settings. Secondly, this research method involves studying these phenomena in all their complexity. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the research output, phenomena must be studied as they occur in

their natural settings, in the so called “real-world” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:136). Accordingly, all the circumstances relating to the CPA in the Sudan were carefully scrutinised. This means that all relevant dimensions and layers of the hypothesis were taken into account. Using the qualitative approach, the research process involved the following stages (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:136–137):

- Description: the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships, systems or attitudes of people should be revealed.
- Interpretation: this enables the researcher to gain insight into a “particular phenomenon”; develop new concepts or theoretical perspectives about the phenomenon; and discover the problems that are related to the phenomenon.
- Verification: this allows the researcher to test the validity of certain assumptions, claims, theories or generalizations within a real-world context.
- Education: this provides a means through which the researcher can judge the effectiveness of particular policies, practices or innovations.

In terms of the deductive nature of this study, the research process moves from the general to the particular (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:136). The approach on ethnic mobilization (instrumentalism) was used as general background and measurement instrument. The theoretical foundation of this study was ethnic mobilization (instrumentalism). The analysis of current applicable developments was therefore measured against the established findings of this approach. Research was narrowed down in particular to the output and outcome of the CPA in the Sudan.

Using the above-mentioned method, a link was created between ethnic mobilization and the secession as an outcome of the CPA in the Sudan.

1.6.2 The dimensions of research

In this qualitative research design there were two recognisable dimensions; the first was ethnographic in nature, meaning that an in-depth study of the ethnic groups was conducted and ethnic mobilization (the instrumentalist approach) served as the theoretical foundation of research. The second dimension was a single case study.

Here the CPA and its outcomes were analysed as the main objective of research; a textual analysis was thus conducted.

1.6.3 Levels of research

Research was divided into three levels, namely:

On the macro-level, whereby the research focused on ethnicity, ethnic mobilization and secession, with specific reference to Africa. This analysis also served as theoretical foundation for research.

On a meso-level, research was narrowed down to the secession of the South as an outcome of the CPA. This output was linked to ethnic mobilization as causal factor.

On the application level, research focused on the secession of the South as an outcome of the CPA. Here the proposed governing structure of the Sudan was descriptively analysed. To provide a future scenario an analysis will also be made of the relevance, advantages and disadvantages of ethnic mobilization in the Sudan.

1.6.4 Search of databases

The following databases were consulted to ascertain the availability of relevant information in this field of research:

- Science Direct;
- Sabinet;
- Proquest;
- SAE publications;
- Emerald; and
- Ebscohost Academic Search Elite.

By means of consulting the above databases, it was established that no other academic post-graduate study with the same title and content has been undertaken.

It was also established that adequate primary and secondary research has been conducted on ethnicity, secession and the Sudan. This proposed study was therefore feasible.

1.6.5 Literature analysis

The main source of information was derived from a literature study. *A History of Modern Sudan* (Collins, 2008) provides an in-depth historical overview of the Sudan. To sketch the background on ethnicity as a primary focus of this research, *An Introduction to African Politics* (Thomson, 2004) outlines the core features of ethnicity and explains how ethnicity can be used as a tool for political mobilization. Glazer and Moynihan (1975) in their *Ethnicity; Theory and Experience*, elaborate further on the theories of ethnicity. Another useful source is *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, by Lake and Rothchild (1998) which gives a wide scope of reasoning and explains the root causes of ethnic conflict.

Introduction to Peace Studies (Barash, 1991) outlines the causes of war; procedures of peace processes; the negotiations and diplomacy leading to peace agreements and treaties. It further discusses the methods and procedures of how to maintain peace and successfully implement a peace agreement. *The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)* (2005), discusses the methods of implementing the peace agreement and its outcomes. *The National Interim Constitution* (2005) was promulgated in the Sudan in 2005 after the signing of the peace agreement, and served as the national constitution for the interim period of six years, until the year 2011.

In *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination* (Buchheit, 1978) there is a detailed analysis of what secession is and the meaning behind self-determination and the right to secede. Williams (1993) outlines the international legal position of secession by making reference to the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People*. *Secession: International Law Perspective* (Kohen, 2006) provides information on the legal routes that must be followed in the event of secession.

1.6.6 Ethical considerations

I hereby declare that this study is the outcome of research I have personally undertaken and is my own work. Where I have included information from any source, I have acknowledged this in the correct manner.

1.6.7 Challenges encountered and possible contributions of the study

This study was subject to a number of challenges. Owing to the geographical distance of the Sudan from South Africa and the financial constraints involved, the researcher was unable to conduct extensive field work. Therefore the study relied largely on published sources and information available in data bases on the internet. An extensive literature analysis was conducted.

The study hopes to make a positive contribution by contributing to a better understanding of ethnicity and how it can be used as a method of political mobilization within the African context.

1.7 CONCLUSION

In July 2011, the continued conflicts in the Sudan ultimately led to the secession of the Southerners, who had made their opinion known in a referendum (Kron, 2011:2). The 2005 CPA made provision for this secession and this initial chapter has outlined the theoretical framework on which this study is based.

In the next chapter the theoretical approaches of primordialism and instrumentalism are explored. The instrumentalist approach in particular is discussed in detail and it is suggested that ethnicity can be used as a tool for political mobilization. The impact of ethnicity and its role in the Sudanese crisis and the theoretical basis of secession are also examined as a preamble to the descriptive analysis of the CPA which follows.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND SECESSION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter focused on providing a background orientation on current political developments and trends in Sudan and South Sudan. In addition, the research objectives, hypothesis and aims of this study were outlined. In order to align the scope of research it is now necessary to discuss the interpretation of concepts such as ethnicity, ethnic mobilization and secession; these provide the contextual background and theoretical foundation of this study. The rationale behind this approach can be related to the hypotheses of this research which assumes that ethnic mobilization culminated in the CPA and eventual Southern secession. In order to accommodate the content of research, this chapter is divided into two sections, namely:

- A theoretical analysis of ethnicity and ethnic mobilization; and
- A holistic analysis of secession as a contemporary political phenomenon in developing states.

Against the background of the above objectives and outlined structure, this chapter therefore serves as a theoretical framework and foundation for the rest of this research.

2.2 THE ESSENCE OF ETHNICITY AS A GLOBAL POLITICAL PHENOMENON

Ethnicity is defined as one level of social stratification or social inequality that includes race, class, kinship, age, estate, gender and caste (Berreman, 1972 *in* Baumann 2004:1). Thomson (2004:72) describes ethnicity as a “communal solidarity based on shared ideas, origins, ancestry, traditions and culture”. In essence, ethnicity is described as a trait, allegiance or association of an individual to a particular group.

Ethnicity in the global world is by no means a new phenomenon. Thomson (2004:60–61) explains that the creation of tribes or ethnic groups existed for centuries prior to the pre-colonial era. Furthermore, the existence of ethnic groups in the Middle East during the third millennium B.C. is highlighted by Hutchinson and Smith (1996:10) with reference to the ancient Egyptians, Sumerians and Elamites. It is further stated that the history of inter-state conflict in the area was interwoven with ethnic migration, invasions and conflicts (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:10). Ethnic groups can therefore be seen as primitive social constructs.

However, Thomson (2004:59–61) cautions against the practice of classifying ethnic groups as “primitive”. This is because ethnic groups in the modern and contemporary world have taken up a new political significance (McNeill *in* Hutchinson & Smith 1996:10). There was a notable increase in the rise of ethnic politics after World War II (Nagel & Olzak, 1982:1). This was caused by rising nationalism and increased political and economic aspirations during colonial and post-colonial times. According to Landsberg and Venter (2011:14) in the aftermath of World War II, ethnical conflicts were exacerbated by the new role of the state in society after decolonization had taken place. This often meant, for example, that a single dominant ethnic group would take control and use its power to exercise hegemony over other ethnic groups within that state. An example is the western Yoruba “tribe” in Nigeria. After Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the Yoruba⁸ seized control of state power and marginalized other ethnic groups in Nigeria. Other examples include the Islamization of the Sudanese by the dominant Northern-based Arab-Muslim group (Thomson, 2004:74).

2.2.1 Linking an ethnic group and ethnic mobilization

Hutchinson and Smith (1996:7) define an ethnic group as:

...a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people hood.

⁸ The Yoruba tribe is the dominant ethnic group in Nigeria and the largest in West Africa.

The salient features of an ethnic group include family ties, physical contiguity, religious affiliations, languages, tribal affiliation and nationality (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:7).

Landsberg and Venter (2011:15) define ethnic mobilization as follows:

This is the organization for political action of an ethnic, tribal, linguistic, religious, cultural or racial group around the idea of the inherent superiority of that group.

Nagel and Olzak (1982:127) agree, and define ethnic mobilization as follows:

The process by which a group organizes along ethnic lines in pursuit of collective political ends [and thereby] threatens the stability and legitimacy of many of the world's states.

Ethnic groups become political when they are mobilized with the aim of attaining a certain desired goal. Ethnic mobilization therefore, is the process in which groups organize themselves according to ethnic ties in order to reach a collective political end such as independence (Nagel & Olzak 1982:127).

According to Hutchinson and Smith (1996:5–6) the concept of ethnicity or an ethnic group exhibits to a variable degree, six identifiable main features, namely:

- A *common proper name*, to identify the “essence” of the community;
- A *common ancestry*, such as a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place. This myth of common ancestry gives the ethnic group a sense of fictive kinship;
- Shared *historical memories* including heroes, events and their commemoration;
- One or more *elements of common culture* such as religion, customs or language;
- A link with a *homeland* or a symbolic attachment to an ancestral land; and
- A *sense of solidarity* on the part of at least some sections of the ethnic population.

Two key elements are emphasized by Hutchinson and Smith (1996:5–6). The first of these is the importance of a shared myth and memories which will promote a sense of solidarity. The second primary element is an orientation to the past, notably to the origins and ancestry of the community, including memories and a shared heritage of its “golden age”. The ethno-history of a group is thus important in keeping that group bound together as a discrete community (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:7).

2.2.2 The essence of an ethnic group

An ethnic group is defined by Thomson (2004:60) as group/community of people who have the conviction that they have a common identity. This common identity, as explained above, could be based either on shared origins, kinship ties, religion, traditions, cultural uniqueness, language or history.

The essence of an ethnic group lies in the conviction of a common identity and fate. For instance, members of a group which has its ancestral origin in Africa and then migrate to America (or as in the slave trade, were taken captive and shipped to the US) are referred to as African-Americans (Nagel & Olzak, 1982:128). Another example is immigrants in the United Kingdom (UK) such as the Asians (many of whom are of Indian descent); such groups of immigrants are then labelled “ethnic minorities”. Ethnic minority groups are usually identified and recognized according to descent and origin (Thomson 2004:60–61). This identification and recognition is usually based on factors such as origin, kinship, traditions, culture, as well as a shared history or language (Thomson, 2004:61).

An ethnic group can be compared to an ideal community because of the similarities and feeling of togetherness shared by its members. When identifying a particular ethnic group the emphasis is however placed on the group’s origin and descent rather than the geographical consideration of a nation. Therefore an ethnic group is often viewed as a smaller community found within a larger society (Thomson 2004:60).

The sense of ethnic identity is thus perceived stronger when specific circumstances highlight common interests within a group and consequently leads to ethnic mobilization (Paglia, 2005:16).

The above quote emphasizes that ethnic identity is both significant and fundamental and that ethnic groups can also be interest groups. Depending on a common interest that is shared, ethnic mobilization can occur.

2.3 IDENTIFYING THE MAIN APPROACHES TOWARDS THE ANALYSIS OF ETHNIC ORIGINS AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Contemporary approaches to ethnicity are divided into two main categories, namely the primordial approach and the instrumental approach (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:7). Primordialism, also known as the naturalistic approach, was initially used in the field of anthropology, sociology, biology and religion, where scholars sought to identify specific forms of biological characteristics (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:7).

According to Isaacs (*in* Glazer & Moynihan 1975:31) primordial affinities and attachment are referred to as the “genes” of what is called an ethnic group. This assumes that primordial affinity equates to the physical identity and natural qualities an individual acquires at birth. It is these natural qualities, it is posited, that may ultimately lead to ethnic mobilization. With reference to identification and possible mobilization, Geertz (*in* Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:41) describes this particular approach as follows;

...by primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “gives” of social existence; immediate continuity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the giveness that stems from being born into a particular race, language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social and cultural practices. These congruities of blood and speech, customs and so on, are seen to have ineffable and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves.

Therefore the primordial approach suggests that individuals are born with particular characteristics such as race and an inborn affinity to adopt a certain culture which immediately associates them with that particular group or community.

2.4 THE INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH AS FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH

The approach that is particularly significant for this research is the instrumentalist approach, because it is based on the belief that ethnic ties can be used or exploited to mobilize people in order to reach a certain desired goal (Olzak, 1983:358). Instrumentalism is simply defined as a “political means to an end” (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:10; Olzak 1983:358).

The instrumental approach to ethnicity is based on the notion of politically mobilizing an ethnic group of people for a desired political, social or economic end or objective (Thomson, 2004:64). The underpinning foundation of instrumentalism is the conviction that ethnic mobilization can be stimulated by certain developments. It is argued that ethnic mobilization will occur whenever there is the possibility of social, political, or most importantly, economic gain (Nagel & Olzak, 1982:131).

The instrumentalist approach to ethnicity suggests that ethnic ties are useful, effective and can also be manipulated in the attainment of individual and collective goals. In a multicultural and diverse society such as Sudan, Nigeria and South Africa, for example, the competition between elites to gain access to desirable resources may require the manipulation and eventual mobilization of different sets of ethnic ties, such as language, religion, traditions, historical lineage, ancestors and race (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:33).

2.4.1 Different types of ethnic mobilization

Ethnic mobilization can take two different forms namely; emergent mobilization and resurgent mobilization. Emergent ethnic mobilization occurs amongst formerly separate and or factious and culturally diverse groups. An example here is the Latinos in the USA who were formerly separate and factious and became united (i.e. unified) based on their shared language (Padilla, 1982 *in* Nagel & Olzak, 1982:129). The second type of ethnic mobilization takes the form of a renaissance or re-emergence of ethnic sentiment and organization among an inactive, formerly mobilized ethnic group. This is exemplified by groups with a history of ethnic activity

and organization such as the Northern Irish, the Kurds and the Armenians (Nagel & Olzak, 1982:129).

2.4.2 Sources of ethnic mobilization in Africa

There are a number of fundamental core elements of ethnicity which are identified by Nash (*in Hutchinson & Smith 1996:24*). These are tribalism, nationalism, religion and language. Each of these four core elements will be discussed in more detail below in an attempt to identify possible reasons for ethnic mobilization.

2.4.3 The influence of tribalism on ethnic mobilization

In the African context, ethnic mobilization for political gain was, and still is, a direct result of the divisions caused by colonial rule. Colonial authorities (be they British, French, Portuguese or Belgian) variously implemented segregation policies and demarcated boundaries to expedite political and economic management. Although certain groups shared common identities and regarded themselves as one ethnic group, the land demarcation by colonial rulers took no cognisance of this. This led to a situation where various groups were forced to share communal space, while others were separated by the artificial colonial borders that had been created by colonial administrators (Thomson, 2004:63).

Tribalism or ethnic identity emerged concurrently during the era of colonialism in Africa. The two overriding reasons for the formation of tribes were: i) it was demanded by imperial rulers and ii) African societies found that the artificial formation of tribes was rather useful in the new colonial political environment (Thomson, 2004:60–63).

Thomson (2004:62) points out that contemporary Africanists refuse to use the term “tribe” claiming that it harks back to the pejorative Social Darwinism of colonialists who saw indigenous African “tribes” as “primitive”. Africanists maintain that it is more accurate to talk of ethnic groups so that the stereotypes of primordial communities can be avoided. However, the counter-argument is that most societies in the African continent lack homogeneous national population (Tibi *in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:174*). This, as explained above, is the result of artificial colonial boundaries and

Thomson (2004:61) therefore concludes that tribal identity is not a primordial (primitive) element which dissolved in the face of modernization. He argues that tribal identity and solidarity are still salient features of African society.

2.4.4 The impact of rising nationalism on ethnic mobilization

Nationalism is an ideology based on the belief and desire that certain individuals who share common ties such as language, race, locality or religion should come together and look after their own interests, for example by forming their own state (Thomson, 2004:35).

The definition of nationalism is stated in Thomson (2004:35) as: "... the desire that the nation should be housed in its own sovereign state."

Baradat (2009:44–45) describes nationalism as the most powerful political ideology of the past 200 years. He points out that nationalism was the mobilizing force that guided many African states to independence and brought the eventual demise of colonial rule. Such states include Libya (1951), Morocco (1956), Tunisia (1956) and Sudan (1956) (Thomson, 2004:33, 37, 64).

2.4.5 The impact of religious aspirations on ethnic mobilization

Religious differences have been established as a social cleavage generating political competition within and between societies in Africa (Thomson, 2004:67). African religions usually involve the worship and communication with ancestors who are portrayed as the heroes who founded the ethnic group concerned. The argument raised here pronounces that African religious beliefs give a powerful political position to individuals, priests, prophets, the elders and any other figure who acts as an intermediate to the spirits. In Africa, religions such as Islam, Christianity and Judaism were spread via trading routes that dated as far back as the seventh century. Islam spread widely through the Northern parts of Africa in states such as Libya, Egypt, Sudan, and Nigeria and was made popular by Arab traders, merchants and colonialism (Khalaifalla, 2004:79). Islam is the world's second largest religion after Christianity, and is constantly expanding. Christianity, initiated by European missionaries in the nineteenth century, dominates the Southern part of the continent.

Thus post-colonial Africa remains a devotedly religious part of the world (Thomson, 2004:68).

Enloe (*in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:197*) maintains that there are critical differences among religions which influence the way that ethnicity is expressed and maintained. Inter-ethnic hostility may arise, and occurs when one religious group believes that their interpretation of theological fundamentals is correct while those held by others have been corrupted.

