

Guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious education institutions

M Diedericks
20290446

Thesis submitted for the degree *Doctor Philosophiae* in
Philosophy of Education at the Potchefstroom Campus of the
North-West University

Promoter: Prof FJ Potgieter

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously (in its entirety or in part) submitted it at any university for a degree.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "M. Diederick", is written above a solid horizontal line.

Signature

2016/03/10

Date

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Dedication

Dedicated to my wife, Magda:

‘Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies.’

Proverbs 31:10 (KJV)

Declaration of proofreading 1

H C Sieberhagen

SATI no 1001489

Hettie.Sieberhagen@nwu.ac.za

Translator and Editor

082 3359846

018 2994554

CERTIFICATE

Issued on 16 October 2015

I hereby declare that I have edited the language of the thesis

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by

Morné Diedericks

student number 20290446

*The responsibility to effect the recommendations and changes remains with
the candidate*



H C Sieberhagen

SATI no 1001489

ID 4504190077088

Declaration of proofreading 2

Amanda S. Potgieter
North-West University (Potchefstroom campus)
South Africa

E-mail: Amanda.potgieter@nwu.ac.za


Tel: +27(0)18 299-1040 (office)

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I have edited the language of the following PhD thesis submitted for the degree ***Philosophiae Doctor*** in Philosophy of Education in the Faculty of Education Sciences, North-West University (Potchefstroom campus):

Candidate: Mr M Diedericks

Student number: 20290446

Guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious education institutions



A.S. Potgieter
I.D. 6008190038080

15 October 2015

Acknowledgments

I have come to the conclusion that a PhD-study cannot be undertaken by one person alone; it involves a community of people. I wish, therefore, to make special mention of a few people who were more than just 'involved' in (and with) my study.

Firstly, to my supervisor, Professor Ferdinand Potgieter. I can now say, albeit light-heartedly, that I have never been so frustrated with anyone in my entire life as I was with him! Prof. Potgieter's passion for detail, his critical disposition, his unending comments and observations and continuous motivation for me to think more critically and deeply, exerted a tremendous influence on my own thinking. Professor, thank you very much for the thousands of hours of feedback, for working with me through every chapter, paragraph, sentence and word. You did not treat me just like another student, instead you treated me as a fully-fledged academic, and you always demanded the best of (and from) me. I am therefore proud to be able to submit this study for consideration by the international scholarly community. I also wish to thank Prof. Potgieter's wife, Amanda, for her hospitality in receiving me in their home and always providing something delectable to eat.

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Soli Deo Gloria!

Summary

GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE PRAXIS IN MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS

Keywords

Absolutism, Dialogue, Dramaturgical tolerance, Epistemology/Epistemological understanding, Epistemological dilemma, Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Individual autonomy, Institutional identity, Intolerance, Multi-religious, Mono-religious higher education institution, Oscillation, Openness, Other, Relativism, Salvationist, Self, Theory of knowledge, Tolerance

Research problem

This research focused on the following problem statement: *What guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis could be drafted for mono-religious higher education institutions, and why?*

Research aims

Arising from the problem question, the research aims were firstly to determine, theoretically, the nature and essential features of religion (Chapter Two), secondly, to determine theoretically the nature and essential features of religious tolerance (Chapter Three) and thirdly, to determine theoretically the nature and essential characteristics of a mono-religious educational institution and how it conceptualises and operationalises religious tolerance (Chapter Four). This was done by means of a comprehensive literature review. The fourth aim was to conceptualise and draft guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions (Chapter Five and Six).

Research methodology

My formal data generation was determined by the title and the scope of my research. I narrowed down the title in my study of the available body of scholarship to the conceptualisation of three related aspects, namely religion, tolerance and mono-religious higher education institutions. The purpose of the data generation was to obtain data from which possible guidelines could be articulated to understand and improve religious tolerance within a mono-religious higher institution. I limited the area of my research to an in-depth study of one research area, namely the mono-religious, private higher education institution, AROS. Identifying AROS as my research site played an important role in regard to the kind of information that I managed to generate for the study.

AROS (Academy of Reformed Studies and Training) represents the location of and for my case study and, as such, it determined the unit of analysis for my formal data generation. I chose AROS as my research site because it is a mono-religious higher education institution in South Africa, and mono-religious higher education institutions form a core component of my study. I have, since 2009, been engaged as a lecturer in Religious Studies at AROS (the specific mono-religious higher education training institution that represents the area of and location for [i.e. the unit of analysis for] this specific study).

The empirical investigation focused the fourth aim. It conceptualised and drafted guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions by means of individual and focus group interviews. These were based on interpretivism as my chosen epistemological paradigm. The purpose of the interpretive paradigm was to develop a better understanding of the way in which staff members and students at the mono-religious higher education institution made sense of the context within which they live and work. The qualitative data collection and methodology required considerations with regard to ethical conduct between myself and the role-players, i.e. the researcher, the Ethics Committee (NWU Faculty of Education Sciences), AROS, the role of the directors, lectures, students, and official documentation used.

As the researcher I prepared the necessary documentation, the interview protocol and interview schedule with which to enter the field. Once the generation of data was completed the data were transcribed. The method of qualitative data analysis included four phases: Phase I: organising the data by using a computer software program, Atlas.ti™, which enabled me to break large bodies of text into smaller units. Phase II: perusing the data to get a sense of the whole data set. This enabled me to write different memos with categories for and interpretations of religious tolerance. Phase III: categorisation of data by identifying diverse themes, subcategories or subthemes. This allowed me to sense what the data might mean. Phase IV: integrating and summarising data by describing relationships among the categories, packaging the data into organisational schemes or offering certain propositions for developing guidelines for religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions. The collected qualitative data were analysed by means of the Atlas.ti™ software programme as a result of which seven guidelines for religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions emerged.

Guidelines for improving religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions

The conceptualisation and drafting of guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions were the result of the

literature review and the empirical investigation. The following seven guidelines were developed from the literature review and the empirical investigation:

- An orientation and induction programme should be implemented for all new members of staff, which, amongst others, will provide a clear explanation of the institutional identity of the mono-religious higher education institution.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should compile a clear and simple description of their vision and mission statements that communicate clearly their institutional identities with all interested parties. These interested parties would typically include the accreditation authorities, prospective and present students, the staff members themselves, as well as all other legitimate stakeholders and role-players.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should have in-house debates about their institutional identities, and they should exchange academic programmes and site visits with other higher education institutions so that they may learn from each other.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should include the following values for improving their own thinking with regard to tolerance: love, peace, critical thinking, respect, honesty and hospitality. These values should, however, also be included in the curriculum and policies of the institution and they should be accurately phrased and seek to provide a clear understanding of each of these values.
- The development of critical thinking should be built into the institution's policies, curricula, inter-staff communications and staff development programmes. This could also be achieved by, for example, encouraging lecturers to participate in national and international academic seminars and conferences. Lecturers should also be encouraged to conduct in-depth research on the work of different scholars with different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions and thereby gain real understanding of and appreciation for their work and their understanding of religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. This knowledge could then be utilised to improve, design and draft the institution's own curricula on a continuous basis.
- Academic programmes which could improve the understanding and importance of honest, authentic dialogue should form an integral part of the curricula of the mono-religious education institution.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should include a quality assurance division within the institution itself, for the purpose of subjecting policies and academic curricula to critical reflection and benchmarking by other academic institutions. This reflection will

improve not only knowledge of the self, but also knowledge of the other, and thereby possibly enhance the academic quality and openness of the institution.

Primary findings

From my study I have found that in any tolerance theory the aspects of the self, other and the space in which the self and the other interact need to be present. Without the space in which the self and the other interact, religious tolerance isn't possible, because tolerance isn't tolerance without the active recognition and engagement between the self and the other. I found, furthermore, that creating the space in which the self and the other interact, is necessary to create an epistemological dilemma. An epistemological dilemma is caused by a back and forth movement (oscillation) between the self and the other in terms of some or other set of opposing normative polarities.

The epistemological dilemma is necessary for enhancing religious tolerance, because it causes a decision-making battle between different theories of knowledge (of the self and the other) trying to offer alternatives to two extreme normative polarities, e.g. between the absolutistic and relativistic theories of knowledge. The starting point then for all theories on tolerance should be to think of all of them as possible activators of the epistemological dilemma. If an epistemological dilemma does not exist, one would then either resort to absolutism or relativism. In my study I found that within absolutistic and relativistic theories of knowledge religious tolerance is not possible, because both these theories of knowledge lead to one single identity, not recognising the other.

Based largely on the findings with regard to the empirical part of my study, it could be concluded that the activation of an epistemological dilemma merely represents the starting point for any theory on tolerance and that one should always strive to move beyond basic, ordinary religious tolerance towards tolerance as recognition and hospitality. For this I developed the dramaturgical theory of tolerance, which not only activates the epistemological dilemma by practically triggering oscillation between the self and the other, but also moves beyond basic, ordinary tolerance by creating an open, dialogic and multilogic sanctuary where the self and the other could interact and experience authentic conversational safety from pursuit, persecution, disrespect, ridicule or any other danger or form of personal embarrassment or indignity.

To improve tolerance in a mono-religious higher education institution such as AROS, it is therefore necessary for them to consider moving beyond their initial, embedded understanding of tolerance, towards understanding tolerance within an open, shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuary of honest, unreserved hospitality. This notion of an open, shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuary should be built into the institution's policies, curricula, inter-staff

communications and staff development programmes. The guidelines I drafted, I believe, can aid in creating such an open, shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuary, which would enhance religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions.

Recommendations

Based on my study I recommend that mono-religious higher education institutions improve their operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis by implementing the guidelines which I have developed. From these guidelines, I furthermore wish to recommend the following:

- Mono-religious higher education institutions should study their respective countries' national policies on religion in/and education with a view to incorporating relevant aspects regarding religion into their own curricula.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should search for possible contradictions in their own policies and address such contradictions through, amongst others, scheduled open (public) discussions and debates among all stakeholders and role-players.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should study various theories with respect to dialogue and train their students and members of staff in the art of authentic dialoguing.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should clearly and honestly state their own institutional identity and communicate it regularly to (and with) all stakeholders and role-players.

Opsomming

RIGLYNE VIR DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN RELIGIEUSE VERDRAAGSAAMHEIDSPRAKSIS VIR MONO-RELIGIEUSE HOËR ONDERWYSINSTELLINGS

Kernwoorde

Absolutisme, Ander, Dialoog, Dramaturgiese verdraagsaamheid, Epistemologie / Epistemologiese begryping, Epistemologiese dilemma, Eksklusivisme, Inklusivisme, Individuele outonomie, Institusionele identiteit, Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling, Multi-religiositeit, Onverdraagsaamheid, Openheid, Ossilasie, Relativisme, Saligmakingsbeheptheid (resp. 'bekeringsbeheptheid'), Self, Teorie van kennis, Verdraagsaamheid

Navorsingsprobleem

Hierdie navorsing fokus op die volgende probleemstelling: *Watter riglyne kan saamgestel word vir die ontwikkeling van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraksis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings?*

Navorsingsdoelwitte

Die navorsingsdoelwitte wat vanuit die navorsingsvraag voortgespruit het, was eerstens om teoreties die aard en wesenskenmerke van religie te bepaal (Hoofstuk Twee), tweedens om teoreties die aard en wesenskenmerke van religieuse verdraagsaamheid te bepaal (Hoofstuk Drie) en derdens om teoreties die aard en wesenskenmerke van 'n mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling te bepaal, asook hoe so 'n instelling religieuse verdraagsaamheid konseptualiseer en op welke wyses religieuse verdraagsaamheid binne so 'n instelling funksioneer (Hoofstuk Vier). Hierdie het deur middel van 'n uitgebreide en deurtastende studie van die beskikbare akademiese literatuur geskied. Die vierde doelstelling was om riglyne vir die ontwikkeling van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraksis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings te formuleer (Hoofstuk Vyf en Ses)

Navorsingsmetodologie

My formele datagenerering is deur die titel en omvang van my navorsing bepaal. Ek het die titel van my studie tot drie verbandhoudende aangeleenthede, te wete, religie, verdraagsaamheid en mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings beperk. Die doel van my datagenerering was om data te versamel waaruit moontlik riglyne geformuleer sou kon word vir 'n beter begryping en verbetering van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraksis binne 'n mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling. Ek het my navorsing tot 'n in-dieptestudie van een navorsingsgeval beperk,

naamlik die private mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling, AROS. Die identifisering van AROS as my navorsingsgeval het 'n sleutelrol in die soort inligting wat ek vir my studie gegenereer het, gespeel.

AROS (Akademie vir Reformatoriese Opleiding en Studies) verteenwoordig die lokus van my gevallestudie. Dit het, as sodanig, as die eenheid vir my formele datagenerering en –analise gedien. Ek het AROS as my navorsingsgeval gekies omdat dit 'n mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling in Suid-Afrika is, en mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings 'n kernkomponent van my studie verteenwoordig. Ek is vanaf 2009 as dosent by AROS (die spesifieke mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling, wat as die geval en lokus vir my formele datagenerering en -analise gedien het) betrokke en onderrig die module Religiestudies.

Die empiriese ondersoek het op my vierde navorsingsdoelstelling gefokus. Dit was naamlik om riglyne vir die ontwikkeling van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraxis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings deur middel van individuele en fokusgroeponderhoude te formuleer. Dit was op die epistemologiese paradigma wat ek gekies het, te wete interpretivisme, gebaseer. Die doel van interpretivisme as epistemologiese paradigma is om 'n beter verstaan van die wyse waarop personeel en studente by die mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling sin maak van die konteks waarbinne hulle lewe en werk, te ontwikkel. Die kwalitatiewe datagenerering en onderliggende navorsingsontwerp en -metodologie het deeglike samewerking en interaktiewe kommunikasie tussen myself en die verskillende rolspelers, bv. die navorser, die Etiese Komitee (NWU se Fakulteit Opvoedkunde), AROS, die rol van die direkteure, dosente, studente en amptelike dokumentasie vereis.

As navorser het ek die nodige dokumentasie voorberei om die navorsingsveld te betree. Dit het die nodige protokol vir die onderhoude, asmede vir die samestelling van die onderhoudskedule ingesluit. Die onderhoude was getranskribeer, direk na afloop daarvan. Die metode van kwalitatiewe data-analise het die volgende vier fases ingesluit: Fase I: die organisering van die data deur gebruik te maak 'n van rekenaarsagtewareprogram, Atlas.ti™, wat my in staat gestel het om groot hoeveelhede data in kleiner eenhede op te breek. Fase II: om deur die data te lees om 'n geheelbeeld van die data te verkry. Dit het my in staat gestel om verskillende memoranda te skryf met kategorieë vir die uiteindelijke verklaring van religieuse verdraagsaamheid. Fase III: kategorisering van data het vervolgens deur die identifisering van diverse temas, sub-kategorieë en sub-temas plaasgevind. Hierdeur het ek 'n gewaarwording begin ontwikkel vir wat die data dalk sou kon beteken. Fase IV: die integrering en opsomming van die data deur die beskrywing van verskillende verbande tussen die geïdentifiseerde kategorieë, die samevoeging van data in organisatoriese skemas en die verduideliking van sekere voorstelle vir die ontwikkeling van

riglyne vir die verbetering van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraksis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings.

Soos reeds vermeld, is die gegenereerde kwalitatiewe data deur middel van die rekenaarsagtewareprogram, Atlas.ti™, geanaliseer. Hieruit is altesaam sewe riglyne vir die ontwikkeling en verbetering van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraksis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings saamgestel.

Riglyne vir die ontwikkeling en verbetering van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraksis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings.

Die konseptualisering en formulering van riglyne vir die ontwikkeling en verbetering van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraksis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings was die resultaat van 'n uitgebreide en intensiewe studie van die beskikbare akademiese literatuur, asmede die empiriese fase van my navorsing. Die volgende sewe riglyne is ontwikkel:

- 'n Oriëntering- en inskakelingsprogram behoort vir alle nuwe personeellede by AROS geïmplementeer te word en dit behoort 'n duidelike verduideliking van die institusionele identiteit van die mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling te bied.
- Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings behoort 'n duidelike en eenvoudige beskrywing van hulle visie en missie saam te stel wat hulle institusionele identiteit duidelik aan alle belanghebbendes kommunikeer. Hierdie belanghebbendes sluit in die betrokke akkrediteringsliggame, die voornemende en huidige studente, die personeel en ook alle ander wettige belanghebbendes en rolspelers.
- Die betrokke mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings behoort interne debatte en gesprekke oor hulle institusionele identiteit te voer en hulle behoort akademiese uitruilprogramme en terreinbesoeke saam met ander hoër onderwysinstellings te reël en uit te voer, sodat hulle by mekaar kan leer.
- Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings kan vir die verbetering van hulle eie denke oor verdraagsaamheid die volgende waardes in hulle amptelike dokumentasie (insluitend hulle kurrikula) insluit: liefde, vrede, kritiese denke, respek, eerlikheid, en gasvryheid. Hierdie waardes behoort egter uitgebou te word in die kurrikulum en die beleidsdokumentasie van die instelling, waarin dit goed omlin behoort te word en waarin daar 'n duidelike definisie vir of verklaring van elke waarde gebied word. Die waardes behoort voorts so omskryf te word dat dit tot voortdurende verduideliking en verheldering van die identiteit van die instelling dien.

- Die ontwikkeling van kritiese denke behoort in die instelling se beleidsdokumentasie, kurrikula, onderlinge personeelkommunikasie en personeelontwikkelingsprogramme ingebou te word. Dit kan byvoorbeeld geskied deur dosente aan te moedig om aan nasionale en internasionale seminare en kongresse deel te neem. Dosente behoort ook aangemoedig te word om deeglike studies oor andersdenkendes te onderneem en daardeur werklik begrip en waardering vir andersdenkendes se religieuse oortuigings te bekom. Hierdie kennis kan ook weer op 'n voortdurende basis ingewerk word in die ontwikkeling en ontwerp van die instelling se eie kurrikula.
- Akademiese programme wat die verstaan en belang van eerlike, oop dialoog kan verbeter, behoort op 'n integrale wyse deel te vorm van die kurrikula van die mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling.
- Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings behoort 'n kwaliteitsverskeringsafdeling binne die organisasie self tot stand te bring, met die doel om beleidsdokumentasie, onderrig- en leermateriaal, asmede die kurrikula krities met die van ander instellings te vergelyk. Hierdie soort kritiese nadenke sal kennis van die self, maar ook kennis van die ander verbeter en daardeur moontlik ook die kwaliteit en die openheidsgesindheid van die instelling verbeter.

Primêre bevindinge

Vanuit my studie het ek vasgestel dat die aspekte van die self, ander en die ruimte waarin die self en die ander met mekaar in interaksie tree, binne enige verdraagsaamheidsteorie teenwoordig moet wees. Religieuse verdraagsaamheid is nie moontlik sonder die ruimte waarin die self en die ander met mekaar in interaksie kan tree nie, aangesien verdraagsaamheid nie verdraagsaamheid is sonder die aktiewe erkenning en noue samewerking tussen die self en die ander nie. Ek het verder vasgestel dat dit noodsaaklik is om 'n epistemologiese dilemma te veroorsaak binne die ruimte waar die self en die ander met mekaar in interaksie tree. 'n Epistemologiese dilemma word veroorsaak deur 'n heen-en-weerbeweging (ossilasie) tussen die self en die ander in terme van een of ander vorm van teenoorstaande normatiewe polariteite.

