Struggle for Leadership Relevance in the African Continent: A Study of Nigeria and South Africa (1994-2012)

By

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DECLARATION

I, Onyebukwa Chijioke Francis, declare that STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP RELEVANCE IN AFRICA: A STUDY OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: 1994-2012, is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Signature: ....   Signature: ....

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Date: Day 17 of 09 2013.   Date: Day 17 of 9 2013.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the glory of God Almighty for the gift of strength and grace to continue especially when it sometimes was difficult for me to do so.

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STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP RELEVANCE IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT: A STUDY OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA (1994-2012).

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1. INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Africa is the second largest continent in the world. It has vast resources and contains more than 12% of the world's population (Okumu, 2005:21). As a result of its strategic position and importance, the global community has over the years tapped into and enjoyed the socio-economic and political resources of the continent.

Within the continent, the overwhelming influence and power of Nigeria and South Africa is not in doubt. Both countries obviously are regarded as socio-economically and politically strong nations in the continent. Nigeria is the most populous black nation in Africa and the world at large; with a population of over 160 million people, it accounts for more than half of the West African population and occupies a strategic location on the West of the continent (Akadiri, 1999: 24). South Africa is also strategically located on the Southern part of the continent with a population of over 60 million people (ibid).

The economic, social and political contributions of Nigeria and South Africa to the development of Africa both at the regional and continental levels concretized their contemporary influential positions in the continent. As a result of this, both countries are regarded as regional super powers and Africa's hegemonic leaders as well. Based on the fact that both countries are dominant actors in the African political dispensation, they have been at loggerheads with each other on various sensitive continental issues. While Nigeria strives to call the shots, set the values and dictate the tune of the continental diplomatic, political and economic game, South Africa counters such leadership roles by disagreeing with Nigeria on most continental issues. What this implies is that both countries are driven by interests as to which one would consequently emerge as an African continental Hegemon.

This competition clearly explains why South Africa projected itself uninvited as a peace broker in the Côte d'Ivoire crisis in opposition to the plan of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was to contend with and manage the crisis through ECOWAS (Akadiri, 1999:97-98). Such action by South Africa is viewed by some as an attempt to upstage Nigeria in West Africa where it holds sway.

Again, the two countries held opposing positions regarding the recognition of the Transition National Council (NTC) as the interim government in Libya during the Libyan crisis. While Nigeria had supported and recognized the NTC as Libya's national interim government, South Africa maintained its support for the government of Gaddafi (Alli, 2011: 2). Even worse, they differed on fundamental matters of peace and security in Libya. This situation has not provided the AU the leadership it deserves rather such a leadership battle has significantly deepened divisions between African countries (Handy, 2011: 9) and created insidious division between Nigeria and South Africa.

Such antagonism degenerated into a diplomatic row between the two countries when the South African government deported a plane-load of Nigerian immigrants from O R Tambo International Airport on the excuse that they had entered the country with fake vaccination documents. In a swift response Nigeria repatriated some hundreds of South Africans in a diplomatic action it termed diplomacy of reciprocity (Akadiri, 1999: 25). Such hostile diplomatic strife has exposed the citizens of both countries residing in the other to undue and unnecessary diplomatic intimidation and stress.

Considering this further, the hegemonic struggle and battle between Nigeria and South Africa poses a very serious danger to the agenda of G3. The G3 has the mandate to represent African states and positions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Obviously, there is the risk of having fragmented positions on the African agenda because of the influence of the contested leadership between these two big African states who unfortunately are both members of G3. A common continental position on the reform of the UNSC is highly likely to be compromised because Nigeria and South Africa who are the major agents of this mission have not been agreeing with each other on some Africa's issues lately owing to their quest to control the African agenda.

However, both countries are major contenders and possible candidates for the permanent seat(s) in the proposed reformed UNSC. I will continue to emphasize seat(s) because it is unfortunately still uncertain how many seats will be allocated to Africa by UNSC and the reform has not yet been pronounced a reality. Even though the Ezulwini consensus requires serious support and commitment by all African countries, it is silent with respect to which country amongst the African

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countries should occupy the seat(s) should the UNSC reform become a reality. The African Union (AU) is uncertain as to which of its member state(s) to endorse and is yet to establish the criteria to be used for selecting African country(s) to the membership of reformed Security Council. In creating this leadership vacuum, the AU is leaving the selection of who will represent Africa in the purported expanded UNSC to be determined by a regional power struggle (Okumu, 2005:24). This has enhanced heightened regional rivalries in Africa between Nigeria and South Africa.

Much as these countries have established their leadership position and influence across Africa, Africa still swings on the pendulum of the lack of distinguished and distinctive continental leadership. The fact remains that these two African regional Hegemons had on several occasion held varying opinions, views and positions on various sensitive continental issues depicting their unrelenting quest for domination over each other, typical of Hegemon universally. The struggle stems from this singular fact of a clear distinctive African leadership which both countries are striving to occupy.

1.2.   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The African continent has been caught in the web of lack of a distinctive leadership. Over the years, the two giant African countries (South Africa and Nigeria) have made unequivocal socio-economic and political contributions towards African development credited to their influence both in their own regions and in Africa; an enduring position that has undoubtedly earned them leadership status within the continent. However both have been engaged in a seemingly cold war of continental leadership which obviously has been elusive in the continent. Suffice to say that the quest for continental leadership ignited the struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria which has been going on for years.

In trying to entrench themselves in the continental leadership, both counties have differed in opinions and positions on bilateral, regional and continental African issues. Fundamentally and most contemporary is the proposed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent seat(s) for Africa. Hence, the problem under

research is the fact that the proposed UNSC permanent seat(s) reputedly ceded to Africa has directly or indirectly enhanced and significantly deepened the struggle for leadership relevance in Africa between South Africa and Nigeria, among others. Basically, this study observes that the struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria has not been adequately researched thereby providing a justification for this exercise.

1.3.   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

As a consequence of the above stated problem, it is the intention of this research to;

1.   Explore and examine roles played by South Africa and Nigeria to assert leadership control and the case of the heightened struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria in Africa.

2.   Examine the influence of the proposed UNSC permanent seat(s) on South Africa and Nigeria's quest for continental leadership.

3.   Attempt to proffer recommendations on the continued struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria not only for both countries but also for the African continent.

1.4.   SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The expected outcome of the study is the emergence of a fresh perspective in the analysis of the struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria. This will be a significant contribution to the development of a better and clearer academic understanding of the leadership struggle that has engulfed both countries over the years; particularly and most recently, with regards to the proposed UNSC reform agenda which reputedly ceded permanent membership seat(s) to Africa. The research will also point out policy alternatives for Africa on how to contain the continued leadership struggle between both countries. Furthermore, this study intends to canvass the possibility of a better, peaceful and non-antagonistic approach to the resolution of the rivalry between both countries through the

African Union (AU). Finally, it is hoped that this study will be a part of contribution to resolution mechanism of the continental leadership struggle between both countries.

1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In this section, certain research questions arising from the struggle for leadership relevance in Africa between South Africa and Nigeria which are relevant to the study will be asked. Such questions include the following:

1. What regional and continental roles have South Africa and Nigeria played to assert continental leadership of Africa and why?

2. What are the causes of rivalry between South Africa and Nigeria?

3. What recommendations are proffered to handle the deepening struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria as a result of the proposed UNSC reform agenda?

1.6. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS:

Two main hypotheses form the pillars of this study.

1. The more South Africa and Nigeria continue to pursue continental leadership, the more the struggle for leadership between them.

2. The more South Africa and Nigeria continue to pursue their aspirations for the seat in the proposed reformed UNSC, the deeper the rivalry between both countries.

1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

This research seeks to examine the struggle for leadership relevance in Africa between South Africa and Nigeria. As a result the methodology or research design to be adopted for this study is the qualitative research model. The choice of this model for this research is based on its considered relevance to the objective of the

study. According to Maree (2007:78) qualitative research model is based on a naturalistic approach that seek to understand "phenomena in context (or real world setting) and, in general, the research does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest". This means that research is carried out in real life situations and not in an experimental situation of testing and retesting.

Maree (2007:78) further posited that qualitative research methodology is concerned with understanding the processes and social and cultural contexts which underlie various behavioural patterns and is mostly concerned with exploring the "why" questions of research. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, this research methodology approach will be harnessed to address the "why" questions of this research exercise.

In general terms, what distinguishes the qualitative research method from other methods is that its collectable data are mostly expressed using words. It seeks to discover internal meaning from other peoples' works which are comprehensively analyzed to provide relevant hypothetical answers; analytical enough to address the questions this research intends to answer.

1.7.1. DATA COLLECTION

This research exercise will depend on secondary sources of data collection. This will include books, special publications, journals, periodicals, newspapers and internet sources such as Google, a search engine (social media) etc. To be able to extract relevant information from these secondary sources, the researcher will engage the services of the library of the North West University and its very efficient computer labs. Also the libraries of notable South African Institutes like the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Institute of International Affairs (IIA) and Institute of Global Dialogue (IGD), which are all located in Pretoria and are reputed to possess expert knowledge in global issues, especially as they relate to African continental international affairs, will be visited. Data collected from these institutions will no doubt significantly create a basis for balanced objectivity for the study.

Furthermore, visits to South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation and Nigerian embassies, also in Pretoria will afford me access to

periodicals, journals and special publications which are rarely accessible outside the embassies but very significant to this research exercise.

1.6.2. DATA ANALYSIS

For the purpose of this research, the content analysis as a method of data analysis will be applied to comprehensively and in an interpretative manner examine the data collected with the intent of using such interpreted data to provide answers to the enquiry this research intends to make. Content analysis by definition according to Maree (2010:83), as a term, refers to the analysis of such materials as books, written documents, journals, news reports etc. In other words, it is an approach that identifies and summarizes massage contents. It tries to establish how writers make meaning and interpret phenomenon by expressing their feelings, perceptions, understanding, knowledge, attitudes, values and experiences, in an attempt to approximate their construction of the phenomenon. Thus, the use of content analysis for this research will facilitate the arrival at hypothetical answers to the "why" questions this research intends to answer.

Therefore, for this research, materials gathered will be read with the intent of identifying facts that will aid provide answers to the research questions of this work, these will be summarized and thereafter hypothetical answers shall be drawn from these and approximated to the phenomenon this research intends to explore.

1.8.   SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study covers the period between 1994 and 2012. The choice of this period is derived from the major watershed political and diplomatic events touching on South Africa and Nigeria relations occurred.