Thomson (2004:71) is of the view that religion enters politics not just for spiritual or moral reasons but there are often instrumental imperatives as well. This being so, religion, as a common or shared feature of ethnicity, can be used in political mobilization.

2.4.6 The impact of language as a source of identity on ethnic mobilization

Language is also identified as a core feature of ethnic division (Nash *in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:27*). According to Bartlett (*in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:128*) vernacular language has a significant role in defining nationalities. Medieval priests and scholars found it natural to see the post-Babel differentiation of language as the first step in the formation of races or people (Bartlett *in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:128*). The assumption drawn here is that racial differentiation arose from different languages and not vice versa.

The power of linguistic bonds was recognized by the fourteenth-century chronicler, Peter of Zittau. According to Bartlett (*in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:128*), this early chronicler wrote that: "... those who speak the same language are deeply entwined in love", implying that the bond between groups who speak the same language is more enduring than other socio-economic ties.

It is evident that these tight bonds of love and solidarity manifest themselves in wars and various tribulations arising between ethnic groups who speak different languages. It is further assumed that those who speak the same language tend to bond together standing firm in their opposition against those who speak different languages (Barlett *in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:128*).

In summary, the four core elements discussed above, namely ethnicity (tribalism), nationalism, and religion, can serve as catalysts in political mobilization of a group towards achieving a desired political outcome. These elements can therefore be seen as the building blocks of ethnic mobilization.

The instrumentalists argue that ethnic mobilization can be the result of manipulation by the elite or nationalist appeals towards pursuit of their own interests and power. This, in many instances, causes conflict and can even lead to civil war (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:33).

2.5 ETHNICITY AS A METHOD OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN SUDAN

In order to distinguish between the positive and negative connotations of political mobilization along ethnic lines, this study will discuss its relevance, advantages and disadvantages in general and with specific reference to the situation in Sudan.

2.5.1 The relevance of utilizing ethnicity as a method of political mobilization

Ethnicity, amongst other social organizations such as class or ideology, is a relevant and effective method to utilize in political mobilization. Thomson (2004:64) states that ethnicity can be a progressive force because it provides a degree of pluralism and representation. Weber (*in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:35*) is of the opinion that any belief in group affinity can have important consequences in a political community. This is regardless of whether or not the group has an objective foundation. The belief that is held by that group can be related to the similarities they hold in common, be it ancestral descent, shared history or a product of colonization. Such beliefs are of the utmost importance for the spread of group formation.

Ethnic membership differs from family relations in the sense that ethnicity is a presumed identity and it facilitates group formation, especially in the political sphere (Weber *in Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:35*). This has been seen to be the case in Sudan where Southern ethnic groups gathered to mobilize politically through the formation of the SPLM/A. These ethnic groups, namely Missariya, Zande, Shalluk and Beja affiliated under the militant political party SPLM/A in order to reach their primary

political goal – the self-determination of the South. This type of ethnic mobilization has its theoretical foundation in the instrumental approach which stipulates that ethnicity can be used as a method of political mobilization towards the attainment of a desired goal (Nagel & Olzak, 1983:358).

The ethnic affiliation into the SPLM/A of the aforementioned ethnic groups only lasted until after the secession. Once this main goal was achieved, certain ethnic groups dissociated from the SPLM/A (Kron, 2011:2). This was because of the inherent differences these groups have in terms of culture, ancestral lines and history. After the secession of the South it was reported UN (2011) and Kron (2011:2) that there were renewed outbursts of “tribal” clashes amongst the Southerners. These were fuelled by disputes over resources, cattle herding, land and accusations that the Dinka ethnic group are currently monopolising the top positions in the newly established government of the Republic of South Sudan.

According to Weber (*in* Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:35) this occurrence is part of a predictable pattern because the ethnic affiliates have marked differences. The assumption can thus be drawn that the apparent unity of a politically mobilized South Sudan versus Sudan was an inherently artificial, forged construct. The underlying reason for the spontaneous political mobilization of numerous ethnic groups in the South was merely to achieve the political autonomy of the Southern region.

Through ethnic group affiliation, political mobilization was made possible and the desired goal of self-determination was attained. In other words, it is evident that ethnicity is a relevant factor that can be used in group formation and political mobilization. Ethnic affiliation offers leverage to empower members of a community; it translates into the attainment of certain desired political, economic or social goals.

2.5.2 The advantages of utilizing ethnicity as a method of political mobilization in Sudan

Ethnicity offers individuals a platform to commemorate their origins, descent and history (Thomson, 2004:61–64). It eliminates the alienation of individuals within a society; this factor is reiterated by Singh (2008:2) in the following statement:

The positive aspect of ethnicity serves as an adaptive mechanism to enable the individual to adjust successfully to the increasing alienation of mass societies resulted by divisive competition in market oriented society.

The advantages of ethnic groups are summarised and discussed below:

- Strong ethnic loyalties can protect ethnic groups from state harassment (Thomson, 2004:64). The minor ethnic groups in the Sudan, such as the eastern Nubians, and Southern Shilluks, Beja, Missariya and Nuer were able to unify under the political party SPLM/A and mobilize themselves politically towards attaining autonomy. They were also able use this ethnic affiliation to protest against the state in protection of their particular ethnic affinities, culture, heritage, language and religion.
- The state cannot ignore the demands of the ethnic groups within its society. In a democratic state, as envisaged by the Sudan (CPA, 2005:3) the state is obliged to meet the demands of its constituencies, in particular as far as resource distribution is concerned.
- Thomson (2004:64) stipulates that one of the social benefits of ethnic solidarity is that it has become a method of securing tangible political power and economic advantages. The political affiliation of Southern supporters into the SPLM/A and their determination to strive towards independence of the South proved fruitful when the South was declared independent in July 2011. The establishment of an autonomous South Sudan meant that the SPLM/A leadership gained both political and economic power.
- For post-colonial African states in particular, ethnicity has served both the state and civil society. Ethnic brokers who represent the various ethnic groups are then able to liaise with the state and advocate the needs of that group (Thomson, 2004:65).

Ethnicity has been advantageous in Southern Sudan in that it bonded individuals together and promoted a sense of identity. Individuals were able to express their appreciation of their cultural heritage, history and traditions. It further provided a form of supportive social network (Singh, 2008:2).

2.5.3 The disadvantages of utilizing ethnicity as a method of political mobilization in Sudan

As explained above, there is no doubt that Western colonization has left its legacy and that this continues to impact on the current political landscape of African states. This is clearly evident in the case of post-colonial Sudan which inherited a weak political state system. Political power was left in the hands of the dominant Arab and Islamic ethnic groups, ignoring the divisions of existing ethnic, religious, linguistic and indigenous groups within Sudanese society. The Southern population was marginalized in terms of political power, job opportunities, resources and economic and social development before long, the dominating Arab and Islamic ethnic group became recognized as the “new colonizers” (Singh, 2008: x).

The problem with utilizing ethnicity as a method of political mobilization lies in the essence of segregation of the civil society within a state and this tends to cause tension and conflicts within that society (Singh, 2008: xi). In the Sudan it has ultimately led to the secession of the South from the North, whereby a completely independent state was established. Problems that may result from political ethnic mobilization in newly established states such as the South Sudan, are discussed in Singh (2008:xi). They can be summarised as follows:

- Lack of internal cohesion;
- Ethnic polarization of minorities and majorities;
- Social fragmentation;
- Civil discord;
- Institutional decay; and
- Regime instability.

The problems identified above are indeed visible in the current socio-political landscape of the South Sudan. The state became independent in July 2011, and within a few months tribal clashes, civil discord and social fragmentation were reported (Kron, 2011:2). The independent Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states

which are under Arab-Mussarayi and African Nuba rule are socially and politically unstable. Singh (2008:xii) is of the opinion that in the post-Cold War period ethno-national driven groups raised the expectations of many ethnic groups on the issue that the goal of independence was achievable. This was not a completely negative factor; however, it gave rise to immature secession of ethnic groups considered to be minorities. Minority groups had discovered a way to rise against the state authority, and that was through ethnic ties. In some cases, as happened in the South Sudan, these ethnic ties were forged through the assimilation of very diverse ethnic groups into the SPLM/A in order to achieve secession (ICG, 2008:1). There is little doubt that the ongoing tribal clashes and instability in the newly established South Sudan are evidence of the problems enumerated above as advanced by Singh (2008:xi).

Another negative aspect of ethnicity is that it makes it problematic to achieve social harmony in multi-ethnic societies such as states like Rwanda, Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia, where conflict between diverse ethnic groups has resulted in civil wars (Singh, 2008:3). This therefore suggests that ethnicity can promote violent conflict, especially if used to mobilize citizens on a political agenda. “Tribal” clashes in the South Sudan led to the death of an estimated 3 000 Southern Sudanese who perished in intra-state conflict in the three months after secession (Singh, 2008:3).

2.6 DEFINING SECESSION IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Secession, based on the rational choice premise,⁹ can be explained as the “demand for a formal withdrawal from membership of a central political authority” or religious organization by a member unit or units on the basis of claiming independence and/or self-governing status. Secession is thus the outcome of a collective decision made by regional leaders and a significant portion of the population in the host state (Hetcher, 1992:267). Secession can also be described as a call for official “partition” and/or “self-determination” and is only successful when the withdrawal is formally awarded recognition by the host state and the international community at large (Hetcher, 1992:267).

⁹ The rational choice premise sees secession as the outcome of a series of collective decisions made by regional leaders and the populations of host states (Hetcher, 1992:267).

2.7 ESTABLISHING AND UNDERSTANDING THE LEGITIMACY OF SECESSION

Where secession is concerned, the underlying factors are that the decision to secede should be a collective one by the leaders of the region as well as the community. Legitimacy of the new “state” remains a crucial factor and is dependent upon recognition by the host leaders, the community concerned, and due acceptance of the secession by the world community (Hetcher, 1992:267). The theoretical framework and legal implications of secession will be explored below in an attempt to comprehend when and why states secede and what legal implications have to be considered.

Hetcher (1992:268) explains that three types of information are required to understand the dynamics of secession. These are:

- Data on the territorial population’s preferences with regard to secession;
- Data on the socio-economic configuration of this population; and
- Data describing the factors that are relevant to the benefit/cost that the host state and its leaders might incur with respect to secession.

Sentiments on how they feel about secession can be communicated by the population concerned by actions such as strikes, demonstrations, and also by voting in an election or referendum. According to Hetcher (1992:269) secession is the outcome of four separate steps or processes:

- The initial process includes the establishment of collective agreement about the existence and boundaries of a sub-unit termed the “region”. Regions in this particular context are territories in which a large majority of the population has a common interest in seceding from the host state. Thus regions are units most inclined to secession.
- The second process is the collective action of the regional population through the formation of a social movement or political party in order to press for their common interest.

- Thirdly the process entails the social base of secession. Some members of the population may be content to remain within the given state, thus regional parties may decide to opt for secession rather than to try to pursue their interests “within the bosom of the host state”.
- The final step should be an examination of the decisions made by the rulers of the host state. This is important because it should be remembered that secession can only occur when the rulers conclude that it is less costly to relinquish sovereignty over the region than to maintain it.

These considerations should be addressed before secession takes place.

2.7.1 Theoretical approach to secession: the normative theory

Over the years political philosophers have paid little or no attention to the phenomenon of secession. It was simply seen as a state’s struggle for national independence from colonial rule. After a long period of neglect, scholars have now turned their attention to the issue of secession Buchanan (1997:31). This sudden interest was awakened by the increasing number of minority groups wanting to secede. What ought to be kept in mind when secession is mooted is the question of “the right to secede”. Buchanan (1997:31) notes that there has as yet been no systematic assessment of the normative theories of secession. International law on secession has always justified secession on moral grounds. But in terms of international law no attention is given to crucial implications of secession such as:

- Under what circumstances or conditions (other than the issue of institutional morality), does a group have the moral right to secede?
- Under what conditions should a group be recognized as having a right to secede, as a matter of international institutional morality?

In an attempt to answer these questions a UN resolution known as The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966. This provides some guidelines on dealing with secession (Freeman, 1999:355) and is discussed in some detail below.

Because secession crises tend to have international repercussions which call for international responses, these responses must be consistent and morally progressive. In his discussion of what he describes as the “need for and lack of a normative theory of secession” Buchanan (1991:322) stresses the urgent need for a systematic theory of the right to secede. A possible response in defence of the current absence of an adequate consideration of secession is the fact that it is an issue for non-ideal theory and the task of political philosophers is to construct and defend a plausible ideal theory.¹⁰

2.7.2 The “Remedial Rights Only” theory

There are two types of identifiable normative theories of secession, namely the Remedial Rights Only theory and the Primary Right theory. These two theories differ in the sense that, the Remedial Rights Only theory asserts that a group has a general right to secede under circumstances of having had suffered certain injustices. Secession in this context serves as a remedy of last resort when all other attempts to resolve the unjust circumstances have failed. Various injustices are identified as warranting the remedy of secession. On the other hand, the Primary Right theory asserts that even in the absence of injustice a group is eligible for secession because it has a primary right to secede. Legitimate secession is thus not limited to being a means of remedying an injustice. However certain conditions are identified as grounds for secession in the absence of injustice (Buchanan, 1997:35).

The Remedial Rights Only theory views secession as similar to the right to embark on a revolution. It stipulates that the right to secede and the right to launch an uprising or revolution have important similarities. Furthermore, the right to secede may well accrue to a portion of the citizenry who are in the majority in a particular region of the host state. The intention is not necessarily to overthrow the government but to gain a form of autonomy over a certain portion of the territory concerned. The Remedial Rights Only theory has its foundation in John Locke’s theory which asserts that people have a right to overthrow the government if and only if their fundamental

¹⁰ Ideal theory is the articulation and defence of principles of justice in a society in which these principles are fully implemented. “Non-ideal” theory deals with principles suitable for situations in which compliance is not perfect (Buchanan, 1991:325).

rights are violated and there are no available peaceful means to restore these basic human rights (Buchanan, 1997:35). As explained above, the Remedial Rights Only theory asserts that the general right to secede exists only when the group is experiencing a degree of injustice. The circumstances under which a group has the right to secede are outlined by Buchanan (1997:36) as follows:

- The state grants a right to secede; or
- The constitution of the particular state includes a right to secede, for example in the 1993 Ethiopian Constitution; or
- The agreement by which the state was initially created out of previously independent political units included the implicit or explicit assumption that secession at a later point was permissible, as for example in the case of the secession of the Southern Sudanese from the North.

The Remedial Rights Only theory believes that the right to secede should be permissible if a group has suffered a form of injustice. According to Buchanan (1997:37) the group has a right to secede on the grounds of injustice if :

- The physical survival of its members is threatened by actions of the state or it suffers violation of other basic human rights; or
- It's previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the state.

It is further stipulated that other conditions must be met if a group that suffers any of these abovementioned injustices is to be recognized in terms of international law or international political practices as having a right to secede. There have to be credible guarantees that the newly-seceded state will honour and respect the human rights of all its citizens (Buchanan, 1997:37). For instance the president of the United States, Barack Obama, gave a supportive speech which recognized the formation of the new state of the Republic of South Sudan. A number of other countries also voiced their recognition of South Sudan as an independent state. Thus, acknowledgement and acceptance was indeed granted to the new republic by the international community (Kron, 2011:1).

The Primary Rights theory can be further subdivided into two categories, namely the ascriptive group theory and the associative group theory. The ascriptive theory refers to groups whose membership is defined by what can be described as ascriptive characteristics that recognise the right to secede even in the absence of injustices. Ascriptive characteristics of certain groups are those that are grounded in its right to an independent political association. Being a “nation” or a discrete “people” is an ascriptive characteristic (Buchanan, 1997:38). In other words, the group enjoys certain solidarity and is bound by aspects which are not necessarily political; these characteristics which may bind a group, according to Buchanan (1997:38) include enjoying a common culture and/or history, language, a sense of distinctiveness, and a shared aspiration for constituting its own political unit.

In contrast, the associative group theory does not require that a particular group has any ascriptive characteristics in common (such as ethnicity, language, religions or culture). The members might not even see themselves as having any commonly held characteristics other than the desire to form their own state. In associative group theory, the focus is placed on the voluntary political choice of the members of a group and their decision to form their own independent political unit. In other words any group has the prerogative to qualify for the right to secede. The only relevant factor is the member’s voluntary choice to want to associate with others in a quest for secession (Buchanan, 1997:39).

2.7.3 The international right to secede

The resolutions passed by the UN on civil and political Rights are included in its International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 (Freeman, 1999:355). One of the articles of the covenant spells out that: “All peoples have the right to self-determination”.

Indeed, the representatives of UN member states have included this pronunciation as the first article of the United Nations Charter, which suggests that it is particularly significant. However, Freeman (1999:356) asserts that the UN’s 1966 conception of the right to self-determination was based purely on the elimination of racism and colonialism, i.e. emancipation from European imperial rule (for instance pre-1994

white minority rule in South Africa) and has very little to do with the right to self-determination or secession.

Therefore in Freeman's (1999) view the concept of self-determination in the current circumstances needs to be better understood in terms of contemporary liberal-democratic values. He argues that the post-colonial consensus in the international community from about 1960s to the late 1980s was unstable in both theory and practice. Aggrieved ethnic groups challenged the elites of the new post-colonial states by appealing to the principle of democratic-nationalist self-determination; neither the international community nor the relevant authorities in these post-colonial states had a convincing theory with which to oppose the demands voiced by these ethnic groups (Freeman, 1999:358). He maintains that

...the potent ideology of anti-colonialism encouraged both discontented people in the post-colonial countries to rebel against their states and minority nations in the old states, to assert the right to national self-determination (Freeman, 1999:358).