Die epistemologiese dilemma is noodsaaklik vir die verbetering van religieuse verdraagsaamheid, aangesien dit 'n besluitnemingstryd tussen verskillende kenteorieë (van die self en die ander) veroorsaak, wat poog om alternatiewe te bied vir die twee ekstreme (teenoorstaande) normatiewe polariteite, bv. tussen die absolute en relatiewe kenteorieë. Die beginpunt van alle verdraagsaamheidsteorieë behoort daarom die aktivering van die epistemologiese dilemma te wees. As die epistemologiese dilemma nie bestaan nie, sal mens of verval in absolutisme of in relativisme. Vanuit my studie het dit duidelik geblyk dat religieuse

verdraagsaamheid nie moontlik is binne absolutistiese en relativistiese kenteorieë nie, aangesien albei hierdie kenteorieë tot 'n enkele identiteit aanleiding gee, wat die ander uiteindelik nie erken nie.

Hoofsaaklik gebaseer op die bevindinge van my empiriese studie, het ek tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die aktivering van die epistemologiese dilemma slegs die beginpunt van enige verdraagsaamheidsteorie verteenwoordig, maar dat mens altyd daarna behoort te streef om verby die basiese religieuse verdraagsaamheid na verdraagsaamheid as erkenning en gasvryheid, te beweeg. Daarom het ek die dramaturgiese verdraagsaamheidsteorie ontwikkel, wat nie net die epistemologiese dilemma deur die praktiese aktivering van 'n ossilasie tussen die self en die ander veroorsaak nie, maar ook verby basiese verdraagsaamheid beweeg deur 'n oop, dialogiese en multilogiese ruimte moontlik te maak. In hierdie omgewing kan die self en die ander met mekaar in interaksie tree en veilige outentieke gesprekvoering ervaar, sonder vervolging, disrespek, bespotting of enige ander gevaar of vorm van persoonlike verleentheid of vernedering.

Om verdraagsaamheid binne 'n mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstelling soos AROS te verbeter, is dit noodsaaklik vir die instelling om vanaf hulle oorspronklike begryping van verdraagsaamheid, na 'n gewysigde begryping daarvan te beweeg, wat binne 'n oop, gedeelde, dialogiese en multilogiese ruimte (gekenmerk deur eerlike en ongereserveerde gasvryheid) sal kan plaasvind. Hierdie gedagte van 'n oop, gedeelde dialogiese en multilogiese ruimte behoort voorts in die instelling se beleidsdokumentasie, kurrikula, personeelkommunikasie en personeelontwikkelingsprogramme geïnkorporeer te word. Die riglyne wat ek saamgestel het, glo ek, sal help om so 'n oop, gedeelde, dialogiese en multilogiese ruimte te skep, wat sal help met die verbetering van religieuse verdraagsaamheidspraxis vir mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings.

Aanbevelings

Vanuit my studie stel ek voor dat mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings hulle religieuse verdraagsaamheid verbeter deur die riglyne wat ek ontwikkel het, te implementeer. Vanuit die riglyne wat ek ontwikkel het, maak ek vervolgens die volgende aanbevelings:

- Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings behoort hulle land se nasionale beleid ten aansien van religie in/en die onderwys (en opvoeding) te ondersoek en belangrike aangeleenthede aangaande religie in hulle kurrikula te inkorporeer.

- Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings behoort teenstellings binne hulle eie beleidsdokumentasie op te spoor en daardie teenstellings binne oop gespreksforums onder en tussen (onder andere) personeellede, te bespreek en te debatteer.
- Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings behoort verskillende dialoogteorieë te ondersoek en hulle studente en personeel in die kuns van outentieke dialoog te onderrig en te laat onderrig.
- Mono-religieuse hoër onderwysinstellings behoort duidelik en eerlik en op 'n gereelde basis hulle eie institutionele identiteit met alle belangstellende partye te deel.

Quotations

‘To kill a man is not to protect a doctrine, but to kill a man’ (Castellio, 1965:203)

‘Religious tolerance is the principle that society and state should, as a matter of right, extend complete freedom of religious belief and expression to all their members and citizens, and should refrain from imposing any religious tests, doctrines, or forms of worship or religious association upon them.’

(Zagorin, 2003:7)

‘To tolerate means to insult.’ (Von Goethe, 2005:116)

‘Let not the Jews or Turks [Muslims] condemn the Christians, nor let the Christians condemn the Jews or the Turks, but rather teach and win them by true religion and justice, and let us, who are Christians, not condemn one another, but, if we are wiser than they, let us also be better and more merciful. This is certain that the better a man knows the truth, the less is he inclined to condemn.’

(Castellio, 1965:133)

‘The currency of the term tolerance has become badly debased. Where it used to mean the respecting of real, hard differences, it has come to mean instead a dogmatic abdication of truth-claims and a moralistic adherence to moral relativism. Where premodern tolerance allowed hard differences on religion and morality to rub shoulders and compete freely in the public square, liberal tolerance wishes to lock them all indoors as matters of private judgment; the public square must be given over to indistinctness.’ (Pearse, 2004:12)

‘So, this is the thing that I like about AROS – they remind you every time what is right and wrong.’ (Student C)

‘Yes, AROS has an out-and-out exclusivist view of salvation.’ (Lecturer D)

‘No serious person or theory operates with absolute tolerance. Even the most tolerant person would admit that there are limits to tolerance and acceptance. This means that both tolerance and intolerance may be legitimate and illegitimate, according to the theory and the understanding of the situation in question.’ (Afdal, 2010:599)

‘God wishes to be worshipped in love and not under compulsion.’ (Director A)

‘The only reason why one should engage in conversation with others is to proclaim the truth to them.’ (Lecturer F)

‘I think that AROS should be an institution that does not doubt itself, that does not try to be everything to everyone, but which would like to bring everyone to the only God.’ (Director A)

Abbreviations

AD	Academic Director
APA	American Psychological Association
AROS	Academic Reformed Teaching and Studies
C	Curriculum
CAQDAS	Computer-aided qualitative data analysis software
CHE	Council on Higher Education
CRSA	Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
DHET	Department of Higher Education and Training
DI	Director of Identity-development
DST	Dialogical Self Theory
FD	Financial Director
FDA	Official documentation from AROS
FDAA	Official documentation from the accreditation authorities
HEQC	The Higher Education Quality Committee
I	Interviews
IB	Interviews with Board
ILS	Interviews with Lecturing Staff
ISC	Interviews with Student Council
NPHE	National Plan for Higher Education
NPRE	National Policy on Religion and Education
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
NWU	North West University
PHEI	Private Higher Education Institution

QC	Quality Council
QCTO	Quality Council for Trades and Occupations
SACE	South African Council of Educators
SAQA	South African Qualifications Authority
UMALUSI	Council on Quality Assurance in General and Further Education and Training
UNISA	University of South Africa

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Chapter 1: Orientation

1.1 Introduction

Before you start reading, please watch the introductory video to my thesis by going to the following link <https://youtu.be/3QnBhaRrjio>

An explosion, followed by tremendous confusion. Please (re)call 9/11 (no pun intended). Although it could be argued that it has been with us since *homo sapiens sapiens* first walked the earth, religiously motivated violence is nevertheless a somewhat recent and largely unexpected phenomenon for most of us who are now walking the same planet. The religious violence and religious intolerance that ravaged Europe in the 17th Century might have been brought under control for a significant period of time, but the Pandora's box of religious intolerance has once more been opened by events such as the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. The current strife in Syria, the recent 'Arabic Spring' uprisings and the conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian south of Nigeria present further examples.¹

Since the time I started lecturing in Religious Studies at AROS (Academic Reformed Teaching and Studies) in 2009, a private education institution, questions and viewpoints about the relationship between different religions, definitions for religion, and teaching students about religion and the reasons for religious conflict such as terror attacks, have occupied my thoughts. I have wondered whether my teaching of religion helped students to understand the most desirable relationship between different religions and whether my classroom-based instruction contributed to a personal growth in terms of religious tolerance in each of my students.

To enhance my understanding of religious tolerance and the implementation of religious tolerance praxis in a mono-religious education institution, I conducted a literature study which focused on a philosophically orientated overview of the following topics:

- The nature and essential features of religion.
- The nature and essential features of religious tolerance.
- The nature and essential features of a mono-religious educational institution.

¹ "Terrorism is on the rise in both advanced societies and in the stateless "zones of anarchy." In this environment we no longer have the "peace education" that developed out of the Peace Corps and propaganda of the Cold War but "education for war" or "education for empire" – an accent on the preparedness and training for terrorist attacks,..." (Peters, 2015:10).

From these topics I developed a conceptual framework which I used as guiding principles to direct the data generation for my empirical study. My research focused on AROS and the context in which this institution operates, because AROS is a private higher education institution with a mono-religious institutional identity, involved in the initial training of teachers. From the empirical data generated, I drafted guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions.

This chapter offers a preview of the inquiry and is presented in four parts. The first part describes the research rationale and justification, followed by an explanation of key terms used in the study and an introductory overview on the concept of religious tolerance. Thereafter, I formulate the research questions and the purpose of the research. I also demarcate the scope of this inquiry and explain its research design and methodology. This chapter concludes with the limitations of my study and the presentation of a visual framework of the organisation of the thesis.

1.2 Rationale and justification

Peck (2006:173) points out that religious differences can exist between atheists and theistic believers as well as within religious groups. 'We see dogmatism, and proceeding from dogmatism, we see wars and inquisitions and persecutions. We see hypocrisy: people professing the brotherhood of man killing their fellows in the name of faith, lining their pockets at the expense of others, and practicing all manner of brutality' (Peck 2006:184). In Wright's (2009:421) view, 'the bulk of westerners and the bulk of Muslims are in a deeply non-zero-sum relationship, [and] by and large aren't very good at extending moral imagination to one another'. Alford (2009:57) concurs with him, saying that religious fundamentalism seems to be the cause of many of the world's ills (for example suicide bombers, beheading of journalists, kidnapping of girls). The reason for this is that people tend to operate from a frame of reference (worldview) more narrow than they are capable of, thereby failing to transcend the influence of their particular religion, culture, particular set of parents and childhood experiences upon which their understanding is based (Peck, 2006:180). The following seem to attest to this possibility: the name of the Islamic organisation suspected of being responsible for the 2010 New Year's Eve bomb explosions in Nigeria (in which 23 people were killed) is Boko Haram, which literally means 'Western education is prohibited' (Okonta, 2011:12), and in 2012 a murder took place in a rural South African town where the victim was murdered just because he had a beard associated with Muslim men (Cilliers, 2012).

Two political philosophers of the 1990s, Rawls (2005) and Waltzer (1997), believed that religious tolerance was a 'done deal', but Hoffman (2002:1) in his article *Lessons of 9/11* explains how terrorism (mainly religiously oriented) that started in the early 1990s had

undergone a fundamental change. The Pew Research Centre's Forum on Religion and Public Life concluded (as a result of its four year study) that religious intolerance is a developing issue globally, because contact between religious groups has become more and more common. This indicates that three-quarters of the world's human population of seven billion live under strong governmental restrictions with regard to religion, or under the continuous threat of serious 'social hostilities' involving faith issues. The Forum's analysis of 197 countries and territories identifies a sharp rise in religious restrictions with regard to the establishment and maintenance of mono-religious higher education institutions globally and a six per cent increase in restrictions in the four years until 2010 (Grim, 2012:9).

As this growing conundrum of religious tolerance became a global issue in the 1990s (Powell and Clarke, 2013:6), South Africa also started to face new questions with regard to religious tolerance. Issues which were mostly theoretical before the 1994 democratic elections, became practical in real life terms after the election. After the democratic elections in 1994, a new education system, grounded in Outcomes-Based Education Theory, was introduced in 1997. Many public schools in South Africa shifted from the former system of Christian National Education to multi-cultural and multi-religious education (Roux, 2000:152-153).

Albeit a rhetorical one, the question remains whether it was necessary to alter the epistemologies that underpin the educational policies in South Africa after 1994. According to Roux (2006:154), the reason for the change in the educational system was to engage in a more holistic approach with learners from all societal structures, because the previous South African social structure was disintegrating and learners from different cultures and religious backgrounds could now attend the school of their choice. When children from different cultures and religious backgrounds began to attend the same schools, problematic situations appeared in many of these institutions. Two key problems that emerged from this scenario are of note. Firstly, there was a conflict between religious freedom and the position of mono-religious education in public schools, because children from different cultural and religious backgrounds could now attend the same school (Roux, 2000:173). Secondly, there was a lack of teachers to introduce multi-religious content or to facilitate multi-cultural teaching and learning and related social interaction situations. Research has shown, in this regard, that the shift from a mono-religious to a multi-religious approach has been problematic for many teachers (Jarvis, 2009:158).

This shift, the issue referred to in the last sentence of the previous paragraph, has led me to the intellectual conundrum of my study, because, as mentioned, I am a lecturer at a recently accredited mono-religious educational institution in South Africa: AROS. At AROS we train teachers to teach in public as well as in private schools. Central to this research, is the fact that

AROS is also a mono-religious education institution with a particular Salvationist² religious ethos. According to Mendus (2008:22), it might be exceedingly difficult to understand how Salvationist religious institutions, such as AROS, could view tolerance as a moral principle.³ This is an aspect to which I return and on which I elaborate in my review of the relevant body of scholarship.

With regard to these introductory remarks that were made towards providing a rationale for and justification of this research and the subsequent literature review, the intellectual conundrum and focus of this research can be phrased in the following manner: *What guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis could be drafted for mono-religious higher education institutions, and why?* An explanation of key terms and a review of the relevant body of scholarship follow in an effort to clarify this conundrum, its subordinate research questions, as well as the rationale and justification for this research project.

1.3 Explanation of key terms

Absolutism: The term ‘absolutism’ distinguishes between Meta-ethical absolutism, Moral absolutism and Political absolutism (Sommerville, 1991; Haber, 1994; Rachels, 2006). In my study I refer in particular to Moral absolutism. According to Moral absolutism, an absolute reality exists, underpinned by a universally valid moral system. This absolute reality with its universally valid moral system is an objective reality, and unlimited in space and time, although human knowledge pertaining to it is restricted (the scope of knowledge and what is knowable in each person is limited). According to Van der Walt (1999:53), absolutist scholars canonise their religion as the only true religion, which causes a static understanding of truth and knowledge.

Dialogue: In my study I refer to ‘dialogue’ as a discursive practice of focused conversation between two or more people or groups directed towards the investigation of a particular subject to resolve a problem.

Dramaturgical tolerance: This is a theory that I developed as a result of my study by combining two main concepts of the recognition theory: the self and the other and the encounter between the self and the other (the dialogical interplay between the self of the other) – which Goosen

² The word Salvationist is used here in the sense that people regard their religion as the only true religion and that to receive salvation and everlasting life, they are obliged to believe in only this one religion.

³ One of my critical readers suggested that I consider studying more than one mono-religious education institution with a Salvationist religious ethos. However, after having undergone exhaustive training in qualitative research design and methodology and after having spoken to a number of qualitative research experts from a number of highly respected South African universities, I have decided not to heed this suggestion for the purposes of this particular study. What I did, however, was to cast the net much more widely on account of the available body of scholarship. Instead of focusing on literature that mainly deals with the issue of specific mono-religious higher education institutions with a Protestant salvationist religious ethos, I read much more broadly and included, for example, literature that also addresses mono-religious higher education institutions with different kinds of salvationist religions, such as Muslim and Roman Catholic. Non-salvationist mono-religious education institutions’ religious ethos, such as paganism, Buddhism and Hinduism are also addressed in the literature (cf. par. 3.4.2.1).

(2007:10) refers to as dramaturgy. In his book *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* Goffmann (1956) first refers to the dramaturgical analysis in which he uses the imagery of the theatre in order to portray the importance of human social interaction. Dramaturgical tolerance is characterised by the autonomy of the self and the other while taking part in the dramaturgical interplay.

Epistemology/Epistemological understanding: Chrisholm (2005:259) explains that epistemology stems from the Greek word 'episteme', which means knowledge. Therefore, all things that are described, stand in relation to knowledge or at least to the justification of an individual's understanding of what knowledge is.

Epistemological dilemma: Alexander (1990:532) describes an epistemological dilemma as the decision-making battle between different theories of knowledge trying to offer alternatives to two extreme polarities, for example the epistemological dilemma that exists between the absolutistic and the relativistic theories of knowledge.

Exclusivism: Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:4) relate exclusivism to people who regard the practice of their own religion as the only correct lifestyle. When I refer to exclusivism, I therefore refer to the exclusivist practice of religion.

Inclusivism: When I refer to inclusivism, I refer to religious practice or behaviour which asserts that more than one set of religious beliefs could be true, and that all religious beliefs are essentially the same (Wolhuter *et al.*, 2014:5).

Individual autonomy: According to Christman (2011:1), the idea of individual autonomy refers to the human capacity to be one's own person; to live one's life according to one's own reasons and motives.

Institutional identity: When I refer to the identity of a mono-religious education institution in this study, I specifically refer to the institution's mission, vision and values which are visible in the institution's policies and which the institution communicates to others through marketing or brochures.

Intolerance: In this study I refer to the concept 'intolerance' as the unwillingness to accept religious beliefs or theories of knowledge that differ from one's own.

Multi-religious: I use the adjectival qualifier 'multi-religious' to refer to particular societies or higher education institutions accommodating followers from more than one religion.⁴

⁴ Collins, Online English Dictionary: <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/multireligious>

Mono-religious higher education institution: According to Hermans (2003:337) and Goldberg (2010:351), mono-religious higher education focuses mainly on one religion. They describe this method as the ‘transmission model’ because it has the objective of transmitting one specific religion to their students. As it is derived from the adjective ‘mono-religious’, Hermans highlights the fact that education of this kind is distinguished from that of other types of higher education institutions by the fact that it focuses on one (mono) religion only.

Oscillation: In this study I refer to oscillation as the back and forth movement between two extreme polarities, such as the back and forth movement between absolutism and relativism, exclusivism and inclusivism, or openness and reservedness of the self and the other. Shiffman (2012:189) explains that oscillation can occur in anything from tides, the plucking of a guitar string or a person’s decision-making process.

Openness: In this study I refer to openness as a person’s attitude towards accepting the idea of changing one’s own knowledge of, as well as prejudices and beliefs with regard to, the religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions of other people.

Other: In this study I use the word ‘other’ to refer to a person or institution who might be different, or divergent, from one already mentioned or familiar to the speaker.

Relativism: A relativist denies that there is an absolute reality with a universally valid moral system. For relativists, reality only exists in human knowledge and reality as an object of knowledge is relative to the knowing subject. According to relativism, the absolute can only be located outside the human experience; it is essentially unreachable for human knowledge and therefore also unknowable (Gowans, 2012:1).

Salvationist: The word ‘salvationist’ is used in this study in the sense that people regard their own religion as the only true religion, and that to attain salvation and everlasting life, they are obliged to believe in and act in accordance with this one religion only.

