Evaluating the impact of divisions among African states towards UN Security Council reform.

By

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This study is dedicated to my late sister Moselantsha Nancy Lekaba and my late uncle Makgotla Lekaba.
ABSTRACT

The attempt to reform the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) took place in 2005, this was after the UNSC was last reformed in 1963. The reform did not materialise in that year owing to a number of reasons; the privilege enjoyed by the Permanent five members of the Security Council to invoke veto, the disagreement on the quorum to be met and most importantly, the disunity among the countries pushing for UN Security Council reform. Africa was the only region that drafted and adopted a “Common Position” on the modality of the reform titled “Ezulwini Consensus.” This was as a result of the summit of ministers of foreign affairs of the African states, held in Ezulwini, Swaziland under the auspices of the African Union. Despite the common position, the African states were divided in the summit. This thesis examined the causes of this disunity among African states with the aim to reconfigure and reinvigorate the debate. The study employed Regime and Realist theories, as the theoretical framework. The methodology espoused Qualitative research approach, with the sample composed by representatives of African states which are regarded as regional hegemons and few scholars in the discipline. It was discovered that foreign direct investment, foreign aid and colonial legacies are the factors featured in the causes of the disunity among the African states towards the UN Security Council reform. Therefore, the thesis recommends that the debate should continue relentlessly; the African Union should develop a mechanism to hold states serving in the Security Council as non-permanent members accountable; and the Ezulwini Consensus should be reviewed in order to be pragmatic and inclusive. South Africa and Nigeria should use their membership in the global organizations composed mainly of the countries of the South, namely BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) respectively to mobilise external support for the reform of the Security Council.
ACRONYMS

AU- African Union
BRICS- Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CCR- Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEN-SAD- Community of Sahel-Saharan States
COMESA- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.
DAC- Development Assistance Committee
DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS- Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOC- Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States
EU- European Union
ICJ- International Court of Justice
ICTY- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMF- International Monetary Fund
MDGs- Millennium Development Goals
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO- Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT- Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAU- Organisation of African Unity
OECD- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC- Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SAIIA- South African Institute of International Affairs
SADC- Southern African Development Community
UMA- Union du Maghreb Arab
UNC- United Nations Charter
UNGA- United Nations General Assembly
UNSC-United Nations Security Council
WB- World Bank
WMD- Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Chapter One

1.1. Background of the study

The term "United Nations", coined by the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt was first used in the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, during the Second World War, when representatives of 26 nations pledged their Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers. The forerunner of the United Nations was the League of Nations, an organization conceived in similar circumstances during the First World War, and established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles 'to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security.' The International Labour Organization was also created under the Treaty of Versailles as an affiliated agency of the League. The League of Nations ceased its activities after failing to prevent the Second World War. In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States between August and October, 1944. The Charter was signed on the 26th June, 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 Member States. The United Nations officially came into existence on the 24th October, 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States and by a majority of other signatories (Meister, 1995).
The United Nations organisation is composed of “six principal organs” which are: Security Council; Trusteeship Council; Secretariat; International Court of Justice; General Assembly; Economic and Social Council; and “semi-autonomous agencies”. The trusteeship Council has met its mandate of preparing colonised states for self-governance and transfer of power from the former colonialists. It’s no longer effective or in use (Weiss, 2009). This is how the United Nations was formed and structured. It is the power imbalances and the nature of this organisation that has led to calls for its reform to make it relevant to the new global conditions. The call for the reform of the United Nations was even captured in the United Nations Charter that 'the amendment to Article 109 of the United Nations Charter, which relates to the first paragraph of that Article, provides that a General Conference of Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council.'

It is in this context of the evolution and advancement of the international system that Ronzitti (2010) has identified the reasons for the UN Reform as: (a) the birth of new States and the transformation of the international community; (b) the UN’s membership was more than double that number when the amendment on the increase in non-permanent members of the SC entered into force. Nowadays, the number of UN members has increased almost fourfold since its foundation. Since its birth, the international community has completely changed. In the beginning, the UN was composed of Western and Eastern European countries plus a number of Latin American countries. Nowadays, the majority of members belong to African and Asian countries. (c) The increase of the Security
Council's (SC) role after the end of the Cold War. While during the Cold War the SC was the place where the two superpowers engaged in verbal confrontation and was virtually paralyzed, after the fall of the Berlin wall, its policy changed. The SC then became the place where effective decisions were discussed and taken. For instance, this is demonstrated by the number of peacekeeping operations put in place and by the crises solved such as the Timor Leste case. The SC has also taken on an important territorial administration function, for example in Kosovo before its independence. The Security Council can draft and pass resolutions without the input of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The Charter attributes to the Council the power to take decisions on measures to be carried out by the member-states, and (Article 25) mandatory sanctions fall within this framework. They are a kind of administrative regulations adopted to cope with concrete situations such as threats to peace. Since 9/11, the SC has started to adopt "Legislative Resolutions", i.e., Resolutions taken to address hypothetical situations such as the threat arising from international terrorism or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation. Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) of the Security Council serve as best examples for this privilege enjoyed by the Security Council.

Resolution 1373 was adopted after the attack on the Twin Towers in New York on the 11th September, 2001. Resolution 1540 defines the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a threat to peace and, like Resolution 1373, lays down provisions that oblige States to enact legislation to address proliferation and ensure that they fulfil their duty to prevent the production of WMD. Resolution 1540 declares that States should also adopt measures to prevent WMD and their means of delivery from falling into the
hands of non-State actors. The creation of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals should also be remembered, i.e. the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (SC Resolutions 808-1993 and 995-1994). (d) The new threats; the international community is facing new and dangerous threats, stemming from international terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed States. Nuclear proliferation has required action by the SC vis-à-vis those States that have withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or have been accused of failing to comply with the obligation to produce fissile material only for peaceful purposes. North Korea and Iran are cases in point. North Korea and the sanctions policy show how the freedom of States to withdraw from the NPT has been curtailed and the principle of consent to enter into international obligations has been reduced and (e) the use of force by States.

The UN Charter clearly explains that States are allowed to use armed force only in self-defence. The principle is enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the main moot point is whether anticipatory self-defence is lawful or, on the contrary, may only be exercised after an armed attack has occurred. Contemporary international law doctrine has construed Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter as giving the SC the power to authorize States to resort to armed force whenever a threat to peace occurs. For instance, States may be authorised to use force to prevent or put an end to genocide or to meet a latent threat stemming from an accumulation of WMD.
President Jacob Zuma once remarked that the United Nations is “skewed in favour of the developed North,” and these sentiments were echoed by the Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff further stating that the Organization needs more legitimacy (Tait, 2011). The leaders of developing Nations also joined the chorus claiming that the United Nations (UN) failed to reflect the realities of the modern world. This is as a result of the representation in the Organization, particularly on the organ of the UN Assembly so as to represent them and vote on decisions to be taken at this level. According to Meisler (1995), each member gets to vote once on any issue that is put to voting in the assembly. The problem with this comprehensive representative organ, according to countries calling for the UN reform, is that the UN Charter which serves as a constitution of the Organization ‘permits the assembly to discuss any question of importance to the UN and to recommend action to be taken by the members or by other UN Organs.’ The assembly is disabled to decide on any matter concerning the UN.

The only organ with powers to ultimately and solely decide is the United Nations Security Council. This is done irrespective of the skewed representation of the UN member-states in this Organ. It was not the decision of all UN member-states or at least majority members to bomb Libya as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) did in 2011 nor Iraqi invasion by the United States of America while claiming to act on the mandate of the UN, but those were decisions taken by the Security Council which is composed of 15 member-states in which five are permanent members with veto powers. The majority of the UN member-states want the Palestinians to be granted full membership in the Organization as they recognize them as a Nation, but because of the veto powers conferred on each
of the UN Security Council (SC?) permanent members, this cannot be passed as a resolution of the UN because one or two members are against the view of the majority. This is how skewed the Organization is, in terms of representation, as thus the UN does not reflect the modern body politic of world affairs which is compounded by democracy that simply means the majority rule.

Spies (2008) states that at the end of the Second World War, the vast majority of current UN member states were subjects of colonial or other type of external domination. Presently, the 53 states of Africa comprise more than a quarter of the UN membership, in 1945 only four of them — Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa — were members. The inevitable effect of this asymmetrical start, according to Murithi (2007) was that 'African countries were effectively preached to rather than consulted as equals', producing a paternalistic relationship between the UN and Africa. Africa has been challenging this relationship since 1963, when the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) very first summit called for the UN Security Council expansion. During the past decade this quest for equity in global governance has taken on renewed vigour, but until now Africa has not succeeded in obtaining permanent membership of the Security Council (SC). Africa's profile in the UN has; however, changed significantly because of its quantitative presence. This has rendered Africa a potent voting bloc in the UNGA, and during the past two decades the continent produced as many Secretaries-General of the UN. Of specific relevance to the Security Council is the extent to which Africa dominates its agenda. Adebajo (2009) points out that almost 70 % of the issues considered by the Council are problems in Africa. As a result, most of the UN's humanitarian efforts are
based in Africa, and the continent currently hosts the largest, most numerous UN peacekeeping missions in the world — a staggering 90% of the organisation's peacekeeping personnel. If Africa then dominates the work of the UNSC, the question arises as to whether a permanent African presence on the Council is not indeed essential, rather than merely desirable.

Reflecting on the impact of the call for UN Security Council reform had on dividing states, Weiss (2003) states that "political paralysis" has played fundamental role in stalling the debate about Security Council reform because some states were concerned about the outcomes than the process itself. Those states were consumed by the desire to form part of the newly reconfigured Security Council than improving the effectiveness of the General Assembly. And the issue was also about the criteria to be employed to choose states to form part of the Security Council, whereby Weiss (2003) submits that 'even more difficult has been reaching agreement on new permanent members. If dominance by the industrialized countries was the problem, why were Germany and Japan obvious candidates? Would Italy not be more or less in the same league? Would it not make more sense for the European Union to be represented rather than Paris, London, Berlin, and Rome individually? How did Argentina feel about Brazil’s candidacy? Pakistan about India’s? South Africa about Nigeria’s? How did such traditional UN stalwarts as Canada and the Nordic countries feel about a plan that would leave them on the sidelines but elevate larger developing countries, some of which represent threats to international peace and security? Moreover, if the veto was undemocratic and debilitating for the
Security Council’s work, should this privilege be given to new permanent members? Would that not make the lowest common denominator lower still?’

1.2. Importance and Relevance of the Study.

This study is important because it explored what makes the continental leaders and states to be less united in this common value for the UN Security Council reform. The call is also made by NGOs wishing to form part of the mainstream decision-making UN body, others have opted to focus on the Bretton Woods (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) institutions’ reform which also forms part of the Organization. Other members have a problem with the International Court of Justice and want it to be reformed. To this end, an in-depth study was required in order to shape and redirect the call for the reform of the Security Council to afford seats in this organ to African and Latin American countries. The case of Libya and Syria where the Security Council was prompt to resolve and intervene in the former and is reluctant to do so in the latter, gave rise to this study to probe this inconsistency by the Security Council in resolving internal conflicts of its member-states. The Organization is reluctant to intervene in the Syrian crisis as they hastened to intervene in Libya claiming the principle of the “responsibility to protect” (Campbell, 2013). This might be as a result of lack of interest by the dominant powers in international relations particularly the permanent five of the UNSC in Syria as in Libya and also because Africa is not enjoying the privileged relations with these dominant powers.
The study is also important to exert more pressure on the West to allow representation as it seeks to substantiate the call. The study seeks to influence how the call is made, particularly the approaches used by the proponents for Security Council reform. Why can't the proponents for the reform of the Security Council focus on shifting the powers of the Organs of the UN instead of narrowly focusing on the UN Security Council representation; for instance, cancelling veto powers of permanent members of the Security Council and strengthening the UN General Assembly to make decisions as opposed to recommending actions to be taken in resolving conflict to the Security Council. This call finds resonance even among the permanent members of the UN Security Council; this was highlighted when President Jacob Zuma visited France in 2011. Nicholas Sarkozy said it was ‘scandalous’ for Africa not to be represented on the UN Security Council. Although it seemed as if he was not genuine, this proved the significance of the study.

1.3. Problem Statement

Though the endeavour to reform the UN and the Security Council (SC) in particular is sacrosanct, it has caused enormous divisions among African states and consequently caused the distrust among them. African leaders seemed united in pursuing the UN Security Council reform in 2005 by developing a comprehensive document, the Ezulwini Consensus, in response to the call for proposals on the Security Council reform. The cracks started to show, according to Landsberg (2009,) ‘after a meeting in London in August 2005 between African Union and G4 (Brazil, Germany, Japan and India) foreign ministers.’ It appeared that the Africans would have to drop their veto demand in exchange for the G4 agreeing to lobby for 26 instead of its preferred 23 seats. An
acrimonious meeting of AU leaders in Addis Abbaba in August, 2005 exposed the continent's deep divisions over this issue, with countries such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Zimbabwe reportedly opposing the pragmatic approach of Nigeria and South Africa; which were willing to drop the unrealistic insistence on a veto (Germany, Japan as well as their Brazilian and Italian allies, were also prepared to drop the veto). This lack of African consensus, apparently with China reportedly influencing several countries in a bid to stall Security Council reform- contributed significantly to the failure to achieve the Security Council reform at the September 2005 summit (Zhao, 2008). The African bloc of 53 states- about a quarter of the 192- strong General Assembly membership was thus unable to play the bridging role required to reach the 128 votes needed to obtain a two-thirds majority, and put pressure on Washington and Beijing to agree to the expansion of the Security Council.