Six contemporary theories based on liberal-democratic values are identified by Freeman (1999:359) as follows:

- **Liberal theories**

Classical liberal theory is concerned with the protection of the rights of the individual; and maintains that government is obliged to provide such protection. If the government fails in doing so then the individuals concerned have the right to emigrate, resist or secede. It must however be shown that this right to national self-determination is necessary to protect the fundamental rights of these individuals. The Remedial Rights Only theory discussed above emphasizes the importance of human rights, stating categorically that no-one has the right of secession or national self-determination unless it is evident that there are serious and persistent violations of human rights and that no solution other than that of self-determination is available (Buchanan, 1997:38; Freeman, 1999:359).

- **Democratic theories**

Democratic theory is based on legitimate power and locates such power to the people as a whole, whereas liberal theories emphasize the rights of individuals. Modern nationalism was originally closely associated with democracy and the right to national self-determination is now widely interpreted as the right to democratic government (Freeman, 1999:362–363).

- **Communitarian theories**

Freeman (1999:363) insists that in order for a democratic case of self-determination to persist due consideration should be given to communitarian issues. The argument presented here suggests that people are born into a certain community and this sense of belonging and togetherness becomes a significant part of their identity; the right to self-determination is therefore a communal right. Communitarian theory also claims that the right to self-determination is based on the value of entrusting political power over to a group (be it a tribal, ethnic or national group). The kind of group that is entitled to enjoy the right to self-determination usually has a common culture, and other ethnic ties (as discussed earlier) that bind the group and may encompass many diverse aspects of the lives of its members.

- **Realist theories**

The concept “realist” in this regard is used in the context of comparing different theories of self-determination. This should be understood firstly, in endorsement of the conception of the right to national self-determination that is acceptable by the host state and in the contemporary world at large. Secondly, it is argued that the policy of self-determination in the international community has failed to meet its own criteria, because since the end of the Second World War world history has been riddled with secession violence (Freeman, 1999:365). This argument is supported by Shehadi (*in Buchanan, 1997:41*) who is of the view that the international community should be guided on how to assess and deal with claims that arise for the right to secede. Furthermore it is important for the international community to clarify its conception of the right to self-determination.

- **Cosmopolitan theories**

Miller (*in* Freeman, 1999:366) stipulates that the fundamental principles of cosmopolitan ethics can be found in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This stipulates that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. Scholars who adhere to cosmopolitan theory are committed to the principle of universal moral equality and the priority of the good in all institutions. In other words, cosmopolitanism is indeterminate with regard to the right to national self-determination. It also takes into account not only the interests of those claiming secession or self-determination, but those whom it will affect.

- **Cosmopolitan realism**

Cosmopolitan realism is not necessarily a sixth theory but is a combination of two other theories. Cosmopolitan realists deny that existing state borders have primary ethical value; the wellbeing of human beings is highly valued beyond any existing institutions. Furthermore, cosmopolitan realists are not committed to a uniform universal morality. In essence a just cosmopolitan world would comprise a wide range of nations, states and a rich cultural diversity (Freeman, 1999:367). Therefore cosmopolitan realism may under some circumstances endorse the right to national self-determination but it does not recognize a general right to do so owing to the fact that it calls into question the vision of a world of nation-states. The ideal solution, according to cosmopolitan realists is to explore institutional organizations that go beyond traditional ideas of nation and state, such as semi-sovereign communities associated with states or inter-state organizations such as the European Union (Freeman, 1999:367).

2.7.4 International law on the right to secede

As discussed earlier, the international legal right to secede was initially directed towards the elimination of colonialism and racism. However, after the Second World War the number of ethnic groups wanting to secede grew tremendously. The international community had not yet established specific guidelines and solid procedures on how these matters should be handled (Buchanan, 1997: 33–37). Enshrined in the United Nations Charter on Human Rights, Article 1, the

pronouncement that “all peoples have the right to self-determination”, was used by nationalist, ethnic and tribal groups as the sole fundamental right giving them the prerogative to secede. This lack of a definitive normative theory on the right to secede posed something of a crisis in the international community (Buchanan, 1997:31).

In an attempt to clarify the implementation of the secession process in the international context, Buchanan (1997: 41–54) has compiled the following criteria as a guideline on how the issue of secession should be handled. Under the heading ‘Criteria for Evaluating Proposals for an International Legal Right to Secede’ he lists the following:

- There should be minimal realism. In other words, a proposal for the right to secede ought to be morally progressive and at least minimally realistic. A morally progressive proposal when implemented, should serve basic values. The status quo after secession should ensure that the protection of human rights is a top priority (Buchanan, 1997:42).
- There must be consistency with well-entrenched, morally progressive principles of international law. A proposal should not contradict the morally acceptable principles of existing international law. Acceptance and implementation of a new principle should not come at the price of questioning the validity of well-entrenched morally progressive principles (Buchanan, 1997:47).
- A proposal to secede should not create perverse incentives. In other words the proposal should not encourage behaviour that undermines morally sound principles of international law or of morality; nor should it hinder the pursuit of morally progressive strategies for conflict resolution. For example, international legal principles should not accept the encouragement of states to pursue ethnic cleansing, or regressive immigration policies and other discriminatory development policies. The way in which acceptance as a principle of international law creates incentives is by conferring legitimacy on certain types of action (Buchanan, 1997:50).

- There should be moral accessibility. This implies that a proposal for reforming the international law should be morally accessible to a broad international audience. It should be as subjective as possible, without requiring acceptance of particular religious or ethnic groups (Buchanan, 1997:54).

These guidelines on the international right to secede stipulate the criteria for evaluating secession proposals. The guidelines also promote morally progressive and acceptable principles and speak to the moral obligations that states should adhere to when submitting proposals to secede.

2.8 CONCLUSION

In this chapter ethnic mobilization and secession were the two overriding themes and are discussed in detail. The chapter moves from defining the terms to providing insight on various theoretical approaches. The key concepts of ethnicity, ethnic mobilization and secession are discussed and analyzed, along with their supporting theoretical framework.

The primordial view is that ethnic groups are primitive; it draws on the assumption that such groups no longer exist in the modern world (Nagel & Olzak, 1982:131). In contrast, the instrumentalist view is that ethnic affiliation does exist in the modern world and plays a significant role in contemporary political trends. The instrumentalist view provides a reflection of what is currently transpiring in the Sudan. For instance, it was through ethnic ties that the Southerners managed to mobilize and secede from the North (Collins, 2008:57).

This chapter also analyses theoretical approaches to secession, including the causes and legal implications thereof. It expands on the explanation that initially, after World War Two, secession was a means of eliminating racism and colonialism. However in the contemporary world, secession is a prerogative granted to any group if they have become victims to unjust circumstances (Buchanan, 1997:35).

The following chapter will attempt to link the contemporary political trends in the Sudan and the secession of the Southerners to the theoretical approaches provided in this chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

TOWARDS THE CPA AND SECESSION OF SOUTH SUDAN

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter two, ethnic mobilization and secession as a theoretical foundation for research was discussed. The emphasis fell on primordialism, instrumentalism and developmental reasons as a causal framework for potential political and economic instability. This chapter will focus on the nature and impact of ethnic mobilization on past and current political developments in Sudan, which in turn led to the Southern secession from the North in 2011. The value and impact of this chapter relates to objective three of chapter one, which is to provide an analysis of how ethnic diversity and eventual mobilization contributed to the current political instability, the CPA and the eventual secession of the South. The relevant theory that relates to events in the Sudan is the instrumentalist view that ethnic ties can be an instrument for political mobilization. This approach therefore serves as a framework for comparison with contemporary developments in Sudan. The fundamental elements of instrumentalism were identified as religion, language, race, culture and political affiliation and these will therefore be used as structural guidelines for analysis in this chapter.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a brief orientation of the political history of Sudan from the Mahdist state to the Anglo-Egyptian invasion and the advent of the British colonizers. This section is important because it serves as a contextual background to understand the nature and origin of the current division and other dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan.

In the second section the focus shifts to an analytical description of the ethnic divisions of the Sudanese population. Thirdly, this chapter discusses the impact of the identified elements of instrumentalism on recent political developments in Sudan.

3.2 THE PRE-COLONIAL TIMEFRAME: SUDAN AS AN ISLAMIC (MAHDIYA) STATE (1895–1898)

The Mahdiya¹¹ state played an important role in the rise of Sudanese Islamic nationalism and eventual independence. Muhammad Ahmad ibn' Abdulla proclaimed that he was the Mahdi, and that this honour was bestowed on him in the form of a so-called revelation.¹² The Mahdi favoured theological purification in the form of establishing a completely Islamic state (Collins, 2008:22).

It was through two successful military victories that the Mahdi gained its reputable image and its number of supporters grew. The Madhiya had achieved independence for the Sudanese people from the Turkish invaders. The first was a signal victory over the Jihadiyya (the Turkish invaders) in December 1881 (Collins, 2008:22).

In 1882 the British attempted to halt the Islamic uprising in the Sudan by sending in their allies in the form of Egyptian troops to take over Khartoum. The alliance between the British and Egyptians was formed for two reasons, namely i) to quell the Orabi revolt and ii) to protect the Suez Canal so that British shipping over via the Indian Ocean and through the canal would not be disrupted. The Egyptian troops in the Sudan were eventually defeated in 1885. This conflict left Khartoum and other nearby areas completely ruined.

In 1885 the Mahdi died from natural causes, leaving behind a weak administration managed by the military. Rivalries over who should succeed the Mahdi led to internal conflicts between the Ja'aliyyin and Danaqla groups.¹³ Talk of overthrowing one another persisted and this resulted in a debilitated Mahdiya state. In 1898 the Mahdist state was defeated by the Egyptian-British troops, who then invaded and colonized the Sudan (Collins, 2008:28–31).

¹¹ The Mahdiya movement was in favour of Islamic purification, religious revival and nationalist political mobilization. Members of this movement dominated the Sudan from 1885 to 1898 (Collins, 2008:21).

¹² A revelation is a something revealed or disclosed in a form of a vision or dream.

¹³ The Ja'aliyyin and Danqla groups are disciples of the Madhi.


3.2.1 The North (Muslim) /South (non-Muslim) division as a consequence of (British) colonization (1898–1947)

In 1898 the Sudan was invaded by a combined British/Egyptian force and was colonized by Britain. By 1922 the British had devised a system of separate administration of the North and the South. This was done because of the marked political, historical, and cultural differences between the people as well as the geographical location (see Map 3.1) of the two regions. A new colonial policy was passed and promulgated by the British in 1920 and was encapsulated in *The Closed District Ordinances*.

This policy stipulated that whoever wanted to pass from either South to North or vice versa, was required to apply for a passport and be granted a visa if approved. Trade between the North and South was regulated by the colonial administration (Collins, 2008:38–42). A language policy was also developed and enforced in South Sudan; this laid down that English should be the official language of South Sudanese. It also approved the use of indigenous languages such as the Sillok, Nubian and Zagawa languages (Dhurgon, 1995:2). Arabic (an Islamic language) was not recognized as an official language in the South. British colonial rule clearly intended to ensure that South Sudan (non-Muslim) remained a completely separate state from North Sudan (Muslim), which is why these particular trade and language policies were introduced (Dhurgon, 1995: 2, 3).

3.2.2 The entrenchment of South Sudan and Sudan

According to Heleta (2008:1) in the early 1920s the British continued to consolidate their position in the North by establishing a developed administration and governance structures. Britain claimed that the South was not advanced enough to open up to the modern world (Metz *in* Heleta, 2008:1). A council called the North Sudan Advisory Council was established and was empowered to act as an advisory body on how to administer North Sudan. It governed all the provinces of the North and comprised only Northern Sudanese representatives. The council had no jurisdiction, role or relevance in the governance of South Sudan. Thus the idea of the two regions being entirely separate entities was further entrenched (Dhurgon, 1995:4).



MAP 3.1 THE DEMARCATON OF BORDERS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND NORTH SUDAN (1956)

Source: UN (2008)

In 1947, Britain officially (but unexpectedly) decided to place South Sudan under the authority of the North Sudanese Advisory Council. The reason for this was that the colonial administration not only wanted to maintain strong ties with the government of North Sudan to ensure that it had ready access to Sudan's natural resources; it also

wanted to protect its interests as far as the Suez Canal was concerned (Collins, 2008:38–39).

Despite this centralization of authority, the North and the South remained two separate and divided entities in terms of culture, traditions, language and religion. Furthermore, the colonial administration made a concerted effort to modernize the economy and infrastructure of the North whilst largely neglecting development in the South (Heleta, 2008:2). Indeed, in terms of development the British entrusted Christian missionaries with the responsibility of providing moral guidance to the Southerners in the decidedly paternalistic opinion that there was a greater need for such guidance in the South than there was for economic development (Deng, 2005:246).

The Progress Monitoring Report (2006:5) outlines the framework for sustainable peace and poverty eradication in the Sudan. This document places great emphasis on the need for social and economic development of the South because it has been sorely neglected since the civil war.

This neglect of development in the Southern region has led to a deeper entrenchment of division and tension between North and South. These historical developments of division have undoubtedly given rise to the current political and economic instability in Sudan (Deng, 2005:247; Heleta, 2008:2).

The border demarcation between the South and North Sudan was created by the British colonial rulers and was designed to control trade and curb the movement of Southerners into the Northern region and vice versa. Another reason was Britain's attempt to minimize the Northern influence – particularly the proliferation of the Muslim religion – throughout the South (Collins, 2008:30).

3.3 THE CURRENT CAUSES OF DIVISION AND INSTABILITY BETWEEN NORTH SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

In addition to religious differences, contemporary conflict and political instability in Sudan and South Sudan revolves around disputes over ownership of natural

resources such as oil and water. These disputes and differences are also fuelled by ethnic diversity. These causes of tension are discussed below.

3.3.1 Oil production as a source of division in the Sudan

Oil exploration began in 1959 in the Sudan. The first significant source of oil was found in 1979, when an American company called Chevron made the discovery on the Darfur/Kordofan border (Anon, 2009:1).

The discovery of oil in Sudan is viewed by Switzer (2002), Collins (2008) and Dagne (2011) as one of the main causes of political, social and economic instability in the Sudan. Government appropriation of oil lands and the atrocities perpetrated against the civilians who inhabit the oil-rich areas have served to intensify social tension between Southern civilians and the central government.

Communities and ethnic groups such as the Missarayi who were resident in the oil-rich Abyei region, were the most heavily affected. Militia troops were sent by the government to remove inhabitants from the vicinity of the oil fields (Dagne 2011:1).

A marked increase in oil production in the late 1990s has exacerbated the situation and caused further division between the North and South regions. Switzer (2002:2) is of the opinion that:

...revenues from petroleum production are financing the conflict ... the oilfields have become strategic targets for rebels, and various foreign interests – China and Malaysia, and multinational corporations from Europe, North America and Asia – have interests that are not necessarily aligned with the promotion of peace.

Emphasis is placed on the fact that conflict over ownership of oil reserves has become a major cause of escalating antagonism between North and South:

Oil was clearly implicated in exacerbating the conflict in Sudan and was a significant obstacle to successful peace negotiations (Jok, 2008:197).

Underlying this antagonism is the reality that the planning and administration of oil production takes place in the North (Khartoum) whilst many oil deposits are situated in the South, and areas bordering the South (Switzer, 2002:7). Switzer (2002:8) goes on to say that the discovery of oil in South Sudan led the central government to claim ownership of the valuable oil regions. Indeed, the government of Sudan controlled not only oil production but also the revenue that accrued. Inequalities of profit division between the two regions led to ever deepening frustration and antagonism (Deng, 2005:246).

Prior to 1998, Sudanese oil production and exports decreased as a result of the escalating conflict between South and North. As a result of internal instability and international pressure, investors also withdrew. However in 1998, oil exports resumed after a consortium of Canadian Talisman re-invested in oil production. The government of Sudan was soon able to purchase weapons from China, Iran and Russia in exchange for its oil exports (Jok, 2008:188).

The atrocities perpetrated against civilians continued unabated and have risen to genocidal levels, with a humanitarian disaster being declared by 2008 in the Darfur region (Jok, 2008:185). Switzer (2002:2–5) is of the view that the discovery of oil is directly proportional to the intensified conflict in the Sudan. The reasoning behind this is as follows:

- Firstly, the oil discoveries led to attempts by central government to appropriate the oil-bearing regions;
- Secondly, the appropriation of these regions by central government without consulting the groups that inhabit the region, or compensating them, led to rising social tension and the outbreak of rebellion; and
- Lastly, the oil revenues were used to finance government military action and the purchase of advanced weaponry. This in turn led to intensified military campaigns against inhabitants of the oil-rich regions.

In the light of the above it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that oil exploration and the struggle for political control in the Sudan are closely correlated. Oil disputes

are unfortunately not merely a thing of the past – they are an ongoing source of tension and antagonism between the North and South. Seven years have passed since the signing of the CPA and the dispute over the oil-rich Abyei region still remains unresolved (Dagne, 2011:4).

3.3.2 Islam versus Christianity as a source of division in Sudan and South Sudan

Among the most powerful of the influences exerted by colonialism was the introduction and spread of religion in Africa (Thomson, 2004:13–15). In the Sudan, Islam was introduced by merchants, tribesmen and fugitives in the early seventh century and soon dominated the larger part of North Africa including Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Chad and some parts of Nigeria. However the spread of Islam became significantly more difficult in the region of Egypt in the eleventh century with the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem by the Crusades (Khalaifalla, 2004:79). Christianity became dominant in the Southern part of Africa, including states such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Southern Sudan (Thomson, 2004:13).

When Egypt administered the Sudan jointly with Britain in 1899, this came with significant religious influence. The inheritance of religions from the colonial rulers could be the explanation of how a single state such as the Sudan could be so sharply divided between two dominating religions. Northern Sudan adopted the Islamic religion and Arabic culture, while the Southerners adopted Christianity. It is true to say that in essence the state is divided between two opposing and antagonistic religions (Khalaifalla, 2002:79–82).

3.4 ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN AS A SOURCE OF DIVISION

In order to understand the problematic nature and complexity of the division between North and South Sudan, it is necessary to provide a holistic demographic overview of the region.