Self: The ‘self’ is referred to in this study as a person’s essential being that differentiates such a person from others, especially considered as the object of self-examination or self-reflection.

Theory of knowledge: Refer to Epistemology/Epistemological understanding.

Tolerance: Irrespective of how I refer to the nature and essential features of tolerance in Chapter 3, my readers should understand that I regard tolerance – in a general sense – as the willingness to tolerate, abide with, endure, different opinions or behaviour that one might otherwise dislike or disagree with as a result of one’s own life- and worldview.

1.4 The intellectual conundrum in light of the relevant literature

Why tolerate religion? This is the title of one of Brain Leiter's (2012) book. It addresses one of the most enduring puzzles in political and religious philosophy: why should religion be tolerated while other obligations of conscience are not? This question also begs at least the following sub-questions:

- What is the relationship between religion and religiousness?
- What is the relationship between religion and religiosity?
- What is the relationship between religion, religiousness, religiosity and the adjectival qualifier *religious* (as in *religious tolerance*)?

To answer these questions, one could start by noticing the relevance of this theme as it was emphasised by the events of September 11th 2001, which triggered two predominantly academic debates. On the one hand there are scholars such as Pape (2005) and Goodin (2006) who stress the political dimensions of Al Qaeda's conflict with the United States by explaining Islamic suicide bombing in purely political terms. On the other hand, scholars such as Stern (2003) and Ignatieff (2004) stress the influence of religion in society. It is this last aspect, the influence of religion in society, which is central to my study. Ignatieff (2004) stresses the role that religion, and especially salvific religion, plays in acts of terrorism. Ignatieff (2004:124) argues that political violence could obviously inspire acts of terrorism, but when it comes down to performing the act itself, political violence becomes subservient to personal motives.

From the body of scholarship it became obvious that there can be a direct relation between religion, on the one hand, and the religious behaviour on the other, which might include violence, intolerance and persecution with regard to the other (Allport and Kramer 1946; Rosenblith 1949; Stouffer 1955; Fislinger 1976; Mendus 2008; Powell and Clarke 2013). For purposes of this study I understand religion mainly as some or other belief system. Religiousness and religiosity, including religious tolerance, I regard as human behaviour that results from a particular belief system (Potgieter, Van der Walt and Wolhuter, 2014:2). For purposes of this thesis I will not go into any further detail regarding the ontology and range of semantic values with respect to the nouns religiousness and religiosity, and the adjectival qualifier religious.

Mendus draws attention to the close historical and conceptual relationship that religious belief has with violence. She concludes by saying: 'salvationist religion is the place at which defences of toleration meet their Waterloo' (Mendus, 2008:16). According to her, diversity and autonomy of religion are often irrelevant for those religious believers who regard salvation as of pivotal/crucial importance. What matters for salvationist believers is that they attain life

everlasting, and, in order to achieve this, they should possess the correct set of beliefs and on live their lives as is pleasing to their God. So, even if the general problem of tolerance can be partly addressed and alleviated by an appeal to diversity and autonomy, the specific problem of religious tolerance cannot - at any rate, not once religion has been granted a salvationist character. Mendus (2008:16) further argues that when religion takes a salvationist form, it carries within itself the propensity to lead to acts of violence, persecution and intolerance. A vast amount of literature exists on the relationship between religion and intolerance, urging religious believers and especially salvationist religious believers, such as those who belong to and choose to work in mono-religious higher education institutions, to provide answers with regard to their understanding of religious tolerance. One of the aims of my research was to understand how salvationist religious believers conceptualise religious tolerance and why they do so.

Agnostics and neo-atheists such as Harris (2004), Dennett (2006), Dawkins (2006) and Hitchens (2007) have launched a major polemic attack on religion: according to Powell and Clarke (2013:2), they take it for granted that religion is the fundamental cause of terrorism. Theistic polemicists such as D'Souza (2007), Garrison (2007) and Haught (2008), disagree. According to Powell and Clarke (2013:3) these debates 'left us with a chorus of voices urging Christians not to tolerate Islam, Muslims not to tolerate 'the West', and atheists not to tolerate religion.' These debates emphasise the importance of research about tolerance and particularly about issues relating to religious tolerance.

My study is, however, not concerned with 'who is to blame for what?' Instead, it is about how religious tolerance may best be conceptually understood. I specifically chose a conceptual mode of reasoning,⁵ because the verb *conceptualising* and related terms (concept, conceptualise, conceptualisation) capture the notion of the semantic journey of the researcher from engaging with, exploring, understanding, and explaining, to the eventual development of guidelines for a praxis of religious tolerance. On the one hand *conceptualising* is synonymous with understanding (Afdal, 2006:38), and on the other, it denotes 'an abstract notion or idea' (Webster, 2003:270), which could metaphorically be described as a brick in the wall that constructs a theory. The same conceptual 'bricks' can be used to engage with, explore, explain, understand and construct different theories. For the purposes of this study the phrase '...conceptualise religious tolerance...' is used in the latter sense, as an abstract notion or idea.

⁵For my research design I chose a case study. According to Mouton (2003:150) in case studies a conceptual mode of reasoning usually forms the proverbial golden thread that seeks to connect certain 'general ideas' and 'expectations'. As such, a conceptual mode of reasoning guides the empirical research. I followed the same *modus operandi* in the case of my own study.

There is hardly any concept more complex and controversial in modern political thought than that of religious tolerance, as the increase in literature on the concept of religious tolerance demonstrates (Sardoc, 2010:6). The growing interest in the theoretical understanding of religious tolerance makes it particularly hazardous for analysts of tolerance, because common theoretical ground and scholarly compromise seem all the more difficult to achieve. According to Collins (2009:609), the expanding collection of work on religious tolerance is in need of 'professional historians', who can reconstruct the work that has been done with regard to 'certain content and substance'. By reconstructing religious tolerance theories in terms of their historical development, major theories could be identified, making it easier to understand which theories are original and innovative and which theories are essentially little more than old wine in new skins: warmed-up existing theories applied in new contexts. It stands to reason that my study should also contribute in this regard by placing religious tolerance in its historical context.

Historically, many scholars regard the Enlightenment as the birth of religious tolerance, but it is the major work by Israel (2001), *Radical Enlightenment*, which gave religious tolerance its thematic and chronological place with reference to the Enlightenment. The reason for regarding the Enlightenment as the birth of religious tolerance was that medieval and early modern Europeans were typically intolerant of different religious practices (Collins, 2009:625). According to Powell and Clarke (2013:7-8), the incentive for the shift to a culture of tolerance in the late 17th and early 18th centuries may be found in a collective reaction to the bitter religious wars between the Catholics and the Protestants during the 16th and early 17th centuries. Most scholars therefore revert to the Reformation and Enlightenment for answers about the origin of religious tolerance.

The German language first borrowed the word 'Toleranz' – or tolerance – from Latin and French, in the 16th century (Krug, 1832:632). This explains why, in the context of the Reformation, the concept of *religious tolerance* immediately took on the semantic value of indiscriminate approval of other religious confessions (Habermas, 2004:5). According to Habermas (2004:5), religious tolerance became a legal concept in the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, when governments issued tolerance edicts that compelled state officials and the population to be tolerant in their behaviour toward religious minorities, such as the *Edict of Nantes*, issued in 1598 by Henry IV of France. The controversies of that period and their concomitant underlying thoughts on, and practices with regard to, religious tolerance set the platform for modern liberalism (Rawls, 2005:10).

Israel (2001:2) and Marshall (2006:1) claim that religious tolerance constitutes the central (pivotal) value of the Enlightenment. According to Powell and Clarke (2013:5), many scholars consequently attempt to justify the association of the value of religious tolerance with that of

liberalism, referencing mainly the work of three seminal scholars, namely: John Locke (1689/1963), Pierre Bayle (1685/1987) and John Stuart Mill (1859/1974). The major theoretical strands that continue to underpin our current understanding of religious tolerance could be drawn from these philosophers. I briefly refer to these strands in the next paragraph.

Collins (2009:630) summarises the Enlightenment's commitment to tolerance in terms of three theoretical strands: rationality, universalism and progress. Firstly, rationality as a foundation for understanding religious tolerance can be understood with reference to Locke's argument for religious tolerance, especially on the grounds of his 'argument from ignorance'. According to Locke, the magistrate is a person just like any other person, fully capable of error, and because of this, religious persecution is ineffective and therefore irrational (Locke, 1824:25). By limiting the magistrate to civil matters, Locke suggests religious pluralism, by which religion and aspects of salvation become individual concerns which could be freely debated, preached, taught and instructed (Locke, 1824:475). Many modern theories of tolerance have either drawn on Locke's liberal theory of rationality or on present opposing points of view, such as positive pluralism (Beneke, 2006), public reason theory (Rawls, 2005), recognition theories (Galeotti, 2002 and Laegaard, 2008) and rational motivation theories (Muldoon, *et al.*, 2012).

Secondly, universalism as a theoretical foundation of religious tolerance could be understood from the Millian argument that there is a 'right to religious freedom'. Mill substantiates this right by an appeal to the value of individual autonomy (Powell and Clarke, 2013:5). According to Christman (2011:1) the idea of individual autonomy refers to the human capacity to be one's own person, and to live one's life according to one's own reasons and motives. Individual autonomy is granted fundamental status in Mill's version of utilitarian liberalism (Mill, 1974:ch. III), where he also suggests the 'harm principle' as a guide to comprehending the appropriate limits of tolerance. Many modern theories of tolerance have either drawn on Mill's liberal theory of universalism, or on current opposing theories, such as religious freedom and pluralism (Kymlicka, 1992), moral neutrality (Zagorin, 2003), religious plurality (van Eijnatten, 2003), universalism (Marshall, 2006), multiculturalism (Wokler, 1999), autonomy theory (Rawls 2005), religious diversity (Dastmalchian, 2013) as well as on moral theories such as moral convergence and moral compromise theories (Nagel, 1987).

Thirdly, process as a theoretical underpinning of religious tolerance could be understood from Bayle's appeal for epistemic uncertainty. Bayle argues that religious believers should allow, on the basis of their conscience, for the possibility that their own religious beliefs might be false and that those of their various rivals might be true. They ought to tolerate religious beliefs, which might possibly be true, since they ought to be interested in discovering and respecting religious truth (Powell and Clarke, 2013:6). Many modern theories of tolerance have either drawn on

Bayle's liberal theory of process, or on current opposing theories, such as coexistence theories (Kaplan 2009), conscience theories (Murphy, 2003), respect theories (Leiter, 2010), quest theories (Batson, *et al.*, 2008) and truth theories (Lynch, 2009).

The above three theoretical strands mentioned by Collins (2009:630): rationality, universalism and progress, could be considered to be captured by Zagorin's (2003:7) principle of tolerance...

'...society and state should, as a matter of right, extend complete freedom of religious belief and expression to all their members and citizens, and should refrain from imposing any religious tests, doctrines, or forms of worship or religious association upon them.'

Many scholars use Zagorin's principle of tolerance as the basis for understanding religious tolerance. This broad, liberal principle of and for tolerance can, however, not be fully understood without comprehending something of the liberal debate about the 'limits of tolerance' (Gorham, 2011:104). As Powell and Clarke (2013:6) explains, not everyone who argues for tolerance of sexual diversity, wants to extend tolerance to include paedophilia. Likewise, those who argue for freedom of religion often draw the line at 'sects' who might sacrifice animals or perhaps even human beings. The theory that deals with the 'limits of tolerance' was also investigated in my study of mono-religious higher education institutions, because I believe it captures the dogmatic and ethical coordinates of religious believers' final vocabulary and belief-related stances of conviction that often seem to form the backdrop to acts of religious intolerance. By understanding a mono-religious education institution's limits of religious tolerance, I was able to focus in my study on the reason and theories for such limits, which in turn assisted me in conceptualising a theory on how such limits could best be overcome.

The one-sided look at the Enlightenment and the quest for answers concerning tolerance brought about a theoretical interest in the subject, mostly by philosophers and political theorists. Their theoretical work is largely examined through the lens of current political debates. According to Collins (2009:608), such studies tend to produce works that, although often insightful, are more often than not one-sided. Disciplinary particularity has thus, to some extent, blunted the critical capacities and, to a greater extent, limited the potential audience and relevance of much of the most recent historical work on religious tolerance. As Forst (2008:79) points out, tolerance is a normatively dependent concept, one that is in need of other independent normative resources. In studying religious tolerance, the most recent scientific data from various scientific fields of interest (together with some of their sub-disciplines) such as Theology (Religion, Missiology), Social Sciences (Education, Philosophy, Politics) as well as various health sciences (Psychology, Psychiatry – e.g. cognitive bias theory; theory-of-mind, etcetera), have also been effectively explored in order to engage with, explore, explain and understand religious tolerance.

My study focused principally on the understanding of religious tolerance in a mono-religious education institution within a diverse, contemporary, multi-cultural and multi-religious society. Scholars such as Enns (2005) and Van der Walt (2013) support mono-religious education and maintain that tolerance might, in fact, constitute the centre principle of mono-religious higher education institutions. Despite the fact that the work of these two scholars seems to contradict the conclusion reached by, for example, Mendus (2008), Enns (2005:28) explains that real tolerance should be grounded in faith. He does, however, admit that faith *per se*, does not promote unlimited tolerance. Van der Walt (2013:76) also grounds tolerance in his faith as a Christian scholar and discusses 'the intolerance of the so-called secular tolerance'. Van der Walt (2013:74) distinguishes between at least two kinds of education-related tolerance: tolerance for mono-religious education and tolerance for secular education.

The literature also revealed a distinction between two groups of scholars: On the one hand, there are scholars such as Ringenberg (2006), Craig and Gould (2007), Shorten (2010) and Van der Walt (2013), who discuss the importance of developing the common identity of a particular institution and consequently object to preference being granted to multiculturalism and multi-religiosity. On the other hand, scholars such as Kazanjian (2000), Jarvis (2009), de Freitas (2011) and Wapu (2011), suggest a change in identity from a mono-religious approach to a multi-religious approach. Wapu (2011:22), for example, argues that a mono-religious approach makes it difficult for teachers or lecturers to be effectively and efficiently religiously tolerant. These two different notions, with regard to the identity of mono-religious higher education institutions, emphasise the scientific need to determine theoretically the nature and essential features of mono-religious higher education institutions, which I address in Chapter 4 of my thesis.

Both these groups of scholars agree on the importance of tolerance, yet they disagree with respect to its supposed ontic status. My method of working with the conceptualisation of religious tolerance was to theorise 'religious tolerance' at a high(er) level of abstraction; after which I drew the implications from such theorising for the development of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions.

The first phase of my research project was to review the body of scholarship by gathering information on such praxis in and for mono-religious higher education institutions. To obtain the most relevant literature sources by means of literature scooping, I chiefly accessed electronic databases via the Internet from libraries across the world, including the following: NEXUS, GKPV, RSAT, EBSCOHost (ERIC & Academic Search Premier), the Internet Public Library (www.ipl.org), JSTOR, ScienceDirect, AlltheWeb and Sabinet. I furthermore accessed renowned philosophy of education and religion journals, such as: *Sociology of Religion*, the

British Journal of Sociology of Education, the International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, the Journal of Moral Education, Studies in Philosophy and Education, the Journal of Beliefs & Values: Studies in Religion & Education, the Journal of Philosophy of Education and Education Philosophy and Theory.

1.5 Research Questions

My research questions arising from the discussion and the review of the body of scholarship were the following:

- Question 1: What are the nature and essential features of religion?
- Question 2: What are the nature and essential features of religious tolerance?
- Question 3: What are the nature and essential features of mono-religious higher education institutions and how does a particular salvationist, mono-religious higher education institution conceptualise and operationalise religious tolerance theories?
- Question 4: What guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis could be drafted for mono-religious higher education institutions, and why?

1.6 Purpose of the research

From the above research questions it should be clear that the purpose of the research was to engage with, explore, explain and understand the phenomenon of religious tolerance, and to develop guidelines for religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions. From the purpose of research, the following four aims were deduced:

- Research aim 1: To determine theoretically the nature and essential features of religion.
- Research aim 2: To determine theoretically the nature and essential features of religious tolerance.
- Research aim 3: To determine theoretically the nature and essential characteristics of a mono-religious educational institution and how it conceptualises and operationalises religious tolerance.
- Research aim 4: To conceptualise and draft guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions.

In attempting to achieve these aims, the following research design and associated methodology guided the research.

1.7 Research design and methodology

According to Mouton (2003:55), a research design is the plan or blueprint of how one intends to conduct one's research. The research design focuses on the end product, what kind of study is being planned and what kind of result is being aimed for. The following conceptual framework summarises my research design.




Figure 1:1 Illustration of the research design

1.7.1 Epistemological paradigm underpinning my research design

In my study I wanted to understand the phenomenon of religious tolerance and relate it to the context of a specific mono-religious education institution (which, in the case of this study, is AROS). Gadamer (1976:117) explains that the process of understanding a phenomenon such as, in this case, religious tolerance, entails constantly moving from the whole to the parts and back to the whole again. He refers to this hermeneutic relationship as an iterative, circular process (Gadamer, 1976:117). This circular process can be used to understand a phenomenon in terms of the human interaction that takes place within a specific social context; thus explaining why I elected to frame my research epistemologically within the interpretivist paradigm.

The said paradigm attempts to understand particular phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them in, during, and with regard to their lived experiences and perceptions

(Mertens, 2014:12). The interpretivist questions the existence of an objective reality, because reality is not a single, fixed, objective phenomenon waiting to be discovered. Instead, reality is holistic, ever changing and multidimensional (Merriam, 1998:202). Working within the interpretivist paradigm, my study relied heavily on my personal insights and concomitant descriptions of the reality of and with regard to the particular case that I wanted to study. Hence, it needed to be systematic, yet not restricted to a rigid, prescriptive framework. My personal disposition towards reflective thinking enabled me to gain an understanding of the lived experiences and perceptions of the participants within their unique contexts. Reflective thinking also helped me to evaluate my own work critically, which in turn enabled me to theorise relevant issues at a high(er) level of abstraction.

1.7.2 Research design and methodology

According to Bertram & Christiansen (2014:25), the interpretivist paradigm provides the primary foundation and anchor for qualitative research methods. Qualitative research refers to a broad class of empirical procedures designed to describe and interpret the experiences and perceptions of research participants in a specific social context. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010:135), all qualitative research approaches have two characteristics. Firstly, they involve studying those phenomena in their complexity and secondly, they focus on what occurs in social settings. Both these characteristics of qualitative research design enabled me to study the phenomenon of religious tolerance in all its complexities and also in the specific social setting of a mono-religious education institution (AROS). This justifies my choice of a qualitative research design.

Creswell (2013) identified the following five methodological traditions that could be employed to help design qualitative research: biography, grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenology and case study. I chose the case study design for my own study. The reason for doing so is that AROS represents a specific mono-religious education institution; consequently, AROS presumes and implies various education-related role-players and stakeholders. This institution also displays a definite social context that is set within specific parameters of what Merriam (1998:27) refers to as a 'bounded system'. The unique strength of a case study lies, therefore, in the in-depth data that it has the potential to generate. This data generation suggests multiple sources of information that are rich in content and scope and include, for example, documents, archival records and interviews (De Vos *et al.*, 2013:272).