1.9.   DEFINTION OF TERMS

A concerted effort will be made to define some terms used in the context of this research to ensure a clear understanding of the study. This becomes necessary mainly because Social Sciences as a distinctive discipline, has its own peculiar

terminologies which may not be easily comprehensible to people without any Social Science background and who may wish to make use of this work either for further research or for academic purposes. Such terms include the following; hegemon, diplomacy, realism, conflictual, clout, pessimistic, etc. Thus, there is an unavoidable need for the definition of such terms as may be used in this study.

Hegemon- The social, cultural, political, ideological or economic influence exerted by a dominant group, state or entity over others.

Diplomacy- The art and practice of conducting international relations.

Realism- Concern for fact or reality and rejection of things regarded as impractical or visionary.

Conflictual- To be incompatible or in opposition to each other.

Clout- Influence, especially effective political power.

Pessimistic- A tendency to stress the adverse aspect of a situation or event or to expect the worst possible outcome.

Source: The Penguin Complete English Dictionary; WS Bookwell, Finland.

1.10. LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY

The desired visit to the libraries of reputable Nigerian Institutes like Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (IPSS) and Institute of international Affairs (IIA) to further enhance quality and balance of data collection, is elusive. This situation is no doubt very challenging and as a result the researcher is confined only to other bodies and organization of Nigeria in South Africa such as the Nigerian Embassy, for source of materials.

1.11. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The researcher is mindful of the need for the referencing of his sources of information in this exercise; therefore this research operation shall be strictly guided by the ethical guidelines that ensure proper and complete referencing of works used in this research.

1.12. ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS

Chapter one covers the following in this order: background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, significance of the study, research hypothesis, research methodology, scope of the study, definition of terms, limitations to the study, ethical consideration and organization of the chapters.

Chapter two contains the

- Theoretical framework
- Literature review

Chapter three highlights the involvement of South Africa and Nigeria in peacekeeping operations; South Africa in Lesotho and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Nigeria in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone.

Chapter four explains the connection between involvement in peacekeeping operations and the struggle for leadership between South Africa and Nigeria. It also covers some instances of claims to leadership and areas of diplomatic disagreements, precipitating the leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria on some African issues that required unanimous continental diplomatic agreement, usually through the AU, for instance on such as Libya, Côte d'Ivoire and the proposed UNSC seat(s) for Africa.

Chapter five provides recommendations, summary and conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains the theoretical framework and the literature review. The theoretical framework chose offensive realism as the theory that provided an analytical framework that can properly be used to analyse the issue the research intends to analyse. The literature views the perceptions of literatures of other scholars and finds in the process a gap which it intends to fill through this exercise.

2.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The basic realist ideas and assumptions are; a pessimistic view of human nature; a conviction that international relations is necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; a high regard for the values of national security, state interest and survival; and a basic scepticism that is comparable to that in domestic political life.

These basic ideas and assumptions steer the thoughts of most leading realist international relations theorists, both past and present (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006: 275). In realists' thoughts, humans strive to have the edge in relationship with other people, including international relations with other countries (Ibid). Therefore, the desire of states in international relations to take the advantage over others and avoid domination by others is thus universal.

As clearly enunciated by a revered classical realist, Machiavelli, Meaisheimer (2001:65) posited that the goal of power, the means of power and the uses of power are central preoccupations of political activity. To him, international politics is portrayed as power politics and an arena of rivalry, conflict and war between states in which the same basic problems of national interest and ensuring the continued survival of the state repeat themselves over and over again. Implicit in this model of realism is the fact that the main point in international politics is power politics projected towards the defense of state interests to ensure continued survival of the state. In other words, the theory is primarily a theory of state survival.

A glance at this concept of realism suggest that it is the responsibility of rulers to always seek and take advantage of weaknesses of rivals in international power politics to defend the state; the fundamental, overriding values of security and state survival must guide foreign policy of state.

Another notable realist, John J. Mearsheimer (2001: 87-90), in his theory: OFFENSIVE REALISM holds that the anarchic nature of the international system is responsible for aggressive state behaviour in international politics. While offensive realism theory reiterates and builds on certain assumptions elaborated by classical realists, it departs completely from this branch by using positivism as a philosophy of science and by adding a system-centric approach to the study of state behaviour in international politics based on the structure of the international system.

The theory is grounded on five basic assumptions;

    i.   Great powers are the main actors in world politics and the international system is anarchical,

    ii.   All states possess some offensive military capability,

    iii.   States can never be certain of the intentions of other states,

    iv.   States have survival as their primary goal,

    v.   States are rational actors capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospect for survival.

Offensive realism claims that states are in fact power-maximizing revisionists harboring aggressive intentions. According to Mearsheimer, the international system provides great powers with strong incentives to resort to offensive actions in order to increase their security and assure their survival. He insists that the international system is characterised by anarchy, uncertain state intentions and available offensive military capabilities, which leads states to provide for survival.

In order to alleviate this fear of aggression each state holds about the others, states always seek to maximize their own relative power, defined in terms of material capabilities. As Mearsheimer puts it: "they look for an opportunity to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals since the greater military advantage one state has over other states,

the more secure it is. States seek to increase their military strength to the detriment of other states within the system with hegemony as their ultimate goal".

He summed up this view as follows: "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive". Accordingly, Mearsheimer believe that a state's best strategy to increase its relative power to the point of achieving hegemon is to rely on offensive tactics. Provided that it is rational for them to act aggressively, great powers will likely pursue expansionist policies, which bring them closer to hegemony.

Clearly his case rests on the assumptions that great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. He was so definite to posit that regional hegemons can see to it that there are no other hegemons in any part of the world. He argued further that hegemons can prevent the emergence of peer competitor and insisted that there will always be a struggle between hegemons or of states for power and domination in the international system.

The above realism interpretations predicated on the continued survival of the state emphasizes the fact that there will always be conflicts for power between states who would see to it that they dominate the affairs of the international system in their relations with other states. However, views of Mearsheimer in his offensive realism seem useful in providing a more reliable platform for an enquiry into the struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria, even though the realist theory in general has laid a foundation for his theory. Offensive Realism provides a clear relevance to the research because by providing the basic characteristics and behavioral patterns of regional hegemons in international politics it explains the reasons behind the rivalry and leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria.

Obviously therefore, the preference of offensive realism over other realists' positions for this research exercise is premised on the clear and analytical postulations of Mearsheimer which has apparently provided a framework for

analytical explanation of the hegemonic battle between Nigeria and South Africa which this research intends to discuss.

2.3. LITERATURE REVIEW:

Varied opinions, perceptions and arguments have greeted the concern of scholars of international relations who individually and collectively proffered and maintained positions on the hegemonic contest between Nigeria and South Africa, which has left both countries as clear rivals in the African continent and global community, precipitating a continuous struggle for more relevance between these two countries.

According to Okumu (2005: 5), the campaign for the proposed new permanent seat(s) in the reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC), while producing fireworks around the globe has also opened up old historical wounds among African countries and heightened regional rivalries. He explained further that Africa is also exhibiting deep division along religious and language lines as countries of Africa scramble for the coveted seat(s). The battle ahead, he insisted, is likely to be long, nasty and brutal and is sure to lead to increased tension between Africa's power brokers.

However, the failure of this work to assert this fact as the central factor and undisputed reason for the struggle between Nigeria and South Africa becomes one of the focal areas this study intends to discuss. Obviously, Nigeria and South Africa are unavoidably among the major contenders for the seat(s) in the proposed expanded UNSC. Analyzing this position will elucidate the obvious reasons why the continued struggle for leadership relevance between these countries has led them into antagonistic and rival positions on several occasions particularly when it concerns international issues of a holistic Africa.

There has been much debate and concern about who represents, and what it means to represent the African continent in the international system. Basically, according to Okumu (2005:7), whoever is chosen to represent Africa at the proposed expanded United Nations Security Council (UNSC), automatically assumes the position of African continental hegemon and clearly asserts the long elusive continental leadership position. Ironically, such a county becomes the leader in Africa and would now be looked upon as representing, promoting, protecting as

well as defending the interests of the African continent as a whole. This would mean the emergence of the long awaited Africa's distinctive hegemon.

Souare (1992: 4) clearly depicts the uncontested regional hegemonic position of Nigeria in the West African region. He believes that the term 'hegemon' is often used to describe the dominant state in a particular region which requires a certain level of military capabilities and financial clout. Nigeria has possessed the requisite financial and military clout to achieve leadership and harnessed these sufficiently over the years to sustain its regional leadership position.

Souare (1992:8) contended further that economically, Nigeria has many times served as a leading country providing bilateral aid and technical assistance to other African states, as is typical of a hegemon universally to provide the common public good, a diplomatic move largely viewed as a way to assert and sustain leadership in the West. Most significantly, it has relentlessly promoted and supported regional economic integration in West Africa through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and plays a pivotal role in its peacekeeping mission within the African Union (AU) and around the globe under the United Nations (UN). The position he maintains portrays Nigeria unarguably as the only country in the region of West Africa to have met all the criteria needed to assume the position he terms "the mobilizer", (a leading country).

On the other hand, South Africa has gained standing in international politics over the 19 years since the end of apartheid, and therefore equally possesses a claim to Southern African regional leadership. The country is an economic engine of Southern Africa, though with regard to a role as a regional big power, South Africa's position is more uncertain, (Schoeman, 2000:4). Schoeman (2000:5) maintains that South Africa seems to be willing to push for a stronger role in regional and continental affairs, as seen from its signals regarding Security Council membership.

However he further asserts that South Africa's quest for a leadership role among its neighbors in Southern Africa and beyond, finds its clearest expression in what has become known as Mbeki's doctrine embodied in the idea of an African Renaissance (Schoeman, 2000:6) which had culminated in new levels of commitment and involvement of South Africa in regional peacekeeping missions,

indicating acceptance of responsibilities inherent in regional leadership. To clearly assert the regional leadership position, he insists that South Africa has been touted as an example and model to other countries in transition, interpreting it as predestined in its leadership role, and such specific role and function, confirms the extent to which South Africa is accepted as a regional leader by its neighbors.

In this sense, South Africa has clearly demonstrated beyond doubt that its emphasis on the Southern African region as center piece of its foreign policy is sincere and tangibly geared towards leadership. South Africa has shown strength of its commitment to security in the region through its involvement and practical disaster relief programs of assistance to its disaster ridden neighbors including Tanzania and Lesotho, among others (Schoeman, 2000:7).

A logical inference can only be drawn from the above reviewed literature that Nigeria and South Africa are at best regional hegemons but does not reference the covert or overt intentions of continental leadership which has over the years directly and indirectly tailored, shaped and influenced the rival and antagonistic relationship between Nigeria and South Africa.

Secondly, it fails to recognize the fact that such rival and antagonistic relational behaviors are attributed to regional hegemons who would see to it however, that there are no other hegemons in any part of the world. Hegemons struggle to prevent the emergence of peer competitors and there will always be a struggle between hegemons for power and domination in the international system.