According to the World Bank (2011) the total Sudanese population (North and South combined) was estimated at 34.3 million people in the year 2010, with an annual growth rate of approximately 2.8 percent. It is also reported that over 2 million Sudanese have been displaced in the period of civil wars (Jok, 2008:20–21).

There are a number of cultural differences which divide Sudan. Statistics provided by Gatkuoth (1995:2008) indicate that there are over 570 ethnic sub-groups in Sudan, which can be classified into 56 ethnic groups. These statistics are further reduced into nine main categories, based on shared language, history, ancestral lines and/or religion (See Table 3.1).

For simplicity and the purposes of this study, the main framework for analysis falls on the Arab and Muslim Northerners and the (non-Arabic) Christian/Animist Southerners.

3.5 THE VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

The purpose and relevance of this section is to elaborate on the complexity and diversity of ethnic differences between the populations of the North and South (See Table 3.1). The Muslims have dominated Northern Sudan while the Non-Muslims have prevailed in the South (Collins, 2008:6). There are, however, also internal regional divisions, especially in the South. The nature of these divisions has led to political instability and necessitated not only a negotiation process leading to a peace agreement, but also the eventual secession of South Sudan, both of which are discussed in some length in the next chapter.

TABLE 3.1 THE SUDANESE ETHNIC COMPOSITION THROUGHOUT THE NORTH AND SOUTH

	ETHNIC GROUP	PERCENTAGE	REGION
I.	Arabs	40%	North
II.	Missariya	13%	Abyei region on the South/North border
III.	Dinka	12%	South
IV.	Beja	7%	Western region of the North
V.	Foreigners	7%	South and North
VI.	Nuba	5%	Far North
VII.	Nuer	4%	South
VIII.	Shilluks	2%	South
IX.	Zande	1.8%	South

Source: Gatkuoth (1995:208)

3.5.1 The Arab ethnic group

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has been perceived as an Arab nation and its entire citizenry was expected to adapt to the Arab culture, religion and language (Collin, 2008:137). This prediction was not entirely accurate but it is estimated that 40 percent of the total population of the Sudan adheres to the Arabic culture and religion (Islam) which has been widely promoted by the government of Sudan in the North (Flueher-Lobban, 1990:616). The spread of Islam in the Sudan from the twelfth to the fourteenth century was coupled with a broad acceptance of Arab culture and lifestyle.

The identification as Arab is based on cultural identity and the use of Arabic as a mother tongue (Ali, 1996:59).

People of Arab background in the Sudan claim their descent from Saudi Arabia or Yemen and speak Arabic. The World Fact Book (CIA: 2012) estimates that the contemporary population of Arab Sudanese is now as high as 67 percent and claims that there is Arab dominance over political, economic and social development in the Sudan. Another reason for the rapid growth of Arab influence is that anyone who wishes to do so can convert to become a Muslim and adopt the Arabic culture (Ali, 1996:57–59, CIA: 2012).

The most widely followed religious belief of the Arabs is Islam (Ali, 1996:57). For the most part the Arab ethnic group comprises middle to upper class income citizens (Jok, 2008:6). The Arabization of the Sudan began in the late fifteenth century and this infiltration fuelled the conflict between North and South. The Southerners were strongly opposed to the Islamization of the Sudan and the spread of Arabic culture. They were also resentful of the Arab domination of political and economic progress and their control over Sudanese natural resources (Paglia, 2005:14).

3.5.2 The Missariya ethnic group

The Missariya ethnic group comprises about 13 percent of the population of the Sudan. They are resident in the oil-rich Abyei region which is on the border between the North and South. In the same area there are also members of the Dinka ethnic group. Tribal clashes and conflict are ongoing in the Abyei region because of the exploitation of the oil reserves, quarrels over the profits accrued, and the domination of one ethnic group over the other. The Missariya are divided into two factions on religious and ethnic grounds. The majority of Missariya are Muslims and adhere to the Arabic culture, while the minority are Christians. Arabic is the language most widely spoken by members of the Missariya ethnic group (Gatkuoth 1995:209).

3.5.3 The Dinka ethnic group

The Dinka is one of the largest and most dominant groups in the Sudan and make up about 12 percent of the population of the South (Gatkuoth, 1995:209). The language most widely spoken by this ethnic group is Dinka, which is sub-divided into five different dialects in various zones. A small minority of the Dinka speak English. The Dinka ethnic group populates the Northern portion of South Sudan (Collins, 2008:6–8). They are also described as a rural community and one that is relatively underdeveloped (Deng, 1972:3).

According to Deng (1972:1) the Dinkas are widely spread in settlements across the rich savannah, segmented by the waters of the Nile River. They are distinguishable by unique physical characteristics, being both slim and tall. There are also very uniform in their cultural identity. The Dinkas fall under two separate administrations, namely those of the Upper Nile, and Southern Kordofan. As is the case in many traditional African cultures, cattle play an important social role in the Dinka ethnic group and members are described as “loving slaves of cattle” (Deng, 1972:2). Livestock are an important source of food; are used as sacrifices to ancestors; and are made in payment for bride-wealth. The dominating religion of the Dinkas is Animist and ancestral belief and for the most part, indigenous languages are spoken (Deng, 1972:2-3).

3.5.4 The Beja ethnic group

The Beja ethnic group is a particularly large group, and constitutes some 7 percent of the Sudanese population. The Beja are situated in the western part of the North region. Some Beja have converted to Muslim religion and adopted Arab culture. According to Sidahmed (1995:1) the Beja are amongst the earliest ethnic groups of the Sudan and have a history that goes back for about 4 000 years. The language most used is the Beja language known as To-Bedawai. The To-Bedawai language is one of the indigenous languages of the Sudan and is classified as an Afro-Asiatic language. A sub-clan¹⁴ of the Beja people speaks Arabic. The Beja region is in effect

¹⁴ “Sub-clan” in this context refers to the minor group classified under the main group, which is the Beja.

an arid desert and semi-desert region in the highlands of the Red Sea. The members of the Beja ethnic group are known for their camel herding (Sidahmed, 1995:1).

Most of the Beja converted to Christianity during the sixth century. This was brought about by the influence of the three Nubian Christian kingdoms that developed along the Nile River for a period of 600 years. However, in the thirteenth century, most of the Beja accepted Islam as a religious belief in a period during which they moved towards Egypt and the far Northern regions of Sudan (Sidahmed, 1995:1).

3.5.5 The foreigners

Most of the foreign immigrants in the Sudan are from the neighbouring states such as Niger, Ethiopia and Egypt. These immigrants moved into the Sudan as early as the seventeenth century to become active in trade of all kinds, including slave trading. For example, Niam-Niam (an ethnic group), are immigrants from near the border of Sudan and Ethiopia. Over the years they have been assimilated into the Azande ethnic group through inter-marriage. Although they have been in Sudan for over 300 years, some of the Sudanese still consider them to be “foreigners” because their ancestors were not originally from Sudan. This group speaks an indigenous language known as Adawama or Zande (Collins 2008:8).

3.5.6 The Nuba ethnic group

The Nuba or Nubians are based in the far North of the Sudan around the foothills of the Nuba Mountains of the Southern Kordofan state. They constitute about 5 percent of the Sudan population (Jok, 2008:104). The primary religion of the Nubian people is Islam although some are Christians and a small minority follow indigenous forms of worship. The most frequently used language is Arabic. According to Jok (2008:104–106) there are over 100 indigenous languages that are spoken in the Nubian areas and the official language, Arabic, is also used frequently. The Nubians are identified as farmers who keep livestock and grow crops as a means of subsistence (Jok, 2008:105).

3.5.7 The Nuer ethnic group

The Nuer group is the second largest ethnic group in Sudan and constitutes an estimated 4 percent of the population. This ethnic group borders such tribes as the Shilluk and Dinka in South Sudan. It is important to note that keeping cattle and crop farming play a significant role in the culture of the Southern Sudanese people (Collin, 2008:6–8). The number of cattle a group or clan owns signifies their influence and wealth. The Nuer, like the Dinka are cattle herders and also cultivate crops to maintain a subsistence lifestyle (Collins, 2008:47).

The majority of the Nuer adheres to Animist belief and other indigenous forms of worship, while a few are Christians. The most frequently spoken languages are English and indigenous languages (Jok, 2008:47,104).

3.5.8 The Shilluk ethnic group

The Shilluk are the third largest ethnic group in the Southern region, making up approximately 2 percent of the Sudanese population. The Shilluks rely more on agriculture and fishing in order to survive. Unlike other ethnic groups mentioned above the Shilluk keep a limited number of cattle (Collins, 2008:7, 34).

This ethnic group resides along the western and eastern banks of the Nile River. The Shilluks are mostly Christians although some are Animist. The spoken language amongst this ethnic group is the indigenous Shilluk language (Seligman & Seligman, 1932:37).

3.5.9 The Zande ethnic group

The Zande, also known as the Azande ethnic group, constitute an estimated 1.8 percent of the Sudanese population. They are situated in the Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal provinces in South Sudan (Collins, 2008:8, 40).

The home language of the Zande ethnic group is Adamawa and the Azande language called Pazande. Most of the members of this group have adopted the

Christian faith, while some still retain their Animist belief. There is also a small minority who believe in magic and witchcraft (Baxter & Butt, 1953:16–18).

3.6 THE DIVERSITY OF ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND THE COMPLEXITY OF ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN


Nationalism is defined by Baradat (2009:44) as an ideology which encourages people to identify with the interests of their national group and to motivate and support the creation of a state. Sudan and South Sudan are still faced with challenges of nation-building and the establishment of their own national identities. The challenge of establishing a national identity is complicated by the heterogeneous and diverse nature of the populations of Sudan and South Sudan (Gatkuoth, 1995:206).

Diversified societies are not unique; every state has an element of diversity. “Antagonism arises, however, when one ethnic group dominates, discriminates against, or marginalizes another” (Thomson, 2004:59–63). Thomson (2004: 60–65) is of the opinion that ethnicity can be used as a method to mobilize people for political gain.

The rivalry in terms of the search for a national identity in Sudan and South Sudan is caused for the most part by:

- Conflict over the ownership of oil,
- Conflict over the ownership of territory

This rivalry is fuelled by a variety of ethnic differences which contribute to the multi-dimensionality and complexity of the Sudanese situation.



MAP 3.2 THE DIVERSE ETHNIC GROUPS OF THE SUDAN

Source: Isady (2000)

3.7 ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SUDAN

The ethnic diversity of Sudan (North) region is discussed below to highlight the similarities and differences between North Sudan and South Sudan.

3.7.1 The influence of Arabism on the Sudanese political landscape

According to Aguda (1973:177), the international perception that Sudan is an Islamic state has been a major cause of internal conflict. As shown above, the reality is that only 40 percent of the population is of Arabic origin. Nevertheless the Arab domination over politics, economy, administration commerce and industry in the Sudan makes it basically an Arab state. The economic and political dominance of the Arabs in the North has indeed intensified the North–South conflict (Gatkuoth, 1995:208–209).

Arabism and Islamism of the Sudanese occurred virtually simultaneously in the early fifteenth century. Intermarriages and cultural assimilation provided many an opportunity for the Arabs to increase in number and expand their influence in the Sudan, and soon those who had married into the family of traditional rulers gained political control. The Sudanese who have been assimilated into Arabism tend to place greater value on cultural elements rather than biological traits (Aguda, 1973:180). The Muslim faith is strongly linked to the Arabic language because a translation of the Quran (the Islamic book of law) into any other language is regarded as a different interpretation of Islamic law rather than the authentic version. Arabism has become a subject of pride, not only amongst Arabs but also throughout the Muslim world (Aguda, 1973:180).

The Arabism movement called for the assimilation of other cultures into the Arab culture, especially in the South and in reaction, policies were pursued and implemented which supported Arab ideologies and an Arab outlook. Arabism was thus actively promoted through education and religion in the South. Arab-orientated schools and mosques were built throughout the South (Collins, 2008; 194).

3.7.2 The Islamization of the state and society

The Islamization of Sudan began in the early 1980s, when the then serving president, Ja'fta al-Numeri, adopted Islamic dress code for all his public appearances. Numeri also supervised the issue of new currency and bank notes depicted him resplendent in his new Islamic persona (Haynes, 2007:313). The

Islamization process in the Sudan was further expanded by Omar-al Bashir, who after a successful coup in 1989, became president and used his extensive military powers to entrench Islamic-inspired control over the state (Collins, 2008:186).

Sharia law served as the law of the land despite the protestations of the Southerners. In October 1989, after the coup, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) formally established a government and adopted the term ‘Islamist’ as a means of distinguishing themselves and their followers from other Muslim fundamentalists (Collins, 2008:187). The RCC was determined in their endeavour to establish an Islamic Sudan. Commitment by members and followers was displayed in their Islam dress, religion and culture. According to Collins (2008:188) the Sudanese cultural identity can be seen as “the struggle between the sacred and profane, religious and secular, Arab-Islam and Western Christianity”.

The RCC under the leadership of Al-Bashir established what was referred to as “Islamic security”. These crack Islamic security units were tasked with ensuring that civilians who did not support and comply with orthodox Islamic laws and directives were severely dealt with. Civilians who opposed Islamic laws would be arrested, tortured, or even killed. Stringent policies based on Sharia law were announced by the RCC (Collins, 2008:190). The press and all other forms of media had to be under government control. Woman had to “properly” dressed, with their heads covered and wearing long dresses. No woman was allowed to work, since the ideal Sudanese woman was one who was a devout Muslim who took care of her family and stayed away from business pursuits and market places. Any woman who was found working in the business sector was promptly arrested and at risk of being tortured (Collins, 2008:190–191).

The expectation, or rather the assumption by the Muslim government under Al-Bashir, was that the non-Muslim majority would become assimilated culturally; adopt the Islam religion; and be happy to abide by the Muslim rule of law. The fact that only 40 percent total population of the Sudan were Muslims left the non-Muslim majority of the population feeling marginalized and discontented (Jok, 2007:83).

Collins (2008:199–203) explains that the Islamization of the Northerners inspired the formation of the SPLM/A which was formed when the non-Muslim population, mainly

based in the South, were mobilized to demand a non-Muslim administration and to work towards attaining independence for South Sudan. The SPLM/A soon gained the sympathy of many other African and international states such as, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zaire, the United States of America and several European states (Collins, 2008:201).

3.7.3 The entrenchment of personal-rule leadership

Al-Bashir as the president of the Sudan from 1983 to 2011, and president of the North from 2011 to date, displays all the characteristics of what can be described as a personal ruler. Personal ruler implies that “all the power is concentrated in the personal authority of one individual” leadership position is usually gained through the status of that individual in the society (Thomson, 2004:115). The rural areas along the Blue Nile and the South-west regions of the South were frequently marginalized, because these regions are predominantly non-Arab and the people are defiant about following Muslim law (Collins, 2008:33–40). The Arab Muslim society is persistent in the pursuit of using the Islamic law as a law of the land, regardless of all the other religions and cultural values that exist in the Sudan. Al-Bashir is currently being charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the brutal killings and other atrocities against those citizens of Sudan who refuse to submit to his style of leadership. However, no arrests have been made (Kron, 2011:1).

Thomson (2004:115) describes personal rulers as individuals who treat the state as their own private property. It is further noted that the characteristics of a personal ruler include the following:

- Authoritarianism as a method of protecting the ruler’s own position, with the leader tending to use the resources of the state in a coercive manner.
- Such leaders are often ostentatious, displaying wealth that they have accumulated as a result of their position in the highest office.
- Personal rulers are often arbitrary; they see themselves as being above the law. Furthermore they refuse to abide to rules and restrictions. Certain laws can be

changed overnight if it suits them to do so, which results in the state system being unpredictable.

- Personal rulers also have a tendency to encourage competition among intra-governmental factions. This breeds a political environment of factionalism, schism, purges and coups.

These characteristics above, as outlined by Thomson (2004:115) are readily recognisable in the behaviour displayed by Al-Bashir, as can be shown in the following outline of his public life as president of Sudan.

Al-Bashir attained the presidency of Sudan through a military coup in 1983. As a method of retaining his power, an armed militia known as the Janjaweed¹⁵ was established. This militia group instilled feelings of fear among citizens who dared to oppose the government or Al-Bashir's pronouncements. Intimidation at the hands of the Janjaweed was especially prevalent in the Southern regions where villages were often raided and homes burnt down (Jok, 2008:49–52).

In 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant of arrest for Al-Bashir. The charges laid against him are those of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes in Darfur. In November 2011, the International Commission of Justice (ICJ) in Kenya issued a provisional warrant for Al-Bashir's arrest, based on the evidence raised by the ICC. Should Al-Bashir set foot in Kenya he will be immediately arrested (Kiunga, 2011:1). As yet no arrest has been made. According to Kiunga (2011:1) Al-Bashir is the first head of state to be indicted by the ICC but as president he has immunity.

The South Sudanese as well as people in other regions which were not affiliated to the government of Sudan in the North were frequently victimized by the personal-ruler style of Al-Bashir. As a result, the South and rural areas in general were politically weak, economically undeveloped and socially marginalized. Frustration and intolerance of their hopeless situation began to mount among the South Sudanese. What exacerbated the tension in 1989 was the official adoption of Islamic law by the

¹⁵ The Janjaweed is an Arab-led militia of government troops.

government of Sudan. This was done without any consultation at all with the predominantly Christian Southerners. This served to intensify the conflict which boiled over into a civil war. Sudanese who refused to abide by the Sharia law were imprisoned, tortured and even killed (Collins, 2008:187).

3.7.4 Arabic as an official language

Arabic became the national language during the struggle for independence under the influence of activists such as the Sudanese Graduate Congress. This congress strongly advocated for the adoption of Arab culture, beliefs and lifestyle (Flueher-Lobban, 1990: 616). The Southerners did not approve of this because they have always identified themselves as Africans (Paglia, 2005:13–15) and are steeped in the cultural roots and traditions of Africa which differ markedly from those of the Arabs.