It is the lack of unity among African states towards the UN Security Council reform that gave rise to this research proposal. It cannot be correct to only conclude that the neocolonial relations among African states with their former colonial masters are the causes of those divisions without substantially proving scientifically these assumptions, and it would not be reasonable to assume this to be true without scientifically proving again, that prioritizing national interests by African states are the causes of this divisions towards the Security Council reform. Thus it would be necessary to investigate substantially the nature of the divisions and ultimately propose a better approach.
1.4. Aim of the study

The study aims to reconfigure the Ezulwini Consensus and afford AU the knowledge and insight on how to close gaps for any potential issues to cause divisions among member-states in pursuit of the UN Security Council reform.

1.5. Objectives of the study

The study objectives were to:

- Investigate the root causes of the divisions among the member-states of the African Union.
- Reconfigure the Ezulwini Consensus to close space for any potential cause for disunity among African Union member-states.
- Analyse how will an African state forming part of the UN Security Council benefit the continent.

1.6. Research Questions

- What causes the divisions among African states towards the UN Security Council reform?
- How to address those root causes of these divisions?
- What are the implications of these divisions on the AU influencing the Security Council agenda?
1.7. Literature Review

The most important function of literature review in research is to afford the researcher an opportunity to close a knowledge gap of previous studies in the same area of investigation or any related study. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010), the duty of literature review is to 'describe theoretical perspective and previous findings regarding the problem at hand.' They furthermore elucidate that 'its function is to “look again” at what others have done in areas that are similar, though not necessarily identical to, one’s own area of investigation,' and this makes the literature review very vital in a research. Karen, Mingst and Margaret (2000) identify events that characterised the end of Cold War as 'the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989; 1990 Iraq-Kuwait war; Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat embracing on the White House lawn and the end of apartheid and the release of Nelson Mandela. These events marked the ending of the ideological, political, economic, and military conflict between Communism and Democracy; known for forty-five years as the Cold War. They produced fundamental changes in the very structure of International politics, which had been defined by the bipolarity of two superpowers (United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) and their competing alliances'. They assert that the end of Cold War Era ushered in a new dispensation which came with new greater demands ‘to deal with peace and security issues as well as environmental and development issues, population growth, humanitarian disasters, and other problems.’ This shows that the change in the “structure of the International Politics” would necessitate the change in the structure of the UN so as to meet these “greater demands.” They further infer that ‘the UN celebrated its fiftieth
anniversary in 1995 but failed to use the occasion to enact necessary reforms in its administration, financing and structure.’

These sentiments were echoed by Nganje (2012) who contrary to the popular belief, suggests that Cold War is not over and stated that ‘the United Nations (UN) Security Council has become extremely divided along west-versus-east lines, with Russia and China standing up to the western powers that have dominated the Council's choice of actions in the past decade. While this has made the role of smaller powers that serve as non-permanent members a little awkward, as they have to often choose between the two power blocs just as during the Cold War, the power struggles have also created opportunities for middle and smaller powers to wedge a space for themselves by occupying the largely vacant space for consensus solutions.’ This scholar has failed to show how those “smaller powers could wedge a space”. He argues that they have to toe the line of either the allies of the United States of America or China and Russia, and further failed to illustrate on how the Regional organisations in the form of the African Union take advantage of this battle among the superpowers to advance their interests.

This gives more reason to call for the UN Reform that is focused on the structure of the Organisation than only reform that is focused on representation. Rourke and Boyer (2010) cite this alternative systematic change as making the UN an "Interactive Arena" for states which are fundamental actors in the international arena “to pursue their individual national interests.” This would only be possible if the veto powers of Permanent members of the Security Council could be scraped off and the UN Assembly would be empowered to take
decisions without the approval of the Security Council. They further identified 'several sources of discontent', as lack of democracy, and quoted Zambia's president who argued that the Council 'can no longer be maintained like the sanctuary of the Holy of Holies with only the original members acting as high priests, deciding on issues for the rest of the world who cannot be admitted.' The second issue is of 'geographic and demographic imbalance.' Geographically, Europe and North America have four of five permanent seats, and those four permanent members are also countries of predominantly Euro-white and Christian heritage. Other criticism charges that the permanent members are an inaccurate reflection of power realities.

Rourke and Boyer (2010) they state that the challenge to UN Reform as 'the two insurmountable hurdles to amending the UN Charter and altering the composition of the UNSC. First, Charter amendments require the endorsement of two-thirds of the Security Council (SC), and the Permanent five of the Security Council are not especially open to diluting their influence by adding more permanent members a veto, or least of all, by eliminating the veto altogether. Specific rivalries also influence the P5, for instance, China would be reluctant to see either of its two great Asian power rivals, Japan or India get a permanent seat. Beijing also complains that Japan has not apologized adequately for its aggression and atrocities during Second World War. Second, another hurdle for a Charter revision is to get a two-thirds vote of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.' The agreement on any new voting formula would be difficult, given the sensitivities of the 192 countries. For example, the proposal that India have a permanent seat alarms Pakistan, whose UN representative has characterized the idea as an undisguised grab for power.
and privilege. It is therefore, an obvious fact from this observation that the agenda to reform the Security Council is divisive in nature and thus should not come as a shock to the commentators when the African Union (AU) is also divided. However a vigorous study is required to understand the nature of the agenda to reform the Security Council and how it could be approached while closing space for any elements of divisions and subsequently provide a way forward.

Adebajo (2009) asserts that the contradictions embedded in the UN especially Security Council are so glaring that the “Great Powers”- United Kingdom; United States; China; France and Russia- can manipulate the system to the disadvantage of the poor or the South. The Resolution 1973 of “no-fly zone” taken about Libya in the guise of protecting civilians is a case in point. The state’s interests pursued by those “Great powers” are in a stark contradiction with the principles and ideals upheld by the organization; justice and equality. If states are indeed equal, then the same resolution could have been advanced about the Syrian crisis. He further states that ‘Africa has sought to transform itself from a pawn on the chessboard of the Great powers to an influential player in global geo-politics.’ This was evident when ministers of foreign affairs of African states met in Swaziland to come up with a comprehensive document in order to consolidate views of Africans in as far as UNSC reform is concerned, and this document is known as “Ezulwini Consensus.” Unfortunately while Africa made efforts to turn tables around, the inevitable took-place, Landsberg (2009) states that in the 2005 UN Summit, Africa did not speak with one voice in as far as the issue of the UN Security Council reform is concerned despite the “Ezulwini Consensus”, but the division occurred when Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt wanted to
compromise on the veto question. He further suggests that till such time African states unite and stop to appeal to the moral sensibilities of the five permanent members of the Security Council and other dominant powers, the UN Security Council reform and the broad agenda of transformation of international institution would remain a mirage. This scholar has brought another dimension about the behaviour of African states in the international relations beyond the continent. This is where the research would fundamentally contribute, the understanding of the relations of African states with Permanent members of the Security Council.

Maseng (2012) argues that France wants to capitalise on the opportunity of Security Council reform to increase its leverage by likely advocating for a francophone country to form part of the permanent members should there be a consensus on this agenda of the Security Council reform. Therefore, it is inevitable for the African Union (AU) to be divided, but until such time the divisions are clearly understood and properly addressed, it is then when African states would be united and close space for any divisions. The scholars specializing on this topic have not adequately provided answers to the question of the Security Council reform, especially on how to address the factors sowing divisions among states. This thesis seeks to address those factors and provide a clear way forward.

1.8. Theoretical Framework

According to Goldstein and Pevehouse (2009), theories provide explanations for events and suggest that it is important to think critically about International Relations events and
consider several different theoretical explanations before deciding which theory provides best explanation. This is because of the complexity of the politics of the International System. Sorensen and Jackson (2007) agree with this view and further elaborate the importance of a theory and described it as a ‘specific set of lenses’ through which political scientists view the world. They state that facts do not speak for themselves, but needs theories to explain them and further assert simply put theory as devices which tell political scientist which facts are important and which are unimportant, that is, they structure the view of the world. As a result, the theories the researcher employed in exploring and explaining the phenomenon are Regime and Realist theories. Rourke and Boyer (2010) state that the term "Regime" ‘does not refer to a single organization, instead, Regime is a collective noun that designates a complex of norms, rules, processes and organizations that, in sum, have evolved to help govern the behaviour of states and other international actors in an area of international concern.’ This theory is appropriate because it enabled the researcher to analyse and explain correctly the behaviour of states in relation to the norms in the international system and the relevance of the United Nations to govern the states’ behaviour. As explained by Jackson and Sorensen (2007), realists assume that states act in their interests, hence this perception informs or explains better the contest among Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt for the UN Security Council seat should the reform take-place, and the divisions underpinning the ‘Common Approach’ of the continent in pursuit of this discourse.
Methodology

This is an in-depth study about the call for UN Security Council reform and its impact on the unity of African continent, the AU in particular. Therefore, the research approach used a qualitative research design. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010), qualitative design 'emphasize personal experiences, interpretation, and self-knowledge over quantification, are concerned with understanding the meaning of social phenomena, and focus on links and attributes across relatively few cases.' In this study, the researcher aimed to measure the impact of the divisions among African states towards UNSC reform and also to explore the reform feasibility, this was done through the interviews conducted with diplomats (participants) of various countries, in order to get their perceptions around the issue. Interviewees included the experts (academics who have written extensively) on the discourse of the UNSC Reform.

3.1 Population

The AU as a study area is composed of the 193 member-states and 8 Regional Economic Communities- Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD); Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arab (UMA). The permanent members of the UN Security Council are the People's Republic of China, Russia, Britain, France and the United States of America.
3.2 Sample Size and Selection Method

The sample of this study is composed of 5 diplomats of the following member-states of the AU: South Africa representing SADC; Kenya representing EAC; Egypt; Libya representing CEN-SAD; Ethiopia representing COMESA; 2 diplomats of the permanent members particularly China and Russia, of the UNSC and the 3 scholars who have written extensively on the discourse from research institutions (Think Tanks) based in South Africa. The total sample size is 10 participants. This sample was selected based on Leedy and Ormrod (2010) who indicated that 'how you identify your sample must depend on the research question(s) you want to answer.' The research questions asked in this study seek answers from the prominent member-states of the African Union and particularly those who harbour the interests of serving in the Security Council in the event the reform agenda succeeds. Countries that have this interests are Nigeria and South Africa. These states are considered hegemons of their respective regions in the continent. The sample method employed in this study is purposive sampling. Strydom (2005) identifies this purposive sampling as a variant of non-probability sampling and states that it 'is based entirely on the judgement of the researcher, in that a sample is composed of elements that contain the most characteristics, representative or typical attributes of the population.' Therefore, the states selected on the sample generally and often at times, represent their respective regions in the discussions in the African Union summits and in the global governance institutions like the UN, IMF World Bank and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).
3.3. Data Collection Methods

Data was gathered through the following methods:

3.3.1. Primary Data

Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable personnel in the field, diplomats of various African states particularly of the Republics Kenya, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and officials in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa. The diplomats of Russia and China which are countries serving as permanent members of the Security Council. Leading scholars and specialists working in Think Tanks such as Africa Institute of South Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and Centre for Conflict Resolution whom have substantially contributed to the discourse were interviewed.

3.3.2. Secondary Data

- Journal Articles
- Newspaper Articles
- Text Books
- Documents and Reports
- Internet Articles

3.4. Data Analysis Methods

In this study, the researcher employed Content Analysis as a framework for analysing the gathered data. Leedy and Ormrod (2010) define this method as 'a detailed and systematic
examination of the contents of a particular body of material for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes or bias.' Through this method the researcher measured the consistency of the states calling for UN Security Council reform particularly the African states, thus was enabled to determine the causes of those divisions.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

Participants were informed about the aim and the purpose of the study. The researcher avoided plagiarism by acknowledging the sources because there was an extensive review of related and relevant literature of the discourse.

3.6 Limitations of the Study

Most of the diplomats interviewed were anxious to speak about issues other than the official positions of their countries on the discourse, this limited the outcomes of the study because it needed them to open up and give their personal account on the discourse. The researcher could not reach the embassies of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France as permanent members of the Security Council as well as the embassies of Chad and Republic of Nigeria
1.9. Chapter Outline

This research paper will contain five chapters presented as follows:

Chapter One:
The Introduction/ Background of the Study
Problem Statement
Aims of the study
Objectives
Research Questions
Rationale/ significance of the study
Methodology
Limitations of the study

Chapter Two:
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Chapter Three
Data Analysis and Findings

Chapter Four:
Conclusion and recommendations
2. Chapter Two

2.1. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

Goldstein and Pevehouse (2009) assert that theories provide explanations for events and further suggest that it is important to think critically about International Relations events and consider several different theoretical explanations before deciding which theory provides best explanation. This is mainly because of the complexity of the politics of the International System. Sorensen and Jackson (2007) hold the same view and further state the importance of a theory and described it as a 'specific set of lenses' through which political scientists view the world. They state that facts do not speak for themselves but need theories to explain them. They simply put theory as devices which tell political scientists which facts are important and which are unimportant, that is, they structure the view of the world.

As thus, the theories the researcher has employed in exploring and explaining the phenomenon and the related literature are a Regime and Realist theories. Rourke and Boyer (2010) state that the term "Regime" 'does not refer to a single organization. Instead, Regime is a collective noun that designates a complex of norms, rules, processes and organizations that, in sum, have evolved to help to govern the behaviour of states and other international actors in an area of international concern.' This theory would be appropriate as it would enable the researcher to analyse and explain correctly the behaviour of states in relation to the norms in the international system and the relevance of the United Nations to govern the states' behaviour. As explained by Jackson and Sorensen (2007), Realists assume that states act in their interests, thus this
perception informs or explains better the contest among Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt for the UNSC seat should the reform take-place and the divisions underpinning the ‘Common Approach’, Ezulwini Consensus, of the continent in pursuit of this discourse.