Such position has unequivocally also informed the obvious discontent between both countries in their unrelenting quest to upstage each other especially when situations demand decisive decisions from Africa on issues that concern and reflect Africa's position at both the international system level and also on domestic issues.

Alden and Soko (2005: 367-392) shear a different view from Okumu and Souare in their literature. Their perspective reflects South African business and parastatals as a large hegemonic project pursued by Pretoria. Secondly, they also see the role of ideology as a crucial measure of South African hegemony.

To buttress these claims, they examined three sites of South African economic engagement in Africa, ranging from its immediate neighbors to the

farthestgeographic extension of the continent. They insisted that the South African Customs Union (SACU), the longstanding customs union made up of South Africa and the BLNS states- Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland- represents the most institutionalized expression of South African hegemony. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), comprising 14 states in south-central Africa and Indian Ocean coast, is a regional organization where South Africa's economic dominance is clear; in Africa north of the Zambezi River, the expansion of South African business interests and the country's attempt to assert itself diplomatically are the main expressions of South Africa hegemony.

To Alden and Soko, SACU provided the most conspicuous example of how South Africa acted as a 'malevolent' hegemonic power through a history of economic dominance. According to them, the lopsided trade relationships that persist within the SADC region with South Africa maintaining a massive surplus with its neighboring trade partners depicts trade disparity which reflects South Africa's economic power in the region's trade and investment patterns. According to them however, this shows that the SADC regional integration process has evolved against a backdrop of gross economic inequalities and imbalance among member states (in which South Africa's economic strength has facilitated its predominance).

In both instances, South Africa is portrayed as regional economic hegemon which utilized its economic strength as a weapon to actualize and sustain its hegemonic leadership in the Southern region. Although this position was asserted by Alben and Soko, they further posited that South Africa's hegemonic project remains a continuous process in terms of the mantle of hegemony thrust upon it.

In a broader spectrum, they posited further that deepening trade and investment between certain countries, particularly between Africa's principal regional powers-South Africa and Nigeria- has brought about exceptional growth in trade and investment between them. Hence, Nigeria has become South Africa's biggest trade partner in West Africa and its third largest on the African continent after Zimbabwe and Mozambique. However, not withstanding the above, Alden and Soko were quick to acknowledge that South Africa-Nigeria bilateral economic relationship has not been devoid of economic fissures and fear of economic hegemonic domination by South Africa over Nigeria in the continent.

They insisted for instance that the complaint by South African business that the Nigerian government has failed to open its markets fully to South African products has been reciprocated by Nigerian business seeking market share in South Africa. This resistance by African governing elites to South Africa's penetration of local economies, they asserted, remain a key obstacle to furthering its hegemonic aspirations. This position reflects that, despite the imminent South African hegemony over the continent, its status remains contested outside its immediate sub-region.

Alde and Soko went further to insist that this manifested in two ways: first, a challenge to the material position South Africa occupies as the leading African economy, and second, recognition that the ideational component of hegemony- 'soft power'- is still limited in its reach and acceptance across the continent. In the first instance, it was their position that South Africa's material position is challenged by other African leading states like Nigeria and Angola, which have sufficient resources to stave off some of the lure of South African investment.

Making their contribution on the role of ideology as a crucial measure of South Africa hegemon, they posited that if the condition for hegemony and the impulse for cooperation reside in South Africa's historically dominant economy and the formalized cooperative arrangements found in the region, its hegemonic aspirations in the sense of seeking out a position of 'structural power' on the continent are most obvious in its ideological promotion of the African renaissance and NEPAD.

Taken together, the South African promotion of a continental ideology of revived pan- Africanism and its instrumental expression in the NEPAD programme and the AU, they insisted, represent a concerted effort to develop the requisite conditions for the exercise of continental leadership. Going by their second position, they posited that this ideational dimension of South African hegemony, which is a cornerstone for sustaining a hegemonic presence and position, remain thinly ascribed to by African leaders because some of these ideological norms reflect South Africa's own circumstances, policies and aspirations.

Clearly, the inference that could easily be drawn from this literature stems from two spheres; economic and ideational spheres. These obviously present a view of

South Africa pursuing its regional aspirations through these spheres but not without challenges. It shows that despite South Africa's material expression of its hegemonic aspirations embedded in its superior financial and natural resources, its position is contested.

Secondly, South Africa's ideational hegemonic project depicted through NEPAD and African renaissance failed because the idea was seen to reflect South Africa's circumstances, policies and aspirations.

Thirdly, despite economic partnership ad cooperation between the two powerful states, South Africa and Nigeria, problems continue to plague cooperative relations that speak as much to the competition for continental leadership as for cooperation.

However, this literature did not clearly show a leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria linked to their desire for a seat in the proposed reform UNSC if it eventually becomes a reality. It only depicted a perspective of South Africa's hegemonic project pursued through economic and ideational dimensions.

After a careful review of the literature used for the purpose of this research, it could easily be dictated that the literature did not comprehensively analyse the positions so to have a direct link or connection to the struggle for leadership between South Africa and Nigeria. However, authors perceptions clearly explained their positions and what views they intended to analyse distinctively but basically, this literature review shows that the struggle for leadership relevance between South Africa and Nigeria, has not been adequately researched thereby providing a gap which this exercise intends to fill.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter has the objective to explore the peacekeeping roles South Africa and Nigeria played to assert leadership positions at regional level. It examines the peacekeeping interventions involving South Africa in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Southern African Region and Nigeria in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the West African Region.

3.2. HISTORICAL NIGERIA

From independence in 1960, Nigeria's foreign policy principle has been characterized not only by a focus on Africa but also particular attention to the West African region where Nigeria is located in the continent. From a general point of view, Africa has remained the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy from its inception. It attached several fundamental principles towards African affairs holistically such as African unity and independence; economic integration and cooperation; peacekeeping and building, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-alignment, decolonization and total commitment towards the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, among others of her foreign objectives. During the 1960's and 1970's, Nigeria took obvious leading roles in opposing apartheid, particularly in meetings of the Front Liners States (FLS) of Southern Africa: chairing the United Nations (UN) Special Committee against Apartheid; and championing the anti-apartheid cause at the Commonwealth (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012: 1).

Furthermore, a few weeks after independence, Nigeria was inducted into global politics when the world body, the UN, asked the country to contribute and deploy a contingent of its national troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for peacekeeping under the UN. Nigeria successfully utilized the platform of this world body to effectively pursue its dreams of decolonizing other African countries and particularly the eradication of apartheid and racism in South Africa (Akadiri, 1999:23), implying the significant beginning of Nigeria's journey to continued leadership role and influence in the continent.

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Within the West African region, Nigeria's leadership role towards regional economic cooperation and integration led to the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 (ibid) which seeks to harmonize trade and investment practices for its fifteen member states. Through this regional body, Nigeria has been able to enthrone itself as a regional pillar, being a drivingeconomic force the region depends upon.

3.3. ECOMOG AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE WEST

With the spiral of conflicts in the region and the changing international environment, prominent member states of ECOWAS, including Nigeria, insisted on the need for an established mechanism or apparatus for managing regional security. Thus, in pursuit of this goal and to sustain its regional leadership position, Nigeria in various ECOWAS summits garnered support for building a regional security framework. When it appeared that the international community would not sanction peacekeeping for the Liberian conflict, Nigeria –the dominant regional power in West Africa- won the argument for creating an indigenous security apparatus to oversee the conflict (Ero, 2000:2).

Before this, several African states were devising a collective system or capacity to respond to conflict rather than relying on an outside force like the UN to intervene. The interventions by ECOMOG marked an important turning point in the practice of peacekeeping by regional or sub-regional organizations (Ibid). It showed that regional conflict management is possible and achievable through a regional conflict management apparatus.

ECOMOG in Liberia represented a watershed in African collective security by a regional body. This was a fulfillment of the dream of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who had the idea for an African peacekeeping force to manage African conflicts when Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union) was created in 1963 (Ero, 2000: 1). The failure of other African states to institute such a regional conflict management mechanism and apparatus before Nigeria significantly portrayed Nigeria's leadership role and position in the region and in Africa. The aftermath of this successful giant leadership stride by Nigeria precipitated the formation of an ECOMOG like body in other regions. The

Southern African Development Community (SADC) was one of such regional creation.

For Nigeria, involvement in this remarkable stride of leading a regional peacekeeping mission portrayed its ability to assume the kind of regional, and above all international, responsibilities associated with playing a high profile role in the UN. It was a clear demonstration of Nigeria's economic and military capacity and strength in the region. Since its intervention in Liberia on 25th August, 1990, ECOMOG- the Monitoring Observer Group- has entered other trouble spots along the West African coastline, notably Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Ero, 2000:1).

In Guinea- Bissau, the initial mediation to stop the fighting was mainly led by Portugal and foreign ministers from Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP): Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe. However it was Nigerian officials who brokered a breakthrough in the conflict on the sidelines of the ECOWAS meeting held between 1-2 November 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria. A peace agreement was signed between President Viera and Brigadier Mane on 2 November under the auspices of ECOWAS. The peace agreement called for a weapons amnesty for both sides; the immediate formation of a unified government; elections set for no later than March 1999; the withdrawal of foreign troops (that is, Senegalese and Guinean troops) from Guinea-Bissau; and the introduction of a buffer force of ECOMOG peacekeepers (Clewlow, 1998:22). Essentially, such successful intervention has not only remained unrivaled but also unparalleled in the region typifying Nigeria's leadership position.

However, in all three interventions, poorer nationswho can contribute fewer troops relied heavily on Nigeria's military capacity and strong financial support for success. Even though the maintenance and sustenance of ECOMOG is a collective responsibility of member states, most of which are poor, it requires the unparalleled support of a strong leading nation within the region, like Nigeria to survive. This meant that there needed to be a 'mobiliser' in the region who could urge others, through its solid support, to appreciate the need for a collective initiative to end the suffering and halt further humanitarian crises not only in these countries, but also in the region as a whole. The 'mobiliser' also had to convince itself that it had the financial means and military capability to do this. Nigeria was

clearly the only country in the region that met almost all these criteria. It thus played this 'mobilizer' role (Souare, 2010: 2).

With a population of more than 150 million people, Nigeria accounts for more than half of the estimated 249.8 million people of the whole of West Africa. By the end of 2002, it accounted for roughly 75 per cent of West Africa's total GNP. Nigeria also maintained an incomparable 95,500 strong army by the end of 2002. These two indicators make it surpass the size of all the other ECOWAS fourteen countries in terms of population and thus manpower and military capability. Economically, Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing country in the world and the largest in Africa (Ibid). All these indices are pointers to the reason why Nigeria's leadership influence is extended across the region and the continent.