The English language was introduced intentionally in the late 1920s under British colonial rule. It was then spread by the Christian missionaries who built schools where English was used as the accepted medium of instruction. The use of English was promoted not only to prepare the Southerners for a future administrative role under colonial rule, but also to discourage them from using the Muslim language of the North, which is Arabic.

There are over 130 recorded languages in the Sudan, Arabic being the main language and the official one used in the administration of government in the North. English is the official language in the South and is the predominant means of communication among the educated. Indigenous languages are used in the rural areas of the South and the western parts of Sudan. There are also distinct tribal languages which are used by ethnic groups and these vary according to region (Diversity Council, 2007:4).

3.8 ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SOUTH SUDAN

3.8.1 The ethnic-based formation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)

The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was established in 1983. The motivation behind its formation was the fact that the government of the Sudan had abandoned the Addis Ababa peace agreement.¹⁶ Oduho was named as the chairperson of this movement and Garang was appointed as the commander of its military wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (Jok, 2007:86). In other words the SPLM is the name of the organization and the SPLA is the armed military wing. In this study it is referred to jointly as the SPLM/A. The objectives of the SPLM/A were emphasized at its inauguration; it wanted a democratic, secular, and a united Sudan (Jok, 2007: 84–86; Collins, 2008:268).

The SPLM/A's claim is that

...it was not so much fighting for the secession of the South but rather for the liberation of the whole country from the tyranny of the minority clique of riverine Arabs and for the creation of a “New Sudan”, free from any discrimination based on race, ethnicity religion or cultural background (Jok, 2007:86).

The principal objectives of the party are listed as follows:

- The establishment of a free, just, democratic and decentralized system of governance and a social contract based on the free will and popular participation of all the people of Sudan.
- The achievement of the right to self-determination by and for the people of the Southern Sudan in fulfilment of their aspirations.
- The realization of voluntary unity between the various regions of the Sudan.

¹⁶ The Addis Ababa agreement was signed in 1972 to end the first civil war between the North and South. The agreement gave a high degree of autonomy to the South.

- Building a national consciousness and common purpose in the Sudan through the liberation of the individual and society from all forms of political, economic, social and other constraints.

According to Jok (2008:86) Garang, the commander of the SPLA, was a member of the Dinka tribe in the South, while Oduho was from Kenya. Oduho subsequently resigned from the leadership of the SPLM and Garang made himself the chairperson and commander. He appointed members of the Dinka into high positions within the SPLM/A while the other smaller ethnic groups such as the Nuer and Shilluks were sidelined. In 1991, a dissident faction in the SPLM/A broke away under the leadership of Nasir and attempted to oust Garang. However their attempts failed and this led to deepening conflicts and divisions in the South. The infighting, power struggles and other divisions in the South hampered the peace negotiations with the government of Sudan (Collins, 2008: 202–204).

3.8.2 The African influence on society

Although, as shown above, Sudan was heavily influenced by Arab culture from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, the people of South Sudan retained their African heritage and ideology. Southern cultural practice is based largely on the Africanist school of thought (Hashim, 2007:1). The review undertaken by the Diversity Council (2007:2) outlines the cultural practices that are characteristic of the Southern Sudanese population:

- **Scarification:** Many Sudanese practise facial scarring as a symbol and marker of the particular tribe to which they belong. Although the ritual, which indicates bravery and beauty, is no longer a popular practice, some of the Southern Sudanese, notably the Shilluk and Nuer ethnic groups, still have facial scarring. The women may also have their bodies scarred, which symbolizes their marital status and the number of children they have.
- **Cattle:** In many traditional African societies it is a widely held belief that the number of cattle one owns symbolizes one's wealth and status. Not only do they provide food, but cattle also hold religious significance for most ethnic

groups in the South and are used to perform rituals and sacrifices by the Animist. They are also used to pay for a bride before marriage. The Dinka and the Nilotc ethnic groups in particular set great store by the possession of substantial herds of cattle.

- **Marriage and family:** Marriages are traditionally arranged by families and polygamy is still common in some tribal groups.
- **Education:** Before independence was gained in the Sudan in 1956, education was for the most part the prerogative of the European-based missionary societies who sent their missionaries to Africa. They erected schools in the South and taught Christian values as well as the English language. However, in 1962 the government closed all mission schools and established Islamic schools where the Quran was studied and Arabic was the medium of tuition.
- **Animism:** The Animist belief is popular in South Sudan. As mentioned earlier, animism is a belief system that ascribes spirits to natural objects such as trees, water, and rocks. Rituals and sacrifices are a constant practice amongst those who adhere to animism.
- **Music and dance:** Music and dance play a major role in religion and recreation in the Sudanese culture. The Muslims in North Sudan also use religious music during prayers, while in the South, natural instruments are made and clapping and dancing are popular in the Christian churches.

These are some of the cultural practices that distinguish the Southerners and are for the most part frowned upon by their Northern neighbours. Arguably the most predominant cultural practice in the South is the social importance and symbolism attached to the ownership of cattle

3.8.3 Christianity and Animist beliefs

The religious belief of Christianity was introduced into the Sudan by the missionaries who arrived to spread their teachings after Britain had colonized the area and established its administration. The idea of saturating the Southern regions of Sudan

with missionaries was to ensure that the Muslim religion that was prevalent in the North did not spread throughout the South, because British rule was threatened by the radical Muslim extremists and activists (Collins, 2008:48–51).

The two main Christian mission societies that established their mission stations in the South were those of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches. The colonial government encouraged the Southerners to participate in church related activities and the churches offered a safe haven for the tortured Southern Sudanese. Furthermore, the children received their education at mission schools (Collins, 2008:50).

Animists base their belief on Africanism. Less than 6 percent of Southerners adhere to Animism, believing that natural creations such as trees, river and rocks are spiritual beings.

3.8.4 The impact of ethnicity on political mobilization towards the CPA in the Sudan

Civil wars and conflicts in African states are often described as ethno-religious conflicts, meaning that such wars are sparked by contentious ethnic and religious issues. According to Humphreys et. al. (2002:9), ethnicity may affect politics directly through its impact on the ability to engage in collective action. This is evident in the Sudan where the SPLM/A was formed to mobilize the people politically and take military action against the government of Sudan as a form of resistance against Islamization.

The Islamization of the Sudan began in the early 1980s and sparked a great deal of tension and rebellion among non-Arab and non-Muslim groups, most of which were situated in the South. But despite the Southerners' resistance, the government continued its dominating tactics, entrenching the Islam religion and culture as national policy. Opposition parties and ethnic groups were unable to make their voices heard because the government was heavily supported by militia groups. In addition, Islamic militants enforced the values of Sharia on the Sudanese people (Collins, 2008:199–223).

The military-Islamic regime of Al-Bashir was eager to Islamize the Sudan in every way possible, forming alliances with the National Islamic Front (NIF) and other Islamic-based organizations in the North (Haynes, 2007:314). The Sharia law does not provide clear direction on governance in the context of the political, economic, technological or social changes of the past 1 500 years. However, Sudan's modern version is “prominent for its repression, lack of human rights, political intolerance and policies of ethnic cleansing”¹⁷ (Haynes, 2007:314).

The Islamic regime, together with the NIF, introduced the policy of ethnic cleansing which was based on the premise that the non-Arab communities do not deserve to be part of the Sudan nation because of their “unacceptable” African identity and cultural heritage. The NIF sought to destroy the traditional bases of authority in these communities and to change their ethnic composition by forced removals, but they also killed civilians and destroyed their villages (Haynes, 2007:314).

In the year 1996, a rebel ethnic-based faction of the SPLM/A under the leadership of Garang signed a peace treaty with the Sudanese government represented by the National Congress Party (NCP). In 1998 a referendum was held and a new constitution was approved. However this peace agreement was short-lived and ongoing conflict eventually led to another civil war (Haynes, 2007:315).

3.9 CHALLENGES FACING THE SUDAN IN THE POST-COLONIAL DISPENSATION

By way of summary, colonialism left the Sudanese state with the following challenges (Paglia 2005:20–25):

- The geopolitical scenario was disrupted by the creation of artificial boundaries. The British authorities intentionally created this border between the North and South of Sudan in the hope that this would prevent the Arab-Islam influence of the Northerners from spreading into the South (Paglia, 2005:20).

¹⁷ Ethnic cleansing refers to the expulsion of an “undesired” population from a given territory based on religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.

- Furthermore, colonialism set in motion mechanisms of identity awareness such as pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. It also promoted the rise of the Arab-Islamist tendencies in the North of Sudan in response to Western imperialism (Paglia, 2005:23–25).
- The legacy of colonialism was apparent in weak political institutions under traditional rulers who were appointed by the colonizers but were largely uneducated in the art of running a Western-style state administration (Paglia, 2005:22).
- Patterns of coercion, violence and exploitation were legitimized; these were used as a method to “tame” rebellious citizens of the Sudan who were defiant in reaction to the rule of invaders in their fatherland (Collins, 2008: 218–224). Post-colonialism as methods, were retained by the leading elite as the accepted routine to maintain order. Violence was seen as a necessary method of ensuring smooth governance in a weakly institutionalized state such as Sudan. The government-led Janjaweed were heavily armed and often used coercive force (Jok, 2008:88).
- Colonialism also left the Sudan state with a fragile economy. It was highly dependent on the import of refined goods by the British colonizer and self-sustainability was an almost impossible task. When left to manage their own economic growth the North reaped the profits from the oilfields in the Abyei region. Fraud, corruption and marginalization of the Southerners from their share of the profits, exacerbated tensions and ultimately contributed to the outbreak of civil war (Jok, 2008:85). Although the oil is extracted in the South, the Southerners were not involved in the administration process and all revenues were strictly under the control of the government in the North. There was no question of sharing oil revenue with the rest of the population of Sudan. Villagers who had their traditional settlements in the Abyei region were subjected to forced removals by the government; if they refused the Janjaweed militia intimidated the rural people and burnt down their homes (Jok, 2008:88).

- Colonization was also responsible for the consolidation of ethnically homogeneous elites despite the multicultural dissimilarity of the societies, especially in the South of Sudan where there are more than 500 different ethnic groups. The dominant group in the Sudanese post-colonial period was the Muslim-based Arab government of the North represented by the National Congress Party (NCP). The NCP marginalized the smaller ethnic groups and rural areas in the South and this resulted in growing competition over resources. This problem still persists despite the independence of the Southerners (Kron, 2011:2). The Dinka, which is the largest Southern ethnic group with the majority of members in the SPLA, dominates the government seats in the newly established state of Southern Sudan. This has raised concerns among the other major ethnic groups such as the Nuer and Mussarayi, causing heated internal conflicts in the South. So much so, that within less than two months of gaining independence, over 3 000 Southern Sudanese were killed (Kron, 2011:1).

As discussed above, colonialism has had a highly negative impact on the African continent. The creation of artificial boundaries in the Sudan, for example had a detrimental effect on civil society and many ethnic groups were either forced to share the same space with other groups with whom they had no definitive ties, or were torn apart by these artificial boundaries.

3.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter was narrowed down to the dynamics and complexity of ethnic realities in Sudan and South Sudan. It was indicated that the current instability cannot (as popularly believed) merely be simplified to religious differences between Arabs and non-Arabs. Political instability in Sudan is also rooted in:

- conflict over ownership of oil;
- territorial disputes; and
- religious beliefs/differences.

The above causal factors are however fuelled by ethnic diversity. For this reason the elements of instrumentalism, as an identified ethnic mobilization approach was used as explanatory framework to structure this chapter.

The chapter attempted to provide a descriptive analysis of the multidimensional ethnic composition of the Sudanese population. By using the instrumentalist approach as a guideline, the research for this study was narrowed down to a separate analysis of ethnic diversity in the North and ethnic diversity in the South.

It was against the background of the causes of conflict and ethnic diversity discussed above that the CPA was eventually negotiated, signed and implemented in 2005. The secession of the Southerners from the North in 2011 was the outcome of the CPA and is discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 SUDAN COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter was compiled against the background of the challenges that faced Sudan up to the signing of the CPA in 2005. In the previous chapter it was indicated that the Sudanese political landscape has been characterized by conflict over oil, territory and religion since its independence in 1956. This conflict was fuelled by a complex web of ethnic differences which mobilized the population into action. It was this mobilization of the people in Sudan and the South Sudan that caused the widespread political instability. In many respects the Sudan was internationally perceived to be in a state of civil war prior to the signing of the CPA. Under the auspices of the UN the CPA was negotiated and signed between the government of Sudan (GoS), represented by the NCP, and South Sudan, represented by the SPLM/A. The purpose of this CPA was to bring an end to ongoing hostilities; establish an interim coalition government; and prepare for a possible referendum on the issue of Southern self-determination within six years.

The chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the contents of Sudanese CPA of 2005; it also examines the terms outlined in the agreement and its outcomes. Firstly, the chapter provides a descriptive background orientation on the circumstances that led to signing of the CPA and then, importantly, goes on to highlight its six key agreements. Secondly, the implementation phase of the CPA will be discussed with specific focus on what was successfully implemented and what is still outstanding. The achievements and failures of the implementation process are also outlined. Thirdly, this chapter is narrowed down to the current outcome of the CPA over the transitional interim period of six years (2005–2011).

4.2 AGREEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE CPA

The government of Sudan and the SPLM/A have been involved in attempts to achieve peace in Sudan through numerous negotiations over the past 19 years since the SPLM/A uprising. These negotiations proved ineffective and political instability and civil war have continued unabated between Sudan and South Sudan (Jok, 2008:256).

The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played the mediating role between the Sudan and South Sudan. The IGAD is a vehicle for regional security and dialogue. It was established in the early 1990s. Members of IGAD include the governments of the following African states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. IGAD's objectives are to promote policies of peace and stability in the region (IGAD, 2011). See Map 4.1 below.

In 1994, IGAD imposed certain restrictive principles on the two contesting Sudanese parties, namely the NCP and the SPLM/A. These principles were named the Declaration of Principles (DoP) and were initiated and accepted in Nairobi in January 1994. It was through these principles that the SPLA and IGAD governments agreed to endorse the self-determination and the formation of a democratic secular Southern Sudan (Collin, 2008:206). These principles reprimanded the NCP and SPLM/A parties for their untoward use of military force. It was under the auspices of the IGAD that between 27 October and 11 November 1997 the two parties began to discuss the practical possibilities of either unity or separation (i.e. a united Sudan or two separate states). The outcome of these discussions was the suggestion by the government of Sudan that a federal system¹⁸ should be created. However, the Southerners opted for complete separation and the creation two separate states (Collins, 2008:262). The agreements reached prior to the official CPA are discussed further.

¹⁸ A federal form of government is one where the union of states recognizes the sovereignty of the central authority while retaining the residual powers of government. The power is therefore divided between one central and several divisional level governmental structures.



MAP 4.1 MEMBER STATES OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

Source: IGAD Profile (2011)

4.2.1 The Addis Ababa Accord

The Addis Ababa Accord was signed in 1972. It was the first peace agreement between the Sudan and the South Sudan. In an attempt to bring peace and stability to the Sudan this agreement was signed by the NCP and SPLMA. This accord articulated the desire of the Southerners to be autonomous and it was through this agreement that the Southerners gained their independence (Schafer, 2007:3). Autonomy of the South Sudan meant that a separate Parliament and High Executive Council would be established in the South. However, the limitations of this autonomy

were that the political parties of the South were given the authority to govern the Southern provinces while national rule was still the responsibility of the Northern governing body (Rolandsen *in Schafer*: 2007:3).

The self-governance of the South was however short-lived. Before long, gross mismanagement of the economy and mounting debt caused the deterioration of the South's infrastructure, which fell into a state of disrepair. The Sudan then used this as a reason for the re-incorporation of South Sudan under the Northern-based national government (Schafer, 2007:4).

According to Schafer (2007:4) the Addis Ababa Accord failed to establish peace between the two regions. The autonomy granted to the South had been based on the claim that efficient self-governance was a possibility in the South, coupled with North Sudan's repressive control. But instead, the in-fighting between North and South resumed as fiercely as ever and ultimately led to the second civil war of 1986–2002.

4.2.2 The Machakos agreement as foundation for the CPA

The CPA is the outcome of the Machakos Protocol (2002:1) which was initiated in July 2002 and signed at Machakos, Kenya by the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. The Machakos agreement was adopted in accordance to the commitment of both parties to the DoP as laid down by IGAD. The Machakos Protocol (2002:5-7) outlines the perceived outcomes of the agreement as follows:

- The possible declaration of self-determination of the Southerners through a referendum after a six-year interim period;
- The provision for the Sharia law to prevail in the North as a source of legislation; and
- The provision for “popular consultation” as a source of legislation in the South. It was envisaged that the process of popular consultation would unfold through a process of a referendum.

The Machakos Protocol established a platform for negotiations in the Sudan, making it possible to achieve a CPA. However, many ethnic groups in the rural areas such as

the Nubians of the Nuba Mountain and Darfur region, felt excluded from the process because its main focus was on the Southern and Northern regions. The Darfur region in particular, felt marginalized because there was no mention in the CPA on how to resolve the conflicts in Darfur (Jok, 2008:256). The insinuation was that the government of Sudan was attempting to make peace with only one region of the Sudan while ignoring other conflicted regions such as Darfur. However, as indicated, the Machakos Protocol served as a useful platform for negotiations, creating a stable environment and holistically identifying the key objectives of the stakeholders involved (Brosche 2007:1).

Before the CPA was eventually signed, six different agreements and/or resolutions were reached between the government of Sudan (represented by the NCP) and the SPLMA of South Sudan. These agreements were important in that they created an environment that was conducive to the signing of a peace agreement. They were: i) the Machakos Protocol (20 July 2002); ii) the Agreement on Security Arrangements (25 September 2003); iii) a power-sharing agreement (26 May 2004); iv) the agreement on wealth sharing (26 May 2004); v) the protocol on conflict resolution (26 May 2004); and the resolution on the Abyei conflict (26 May 2004) (CPA, 2005: xi). These resolutions served to stabilize the political situation and create an environment conducive to the signing and implementation of the CPA in 2005. The content and implications of these agreements are discussed in turn below.