2.2. Realist Theory

This theory is employed in the study because of its assumptions, mainly the one that asserts that ‘the state is the pre-eminent actor in world politics’. International Relations are primarily relations of states. All other actors in world politics—individuals, international organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) among others—are either less important or unimportant (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007). This theory is used despite the fact that this view of NGOs, individuals and international organisations as ‘less important’ or ‘unimportant’ does not reflect the truth about the role played by these actors in the 21st century international relations and cooperation, but it certainly undermines their influence. The focus of the study is on the UNSC and its operations, how it takes decisions and how they impact on the broad membership of the UN particularly on the African continent. The study primarily focuses on the divisions among African states in pursuing the aspirations of their “common approach” to the Security Council reform. The AU was the only continental organisation which agreed on the nature of the reform of the UN particularly the Security Council. This common approach was captured in a document titled Ezulwini Consensus (Landsberg, 2009). The Realist assumption viewing states as the sole primary actors in the global politics thus undermining the role played by other entities, would need to be perfected and reconfigured to better explain the events in the international relations as they unfold recognising the impact of the other actors’ influence.
in decision-making of states and intergovernmental organisations. To illustrate the inadequacy of this theory on the influence and importance of other actors, Jean Ping (2011) states that ‘African issues have long suffered from either a lack of exposure in the mainstream media, marginalisation and misrepresentation or from outright silencing. The case of African Union’s intervention in Libya is a classic example of how African efforts go unreported or are twisted to suit a hostile agenda. The AU Commission has been baffled by erroneous reports that the AU’s actions in Libya were motivated by a desire to protect Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s regime and that, following his downfall, the Union was delaying recognition of the new Libyan authorities in order to force the inclusion of the former Libyan leader’s supporters into the new government.’

In highlighting and expressing the dissatisfaction on how African Union was ‘marginalised’ in the decision-making on resolving the Libyan crisis as a result of the media coverage which is an actor as well in the international relations and corporation, Jean Ping (2011) further states that ‘one of the aspects highlighted by the crisis in Libya relates to the reluctance of some members of the international community to fully acknowledge the AU’s role. Yet, lasting peace on the continent can only be achieved if efforts to that end are based on the full involvement of Africa and a recognition of its leadership role because, as stressed by the summit in August 2009, without such a role, there will be no ownership and sustainability; because we understand the problems far better; we know which solutions will work; and fundamentally, these problems are ours, and our people will live with their consequences.’
The impression drawn from this expression is that the UNSC decided or passed both resolutions 1970 and 1973 on the basis of media coverage and not on what the leadership of the African continent was advancing at this ‘premier multilateral decision-making body for international peace and security’ (Bowland, 2013). This gives more reason for the intensification of the call for the reform of the UNSC. The realist theory is to a certain extent correct on its assumption of a state being a primary actor in the international relations, but the reality is that the 21st century international relations and cooperation involve other players and actors such as the media, multinational corporations and the NGOs hence this is among the areas where it needs to be perfected.

2.3. Regime Theory

The Regime theory is employed in the study solely to complement the inadequacy of realism in explaining the behaviour of states in the international arena and the role of other actors in influencing the foreign policy formulation of states. According to Haggard and Simmons (1987), ‘the interest in regimes sprang from a dissatisfaction with dominant conceptions of international order, authority, and organisation. The sharp contrast between the competitive, zero-sum “anarchy” of interstate relations and the “authority” of domestic politics seemed overdrawn in explaining cooperative behaviour among the advanced industrial states. The policy dilemmas created by the growth of interdependence since World War II generated new forms of coordination and organisation that fit uneasily in a realist framework.’ This theory assisted the researcher by explaining the reasons why African states were divided in 2005 despite having taken efforts to develop a comprehensive document that sought to minimise the divisions and
define the Africa’s position on the UNSC reform. Clearly some African leaders ignored unconsciously the reality of interconnectedness of the economies of some African states to former colonial masters serving in the Security Council. France and the United Kingdom as the major colonial masters of African states are at an advantaged position to manipulate their unequal relations with African states to stall the UNSC. The use of common currency by the former colonies of France with this colonial master speaks volume on the nature of the relationship this country has with its former colonies. The use of common currency mean when there is economic crisis in France its former colonial states would also be badly affected. This is the lacuna the realist theory fails to explain, thus the use of Regime theory. Haggard and Simmons (1987) assert that Regime analysis attempted to close a gap in the realist theory by focusing neither on broad international structure nor on narrow study of formal organisations but it assumed that patterns of state action are influenced by norms, but that such norm-governed behaviour was wholly consistent with the pursuit of national interests.

2.4. Evolution of the International System

The secretary-general's report titled In Larger Freedom Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, delivered by Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan, noted that ‘there is a yearning in many quarters for a new consensus on which to base collective action. And a desire exists to make the most far-reaching reforms in the history of the UN so as to equip and resource it to help advance this twenty-first century agenda.’ This underscores the desire by the African continent in the form of AU and the developing countries in the form of G4 to have permanent representation in the Security Council in
order to realise 'collective action' and not to feel marginalised in the process of decision-making in this global governance organisation. Karen et al., (2000) identified events that characterized the end of Cold War as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989; 1990 Iraq-Kuwait war; Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat embracing on the White House lawn and the end of apartheid and the release of Nelson Mandela. These events marked the ending of the ideological, political, economic, and military conflict between Communism and Democracy, known for forty-five years as the Cold War. They produced fundamental changes in the very structure of International politics, which had been defined by the bipolarity of two superpowers (United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) and their competing alliances. They assert that the end of Cold War Era ushered in a new dispensation which came with new greater demands 'to deal with peace and security issues as well as environmental and development issues, population growth, humanitarian disasters, and other problems.' This shows that the change in the "structure of the International Politics" would necessitate the change in the structure of the United Nations so as to meet these "greater demands." They further infer that 'the UN celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1995 but failed to use the occasion to enact necessary reforms in its administration, financing and structure.'

These sentiments were echoed by Nganje (2012) whom, contrary to the popular believe, suggests that Cold War is not over and states that 'the United Nations Security Council has become more and more divided along west-versus-east lines, with Russia and China standing up to the western powers that have dominated the Council's choice of actions in
the past decade. While this has made the role of smaller powers that serve as non-permanent members a little awkward, as they have to often choose between the two power blocs just as during the Cold War, the power struggles have also created opportunities for middle and smaller powers to wedge a space for themselves by occupying the largely vacant space for consensus solutions.’ This scholar has failed to show how would those “smaller powers could wedge a space” as he argues that they have to toe the line of either the allies of the United States of America or China and Russia, and further failed to illustrate on how could the Regional organisations in the form of the African Union take advantage of this battle among the superpowers to advance their interests. This gives more reason to the call for the UN Reform that is focused on the structure of the Organisation than only reform that is focused on representation. Rourke and Boyer (2010) cite this alternative systematic change as making the UN an “Interactive Arena” for states which are fundamental actors in the international arena “to pursue their individual national interests.” This would be only possible if the veto powers of Permanent members of the Security Council could be scraped off and the UN Assembly would be empowered to take decisions without the blessings of the Security Council. They further identify ‘several sources of discontent’, as lack of democracy, and quoted Zambia’s president who argued that the Council ‘can no longer be maintained like the sanctuary of the Holy of Holies with only the original members acting as high priests, deciding on issues for the rest of the world who cannot be admitted.’ The second issue is of ‘geographic and demographic imbalance.’ Geographically, Europe and North America have four of five permanent seats, and those four permanent members are also countries
of predominantly Euro-white and Christian heritage. Yet other criticism charges that the permanent members are an inaccurate reflection of power realities.

2.5. United Nations Reform Debate

Ronzitti (2010) states that the reform of the United Nations only took place in 1963 with suggestions to expand the Security Council with non-permanent members from 6 to 10 under the Resolution 1991-xviii. The due process to reform the organisation was followed as per the prescripts of the UN Charter. The reform had approval of the General Assembly, with reservations from France and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America abstained. China (Taiwan) voted in favour. Eventually all permanent members ratified the reform that came into force in 1965. In the event the national parliaments of the permanent members refused to ratify the reform, it would have been impossible for the reform to take place. This resolution also increased the number of Economic and Social Council members, another organ in the UN system, from 18 to 27. A second increase from 27 to 54 was approved with Resolution 2847-xxvi, with the amendment entering into force in 1973. Ronzitti also states that the reason for these reforms as the growth in membership number of the organisation compared to the membership number when it was formed. When the United Nations was formed, it had 50 members while by 1963 its membership had grown to 115. The membership growth happened as a result of the process of decolonisation that gave birth to new independent states. According to Ronzitti (2010), there are number of reasons for reforming the Security Council. He enumerated them as; (a) the birth of new states and the transformation of the international community; (b) the increase of the Security Council’s
role after the end of the Cold War; (c) the Security Council as legislator; (d) the new threats; and (e) the use of force by states. Be that as it may, Weiss is very sceptical about the substance of the reform efforts and agendas partly on the basis of what was articulated by Ronzitti that the success of the reform would have to get the blessings from the national parliaments of the Security Council permanent members. Weiss (2003) argues that ‘in practice, however, substantive and substantial reform has proved virtually impossible. In fact, only three amendments have been made to the UN Charter in almost 60 years- and all dealing only with seat numbers in two of the six principal organs, once for the Security Council and twice for the United Nations Economic and Social Council.’ He further states that ‘UN founders deliberately divided member rights and roles by establishing a universal General Assembly with the most general functions and a restricted Security Council with executing authority for maintaining the peace- unanimity among the great powers was a prerequisite for action. This arrangement was designed to contrast with the Council of the League of Nations, a general executive committee for all of the organisation’s functions that failed miserably in the security arena because it required agreement from all states. Eternal seats for the era’s great powers- the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and China- now known as the Permanent five (P-5) with the right to veto decisions of substance, was an essential component of the original 1945 deal.’

The report on strengthening the Nigeria/ South Africa relationship has correctly put into context the politics of the United Nations Security Council reform in the African context and further exposed the nature of divisions among African countries despite having
crafted a common position, the Ezulwini Consensus, guiding the agenda for the reform. The report states that "both Nigeria and South Africa put themselves forward as candidates for a permanent seat on the Council, though Tshwane was more discreet and only publicly declared its interest in 2010. Nigeria stressed that it was "the largest democratic black nation" in the world and had a solid history of international peacekeeping for over four decades. South African officials noted that their country had the largest and most advanced economy on the continent- as measured by industrialisation and diversification- and highlighted the global repute won by the country's relatively peaceful transition from racist apartheid rule to democracy. Both countries touted themselves as gateways for investment and trade to other parts of the continent, and sought to capitalise on this image. Opposition from the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council reform or notably the United States (US) and China- effectively ended any chances of Security Council reform or enlargement in 2005. However, although neither Nigeria nor South Africa could win a permanent seat, the competition between the two countries led to tensions in their bilateral relationship. Subsequently, both permanently on the Council undermines unity of purpose in defending the continent's interests, and should take second place to efforts to win permanent representation for Africa as a whole. Nigeria and South Africa, however, have sometimes differed on how best to secure effective African representation on the UN Security Council and continue to grapple with their divergent views in pursuit of bilateral consensus on this issue, although both sides acknowledge the primacy of the AU in mandating African representative to the UN Security Council. South Africa has been less willing to countenance any new proposal that would formalise how the AU should go about
selecting these representatives. Tshwane continues to stress the need to stick to the letter of the 2005 "Ezulwini Consensus" and insists on seeking the implementation thereof. It was, however, noted that the UN Security Council reform is unlikely to occur in the near future, and that Abuja and Tshwane should not waste their time squabbling about permanent seats that are currently not on offer. One interim suggestion is that one of Africa's three non-permanent seats could be rotated between Africa's major powers (including Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, and Kenya); another between the continent's middle powers; and the third between the smaller African states.

Khadiagala and Lyons (2001) assert that 'despite the postcolonial conundrum of multiple motives and meagre, African elites have treated foreign policy as a way for nation-states to become effective participants and claimants in the international arena.' It is in this context that African heads of states decided to commission their ministers of foreign affairs to craft a Common Position on the UNSC reform. They further highlight the weaknesses of the foreign policy formulation in Africa as 'continental identity, supranationalism, and integration in various forms proceeded from the desire to unite disparate geographic units, to pool resources in concerted action, and to increase the leverage of the continent as a whole in the global and regional affairs of new African states. In contrast, through sovereignty, national identity, and differentiation, African states sought to maximise individual political autonomy, strengthen territorial borders, and guarantee unilateral advantages from privileged relations with external actors. Thus the competing choices and practices of nationalism and Pan-Africanism have co-existed,
though uneasily, in African foreign policy, a testimony to the success of elites in straddling these broad concerns.'

The unity and integration forged among African states was of a particular purpose, which sought to protect African leaders and states from external influence. 'To overcome their own continental and regional institutions. Building alliances is a better alternative approach.'

2.6. Challenges to the UN Reform Debate

Rourke and Boyer (2010) state the challenge to UN Reform as 'the two insurmountable hurdles to amending the UN Charter and altering the composition of the UNSC. First, Charter amendments require the endorsement of two-thirds of the Security Council, and the P5 are not especially open to diluting their influence by adding more permanent members a veto, or least of all, by eliminating the veto altogether. Specific rivalries also influence the P5. China, for instance, would be reluctant to see either of its two great Asian power rivals, Japan or India, get a permanent seat. Beijing also complains that Japan has not apologized adequately for its aggression and atrocities during Second World War. Second, another hurdle for a Charter revision is to get a two-thirds vote of the United Nations General Assembly.' There, agreement on any new voting formula would be difficult, given the sensitivities of the 192 countries. For example, the proposal that India have a permanent seat alarms Pakistan, whose UN representative has characterized the idea as an undisguised grab for power and privilege. Over and above, Weiss (2003) state that 'the veto has been and remains an obstacle to reform both
because of the P-5’s vested interest in preserving power and because no provision in the charter requires them to relinquish this right’. It is therefore an obvious fact from this observation that the agenda to reform the Security Council is divisive in nature and therefore should not come as a shock to the commentators when the African Union is also divided. However a vigorous study is required to understand the nature of the agenda to reform the Security Council and how it could be approached while closing space for any elements of divisions thus ultimately provide a way forward.