3.4. HISTORICAL SOUTH AFRICA

The commonly known history of South Africa concerns the Apartheid system of government. The apartheid system, based on racial segregation and violence, was designed to ensure the broad social dominance of the white minority over the black majority (Trachsler, 2011:1). The violent enforcement of this system caused South Africa to experience increasing international isolation, particularly from the 1960's (ibid) when Nigeria and other newly independent African countries became aggressively involved in and deeply supported all anti-apartheid moves.

This ostracism was partially alleviated in the context of the Cold War through continuing economic and diplomatic contacts with Western countries such as the US, the UK and Federal Republic of Germany. They regarded the country, situated in a key geostrategic location at the Southern tip of the African continent, as a bulwark against the spread of communism in the region and were thus reticent in enforcing sanctions against Pretoria (ibid). However, South Africa continued to remain as an internationally ostracized pariah state until the final dismantling of apartheid in 1994.

3.5. THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION

For the young South Africa, the rise to the regional, continental and particularly global limelight was very fast. The final dismantling of apartheid in 1994 saw

South Africa's transition to its first democratically elected government. The peaceful transition and Mandela's policy of reconciliation rapidly gained international clout for South Africa. This brought great expectations on the part of the international community that South Africa would actively engage in conflict resolution. After 1994, Pretoria resumed diplomatic relations, disrupted under apartheid, with numerous countries and opened more than 40 new diplomatic missions (Trachler, 2011:2).

Within just two years, the country joined 45 international organizations. For instance, in 1994, South Africa joined the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as the South African Development Community (SADC); in the same year it also rejoined the UN from which it had been suspended in 1974 (ibid). What this obviously implies is that South Africa's regional, continental and international rise to political prominence was rapid. Such a rapidly attained level clearly vested South Africa with leadership position and the attendant requisite responsibilities.

Thus this awareness contributed towards the change in attitude by South Africa's government and there was a display of greater willingness to engage in African conflict resolution endeavors (Nibishaka, 2011:2). As noted by Mbeki "there are also expectations from Africa that South Africa should make significant contributions towards peace and development on the continent" (ibid).To buttress this position further, former Director-General Selebi stated the following in an address to the South African military (Neethling, 2003:13).

> I believe it is our collective intention as constituent role-players in our foreign policy establishment, to seek to locate the country in its rightful place in the community of nations, and to transform ourselves as a nation into a global player that is capable of making a meaningful and significant contribution to the advancement of the welfare of the nations in the world. I also believe that we are jointly seeking to rapidly develop and continuously evolve in us all, as this country's foreign policy role-players, an adequate capability to engage the international community at all levels, bilateral, regional and globally. We should all seek to situate this country as an indispensable and very necessary part of the international decision-making processes, whether such matters affect international security and peace, international politics and economics, or international trade or environment... Given the fact that the SANDF remains Africa's most capable and sophisticated military instrument, there is naturally great expectation that this country should increasingly be involved in peacekeeping,

peace-making, peace-enforcement operations, especially in Africa.

In a similar vein, Rear Admiral Rolf Hauter, former Chief Director Strategy and Planning in the SANDF, stated that "we, as South Africans, will have to come to terms with the fact that, as the biggest economy in the region, our country will always have to carry bigger responsibilities (ibid). Thus this is a clear indication that South Africa's leadership is obviously conscious of South Africa's profile and international demands placed on the leadership and that the country needs to be responsive to calls for military contributions to international peacekeeping.

But on the other hand and at the same time, South Africa has shown reluctance to portray an image of a regional big power. This is a result of the country's historical legacy of harsh apartheid policies. In particular, the former front line states are highly sensitive regarding any behavior that will remind them of the apartheid regime's aggressive policies of regional hegemony. Hence a pronounced articulation of Pretoria's claim to regional leadership would imply a high risk of isolation (Flemes, 2007:20). South Africa's policy makers seemed to proceed with a caution perceived as reluctance. This attracted criticism against South Africa in some quarters for its level of involvement as playing the bigger role in regional peacekeeping missions as a regional leader rather than its chosen policy which is more Afro-centric, most visible in what is known as Mbeki's doctrine of African Renaissance.

However, South Africa, through SADC has demonstrated a reasonable level of firm control of the Southern African region, in the sense that with regard to a role as regional power, South Africa's position is more uncertain. This has led to a deep-seated suspicion among some countries about South Africa's intention and 'real' role. Its legitimacy and credibility as an impartial leader, bent on doing what is right just out of concern and benevolence, are often questioned (Schoeman, 2000:3).

Secondly, South Africa's regional leadership position has been in contention particularly by its closest regional rival, Zimbabwe. In its quest to represent and

promote the interest of the South, it is strengthening its position as a bridge with the North. Yet, although it attempts to fulfill this role in conjunction with other Southern Organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the development of a unified position on issues of international concern remains difficult. This was clearly seen in the 1995 NPT review conference (ibid).

Against this backdrop South Africa has shown significant strength in its commitment to security in the region through its involvement and practical disaster relief: to Tanzania after the ferryboat disaster of 1996; the heavy snowstorms and resulting food crisis experienced in Lesotho in the winter of 1996; its assistance to Mozambique after the heavy rains, flooding and damage to infrastructure in February 1999 and again (and on a much bigger scale) in early 2000 (ibid). South Africaalso intervened militarily in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)in its effort to assuage doubts over its perceived reluctance to become involved in regional peacekeeping mission as a regional leader.

In 1994, South Africa took the decisive step of playing the role of peacemaker in Lesotho when hostilities broke out between king Letsie III, and Prime Minster, Ntsu Mokhehle and the elected Parliament (Ero, 2000:2) thus, marking the beginning of post-apartheid South Africa's regional peacekeeping mission. In furtherance of this mission, at the invitation of the Prime Minister Mosisili, the South African Defence Force entered Lesotho on 22nd September, 1998. Nelson Mandela, the President of South Africa between 1994 and 1999 authorised seven hundred South African troops, supported by Botswana, to intervene in Lesotho in order to maintain order. This occupation lasted for seven months from September 1998 to May 1999 (Hadebe, 2000: 23).

The Lesotho peacekeeping intervention in the form of Operation Boleas has been criticized for so many reasons from many quarters as both in Southern Africa and abroad, even though South Africa successfully resolved the Lesotho conflict. South Africa was not only concerned with its power or leadership in the Southern African region, but its security was also important. This implies that the country had its vital national interests to protect in the kingdom which precipitated unilateral decisive action. More so, South Africa did not consult SADC or the OAU before

intervening in the Lesotho domestic conflict because it considered itself the highest authority as far as Lesotho is concerned (Hadebe, 2000: 24).

South Africa's peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) began in 1999, of the UN Command under Operation Mistral against the M23 rebels. The SANDF had 1200 personnel in DRC, were they are tasked with supporting the UN peace mission there and protecting the local population. (Martins, 2012: 1). In June 2003, the SANDF was deployed to war-ravaged Kindu in the Eastern part of DRC (Munusamy, 2003: 4).The number of personnel rose as information indicates that as at 30th September 2003, just over 1400 SANDF members served as Un 'blue helmets' in the DRC, while about 1600 SANDF members were deployed to Burundi (Kagwanja, 2009: 10). A battalion with 1200members took over from the 2nd South African infantry that left the mission on November 7th 2012 (Martins, 2012: 1). However, according to Schoeman (2000: 4), while emphasizing its commitment to peaceful solutions, South Africa had also indicated that the one area, in accordance with SADC principles, in which it would not hesitate to use force, was in the face of a threat to a democratically elected government.

Criticism or not, the commander of SANDF at the time (Ngwenye, 2009: 9) in defense of South Africa's peacekeeping intervention missions Gen. Ngwenya, declared that the decision to deploy was not taken lightly and led to outright criticism. Sceptics frowned on it, but the fact remains that it would have been next to impossible for South Africa to enjoy its new-found democracy with certain states of Southern Africa and the continent at large in a state of turmoil. Considering further, he insisted that accordingly the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) got involved in peacekeeping operations on the understanding that for South Africa to enjoy economic prosperity and all that democracy brings, there needs to be stability on the continent. Indeed, he stated further that our country cannot survive as an island, as South Africa is inextricably linked to the continent's stability. In pursuit of this goal, he contended further that the SANDF continues to be deployed on various peacekeeping missions to assist in the resolution of conflict and in strengthening democracy in a number of African states (ibid).

Clearly, South Africa is an African leader and the dominant state in Southern Africa. Inevitable responsibilities and commitments flow from its position of economic and moral strength. The SADC countries (with the exemption of Zimbabwe) eagerly look to South Africa both for moral and material leadership and it is clearly in its economic interest to do everything within its power stabilize the region (Cilliers & Malan, 1996:3).

Obviously, for South Africa, peacekeeping in Southern Africa may be considered as action in the right direction in pursuit of its national security, directly linked to its interest in the permanent membership of the UNSC which South Africa has demonstrated from the beginning. Against this background it is important to note that explicitly states participation in peace missions is increasingly becoming a prerequisite for international respectability and for a strong voice in supra-national organization and in debates on multinational conflict management (Kagwanja, 2009: 16). To buttress this position, in an interview in late 1998, Selebi said that "since South Africa's main foreign policy concern is to be part of shaping the global agenda, we would want to become a permanent member of the Security Council" (Schoeman, 2000:4).

3.6. CONCLUSION

It was stated initially that the aim of this chapter will be to explore and assess the peacekeeping roles South Africa and Nigeria have played in the regional States to assert regional leadership. Accordingly, this informed the focus of the discussion. To this end, it could be deduced that undertaking peacekeeping missions at the level discussed would definitely involve some responsibilities that can only be conveniently and comfortably shouldered by countries possessing of the requisite military and financial capacity to do so. Thus, the massive military involvement and financial support provided by South Africa and Nigeria in theirpeacekeeping missions, clearly depicts and elucidates their regional hegemonic status.

CHAPTERFOUR

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Much as the previous chapter of this research exercise has tried to explain and analyse the regional leadership positions asserted by South Africa and Nigeria through intentionally selected peacekeeping missions involving both countries, it also cast light on the attendant financial, economic and military clout, capacity and strength required of hegemons. This coincided with the best description attributed to South Africa and Nigeria.

This chapter analyses the continental leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria. It analyses instances of diplomatic disagreement between the countries on some African issues that required unanimous continental diplomatic agreement, usually through the AU.

In trying to comprehensively and convincingly achieve this fit, the research first looks at some covert issues pertaining to leadership as triggers to South African and Nigerian involvement in peacekeeping missions. It goes further to consider instances where both countries have laid claims to regional and continental leadership.

It further considers contested leadership between South Africa and Nigeria and cites examples of instances of their diplomatic disagreements. Such instances include the Libyan crisis, Côte d'Ivoire conflict and most importantly, the proposed UNSC.