1.7.3 Site or social network selection

According to De Vos *et al.* (2013:278), a researcher is compelled to identify a site that maximises the opportunity to engage in the most meaningful manner with the research problem that has been identified. I selected the private education institution AROS as the site where I would

conduct my study. The reason for choosing AROS as site to conduct my study is because AROS is a recently state-accredited, private, self-funded, higher education institution in Pretoria, South Africa. This means that AROS had to conform to all the necessary state regulations and requirements in order to receive state accreditation; for example acknowledging and adhering to the constitutional imperative with regard to respecting freedom of religion (Constitution of South Africa 1996, Ch.2, par. 15). Although AROS accepts students from any religious background to study at AROS towards the bachelor's degree programme that it offers, AROS, the institution, remains an essentially mono-religious education institution with a particular salvationist religious ethos. Before students register at AROS, they are briefed that they will receive Christian-reformational instruction and education during their studies. As mentioned above, it is exceptionally difficult to understand how salvationist religious believers, such as those at AROS, could view tolerance as a moral principle (to name but one example). For that reason, AROS' salvationist religious position maximised my opportunity to engage in the research problem which I had formulated.

Another reason for choosing AROS is because, as explained, I am a lecturer at AROS, lecturing Religious Studies and Christian Biblical Studies to a religiously diverse student body. The issues concerning religious tolerance represent essential academic and scientific components in both these subjects and as the designated lecturer I feel neither adequately trained, nor suitably equipped, at this juncture, to deal with these issues in a manner that could be deemed to be pedagogically justifiable and beyond moral and (and-)gogic reproach. By studying AROS' understanding and operationalisation of the phenomenon of religious tolerance, I have been able to develop guidelines for religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions.

1.7.4 Researcher's role

As the researcher, I spent time in the field, listening, asking, observing and reading. I also interpreted the events, activities and conversations and thereby constructed my own understanding of religious tolerance. I also explained my own bias in as far as it could contaminate my own, personal understanding and subsequent interpretation and conceptualisation of religious tolerance (cf. Rossman and Rallis, 2003:337).

As researcher, my own social positioning as an Afrikaans speaking lecturer at AROS was also considered. The same applies to my limitations in terms of being located in a specific geographic space-time or, as Miller (2003:62-63) suggests, being immersed in circumstantial and pluralistic realities. It was, therefore, my responsibility as a social researcher to exploit the phenomenon of religious tolerance to its full potential by spending considerable time in the field and studying and investigating as many data sources related to the specific theme as possible.

My role as researcher is evident in all the research activities, both as the researcher and as the facilitator of all activities related to the research. I was the primary instrument of data generation and theory development (Merriam, 1998:17; 20).

I was responsible for obtaining permission from all relevant stakeholders to conduct the research, and had to adhere to all relevant ethical research principles. I had to conduct the interviews and facilitate the focus groups, analyse, conceptualise and theorise all the recorded data, and finally develop guidelines for religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions.

I consulted with colleagues from my faculty whenever I was interpreting the qualitative data that were generated during interviews and focus group discussions. My initial findings were also discussed with my supervisor before being documented and finally submitted for evaluation.

1.7.5 Methods of data generation

In undertaking this research, I selected and subsequently employed document analysis and interviews to generate data. The document analysis was divided into two groups: curriculum-related documentation, and official, national education policy-related documentation. The curriculum-related documentation refers, in this case, to AROS' own curricula for teachers' training, consisting mainly of study guides and recommended textbooks, learning outcomes and concomitant assessment criteria. The official, national education policy-related documentation comprises documents that are solicited, compiled and maintained on a continuous basis by government organisations, such as the Council on Higher Education (CHE) and the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) (De Vos *et al.*, 2013:317). These documents include the AROS Constitution, AROS State-accreditation documents, governmental documentation such as the South African Constitution, policies on the minimum requirements for teacher education qualifications (NQF), and the CHE's criteria for programme accreditation. I chose these documents because they include AROS' understanding of religion and why AROS is a mono-religious education institution. They also include and address the issue of minimum requirements for an education institution in South Africa, regarding religion and religious freedom.

Data were generated through semi-structured individual interviews, as well as through focus group interviews. Kavale (2007:207) defines qualitative interviews as 'attempts to understand the world from the participants' point of view, to unfold the meaning of people's experiences, and to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations.' Qualitative interviews allowed me to collect in-depth information about AROS' understanding, perceptions, knowledge, experiences, opinions and beliefs (cf. Anderson, 2004:109) about religious tolerance as a

phenomenon. The qualitative research data were captured through interviews, recording of data and field notes, as recommended by De Vos *et al.* (2013:298).

1.7.6 Participant selection (Sampling)

Seidman (2013:47) suggests the use of two criteria for determining 'enough' (i.e. the number of) participants, sufficiency of data and saturation of the topic. Firstly: sufficiency determines the number of participants needed to represent the population authentically, so that those who might fall outside the sample group, could be afforded the opportunity to connect to the experience of those who form part of the sample group. Secondly: saturation determines the point when the researcher begins to recognise the same information repeatedly and s/he no longer finds new information. In my research these two criteria, sufficiency and saturation, were used to determine the number of participants. Creswell (2013:156) notes that sampling may alter during a study and that researchers need to be flexible enough either to add to the overall number of participants, or to subtract from the number originally planned. Be that as it may, researchers need to plan ahead as much as possible as far as their sampling strategy is concerned.

Purposive sampling was used to determine the participants for my study. In purposive sampling, particular participants are chosen because they best illustrate or represent some or other feature that might be of interest for the particular study (De Vos *et al.*, 2013:329). For my study I chose three different groups of participants: the Executive Directors of AROS, Lecturers at AROS and the Representative Student Council of AROS. The reason for choosing these groups of participants was that, although they are all related to AROS in some hierarchical, managerial manner, they all fulfil different, yet vital roles needed to help me generate relevant data (De Vos *et al.*, 2013:329), which I elaborate on in the following paragraph.

As stated, the study population for the empirical stage of my research consisted of three groups:

- The three (3) Executive Directors of AROS: Three individual semi-structured interviews were used to interview the executive directors of AROS. The participants were selected because these three participants are the original founders of AROS and because they helped to get AROS accredited as a mono-religious education institution. The Executive Directors are also representative of the highest form of authority at AROS. Through the recruitment and subsequent appointment of members of staff, they not only determine, but also help to maintain the particular, distinctly mono-religious and salvationist ethos and educational character of AROS. My interviews with the Directors formed an important part of my empirical study, because they provided me with a good window

onto, and indication of, AROS' hegemonic and organisational attitude towards other religions (cf. par. 6.5.2).

- The six (6) AROS Lecturers: Individual, semi-structured interviews were employed to interview all six of the fulltime AROS Lecturers (excluding myself). I decided to approach all six of these Lecturers because each one of them teaches students who come from different cultural and religious backgrounds, and they do so in different subject and classroom contexts.
- The six (6) students on the AROS Representative Student Council: A focus group interview was used to interview the entire AROS Student Council. The reason for using a focus group interview was because focus groups endorse and encourage self-disclosure among participants. Focus groups are also used when multiple viewpoints or responses are needed on a specific topic (Krueger and Casey, 2000:7). I wanted to understand the multiple viewpoints or responses to religious tolerance, consequently I decided to listen to the voices and lived experiences of the members of the AROS Representative Student Council. They are, after all, the recipients of the teaching-learning endeavours that AROS offers. The AROS Representative Student Council is democratically selected by all the students to represent them. A focus group interview with AROS Representative Student Council assisted me to engage with, explore and understand some of the major issues that the students experience with regard to religious tolerance while studying at AROS.

1.7.7 Data analysis strategies

Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of generated data. De Vos *et al.* (2013:333) describes it as 'a messy, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative and fascinating process.' There is no single correct way to analyse data in a qualitative study, but my approach was to make use of Creswell's (2013:199) data analysis spiral, as well as Tracy's (2013: 218) iterative analysis process. This meant that I examined the data several times, utilising mainly the following steps:

- Organising the data: The data were organised with the use of a computer software program, Atlas.ti™ (described in the following paragraph). This enabled me to break large bodies of text into smaller units.
- Perusing the data: To get a sense of the whole data set, it was necessary for me to peruse the entire data set several times. In perusing the data I wrote different memos with categories for and interpretations of religious tolerance.

- Categorisation of data: At this point I was able to gain a general sense of the diverse themes in my study as well as subcategories or subthemes, allowing me to sense what the data might mean.
- Integrating and summarising data: At this stage I started to describe relationships among the categories, packaging the data into organisational schemes or offering certain propositions for developing guidelines for religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions.
- To reiterate: these four steps were conducted by using a computer software program for qualitative analysis: Atlas.ti™. This program assisted me in managing the data. The main form of analysis that I used was coding. Codes are considered 'tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study' (Miles and Huberman, 2013:56). Atlas.ti™ allows for three types of codes: open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Afdal, 2006:35).
- Open coding is the part of analysis that pertains specifically to the naming and categorising of phenomena through close examination of data. The open coding assisted me to identify and label concepts from raw data such as, for example, the transcriptions of the individual interviews, transcriptions of the focus group interviews, as well as all the field notes that I had collected at that stage. I also used open coding to identify categories and subcategories (De Vos *et al.*, 2013:341) related to religious tolerance.
- Axial coding is defined as a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories. Axial coding puts those data back together in new ways by making connections between a category and its subcategories to ensure the capturing of data about the conditions that gave rise to religious tolerance, and an understanding of the context of, in this case, AROS as mono-religious education institution (De Vos *et al.*, 2013:343).
- Selective coding further enhanced my understanding through the scanning of classified data with a view to identifying similarities and differences in and among the identified categories in order to develop a storyline that describes what happens in contexts where religious tolerance might be experienced (cf. De Vos *et al.*, 2013:343).

1.7.8 Anticipated research problems

At the outset, I wish to share some anticipated limitations to my study. One of my concerns was that AROS, as a recently accredited, private education institution, has not really had time to

consider all the education and concomitant curriculum-related issues with regard to religious tolerance. I thought that this might restrict the amount of data that I would otherwise have been able to generate from the document analysis and interviews of another institution. However, this anticipated limitation effectively assisted me to generate more relevant and wide-ranging data, because the institution does not yet seem to have a fixed concept of religious tolerance.

Another research problem I anticipated was the fact that I am an employee of AROS. I thought that being an employee of AROS might influence the objectivity of my study, as I am researching the institution for which I am working as a case study. In an effort to limit this problem, I asked my supervisor as well as another student (specialising in a similar field of research) to peer-review my research design, methodology and research questions, the latter which were then used to interview my participants. Despite these constraints, I am confident that I have been able to produce a thesis that will be assessed and evaluated as being acceptable to the contemporary academic community. On the other hand, being an employee of AROS gave me the opportunity to generate the maximum amount of relevant data.

1.8 Organisation of the thesis

Chapter 1: Orientation

Chapter 2: The nature and essential features of religion.

Chapter 3: The nature and essential features of religious tolerance.

Chapter 4: Nature and essential characteristics of a mono-religious educational institution and how it conceptualises and operationalises religious tolerance

Chapter 5: Research methodology

Chapter 6: Results and discussion of the data analysis

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Chapter 2: The nature and essential features of religion

2.1 Introduction

Antes (2012:2) visited various bookshops to see what was available in the Religion section. The conclusion to which he came was that the same books could be found in different sections. 'One may find poems of the Persian mystic Rumi under *Religion* or *Islamic mysticism*, as well as under *Literature* or *Poetry*.' The diverse thinking on religion leads to a somewhat vague understanding of the word 'religion'. How do we know what religion is, and what measures do we use to engage with, explore, understand and explain it?

Different understandings of religion or, as Dastmalchian (2013:298) calls it, 'religious diversity' comprise a key topic in contemporary philosophy of religion. The reason for this is that religious diversity leads to religious intolerance (Mendus, 2008:4). This is self-evident as one is not intolerant towards something that one agrees with, but differences in religion create a need for religious tolerance. Mendus (2008:5), for example, concludes that 'disapproval is central to tolerance'.

In my investigation into the nature and essential features of religion, this study considered the etymological development of the word; and on this basis, consequently, the historical development of scholars' reflection on religion, as captured in the philosophy of religion. Lastly, I conclude by demonstrating that a key aspect to understanding the nature and essential features of religion lies in a person's or group's life- and worldview, and emanating from that, a person's or group's theory of knowledge (epistemological understanding) as far as religion is concerned. From my reading of Van der Walt (1999:52) I was able to identify two 'extreme' theories of knowledge with regard to religion, viz.: absolutism and relativism. I propose that these two extreme theories form the boundaries of all other theories of knowledge. The intention of this chapter was not to single out any one definition of (or for) religion which can be deemed relevant for all religions, as suggested in Clouser's (2006:6-20) discussion of religion. Instead, it attempts to highlight the nature and essential features which cause the differences in our scholarly attempts to understand the concept of religion. This makes it easier to grasp what causes different understandings of religion (i.e. religious diversity). The following figure (Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework of literature study, highlighting Chapter 2) represents the conceptual framework of my entire literature study and clearly illustrates the aim of this chapter (Chapter 2).




Figure 2:1 Conceptual framework of literature study, highlighting Chapter 2

2.2 Historical overview

2.2.1 Etymology of religion

In a bid to engage with, explore, understand and explain religion,⁶ many writers resort to the etymology of the word. This has, however, been controversial since ancient times. In the third century AD, the church father Lactantius, for example, explained why his etymological use of the word 'religion' should be used in preference to that of Cicero. This was a courageous move by Lactantius, since it was Cicero who had introduced the main schools of Greek philosophy to the Romans, and he can also be described as the father of Latin philosophical language usage (Conte 1994:199).

This study examines just three of the more scholarly lines of reflection with regard to the etymology of religion. On the basis of the history of religion, I then expand on each of these

⁶De Muckadell (2014) in his article 'On Essentialism and Real Definitions of Religion' counter the notion that a real definition of religion should be avoided within the study of religion. He argue that definitions of religion would be a valuable tool, academically and practically. Although we live in a postmodern society, scholarly attempts at formulating definitions of and for religion are still as relevant as about fifty years ago. In my own study, definitions of and for religion serve as important contributions towards our collective understanding of all the relevant epistemological groundings behind such definitions. For further studies regarding the formulation of definitions of and for religion, refer to Zucca (2014) and Kenny (2014).

three lines with reference to the scholarly reflection of some classical scholars. Haring (1964) examines the etymology of religion in terms of three Latin words: *relegere* (to unite in our thoughts, to take note of or to be aware of), *ligare* (to bind) and *religio* (to have a relationship in the sense of religion). I classify these three main lines of scholarly reflection on religion in terms of the scholars who first introduced them, namely: Cicero, Lactantius and Augustine.

Cicero derived the word religion from the Latin word *relegere*, which means 'to unite in our thoughts', 'to take note of' or 'to be aware of'. For example, Cicero (1850 ed. by Schoemann, II, 28:72) wrote: 'Those who carefully took in hand all things pertaining to the gods were called religious...'⁷ According to Kagema (2014:47), the root word of *relegere* is *leg* or *lig*, which means 'to be aware of', and is derived from the Greek word *alegein*, which means 'to pay attention'. We can summarise Cicero's conceptualisation of religion as 'awareness of the divine' or 'paying attention to the divine'.

Cicero's conceptualisation came strongly to the fore in the 19th and 20th centuries. Müller's conceptualisation of religion (1873:13-14) was in accordance with that of Cicero in that he referred to a faith-based faculty that is present in every person. Müller referred to this faculty as something independent of any sense organs or cognitive faculties that make the individual aware of a divinity. 'Without such a faculty, no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetishes, would be possible.' (Müller, 1873:14). In Müller (1873:14) we do, however, find an additional aspect, namely that he links religion to the Greek word for human, *anthropos* which, according to Müller, means 'he who looks upward'. According to Müller, it is awareness of the divine that makes human beings human. These thoughts on religion are prominent throughout the 20th century among academics such as Bouquet (1941), Feuerbach (1957), Brown (1965), Kasiera (1990) and, more recently, Kagema (2014).

As opposed to Cicero's conceptualisation of religion as an awareness of the divine, Lactantius derived religion from the word *ligare* (to bind). Lactantius wrote, for example: 'We are tied to God and bound to Him by the bond of piety, and not, as Cicero holds, from careful consideration that religion has received its name.'⁸ (*Institutes Divinae*, 1973: IV,28). In line with Lactantius, Thomas of Aquino offers a summary of the Latin tradition on religion, and then comes to the conclusion that religion should be understood within the etymology of *ligare* (to bind) (*Summa Theologica*, 1856:2;2,81).

⁷ 'Qui Omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter pertractarent, et tamquam relegerent, sunt dicitur religiosi ex relegendo...'

⁸ 'Credo nomen religionis a vincula pietatis esse ductum, quod hominem sibi Deus religaverit et pietatis constrinxerit ... melius ergo (quam Cicero) id nomen Lucretius interpretatus est, qui ait religionum se nodos exsolvere.'

In the 20th century the conceptualisation of religion as *ligare* (to bind) was supported by Aiken (1911:30), who prefers *ligare* to *relegere*. He observed: 'A far more likely derivation, one that suits the idea of religion in its simple beginning, is that given by Lactantius.' According to Aiken (1911:32), the criticism is that religion could not have developed from *ligare*. A verb from the first conjugation is not valid because, for example, *opinio* developed from *opinari* and *rebellio* from *rebellare*. More recently, we see that Omoregbe also understands religion as stemming from the basic *ligare*: '...the etymology of the word 'religion' shows that it is essentially a relationship, a link between human beings and divine beings...' (Omoregbe, 1993:5).

The confusion around the conceptualisation of religion is also discernible in the works of Augustine. In his dissertation on *True Faith* [388 AD], Augustine uses the same conceptualisation as Lactantius by arguing that religion should be understood as a bond to the divine. Augustine says, for example: 'Religion binds us to the one Almighty God.'⁹ (*De Vera Religione*, 1841: I; 55; 113) Later, in his book *The City of God*, Augustine explains (2004:X;1) that the Latin word *religio* should be understood with reference to the Greek word *thrêskei*, which means 'religion' or 'worship'. In the 20th century, the notion that religion denotes the worshipping of a deity continues to persist. Merriam (1980:12) describes religion as 'the outward existence of God ... to whom obedience, service and honour are due.'

From the above, it is clearly difficult to determine the origin of the concept of religion from the etymology of the word, explaining the ongoing debate since ancient times. Three themes can, however, be highlighted as far as the thinking regarding the origins of religion is concerned:

- The tradition of Cicero, which understood religion as 'awareness of the divine', as being derived from the Latinate *relegere*.
- The tradition of Lactantius, which understood religion as the 'bond to the divine', as derived from the Latinate *religare*.
- The tradition of Augustine, which understood religion as the 'worship of the divine', as derived from the Latinate *religio*, was most probably borrowed and subsequently translated from the Greek word *thrêskei*.

According to Antes (2012:4) an etymological understanding of religion does not really bring one closer to a clear definition of or for religion. Instead, it emphasises the difficulty in arriving at some kind of universal definition of the concept. This is why I consider it more valuable to understand the reason behind different definitions or concepts of religion. The etymology of the word therefore merely helps us to identify the clear lines of development concerning religion.