Adebajo (2009) asserts that the contradictions embedded in the UN especially Security Council are so glaring that the “Great Powers”- the United Kingdom; the United States; China; France and Russia- can manipulate the system to the disadvantage of the poor or the South. The 1973 resolution of “no-fly zone” taken about Libya in the guise of protecting civilians is a case in point. The state’s interests pursued by those “Great powers” are in stark contradiction with the principles and ideals upheld by the organization; justice and equality. If states are indeed equal then the same resolution could’ve been advanced about the Syrian crisis. He further states that Africa has “sought to transform itself from a pawn on the chessboard of the Great powers to an influential player in global geo-politics.” This was evident when ministers of foreign affairs of African states met in Swaziland to come up with a comprehensive document in order to consolidate views of Africans in as far as UN Security Council reform is concerned, and this document is known as “Ezulwini Consensus.”
Unfortunately while Africa made efforts to turn tables around the inevitable took-place, Landsberg (2009) states that in 2005 UN Summit, Africa did not speak with one voice in as far as the issue of the UN Security Council reform is concerned despite the "Ezulwini Consensus", the division occurred when Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt wanted to compromise on the veto question. He further suggests that till such time African states unite and stop to appeal to the moral sensibilities of the five permanent members of the Security Council and other dominant powers, the UN Security Council reform and the broad agenda of transformation of international institution would remain a mirage. This scholar has brought another dimension about the behaviour of African states in the international relations beyond the continent. This is where the research would fundamental contribute, the understanding of the relations of African states with Permanent members of the Security Council. The study seeks to assess whether are the African leaders afraid to take bold positions that are not in favour of their former colonial masters. Is the foreign aid playing a role in this area of policy formulation, and to what extent?

Maseng (2012) argues that France wants to capitalize on the opportunity of the Security Council reform to increase its leverage by likely advocating for a francophone country to form part of the permanent members should there be a consensus on this agenda of Security Council reform. Thus it is inevitable for the AU to be divided but until such time the divisions are clearly understood and properly addressed its then when African states would be united and close space for any divisions. The scholars specializing on this topic have not adequately provided answers to the question of the Security Council reform
especially on how to address the factors sowing divisions among states. This paper seeks to address those factors and provide a clear way forward.

**South Africa in UNSC 2007-2008**

The most important question is whether the African states advance the cause of the continent when elected to serve in the Security Council on non-permanent basis and thus assess whether would they be African representatives if the reform of the Security Council materialise. South Africa served in the Security Council in January 2007-2008 and was elected again to serve in this organ in 2011-2012. It is therefore imperative to highlight the resolutions it supported and opposed during these two tenure. To this end, Bowland (2012) advices that ‘in examining the role that South Africa has played while on the UNSC and how successful it has been at pursuing its foreign policy objectives, it is useful to look at the range of UNSC resolutions passed during these two terms. To begin with, it should be noted that the continent of Africa takes primacy in terms of the overall number of resolutions that have been adopted or considered for adoption, compared to the rest of the world. In 2011, out of a total of 66 resolutions, 43 were on African issues, a staggering 65%; whereas during South Africa's first tenure, of a total of 123 resolutions, only 56% involved issues on the continent.’ He further went on to draw conclusions about these voting patterns and stated that ‘the rest of the world is more stable, conflicts in other parts of the world don’t make it to the Security Council, or conflict is on the rise in Africa. The latter seems to be counter-intuitive given rising stability and more frequent elections in Africa over the last decade. However, as the Arab Spring demonstrated, the veneer of greater stability does not automatically translate into better governance or peace. In fact,
elections often seem to herald significant instability, such as was the case in Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe.

'South Africa's intervention in Africa has left the country scarred, from internal criticism by the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) on Libya, from West African states on South Africa and Angola's “unwelcome” and uncoordinated presence in the Bight of Benin region and even from alliance partners- Congress of South African Trade Unions and other civil society organisations- on Zimbabwe. The reality, however, is that in the international relations arena, the struggle for political, economic and security dominance between East and West has not ended, in spite of the end of the Cold War. As a result, the UNSC, especially the five veto powers- the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China, sometimes known as the P5 continues to use this forum as a platform to pursue narrow national or alliance partners' interests'.

2.8. The Role of Foreign Aid in the African disunity.

Glennie (2008) in highlighting the influence of institutions set up by the very same world powers who established the UN in order to create a holistic system that would sustain the political and economic relations between the colonised and the colonisers, stated that the World Bank, a development bank set up by major world powers in the aftermath of the Second World War, quickly grew into its role as the world’s main aid giver, while it was set up to support countries in serious foreign exchange deficit, it took longer to take on what over time has become its decisive role in lending to Africa and influencing its political direction. The African Development Bank was founded in 1964 and has played a
supporting role to its bigger siblings in Washington. Meanwhile Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) whose membership, which comprises the world’s twenty or so richest countries, is responsible for around 90 percent of global aid flows. He further stated that from 1980 onwards, aid to Africa has been characterised by ever deepening dependence and the aggressive use of aid conditions to enforce the infamous Washington Consensus, coordinated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The Millennium Summit in 2000, which set out bold new development targets called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), was a manifestation of this new belief in aid as a vehicle for development in Africa. This view gives credence to, and underscores the importance of the aim by South Africa and other countries of the South to transform these global governance institutions. Emergency Aid is a type of aid offered for humanitarian relief where a natural tragedy like famine, typhoon, volcano etc. occurred and had a major destruction of shelters and basic human needs. Development Aid is offered on basis of assisting a country to ameliorate poverty and develop its infrastructure to address the economic, social and political needs of a country (Glennie, 2008). Emergency or humanitarian aid is the fastest-growing type of aid, partly because recorded man-made and natural disasters are on the increase. It is different from development aid, although it can and does contribute to development objectives. Using money to provide for immediate and basic needs in a restricted geographic area is a different challenge from seeking longer-term and sustainable change. Not only does aid often work in these circumstances, it is the only possible humane option. There is no point watching pictures of a famine-prevention systems in coming years, as of course there are problems with
emergency aid. It is frequently late and insufficient, it is scandalously or strongly associated with how much TV coverage a particular disaster is receiving in donor countries and it sometimes has unintended consequences. But emergency aid accounts for only around 10% of all aid flows. The vast majority of aid is not used to respond to time-limited emergencies, but to chronic problems of poverty; this is development aid. Development aid seeks to make a difference in the short, medium and long term, fostering economic growth and reducing poverty. It is spent on improving healthcare, by providing direct services such as immunization and strengthening the health systems; a much longer-term and harder challenge than emergency aid. It is spent on schools and teachers' salaries and infrastructure to help the private and public sectors do their work more efficiently. It is spent on large development projects such as hydroelectric dams and oil pipelines, which are considered by the investors to be important to the long-term economic prospects of the recipient countries. This is not about responding to emergencies, but about making clear interventions in social and economic areas with the aim of fostering progress.

Joseph and Gillies (2009) 'believe that the central purpose of external aid should be to contribute to transforming those aspects of African political economies that hinder steady, sustainable, and equitable growth' and therefore conclude that 'if aid does not help generate higher levels of economic production and income, it is essentially an international welfare system. With regard to this ultimate goal, the citizens of donor and recipient countries are agreed: neither group wants to play indefinitely the roles of humanitarian rescuers and rescued. No matter which euphemisms (e.g. "partnerships")
are used, aid is essentially the transfer of part of the earnings of one people to another. National self-respect and sovereignty require that the aid business, as it has evolved, will only succeed when it can put itself out of business.' This explanation helps in understanding how aid has been used to influence foreign policy formulation of African states. As a result it helps the policy makers to have this born in mind in their approach to signing treaties and forging bilateral agreements with their external partners.
Chapter Three: Data Analysis and Findings

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter of the thesis, the views of the participants are expressed in tandem with the views of the researcher in relation to the objectives and research questions of the study. It must be understood that the views of the participants are not succinctly stated but find an expression in the analysis of the researcher.

The international system and world order have evolved in complexity to the extent that its architectures cannot comprehend their contradictions and problems, thus making it difficult to come up with accurate answers to those problems. The collapse of Soviet Union gave rise to a new system led by the United States of America. To this end, Thomas Weiss (2003) has concluded that there are only two international organisations, the UN, global in membership and the United States of America, global in influence. This assertion suggests that the UN cannot avoid the influence of the United States of America in key issues concerning global security. However, in reality the global security matters are complex and therefore, cannot be handle by the US alone. Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of Britain which serves as a permanent member of the UNSC, has stated that 'Western policy is at crossroads: commentary or action; shaping events or reacting to them. After the long and painful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, I understand every impulse to stay clear of the turmoil, to watch but not to intervene, to ratchet up language but not to engage in the hard, even harsh business of changing reality on the ground. We have to collectively understand the consequences of wringing our hands instead of putting
them to work.’ The impression drawn from this statement of Tony Blair is that the problems of the 21st century require collective action which needs deep understanding of realities causing conflicts on the ground. The problems facing the international system and international society should be resolved by all states through multilateral diplomacy. On the other hand, this cannot be realised when states are not united either in representation or power in the multilateral institutions with such serious mandates of resolving international conflicts like the UN. The SC of the UN has reduced this institution to be a launching pad of the interests of states serving as its permanent members. There is nothing wrong with the United Nations as an organisation catering for international peace, the challenge is with the marginalisation of the countries of the South who constitute the larger part of membership of the organisation. The countries of the South are not adequately represented in the Security Council which is tasked with the responsibility to cater for world peace. The structure of the UN is much skewed in terms of representation because of the way it is set up, it’s vulnerability to manipulation by those who have the extreme powers than others. The UN Charter undermines the potential of member-states to act collectively in maintenance of international peace. The article 24 of the UN Charter states that ‘in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.’ What can be drawn from the responses of the member-states in pursuit of the UNSC reform, is the fact that indeed there would not be harmony and the UN would not respond to issues concerning international peace promptly if the powers to take decisions are conferred to all members-
The reality is that countries of the South are pursuing adequate representation in the Security Council because almost all regions of the world except Africa and South America. Adequate refers to representation with all the prerogatives held by those serving as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council such as veto powers. The international system is complex to the extent that the structure of the UN, particularly the representation question in the Security Council cannot solely be pointed out as a greater challenge to the maintenance of international peace.

The complexity of the international system includes aid offered to the mainly countries of the South by the Developed countries. Some scholars have suggested that these developed countries are using aid as a political tool to direct foreign policy positions of those aid receiving countries. Aid in this context is not used to help in improving humanity and develop the less developed, but it is a tool to sustain the legacy of colonialism and reliance by the recipients on those offering it. The questions that need to be answered in order to understand these complexities include among others, to what extent has aid influenced the behaviour of states in the international system and whether the divisions among African states in pursuing the Ezulwini Consensus can be attributed to it. Does the emergence of China as a second largest economy and BRICS serve as an alternative force for the development of the South and the transformation of the global governance structure? How to reconfigure the Ezulwini Consensus to realise the transformation of the UNSC and other global governance institutions? Are the African states elected to serve in the Security Council as non-permanent members champion the interests of the continent or their states interests, particularly South Africa and Nigeria? What does the
inclusion of South Africa into BRICS mean for the continent and the inclusion of Nigeria in OPEC? In an attempt to answer these questions, there is a need to explore the set-up of the international system, locate the United Nations in the whole structure of this system. Matters to be analysed would be the essence of aid, foreign direct investment in Africa and the nature of inherent divisions in the African Union. Large volume of this chapter will be centred on the foreign policies of South Africa and Nigeria and how they conduct themselves in the continent. These two Republics are the prominent countries in the continent. They play a leading role in most of the affairs of the African Union, therefore their unity is sacrosanct to the operations of the continental body. Their differences, if not well managed, pose a threat to the unity of the African Union and the continent.

4.2. Pursuing state’s interests over the Continental Interests.

Justice should be done to the study by assessing the behaviour of African countries serving in the United Nations Security Council on non-permanent basis. There is a need to check the foreign policy implementation of the African states serving in this important organ of the global governance structure. Realists emphasize the point that states are important actors in the global politics and they do so in pursuit of their own interests (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007). From this observation, one might state that the theory assumes that competition is inevitable among African states for the permanent membership of the Security Council in the event the reform takes place, and therefore unity would always be a fragile matter in the African continental body.
There are three international events that tested the unity of the African Union and thus provide valuable lessons of how important it is for African states to advance continental interests over states interests. South Africa and Nigeria held different positions in almost all of these three events. These events are Libyan crisis, Coté d’Ivoire and the election for the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. In Libya, all African representatives in the United Nations Security Council serving as non-permanent members voted for the resolutions passed at this level, which among others were not favoured by the African Union as solutions to the crisis. South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria voted for resolutions 1970 and 1973 which saw the government of Muammar Gaddafi liquidated and ultimately dissolved. This is despite the fact that the African Union had a roadmap for the transition of government in Libya. All of these African representatives failed to defend the African agenda in the Security Council. One of the major principles of the African Union is a democratic change of government, though Arab Spring tested and resulted in the failure of this principle. The roadmap of Libya was crafted in the context of this principle. The failure of these states to protect and advance the resolutions of the African Union at the UN Security Council signifies the failure by the AU itself to hold those states accountable to its aspirations. South Africa viewed this failure by the AU as a failure of the administrative leader in this continental body. Hence the systematic campaign to remove Dr Jean Ping as a Chairperson of the AU Commission. Clearly the African Union is just electing states without attaching a mandate to be delivered by those states at the United Nations Security Council. In Coté d’Ivoire, South Africa preferred negotiations between the government forces of Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara considering the contestation of the elections outcomes. Nigeria was adamant that Laurent Gbagbo should
cede power to the declared winner of the elections, Alassane Ouattara. This feud between South Africa and Nigeria was informed by the different positions taken by the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The African Union sent former South African president Thabo Mbeki to facilitate a dialogue between Aouattara and Gbagbo while ECOWAS resolved that Gbagbo should cede power and respect the outcomes of the elections. This diplomatic feud was well captured in the Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report (2012) that ‘In Coté d’Iviore, South Africa opposed Nigeria’s belligerent stance towards Laurent Gbagbo, who had refused to cede power after losing elections. Abuja interpreted Tshwane’s actions as a challenge to the principle of “subsidiary” under which each African sub-regional bloc takes the lead in decisions about external interventions within its sphere of influence.’