4.2. WHY INTERVENE?

To clearly understand the struggle for leadership relevance in the African continent between South Africa and Nigeria, it will be pertinent to also understand the unstated and covert but practical triggers and motivation to peacekeeping interventions. As this research has enunciated the involvement of South Africa and Nigeria in selected peacekeeping missions in the continent, the question that calls to mind is; what leads these countries to intervene in violent conflicts? Clearly central to the answer to this question is national interest. To start with, the nexus of

any country's foreign policy objective is its national interests. The forms and what actually constitute national interests is a different discussion on its own but the concern here remains that central to the intervention is a matter of national interest.

To understand this position, it is noteworthy that both South Africa and Nigeria have retained Africa as central to their foreign policy objective. As such therefore, their involvement shows deep concern for African issues that may possibly accord them influence and recognition, remains pivotal to the national interests of these countries.

Recently it has become increasingly important, following the proposed UNSC reform agenda, for interested countries to demonstrate the ability to provide regional responsibilities associated with playing a high profile role at the UNSC to attain strong international recognition, South Africa and Nigeria have increased their efforts in this direction. Among the criteria laid down by the UN Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (the Report on UN reform), is that the new member of the UNSC must have contributed 'most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically', particularly through contributions to United Nations assessed budgets and participation in mandated peace operations. The other conditions spelt out are that new members should represent the broader UN membership, increase the domestic and accountable nature of the Security Council and should not impair its effectiveness (Okumu, 2005: 2).

To increase an awareness of the seriousness of this issue, in an interview in late 1998 Selebi said "since South Africa's main foreign policy concern is to be part of shaping the global agenda, we would want to become a permanent member of the Security Council" (Schoeman, 2000:2). Even the foreign affairs minister at the time Alfred Nzo, in his 1999 budget address to parliament remarked that "in 1997, I raised a question of South Africa having consider whether it is prepared to serve as a permanent member of the Security Council..., it is imperative that we have the debate" (ibid) this explains why Mbeki was more prepared than Mandela to send peacekeepers abroad to increase South Africa's credibility as a major geo-strategic player in Africa (Gumede, 2005: 6).

If, either South Africa or Nigeria becomes a permanent member of the UNSC, this will assertively confirm continental leadership status to it. Therefore, involvement in intervention and participation in peacekeeping missions becomes a test case for South Africa and Nigeria. Both countries has to demonstrate their ability to play central roles in preventing and resolving conflicts across the continent so as to increase their international recognition as well as enhancing their chances of becoming permanent members of the UNSC. This becomes a national interest that vigorously triggers intervention.

In the recent past, both South Africa and Nigeria have retained at the center of their national interest the 'conquest' of African leadership. To understand this point, Nelson Mandela said sometime in 1993 "South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victims to the forces that brought ruins to its various parts" (Alden and Soko, 2005: 370). As part of the country's commitment to achieve this objective and in pursuit of concerns for peace and stability, the South African government has been at the forefront of states in promoting negotiated settlements in Congo, Lesotho, and Burundi as well as providing peacekeeping troops in the case of the former two conflicts (ibid) this research discussed earlier. Interestingly, Nigeria has toed a similar line by intervening in conflicts in Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone either in defence of or pursuit of national interests.

Obviously, the hegemonic status of South Africa and Nigeria and their self-perception as continental leaders encouraged their intervention (Engel and Porto, 2009: 8). To attain such regional hegemonic status, South Africa and Nigeria has adequately utilized to their advantage their economic and military capabilities to play influential and instrumental roles via their unrivaled contributions towards the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.

Such contributions have from time to time not only earned both countries international praise but also have been taken as a contribution to one of the leading criteria or requisites for permanent membership of UNSC, according to the Report on UN Reforms. In the UN's assessment of troop contributions for peacekeeping efforts in 2005, South Africa was ranked 10th and Nigeria was ranked 7th (Okumu, 2005: 4). Nigeria has received praise for playing leading roles in the peacekeeping missions in the Sierra Leone and Liberia civil wars, and in the case of Liberia, in

2003 Nigeria was instrumental in ending the conflict by offering beleaguered President Charles Taylor a safe haven (ibid).

Much as intervention has received international recognition as an important criterion for permanent membership of the UNSC, it has created a deepened need in both countries to intensify involvement in intervention operations. This becomes a matter of vital national interest which is vigorously pursued with the ultimate intention of qualifying for the much coveted position (Okumu, 2005: 7). What this implies is that between South Africa and Nigeria whichever country is chosen to represent Africa becomes Africa's number one and consequently represents the interest of the whole continent signifying an end to Africa's long awaited distinctive continental leadership. This provides elucidation of the reason why both countries intervene in conflict situations.

4.3. CLAIMS TO LEADERSHIP

As a result of the precarious nature and confusion surrounding eligible ascension to the proposed and coveted UNSC permanent seats, both South Africa and Nigeria, the two distichously most qualified African candidates has unequivocally and unambiguously laid claims to African leadership position. Such claims to the African leadership however have created division and deepened and increased tension between these African power brokers and the battle ahead is likely to be long, nasty and brutal (Okumu, 2005: 2). Moreover, because of this precarious nature and confusion surrounding eligibility should the body be expanded, the African Union is uncertain as to which of its member states to endorse and has yet to establish the criteria to be used for selecting African countries to serve on the proposed reformed Security Council (ibid). However the AU in this indecisive state has created a leadership vacuum therefore leaving the selection of who will represent Africa on the expanded UN Security Council to be determined by foreign busybodies and regional power struggles (ibid: 5).

Incidentally, this situation has thrown these distichously influential African power brokers into inevitable pressure, strife and leadership struggle and by extension, a continuous claim to African leadership by both countries over the years. Laying claim to leadership is a diplomatic campaign effort of both countries to portray

itself as such. No doubt, South Africa and Nigeria are both regional hegemons and African leaders but not in a distinctive perspective in which one of them is recoganised as the paramount leader of the African continent considering their level of influence in the continent. Therefore the claim to leadership becomes a sure avenue to assert more continental and international influence.

Going by the criteria laid down by the UN Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, both South Africa and Nigeria have as a result of the level of success in their peacekeeping efforts, appropriated leadership status to themselves. For instance, as Nigeria is competing with South Africa for the regional leadership role and for a permanent seat on the UNSC, Abuja justifies its claim to leadership with its historical role as such, its large population (every 5th black African is a Nigerian), and its military strength (84,000 troops), and its great contribution to African peacekeeping (in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Sudan) (Flemes and Wojczewski, 2010: 22).

In this regard and in other UN peacekeeping involvements, Nigeria has contributed more troops than South Africa. Table 1 below shows the top ten states contributingtroops to the UN mission as at May 2010.

TABLE 1 Top ten states deploying to the UN Mission- May 2010

Country (ranking in overall UN mission contributions).	Troops contributed to UNAMID.	Total contribution to UNAMID (including troops, police, experts and military observers).	Total contribution to all UN missions.
Nigeria (4)	**3327**	**3913**	**5929**
Rwanda (9)	3228	3351	3647
Egypt (5)	3293	2608	5453
Ethiopia (12)	2366	2346	2404

Senegal (11)	1005	1183	2437
Tanzania (24)	885	983	1077
Burkina Faso (26)	806	812	889
South Africa (14)	**776**	**1024**	**1150**
Pakistan (1)	497	788	10719
Bangladesh (2)	581	1310	10385

Sources: Nibishaka Emanuel, South Africa's peacekeeping role in Africa: motives at http://www.rosalux.co.za/wp-content/files_ and challenges of peacekeeping, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Johanesburg. Available mf/1297156628_21_1_9_pub_upload.pdf.Accessed 2013-03-15.Also available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors

The table clearly shows that Nigeria is ranked 4th as against South Africa seated on the 14th position. Interestingly Nigeria has laid claims to leadership and considered itself as most qualified for the UNSC seat more than South Africa based on its level of involvement and troops contributions to all UN missions around the globe. Nigeria has insisted that South Africa is still too young in this area and therefore lacks requisite experience to assume such an important position (Wafulu, 2005: 6).

Eyebrows were raised at an AU summit when one of Nigerian President Obasanjo's aides proclaimed that South Africa and Egypt were not qualified to represent Africa on a reformed UN Security Council because they are 'not black enough' (Alden and Soko, 2005: 387). This implicitly means that Nigeria not only sees itself as a continental leader but has clearly appropriated to itself this status as shown by this rather unguarded statement.

On the other hand, in a statement that was issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs in December 2009, at the end of South Africa's first tenure (2007-2008) as an elected non-permanent member of the UNSC.

South Africa's central objective was to help advance the African agenda, but

it also actively engaged in all issues on the Security Council's agenda pursuant

to global mandate associated with Council membership. South Africa achieved

leadership position, for example as lead nation on Timor-Leste and as head of a key

Security Council mission to Africa....(Matshiqi, 2012: 42)

Apart from this, South Africa has claimed leadership through the African Agenda known as the African Renaissance. It was a doctrine for the reintegration of the continent into the global economy (Gumede, 2005:5). Today there is no doubt that South Africa is committed to the African agenda. As President Jacob Zuma said in February 2011 "The African agenda remains our key policy focus" (Matshiqi, 2012: 43). Even though the formation of NEPAD, which is a child of the African agenda, and the transformation of OAU to AU, attracted a great involvement by South Africa and Nigeria, South Africa's Mbeki remains the enigma behind the scene.

Going further, for countries like South Africa and Nigeria to be successfully involved in various peacekeeping operations and advance the financial consequences inherent in such huge projects implies the presence of economic capability to do so. However this is not listed among the criteria for UNSC selection but it clearly cannot be ignored. But among the qualities expected of a country to be an active and productive member of the Security Council are financial resources to enable it to staff its New York and Geneva UN Mission with adequate and highly qualified people (Okumu, 2005: 6). The resources needed to maintain and run full permanent representation on the Security Council to the standard of the other big five permanent members, are enormous (ibid). In this regard South Africa and Nigeria have both laid claims to leadership and superiority above each other.

For Nigeria, oil is the bedrock of its economic development, accounting for more than 80 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings (Nigeria.com, 2003:2) which has

provided funds to have effectively sustained its numerous peacekeeping involvements within Africa and around the globe under the UN. Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing country in the world and the largest in Africa and by the end of 2002, it accounted for roughly 75 per cent of West Africa's total Gross National Product (GNP) (Wafulu, 2005: 4). This clearly explains Nigeria's standing in Africa which has consequently supported its obvious consistent claim to leadership. To further assert this position, it is on record that Nigeria has at times served as a lending country, providing bilateral and technical aid to other African States (Souare, 2005: 5).