4.2.3 Agreement 1: The Machakos Protocol

The Machakos Protocol was signed in Kenya in June 2002. The foundation of this agreement was the realization that the SPLM/A and NCP were eager to resolve the conflict in Sudan in a way that was sustainable, beneficial to all stakeholders, and effective in the long term. In preparation for the signing of the CPA, the Machakos Protocol revolved around the following issues and discussions:

- The declaration of the intent by both parties;
- The steps to be followed prior to the transition period and thereafter;
- Issues of state and religion; and

- The right to self-determination of the Southerners.

The key ingredient of the Machakos Protocol was a commitment (by both parties) that they would: i) adhere to the principles of universal human rights; ii) maintain continued social and economic development; and iii) work towards a possible Southern secession.

4.2.3.1 Adherence to the principles of human rights

The nature of shared human rights was stipulated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), reconfirmed in 1993, and reads as follows:

Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever their nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.

Entrenched in the Machakos Protocol (2002:3) were the principles of equality, freedom, democracy and unity. These principles clearly stipulate the intention to

...establish a democratic system of governance taking account of the cultural ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of the Sudan.

The Sudan was under some pressure from the international community to adhere to the international standards of human rights. Failure to comply was to invite punishment in the form of various sanctions against the government of Sudan (Jok, 2008: 166).

4.2.3.2 Continued social and economic development

It was agreed that the inequalities of development between the different regions would be redressed by social and economic development of the Southern region and rural areas (CPA, 2005:1). It was in terms of the wealth sharing agreement (see below in 4.2.5) that an undertaking was made that the profits of oil would be shared equally between the North and South. This profit would then be used for economic and social development of the South (Paglia, 2005:3). Social and economic

development in Sudan post-2005 has been guided by the “Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication” (Progress Monitoring Report, 2006:6). This development plan lays down the basics of addressing poverty eradication through social and economic development of the state. It places emphasis on the agreements outlined in the CPA on peace building and development of all Sudanese citizens. It was agreed that development would focus on:

- improving governance;
- facilitation of an increased role for civil society;
- promotion of independent media;
- equitable sharing of national wealth; and
- creating a system of decentralized government to promote community-driven recovery and development (Progress Monitoring Report, 2006:6–8).

In order to attain these goals the government would have to restructure its policies to promote development in the state. However, According to the Progress Monitoring Report (2006: 56-60) most of the social development programmes have been made possible by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The continued disputes over the oil is hampering the economic growth of the state, thus makes development difficult.

4.2.3.3 Potential Southern secession

The Machakos Protocol (2002:5) also made provision for the South Sudanese to claim their right to self-determination in a referendum to determine their future status:

... the unity of the Sudan [should be] based on the free will of its people, democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect and justice for all citizens of the Sudan ... the priority of the parties [must be] that it is possible to redress the grievances of the people of South Sudan and to meet their aspirations within [such] a framework.

From the statement above it seems clear that at the time both parties (SPLM/A and NCP) were committed to the creation of a united government in Sudan. However there is also provision made for self determination of the Southerners. This provision is expressed in the Machakos Protocol (2002:5) and in the CPA (2005:8) as follows:

At the end of the six year interim period, there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GoS and the SPLM/A for the people of South Sudan to confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.

The initial and most desirable system of government was therefore to establish a workable Government of Unity (GoU) where the state would retain most of the residual powers while some were distributed to the Southern regions.

4.2.4 Agreement 2: Power sharing as an integral part of the CPA

The second agreement prior to the signing of the CPA culminated in a power-sharing agreement which was signed on 26 May 2004 between the GoS and SPLM/A in Naivasha, Kenya. This agreement was in accordance to the Machakos Protocol of 2002 and addressed the following important issues as outlined by Dagne (2011:24); the CPA (2005:18); and the Interim National Constitution of 2006:

- The equal distribution of power through a decentralized government. Therefore the North would govern as a fully-fledged state, the South would be semi-autonomous and the other regions such as Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, were declared provincial states under the central government.
- The protection of the rights of the Sudanese. Human rights and fundamental freedoms such as civil and political rights would be prioritized. The initial step was to conform to the international human rights treaties.
- Freedom from discrimination on grounds of race, culture, religion and language. Every citizen was granted the liberty to practise their preferred choice of culture; religious belief and language.

The power-sharing agreement thus condemns human rights abuses such as slavery and torture, and promotes basic liberties, the right to life, and the principles of fair trial, and freedom of expression.

4.2.5 Agreement 3: Wealth sharing in the Government of Unity

The soil in the South is fertile and well suited for agricultural development. A report by the USAID (2009) revealed that as much as 90 percent of the land in Sudan is suitable for crop and/or livestock production. There are also vast oil reserves and adequate water supplies in the Southern region. However, the level of development in the Southern region is particularly low because of widespread impoverishment. The basic infrastructure such as schools and hospitals is neglected and many of the roads have not been tarred. According to Paglia (2005:3), 65 percent of the Southern Sudanese population lives in abject poverty.

This neglect and underdevelopment in the South was partly the result of the protracted civil wars which were fought mainly in the Southern region in the late 1990s (Dagne, 2011:15; UN, 2010). Furthermore, the administrative processes of governance were managed by the wealthier and far better developed Northern-based government in Khartoum (Dagne, 2011:15–23).

In order to address this unequal distribution of wealth between North and South, the so-called sharing of wealth agreement was signed between the two regions. The Wealth Sharing agreement was signed in Kenya on 7 January 2004. Its fundamental premise was that the wealth of the Sudan should be shared equally amongst all its people (CPA, 2005:47). In other words, past economic inequalities had to be redressed. Most importantly, the agreement laid down that the profits from the main source of income, the production if oil in the Abyei region (See Map 4.2) had to be distributed equally between the two regions rather than swelling the coffers of the Khartoum-based government of the Northern region (Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2011:3).

This essence of the wealth sharing agreement translated into the following statement as stipulated in the CPA (2005:47):

...Southern Sudan, and those areas in need of construction/ reconstruction, shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public services standards as the Northern states. To achieve these objectives will take time and effort to build up local institutions, human and economic capacity. For these purposes, two special funds shall be established as provided herein.

The above statement reveals the intention of the Government of Unity to improve socio-economic development in South Sudan. The wealth-sharing agreement further outlines the issues of ownership of land and natural resources.

4.2.6 Agreement 4: The agreement on the oil-rich Abyei region

Abyei is a town centrally situated and on the boundary between Northern and Southern Sudan. The Abyei region is of great economic significance and strategic importance for both the North and the South because of the location of vast oil resources in the area. Domination of the area thus provides better access to these lucrative resources. (Collins, 2008:228).

Because of its location and the permeable, artificially created colonial border, the region is populated by a diversity of ethnic groups from the North and the South, resulting in further destabilization (Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2011:3–4).

In addition to contestation about ownership of oil, there are continuous ethnic clashes between the Arab Mussarayi and Ngok-Dinka. The Arab-Mussarayi identify with the North while the Ngok-Dinka see themselves as Southerners (Klauber, 2011:1). The border region is also home to the Arabic-speaking nomads. The ongoing clashes in the region also flared when it was decided to include the Mussarayi as voters in the final referendum held to determine the status of the Abyei region. This decision was widely challenged by the government of South Sudan which claimed that the Mussarayi should not be eligible to vote because they had not inhabited the region for as long as the nomads, who had been excluded from the referendum. The Mussarayi are the majority group in the Abyei region and are estimated to be 3 to 400 000 strong. In contrast, the other ethnic groups which occupy the oil-rich land, such as the Ngok-Dinka, only number about 70 000. The Southern government is afraid that if the Mussarayi are allowed to vote in the referendum, they could easily

win a majority and this could potentially swing the decision on the ownership of the Abyei region in favour of the North. The Ngok-Dinka are aligned with the SPLM/A while the Arab Mussarayi support the NCP (Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2011:3–4).

The status of Abyei was one of the most controversial issues in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement discussions. A separate commission, referred to as the Abyei Borders Commission (ABC), was assigned the task of defining the extent of the Dinka territory. This was followed by the establishment of a referendum commission that was charged with the task of identifying who was eligible to vote in a referendum on the status of the region (Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2011:4). However, these commissions failed abysmally in the implementation of their respective directives and more harm than good was done. Disputes over who had the greater claim to the region boiled over into brutal violence; the Abyei town was razed to the ground and 600 000 desperate inhabitants fled from the South in search of safety. The SPLM/A and the Khartoum government agreed to discuss the Abyei issue as one of the main items on the agenda of the peace agreement negotiations (Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2011:4).

The various resolutions taken on the disputed Abyei region in the CPA discussions are as follows:

- Residents of Abyei can be citizens of both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, with representation in these legislatures.
- The administration of Abyei will be undertaken by local Executive Councils who are elected by the residents of Abyei.
- The net oil revenues from Abyei will be divided six ways during the interim period. The division will be: the National Government (50%); Government of South Sudan (42%); Bahr el Ghazal region (2%); Western Kordofan (2%); and Dinka locals (2%).
- The National Government (the North) vowed to provide financial assistance towards the accelerated development of the Abyei region.

- International monitors will be deployed to Abyei to ensure full implementation of the agreements.

The CPA (2005:66) makes a provision for the Abyei residents to decide on the fate of the area in a referendum. They could indicate their preference to either remain part of the current administration or become part of the South. This referendum on the future of the Abyei region still remains an outstanding CPA matter (i.e. is as yet unresolved).

4.2.7 Agreement 5: Resolution of the conflict in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states

A brief overview of the history and contemporary political trends of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states is relevant here. Both are situated in the border area between the Southern and Northern regions of the Sudan (See Map 4.2). It is a zone of close interaction between different ethnic groups with contrasting lifestyles, notably Arabs (Mussarayi) and Africans (Nuba). The region was greatly affected during the time of the civil wars between the North and South. To date it remains a very impoverished, poorly managed area, with hopelessly inadequate infrastructure. Hundreds of people have died in the disputes over land and grazing rights. Peace-building efforts by both the SPLM/A and NCP have failed. Furthermore, the conflict has been exacerbated because the SPLM/A is actively recruiting local ethnic groups to join the struggle in pursuit of Southern secession (ICG, 2008:1).

The Nuba remain bitter with their SPLM/A allies; they blame them for not negotiating a better deal for their region when they represented the South in the CPA discussions. The Nuba claim that instead, the SPLM/A prioritized the Abyei region because of its rich oil resources (ICG, 2008:1).

Instead of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile voting for self-determination, they would remain part of North Sudan in the event of Southern secession. However, provision was granted for these two regions to either accept the terms of the CPA or re-negotiate if they felt there were any shortcomings as far as their future was concerned (Gluck, 2010:2). In other words, the democratic right of popular consultation, as stipulated in the CPA (2005:74) grants the opportunity for the

inhabitants of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile to go back to the negotiating table if they feel they have been marginalized by the terms of the CPA.

The CPA did indeed bring stability to a highly charged situation and created the impression that it would radically improve the socio-economic development and security of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. However, three years after the signing of the CPA the key components of the CPA implementation in these areas had not been attended to (ICG, 2008:1–2). The interim period has passed and these areas are still largely neglected as far as development is concerned. This is another example of a component of the CPA that has failed to deliver.



MAP 4.2 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF THE SOUTHERN KORDOFAN, BLUE NILE AND NUBA MOUNTAINS

Source: Epatko (2011)

The three protocol areas located in the frontline during the North-South civil war are the Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan (See Map 4.2 above). These areas have been confronted with a number of challenges, including displaced refugees, inter-tribal conflicts, poverty, insecurity and lack of basic infrastructure. The irony of the

situation in these three areas is that they are wealthy in natural resources such as oil, agricultural land, water, and minerals. This being so, these areas are crucial in the economic wellbeing and development of the state. The Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile Protocol grants these areas a measure of autonomy within the national government. A model of federal governance was envisaged, where the national government would serve as the central state and Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile as federal or regional administrations (UNDP, 2010:1–3).

Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile are considered to be largely independent federal states in terms of the stipulations of the CPA, with their own legislative, executive and judicial organs which report to the national government. Prior to the signing of the CPA there were three administrations in the Southern Kordofan (West Kordofan; the NCP-led South Kordofan; and the SPLM/A- led Nuba Mountains). The CPA made provision for West Kordofan to dissolve into the Northern or Southern Kordofan as single representative state government (ICG, 2008:2).

Pending general elections, as part of affirmative action, the parties agree that Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States shall be adequately represented in National Institutions targeting a percentage not less than the ratio of their population size (CPA, 2005:80).

As shown above Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile is home to many different ethnic groups such as the Arab Mussarayi and the Nuba. These ethnic groups were mobilized during the North/South conflict. The African Nuba ethnic group aligned with the SPLM/A while the Arab Mussarayi joined the Northern-based NCP (ICG, 2008:1). The resolutions outlined in the CPA are discussed below.

The Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile Protocol were signed in May 2004 in Kenya. The protocol recognizes that the conclusion of the CPA necessitates that the problems in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states be resolved. One of the main problems that face South Kordofan is that it is an ethnically integrated area with Africans and people of Arab descent living side-by-side (ICG, 2008:1–2). The protocol continues to reaffirm that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion (CPA, 2005:73).

4.2.8 Agreement 6: Security arrangements as part of the CPA

Agreement 6 deals with security and ceasefire arrangements. There were two recognized armed forces in the South/North conflict, namely the North-based Sudan Armed Force (SAF) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). To bring an end to the war, the parties agreed that these two forces should remain separate during the interim period. A ceasefire agreement was signed (CPA, 2005:87).


The CPA advocates that the SAF and SPLA should form a joint force during the interim period and that this joint unit should comprise equal representation of the two armed forces. It suggests that it should participate in the defence of the country and also be involved in the reconstruction of the Sudan (CPA, 2005:88). Each region was required to withdraw all its troops that were stationed elsewhere in the Sudan.

4.3 ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM SUDANESE GOVERNMENT OF UNITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOUTHERN SECESSION

The SPLM/A was pushing for independence from the North, while the Northern-based NCP wanted a unified government. Against this background a mutual understanding was reached between the two parties in the signing of the CPA (Dagne, 2011:5). As one of the CPA's main outcomes, a Government of Unity (GoU) was established with the provision that there be an interim period of six years (2005–2011). In the fifth year of the interim period the South would be allowed, if need be, to vote in a referendum choosing between secession or a unified Sudan under the Government of Unity (CPA, 2005:8).

In essence, the CPA therefore declared the Southern region as semi-autonomous for the six year interim period until the referendum (CPA, 2005:6). The process also established a Government of National Unity (GNU) in the Sudan, in which both the North and South participated. Al-Bashir remained on as the president of the newly established GNU and Garang was inaugurated as the first vice-president of the Sudan (See Table 4.1). Thus Garang represented South Sudan, while Al-Bashir headed the GNU, which was based in North Sudan, in Khartoum (Dagne, 2011:5–7).

TABLE 4.1 CABINET LIST UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (2005–2011)



Source: GNU (2006)

4.4 THE 2010 NATIONAL ELECTION AND ITS OUTCOME

In an attempt to sustain democracy in the Sudan and fulfil one of the CPA's outcomes, national and regional elections were held in April 2010. Al-Bashir was nominated as the presidential candidate for the NCP of the Sudan. Arman was the elected presidential candidate of the SPLM/A. In total there were about 12 presidential candidates, some of whom represented the eastern parts of Sudan, Darfur, the West and the rural areas of the Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains. The NCP endorsed the candidacy of Kiir of the SPLM/A, as the first prime minister for the Southern Sudanese presidency.

Two separate elections were held: the national presidential election and the South Sudan presidential election. The international community was also involved and fully supported the election process. The United States sponsored the elections to the tune of US\$100 million to ensure that they ran smoothly (Dagne, 2011: 7).

Concerns have been raised on the formation of an independent South Sudan, including the fact that the Southerners are not necessarily united. There are many divisive issues, including ethnicity, language and religion. This lack of unity is a huge challenge (Dagne, 2011; Murphy & Temin, 2011 & Kron, 2011). This reality is clearly supported by what transpired during the 2010 national and regional elections. The presidential candidate and long-standing leader of the SPLM/A in the South, Salva Kiir, was opposed by other minority political parties. There were also members of the SPLM/A who disagreed with the Kiir's candidacy and opted to contest the elections as individual candidates (Dagne, 2011:7). This kind of behaviour indicates the lack of unity between Southerners.

The outcome of the national presidential election was as follows. About 10.1 million people voted and Al-Bashir secured the majority vote with a margin of 68.2 percent. In the South Sudan presidential elections, some 2.8 million people voted and Salva Kiir won with a margin of 92.9 percent of the vote (See Table 4.2)

TABLE 4.2: THE 2010 NATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

CANDIDATE	PARTY AFFILIATION	VOTE RESULTS
Omar Hassan Al-Bashir	National Congress Party	68.2% (6.9 million)
Yasir Arman	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement	21.6% (2.1 million)
Abdullah Deng Nhial	Popular Congress Party	3.9% (396,139)
Hatim Al-Sir	Democratic Unionist Party	1.9% (195, 668)
Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi	Umma Party	0.96% (96, 868)
Kamil Idriss	Independent	0.76% (77,132)
Mahmood Ahmed Jeha	Independent	0.71% (71,708)
Mubarak Al-Fadil	Umma Reform and Renewal Party	0.49% (49,402)
Munir Sheikh El-Din Jallab	New National Democratic Party	0.40% (40.277)
Abdel Aziz Khalid	Sudanese National Alliance	0.34% (34,592)
Fatima Abdel-Mahmood	Sudanese Socialist Democratic Union	0.30% (30,562)
Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud	Communist Party	0.26% (26,442)

Source: Dagne (2011)

TABLE 4.3: SOUTH SUDAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

CANDIDATE	PARTY AFFILIATION	VOTE RESULTS
Salva Kiir	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)	92.9% (2.6 million)
Lam Akol	SPLM for Democratic Change	7% (197,217)

Source: Dagne (2011)

4.5 THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY: A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE

According to the Progress Monitoring Report (2006:5) the Government of National Unity was formally established on 20 September 2005 after the CPA had been adopted and legislated in January. Another of the objectives of the GNU, besides creating peace and stability in the Sudan, was to make the idea of a government of unity “look attractive” (Patey, 2010:16).