The end of the term of office of the Gabonese, Jean Ping as a Chairperson of the African Union Commission ushered in a fierce contestation for the position highlighting some tendencies of regionalism pursued through sub-regional economic communities. SADC was consolidated by South Africa’s campaign to push for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the candidate and the ECOWAS was firmly behind Jean Ping. These campaigns contaminated the relations between South Africa and Nigeria. This diplomatic straw was well captured in the Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report (2012) that ‘at the AU, Nigeria opposed South Africa’s nomination of its home affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for the Chair of the AU Commission. In July 2012, Dlamini-Zuma won the post in the fourth round with 37 votes after a protracted and fiercely contested election. Although
South Africa accurately argued that its action did not break any legal AU rules, Nigeria and several other countries questioned whether it was politically wise.'

These diplomatic straws need a thorough account of the principles driving the foreign policies of South Africa and Nigeria in order to give meaning to the divisions among African states towards the United Nations Security Council reform. Siphamandla Zondi (2010) has made a logical observation about the evolution of South Africa's foreign policy under President Jacob Zuma's administration from the one of the former president Thabo Mbeki. He states that 'the presidential transition from Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma is also a change from one who was considered to have been a foreign policy president to one whose agenda is in gestation. Both Polokwane resolutions and the rejection of Mbeki and his legacy suggest to some that the Zuma presidency will concentrate more strongly on sorting out the many problems confronting the young democracy internally. For this reason and out of pragmatic considerations, the Zuma administration is expected to scale back on altruistic investments in capacity building on the continent.' The impression drawn from this observation is that South Africa would reduce its involvement in what it has defined as the "African agenda". This observation was illustrated by the anger of South African parliamentarians on the deaths incurred by South African soldiers in the Central African Republic in March 2013, whereby questions were raised about South Africa's involvement in that country. The questions centered on the national interests of the Republic in Central African Republic. This is mainly because from his first State of the Nation Address in 2009, President Jacob Zuma made it clear that South Africa is going to be inward looking for the period of his administration. Zondi (2010) clearly captured this
view, that 'secondly, since Zuma’s ascendancy to the Union Buildings, public discussions have suggested that his administration has to demonstrate more visibly the linkage between foreign policy and the domestic agenda. While the adage that foreign policy is the past, the expectation that foreign policy should generate foreign direct investment and that trade opportunities need to enable the country to overcome poverty, create decent work opportunities and deal with human development challenges, has never been greater. There is a view that much of South Africa’s capacity building and peace-making efforts are driven too strongly than before.' Given this scientific account of South Africa’s foreign policy, it is obvious that the reaction of fellow African countries would be hostile towards and skeptical about South Africa in the pursuance of its foreign policy.

The Zuma administration has changed the expectations of African states who had viewed it as a vocal voice and credible candidate to pursue the continental interests in the global village, and particularly in the global governance institutions. The impression among Africans to see South Africa as their representative in the global affairs was inspired by the famous speech of former president Thabo Mbeki in 1996 on the occasion of the adoption of the new South African constitution, when he made a bold and philosophical statement that “I am an African” as an opening tone of the speech and making it clear that South Africa is sympathetic to the cause of “African rebirth”.

The fierce and bitter contestation for the position of Chairperson of the African Union Commission by former Minister of foreign Affairs of South Africa, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and the then incumbent Gabonese Dr. Jean Ping, symbolised the decline of
confidence among African states on South Africa. This decline of confidence is justifiable given the overhaul of South Africa’s foreign policy under president Zuma’s administration. This factor of confidence needs to be addressed by South African diplomats to win back that confidence because it would directly affect how the agenda for transformation of global governance institutions should be pursued. This would not be an easy task for those diplomats. President Zuma has realised this blunder of foreign policy posture in the continent as he invited some leaders of African countries to the 5th BRICS (Brasil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit that was held in Durban 2013 as a sign of trying to win back that confidence. He also went further by explaining South Africa’s involvement in the Central African Republic to the leaders of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), something unprecedented in the new South African democratic dispensation. This was a sign of reconfiguring this foreign policy posture in order to win back the confidence of fellow African leaders. Zondi (2010) indicates that president Zuma’s administration is expected to consolidate economic diplomacy which was started by the former president Thabo Mbeki’s administration. He stated that the conceptualisation of the South African Development Partnership Agency will force South Africa to come to terms with its growing role as a donor or development partner in Africa, a role that is linked to its position as an emerging power globally. However, this will require the president to strike a balance between political and economic diplomacy, and this has proved to be a challenge for President Jacob Zuma’s administration thus far.

The political diplomacy of both former South Africa’s presidents Mandela’s and Mbeki’s administrations overshadowed the economic interests of South Africa in the continent.
This point was even acknowledged and highlighted by Kabemba (2007) that 'there are two schools of thoughts concerning the real motives behind South Africa’s foreign policy in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The first focuses on the idealist approach, which finds its roots in moral values. This perspective is based in South Africa’s liberation tradition and its success in achieving a stable democracy since 1994. The African National Congress (ANC) acknowledges the support it received from a diversity of sources worldwide, not least from African countries and in particular from the frontline states, in its defeat of apartheid. Furthermore, post-apartheid South Africa has proclaimed a foreign policy that promotes human rights, peace and democracy across the continent. The second school of thought regarding South Africa’s involvement in the DRC views it as flowing from its economic interests. This perspective proposes that South Africa’s mediation has had as its principal motivation the goal of situating South African players advantageously amidst increasing competition to exploit the DRC’s resources.’ The existence of these two schools of thought, either accurate in analysis or not, symbolises the balance stroke by Mbeki’s administration which tilted towards political interests than economic interests underpinned by both national interests and continental interest. This blurring national interests and continental interests made it difficult for scholars of foreign policy to confidently state South Africa as a hegemon with the aspirations for continental dominance.

Not all is gloom and doom about the administration of President Jacob Zuma on the part of foreign policy formulation and implementation. It is under this administration that Zimbabwe held free elections though there are lingering questions of fairness in those
2013 elections. President Zuma solemnly declared in 2009 in his first State of the Nation Address, that ‘as the chairperson of SADC and facilitator, we will participate in promoting inclusive government until free and fair elections are held in Zimbabwe. The plight of the Zimbabwe people has had a negative impact on the SADC region, especially South Africa. We call upon all peace-loving countries in the world to support the inclusive government to achieve economic recovery.’ President Zuma’s administration remained firm and committed to the plans outlined in 2009, with regard to Zimbabwe, though in most instances the State of the Nation of Address (SONA) did not clearly articulate the government action other than to "support" the existing operations. This address by President Jacob Zuma was silent on the transformation of global governance institutions particularly the United Nations Security Council reform. With President Nelson Mandela it was very clear from his State of the Nation Address in 1994 May 24 that South Africa’s foreign policy under his administration would be characterised by re-entry into global affairs and institutions. He (1994) stated that ‘tomorrow, on Africa Day, our new flag will be hoisted in an historic ceremony at the OAU headquarters in Addis Abbaba, with the OAU having already agreed to accept us as its latest member. Tomorrow, on Africa Day, the UN Security Council will meet to lift the last remaining sanctions against South Africa and to position the world organisation to relate to our country as an honoured, responsible and peace-loving citizen. As such, the Government is involved in discussion to determine what our contribution could be to the search for peace in Angola and Rwanda, to the reinforcement of the peace process in Mozambique, to the establishment of a new world order of mutually beneficial cooperation justice, prosperity and peace for ourselves and for the nations of the world.’
The successor of President Mandela, President Thabo Mbeki made it clear as well in his first State of the Nation Address in 1999. Thabo Mbeki (1999) stated that ‘the Government will also focus on the task of achieving the objectives of the African century. We will therefore contribute whatever we can towards the resolution of conflicts on our Continent. We cannot accept that war, violent conflict and rapine are a permanent condition of existence for us as Africans.’ On the agenda for transformation of global governance institutions, he made it clear that ‘as part of the world community of nations, we will make our due contribution to the construction of a new world order that will be responsive to the needs of especially the poor of the world.’ Thabo Mbeki wanted to elevate South Africa to the level where it would be a voice and representative of the South. The cause of the South and Africa was understood within the context of transformation of the global governance institution. It is with no doubt that South Africa pursued this endeavour with vigour and rigorous commitment.

4.3. Striking the balance between state’s interests and continental interests

In trying to understand how South Africa stroke the balance between the interests as a state from the continental aspirations, it is important to cite what the then deputy president Thabo Mbeki (1995) said in addressing the South African ambassadors. He stated that ‘a distinguishing feature of South Africa is the sustained interest of the rest of the world in the future of South Africa. The depth of this interest is not only confined to government, but includes ordinary people and especially those who were involved in the anti-apartheid
movement abroad. They have not disengaged themselves from South Africa since the elections. However, the strength and persistence of the international focus on South Africa puts the South African Government of National Unity under pressure to contribute positively and constructively to the global community. The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of their own development. They expect that we interact with them as a partner and ally, not as a regional super power, so that what we achieve, in terms of political, security and economic relations is balanced and mutually beneficial.

There are also expectations from Africa that South Africa should make a significant contribution towards peace and development on the continent. South Africa's problems cannot be worse than those experienced by other African countries. Despite its own limitations and problems, it is its objective to make a significant contribution to ensuring peace, democracy, respect for human rights and sustained development. These principles are fundamental to our foreign policy.

South Africa has sought to advance multilateral engagements through AU especially in pursuit of the transformation of the Security Council. However, it is also important to note that South Africa is in a continent composed of states that have their own interests to pursue; therefore, it should not come as a surprise when the Republic advances its own interests preceding those of continent in tandem.
In full analysis of this phenomenon, Bowland (2012) states that ‘looking more specifically at South Africa’s conduct in the Council, several interesting trends arise. During its two terms on the UNSC so far, South Africa has co-sponsored 18 UNSC resolutions. Of these only two were co-sponsored in 2007, and four in 2008.’ On the other hand, in 2011, South Africa co-sponsored 10 resolutions; moreover, all of these resolutions were co-sponsored with Nigeria and Gabon – the other two non-permanent African representatives on the Council, indicating more effective cooperation. Further, most of these resolutions were co-sponsored with India and Lebanon; indicating successful South-South cooperation, and finally, a majority of these resolutions were co-sponsored with the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Germany and the United States of America—indicating successful North-South cooperation on the part of South Africa.

In its first year on the UNSC, 2007, South Africa only abstained from one vote, Resolution 1757, which authorised the formation of an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The South African representative said at the time that while the South African government condemned the assassination, it believed that the issue could be dealt with most appropriately at a domestic level. In this regard, South Africa argued that the imposition of a tribunal on Lebanon was inappropriate under Chapter VII of the UNSC Charter, and thus was a contravention of the Council’s mandate. In this first term, South Africa also voted against one resolution, the failed draft resolution on Myanmar. This controversial stance was widely criticised as being inconsistent with the country’s stated foreign policy pillar of
human rights. However, again, South Africa argued that the proposed resolution was contrary to the Council's mandate and was best dealt with by the Human Rights Council.

Then, in 2008 South Africa similarly used its right to abstain or vote against a resolution very minimally. It in fact voted against a resolution only once. This was in the case of the failed draft resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. South Africa's stance was informed by the position of both the AU and SADC that sanctions would be detrimental to the political dialogue between the opposition parties and the government, in which South Africa was also intimately involved as a mediator, and again claiming that the matter fell under the mandate of the Human Rights Council and not the UNSC. In this regard, South Africa's foreign policy goal of promoting regional mechanisms to support conflict mediation and of opposing neo-colonialism appears to have taken precedence over other pillars, such as the promotion of human rights. This shows that the Republic is committed to the course of Africa and her states' interests are balanced with those of the continent.

4.4. The Role of Aid on Foreign Policy formulation of states.

Joseph and Gillies (2009) have devoted attention to the critical issues of the impact of large and prolonged aid allocations on local economic and political incentive structure. Out of this observation it stands to reason that if 90% of a country's export earnings derive from petroleum, as has been the case for decades in Nigeria, Gabon, and Congo-Brazzaville, then oil revenues will skew the pursuit of economic advancement of much of the society unless bold countervailing actions are taken. Aid can also distort political dynamics, as public offices become disproportionately vehicles for rent distribution rather
than the provision of public goods. Similarly, as aid becomes a steady financial resource for African governments, it can overwhelm and even marginalise other major forms of revenue generation and inhibit institutional maturation and the emergence of entrepreneurial classes in recipient countries.

The posture of Joseph and Gillies on foreign aid is that it was meant to be transitional operations; however, have expanded over time, sometimes ebbing but more often growing, as African economies became distorted, stagnated, or contracted. This impression was informed by the view held by van de Walle (1999) that 'by early 1990s, Africa’s relationship with the international economy was almost entirely mediated by public aid flows'.