Even though South Africa is on an economically expanding course on the continent, its economic power is felt in the SADC free trade zone and in the South African Customs Union (SACU) (Trachsler, 2011: 3). It has an estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $368billion representing Africa's largest economy (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012: 3). Meanwhile, Nigeria became Africa's second biggest economy by GDP, recording $232 billion in 2011, representing a long-term market for South African investment (ibid). South Africa also shows the highest defence expenditure in its sub region and the African continent as well: $3.55 billion in 2007 (Flemes, 2007: 21). No doubt, this position equally portrays South Africa as a clear picture of the leader which it lays claims to be.

These differences in the economic and political systems mark the hierarchy between South Africa and Nigeria in ideational terms, providing South Africa with more international legitimacy than Nigeria (Flemes and Wojczewski, 2011: 20). In terms of material resources, Nigeria can also be clearly defined as the secondary power in the Sub-Sahara Africa (see table 2).

Table 2: Comparison of South Africa's and Nigeria's Material Resources

South Africa's Material resources:		Nigeria's Material Resources:	
Military		Military	

Military expenditure (US$ million) 2007	4,040	Military expenditure(US$ million)2007	825
Sub-Saharan Ranking	1	Sub-Saharan ranking	2
Total armed forces (thousands) 2008	62	Total armed forces(thousands)2008	80
Sub-Saharan ranking	5	Sub-Saharan ranking	4
Energy		**Energy**	
Oil production (millions of barrels/day)2007	0.2	Oil production (millions of barrels/day) 2007	2.35
Sub-Saharan ranking	7	Sub-Saharan ranking	1
Natural gas production (billions cm) 2007	2.9	Natural gas production (billions cm) 2007	34.1
Sub-Saharan ranking	2	Sub-Saharan ranking	1
Economy		**Economy**	
GDP (US$ billion) 2008	485.5	GDP (SU$ billion) 2008	335
Sub-Saharan ranking	1	Sub-Saharan ranking	2
Global Competitiveness Index Rank 2008	45	Global Competitiveness Index Rank 2008	94
Sub-Saharan ranking	1	Sub-Saharan ranking	7
Demographic/Geographic		**Demographic/Geographic**	
Population (millions) 2008	43.768	Population (millions) 2008	138.2
Sub-Saharan ranking	4	Sub-Saharan ranking	1
Land area (thousand sq.km)	1,219.1	Land area (thousand sq.km)	932.8
Sub-Saharan ranking	6	Sub-Saharan ranking	10

:Flemes Daniels and Wojczewski; Contested Leadership in International Relations: **Source**Power Politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. A Research Programme. Edited by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, February, 2010; pp: 20-21. NO 121. Available at; http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Digital/?id=112666$Ing=en.Accessed 2012-11-08.

The time taken to draw this table is not to compare South Africa and Nigeria in this sense per se. The intent is rather to present through these illustrative tabular analogy variables that had informed South Africa's and Nigeria's claims to leadership and why there are actions reflective of such claims as well. Apparently, there are areas reflective of the material resources superiority of South Africa over Nigeria and vice versa. Therefore laying claims to leadership or exhibiting actions reflective of such claims by either South Africa or Nigeria in areas of superior material resource becomes unavoidable bearing in mind there Sub-regional status in their continent.

4.4. SOUTH AFRICA AND NIGERIA ENGAGE IN A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

For the fact that Africa continues to wallow in lack of the distinctive continental leadership, the leadership struggle will continue unabated among very strong and influential countries of the continent, among which are South Africa and Nigeria. Obviously, the continental leadership pendulum swings between South Africa and Nigeria. The struggle for leadership relevance in Africa between these two countries remains central to this and therefore influences this section.

The economic, social and political contributions of South Africa and Nigeria to the development of Africa, both at the regional and continental levels, concretised their contemporary influential positions in the continent. As a result of this reason both countries are not only accepted but unarguably regarded generally, over the whole, as regional super powers and Africa's hegemonic leaders as well. Based on the fact that both countries are dominant actors in African political dispensation, they have

both been at loggerheads with each other on various sensitive continental issues requiring unanimous continental decisions.

The reason is not be difficult to see. According to a notable realist, John J Mearsheimer (2001: 87), regional hegemons can see to that there are no other hegemons in any part of the world, and hegemons can prevent the emergence of peer competitors and that there will always be a struggle for power and domination in the international system.

Back during the 1960's, 70's and 80's, Nigeria enjoyed a leading role in Africa, opposing apartheid, participating in meetings of the Frontline states (FLS) of Southern Africa; chairing the UN Special Committee against apartheid; and championing the anti-apartheid cause in the Commonwealth (Adebajo and Paterson, 2012: 1). However, after South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, the country's new president and Noble peace laureate, Nelson Mandela, appeared to don the garment of African leader that Nigeria had historically worn (ibid). It meant that Nigeria would have felt its leadership position was threatened with the introduction of another potential leader, South Africa, which consequently rose to international clout rather rapidly, in the international system.

Relations reached a nadir after Nigeria's autocratic leader, General Sani Abacha, ignored Mandela's pleas and ordered the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights activists in November 1995 (Adebajo and Paterson, 2001: 2). Although this event was not purely related to the leadership struggle, it marked the beginning of sour relations between South Africa and Nigeria particularly with Mandela calling for a boycott of Nigerian oil and the country's suspension from the Commonwealth (ibid). Under Abacha's autocratic rule, it was Nigeria, and not South Africa, that was now facing mounting criticism over its human rights record. Having abandoned its apartheid past, South Africa was widely acknowledged to be the most likely political and economic success story in Africa (Adebajo, 2013: 2).

After 1999, presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo initiated a "golden age" of bilateral relations between Tshwane and Abuja, building new institutions and continuous efforts to address difficult issues as they arose, but in May 2008, the Nigerian press criticized Tshwane (Pretoria) over a perceived failure to crack down on

xenophobic violence in South Africa which included attacks on Nigerian immigrants (Adebajo and Paterson, 2001: 2)

However, tension emerged in the relationship from 2005 over African permanent representation on the UN Security Council, the Chair of the AU Assembly of heads of state and government, and Mbeki's mediation role in Côte d'Ivoire (ibid). In 2011, South Africa and Nigeria adopted divergent positions on the UN Security Council and at the AU over the military intervention conducted by French/UN troops in Côte d'Ivoire, and the recognition of the National Transition Council (NTC) as Libya's new government (ibid). These were some significant instances where the struggle for Africa leadership between South Africa and Nigeria was very clearly depicted.

4.4.1. THE CÔTE D'IVOIRE POST-ELECTION CRISIS

In the aftermath of the disputed election in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010, the African Union suspended Côte d'Ivoire from all AU activities until presidential challenger Alassan Ouattara was seated as the rightful winner. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also took a forthright stand in support of the election results as certified by the country's election commission, even going so far as to threaten military action to remove sitting president Laurent Gbagbo for refusing to accept the election results (Simpkins, 2011: 1). Initially, it appeared as though Africa was united through the AU's insistence that Gbagbo must go but, the High-Level Panel saddled with the responsibility of ensuring a resolution of the Côte d'Ivoire standoff began to splinter in its resolve to maintain a united AU stance on supporting Ouattara's widely accepted victory (ibid).

At the January AU summit of 2011 in Addis Ababa, Nigeria and Burkina Faso stood firm on the AU position, but they clashed with Angola and South Africa, who were urging a resolution of the election dispute in a less confrontational manner (ibid). South Africa, incidentally was heading the AU High-Level Panel which merely recommended the recount of votes instead of and in violation of AU's position of outright validation of Alassan Ouattara's mandate (Alli, 2011: 3). South Africa at the time never endorsed the election of Ouattara and backed Gbagbo's insistence that the votes be recounted (Simpkins, 2011:2). The presumed

pro-Gbagbo camp also included Angola, Uganda, Gambia and Zimbabwe; Nigeria and Burkina Faso were joined in their support for Ouattara's victory by Senegal and Kenya (ibid).

To further elucidate South Africa's involvement in Côte d'Ivoire, it is noteworthy to mention at this juncture that South Africa's former president, Thabo Mbeki, led mediation efforts to Côte d'Ivoire that culminated in the Pretoria Agreement that reinforced the country's two-year-old cease-fire agreement. It failed to outline a plan for elections, but he was perceived as too close to Gbagbo and was nudged out and replaced by Blaise Compaore, Burkina Faso's president, who concluded a 2007 agreement setting the stage for elections (Lynch, 2011: 2).

Furthermore, days after Côte d'Ivoire's election, Mbeki returned to Côte d'Ivoire in an effort to mediate an end to the standoff. Mbeki proposed the possibility of some sort of power-sharing agreement, infuriating Gbagbo's West African neighbors, including Nigeria, who believed it would replicate what they have viewed as South Africa's failed diplomatic strategy in Zimbabwe, a power-sharing agreement that effectively preserved Robert Mugabe's rule (ibid). Although South African officials had insisted that Mbeki was not representing South Africa, Zuma had also favored a mediated outcome; "we need to do something to help the situation and don't demand that one leader should go" (ibid).

However, the UN- which was empowered under the terms of a peace agreement between the rivals to certify the election- ruled in favor of Ouattara, consequently setting the stage for ECOWAS, the African Union, the United States, the European Union and the UN Security Council to endorse the election outcome that resulted inOuattara's victory (ibid). Although for months, Cote d'Ivoire's neighbors, led by Nigeria, mounted a diplomatic campaign, backed by the United States, the United Nations, and the European powers, combining financial sanctions and the threat of military action to dislodge Gbagbo, South Africa's action raised concerns that it may be intending to thwart those efforts by pressing for a power-sharing agreement (Lynch, 2011:1).

South Africa, apparently acting in contrast to the views of the UN, USA, EU and the AU attracted international condemnation. In a swift condemnation of South Africa's action, a UN representative for Human Rights watch, Philippe Bolopion,

in an interview with Turtle Magazine in 2011-02-23 said "South Africa, a respected democracy with ambitious aspiration on the world scene, should not be allowed to be seen as helping Gbagbo cling to power, while his security forces kill, abduct, rape and terrorise real or perceived opponents, as shown by our own research"

To West Africa leaders, including Nigeria, the South African move was a challenge to their leading role in a crisis their own region. According to Philippe Bolopion, "while the Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan sees intervention as a way of asserting Nigeria's role in African foreign policy, South African President Jacob Zuma, meanwhile, sought to extend his country's influence in West Africa by asserting a far more aggressive diplomatic role in Cote d'Ivoire".