The Progress Monitoring Report (2006:5–9) provides an outline of the expectations and goals that were set to be realised by the GNU in the first quarter of the interim period, that is before May 2006. These are as follows:

- The completion of the formation and operationalising of the necessary commissions, including a Human Rights Commission; one on the ownership, of land; a Civil Service Commission and an Electoral Commission;
- The guaranteeing of the rights of non-Muslims;
- The completion of preparations for issuance of the new Sudanese currency;
- The scaling up of progress on the implementation of the Abyei Protocol;
- The finalization, approval and implementation of the Political Parties' Act and National Elections Act; and
- The establishment and promotion of the National Languages Council.

The failure of the GNU was evident in the continued deterioration of the relationship between North and South after the establishment of the GNU. Dhurgon (1995:5) is of the view that this has been characterized by the following political trends that have exacerbated division, instability and open hostility in the aftermath of the signing of the CPA:

- There was political marginalization of Southern representatives in the form of discrimination and restrictions from occupying certain senior executive posts such as ministerial positions in the GNU (see Table 4.4). Under the GNU only 28 percent (6 out of 29 ministerial positions) were allocated to Southern representatives i.e. members of the SPLM, while 52 percent (23 of 29) were awarded to the Northern-based NCP. This was in addition to the following NCP executive positions: the president; second vice-president; assistant to the president; and 14 special advisors to the president. The only executive position in the GNU held by a member of the SPLM was that of the first vice-president.
- The neglect of political, economic and social development in the South continued, whereas in marked contrast, the North enjoyed priority in all new development initiatives. Southern Sudan remains one of the most underdeveloped and impoverished regions (Paglia, 2005:1).
- The crisis of national identity remained unresolved. As before, the North defined Sudanese identity in Arab and Islamic terms.
- There was continued cultural subordination to the Islamic law and Arabic culture on all the people of the Sudan in disregard of the African roots of the majority of the Southerners. The declaration of Sudan as an Islamic state by the government of Sudan in 1957 left the Southerners marginalized and neglected. In support of Islamism, a rigorous military administrative policy was imposed on the South. According to Collins (2008:78) this policy was characterized by “racial insensitivity” and “shameless provocation”.

All these factors gained momentum even after the CPA was signed because of the continued marginalization and “maltreatment” of the Southerners by the North and the delayed implementation of the requirements stipulated in the CPA

(Dagne, 2011:17–25). South Sudan regarded the CPA and GNU as having failed and therefore in 2011 chose to exercise its right to hold a referendum on self-determination as the first step towards claiming its right to become an independent state. From a Southern perspective, secession was seen as a resolution of the internal conflict and threat of civil war. The Southerners wanted independence from the North because the GNU was perceived as being an abject failure (Kron, 2011:2).

4.5.1 Southern secession as a consequence of the perceived failure of the Government of Unity

One of the terms agreed upon in the CPA was the right of self-determination for the Southerners on condition that an “internationally monitored referendum” was held. As stipulated in the CPA (2005:8):

At the end of the six year interim period, there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A for the people of South Sudan to confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement, or to vote for secession ...

As part of the CPA (in 2005) the SPLM/A and NCP agreed upon January 2011 as the date for the referendum. The rationale was to allow the GNU ample opportunity to create democratic structures and ensure political and economic stability, equality and the inclusion of the Southerners in the system of governance (Kron, 2011:2). From a Southern perspective, the GNU had not succeeded in implementing the resolutions of the CPA and they opted to exercise their right to hold a referendum..

The Southern Sudanese referendum took place from 5 to 8 January 2011. The results, which were duly published on 7 February 2011, indicated that of the 3 947 676 Southerners registered to vote, 3 851 994 (98.3 percent) of the votes were cast in favour of secession from the North (SSRC, 2011:2). This turnout of voters far exceeded the required 60 percent. South Sudan was declared independent on 9 July 2011. This newly-established state was internationally recognized and named the Republic of South Sudan (See Map 4.3) (Dagne, 2011:73).



MAP 4.3 CONTEMPORARY MAP OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN AFTER THE SECESSION OF JULY 2011

Source: UNMISS (2011)

In August 2011, barely a month after the independence of the South, there were reports of persistent clashes amongst various South Sudanese ethnic groups. These conflicts flared up because of disputes over land and space to graze their cattle. Another crucial cause of tension is the accusation that the newly established, Dinka-led government is showing favouritism to the Dinka ethnic group by appointments into government positions and awarding of tenders and business opportunities (Kron, 2011:1). It was reported in *The Economist* (Anon, 2012:1) that:

... this was one of the bloodiest episodes since independence ... an estimated 7 00 heavily armed youths from the Lou Nuer tribe attacked villages belonging

to the rival Murle in eastern Jonglei state at the end of last year, stealing tens of thousands of cattle and abducting women and children

It would therefore appear that the South Sudanese were only united as a nation in order to gain independence from the Arab-Islamic Northerners. Conflicts and disputes over the leadership of the governing SPLM/A may well destabilize the newly independent Republic of South Sudan.

4.6 OUTSTANDING AND/OR UNRESOLVED FACTORS OF THE CPA AS CAUSES OF CONTINUED INSTABILITY

As shown above, in the aftermath of South Sudan gaining its independence, instability has become endemic. Instability is attributed to certain key issues that were not resolved by the GNU during the six year interim timeframe. These outstanding issues have still not been resolved and are discussed below.

4.6.1 The failure to demarcate the border between Sudan and South Sudan effectively

One of the most important unresolved issues agreed upon in the CPA is the demarcation of the border between South Sudan and Sudan (Klauber, 2011:1). The demarcation of the Abyei region is still being contested even after the secession of the Southern Sudan (Dagne, 2011:29). There is ongoing tension and sporadic outbreaks of violence in the Northern versus Southern conflict and this unrest has also exacerbated inter-tribal confrontation in the Southern region (Kron, 2011:1–2). The referendum for the Abyei population was never held and thus the situation remains unresolved.

4.6.2 The absence of popular consultation on the purpose of the CPA

The resolution in the CPA on “popular consultation”, a clause which was aimed at providing the inhabitants of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile the opportunity of sharing their views and opinions (CPA, 2005: 72–74) has simply not been addressed. It is stated in the CPA (2005:74) that:

Popular consultation is a democratic right and a mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States on the comprehensive agreement reached by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

The intended popular consultation is still not implemented and is another of the outstanding issues of the CPA. The population of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile regions could either endorse and rectify, or declare the failure of the CPA to meet their expectations to be autonomous (self-governing), and be granted cultural and religious rights. They have not as yet done so. There was also an expectation that if these regions were autonomous then they would be granted a significant delegation of authority and wealth (Gluck, 2010:2).

Gluck (2010:1) is of the opinion that a successful popular consultation could begin to transform Sudanese politics by a process of aligning political parties to the state and thus providing a “test case” for setting up a new system of governance for states such as the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The importance of popular consultation in the Sudan is summed up by Gluck (2010:4–6) as follows:

- The political landscape of the Sudan is overly concentrated on the two major political parties, the SPLM/A and NCP. The CPA was signed and negotiated by representatives of these two parties because of their involvement in the civil wars. But the agreements and protocols in the CPA affect all citizen of the state, especially those in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile which are located centrally between the Northern and Southern regions. Therefore popular consultation with these regions may well assist in reinstating a measure of stability and peace.
- Popular consultation could provide the platform for inter-community, inter-ethnic, and multi-lingual initiatives to engage on issues of common concern. Furthermore, public participation in the political landscape, a very real need if challenges of disunity are to be met, would be encouraged.

Popular consultation is described in the CPA (2005:72) as a democratic right for the people of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. However the lack of enthusiasm and

tardy pace of implementation by the Khartoum government suggests that these rights are being largely ignored. The right of popular consultation is another of the resolutions of the CPA that has been neglected.

4.6.3 No resolution on how to repay Sudan's outstanding debt

Another factor that was not addressed despite being agreed to in the CPA, is the crisis of the debt of the state. Prior to secession of the South, the state of Sudan had a total debt of US\$36 million and repayment of this loan was an estimated US\$35.5 million in arrears (IMF, 2011:12). According to Dr E. Kisangani (personal communication, 2011) of the Institute of Security Studies, the issue of this debt was not finalized in the CPA discussions. This matter still remains a crucial one and the respective governments in both the North and the South need to make arrangements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on how this debt will be settled. There are two options available in handling this issue, namely that the IMF be persuaded to write off the debt, or secondly, that both states share the responsibility of settling the debt.

4.6.4 No clarity on citizenship

Lastly, the issue of citizenship has still not been settled. What transpired after the Southern secession was that all citizens were forced to return to their original places of residence. For instance, those who were originally from the South and had accepted employment in the North were obliged to return to the South. There is also the matter of displaced individuals who are scattered in neighbouring states or fled to other parts of the Sudan. An attempt to create a roadmap for the return of individually displaced persons (IDPs) is being undertaken by the SPLM/A and the NCP. Currently the issue of citizenship remains a challenge (Dagne, 2011:26–28).

4.7 CONCLUSION

The signing of the CPA did temporarily halt the ongoing civil wars that raged between the people of the Southern and Northern regions. The CPA aimed to make a Government of Unity an attractive and acceptable system of governance not only in

the eyes of other African states but also in the international community at large (Brosche, 2010:13). It advocated power-sharing and conflict resolution, but was perceived as a failure by the Southerners (Kron, 2011:2). The CPA also held the values of ethnicity, culture and religion in high regard, but in these respects too, the Southerners felt that they had been dealt a raw deal (Brosche, 2010:13).

Through the CPA, the Sudanese population participated in a national democratic election in the year 2010. And in 2011, the Southerners by means of a referendum, successfully seceded from the Sudan. Secession of the South is thus one of the CPA's positive outcomes (Kron, 2011:2). The Southerners certainly exhibited a marked degree of unity and cooperation in exercising their vote in the referendum, and 98.3 percent voted in favour of secession (Kron, 2011:2). The element that unified the South, despite their different ethnic and political party preferences, was the shared sentiment of united opposition against the Arab and Islamic Sudan.

The first democratic elections in Sudan were held in April 2010 and this was one of the important provisions of the peace agreement. Furthermore, the 2011 referendum led directly to the newly established African state, the Republic of South Sudan. However, the South is still faced with a number of challenges, including the speeding up of economic development; stabilizing the political system; and improving infrastructure and social development (Dagne, 2011:8).

This chapter has made an in-depth analysis of the 2005 CPA signed in the Sudan between the SPLMA and NCP. It was shown in this chapter that the CPA comprised six protocols or agreements and these were outlined and discussed in detail. The chapter also examined the achievements of the CPA and its shortcomings. The implementation of the measures outlined in the CPA was discussed and finally, the issues which are still outstanding and are yet to be resolved were highlighted.

CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The underlying objective of this research was to provide a descriptive analysis of the outcome of the Sudanese CPA by examining ethnic mobilization as its structural theoretical foundation. By using an instrumentalist approach it was established that ethnicity can firstly, be used as a tool for political mobilization towards the attainment of socio-economic or political objectives. Secondly, ethnicity served as formulative guideline on the eventual outcome of the CPA.

Against the above background this closing chapter aims to discuss the findings of the study and to provide a possible scenario perceptive on the unfolding of economic and socio-political developments in Sudan and South Sudan. The immediate situation in these two African states can be summarized briefly as follows.

South Sudan and Sudan are in conflict over issues such as ownership of oil revenues and the settlement of a large IMF debt. In January 2012, when no definitive agreement could be reached between the two states, the Southern government abruptly stopped oil production, leading to continued conflict. This sparked international fear that another war may break out.

The secession of the South saw the establishment of the fifty-fourth official state on the African continent, the Republic of South Sudan. Even though South Sudan is an autonomous state, there is still tension, unrest and continued conflict between the majority ethnic groups such as the Dinka and other smaller groups like the Nuers and the Shilluks. Internal conflict in South Sudan is furthermore fuelled by disputes over executive positions in government, land ownership and unfulfilled promises made by the SPLM/A to the provinces that supported the party, such as Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. In the aftermath of the secession, more than three thousand South Sudanese were killed in less than three months from August to December 2011.

The argument presented in chapter one was that ethnic mobilization was a contributing factor in the outcome of the CPA and Southern secession. This argument was sustained throughout chapters' two to four. Chapter two elaborated on ethnicity and secession as the theoretical foundation of the research. In this study the instrumentalist approach was identified and used as a structural guideline. Chapter three provided an in-depth analysis of ethnic diversity in Sudan and South Sudan, the 2005 CPA and the implementation thereof. The shortcomings of the CPA were also highlighted because these contributed to the perceived failure of the GNU.

In chapter four the argument was sustained by explaining how ethnicity and ethnic mobilization impacted on the format and content of the CPA to influence the current socio-political landscape of Sudan. Here ethnic diversity was discussed, including an analysis of instrumentalist elements such as language, religion and culture in the Sudanese context.

The research questions and objectives were based on the above perspectives and findings.

5.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS STUDY

In order to achieve the set objectives, the following questions served as a structural guideline for research:

- What was the essence of ethnic mobilization and secession, specifically in the Sudanese and the wider African context?
- What was the relevance, and what were the advantages and disadvantages of utilising ethnic mobilization to influence the outcome of the CPA in the Sudan?
- What is the format and nature of ethnic diversity in the Sudan?
- What was outlined in the 2005 CPA of the Sudan and what were the outcomes?
- How was ethnic mobilization used as a mechanism to influence the current outcome of the CPA in the Sudan?

- What are the challenges that Sudan and South Sudan are still facing after the implementation of the CPA?

All these research questions were addressed in the various chapter divisions. The methods used to achieve the research objectives are discussed below.

5.3 METHODS USED TO ACHIEVE THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

In chapters two to four the questions outlined above were addressed and analysed. The outcomes of these chapters were aligned with the research objectives as provided in chapter one. To address the research objectives and the questions given above, a thorough literature study was conducted. The methodology which this research employed was that of a qualitative approach which was deductive in nature.

Two dimensions of research were identified. The first of these was to conduct an in-depth analysis of the ethnic groups in the Sudan. Secondly, a case study of the CPA and its outcomes was carried out with an emphasis on Southern secession.

The most appropriate approaches on the theory of ethnicity were identified as primordialism and instrumentalism. The instrumentalist approach suggests that ethnicity can be used as a method for the mobilization of an ethnic group towards the attainment of certain political goals (Thompson, 2004:64; Nagel & Olzak, 1983:358). This theoretical approach was used and identified as the most applicable framework for research. It suggests that ethnicity as a social cleavage is ideal to use as a method for political mobilization. It may be assumed that any form of mobilization can be facilitated when promoted by ethnicity and ethnic ties. The logic behind this, as suggested by the approach, is the almost natural tendency of individuals to associate with a group in which there are shared and common ethnic ties. The ethnic ties identified in chapter two were linked to the contemporary and historical political landscape of the Sudan as suggested in the instrumentalist approach.

Three levels of research were identified in chapter one, which were then used to achieve the main objectives of this research:

- On the macro-level, the research focused on ethnicity, ethnic mobilization and secession with specific reference to the African and Sudanese contexts.
- On the meso-level, the research was narrowed down to the secession of the South as the main outcome of the CPA. However, secession was linked to ethnic mobilization which was seen as the most powerful causal factor.
- On the application level, the research focused on secession as a result of the CPA, as well as the challenges that face Sudan and South Sudan. Here the contemporary political and social landscape was discussed.

5.4 THE REALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

As indicated, research was divided into macro, meso and application levels. This was achieved through the division of the chapters to focus on a specific objective as outlined in chapter one.

Chapter one provided the background and orientation on the Sudan and the contemporary political landscape. This chapter further outlined the research problem, questions, objectives and the structure that was followed. In essence, this chapter revolved around how ethnic mobilization impacted on the CPA and still impacts heavily on developments in the Sudan.

Chapter two focused on the theoretical foundation and measure instruments of research. This chapter was divided into two theoretical themes, namely ethnic mobilization and secession theories in the African context. The most applicable and significant ethnic approach selected was instrumentalism. This approach is based on the premise that ethnicity and ethnic ties such as religion, language, culture, traditions and religion can be used as methods of political mobilization in order to achieve specific objectives.

In chapter three, this theoretical approach was used to explain the origins and format of ethnic diversity in Sudan and South Sudan. It furthermore served as an introduction to the next chapter, where the impact of ethnicity on the CPA was discussed. Chapter three provided an analytical overview of the ethnic diversity of the Sudan, highlighting the complexity of this diversity. It was clearly illustrated that

conflict and antagonism between Sudan and South Sudan are fuelled by ethnic differences, which in turn led to ethnic mobilization and impacted on the format and outcome of the CPA.

Chapter four revolved around an analysis of the 2005 CPA. The agreement, protocol and resolutions of each chapter of the document were analysed. The document comprised six agreements/resolutions taken by the NCP and SPLM/A. These agreements are reflected in each of the six chapters of the CPA. The signing of the CPA represented a step toward stability for North and South Sudan. The CPA, together with the National Interim Constitution served as guiding documents during the six year interim period under a Government of National Unity. The core values of the CPA were based on establishing a democratic and unified state, with the elimination of religious, cultural and racial discrimination (CPA, 2005:2). This document also accommodated the ambition of the South to secede from the North and become a completely independent state in 2011.

The CPA furthermore addressed the major areas of dispute between the South and North, namely the oil-rich Abyei region; power sharing; security arrangements; the terms of the Machakos Protocol; and the resolutions taken about the federal states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.

The outcomes and recommendations of this research and the resultant study are based on the analysis conducted in chapters one to four.