The disturbing phenomenon in Africa is the reality highlighted by Joseph and Gillies (2009) that ‘today, aid sub-Saharan Africa amounts to billions annually and often accounts half or more of the income of a number of governments. Meanwhile, prominent advocates of African development insistently call on the richer countries to provide significantly greater amounts of aid. For the citizens of the recipient countries, as well as donors, the time has come to deal frankly, fearlessly, yet humanely with the paradox of abundant aid that too often deepens dependency, sustains corrupt governance warps the incentive structure of recipient societies, and inadequately subordinates for the private capital that many Africans, not to mention foreign entrepreneurs, have been reluctant to invest.’
This phenomenon is very disturbing because it creates dependency by the recipients on the donors. It tilts the scale of power relations between these two parties towards the donors as the more powerful and the recipients as the less powerful. The donors whom are generally the former colonisers and particularly those who are serving in the Security Council as permanent members, are at an advantaged positions to influence the political and economic directions of the aid recipients. By this, aid undermines the sovereignty of states. Therefore it seeks to sustain the status quo of the power relations between the less developed South and the more developed North countries. The endeavour to address the question of representation in the UNSC should be intertwined with the struggle to gain political and economic independence of African countries, which would result in self-reliance and sustenance in all fronts.

4.5. Election of member-states to the United Nations Security Council

The reason why states are contesting fiercely to be part of the UNSC is because of the nature of the structure of this global governance organisation and the nature of the power relations in it. The UN is made up of various organs namely: Security Council; General Assembly, International Court of Justice; Economic and Social Council and specialised agencies; Secretariat and the Trusteeship Council. The application of real power lies in the Security Council. Luck (2006) has clearly articulated this view by stating that 'the Security Council is a special place. Over several centuries of institutional evolution, it is the closest approximation to global governance in the peace and security realm yet achieved. Its enforcement authority is unique in the history of inter-governmental cooperation. The UN's 192 sovereign member states have agreed, under its Charter, to
accept the decisions of the Council's fifteen members as binding, despite ceaseless complaints about its undemocratic and unrepresentative character. The decisions of the Security Council are absolute and not open for amendments. This finds expression in the UN Charter which stipulates in article 12 that 'while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.' The Security Council acts as a final arbiter on issues threatening international peace and thus resolves on how they should be addressed. Resolution 1970 which referred Muammar Gaddafi to the International Court of Justice and the 1973 'no fly zone' resolution implemented by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to protect civilians in Libya is a case in point. These resolutions were passed by the Security Council without even consulting the AU as a regional organisation of the African continent. 'African issues have long suffered from either a lack of exposure in the mainstream media, marginalisation and misrepresentation or from outright silencing. The case of the African Union's intervention in Libya is a classic example of how African efforts go unreported or are twisted to suit a hostile agenda' (Ping, 2011). Ping (2011) highlights the dissatisfaction of Africans on the manner decisions are taken at the Security Council and how Africans are treated in this whole process which highlights the importance of African representation in the UN Security Council with all the prerogatives enjoyed by permanent members. He further pointed-out the importance of repositioning the AU in the International Affairs of the Continent, he noted that 'one of the aspects highlighted by the crisis in Libya relates to the reluctance of some members of the international community to fully acknowledge the AU's role. Yet, lasting peace on the
continent can only be achieved if efforts to that end are based on the full involvement of Africa and a recognition of its leadership role because, as stressed by the summit in August 2009, without such a role, there will be no ownership and sustainability; because we understand the problems far better, because we know which solutions will work and because, fundamentally, these problems are ours, and peoples will live with their consequences.'

Dr Ping, suggests a clear way forward though it seems like he deliberately ignored the role played by some African states serving as non-permanent members in the Security Council in the resolution of the Libyan crisis in particular. All countries serving in the Security Council at the time, voted with the superpowers on both resolutions on the Libyan crisis. Moving forward he points out that 'asserting Africa's leadership will also require that, as highlighted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC), an organ in the African Union structure (sic), on the occasion of its solemn launching, on 25 May 2004, we do not shrink from decisive actions to overcome the challenges confronting the continent; that there is no conflict on the continent that will be considered to be out of bounds for the African Union; and that where grave abuses of human rights occur, the AU is the first to condemn, and to take swift action, consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitutive Act of the Union and other relevant instruments that we subscribe to.' What Dr Ping is failing to acknowledge in the process of decision-making in the United Nations Security Council is the fact that the African states serving in this organ are to a certain extent failing to defend the continent or probably are failing to articulate the African positions well. He pointed out that 'one week after the adoption of the AU Roadmap, the UN Security Council
passed resolution 1973 (2011), in which it imposed ‘no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilian population’. Given this observation, it is either the African countries serving in Security Council are not raising and defending African views or are not being listened to all by those serving in the Council, or probably they are not popularising those positions to win the support of other countries serving in this Security Council. To illustrate this point, Johnson (2009) states though in a critical manner that ‘when South Africa presided over the Security Council for a month in January 2007 it merely compounded the damage. South Africa used its chairmanship to prevent the Council from discussing the denial of democracy in Burma or human rights atrocities in Zimbabwe and to obstruct UN sanctions against Iran for its refusal to terminate its nuclear enrichment policy. It also abstained on a US motion for a tribunal to investigate political killings in Lebanon and opposed Western pressure for sanctions against Sudan over Darfur.’ Though Johnson is critically raising an important issue of the contribution played by South Africa during its tenure in the Security Council as a non-permanent member in the period 2007-2008, the bottom-line is that South Africa raised those issues in defence of the African agenda in particular and the South in general. Johnson unconsciously acknowledges this fact though he reduces it to personality that ‘Mbeki’s ambition to transform the international order had been the emanation of a personality with grandiose illusions. South Africa was a middle-income developing country of less than fifty million people. The idea that it could be a key initiator of change in the world system- or even the leader of the Third World- was absurd.’

It is not by accident of history but by a deliberate design, that the Security Council is used a launching-pad of the interest of the few in the international community against the
wishes of the majority who are the South or less developed. To illustrate this point Luck (2006) states that president Roosevelt of the United States remarked in the interview that 'post-war organisation must be built on a clear foundation of power politics, not welfare politics or wishful thinking. Given the prospect of American military dominance in the post-war world, he opposed any sort of autonomous or distinct United Nations military capacity or the delegation of sovereignty from member states to the World body. America's two major partners in winning the war and designing the peace, the Soviet Union and United Kingdom, shared the same sentiments.' The architects of the new global dispensation following the failure of the League of Nations to prevent war, borne in mind the fact that this new era would require an organisation that would manage the conditions characterising it in their own interests. They also appreciated the fact that they should balance power among themselves in order to avoid a conflict that would result in another third world war, thus Moscow and London had strong strategic reasons for preferring a small Security Council built around the cooperation of the chief wartime allies, and they insisted more than Washington, that the new organisation not be able to act on security issues without the unanimity of the great powers. This was despite subtle ideological differences; but more about an alliance forged by necessity, as a reaction to Axis ambitions. War against a common enemy had brought together America; Soviet Union and Britain, the UN, particularly the Security Council, provided a potential means for perpetuating the wartime collaboration should other potential aggressors appear or should differences arise among the wartime allies (Luck, 2006).
While it appears that the victors of the war were in agreement on the form the new inter-
governmental organisation should be which had to be, different from the League of
Nations, America appeared more vividly than any other country in planning the set-up of
this Organisation. This then supports the view held by Weiss (2003) that there are only
two international organisations, the United Nations global in membership and the United
states global in hegemony. Therefore any attempt to change this systematic
organisational set-up of the United Nations face a trial of first to challenge America's
influence and quench its supremacy in the international relations and corporation.
America was very instrumental in the formation of the United Nations because most of
the intensive planning for the post-war dispensation was conducted in this country,
ironically the territory and infrastructure of America was least touched by the war's
devastation. In fact, the formation of this organisation was not a product of multilateral
diplomacy (Luck, 2006). It is very ambitious but achievable through unity for the current
membership to reform a structure of the United Nations in order to transfer power from
the few minority who created it to advance their states’ interests to cater for the view of
the majority. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had a series of conferences which as a result
brought a high degree of convergence on the basic structures and purposes of the
prospective world body. This was before San Francisco could be an idea or a thought.
More detailed proposals were worked out at a two-part series of conversations (Luck,
2006). San Francisco was sponsored by a ‘Proposals for the Establishment of a General
International Organisation’ document which laid-out points of discussions at the UN’s
founding conference. China's participation in crafting this document was minimised by the
Soviet Union in those secret meetings because of the Chiang Kai Shek regime and
consequently served as a window of opportunity for the Anglo-American relations to be further tightened and this also informed their relationship in the present moment which is very politically romantic. France only became a big fish in San Francisco, the then Big Four became the Big Five.'

How San Francisco conference constituted was much skewed in its nature, because invitations were extended and limited to those states that had declared war on one of the Axis countries. Luck (2006) states that the Charter adopted in this conference left membership 'open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.' This would only happen through a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly which is very unlikely, upon ratification of the amendments of the Charter by the parliaments of permanent members of the Security Council. The impression drawn from this analysis finds the basis from the words of the late Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa whom described the Security Council as the "holy of holies". The realist assumption on the transformation on the system is that the powerful countries should go to war in order to change the balance of power. This is not an option for the global community given the devastating effects it suffered post first and second world wars. Therefore the onus is on the countries of the South to make it a point that they unite with the purpose of pushing for the inclusion of their representatives into the Security Council and deal away with its "undemocratic" tendencies. This process should be deliberate as the process preceding San Francisco was.
Luck (2006) states the unpalatable reality that ‘at San Francisco, the big powers held firm the centrality of the Council to their larger vision. There were gaps in the Dumbarton Oaks plans, of course, none more consequential than what the voting procedures in the Security Council would be. The Big Four agreed on the need for unanimity among them for the authorization of collective enforcement action, so as to insure that the organization would not turned against any one of them.’ The currency of the international relations and cooperation of the global community lies in the play of power politics within United Nations Security Council because it is the one with the prerogative to decide on matter of global peace and security. The attempt to makes changes in the structure of the United Nations Security Council would first have to focus on the rewriting of the United Nations Charter which seems to be impossible at the present moment not because of lack of unity and coherence from the countries of the South but because of the prerogative by the countries of the permanent five to have a final ratification of the amended Charter.

The UN Charter states that the composition of the Security Council ‘shall consist of fifteen members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the other purposes of the organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.’ And further states that "the non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of
two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional member shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.' South Africa got to be elected into the Security Council in 2007-2008, to serve as non-permanent member. This can be dominantly attributed to the role the Republic played in the African continent of resolving perennial conflicts and again because of her role in advancing the agenda to transform global governance institutions. As Makgetlaneng (2011) notes, the post-apartheid South Africa became a member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1994. It led the transformation of the OAU into the AU and the formation of the continental development programme, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). It has been active in Africa continental affairs by promoting the peace, security and prosperity of the rest of the continent. It has been constantly promoting negotiated resolution of political conflicts throughout the continent. It served as an active peace broker in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Its military forces have been engaged in efforts to contribute towards peace keeping in countries affected by conflicts. It has been enormously contributing towards the reconstruction and development of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe. It has played a crucial role in the restoration of peace and security in Cote d'Ivoire. It is therefore of notable point that the prestige of the country and members-states of the UN matters most in nomination for the seat in Security Council. Article 23 of the UN Charter states that the General Assembly shall elect ten other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of
members of the UN to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the 
other purposes of the organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

Although the UN Charter is mum on what kind of a state gets to be elected into the 
Security Council in terms of behaviour, but one issue that also earned the Republic an 
opportunity to serve in the UNSC was its approach in advancing the agenda for global 
governance transformation. Landsberg (2011) states that South Africa conformed to the 
norms and rules of UN in particular and the international community in general in pushing 
the agenda for UN reform and advocating for the sanctions not to be imposed on 
Zimbabwe diplomatically. It is unlikely for a pariah and a rogue state to get elected into 
the UNSC. Generally, South Africa given its prestige in the international system deserved 
to be non-permanent member of the UNSC.

4.6. The agenda for transformation of the global governance institutions

The end of the Cold War epitomised the fundamental transformation of the structure of 
the international system and resulted into an urgent need for the transformation of global 
governance structures. This applied also to the issue of Security Council reform — a 
debate that reached a crescendo within the UN community during the 1990s (Spies, 
2008). It is therefore, not a surprising fact that the new democratic South Africa had to 
include this agenda of the transformation of the global governance structures into her 
foreign policy objectives. As stated in the foreign policy discussion document (1996) 'a
matter of future importance will be the reform of multilateral organisations such as the UN and OAU. A clear strategy on this must be developed and South Africa will need to interact with our OAU partners. Many member nations are appreciative of South Africa’s growing contribution to this debate. Solidarity with the hopes and aspirations of Africa should be the watchword.’ It is not even a shock, but a matter of applause that the Republic managed to achieve this goal of transforming the OAU to AU and is currently making inroads on the agenda of the UN Security Council reform.

It should be a notable point that the agenda for the transformation of the global governance structures particularly the UNSC needs meticulous and impeccable diplomatic tactics, because it is an issue that has been pursued since the establishment of the Organisation. Adebajo (2011) states that ‘in an effort to secure fairer global representation, a meeting of African Union foreign ministers in Swaziland in March 2005 – in what became known as the “Ezulwini Consensus” – called for an expansion of the UNSC from 15 to 26 members, with two permanent seats with veto power for Africa, and three rotating non-permanent seats.’ This has been the point of departure for the Republic on the issue of the UN Security Council reform. Landsberg (2011) acknowledges that Thabo Mbeki adopted a simple transformational perspective when he characterized the most critical global problems in three inter-related categories namely; poverty and underdevelopment; peace and security; and global power relations.’ And he further states that the Republic under the leadership of President Mbeki conformed to the norms of the international system. South Africa desisted from participating as a rebel and rogue state
in advancing the course of ‘global governance reform no matter how legitimate and concrete it is.

South Africa forged strategic partnerships to advance the course of transformation of the global governance structure. It has been engaged in platforms such as Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS), the G20, etc. All of these are structures composed of member-states of the UN and they carry a potential to advance fundamentally the transformation of the Security Council. Primarily because China and Russia are permanent members of the Security Council and India is a leader of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation. Brazil has enormous regional influence in the Free Trade Area of the Americas.