During the post-election crisis in Cote D'Ivoire, Nigeria adopted a belligerent stance towards Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to stand down after losing the election. South Africa provocatively sent a warship, the SAS Drakensberg, to the Gulf of Guinea in Nigeria's traditional African "sphere of influence" (Adebajo, 2012: 3), in a rare and highly ambiguous show of force that riled regional African powers, including Nigeria, and complicated international efforts to compel the country's defeated presidential incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, to yield power (Lynch, 2011: 3). In a show of surprise and disappointment with South Africa's action, James Victor Gbeho, the Ghanaian chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), at the time said in an interview with Turtle Magazine on 2011-02-23, "I'm surprised that a distinguished country like South Africa would decide to send a frigate to Côte d'Ivoire at this time".

Apparently, these actions depict a growing struggle for leadership and influence between sub-Sahara African powers, South Africa and Nigeria, who are seeking international support for their bids for permanent seats on the UN Security Council. Thus, the rivalry between South Africa and Nigeria inevitably has to do with jostling for a seat on the UN Security Council.

4.4.2. THE LIBYAN CONFLICT

The first protest in Libya occurred immediately in the wake of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the first African Union (AU) discussion on Libyan crisis was at the Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting on 23 February, 2011. This discussion focused on the Libyan authorities' repression of demonstration and the threats that Gaddafi was making against the opposition (De Waal, 2012: 1). The next discussion, held at the level of heads of state level on 10 March, 2011, forged the African diplomatic response to the Libyan crisis (ibid). The PSC proposed a high-level ad hoc committee made up of heads of states, anticipating that this would have the required clout and influence to facilitate a negotiated solution in Libya and rally the international community behind the AU's efforts (ibid).

At the end of the PSC meeting, the commission agreed that there had been an irreversible change in Libya and that Mummer Gaddafi was out of the picture (Editorial column, Economy Magazine, 2011). In effect therefore, in its communiqué, the AU's PSC strongly reaffirmed that it stood with the people of Libya and encouraged all the stakeholders in Libya to come together and negotiate a peaceful process that will lead to democracy (ibid). The themes of the meeting included the need for a ceasefire, for humanitarian assistance (including the rescue of African migrant workers), and for an inclusive peace agreement combined with a democratic transition (De Waal, 2012: 2). The most substantive element of the themes in the themes was paragraph 7, which became known as the 'roadmap' and it affirmed as follows;

i.   The immediate cessation of all hostilities,

ii.   The cooperation of the competent Libyan authorities to facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy population,

iii.   The protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya and,

iv.   The adoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary for the removal of the causes of the current crisis.

The AU's constituted ad hoc committee, headed by South Africa but conspicuously excluding Nigeria, consequently flew into Tripoli to meet with both Gaddafi and the National Transition Council (NTC) leadership after permission

was granted them to fly following the aftermath of the imposition of a no-fly zone against Tripoli by the UN. Gaddafi accepted in principle the AU roadmap including ceasefire and negotiations (ibid). However, the NTC leadership rejected the plan. Mustfa Abdel Jalil announced the immediate departure of Gaddafi; "Gaddafi must leave immediately if he wants to survive", he said (ibid). Following the rejection of the roadmap by the NTC and Gaddafi agreeing with it in principle but practically not keeping his words for an inclusive dialogue with the participation of NTC, the AU was put in a very tight position.

Consequently however, the three African countries on the Security Council of the UN (Gabon, South Africa and Nigeria), all voted for resolution 1973 whose operative provision were different entirely from the AU's position on the Libyan crisis (De Waal, 2012: 4). Although the resolution refers to the AU efforts in its preambler section, including calling for a ceasefire and facilitating dialogue to lead to political reforms necessary to finding a peaceful and sustainable solution, it also allowed the UN the use of military action, where necessary, and the imposition and enforcement of further sanctions such as; the no fly zone, on Libya (ibid). What transpired between the AU and the UN NATO involvement in Libya remains a discussion on its own.

However, the rejection by the NTC and the mere acceptance in principle by Gaddafi, of the AU roadmap, divided Africa. While most of the continent wanted Gaddafi gone with minimal disruption, a few leaders were still sympathetic to the "Brother Leader" (De Wall, 2012: 5). Between South Africa and Nigeria, a cold war was apparent over the fate of the embattled Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. To buttress this position, a top Nigerian government official, who spoke in an interview with The Nation Newspaper on 2011/09/04, said "Nigeria has a sharp disagreement with South Africa on how to address the Libyan crisis but we would not allow it to degenerate so as to affect the cordial ties between the two countries". This statement was tested after all as both countries went their separate ways on the Libyan crisis in a rather test of influential superiority in Africa.

Nigeria's prompt recognition of Libya's National Transition Council (NTC), tallied with the AU's call for the establishment of an all-inclusive and broad government, as well as for Muammar Gaddafi to relinquish power immediately (Editorial column, Economy Magazine, 2011). But by contrast, President Jacob

Zuma of South Africa was supporting Gaddafi, meaning that the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria had maintained a peaceful parallel position to that ofPresident Jacob Zuma of South Africa over Gaddafi's fate.

South Africa and two other countries claimed that the AU's Constitutive Act does not allow the Union to recognise the NTC because it was an illegal force and insisted that any government in Africa can only be removed through a constitutional process while Nigeria and other African countries maintained that the Constitutive principles are the last ones listed in section 14 of the Constitutive Act and that the Act cannot be implemented in isolation of other principles supporting human rights and social justice among others (De Wall, 2012: 6).

Nigeria and others had insisted that Libya had never been ruled under any known constitution since Gaddafi took over in 1969 (ibid), "the last constitution Libya had was under Idris, who was deposed by Gaddafi, so we are also arguing that the Constitutive Act cannot apply to Gaddafi who had never run a constitutional government. Apart from that, the Constitutive Act did not take into account popular revolt as being witnessed in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya when it was drafted, it only applied to military regimes", the Nigerian official stated in further defense of Nigeria's position against South Africa's. The official went further to challenge South Africa why it had accepted the popular revolts in Tunisia and Egypt as legitimate but decided to maintain support for Gaddafi. Apparently, this was a clear show of the leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria. It was a situation of breakdown in diplomacy in Africa that had required AU's unanimous decision and specific position on a decisive way forward.

This breaking of ranks between South Africa and Nigeria had unfortunately been singled out and roundly criticized in South Africa through Gwede Mantashe, the Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC). Countries such as Ethiopia, Senegal, The Gambia, Egypt, Tunisia and Rwanda had earlier recognised the TNC which points to the weight they ascribe to Nigeria (De Wall, 2012: 7). Again, in response to this criticism, the Nigerian official was quoted as saying, "but Mantashe in his criticism seemed to have forgotten so soon that Nigeria recoganised the ANC at a time most of the world saw it as a terrorist organization".

Furthermore, while Nigeria's position regarding the TNC was supported by 34 African countries, only Uganda and Zimbabwe were seen to have clearly teamed up with South Africa to align with Gaddafi (Alli, 2011: 1). In the same interview, the Nigerian official had said that "Zuma is angry with Nigeria over Gaddafi but the Federal Government is insisting on its recognition of the rebels. With the backing of Nigeria by 34 countries in Africa, its position is vindicated", the source concluded. Again, this was a show of superiority of influence by Nigeria over South Africa in the African continent.

With Nigeria taking a different stand and winning, South Africa has come to realize the full impact of Nigeria's action because the ruling ANC's quest to paint South Africa as the most dominant county in Africa, was threatened by Nigeria's profile (Alli, 2012: 2). Of course South Africa and its supporters lost to Nigeria and its supporters when Gaddafi was finally removed from power following his death at the hands of the NTC.

Following the end of Gaddafi's rule, the struggle for leadership between South Africa and Nigeria in this regard seemed to have been fought and won. However South Africa was worried that with the passing of governmental baton in Libya, Nigeria's influence in Africa will likely loom large in a post Gaddafi era and several other countries will soon follow Nigeria's lead, thus undermining South Africa untenable quest for Africa's leadership (De Wall, 2012: 5).

Obviously going by the outcome in Libya, Nigeria demonstrated that its influence in the continent was superior to that of South Africa. Secondly, it depicted a clear struggle for leadership in the continent between both South Africa and Nigeria arising from the lack of a distinctive continental leader. Thirdly, this struggle shows a lack of credible leadership in Africa.

4.4.3. THE PROPOSED UNSC REFORM

The call for a permanent African seat on the UNSC for greater African representation has been made from many parts of the world, including the AU, and has been supported by the African continent as being deserved by the continent. Within the continent, some countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal,

Angola, Egypt, etc, had declared their interests in the race for permanent membership of the UNSC (Okumu, 200: 6). As the concern of this study, the jostling for permanent UNSC seats revolves around South Africa and Nigeria who are strong contenders in the race and who are distichously qualified for this position in the continent.

Regrettably, as a consequence, the quest for this coveted position deepened continental rivalry and dichotomy between South Africa and Nigeria. Thus, Ikome and Samasuwo, Maseng (2012: 48) assert that 'the attractiveness of securing a permanent seat (even one devoid of the undemocratic but strategic veto privilege), might be sufficient incentive to bring about a divorce between Africa's leading states, particularly South Africa and Nigeria'

Although according to the Ezulwini Consensus, which was adopted by the AU Foreign Ministers as Africa's common position on UN reform, the AU has agreed that "Africa's goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council, which is the principal decision making organ in matters relating to international peace and security" (Martini, 2010: 5) but nothing has yet been done. The African Union (AU) is uncertain as to which member state(s) to endorse and is yet to establish the criteria to be used for selecting an African country(s) to the membership of a reformed Security Council. In creating this leadership vacuum, the AU seems to be leaving the selection of who will represent Africa in the proposed expanded UNSC to be determined by a regional power struggle (Okumu, 2005: 24).

As previously stated, the UN report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set the following pre-qualification requisites; the new UNSC members must have contributed " most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically", particularly through contributions to the UN assessed budgets and through participation in mandated peace operations (Martini, 2010:6).

No doubts the openly declared intentions of both South Africa and Nigeria to have the UNSC permanent seat. As far back as 1998, Selebi, who was a Director General in the Department of Foreign Affairs at the time, was quoted as saying "since South Africa's main foreign policy concern is to be part of shaping the global agenda, we would want to be a permanent member of the Security Council"

(Scheoman, 2000: 2). The interpretation in clear terms implies South Africa declared an interest in the coveted position. Nigeria however in an unguarded statement by an aide to President Obasanjo had said concerning its interests for the seat that "South Africa and Egypt are not black enough to represent Africa on the UNSC" (Soko, 2005: 387). Clearly by such statement, Nigeria has already appropriated the status of African leadership to itself. Such a war of words depicts the negative impact of the quest and jostling for the UNSC seat for both countries and in Africa at large.

To qualify for a seat on the UNSC, an intending country must first meet with the necessary qualification requisites put forward by the UN. Singling out military contributions and involvement in mandated UN peace keeping operations as the point of argument, it would be clearer to understand why South Africa and Nigeria attach so much importance to peacekeeping operations. South Africa and Nigeria championed various peacekeeping operations in their regions, in Africa and globally, some of which this study has mentioned. They have also made unrivaled developmental contribution to earn great influence and acceptance in the continent as leaders.