5.5 OTHER KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The key findings of this research are linked to the hypothesis which underlines that ethnic mobilization is a major contributing factor in the secession of the South as an outcome of the CPA. The main findings are outlined as follows:

- The essence of ethnic mobilization and secession in the African context lies in the historical political influence of the colonial authorities. Ethnic mobilization in the Sudan was stimulated by the domination of the Arab and Muslim population. The Arabic Sudanese in Sudan became a “second colonizer” of South Sudan in the post-colonial era (Paglia, 2005; Collins, 2008; and Mareng, 2009). It was

established in chapter two that the existence of ethnic groups in the African continent is not a primordial element, but a continuous and contemporary one.

- The relevance of utilizing ethnicity as a method of political mobilization lies in the underlying factor that a given ethnic group shares a common history, language or ancestral lines, facilitating mobilization according to ethnicity. The advantage of ethnic mobilization is that it minimizes or completely eradicates harassment from the state towards that group. The minority in the given society will have a support system on which to raise its concerns and address its needs.
- The South Sudanese were discriminated against, particularly in the period prior to the current secession. Indeed, the central government had approved and implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing. There was also resource marginalization, whereby Arabic Muslims were prioritized in the distribution of resources. The rural areas and most South Sudan regions were left underdeveloped and poor. Through the auspices of the SPLM/A, ethnic groups from different regions of the South Sudan were able to mobilize politically towards the attainment of political independence. The Arab Missariya of the Southern Kordofan also supported the mostly Christian based SPLM/A.
- As many as 98.3 percent of the Southerners voted in favour of the secession (Kron, 2011:2) and in July 2011, South Sudan declared its independence. Instrumentalism as an identified ethnic mobilization approach can therefore be seen as a causal factor of the North/South split in the Sudan. This was established in chapter four.
- This study also analyzed the CPA of 2005 in considerable depth. It was established that one of the main outcomes of the CPA was the secession of the Southerners after they had made their opinion on secession known in a referendum. Secession was achieved in July 2011, in the sixth and final year of the interim period. The signing of the CPA also successfully brought to an end a 24-year period of continued war between the South and North. There are, however, several CPA agreements which remain unresolved, as is outlined in chapter three. One of the biggest issues is the oil-rich Abyei region. A dispute

between Sudan and South Sudan over ownership of this lucrative area and claims to the revenue from oil production are ongoing. The demarcation process is still not resolved and this may well spark conflict between the two regions in the future.

- The Sudanese population is very diverse in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, history, culture and traditions. As pointed out in Thomson (2004:62) no state is socially homogenous; they all have social cleavages. Political mobilization was organized along ethnic lines in the Sudan (as established in chapter four) and this eventually led to the secession of the Southerners.
- Chapters three and four substantiated the main hypothesis of this research in which it was stated that ethnic mobilization is a contributing factor in the secession of the South as an outcome of the Sudanese Peace Agreement. Included among the resolutions agreed upon and stipulated in the CPA was that a Government of Unity should be established within an interim period of six years. Provision was made in the CPA that if, after the six-year period, South Sudan wished to secede, it could do so subject to a referendum being held to establish the will of the people. In July 2011, South Sudan duly became an autonomous, independent state with the former colonial Sudan being literally demarcated into two independent African states.
- The challenges that still face Sudan and South Sudan include unresolved issues such as the demarcation border of the Abyei region; the need to undertake 'popular consultation' with the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile; the necessity of resolving the pre-secession debt crisis of the Sudanese GNU; and solving the impasse of granting citizenship to the people who live in the vicinity of the South/ North border.

From these findings a future scenario, possible challenges and recommendations have thus been identified.

5.6 SUMMARY

There are many challenges facing the new South Sudan. Among these are the need for economic stability, social development and dealing with continued inter-state ethnic conflict. The confrontation between South Sudan and Sudan has again been renewed because of unsettled disputes over the Abyei land demarcation. According to Mr E. Kisiangani (personal communication, 2011), the newly established government departments in South Sudan call for the appointment of skilled and experienced officials to run the administration. This may well pose a serious challenge for the Southern Sudanese. Assistance in the form of orientation and information from the more experienced government is based in Khartoum and the North could be of great value to the emerging South Sudanese state.

The renewed disputes between the North and South over the oil and ownership of the land could possibly spark another civil war. Intervention of the African Union and world bodies such as the UN are required for security and peacekeeping. The continued inter-state ethnic rivalries amongst the Southern Sudanese may result in a destabilized political system in the South. Furthermore, the loss of external investors will hamper the chances of economic growth.

Conflicts in other regions such as Darfur to the west and the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states should be addressed as a priority by the government of Sudan. The issues of these regions should have been handled when the CPA was signed. Popular consultation with the people of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states should be implemented to avoid further tension and conflict (Brosche, 2007;4). Democratic values can be instilled through the implementation of popular consultation and will serve to promote and ensure good governance practice.

As a means to avoid future conflicts and stop tribal clashes in South Sudan, the government should ensure that there is an equitable distribution of resources. Fair and equal representation of the people in the civil service administration can minimize tribal clashes. Furthermore, the governments of both South Sudan and Sudan should ensure that all the agreements of the CPA are addressed, especially where other provinces (notably Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur) are concerned, because there are continued conflicts in these regions.

The socio-political landscape of the Sudan is constantly changing. Although the secession of South Sudan is official, as indicated there are still pending issues such as the demarcation of Abyei region that need to be resolved in discussion with the government of Sudan. It therefore becomes difficult to sketch a prediction for a future scenario as far as South Sudan and the Sudan are concerned. Further research in this area would be beneficial, especially as regards the stance taken and policies introduced in South Sudan. This would provide greater insight and better understanding of the impact of ethnic diversity and the issue of self-determination/secession elsewhere on the African continent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALI, M. 1996. *Ethnicity, Politics, and Society in Northeast Africa: Conflict and Social Change*. New York: University Press of America.
- BARASH, D.P. 1991. *Introduction to Peace Studies*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- BARADAT, L.P. 2009. *Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact*. Princeton, NJ: Pearson Education.
- BAXTER, P.T.W. & BUTT, A. 1953. *The Azande and Related Peoples of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Belgian Congo*. International Africa Institute: London: International African Institute.
- BRYNARD, P.A. & HANEKOM, S.X. 1997. *Introduction to Research in Public Administration and Related Academic Disciplines*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- BUCHHEIT, L.C. 1978. *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination*. London: Yale University Press.
- COLLINS, R. 2008. *A History of Modern Sudan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- COUGHLAN, R.M. & ELLER, J.D. 1993. The Poverty of Primordialism: The demystification of ethnic attachments. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 16 (184–202).
- DENG, F.M. 1972. *The Dinka of the Sudan*. London: Yale University Press.
- DENG, L.B. 2005. The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will it be sustained? *Civil Wars*. 7(3): 244–257, Autumn.
- GLAZER, W. & MOYNIHAN, D.P. 1975. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press.
- HAYNES, J. 2007. Religion, Ethnicity, and Civil Wars in Africa: The case of Uganda and Sudan. *The Round Table*. 96 (390): 305–317, June.

- HUTCHINSON, J. & SMITH, D. 1996. *Ethnicity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- JOK, M.J. 2008. *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*. Oxford: T.J. International Ltd.
- KHALAFALLA, K.J. 2002. *Political Islam in Sudan: Political Opportunities and Mobilizing Structures*. Zu Bonn: Wilhelms University. D Phil thesis.
- LAKE, D A. & ROTHCCHILD, D.S. 1998. *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- LEEDY, P.D. & ORMROD, J.E. 2010. *Practical Research: Planning and Design*. 9th Ed. River, NJ: Pearson Education.
- MARENG, C.D. 2009. The Sudan's Dimensions: A country divided by ethnicity and religion. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*. 3 (12): 532–539. December.
- OLZAK, S. 1983. Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization. Yale University, Department of Sociology, 9: 355–374.
- PATEY, L. 2010. Oil and Politics: A dangerous mix. *Africa.Org*.16, April/May.
- SCHAFFER, L.A. 2007. Negotiating the North/South Conflict: Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement. ISS Paper No. 148. July 2007.
- SELIGMAN, C.G. & SELIGMAN, Z. 1932. *Nilotic Sudan*. London: Routledge.
- SINGH, J. 2008. *The Problem of Ethnicity: The United Nations and Kosovo Crisis*. Chandigarh: Unistar Books.
- THOMSON, A. 2004. *An Introduction to African Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- TURNER, B. 2011. (Ed.) *The Statesman's Yearbook*. New York: Palgrave.
- VENTER, A. & LANDSBERG, C. 2011. *Government and Politics in South Africa*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

WEBIOGRAPHY

AGUDA, O. 2011. Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 11(2): 177–200, June. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/160105>
Date of access: 29/09/2011.

ANDREOUPOULOS, G.J. 2011. Encyclopædia Britannica. <http://www.britannica.com>
Date of access: 13/01/2012.

ANON, 2009. Sudan's NCP says SPLM has three options to resolve impasse over Abyei. *Sudan Tribune*. <http://www.sudantribune.com> Date of access: 12/02/2011.

ANON, 2012. Giving divorce a bad name. *The Economist*.
<http://www.economist.com/node/21552581> Date of access 17/04/2012.

BAUMANN, T. 2004. Defining Ethnicity.
<http://qbl.indiana.edu/baumann/Baumann%202004%20-%20Defining%20Ethnicity.pdf> Date of access: 27/08/2012.

BERMAN, B.J. 1998. Ethnicity, Patronage and the African States: The politics of uncivil nationalism. <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org> Date of access: 22/11/2011.

BROSCHE, J. 2009. Sharing Power – Enabling Peace. <http://www.peace.uu.se> Date of access: 19/02/2012.

BUCHANAN, A. 1991. Towards Theories of Secession. University of Chicago (322–342). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381866> Date of access: 30/05/2011.

BUCHANAN, A. 1997. Theories of Secession. *Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs* 26 (31–61). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2961910> Date of access: 23/06/2011

CIA. 2012. Sudan Profile. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html> Date of access: 05/07/2012.

COLLINS, C. 1976. Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010898> Date of access: 26/10/2011.

CPA. 2005. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army. <http://www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa> Date of access: 05/07/2010.

DAGNE, T. 2011. Crisis in Darfur and the Status on the North-South Peace Agreement. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?fecvnodeid=127593&groupot593=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&dom=1&fecvid=21&ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&v21=127593&lng=en&id=10332>. Date of access: 15/11/2011.

DHURGON, M.T. 1995. South Sudan: A History of Political Domination – A Case of Self-determination. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_marchar.html. Date of access: 03/11/2011.

DIVERSITY COUNCIL, 2007. Sudanese Culture: An Overview. <http://www.diversitycouncil.org>. Date of access: 27/01/2012.

DUBBLEMAN. B. 2011. Polity: Results of the Referendum. <http://www.polity.org.za/article/sudan-post-referendum-report-2011-02-08>. Date of access: 12/04/2011.

EPATKO, L. 2011. In Violent Areas of Sudan Many Finding Refuge in the Hills. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/10/Southern-kordofan.html>. Date of access: 23/02/2012.

FIALKOFF, A.B. 1993. A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48961/andrew-bell-fialkoff/a-brief-history-of-ethnic-cleansing>. Date of access: 18/01/2012.

FLUER-LOBBAN, C. 1990. Islamization in Sudan: A critical assessment. *The Middle East Journal*. 44(4):610–623, Autumn. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328193> . Date of access: 18/01/2012.

FREEMAN, M. 1999. The Right to Self-Determination, *International Politics: Six Theories in Search of a Policy*. 25 (355–370). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097605>. Date of access: 29/06/2011.

GATKUOTH, J.M. 1995. Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Sudan.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2065/is_n2_v47/ai_16885559/. Date of access: 05/08/2011.

GLUCK, J. 2010. Why Sudan's Popular Consultation Matters. <http://www.usip.org>. Date of access: 21/02/2012.

HELETA, S. 2008. Roots of Sudanese conflict are in the British Colonial policies. *Sudan Tribune*: 13 January. www.savohheleta.com. Date of access: 07/05/2011.

HETCHER, M. 1992. The Dynamics of Secession. *Journal of Acta Sociologica*, 35 (267–283). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4194789>. Date of access: 02/06/2011.

HUMPHREYS, M. POSNER, D.N. & WEINSTEIN, J.M. 2002. *Ethnic Identity, Collective Action and Conflict Experimental Approach*. (Paper presented at APSA, Boston, September 2002. P. 1-30.
<http://www.international.ucla.edu/CMS/files/Ethnic%20ID,%20Collective%20Action%20and%20Conflict1.pdf>. Date of access: 17/09/2012.

ICG. 2008. Sudan's Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?.
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/Sudans%20Southern%20Kordofan%20Problem%20The%20Next%20Darfur.pdf>. Date of access: 21/02/2012.

IGAD. 2011. Intergovernmental Authority on Development. http://www.africa-union.org/recs/igad_profile.pdf. Date of access: 20/08/2012.

IMF. 2011. Sudan and the IMF. <http://www.imf.org/external/country/sdn/index.htm>. Date of access: 08/08/2012.

ISADY, M. 2000. Ethnic Divisions of the Sudan
<http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml> Date of access: 09/11/12.

KIUNGA, M. 2011. Kenya: Warrant of Arrest against Al-Bashir on Erroneous Reading of International Law. <http://allAfrica.com/stories/201112190355> Date of access: 31/01/2012.

KLAUBER, E. 2011. On South Sudan: Ethnic Minorities and Political Autonomy. <http://972mag.com/Southern-sudans-independence-ethnic-minorities-and-political-autonomy/17565/> Date of access: 29/09/2011.

KOKO, S. & WAKANGELA, M. 2010. The Referendum for Self-Determination in South Sudan and its Implications for the Post-Colonial State in Africa. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=127532> Date of access: 15/11/2011.

KRON, J. 2011. Tribal clashes raise fear of Instability in South Sudan. *The New York Times*. <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11318/1189859-82.stm> Date of access: 18/11/2011.

LEIFER, E.M. 1981. Competing Models of Political Mobilization: The role of ethnic ties. *American Journal of Sociology*. 87 (23–47). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778538>. Date of access: 14/06/2011.

LOKUJI, A.S. 2006. Building the Capacity for Sustainable Peace in Sudan. <http://www.amaniafrika.org>. Date of access: 10/11/2010.

MACHAKOS PROTOCOL. 2002. The Machakos Protocol of July 2002. http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indigenous/documents/Sudan/Legislation/Machakos%20Protocol%202002.pdf. Date of access: 02/07/2011.

MARTELL, P. 2011. South Sudan Backs Independence. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12379431>. Date of access: 12/09/2011.

NAGEL, J. & OLZAK, S. 1982. Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old State: An extension of the competition model. 30 (2) 127–143. December. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/800513>. Date of access: 23/05/2011.

OECD. 1989. Online version June 2011. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/192362>. Date of access: 26/7 2011. Earlier version first published in *New English Dictionary*, 1919.

PAGLIA, P. 2005. Ethnicity and Tribalism: Are these the root causes of the Sudanese civil conflicts? *Journal of African Economic Analysis*.
<http://www.africaeconometricanalysis.org>. Date of access: 04/03/2011.

PATRICK. H. 2010. Map of Sudan. http://www.helenaandpatrick.com/?page_id=36. Date

PROGRESS MONITORING REPORT. 2006. Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan: Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication. January 2005 to February 2006.

SANSCULOTTE-GREENIDGE, K. 2011. Abyei: From a Shared Past to a Contested Future. www.accord.org.za Date of access: 03/09/2011.

SHILS, E. 1957. Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/587365>. Date of access: 09/06/2011.

SIDAHMED, A.S. 1995. The Beja.
<http://www.sudanupdate.org/REPORTS/PEOPLES/BEJA.HTM>. Date of access: 27/08/2012.

SWITZER, 2002. Oil and Violence in Sudan.
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec_oil_violence.pdf. Date of access: 07/08/2012.

WEISSBACH, M.M. 1995. Sudan's Political System. *Executive Intelligence Review*. (45–46). http://lcps-lebanon.org/governance/admin/mycache/CashedFile_146.htm. Date of access: 21/02/2011.

World Bank. 2011. Data and Statistics.
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXTN/0,,menuPK:375448~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSitePK:375422,00.html>. Date of access: 18/08/2012.

U.N. 2011. Map of the Republic of South Sudan.

<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf>. Date of access: 06/12/2011.

U.N. 2011. Map of North Sudan.

<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf>. Date of access: 06/12/2011.

U.N. 2011. Map of the Sudan.

http://www.google.co.za/imgres?imgurl=http://mapsof.net/uploads/static-maps/un_sudan.png&imgrefurl=http://mapsof.net/map/un-sudan&usq=e0qxdRiyCgk6rhLYUKW9Bn0w_q0=&h=1506&w=1200&sz=353&hl=en&start=1&zoom=1&tbnid=1NEFsWHI_-9OaM:&tbnh=150&tbnw=120&ei=1vPdTty5L8TqOdn4rKwJ&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dun%2Bmaps%2Bsudan%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN%26gbv%3D2%26t bm%3Disch&um=1&itbs=1. Date of access: 06/12/2011.

U.N. 2011. Maps of the Sudan. <http://www.unhcr.org/4de4ec096.html>. Date of access: 21/02/2012.

U.N. News Centre, 2011. Displaced People.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39444&Cr=Kordofan&Cr1>. Date of access: 21/02/2012.

U.N. 1993. United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

<http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/language.aspx?langid=eng>. Date of access: 13/04/2012.

UNMISS. 2011. United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/>. Date of access: 09/08/2012.

USAID. 2009. USAID Sudan Mission. http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/sudan/index.html. Date of access: 09/08/2012.

Murphy, T. & Temin, J. 2011. United States Institute of Peace: Report 278. www.usip.org. Date of access: 11/11/2011.

INTERVIEW

KISIANGANI, E. 2011. Verbal communication with author. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2 December 2011.