4.7. The impact of the UN Security council reform on African unity.
The reform of the UNSC only occurred in 1963 when the number of the non-permanent members increased from 6 to 10 under Resolution 1991- XVIII.’ This 1963 reform was informed by the ‘membership growth’ (Ronzitti, 2010: 04). He further states that ‘in 1945 the UN counted only 51 members, while by 1963 its membership had risen to 113. This was due to the admission of several European States in 1955 and the entry of Asian and African countries as a result of decolonisation. However, in 1963 the decolonisation was not yet entirely complete. The birth of new countries with the completion of the process, the split-up of the Soviet Empire and the dissolution of the Yugoslavia would dramatically increase the UN’s membership, which now stands at 193 states.’ Since then, there has never been any substantive reform despite the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989, which
marked the end of Cold War according to Mingst and Margaret (2000), and the ushering in of a new global order with the United States of America as a superpower. Mingst and Margaret (2000) view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a precipitating factor for fundamental changes in the very structure of International politics, which had been defined by the bipolarity of two superpowers and their competing alliances. As thus, this evolution of International System necessitates the reform of the United Nations particularly the Security Council so as to enable it to contend with the challenges of this dispensation as a solid unit in pursuit of global governance.

If there could be a shift of power from the Security Council to the General Assembly where every member-state is represented, this would make the structure relevant to the modern era. Weiss (2008) states that the Security Council represents the world of 1945 and not the twenty-first century’s distribution of power. This therefore necessitates the reform of this structure but not a cosmetic reform that is focused on representation rather a substantive and substantial reform that would shift the decision-making powers from the few to the majority. President Jacob Zuma once remarked that the United Nations is “skewed in favour of the developed North” and these sentiments were echoed by the Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff further stating that the Organization needed more legitimacy (Tait, 2011). The leaders of developing Nations also joined the chorus claiming that the United Nations failed to reflect the realities of the modern world. This is as a result of the representation in the Organization, particularly on the organ of the United Nations Assembly so as to represent them and vote on decisions to be taken at this level. According to Meister (1995), each member gets to vote once on any issue that is put to
voting in the assembly. The problem with this comprehensive representative organ, according to countries calling for the UN reform, is that the UN Charter which serves as a constitution of the Organization ‘permits the assembly to discuss any question of importance to the UN and to recommend action to be taken by the members or by other UN Organs.’ The assembly is disabled to decide on any matter concerning the United Nations. The only Organ with powers to ultimately and solely decide is the United Nations Security Council. This is done irrespective of the skewed representation of the UN member-state in this Organ.

Be that as it may, Weiss (2003) believes that the reform agenda of the UN Security Council is divisive in nature. This is in part because of the “political paralysis” from the proponents of this agenda. There seems to be a problem in agreeing about the new permanent members because of the complexity of the matters involved. There have been various reform modalities from various groupings as a result hampered with reform agenda. Over and above, Zorn (2007) shared the same sentiments with Ronzitti and stated that the number of states at San Francisco amounted to 51 member-states of the UN Security Council composed of the current Permanent five states and six rotational non-permanent members, where else in 1965 membership of the UN stood at 118 and the Security Council was expanded with four non-permanent seats which made the number of the Council to be 15-5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members. At the moment, the number of UN members has increased drastically and dramatically since its foundation which stands at 193. Since the establishment of the United Nations, the international community has completely changed. At the beginning it was composed
of Western and Eastern European countries plus a number of Latin America countries. Nowadays the majority of members belong to African and Asian countries. (b) Secondly, the role of Security Council has increased after the end of the Cold War. The role of the SC has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War. While during the Cold War the SC was the place where the two superpowers engaged in verbal confrontation and was virtually paralyzed, after the fall of the Berlin wall its policy changed. The SC started to become the place where effective decisions were taken. This is demonstrated, for instance, by the number of peacekeeping operations put in place and by the crises solved, such as the Timor Leste case. The SC has also taken on an important territorial administration function, for example in Kosovo before its independence. (c) Thirdly, the Security Council is acting like a legislator. The Charter attributes to the Council the power to take decisions on measures to be carried out by member States (Art. 25). Mandatory sanctions fall within this framework. They are a kind of administrative regulation adopted to cope with concrete situations such as threats to peace. Since 9/11 the SC has started to adopt “legislative Resolutions”, i.e. Resolutions taken to address hypothetical situations such as the threat arising from international terrorism or WMD proliferation. Take for instance SC Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). The former was adopted after the attack on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001. The latter defines the proliferation of WMD as a threat to peace and, like Resolution 1373, lays down provisions that oblige States to enact legislation to address proliferation and to ensure that they fulfil their duty to prevent the production of WMD. The Resolution declares that States should also adopt measures to prevent WMD and their means of delivery from falling into the hands of non-State actors. The creation of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals should also
be remembered, i.e. the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (SC Resolutions 808-1993 and 995-1994). (d) The new threats. The international community is facing new and dangerous threats, stemming from international terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed States. Nuclear proliferation has required action by the SC vis-à-vis those States that have withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or have been accused of failing to comply with the obligation to produce fissile material only for peaceful purposes. North Korea and Iran are cases in point. North Korea and the sanctions policy show how the freedom of States to withdraw from the NPT has been curtailed and the principle of consent to enter into international obligations has been reduced and (e) the use of force by States. According to the Charter, States are allowed to use armed force only in self-defence. The principle is enshrined in Article 51 and the main moot point is whether anticipatory self-defence is lawful or, on the contrary, may only be exercised after an armed attack has occurred. Contemporary international law doctrine has construed Chapter VII as giving the SC the power to authorize States to resort to armed force whenever a threat to peace occurs. For instance, States may be authorised to use force to prevent or put an end to genocide or to meet a latent threat stemming from an accumulation of WMD.

In the broad spectre of globalisation, the unity of states and regional blocs is more important than before. However the African Union is having cracks towards this agenda of United Nations Security Council Reform. Spies (2008) states that at the end of the Second World War, the vast majority of current UN member states were subjects of
colonial or other type of external domination. Presently, the 53 states of Africa comprise more than a quarter of UN membership, in 1945 only four of them — Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa — were members. The inevitable effect of this asymmetrical start, according to Murithi (2007) was that "African countries were effectively preached to rather than consulted as equals", producing a paternalistic relationship between the UN and Africa. Africa has been challenging this relationship since 1963 when the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) very first summit called for UNSC expansion. During the past decade this quest for equity in global governance has taken on renewed vigour, but until now Africa has not succeeded in obtaining permanent membership of the Security Council. Africa’s profile in the UN has, however, changed significantly. Its quantitative presence has rendered it a potent voting bloc in the UNGA, and during the past two decades the continent produced as many Secretaries-General of the UN. Of specific relevance to the Security Council is the extent to which Africa dominates its agenda: Adebajo (2009) points out that almost 70 per cent of the issues considered by the Council are problems in Africa." As a result, most of the UN's humanitarian efforts are based in Africa, and the continent currently hosts the largest, most numerous UN peacekeeping missions in the world — a staggering 90 per cent of the organisation's peacekeeping personnel. If Africa then dominates the work of the UNSC, the question arises as to whether a permanent African presence on the Council is not indeed essential, rather than merely desirable.

In reflecting on the impact the call for UN Security Council reform had on the dividing states, Weiss (2003) states that "political paralysis" has played fundamental role in stalling
the debate about Security Council reform because some states were concerned about the outcomes than the process itself. Those states were consumed by the desire to form part of the newly reconfigured Security Council than improving the effectiveness of the General Assembly. The issue was also about the criteria to be employed to choose states to form part of the Security Council whereby Weiss (2003) states that ‘Even more difficult has been reaching agreement on new permanent members. If dominance by the industrialized countries was the problem, why were Germany and Japan obvious candidates? Would Italy not be more or less in the same league? Would it not make more sense for the European Union to be represented (rather than Paris, London, Berlin, and Rome individually)? How did Argentina feel about Brazil’s candidacy? Pakistan about India’s? South Africa about Nigeria’s? How did such traditional UN stalwarts as Canada and the Nordic countries feel about a plan that would leave them on the sidelines but elevate larger developing countries, some of which represent threats to international peace and security? Moreover, if the veto was undemocratic and debilitating for the Security Council’s work, should this privilege be given to new permanent members? Would that not make the lowest common denominator lower still?’

4.8. Nigeria in OPEC for African Agenda

Nigeria is a second largest economy in the continent. According to Jones (2013), ‘Nigeria has moved into second place, from third last year, overtaking Egypt which is now in the third position despite its continuing political upheavals.’ It is in the league of the rich oil producing countries, OPEC. This growth in the Nigerian economy should not be aimed at upstaging South Africa as the largest economy in the continent and thus get locked in
hegemonic contest for the domination of the continent. Nigeria should use its power in this global organisation to influence the countries affiliated to it to support the African agenda, particularly on the transformation of International Court of Justice, IMF, the World Bank and the UNSC. Nigeria should rally countries of OPEC behind the aspirations of the Ezulwini Consensus and thus get external views on this agenda so that when the time comes for Africans to review Ezulwini, it then inform the continent on key issues to be reviewed and which ones are supported externally to the continent.

4.9. South Africa should use BRICS to push the UNSC reform.

South Africa is part of BRICS which has proven to be the emerging global power economically, though on political front is very unclear at the moment. Even renowned scholars in the field of International political economy have underscored this characteristic of BRICS and have reservation about its influence on political issues in the international system. Vanaik (2013) acknowledges that ‘the main importance of BRICS lies in the fact that it accounts for more than half of the world GDP growth rate. In what follows the Delhi Declaration issued after the last annual Summit is taken as a basis for assessing the nature and role of BRICS precisely because it is their collective statement to date. That the final Durban Declaration will show some forward movement is very likely but in what direction? In the eyes of skeptics there will be more reinforcement than departure from the existing political and economic scripts.’ It is therefore the responsibility of South Africa as a representative of the African continent in this global organisation to push the aspirations of Africans particularly those officially declared as continental positions in the international system. The Ezulwini Consensus should guide South Africa’s foreign policy
in BRICS on the issue of the United Nations Security Council reform. The endeavour to reform the UN Security Council has been declared as an issue to be pursued by all member-states of BRICS in its 5\textsuperscript{th} Summit held in Durban 2013. The BRICS summit was preceded by the summit of scholars coming from the member countries of BRICS in order to intellectually inform the resolutions of the Summit to be attended by heads of states. This fact was highlighted by the message carried in the speech of Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the South Africa minister of International Relations and Cooperation, to that forum of intellectuals and she succinctly indicated the role of intellectuals in BRICS that ‘it is in the area of ideas where this forum has a role to play in the BRICS architecture. You are the brain-trust that must enrich policy development within BRICS and in the BRICS countries; and generate scientific knowledge to improve our understanding of the world and nature.’ This summit of scholars indeed rose to the occasion and heeded the clarion call made by the South African minister of International Relations and cooperation and the forum recommended that ‘recognising the shared objective of progressive and democratic transformation of the institutions of global governance, BRICS should strive to enhance the voice and representation of emerging economies and developing countries in multilateral forums. BRICS should actively explore innovative and complementary partnerships for sustainable and equitable development. The delegations propose the creation of a BRICS parliamentary forum as a platform for intensifying political interaction. BRICS should continue to collaborate to identify and utilise strategic opportunities to advance its objectives of reform of global multilateral institutions in order to make them more democratic, representative and accountable.’
South Africa’s important role in BRICS as a representative of the African continent is of no doubt to the leaders and intellectuals of the African Continent. ‘The course of South Africa in the context of BRICS can only be understood through the foreign policy objectives of the state and how it pursues them. The inclusion of South Africa in BRICS is not only an achievement of it as a state alone but also as a continental achievement underscored by its continental power in African Affairs and as a player in international power relations.’ The understanding in the South African foreign policy formulation as articulated by Habib (2010) and the explanation as to why it is a member of BRICS is that ‘one of the biggest problems for countries in the developing world is the undemocratic character of the global order. This has not only created conditions in which rivalry among great powers has undermined the prospects for security and freedom in large parts of the developing world, but it has also significantly compromised the development agenda of these countries. Changing this situation is necessary if stability, freedom and development are to be realized. How to do this has become one of the overriding priorities of SA’s foreign policy. One of the strategies developed has been to pursue multilateralism.’

The influence BRICS possess cannot be undermined. Sincerity to fully implement the resolutions of the summits of this powerful force of South by its members would be the factor that would really test the power of BRICS. Even some scholars have highlighted this important fact about BRICS. ‘The growing combined economic power of these five nations presents an alternative centre of power, they claim. Only time will tell if BRICS will bring about a radical restructuring of our prevailing inequitable globalised framework;
or it will merely translate into a re-arrangement of this framework in which the powers will now be located in new geographic sites without a substantial change in the ideologies and values that drive that system?’ (Shabodien, 2013). BRICS is important to Africa for political reasons, because it is through BRICS that the continent wishes to advance the agenda for transformation of global governance institutions particularly the UNSC. The quest for transformation of these institutions is to reposition the African Union and the continent in the system of international political economy. It is for these political reasons that South Africa is seen as an African representative in this global force of the South. Thus Africans would appreciate it if China and Russia as the most politically senior in BRICS to advance this agenda of the Africans.