However, their interest in the UNSC seat has increased their quest in wanting to upstage each other to ensure a claim to this position. This position stems from the fact that "whichever country eventually chosen to represent Africa, automatically becomes Africa's first" (Okumu, 2005: 25) and therefore represents leadership of the Africa continent. This is where the bone of contention lies. Consequently, every effort must be geared towards achieving this hitherto absent distinctive position.

In their bid to achieve this interest, South Africa and Nigeria had sometimes projected themselves in a manner that has precipitated division and conflict of interests resulting in tension and a threat to continental cohesion and integration (Maseng, 2012: 49). Instances are the Libya and Côte d'Ivoire crises in which South Africa and Nigeria held divergent views and positions about how to resolve the conflicts dividing Africa along these line. Obviously, such prospects are extremely dangerous for African unity and peaceful coexistence.

Considering the AU's position on the UNSC based on the Ezulwini Consensus, it would be very difficult to realize this position because of the hegemonic contest between South Africa and Nigeria. Hence, Ikome and Samauwo stated 'in Africa, the struggle to influence the reform process has created a potential destructive rift that has brought into sharp relief how the continent's leadingstates view each other' (Maseng, 2012: 49). This provides an explanation for the fact that the potential candidature of South Africa and Nigeria has contributed to growing schism and disunity in the leadership of the AU and the continent as a whole.

4.5. CONCLUSION

It could easily be deduced from the above analysis that there is a leadership struggle going on between South Africa and Nigeria. In their bid to achieve their own national interest, namely, securing a UNSC permanent seat, South Africa and Nigeria have laid claim to leadership because of the level of their influence in the continent. They also have involved in various peacekeeping operations in preparation to meet the requisites needed for the UNSC. The advancement of this important national interest however has resulted in sour diplomatic relations between South Africa and Nigeria and by extension, threatened continental integration as well as escalated divisions and deepened schism among African countries.

Obviously, because of the fact that both South Africa and Nigeria remain as central contenders to this UNSC seat and are distichously qualified but because neither of them has yet been confirmed as a permanent member, it would be very difficult to exclude rancor and acrimony between them because both countries will unavoidably bear a perception of each other as rivals.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter proposes some recommendations that if effectively applied, will chat a way forward for Africa and the African Union to curb the leadership battle between South Africa and Nigeria.

It goes further to summarise chapters one to four and finally ends with a conclusion.

5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Organisation of African Unity's (now AU) original mission included a broad range of objectives. In precious few areas, such as gaining independence from colonial masters, it can claim unequivocal victory. In most, however, success was only partial. According to its founding charter, its major objectives were;

i.   To achieve equality, justice and dignity for all citizens and ensure their advancement;

ii.   To establish unity that transcends ethnic or national lines;

iii.   To establish and maintain peace and stability and settle disputes through mediation and negotiation;

iv.   Freedom, including fighting against all forms of neo-colonialism;

v.   Non-interference in the internal affairs of the other African states, with a specific prohibition on cross-border subversive activities; and

vi.   Non-alignment with any major power bloc (Mail and Guardian, May 24, 2013: pp. 24).

A return to these foundational objectives will resurrect a new Africa, united and formidable enough to effectively champion the affairs of the continent. Central to these objectives is unity. The AU must ensure policy harmony on everything concerning the continent as the unifying body. Unity and oneness of purpose remains a veritable tool to gain high profile achievements. Therefore the AU should resort to a unity that transcends tribal boundaries.

In addition, there is a need for an urgent structural and constitutional reform of the AU to strengthen the AU Commission's prerogatives against heads of state. The AU would benefit a great deal from the more active involvement of some important member states (Handy, 201:9). There should be constitutionally defined regulatory modes of political governance and change of regime in Africa to prevent differences of opinion on the question challenging the constitutionality of regime change in Libya. This will help calm the tension that exists in Africa between unconstitutional regime change and the non-existence of a framework to bring about internal stability through democratic norms.

The approach to democratisation of the UNSC should deepen strengthen and promote Africa unity, integration and cohesion rather than divide the continent. A common continental position on fundamental issues and challenges facing the African continent requires that South Africa and Nigeria work together in harmony and (Maseng, 2012: 48) to promote Africa's interests rather than be involved in a leadership battle, balkanizing the continent as a result. It will be important for AU and South Africa and Nigeria to re-establish a common strategic approach to African issues if Africa's voice is to carry weight on the global stage. The lack of such a cohesive approach will definitely remain an obvious obstacle to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the continent.

The Libya and Cote d'Ivoire crises have outlined the need for some large African states to create an informal, mini-forum to help create consensus through regular exchanges on major issues facing the continent (Handy, 2011:10). For instance, if such a frame work had existed, some of the publicly expressed divergences between South Africa and Nigeria over Cote d'Ivoire and Libya could have been avoided and the African position would have appeared stronger and more credible.

South Africa and Nigeria should prioritise their bilateral relationship to promote democracy, security and development in Africa. Divergent national and regional interests need to be carefully managed (and if possible totally expunged) to ensure that the continent is protected from external attempts at "divide and rule". Steps should be taken to ensure that the two countries' efforts to keep and build peace in Africa are not misinterpreted as attempts to further parochial agendas (Adebajor and Paterson, 2012: 6).

South Africa and Nigeria need to resolve their differences over representation on the international bodies. Consideration should be given to agreeing a mechanism to formalise how the African members of the UNSC will be chosen if the reform dreams come true.

5.3. SUMMARY

In chapter one, the research began with an introductory background to the study. This brief introduction summarily captured a general overview of what the research intends to study. It was an introduction that presented the leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria in the African continent and specifically stated the issue the research analysed.

This was preceded by the statement of the problem, research objective, and significance of the study, research methodology, and scope of the study, definition of terms, limitations to the study, ethical consideration and organization of the chapters.

Chapter two contains the theoretical framework and the literature review. The theoretical framework introduced the theory that the researcher used in his analysis. This researcher chose and used the realist theory to analyse his position in this work. Most precisely and specifically, the researcher relied on John J Mearsheimer's offensive realism for a better elucidation of the research analysis and for proper understanding of the work. The chosen theory, offensive realism clearly brought relevance to the analysis because it provided the basic behavioral patterns of hegemons which was adequately utilized in analysing the leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria.

The literature review considered varied opinions, perceptions and arguments generated among scholars in trying to analyse the hegemonic contest between South Africa and Nigeria. The review dictated the failure of Okumu in his literature to assert the proposed UNSC reform, which he argued had created rivalries within Africa, as central to the struggle between South Africa and Nigeria.

Furthermore, Souare on his part argued that South Africa and Nigeria are regional hegemons who in carrying out leadership responsibilities, engage each other in a

leadership struggle within their regions to assert their leadership positions. However, Souare failed to recognise such attributes to behavioral pattern of hegemons globally. This as well offered a gap which this exercise tried to fill.

Chapter three appeared only abstract and not purely connected or relevant to the study. However it was intended to analyse and highlight South Africa's and Nigeria's involvement in peacekeeping operations as a covert national interest which was born out of the desire to meet the UN prescribed requisites for qualification to be considered during the proposed UNSC reform inwhich both countries are jostling fore a seat. In lieu of this, the research only analysed both countries peacekeeping involvements in specifically selected crisis ridden countries which were relevant to the study to buttress this position. Instances of countries such as South Africa's involvement in Lesotho and Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria's involvement in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, were cited.

Although the research acknowledged there are other reasons for the involvement of both countries in peacekeeping operations in chapter four, it however maintained its position that such peacekeeping operation involvements were prompted by their desire to fulfill requisites for the UNSC seat in which South Africa and Nigeria are both interested.

Chapter four went further to assert that in furtherance of their ambitions, South Africa and Nigeria had laid claims to African leadership. They attributed this to their hitherto unrivalled socioeconomic and political contributions to the development of the continent, which had earned them great influence and acceptance as regional leaders. However, the research posited further that because of the lack of distinctive African leadership, in laying such claims to African leadership, both countries intended to attract more support and influence themselves, both continentally and globally, resulting in the leadership struggle and division between them.

The research stressed the leadership struggle further in the Libyan and Côte d'Ivoire crises which were cited as examples of instances of a deeper leadership struggle between South Africa and Nigeria. In both crisis-ridden countries, the research tried to relate the adoption of different positions and views by South

Africa and Nigeria on the resolution of these crises as a clear depiction of a leadership struggle. The research asserted that the result was a division among African states and a test of continental influence as well.

Finally, the research examined the influence of the propose UNSC reform and its effects as central to the leadership struggle between these major and distichously qualified contenders to this position in Africa. It asserted the reasoning that whichever is chosen to represent Africa on the UNSC automatically becomes Africa's distinctive leader. Therefore the research insisted that such struggle was inevitable as both countries would always view each other as rivals as long as the race for the UNSC is on.

5.4. CONCLUSION

It is the analytical position of the research exercise that there is a struggle for leadership between South Africa and Nigeria. It is also the view of this research that this struggle had existed particularly since the introduction of South Africa into the international political system following its first successful democratic election that signified the end of apartheid and the birth of democratic rule in the country. The research also acknowledged the lack of distinctive continental leadership which both countries aspire to occupy.

However, the research cited the proposed UNSC reform agenda of the UN as central to the contemporary deepened rivalry between South Africa and Nigeria and that both countries' involvement in international peacekeeping operations was necessary to meet the UN qualification requisite; namely, involvement in UN mandated peacekeeping operations, to be considered for the UNSC permanent seat.

Analytically, the research cited South Africa's and Nigeria's peacekeeping involvement in Lesotho and DRC,and Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, respectively as examples to buttress this position, but did not fail to recognise that there could be other reasons why both countries become involved in peacekeeping operations.

It further cited the divergent views of both countries on how best to bring peace in the Libyan and Côte d'Ivoire crises as examples showing the deepened leadership

struggle that existed between both countries. Generally, the research insisted that this deepened leadership struggle is linked to both countries jostling for a permanent seat in the proposed reformed UNSC because both contesting countries have and will continue to see each other as rivals in the race.

However, although the research posited that as long as both countries remain central in the race for this coveted seat on the UNSC, the rivalry is almost inevitable until such a time one or both of them is confirmed to that position or when Africa and indeed the AU resort to and apply some of the suggested recommendations of this research.

The fact remains however that between these two powerful regional leading countries of the continent, whichever is chosen for this UNSC permanent seat to represent Africa automatically becomes Africa's first and unequivocally, the long awaited distinctive African leader. The fire can only rage on while the proposed reform remains unimplemented.

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