⁹ 'Religet ergo nos religio uni omnipotenti Deo.'

This development of the etymology of the word 'religion', forms the basis of exploring the historical development of the concept of religion.

2.2.2 Historical development of the concept of religion

Historical studies of the concept religion fall within philosophy of religion as a field of study that consists of two core concepts: philosophy and religion. Both philosophy and religion investigate aspects such as intention, truth, value, reality, as well as human thought and conduct. Numerous complications arise in both of these fields regarding definitions of philosophy and religion and the implications for different fields of study, and even more so if they are combined in philosophy of religion. For example, one's respective understanding of philosophy and / or religion separately determines one's understanding of the philosophy of religion (Van der Walt, 2011:38).

As this chapter progresses, it becomes clear that the study of philosophy of religion is a modern field of study, and that this subdivision of philosophy (philosophy of religion) has increased in scope in the past decade. Many recent academic journals registered within the study field of philosophy of religion have made their debut in the past decade or so. Some of these journals are international, such as *Ars Disputandi* which commenced publication in 2001, the *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion* in 2008 and the *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion* in 2009. Many authors have also found the courage to write introductory textbooks on the philosophy of religion.

In comparing textbooks on the philosophy of religion, such as Zagzebski's *Philosophy of Religion: An Historical Introduction* (2007); Meister's *Introducing Philosophy of Religion* (2009); Oppy and Scott's *Reading Philosophy of Religion: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary* (2010); Stewart's *Exploring the Philosophy of Religion* (7th ed., 2010), Van der Walt's (2011) *Man and God: the Transforming Power of Biblical Religion* as well as Pojman and Rea's *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology* (6th ed., 2012), it is notable that each of them approaches the concept of religion from a historical point of view.

These books do not get underway with contemporary aspects of the philosophy of religion; all of them commence with an introductory historical review. Within such a review, the authors typically identify various important themes regarding the nature of religion and what various communities of faith teach. Although all of these textbooks acknowledge that philosophy of religion is a subdivision of philosophy that only originated in the 18th century, in their entirety they follow a historical approach commencing with the pre-Socratic era which segued into the Socratic period. The Middle Ages, leading into the Renaissance and Reformation periods, are also addressed. This historical view on religion is important for my own study's conceptualisation thereof.

The description below explains the basic framework used within the study of philosophy of religion to indicate how different epistemological approaches lead to different conceptualisations of religion. Firstly, the aim of this historical overview of religion is not to provide a critical evaluation of each conceptualisation of religion, but primarily to offer the reader a quick overview of the different conceptualisations of religion and how these developed throughout history and, secondly, to indicate the important relationship that exists between a person's or a group's¹⁰ (a) theory of knowledge and (b) conceptualisation of religion.

2.2.2.1 Pre-Socratic thinking

The above-mentioned three different etymological positions on religion serves as an academically justifiable basis for any authentic study of the historical works on religion, and I utilised them as a basis of the three ways in which the pre-Socratic philosophers regarded religion:

- as awareness of the divine,
- as being bound to the divine,
- as worship of the divine.

The first aspect, awareness of the divine, is reinforced by the distinction that philosophers such as Xenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno of Elea had drawn between the divine and the human. Xenophanes (570-478 BC), for example, was a poet and philosopher who attacked the traditional understanding of God as being identical with the cosmos. Xenophanes was particularly opposed to the anthropomorphism of the poets Homer and Hesiod (Fieser, 2012:I;D).¹¹ Anthropomorphism is the tendency to ascribe human qualities to non-human entities. The reason for Xenophanes' disagreement was his theory of knowledge (epistemology), which is still relevant today. He believed that something like the divine exists, but that the divine is not knowable (Leshner, 2001:102). From his theory of knowledge, Xenophanes created an awareness of the divine.

Secondly, being bound to the divine was promoted by scholars such as Anaxagoras and Archelaus. According to Jordan (2005:802) some pre-Socratic scholars who perceived the cosmos as the mechanical or physical origin of things, supported the idea of a bond between the divine and human beings. This perception of a divine bond was developed particularly by Anaxagoras (500-428 BC) who, through his epistemological belief that humans can reach

¹⁰ My critical evaluation of a mono-religious higher education institution's conceptualisation of religion and of religious tolerance will be detailed in Chapter four.

¹¹ 'Homer and Hesiod attributed to the gods all things which are disreputable and worthy of blame when done by men; and they told of them many lawless deeds, stealing, adultery, and deception of each other.' (Fairbanks, 1898:65)

understanding by beginning with sense experience, perceived the cosmos as a revolving circle bound to the divine intelligence (*nous*). In this way, the latter was believed to have been the primary cause of every mechanical change in the universe (Jordan, 2005:802). The third aspect among the pre-Socratic scholars was to experience and worship the divine. One philosopher who contributed to the thinking on worship was Aristophanes (446-386 BC). Through his theory of knowledge he sought to understand the divine through the experience that other people have gained during their own worship of the divine. Aristophanes attacked other believers for not worshipping the divine, and slated them as being non-religious (Jordan, 2005:802).

2.2.2.2 Socratic thinking

Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics converted the pre-Socratic thinking into fixed systems of thought that largely influenced later thinking on religion. In Plato's (427-347 BCE) reflection on religion, one can discern the pre-Socratic aspect of religion as worship. For example, in Plato's exposition of religion, he defends the traditional mythology as well as participation in community rituals. In his discussion with Phaedrus, he interprets the myth of Boreas and Orithyia not as naturalistic, but as divine (Plato [*Phaedrus*], 1925:229b-230a), and in his *Republic*, he also mentions that he attends religious festivals: 'I went down yesterday to Peiraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions to the Goddess, and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.' (Plato [*Republic*], 1987:327a). Plato rejects thoughts that cast doubt upon the divine and even spoke of a monotheistic god in his writings on the Olympic gods. His epistemology holds that, through worshipping the gods and learning about the innate ideas, knowledge, which is buried deep in the soul of man, is developed (Jordan, 2005:802).

Aristotle (384-322 BC) cultivated an awareness of the divine among his readers, but in his case, the divine was not bound to the cosmos (Walker, 1911:30). In his work, *Metaphysics*, Aristotle expounded the concept of a 'prime mover': 'And further, neither is it true that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes, but nothing continuously; for there is something which always moves that which is moved, and the 'prime mover' is itself unmoved.' (Aristotle, [*Met.*], 1989:4.1012b) Subsequent traditions utilised Aristotle's notion of the 'prime mover' of the cosmos as an argument for the existence of God, thereby inculcating among people an awareness of the divine (Taliaferro, 2011:25).¹² According to Aristotle (*Met*, 1989:12.1075b), however, it was not necessary to worship the prime mover; the cosmos was merely an instrument or expression of the divine intelligence, but was not bound to the divine intelligence.

¹² 'Theists employing the teleological argument will draw attention to the order and stability of the cosmos, the emergence of vegetative and animal life, the existence of consciousness, morality, rational agents and the like, in an effort to identify what might plausibly be seen as purposively explicable features of the cosmos' (Taliaferro, 2011:25).

The Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines were adopted in various schools of thought in ancient times. The doctrines of both Plato and Aristotle were included in the Stoic school of thought. The Stoics were particularly interested in the link between the physical and metaphysical (Jordan, 2005:803). They believed that the physical, the cosmos, was under the control of the divine intelligence that regulated all things. The Stoics equated the divine intelligence to the world soul (*logos*), which they also described as the divine providence (Jordan, 2005:804). The divine providence then controlled and managed the cosmos with mechanical precision. The divine intelligence, cosmos and man were bound to each other, but in a fatalistic manner. According to the Stoics it was not necessary to worship the divine (Frick, 1999:7-8).

2.2.2.3 *The revelational thinking of the Middle Ages*

Philosophical thinking on religion in the Middle Ages was largely influenced by Judaism, Christianity and later by Islam as well. According to Jordan (2005:803) the contributions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam to scholarly reflection on religion rest in their perceptions of divine revelation and their blending thereof with philosophical reflection on religion. Revelational scholars such as those found in Judaism, Christian and Islam, brought about a major shift in scholarly reflection on religion by utilising the works of the philosophers and blending them into their own arguments.

Philo, Augustine and Averroës are examples of such scholars. The Jewish scholar Philo (20 BC-50 AD) constructed a dogma that was in conflict with the philosophical systems of his time. Philo sought to reduce the hiatus between the Jews and the Greeks by blending the Judaic thinking based on their revelational scripture, the Torah, with Greek thinking (Frick, 1999:18). According to Johansen (1998:554) the Christian church father Augustine (354-430 AD) also used neo-Platonic terms to explain Christian dogma. The Islamist writer Averroës (1126-1198 AD)¹³, for example, blended the works of Aristotle with the revelational content of the Koran (Praamsma, 1979:303).

However, revelational reflection made it very difficult for these scholars to speak of a 'philosophy of religion'. When the revelational scholars referred to philosophers, they referred to them as people or groups reflecting and thinking about the divine, who had not received revelation(s) from the divine. The revelational scholars did not perceive their own works as philosophy, but as studies of the divine, because the reflection of the ancient philosophers was not in accordance with revelational thinking, whereas the revelational scholars founded their concepts and ideas about aspects such as epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, logic, ethics and

¹³ Usually known these days by his Muslim name, Ibn Rushd.

aesthetics on the basis of revelational books such as the Bible, the Torah and the Koran (Pojman, 2012:25).

2.2.2.4 The Reformation and the Renaissance

The 'Enlightenment' later made its appearance and sought to provide new light for the 'Dark Ages'. The 16th century characterised the end of Christian government which had held sway over the West for more than a millennium (500-1500 AD). The 16th century may also be characterised as the start of secularisation in the West. Much of the medieval thinking on revelation and philosophy spilt over to the Reformation and Renaissance. A wide variety of intellectual directions arose in this new era in Western culture, 'each of them seeking to offer stability and certainty to the European man [sic]' (Van der Walt, 2011:44).

Though the Reformation and the Renaissance were contemporaries in terms of their historical positioning (the 14th-16th centuries represent the timeframe during which their main philosophical concepts and ideas were being developed), they were not allies. Both broke with the mentality of synthesis and compromise. To those in the Reformation, Christianity's synthesis with ancient heathen faiths became unacceptable. Reformational scholars felt that the revelation of God did not come into its rightful place when it was blended with ancient faiths (Van der Walt, 2011:45). The under-emphasis of the biblical revelation by the Roman Catholic Church led to a Christian resistance movement that culminated in the Reformation. Reformational scholars such as Luther, Calvin and Zwingli were critical towards philosophical approaches to the divine. According to Van der Walt (2011:46), they regarded divine revelation as the basis for thought on the divine and religion. Partee (2005:15) avers that reformists such as Calvin acknowledged both truth and error in the works of the ancient philosophers. However, Calvin used divine revelation as the base from which to evaluate the ancient philosophers' concepts and ideas on philosophical matters (i.e. epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, logic, ethics and aesthetics).

The Reformists therefore did not seek their 'light' in the works of the Greek philosophers or the pagan faiths; they also did not follow the 'light' of their own intellects, nor the authority of the Pope. According to the Reformists, the 'light' that awarded knowledge and certainty came from the divine, by means of 'conversion' to God and his revelation. To the Reformists, absolute authority belonged to God, and his revelation provided the only knowledge or 'light'. For example, Calvin embarked upon his *Institutes* from the basis of his theory of knowledge – commencing with the biblical revelation of God (Calvin 1984, 1:1).

In the conflict between the Protestants and Roman Catholics, the subject of dialogue was the biblical revelation and innumerable points of Christian doctrine. According to Jordan (2005:804) this conflict restricted speculation on religion and reduced theology to a matter of laws. Also,

according to Jordan (2005:804), it largely led to a focusing on the field of theology, at the expense of investigation into other fields of knowledge.

On the other hand, scholars in the period of the Renaissance attempted to break with the mentality of synthesis because they could not tolerate the Christian and biblical elements that were prevalent in medieval thinking (Van der Walt, 2011:46). The Renaissance sought 'light' in a direction completely different from that of the Reformation. The forerunners of the Renaissance, the Humanists, went even further back than the Reformationists in their bid to find the 'new light'. They reverted to the scholars of ancient Greece and Rome (Van der Walt, 2011:47).

An important influence on Renaissance thinking concerning religion was that of the Stoics, especially Stoic scholars such as Cicero and Seneca (Van der Walt, 2011:47). Stoic thinking centred on human beings and their moral obligations, and also the 'back to nature' movement. This movement found its basis for laws pertaining to a moral life in two places – in nature and in the intellect of humankind. Stoic thinking held that man [sic] was his own lawgiver and highest authority (Van der Walt, 2011:48).

As opposed to Roman Catholic and Protestant scholars of the Middle Ages, the scientists of the Renaissance brought about fundamental changes in philosophic and religious thinking, achieving this by developing a new method for discovering knowledge, which included new epistemological developments. The early modern scientists of the Renaissance strongly emphasised observation and the formulation of a temporary hypothesis. This method of observation implied two results: firstly, traditional explanations of the behaviour of nature should be demonstrated empirically, and secondly, the notion that such explanations could be wrong, implying that new information could become available to scientists if they were able to penetrate the superficial appearances of things (Stumpf, 1982:209). Scholars started looking at the world with new awareness, and to improve their observations they invented scientific instruments, such as the microscope in 1590, the telescope in 1608 and the first air pump in 1650 (Stumpf, 1982:210).

These discoveries made great demands upon the church. In 1633, Galileo Galilei was charged with promoting heresy by proclaiming the Copernican teachings that the sun was the central point of our solar system, and that the earth orbited the sun. Following the execution of Galileo on 22 June 1633, scholars of philosophy became watchful about what they were saying (Machamer, 2012:4). Galileo had raised this matter as early as 1613 in his letter to Benedetto Castelli in which he explained that he also believed the Bible was the revealed text, but that two truths could not contradict each other (Galilei, 1854:283). By referring to two truths, Galileo was referring to God's written word, the Bible, but also to God's manifested word, the creation.

If there were apparent contradictions, either the Bible or the creation had been incorrectly interpreted, but they could not contradict each other.

According to Stumpf (1982:211), this new science influenced the development in philosophical thought in two ways. Firstly, nature was observable and formed part of a mechanical model, and even human thinking and human conduct could be explained in mechanical terms. Secondly, humanity's position in the universe had shifted as a consequence of Copernicus's new hypothesis, which placed the sun at the centre of our solar system, with the earth orbiting the sun.

This new school of thought regarding science had an immediate effect on the development of modern philosophy. One of the new developments was that of Rationalism, which had, to a lesser extent, been present in the early Stoicism. It was absorbed keenly by the Renaissance scholars and rapidly gained a leading position in the Western world (Van der Walt, 2011:47). René Descartes (1596-1650), the father of modern philosophy, attempted to do something that the philosophers of the Middle Ages, including Bacon and Hobbes, had tried: to devise and articulate a new concept of philosophy. Descartes, influenced by the progress and success of science and mathematics, attempted to articulate a new philosophy of accuracy or preciseness. Descartes (1996:5) saw philosophy as the road to certainty; more specifically, intellectual certainty which, he felt, could be devised and articulated only through the rational capacity of human understanding. At that point in time, the source of truth about man and the world was mainly determined by human understanding, according to him (Descartes, 1996:5).

Although Descartes did not reject the claims of religion and theology, he nevertheless searched for truth outside of supernatural revelation (Stumpf, 1982:227). Descartes revered theology, (it could have been either fear or true reverence), yet he failed to devise a method within theology whereby people could arrive at the truth. He came to the conclusion that truths could be attained only through the power of human reasoning (Descartes, 1996[1637]:5).¹⁴

2.2.2.5 *The study of 'philosophy of religion' (1800)*

Tarnas (1991:277) describes Descartes' Rationalism as a combination of scepticism and mathematics, together producing the Cartesian revolution in philosophy. According to Taliaferro (2011:2), Rationalism brought about a clear shift in thinking about religion and philosophy. This becomes clear when the term 'philosophy of religion' first appears in the 17th century work of Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688). According to Taliaferro (2011:3), the term 'philosophy of religion'

¹⁴ 'I revered our theology, and I desired as much as anyone else to reach heaven; but having learned as something very certain that the road to heaven is open no less to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and would not have dared to submit them to the frailty of my reasoning. And I thought that, in order to undertake an examination of these truths and to succeed in doing so, it would be necessary to have some extraordinary assistance from heaven and to be more than a man.'

was later popularised by John Caird (1880) in his book: *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*.

It is clear from the history of scholarly reflection on religion that there are a number of diverse schools of thought on what actually comprises religion, and that all of them have influenced the field of philosophy of religion. According to Jordan (2005:802), 'philosophy of religion' comprises those aspects that the Greek philosophers discussed under the headings of 'philosophy' or 'metaphysics', also those issues that Judaism, Christianity and Islam discussed as 'wisdom', 'holy doctrines', 'revelation' or 'theology', as well as those matters that modern philosophical writers discuss under the terms 'natural theology', 'natural religion' and 'science of religion'. From the historical overview on the concept of religion, it is clear that it is difficult to reach consensus regarding a singular conceptualisation of 'religion', because the word is used in a myriad of manners: in rituals, organisations, faith communities and contexts, doctrines and feelings, as well as in different religious traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Clouser, 2006:9). A conceptualisation of religion that would, for example, include the thought of a personal god, would typically exclude other faith communities such as Buddhism and Taoism.

In the study of philosophy of religion a wide variety of diverse conceptualisations of religion can be found: there seems to be as many definitions as there are philosophers (Van der Walt, 2011:38). It is not the purpose of this study to articulate yet another understanding or definition of religion, but rather to point to various conceptualisations of religion, considering the territory of philosophy. By 'the territory of philosophy' I refer to the role and purpose of the study of 'philosophy' and, in my particular study, the study of 'philosophy of religion'. Clouser (2006:70) explains that 'the main role and purpose of philosophy is to give an all-encompassing overview of all the aspects of all the sciences, and to explain the general connection between all the aspects of all the sciences.'

Noebel (1998:3) identifies the following major territories of philosophical concern: epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, logic, aesthetics and ethics. Noebel (1998:5) and Clouser (2006:70) identify epistemology (the theory of knowledge) as one of the most important branches, if not the most important, of philosophy. Chrisholm (2005:259) explains that epistemology stems from the Greek word 'episteme', which means knowledge. Therefore, all things that are described, stand in relation to knowledge or at least to the justification of the understanding of an individual of what knowledge is. Gadamer (1998:309) emphasises that people always convey their presuppositions to every aspect of understanding, and consequently also to their understanding of religion. According to Antes (2012:3) and Carson (2012:161), every individual's definition of religion is determined by his or her own theory of knowledge (epistemological understanding).