The marginalisation of the African continent is a product of the historical process of slavery, colonialism and now globalisation. Africa has been a battleground for developed countries economically, and this led to the partitioning of the continent in the 1884 Berlin Conference. This process that has resulted in the marginalisation of the African continent is still ensuing. According to Carmody (2011), there is a scramble ongoing for the resources of the African continent and this new scramble is characterised by ‘intense interconnection between the United States and Chinese economies, which make open conflict between the two highly unlike. The Chinese are dependent on the United States Foreign Direct Investment (sic) and markets for their goods, while the United States is dependent now on cheap industrial goods from China and the Chinese government recycling its massive foreign exchange reserves by buying the United States government debt. Competition for African resources is a relatively minor concern compared to the
importance of these flows.' This realisation of the fact of interconnectedness between China and the United States of America, thus sanctioning a corporation and bond of sincerity towards realising their common interests in the continent should serve a great lesson for African Heads of states. That there should be a realisation among those leaders of the African countries that continental development and championing the cause of the continent is more important than pushing the individual states interests, as it would create disparity in terms of development and attract foreign immigrants from other African countries and thus result in xenophobic attacks as we have seen in South Africa in 2008. He suggests that as opposed to labelling the on-going process 'African governments should adopt a strategic approach to foreign investment, by selectively continuing to promote it while maximizing local benefits, as China has.' Furthermore what Carmody has omitted in his analysis is the fact that the Africans are at a better position to define the terms of reference on doing business with any country that wants to invest in the continent. These terms should include among others the support the African Unions needs to realise the UNSC reform as outlined in Ezulwini Consensus. African leaders particularly of South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt should use their political and economic prestige in the international society to advance the cause for the reform of the UNSC. South Africa is a member of emerging economies in the form of BRICS, Nigeria is in the league of the oil producing countries, OPEC, while Egypt is a strategic ally of the United States of America in the politics of Middle East. These positions of these African countries should be used meaningfully to realise the aspirations of the Ezulwini Consensus. This can only happen if there is a common programme and approach defined at the level of the African Union. This then calls for review of the Ezulwini Consensus in order to close
gaps for disunity among African countries. The other factor that is going to elevate Africans to a better position in the international community is the sincerity of leadership in the continent particularly in Nigeria and South Africa. It is without doubt that the leadership of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and South African former president Thabo Mbeki, were very united in advancing the African agenda in the international forums. This leadership achieved the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity to African Union with a new mandate and programme, the managed to negotiate for debt relief for African states and formulated the plan of action for the African Union. They developed supporting structures for this principal organisation in the continent. They agreed on a common path for the Africa’s development. During the leadership of these former heads of states, the African Union was not prone to externally inspired divisions. They differed at the level of the African Union and went further to implement the agreements and resolutions of this continental body. They identified strategic partners for the development of the continent, something Bashar al-Assad has managed to master.

4.10. The Syrian Crisis and the question of multilateralism.

The Syrian crisis has exposed the reality that the UN can be used as a tool to apply the process of checks and balances in the international community. Russia, China and other countries of the South have countered the plan of the United States to punish Bashar al-Assad by campaigning strongly against the use of force against Assad’s regime which had crossed the red line imposed by the United States by unleashing chemical weapons attack on the civilians.
The inconsistency and inability of the United Nations Security Council to act promptly to avert violent conflict from escalating and its vulnerability to manipulation by the Permanent Five (P5) is very vivid in the Syrian crisis as opposed to how it acted against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. The Syrian crisis was precipitated by the Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in January 2011. The Arab Spring had no respect and regard for the states borders, it transcended from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and ultimately landed in Syria knocking on the door of Bashar al-Assad’s presidency. This phenomenon caught the international community by surprise rendering the United Nations Security Council incapable of resolving it. However, it is the United Nations which sanctioned both resolutions 1970 and 1973 ushering in the regime change in Libya and the murder of Muammar Gaddafi. The United Nations acted promptly to the Libyan crisis but is failing to take such a bold action against Syria despite the similarity of the conflict. This failure to intervene is paralysed by the close relationship between Bashar al-Assad and Russia.

The campaign for the UN to intervene in Libya was led by the West, the United States of America, France and Britain with the silence of China and Russia. It is the same West alliance that is pushing so hard for the UN to resolve on the Syria to the extent that it is even willing to act alone. The UN is paralysed in this crisis, Russia and China vetoed the proposal to allow the United Nations Security Council to discuss the Syrian crisis. Both Russia and China are adamant in protecting al-Assad from experiencing what Muammar Gaddafi experienced. The crux and details of the Syrian crisis are very complex. There are more than 1000 deaths of innocent civilians as a result of chemical weapons attack.
in Damascus (Palmer, 2013). The answer to the question of who unleashed this chemical weapons attack remains to be approximated. Both the rebels and the Syrian government forces have the capacity to unleash such an attack on the civilians. Rebels can unleash this act with the sole purpose of prompting a UNSC sanctioned action against al-Assad, exposing the inconsistency of the UNSC in resolving international conflicts, given the precedence of Libya. Bashar al-Assad can also do so taking advantage of the complex situation. This is what has paralysed the United Nations Security Council in resolving this problem. However, the UN sent inspectors to assess if indeed the chemical weapons were unleashed on the civilians. Critically though, these UN inspectors are not investigating the culprit of the chemical weapons attack, which then one can say it’s a futile exercise. What has further paralysed the UNSC to intervene in the Syrian crisis again is the fact that Bashar al-Assad has a principled, consistent and reliable friend in Russia as one of the permanent members of the UNSC. Russia has managed to convince China to support and protect Bashar al-Assad from the West. Russia resisted the temptation of dropping al-Assad when Saudi Arabia pledged the middle-east to Russia’s influence if it is willing to allow the regime change in Syria.

Assad is a beneficiary of historical flaws committed by the international community and the United Nations Security Council. ‘It is encouraging to hear voices of reason from the inner circles of both London and Washington, demanding a compelling and plausible case based on facts to be made before any action. This is largely because of embellished or flawed intelligence used to justify the invasion of Iraq. It also has to do with the misuse of a UN Resolution imposing no-fly zones in Libya to execute regime change. After having
been misled on Iraq and Libya, we should demand more compelling, conclusive and plausible evidence to justify any decision to launch an attack on Syria. The burden of proof should lie with those wanting the international community’s endorsement for an attack’ (Dlamini, 2013). The West are searching for terminology to support their intervention in Syria because the odds are against them. Terms such as “an international norm” and “humanitarian intervention” have been used justifying an intervention in Syria. It’s the same tactics applied by the West using UN Security Council to intervene in Libya under the guise of “responsibility to protect”.

The most important lesson for African Union and the countries of the South that can be drawn from this crisis is the fact that relationships forged with other countries particularly of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should be on the basis of mutual respect, interests and reliability. Bashar al-Assad is arrogant to bow to the pressure of the West because he has the backing of Russia and China. The protection given to Assad by Russia and China should have been provided for Muammar Gaddafi as well and thus the respect and recognition for the roadmap suggested by the African Union. The firmness of Russia and China in protecting Bashar al-Assad is also required to advance the reform of the United Nations Security Council. If South Africa could use its position in the BRICS to solicit the support of these two powerful countries for the aspirations of the Ezulwini Consensus, UNSC reform could be realised.
Research Findings

The divisions among African states towards the Security Council reform despite the adoption of the common position emanate from number of reasons. The role played by external forces in the continent compromised the unity of African states. It is discovered that Francophone countries still owe allegiance to France because of their economic, military and social reliance on France. This was made possible by the fact that the continent is still polarised along arrangements of the Berlin Conference, Anglophone and Francophone. Anglophones with the little exception of South Africa and Nigeria, are still sympathetic to Britain in terms of their Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and aid while Francophone countries are still sympathetic to France because of the same reasons. This polarisation owes to the colonial ties that still binds these countries mainly economically.

It is discovered that China as well played a role in stalling the UNSC reform thus was divisive in the continent. China is the main investor in the continent with its ignorance of the human rights abuses and has attracted many African leaders to forge relations with it, so it used its economic leverage to stall the reform. The UNSC reform is against the Chinese geo-strategic interests. There are high chances that when the reform happens, Japan would be among the states to be included in the Security Council.

The debate of the UNSC reform has been exhausted. Every year in the United Nations General Assembly summit, Presidents of various countries lament on this issue but there seems to be no change. The reform only took-place in 1963 to accommodate new member-states who joined the organisation. This membership expansion was a result of
the process of decolonisation whereby many African and Asian countries gained their independence.

It was discovered that there are serious hurdles to the reform of the United Nations besides the disunity within the African bloc. In the 2005 summit that discussed the reform, there were a number of hurdles that stopped the reform from happening. Ironically, countries that are advancing the reform did not agree on a single modality for the kind of reform to happen. Countries were divided along groups with various proposals, African Group was pushing for 2 permanent and 5 non-permanent seats to African states, G4 advancing for 6 permanent (2 for African states, 2 for Asian States, 1 for Latin America and Caribbean, 1 for Western Europe and other states). The second hurdle and most importantly was that for the reform to be successful, all countries serving in the Security Council had to accede to the reform proposal advanced and their national parliaments should ratify the UN Charter which proves to be one of the major hurdles for the reform to take place.

Foreign Aid is used as a political tool to direct the foreign policy positions of its recipients and thus played a major role in dividing the African countries on the agenda for the UNSC reform. Majority of African countries receive foreign aid from France, United States of America and Britain which is used to advance the interests of these countries.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been as well used as a political tool to influence foreign policy formulation of African states and this has played a fundamental role in stalling the divisions among the African countries. Contestation for continental domination
by South Africa and Nigeria has been discovered as an issue that contributed to the divisions among African states. There is no harmony between these powerful states in the continent particularly on the question of representation of the African continent in the Security Council. Both these states aim to be selected members of the Security Council in the event the reform takes place. The debate for the reform of the Security Council is a good topical issue for academics as there are many academics who have written extensively and creatively on the reform of the United Nations Security Council.

4.11. Conclusion

The reform of the UNSC depends on the determination of leaders of the countries of the South and their sincerity to resolutions of the platforms used to unite them. Countries serving in the Security Council as permanent members have made it clear about their aim to maintain the structure of the Security Council intact. This might not be clearly communicated but what is important is their foreign policy objectives, and how they implement them. The onus is on the leadership of South Africa and Nigeria to use BRICS and OPEC respectively to campaign for and realise the goals of the Ezulwini Consensus. The leadership of these two Republics need to constantly review and rearrange their foreign policies in order to complement each other particularly in the pursuance of the African agenda.

Foreign Aid and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have been used as political tools to direct the foreign policies of the African countries and thus have a negative implications in advancing the Ezulwini Consensus. Therefore the regional economic powerhouses in the
continent like South Africa and Nigeria should use their power in the continent to dictate to this foreign aid and investment to support the cause for the African agenda. This should be a resolution adopted and enforced by the African Union. Countries investing in the continent need to support the AU’s cause in the reform of the United Nations Security Council reform, particularly the BRICS countries.

5. Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations.

Conclusion

The debate for the reform of the United Nations has been going on for years now. It dates back from the 1960's. It was only in 1963 that there was reform of the structure. This reform was not substantial in its nature. It left the supreme powers and the balance of power intact within the structure of the UN. Those veto yielding countries remained to enjoy this privilege despite the reform. African continent and Latin American countries were not represented in this powerful organ of the global governance organisation. That is what made the reform unsubstantial. The debate is divisive in its nature, it has divided countries into blocs according to their geographic regions and interests. This has proven to be among the hurdles for the success of the reform. However, the divisions among Africans do not emerge from the circumstances that are domestic between the members of the African Union. The divisions within the countries of the African continent emanate from their external partners. The member-states of AU are divided along the arrangements of the colonial masters, the Anglophones and Francophone. It means African countries need to be clear and set terms that favour the development of the continent when doing business with their external partners. The Ezulwini Consensus was
a good effort to forge unity among African states towards a common approach on the
UNSC reform agenda. This debate has to ensue until substantial reform has been
achieved. African countries need to strengthen the African Union to enable it to respond
to conflict situations in the continent promptly and effectively.

Research Recommendations

• It was discovered through interviews that the Ezulwini Consensus needs to be
revisited and revised in order to make it relevant with the knowledge of what
happened in 2005. The African Union needs to take a resolution to review the
Ezulwini Consensus and address its weakness. This is a task of the African Union
because it was through this continental intergovernmental organisation that
ministers of foreign affairs of the African countries met and agreed to formulate the
Ezulwini Consensus as a common position of the continent on the Security Council
reform.

• The focus of African states should be on strengthening the AU to take rapid
response to conflict resolutions and any other matter concerning the development
of the continent. This will erode the power of the Security Council to be used as a
tool to intervene in the continent. The leaders of the continent are making strides
on this area as they are planning to introduce initiatives like standby force and
rapid response force. This planning needs to be implemented.
• The decisions and resolutions of the AU should take precedence over those of sub-regional bodies like the SADC, ECOWAS etc. This is informed by the parallel resolutions taken by ECOWAS and the AU in the Coté d'Ivoire crisis in 2010. This enabled external forces to intervene in the internal challenges of that country, undermining its sovereignty and the position of the African Union.

• The leading African economies in the continent should invest more in the countries of the continent in order to reduce the influence of external partners to direct the foreign policy of African states using their foreign direct investment leverage. This is more particularly for South Africa and Nigeria. They should use the wealth of their countries for the development of other African countries.

• The AU Commission should develop a mechanism to hold countries serving in global governance institutions accountable. It is assumed that countries sending candidates to the global governance institutions, do so with the interest to champion the cause of the countries of the South and of the continent in these organisations. Thus they should be given a mandate to deliver when serving in this organisations and should be held accountable.

• The hegemonic contest between Nigeria and South Africa needs to be tamed through the strengthening of the Bi-National Commission. This should be done through the institutionalisation of this Commission and the employment of its permanent employees. It should be a unit or a desk in the structures of the
governments of both Republics, either within the Departments of foreign affairs or within presidency.

- South Africa and Nigeria should use their alliances in BRICS and OPEC to rally external support of other countries who are members to these organisations behind the aspirations of the Ezulwini Consensus.

- The debate to reform the Security Council should continue because of its undemocratic and unrepresentative nature. The struggle for the reform should be relentless.
6. REFERENCES

Online sources and newspaper articles


Zondi, S. 2013. “South Africa is right to appeal that the UN be given a chance to discharge its global mandate.” The Sunday Independent. 08 September 2013.


Books