According to Dastmalchian (2013:298), the key to researching a person's or group's understanding of the phenomenon of 'religion' can be found in the understanding of that person's or group's interpretation of the theory of knowledge (epistemology). Dastmalchian's (2013) method, 'epistemology of religious beliefs', explores the nature and essential features of different philosophers' understanding of religion by examining their different theories of knowledge (epistemological approaches).¹⁵

I undertook a brief investigation of the influence that a person's theory of knowledge (epistemological viewpoint) has on her or his understanding of religion. The historical overview of the conceptualisation of religion explored the ideas of two 18th century philosophers, namely Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). There were four reasons for referring to the thinking of these two scholars:

- Firstly, both had a significant influence on the schools of thought during their time and also subsequent to their time.
- Secondly, they both lived in the 18th century at about the time when the philosophy of religion was being developed as a field of study (cf. par 2.2.2.5).
- Thirdly, they were both influenced by the work of Leibniz, Newton and Locke.
- Lastly, for the purposes of this study on mono-religious higher education institutions, both philosophers' conceptualisations of (and on) religion sketch important backgrounds for understanding mono-religious education institutions' conceptualisations of religion as a construct and the many epistemological difficulties encountered by scholars trying to understand the construct.

2.2.2.6 Jonathan Edwards' theory of knowledge and understanding of religion

Edwards's theory of knowledge and conceptualisation of religion is a good example of the thoughts and possible conceptualisations of religion that might prevail in a mono-religious education institution. Edwards believed in one religion as being the only true religion. He was also the president of a mono-religious education institution, namely the College of New Jersey.

Edwards' thinking reveals a blending of Calvinism and modern 18th century thinking that had developed largely as a result of the work of scholars such as Newton and Locke (Martin, 1973:247). Edwards' theory of knowledge was principally influenced by the empiricism of John Locke, and in particular the latter's belief that the method of arriving at understanding or knowledge is through sensory experience (as a kind of 'lived' epistemology) (Wainwright,

¹⁵ Dastmalchian (2013:298) explores the epistemological thoughts of Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston and John Hick and the influence of these on their understanding of religion.

2012:4.1). Locke's (1824:31) empiricism held that the individual's field of understanding is like a blank sheet of paper. Any sensory experience is then inscribed on this sheet of paper and in this manner the individual arrives at a state of knowledge. However, 'ideas' reside only within the individual's own intellect. Edwards (1957; vol. 18:457), who also founds his theory of knowledge on empiricism, differs from Locke in that he does not locate 'ideas' in the intellect of the individual, but instead perceives them to be 'ideas' in the intellect of God.

Edwards sought to indicate in his understanding of knowledge that the new scientific developments should not disconnect material and spiritual things from each other, because this leaves God out of (the) creation. Instead, he attempted to indicate that the new scientific developments were fully integrated with God's intimate involvement in creation (Marsden, 2003:73). He tried to indicate that knowledge of 'ideas', which the individual gained through experience, could be correctly understood only if there was knowledge of God as the Creator of the 'ideas' (Edwards, 1957 vol. 18:457). According to Edwards, one should, therefore, know God, the Creator of the 'ideas', in order to arrive at any scientific knowledge. Hence, the only way in which one could attain knowledge of God was through revelation (Edwards, 2005; vol. 2:157).

According to Edwards, revelation occurred in two ways, firstly through God's Word, and secondly through God's creation. The first was essential to the attainment of knowledge of God as Creator; only then would the second, the creation itself, have any value as a revelation for the individual (Edwards, 2005; vol.2:158).

In his discussion of Edwards' theory of knowledge, Wainwright (2012:4.2) notes: 'Only those with properly disposed hearts can read the evidence correctly.' This explanation of Edwards' theory of knowledge is perhaps better highlighted in a sermon that he delivered in 1734 with the theme: 'A Divine and Supernatural Light'. This sermon dealt with the heart of the person who is preparing for knowledge. Before the individual can attain any knowledge through experience, his [sic] heart must first be prepared by means of divine revelation (Edwards 2005; vol. 2:12).

To Edwards, religion is 'to have knowledge of God', which is gained through God's Word and creation. According to Edwards, any knowledge is metaphysical (Martin, 1973:253); religion is therefore the main purpose of life. 'For religion is the very business, the noble business of intelligent beings, and for this end God has placed us on this earth.' (Edwards 2005; vol.2:158).

2.2.2.7 Immanuel Kant's theory of knowledge and understanding of religion

For the purpose of my study on mono-religious higher education institutions, Kant's theory of knowledge and conceptualisation of religion plays an important role in the critical evaluation of such institutions.

A change in thinking occurred away from the concept of 'revelation' in the 18th century. To understand this deviation in direction, it is necessary to understand Immanuel Kant's appreciation of religion. Kant described the century in which he lived as 'the century of the development of the Enlightenment'. By this description of the times in which he lived, he sought to promote the struggle for free thinking and the use thereof in public (Kant, 1996a:41). Free thinking and the freedom of reason expressed in public was a real stumbling block for Kant, because he himself had experienced a personal crisis when the Prussian government banned his book *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (Pomerleau, 2011:1). For this reason, the freedom of reason, the application of free thinking in public, as well as engagement in public dialogue on aspects of religion all played an important role in Kant's philosophy.

To understand Kant's thinking on religion, it is necessary to commence with his epistemological distinction between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. Although it sounds paradoxical, practical reasoning (according to Kant) deals with knowledge on 'what should be', while theoretical reasoning deals with what 'is' (i.e. the empirical). When he spoke of religion, it was under the heading of practical reasoning, because this dealt with 'what should be'. His definition of religion was that it was recognition of everything that we 'should do' (Kant, 2010:133). According to Kant, public reflection on morality (the requirements or demands of propriety or obligations) leads to religion. Morality is then formed through the free use of reasoning in public; through public reflection on the ideas of metaphysics such as God, freedom, morality and immorality (Kant, 1998a:6).

According to Kant (2008:25), these metaphysical ideas cannot be proven, yet they are important preconditions to the formation of morality. The ideas play an important regulatory role in the public's reflection on morality. The metaphysical idea of God, for example, is only a regulatory idea of our faith in morality, but according to Kant (2008:26) it is not proof of theological knowledge. Kant (1998a:494) argues that theology is only speculation on the 'ultimate reality', and is therefore always uncertain. If man [sic] is then confronted with a moral doctrine which is based on revelation, he is, according to Kant (1998a:49), by definition burdened with uncertainty, because the nature of all historical knowledge is uncertain. Historical knowledge is uncertain because it is always dependent on external information or knowledge. Historical proof such as revelation can therefore, according to Kant (1998a:495), never offer the basis for morality because historical proofs are always uncertain.

It is clear from Kant's theory of knowledge why he defines religion as morality (Taylor, 2010:15). He writes:

'Different religions, an odd expression! Just as if one could also speak of different morals. There can indeed be historically different creeds, not in

religion but in the history of means used to promote it, which is the province of scholarship, and just as many different religious books . . . but there can be only one single religion holding for all human beings and in all times.' (Kant, 1996b:336).

2.3 Conceptualisation of religion

The conceptualisation of religion by respectively Edwards and Kant influences epistemology (theory of knowledge), and arguably, their respective epistemologies (theories of knowledge) influenced their respective conceptualisations of religion. So, when Harris (2004:40) asks 'Whose epistemology?' and then answers that even within Western thinking, there are diverse theories of knowledge, he is essentially interrogating various ways of conceptualising religion. These differences clearly emerge in the work of Edwards and Kant, which has just been discussed. Edwards and Kant's theory of knowledge strongly influenced their attempts at conceptualising religion. Where Edwards interpreted religion as knowledge of God acquired through God's revelation, Kant understood religion as morality, which was defined not by revelation, but through public reasoning. According to Helm (2007:57), the core of these (and other) theories of knowledge lies in 'truth claims'. This begs the question of 'Who is right?' Different theories of knowledge are among some of the root causes of religious differences which give rise to conflict between persons and groups, leading in turn to religious intolerance or the necessity of religious tolerance (Helm, 2007:57). Mendus (2008:5) explains that one is not required to tolerate something one agrees with: tolerance only becomes possible when there are clear grounds for difference. This is why religious tolerance initially commences when different religions have conflicting views (Mendus, 2008:5).

From the above it would seem that the study of religious tolerance is intricately related to the study of different theories of knowledge, and that different theories of knowledge are, in turn, intricately related to the truth claims which are made by different people or groups. According to Fish (2007:15) the essence of religious tolerance revolves around truth; hence the truth claims that are made pertaining to any particular religion should be seriously considered, because: 'The truth claims of a religion – at least of religions like Christianity, Judaism and Islam – are not incidental to its identity; they *are* its identity.' Consequently, the study of religion and religious differences that may lead to intolerance, are most intimately rooted in people's religiousness and religiosity. Subjects such as religion, religious differences and religious tolerance are therefore invariably emotionally loaded, and related to religious behaviour as the outcome of their religion (belief system) (Carson, 2012:125).

Van der Walt (1999:52) identifies two extremes of the theory of knowledge with respect to religion, namely absolutism and relativism. By 'extreme', Van der Walt refers to absolutism and relativism as two ideas that represent the two opposite polarities with regard to the theory of

knowledge. It indicates that all the other ideas or concepts on the theory of knowledge locate themselves somewhere between these two polarities, for there is nothing more absolute than absolutism and nothing more relative than relativism.¹⁶

The term 'absolutism' distinguishes between Meta-ethical absolutism, Moral absolutism and Political absolutism (Sommerville, 1991; Haber, 1994; Rachels, 2006). In this thesis I refer in particular to Moral absolutism. According to Moral absolutism, there exists an absolute reality with a universally valid moral system. This absolute reality with its universally valid moral system is an objective reality, unlimited in space and time, to which human knowledge (in terms of what is knowable) is restricted. A precondition of Moral absolutism is objectivism. According to objectivism, moral principles are true, independently of whether anyone believes that they are either true or false (Cook, 1999:20). According to Van der Walt (1999:53) absolutist thinkers canonise their religion as the only true religion, which causes a static understanding of truth and knowledge. An example of absolutist thinking is that of Edwards (mentioned earlier), because he believed that knowledge is only possible through the objective truth of the divine revelation of the scriptures (Edwards 2005; vol. 2:12).

The other extreme concept of the theory of knowledge that Van der Walt (1999:52) highlights is relativism. Moral absolutism is opposed to moral relativism. The latter denies that there is an absolute reality with a universally valid moral system. For relativists, reality only exists in human knowledge, and reality as an object of knowledge is relative to the knowing subject. For relativism the absolute could only be outside the human experience, unreachable for human knowledge and therefore also unknowable (Gowans, 2012:1).

The battle between the absolutistic theory of knowledge and the relativistic theory of knowledge, according to Alexander (1990:532), is known as the 'epistemological dilemma'. Forst (2013:22) refers to this conflict as the 'epistemological paradox'¹⁷. Many problems and difficulties occur in this struggle¹⁸. Alexander (1990:532) describes this struggle as the battle between different theories of knowledge trying to offer alternatives to the two extreme forms, the absolutistic theory and the relativistic one. The former holds that knowledge is unrelated to 'the social position and intellectual interests of the knower' (Alexander, 1990:532), in which case the theory of knowledge is objective and absolute. The relativistic theory of knowledge holds that 'knowledge' is always in the mind of the knower, in which case relativistic knowledge can be the only result (Alexander, 1990:532). Alexander (1990:533) explains that a choice between these two unpalatable alternatives, absolutism and relativism, causes the epistemological dilemma. The

¹⁶ Also refer to Kelsen (1948) 'Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics.'

¹⁷ I elaborate on the 'epistemological dilemma' in Chapter three.

¹⁸ Campbell (2014:1) for example, highlights some problems or difficulties which occur in the epistemological battle between absolutism and relativism.

epistemological dilemma is caused by the back and forth movement between these two theories of knowledge. The movement between these two polarities, absolutism and relativism, are what Shiffman (2012: 190) refers to as oscillation. Oscillation is for example the movement caused when plucking a guitar string. It is this same up and down, back and forth movement between the two theories of knowledge, absolutism and relativism, which causes the epistemological dilemma.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, my study is not concerned with attempts at trying to engage with, explore, understand or explain the question 'Who is to blame for what?' The purpose of this particular chapter, therefore, is not to try and determine which theory of knowledge (epistemological viewpoint) regarding absolutism or relativism is right or wrong with respect to the concept *religion*. As stated in Chapter 1, I have specifically chosen a conceptual mode of reasoning. As such, I understand the adjectival qualifier 'conceptual' to refer to an abstract notion or idea that acts like a brick in the wall that helps to construct a theory.

The purpose of this chapter was consequently threefold:

- Firstly, it was to indicate the wide variety of different conceptualisations regarding religion.
- Secondly, it was to indicate that the nature and essential features of a person's understanding of religion are influenced by that person's theory of knowledge (epistemological viewpoint).
- Thirdly, the two extreme theories of knowledge with regard to religion are absolutism and relativism, and they need to be reckoned with, while studying philosophy of religion.

Hence, to conceptualise religion calls for an investigation into people's epistemologies. The first brick in the wall of my own theory of religious tolerance is 'religion and the theories of knowledge' with its two extreme forms, 'absolutism' and 'relativism', as illustrated below.




Figure 2:2 Religion and the theories of knowledge

2.4 Summary

By engaging with, exploring, understanding and explaining religion as a concept, it becomes clear that there tends to be as many explorations, understandings and explanations as there are scholars. Although an etymological study of the term does, to a certain extent, help to uncover various schools of thought regarding religion, every etymological distinction of the term 'religion' remains almost solely the understanding of each and every author, as far as its presumed ontology (of religion) is concerned. Through understanding the etymology of the term religion, one is able to determine three main lines of thought, which in turn serve as an academically justifiable basis for any authentic study of the historical books on religion. These are:

- Awareness of the divine.
- Being bound to the divine.
- Worshipping the divine.

The historical study of religion underwent distinct changes during the time of the Reformation and Renaissance when the concept of Philosophy of Religion first made its appearance. The Reformation and Renaissance therefore symbolise an important distinction in the scholarly reflection on religion. These diverse theories of knowledge are reflected in, amongst others, the work of Jonathan Edwards and Immanuel Kant. Edwards' theory of knowledge is characterised by revelation, and that of Kant by human reasoning. For the purpose of this study, Edwards' and Kant's theories of knowledge and the influence they had on their conceptualisation(s) of religion, represent two critical points of view regarding any discussion of mono-religious education institutions' conceptualisations of religion.

2.5 Conclusion

By using the heuristic 'epistemology of religious beliefs', I explained how the nature and essential features of religion are linked to the theory of knowledge of the individual observer and I subsequently identified two extreme forms of theories of knowledge, namely absolutism and relativism. By 'extreme' I mean that these, as previously explained, form two opposing polarity concepts in epistemology and that all the other notions of epistemology can be located somewhere inside these two polarities. Absolutism believes that there is an absolute reality with a universally valid moral system and that knowledge does not originate in the human mind. Relativism, on the other hand, denies that there is an absolute reality with a universally valid moral system. For relativists, reality only exists in human knowledge and they regard reality as an object of knowledge that is relative to the knowing subject. The dissimilarities between absolutism and relativism cause an epistemological dilemma, which forms the core of most religious differences and also of religious tolerance (Alexander, 1990:532).

Investigation of matters such as religious tolerance does not merely require exploration, understanding and explanations of religion; it is necessary to penetrate right down to the core differences, the epistemological *a priori*, as it were, that impact on any and all attempts at engaging with, exploring, understanding and explaining religion as a concept. In order to conceptualise a framework for religious tolerance in mono-religious higher education institutions, the results of my reading of the literature in and for this chapter are captured in figure 2.3 below. It demonstrates that all religion-related epistemologies can be plotted on a normative continuum between the extremes of either absolutism or relativism.




Figure 2:3 Part 1: Plotting religion-related epistemologies

Based on all of the above, the following critical questions arose from my reading of the body of scholarship in and for this chapter:

- Does religion have ontic status (what is the ontic nature of religion)?
- How do we come to knowledge of religion?
- Is there only one possible answer to the question of the nature of religion, or is a normative continuum of answers possible?
- What do we do with our knowledge of religion (how do we behave as a result of our knowledge of religion)?

Now that we understand what religion is ontically (cf. 2.3), we can start interrogating what religious tolerance entails. With regard to religion there is an argument to be made that tolerance (as in religious tolerance) represents a critical behavioural outcome of a person's epistemological stance towards his or her religion. Potgieter *et al.* (2014:2) argue that religious tolerance as a behavioural outcome is essentially a response (with disapproval) to a set of beliefs that are originally thought to be objectionable, but without using force or coercion to change them. Tolerance as behavioural outcome or response manifests itself in terms of certain distinctive human attributes, such as individual(-ised) attitude, capacity, action, form of behaviour or response. Therefore, religious tolerance could be plotted on a spectrum or normative continuum. At the one end of the normative continuum, tolerance may be understood to reflect a fanatisist, fundamentalist and completely exclusivist attitude towards the religious opinions and practices of people who may differ from one's own. At the other end of the spectrum tolerance may be understood to reflect a permissive, *laissez-faire* and a completely inclusivist attitude towards the religious opinions and practices of people who may differ from one's own (Potgieter *et al.*, 2014:2). This idea will now be developed further in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3: Nature and essential features of religious tolerance

3.1 Introduction

The first building block in my conceptualisation of religious tolerance for mono-religious higher education institutions was positioned in the previous chapter (Figure 2.3 refers): the building block of different theories of knowledge (epistemological points of departure). This building block comprises the two epistemological polarities of absolutism and relativism. When I refer to the different theories of knowledge, I refer to the *a priori* presuppositions that people bring to every aspect of their understanding regarding religion, and also with regard to religious tolerance. Their theories of knowledge (epistemological understanding or understanding of what knowledge is and where it comes from (Chisholm, 2005:259)) influence their respective points of epistemological departure. Where people depart from, epistemologically speaking, will determine where they are most likely to arrive at. I explained this with reference to the scholarly work of Jonathan Edwards and Immanuel Kant. Edwards and Kant had different understandings of knowledge and where knowledge originated, therefore arriving at divergent understandings of what religion¹⁹ is.

In the light of the above mentioned, I would in the first place like to investigate religious tolerance by positioning it within the historical context in which it had developed.²⁰ According to Forst (2013:4), only a historical examination of the concept of 'tolerance' can bring home to us the complexity surrounding this term 'tolerance'. Forst (2013:237) explains that no study of tolerance can investigate the theoretical aspects of tolerance in isolation from its practical aspects. Theoretical concepts of tolerance should therefore be taken into account together with the historical implementation and practical implementation of those concepts.

¹⁹ In public life and in academic texts people use the word 'theory' in at least three ways:

- Theory as the opposite of practice: theory is about thinking and reflecting as opposed to doing things.
- Theory as hypothesis: Theory is an initial idea, model or heuristic that needs to be tested or followed up to determine whether it is valid or true.
- Theory as explanation: Theory is a more or less an established explanation for a specific phenomenon such as religious tolerance (Jansen, 2004:378).

Religion as a belief system gives rise to religious behaviour in individuals and communities. Religiousness and religiosity represent, arguably, the two most well know categories of such behaviour. Tolerance – as in religious tolerance – constitutes a particular behavioural nuance of a person's religiousness and religiosity. Religious tolerance differs from mere tolerance in the sense that tolerance can also for example refer to cultural tolerance. Abu-Nimer (2001:686) explains it is easier to overcome cultural differences than religious differences. "Tolerance is essentially an attitude towards life and there is more or less agreement among scholars that tolerance as life-attitude" subsumes, for example, religious tolerance."

²⁰ Although I speak mostly of tolerance in this text, the historical study was focused mainly on religious tolerance. When I refer to the 'historical context' in this sentence, I refer to the fact that over the course of time particular events in the lives of people (religious wars, crusades, etc.) influenced their thinking and behaviour with regard to religious tolerance.

Examining ‘tolerance’ below, I made use of a critical historical method of argumentation. For this purpose, numerous divergent theories regarding tolerance were considered. These were categorised under the two main tolerance theories, namely, exclusivism and inclusivism. I termed these two categories ‘exclusivist tolerance theories’ and ‘inclusivist tolerance theories’. I identified these two categories from other scholars’ categorisation of tolerance theories such as Louw (2004), Powell and Clarke (2013) and Wolhuter *et al.* (2014).

I am well aware that to categorise these tolerance theories primarily under either exclusivist tolerance theories or inclusivist tolerance theories does not necessarily mean, or imply that the particular theory is only exclusivist or inclusivist in nature. Bryman (2012:709), however, describes the goal of categorising as the organising of theories, ideas, concepts, people and so forth, into different groups by lifting each item to a higher level of abstraction through placing it into one main group which best describes all of those theories and concepts placed under it. The theories which I categorised under either exclusivist tolerance theories or inclusivist tolerance theories tend to be either more exclusivist or more inclusivist, depending on where the tolerance theories are located on this normative continuum. The following figure represents the conceptual framework of my whole literature study and it also illustrates the aim of this particular chapter (Chapter 3).




Figure 3:1 Conceptual framework of literature study, highlighting Chapter 3

3.2 Problematic nature of the concept of tolerance

It is commonly agreed that we should tolerate one another, but when we start to interrogate what tolerance is, conflict, confusion and disagreement usually result. Afdal (2010:597) speaks of the 'maze of tolerance', exemplifying tolerance as a tricky and elusive concept. When reading up on tolerance, Afdal's explanation of tolerance as a maze becomes clear. Around every corner, two or more alleyways appear; the further one ventures, the more confused one becomes.

Forst (2013:10-15) highlights the paradox within the theory of tolerance, which concerns the question of ethics and morality. If tolerance comprises the admission of things with which one does not agree because they are ethically and morally wrong, how can it be 'acceptable' to tolerate something which is unacceptable? The study of tolerance is therefore essentially concerned with matters such as right and wrong, true and false, in ethical as well as in moral affairs.

Moran (2006:24) explains in his article 'Whose Tolerance?' that so many divergent concepts requiring consideration regarding tolerance exist, that to try and contain 'tolerance' within a fixed definition, is a challenging or even impossible task. Potgieter *et al.* (2014:3) assert that the concept of 'tolerance' points to an entity with a particular observable status. This status, to which we can also refer as the ontic status, can only be investigated as a quality or character of something else. This is why Potgieter *et al.* (2014:3) argue that 'tolerance cannot be observed *per se*; it can only be observed as a quality, attitude, action or behaviour of a person.' In this sense, tolerance has the same ontic status as, for example, endurance, education, kindness, love, hate or sympathy.

According to Van der Walt and Fowler (2006:33-34), the composition of an entity (such as tolerance) may take various forms, which include theoretical analysis, free observation, dialogue, critical thinking, reflection, self-reflection and conceptualisation. All of these varied aspects must be taken into account when investigating the concept of 'religious tolerance' and, in my opinion, placing religious tolerance in the historical context in which it developed is a way of taking all of these aspects into account.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a 'map of the maze of tolerance' (Afdal, 2010:598). My intention is not to describe the maze of tolerance in every detail. This would be an impossible task, for the current scholarly dialogue regarding tolerance is simply too wide and complex. My aim is, firstly, to identify a variety of meanings pertaining to tolerance and, secondly, to evaluate each conceptual understanding of tolerance critically.

3.3 The labyrinth of semantic values surrounding the concept of ‘tolerance’

The English word for tolerance is derived from the Latin *tolerantia*, which developed from the verb *tolero* (Sinclair, 1999:420). According to Afdal (2010:598), the Latin verb *tolero* has four baseline semantic values:

- To bear the weight of, or to support.
- To maintain something.
- To be prepared to be subservient or to endure difficult circumstances.
- To resist.

Although some languages opt for the English concept of ‘tolerance’, much may be learned from the Afrikaans-Dutch concept of the word, Potgieter *et al.* (2014:2) point out that there are interesting similarities between the English ‘tolerance’ and the Afrikaans word ‘verdraagsaamheid’. The Afrikaans word stemmed from the Dutch word ‘dragen’, which in English means ‘to bear’. The prefix ‘ver-’ is added to form the verb ‘verdragen’, which emphasises the notion of ‘dragen’. By adding the suffix ‘-saam’, the word ‘verdraagsaam’ (to be tolerant) forms an adverb in Afrikaans and Dutch. In this form, the word ‘verdraagsaam’ (to be tolerant) refers to something beyond itself, namely an attitude or some or other form of conduct. The Dutch suffix ‘-saam’ means ‘(gemeen-)saamheid’ in Afrikaans or ‘togetherness’ in English. This suggests that tolerance cannot exist unless people enable, empower or capacitate one another to be tolerant. The further addition of the suffix ‘-heid’ (-ness) changes ‘verdraagsaam’ (to be tolerant) into the noun ‘verdraagsaamheid’ (tolerance). All of these different additions appear in the English word ‘bear’ – ‘forbear’ – ‘forbearing’ – ‘forbearance’. It is interesting that the English word ‘bear’ is the same as the Dutch word ‘baren’, which means ‘to give birth to’ or ‘to bear something’.

3.4 Historical development of teachings regarding tolerance

Collins (2009:609) emphasises the importance of professional historians’ involvement in scientific studies regarding the understanding of tolerance. The great variety of studies regarding tolerance, as well as the existence of a wide diversity of concepts and notions with respect to tolerance, including the lack of sound historical research into ‘tolerance’ as a social construct, have resulted in scholarly reflection about and writings on the subject, which are not well ordered either historically or thematically (Collins, 2009:610).

What always complicates a historical study about a specific topic is that various aspects of the topic developed at different times in history. In this study, I made use of the ‘critical historical

method of argumentation' presented by Forst (2013:4)²¹. This method requires that the different aspects of the topic are first chronologically positioned and then critically discussed within that historical context.

In the following historical overview regarding tolerance it became clear that philosophers such as Averroës, Castellio and Bayle were ahead of their time, making an attempt to position religious tolerance chronologically without any thematic classification, *per se*, exceptionally difficult. This is why I decided to make use of the thematic chronological classification of tolerance presented by Afdal (2010) instead. Afdal classifies tolerance under three main headings; firstly the period prior to the Reformation and the Renaissance (0-1600 AD); secondly, the period from the Enlightenment until the nineteenth century (1700-1900 AD) and thirdly, the period after the modern Enlightenment (1900-including current thinking on tolerance). Afdal (2010:603-610) labels the first period, prior to the Reformation and the Renaissance, from 0-1600 AD, the period of premodern tolerance. The second period, the Enlightenment until the nineteenth century, he refers to as the period of liberal tolerance, and he calls the third period, post the modern Enlightenment from 1900 up to and including current thinking on tolerance, the period of postmodern tolerance.

Although I utilise Afdal's classification of premodern tolerance, liberal tolerance and postmodern tolerance, I have, nevertheless, added two additional periods: those of Medieval tolerance, and the Humanistic and Reformational tolerance. In my view, these two periods serve as important linkages between premodern and liberal tolerance. I have also indicated that some scholars were ahead of their time in their reflection on tolerance. It is therefore difficult to classify tolerance on a purely chronological basis, and this necessitates the inclusion of a thematic classification. The periods that I used for the historic study of tolerance were classified as follows:

- Premodern tolerance (0-500 AD).
- Medieval tolerance (500-1500 AD).
- Humanistic and Reformational tolerance (1500-1700 AD).
- Liberal tolerance (1700-1900 AD).
- Postmodern tolerance (1900- including current thinking on tolerance).

²¹ The reason for using Forst's 'critical historical method of argumentation' is that this method allows for placing religious tolerance in its historical context, a necessity highlighted in Chapter 1.

By positioning religious tolerance in its historical context, I was able to unravel the labyrinth of tolerance, which eventually helped me to formulate guidelines for religious tolerance in mono-religious higher education institutions.

3.4.1 Premodern tolerance

Some academics erroneously limit their thinking regarding tolerance to the 16th century or the start of the Enlightenment (Afdal, 2010:603; Horton, 2011:289). On delving into the historic development of the concept of tolerance, we see that scholars had already started pondering the concept of 'tolerance' in ancient times.

As already mentioned, Afdal (2010:603) distinguishes between three types of tolerance, the premodern, the liberal and postmodern tolerance. Carson (2012:13) highlights three aspects that he considers to be included in the premodern conceptualisation of tolerance:

- There is an objective truth and we must find it.
- The various parties engaged in dialogue with each other believe they all know independently from each other where the truth lies. They therefore differ strongly from each other and they consequently believe that the other party is wrong.
- The best way of discovering the truth lies in reasoning (dialogue) and the unfettered exchange of ideas, irrespective of how wrong those ideas might be.

Premodern tolerance can primarily be attributed to the reflections of the early Christian church. During the first three centuries of the Christian church, scholarly critique against the church from the side of paganism was that its faith was too exclusive. Pagan academics such as Celsus, Porphy and Symmachus also defended their faiths against other faiths, but, unlike the Christians, did not claim that each of their faiths was the only one. The pagan academics rejected the Christians' claim that Christ was the only way to eternal life (Wilken, 1995:42-43).

However, according to Carson (2012:53) tolerance was regarded as a primary moral principle during the first three centuries of the church. The reason for this was that during this period, the early Christian church was severely persecuted. It is clear that there is much that we can learn about tolerance from scholars within the early church. As an example, Tertullianus (160-225 AD) of Carthage wrote:

'It is a human law and a natural right that one should worship whatever he intends; the religious practice of one person neither harms nor helps another. It is no part of religion to coerce religious practice, for it is by free choice not coercion that we should be led to religion.' (Tertullianus, *To Scapula*, 2.1-2).

About a century later the church father Lactantius (240-320 AD) wrote:

‘For nothing is so much a matter of free will as religion, for if the mind of the worshipper turns away it is carried off and nothing remains, religion cannot be a matter of coercion; it has to do with the will.’ (Lactantius, *Divinarum institutionum*, 5.19)

After Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, the situation of the Christians changed rapidly from that of being persecuted to that of being an imperial power. This shift also modified their thinking regarding tolerance. The principle established by Tertullianus and Lactantius that a person could not be coerced to follow or obey the tenets of a particular faith, was reconsidered. The work of Augustine was regarded by Forst (2013:48) as the basis on which subsequent teachings regarding tolerance developed. Forst (2013:48) explains how numerous scholars after him developed their views with regard to tolerance on the basis of his works, whether they agreed with him or not. It therefore serves a useful purpose to look briefly at the principal tenets that underpin Augustine’s reflections with regard to tolerance.

3.4.1.1 Augustine (354-430)

The concepts of premodern tolerance seem to be consolidated in the work of the church father Augustine, who was appointed as Bishop of Hippo in 395 AD, during a major conflict of faith between the Catholics and the Donatists. Augustine’s views regarding tolerance can be divided into two periods; the first during which he sought the way of peace and the second in which he did not think it was always a bad thing to ‘help someone to believe’ (in other words, ‘coercion’) (Kamen, 1967:14).

The views of the early Christian church regarding tolerance were based on a perfectionist framework. According to Rawls (1999:50), ethical perfectionism (also known as Salvationism) comprises faith in one religion, which is regarded as the only true religion. It is also the view of perfectionism that there can be no salvation to eternal life unless the person concerned believes in this one true religion.

Augustine’s perfectionist thinking is particularly well portrayed in his book, *The City of God* (Forst, 2013:25), where he draws a parallel between two cities. One is the city of God. In it live the Salvationists, who belong to God and inherit eternal life as a result of their faith in their Redeemer, Jesus Christ. The other is the city of man [sic]. Its residents are those who have not been redeemed because they do not believe in the Redeemer, Jesus Christ. It is important, in understanding the premodern thinking on tolerance, to comprehend this distinction between the two ‘cities’.

The latter is referred to in the teachings regarding tolerance as the Two Kingdoms theory. In Augustine’s teachings on these kingdoms, he explains that humankind’s limited thinking

(finitude of reason) and lack of good judgement denote that man may not appoint himself as the final arbiter of other people's sins. Tolerance is therefore necessary while we wait for the final judgement of God (Augustine, 2004:49).

Augustine (1989:155) explains that the city of God's tolerance towards the city of sin represents the Christian idea of love – a love that Augustine describes as an unconditional love for God and one's neighbour. This love provides the foundation of our relationship towards ourselves and with the people around us. According to Augustine (2004:601), all people have been influenced by sin and must therefore practise tolerance towards one another. This is why Augustine understands tolerance as a value of love that flows forth from the love of God and facilitates patience and tolerance towards others.

Christian love also embraces the unity of Christianity. Accordingly, love for this unity includes tolerance towards false teachers. 'Those then who are of a different opinion from us must be corrected with meekness in the interest of unity.' (Augustine, 1989:33) The benefits of this Christian unity in God are, according to Augustine (1989:43) so important that he calls upon Christians to preserve the peace instead of involving themselves in conflicts.

An element of the Two Kingdoms theory was that the one kingdom could not coerce the other kingdom into believing its tenets. Augustine also believed, initially, that human conscience was non-coercible (freedom of conscience), because true faith could develop only from within and not from without.²² For this reason, true faith has to be based on free will and not on coercion (Augustine, 1989:34).²³

From the Two Kingdoms theory and the way in which the two kingdoms could coexist, it is clear that perfectionist thinking regarding tolerance effectively mirrors the permission theory (Forst 2013:409). Forst (2013:544) refers to this version of the permission theory as the classical exclusivist permission conception.

The permission theory refers to a situation in which one group, for whatever reason, permits another group to exist, even though the viewpoints of the two groups differ from each other. I categorised the permission theory with its different sub-theories under the exclusivist tolerance theories, which, together, constitute important building blocks in my own attempt at conceptualising religious tolerance (refer Figure 3.3).

²² *credere non potest homo nisi volens.* (a man ... cannot believe unless he is willing) (*In Johannis Evangelium*, 1845:158)

²³ Although Augustine was opposed to any such thoughts as torture, later in his life he did start to think differently concerning freedom of conscience. He considered it better for someone to be compelled to believe than ultimately to land up in eternal damnation (Carson 2012:54). Scholarly critique of the permission conception of the Two Kingdoms is addressed later in the study.

Augustine's thinking regarding tolerance as permission can be summarised briefly in the following three points, which are also illustrated in the figure below (Figure 3.2): perfectionism, finitude of reason, and freedom of conscience.




Figure 3:2 Exclusivist tolerance theories of Augustine

3.4.2 Medieval tolerance

The Middle Ages, sometimes referred to as the dark ages, superficially appear to be very dark concerning a theme such as tolerance, because little is available in the way of scholarly literature on the era's conceptualisation of tolerance. The Middle Ages are mainly perceived as an intolerant era in which the Christian church violently suppressed any form of divergence from the exclusive Christian truth (Schreiner and Besier, 1990:448); we need only consider the great number of crusades that took place, in order to realise this.

However, Bejczy (1997) in his article '*Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept*', argues that the Enlightenment's understanding of tolerance cannot really be understood without considering Medieval thinking on the subject. We can describe it as an important link in a chain; if the Medieval link in the teachings regarding tolerance is broken, the rest of the chain will also be worthless. Bejczy (1997:367) says: '*Medieval tolerantia* is a full-fledged example of what tolerance could be.' I have therefore inserted this important link between premodern and liberal tolerance, namely the notion of tolerance in or during the Middle Ages.

According to Forst (2013:58), the Medieval concept of tolerance did not contain much more than Augustine's thinking; the Medieval philosophers only implemented what Augustine had devised. The implementation of the teachings regarding tolerance differed from the classical

and early Christian understanding of tolerance in the social sense. Both the classical and early Christian conceptualisations of tolerance referred to tolerance in an individualistic manner. In other words, they understood tolerance as the personal (or individual) acceptance of differences. According to Bejczy (1997:368), the social and the political conceptualisations of tolerance were both Medieval developments. Socially unacceptable conduct displayed by a person during the Middle Ages was no longer primarily regarded as a concern of only personal importance, but also as a concern of the entire community.

The Medieval social and political conceptualisations of tolerance built upon the permission theory (Forst, 2013:409). The only difference was that they implemented the permission theory in a social-legalistic manner. Raymond (1975:8) names the following two ways in which tolerance was implemented in the Middle Ages:

- When something was permitted that was not prohibited by any law.
- Permission also takes place when a smaller contravention of the law is permitted in order to prevent the occurrence of a bigger contravention.

A further aspect that was underestimated in the influence of the Medieval thinking regarding tolerance is related to the armed conflicts of faith that took place – particularly the wars between the Christians and Muslims. Just as the terrorist onslaughts in our present time have led to an increase in thinking (and debate) about tolerance, so too did the armed conflicts of faith in the Middle Ages influence thinking with regard to tolerance. Although the Medieval conflicts (e.g. the Crusades) stood out as examples of intolerance between Christians and Muslims, Herde (1967:12) points out that the laws of the Middle Ages prohibited any persecution of Muslims who lived in peace with Christians. For example, according to Schreiner and Besier (1990:462), it was the non-Christian social group that arguably benefited the most from the Medieval social and political conceptualisation of tolerance. The conflicts of faith in the Middle Ages compelled philosophers to examine societies composed of different faiths and faith-based communities, and ways in which these communities could live in peace with one another. One of these philosophers who made an important contribution to the teachings regarding tolerance was the Islamic philosopher, Averroës.

3.4.2.1 Averroës (1126-1198)

According to Forst (2013:89), most of the modern debates regarding tolerance seem to be based on Christian thinking. It would, however, be a great injustice not to consider the important contributions the teachings of other faiths on tolerance. One of the philosophers who made an important contribution to the teachings regarding tolerance was the Islamic philosopher, Averroës.

The Spanish-Arabian philosopher, Ibn Rushd, known as Averroës (his Latin name), was the most important Aristotelian philosopher among the Islamic philosophers of his time. Averroës focused on the problem of relationships between Greek logic and the revelatory content of the Koran. The intellectual conundrum that Averroës (Rushd, 1954:357) encountered, concerned the link between revelatory thought and human reasoning, which causes an epistemological dilemma; he tried to resolve this dilemma by referring to three types or orientations of people: rhetorical, didactic and philosophical. According to Averroës, the rhetorical or simple people held fast to divine revelation. The didactic or intellectual people processed information on revelations in a reasoned fashion, while the true philosophers relied on pure reasoning (Rushd, 1954:358). On the basis of this distinction, Averroës' followers came to the conclusion that particular thoughts could simultaneously be both true and untrue. Matters might be true for those of simple faith, but untrue when looked at through the lens of pure reasoning (Praamsma, 1979:303).

Averroës (Rushd, 1954:359) attempted to cultivate a spirit of tolerance as opposed to contempt between these three different 'persons' in respect of 'philosophical speculation' on religious matters. According to Averroës (Rushd, 1954:360), religion was ethically and politically useful because it served to help maintain an ethical and political social order. However, the educated man or the philosophically orientated person would, according to him, relinquish the minutiae of his own religion and seek the best faith for his time.

On the basis of his philosophical speculation, Averroës regarded faiths such as Islam, Judaism and Christianity as equal, and he sought an ethical and moral unity between them (Rushd, 1954:360). I regard this distinction of Averroës as another important brick in the wall of my own conceptualisation of religious tolerance; I refer to this distinction of Averroës as the 'theory of ethical and moral unity'²⁴. I categorise this theory under the inclusivist tolerance theories, because Averroës' theory of ethical and moral unity grew out of his inclusivist idea that particular thoughts could simultaneously be both true and untrue (as explained above). The following figure (Figure 3.3) conceptually captures Averroës' theories on tolerance:

²⁴ I later refer to this concept as 'ethically moral unity'.




Figure 3:3 Inclusivist tolerance theory of Averroës

In the last twenty sections of Averroës' work, *The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahafut al-Tahafut)*, he works on the relativisation of religion. There, he attempts to demonstrate that the way to ethically moral unity between faiths and faith communities can possibly be found in philosophical speculation and the relativisation of truth within any particular religion.

Averroës serves as an important link between the premodern tolerance of the early Christian church and the liberal tolerance of the Enlightenment²⁵. He sought to hold fast to premodern tolerance because he believed the revelation concept was necessary in order to maintain a sound ethical, political and social order. He also laid the foundations for liberal tolerance by seeking to promote ethically moral unity between faiths. According to Forst (2013:89) the Enlightenment later used Averroës' search for ethically moral unity as the point of departure in that era's thinking concerning tolerance.

3.4.3 Humanism and the Reformation

The 'new era', characterised mainly by Humanism and also later by the Reformation, fundamentally altered the scholarly dialogue regarding tolerance. Humanism and the Reformation both fought against two aspects of the Middle Ages. Firstly, they both combated the subordination of human beings to religious and church structures, and secondly they opposed the subordination of secular forces to spiritual forces. The major struggle of Humanism and the Reformation was to regard the human being as a spiritual individual and also for this to be recognised in society (Burckhardt, 1937:70). Despite Humanism and the Reformation both holding on to the same ideal in so far as they both regarded a new understanding of people and their individuality, there were also great differences between them. The distinction between the understanding of Humanism and the Reformation

²⁵ Leaman (2013:164-165) indicates Averroës' influence on the Renaissance period.

concerning human beings, and their respective thoughts regarding tolerance, are probably best understood by referring to the thinkings of Erasmus, Luther and Castellio.

3.4.3.1 Erasmus (1466-1536)

According to Hoffmann (1982:80), understanding of the Christian humanistic comprehension of tolerance is most readily accomplished by referring to the work of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. According to Dilthey (1921:42), Erasmus was the 'Voltaire of the 16th century'. His thinking about tolerance was further divided into two areas: firstly, tolerance of Christians amongst one another, and secondly, the tolerance of Christians towards people who happened to be of different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions.

There is, of course, much that may be said about Erasmus' teachings regarding tolerance, but for the purposes of this study I have focused only on the *core aspect* of his input on the subject.²⁶ Erasmus' core principle of tolerance is comprehensively described in his text *The Manual of the Christian Knight*, which he wrote for the Christian soldier. The core teaching of Erasmus (1905:208) with regard to Christians' tolerance towards one another is that all Christians adhere to a central religious dogma and that there is no need for contention over other aspects that do not deal with the core of their religious dogma. Erasmus therefore works with the theory of *adiaphora* (matters that are not necessary to obtain salvation) or the 'undogmatism'²⁷ of religion. By this, he meant that religion should focus only on the core aspect, such as salvation, and that the other aspects of religion are side issues which are unimportant. According to Erasmus and Rhenanus (1987:113), the core aspect of Christian faith lies in the original teachings of Jesus Christ, dealing with the ethical aspects of life.

As far as Erasmus' second notion of tolerance is concerned, namely the tolerance of Christians towards people from other faith persuasions, it is interesting to note that he worked mainly along the lines of the theory of competitive unity. For Erasmus (1905:206), love was the principal law; through it, mercy could be shown towards people from other faith persuasions. Love was believed to tolerate all differences while at the same time assisting in leading others to the truth. Pertaining to competitive unity, Christian love, according to Erasmus (1962:507), has the competitive edge on other faith groups. I have categorised Erasmus' two theories on tolerance of *adiaphora* and competitive unity as sub-theories of Averroës' inclusivist tolerance theory, that is, ethical and moral unity. These theories of Erasmus are conceptually captured in the following figure (Figure 3.4):

²⁶ For an in-depth study of Erasmus' understanding of tolerance, refer to the work of Bejczy (1997:376-383).

²⁷ The word 'undogmatism' is not a familiar word but is described by Jaspers (2014:5) as taking away any dogmatic belief and leaving only the religious content necessary to obtain salvation.




Figure 3:4 Inclusivist tolerance theory of Erasmus

3.4.3.2 Luther (1483-1546)

The Reformation is recognised as the turning point in the modern understanding of religious individuality, the development of the secular concept of a state and the division between secular and ecclesiastical authority (Bienert, 1982:15). As mentioned above, these characteristics are also present in Humanism, but the division between Humanism and the Reformation's understanding of humankind could not have been greater²⁸. This is particularly clear from the work of one of the renowned Reformational thinkers, Martin Luther.

The German reformer, Martin Luther, is commonly regarded as one of the three greatest reformers of the 16th century, together with Ulrich Zwingli and John Calvin. Luther is particularly known for his 95 theses concerning the Roman Catholic Church which he nailed to the door of the church in Wittenberg on 31 October 1517. Luther himself experienced intolerance of his doctrines and had to defend his writings against the Roman Catholic Church in Worms in 1521. The church ordered him to recant his writings. From his defence, we learn a key aspect of his thinking regarding tolerance when he said:

'If my judgment is not in this way brought into subjection to God's word, I neither can nor will retract anything; for it cannot be right for a Christian to speak against his conscience.' (Luther, 1906:837)

²⁸ The differences between Humanism and the Reformation are clearly illustrated in this exchange of letters between Erasmus and Luther (Bainton 1969:189).

Forst (2013:117) indicates that Luther had been an Augustinian monk and therefore elaborated further on Augustine's teaching of the Two Kingdoms and free conscience. Although one can delve more deeply into Luther's understanding of tolerance, in this study, I have only highlighted Luther's main contribution to tolerance, which comprises his teachings regarding free conscience.²⁹

Whereas the Humanists, such as Erasmus (1969:95), emphasised human dignity and freedom, the Reformers, for instance Luther (1969:309), emphasised the sinful impotence of man before God. The reason why Luther did so, lies in his conceptualisation of freedom. According to him, true freedom could be obtained only when a person recognised his/her own sinfulness and imperfection, and subjected himself/herself to the authority of the Word of God. Through this authority, God reveals Himself to the individual in his faith. It is the responsibility of the individual to avail himself of this truth. One's free choice then lies in obeying the Word of God (Luther, 1991:26), implying that a person is only free if s/he complies with the truth. Forst (2013:335, 395) describes this kind of freedom as 'the concept of the unfree free conscience'.

One of the results of the Reformation was that Europe became divided, split into Catholic and Protestant states. To a large extent Catholics did not tolerate Protestants, and vice versa.³⁰ According to Rawls (2005:5), both Protestants and Catholics attempted to use the state (in other words the available political machinery at the time) to promote their own faiths. After an extended struggle comprising many wars and uprisings, both Catholics and Protestants realised that the oppressive power of the state alone could inculcate obedience to a specific religious dogma. The Reformers, Luther and particularly Zwingli and Calvin, tried to promote increased state power for the purpose of institutionalising the Church for the propagation of the Protestant truth (Troeltsch, 1992:691).

A significant example of the secular power of the government being used to implement the Church's judgement occurred during the prosecution of the physicist Michel Servet in Geneva. Servet, who had fled from the Inquisition in France, found asylum in Geneva. In October 1553 he was sentenced under the Calvinist government and burnt at the stake because, in his own writings, he had rejected the accepted teachings regarding the Holy Trinity (Selderhuis, 2009:89).

²⁹ For a useful discussion of Luther's understanding of tolerance, refer to Bienert (1982).

³⁰ Luther used the word 'tolerance' (toleranz) in 1541, in the sense that he longed for a peaceful coexistence between Protestants and Catholics (Luther 1941:441).

3.4.3.3 Sebastian Castellio (1515-1563)

After the execution of Servet in 1553, the professor of Greek at the University of Basel, Sebastian Castellio, launched a personal campaign against Geneva and specifically against Calvin (Guggisberg and Gordon, 2003:25). From the exchange of correspondence between Castellio and Calvin, we learn much of Castellio's scholarly reflections with regard to tolerance. He blended the Humanistic and Protestant thoughts with regard to tolerance, resulting in a conceptualisation of tolerance that, according to Forst (2013:126), was far ahead of its time.

In Castellio's (1965:122) conception of tolerance, he introduced an epistemological distinction between two normative spheres: the first is that of universal morality and the second, the dogmatic religious sphere. According to Castellio (1965:131), the sentencing of heretics could not take place if, like Servet, they had contravened the second sphere, the dogmatic religious sphere. It could only happen if they contravened the sphere of universal morality. Castellio's epistemological distinction between the two normative spheres is, as it were, the key to understanding the concept of liberal tolerance. His argument also represents a distinction between two different truths: the truth of universal morality and the truth according to every person's own religion and personal religious beliefs (Castellio, 1965:132).

According to him, universal morality is so authentic and natural that it has been written by God's own finger on the hearts of all people (Castellio *et al.*, 1935:261). Universal morality is obtained through the humanistic *adiaphora*. The *adiaphora* within universal morality is, according to Castellio (1965:132), the central truth that is present in any person at any time and in every place. The central truth of universal morality can then, according to Castellio *et al.* (1935:261), be reduced to the formula of *reciprocity*. *Reciprocity* is contained in the golden rule that *we should do unto others as we would like them to do unto us*.

Castellio (1965:132) stated that the second normative sphere, the dogmatic religious sphere, represents the truth that is given to people in 'strange' ways. These 'strange' ways include beliefs about revelation. Dogmatic religious truth leads, Castellio (1965:133) argues, to an unsolvable struggle as a consequence of a person's limited understanding (*finitude of the human cognitive faculty*). The limitations in, and of, human understanding, result in different theories of knowledge with regard to dogmatic religious truth. According to him (Castellio 1965:133), any knowledge of religious truth, such as, for example, with respect to God, is pure speculation. Dogmatic religious differences between people can therefore not be understood as heresy; also, according to Castellio, such differences cannot be used to prosecute people.

By referring to the epistemological uncertainty of the religious normative sphere, Castellio was not seeking to generate scepticism towards a person's own, individual faith. He simply wanted to create an environment in which different faiths could coexist peacefully. Castellio believed

(just like Averroës) that the best faith or the true faith would eventually triumph. This is the concept of *competitive unity* that Castellio (1965:133) explains:

‘Let not the Jews or Turks [Muslims] condemn the Christians, nor let the Christians condemn the Jews or the Turks, but rather teach and win them by true religion and justice, and let us, who are Christians, not condemn one another, but, if we are wiser than they, let us also be better and more merciful. This is certain that the better a man knows the truth, the less is he inclined to condemn.’

Although the Humanistic idea of reducing conflict through the undogmatisation of core articles of faith and the Protestant ideas of freedom of conscience and the teachings of the Two Kingdoms influenced the thinking of Castellio, he added a new aspect to scholarly attempts at conceptualising tolerance which forms an important brick in the wall of my own conceptualisation of religious tolerance. I have named this brick ‘normative differences’, and have captured the theory of normative differences, with its different sub-theories, under the category of inclusivist tolerance theories. From Castellio’s theory of normative differences, he developed a sub-theory, namely the respect theory. By adding the concept of respect, he appeals to the universal human morality of reciprocal respect and the need to justify one’s actions if the freedom of others is restricted. Through this epistemological distinction, he also indicates that religious differences are unavoidable and that controversial religious doctrines cannot serve as the basis for the restriction of freedom. Castellio’s tolerance theories may be conceptually illustrated in the following manner (Figure 3.5):




Figure 3:5 Inclusivist tolerance theories of Castellio

His arguments represent an important phase in the process of the ‘rationalisation of morality’, which is an important development in the grounding of liberal tolerance. Castellio’s (1965:203)

brief but powerful comment made during his discussions with Calvin: 'To kill a man is not to protect a doctrine, but to kill a man', can be regarded as an example of the typical Humanistic and Protestant dialogue regarding tolerance at the time. Castellio thereby indicates that people should be respected above and beyond the boundaries of religious doctrine and authority.

In the Humanistic and Reformational thinking on tolerance, three core lines of argumentation were developed:

- The Humanistic notion that seeks to resolve conflict by relying on the religious foundation that is shared by all parties.
- The Reformational thinking that emphasises individual responsibility before God, and freedom that is bound to the will of God (the notion of the so-called 'unfree free conscience').
- Thirdly, Castellio's thoughts that emphasise the notion of universal morality which remains above any religious dogmatic differences in human thinking.

3.4.4 Liberal tolerance

The increasing intolerance between the Catholics and Protestants during the Reformation period reached its high point in the devastating Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Scholars agree that this was a war of and about faith. What should be taken into account is that religion was also used to establish political power at the time. The Reformation and the wars of faith that arose from it compelled people to look for a better way (a more tolerant way) of living together and regulating their livelihoods and earthly affairs (MacCulloch, 2005:14). According to Zagorin (2003:49), the holy wars that arose from the Reformation forced Christians to resolve their differences among themselves without persecution. Forst (2013:169) describes the sixteenth century as the 'decisive juncture in the discourse on toleration.'

An important question in the debates regarding tolerance is whether it is a result of Liberalism, or whether Liberalism is a result of tolerance. According to Rawls (2005: XXIV) the historical origin of Liberalism lies in conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Liberalism and liberal tolerance developed mainly from the Humanist and Reformational era's struggle for freedom, and particularly individual freedom. Liberal tolerance, Afdal (2010:604) contends, operates with the notion that the state should be neutral as far as issues of the good are concerned. Carson (2012:96) calls liberal tolerance the 'new tolerance' and describes it as a political tolerance that was 'neutral' in respect of any ethical,

moral or religious system.³¹ Zagorin (2003:7) presents a worthwhile summary of liberal tolerance that might also serve as a useful understanding and explanation of it:

‘Religious tolerance is the principle that society and state should, as a matter of right, extend complete freedom of religious belief and expression to all their members and citizens, and should refrain from imposing any religious tests, doctrines, or forms of worship or religious association upon them.’

To understand this explanation of tolerance, we need to look at the development of tolerance among the Enlightenment philosophers. According to Powell and Clarke (2013:5) and Forst (2013:170), the core of liberal tolerance is contained in the thinking of three Enlightenment philosophers: John Locke, Pierre Bayle and John Stuart Mill. Although there are obviously numerous other scholars that can be added to this list, such as Milton, Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau and Voltaire (Forst, 2013:399-446) I have made just one addition to this list namely Immanuel Kant. I added Kant because of his important contribution to the respect theory and his notion of public dialogue. The spectrum of basic principles of liberal tolerance is covered by the work of Locke, Bayle, Kant and Mill.

3.4.4.1 John Locke (1632-1704)

To crown Locke as the father of tolerance is no exaggeration. All historical studies regarding tolerance mention the influence that he exerted on this notion. For example, Forst (2013:209) says: ‘It is not an exaggeration to say that liberal justification of tolerance reaches its culmination in Locke’s work.’ According to Dunn (1982:50) Locke was not initially positive about tolerance towards other faiths, but this altered drastically during the course of his life and to such an extent that Locke (1963a:23) described the new act of tolerance as the characteristic of the true church.

As with any writer, his thinking cannot be reviewed in isolation from the time period in which he wrote. This is clearly discernible in the work of Locke, whose thinking developed as a result of specific political and cultural circumstances³². Locke was born in the middle of the Thirty Years War and also lived during the twenty-eight year period of political instability in England (1660-1688) which was characterised as a time of persecution of Catholics and of Protestants who were opposed to the Church of England. The persecution exerted a direct influence on Locke, to the extent that he had to flee to the province of Holland in the Netherlands in 1683 (Coffey

³¹ The concept of ‘neutrality’ denotes a wide variety of meanings. For a good exposition of the various meanings, see Rawls (1999:260-265). I use the concept of ‘neutrality’ in the same sense as Kymlycka (1992:34): That is when a person, group, state etcetera does not justify its conduct from its own epistemological understanding, and regards all life views as equal.

³² For an overview of the political and cultural circumstances in which Locke lived, refer to the work of Goldie (1991), entitled: ‘The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England.’

1997:172). It was during his time in Holland that he compiled his well-known work, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*.

Only after the Glorious Revolution of William of Orange in 1688, Locke was able to return to England. In 1689, William of Orange passed the Act of Toleration. Although this act granted freedom of worship to Protestants, it restricted the Roman Catholics and Unitarians in their acts of worship (Kamen 1967:207)³³. The Act of Toleration functioned within the Augustinian permission theory. In terms of this law, the minority was allowed to take part in the government, but prohibited from ruling in full freedom. This sort of tolerance is described by Forst (2013:235) as tolerance that is exclusive through inclusivity: 'tolerance that permits and forbids.'

It is against the above-mentioned background that Locke's works on tolerance need to be understood. His main writings in this regard comprised *Two Treatises: Letters Concerning Toleration* as well as three other letters regarding tolerance, which he wrote mainly as a rebuttal of the scholarly critique of Jonas Proast. According to De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008:531), Locke's *Letters Concerning Toleration* are not well-known for their originality, because they simply discuss the saddle-backed, familiar arguments and thoughts regarding tolerance at the time. The uniqueness of these writings does, however, lie in the fact that they encapsulate and further organise into different strands, the scholarly reflections regarding religious tolerance in an analytical and systematic manner.

De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008:523) indicate that Locke's understanding of tolerance was immersed within the Protestant political theology founded on the Augustinian Two Kingdoms theory. This theory divides society into two spheres, the temporal political kingdom and the spiritual kingdom of Christ. The question then is what new aspects distinguish Locke's teachings with regard to tolerance from the so-called premodern conceptualisation of it, such that Locke's understanding of it can be understood in terms of 'liberal tolerance'.

One of the aspects that answer this question comprises Locke's (2003:218) distinction between the two spheres of social life, namely religion and civil government. This also represents a distinction between liberal tolerance and the premodern conceptualisation of tolerance. In the twenty-first century liberal tolerance also asserts that society consists of two spheres: a religious sphere (also referred to as a conceptualisation of what is good), and a civil political sphere. In respect of our modern liberal state, as long as democracy and the constitution of the country are respected, the liberal state may not interfere with the moral and religious life of the individual (Williams, 1996:22).

³³ The Act of Toleration played a key role in the development of tolerance-related teachings, yet the core principles that appear in the law are also present in the work of Locke.

According to Locke (2003:241), the need for a 'good life' includes not only religion, but also civil government. The problem, however, is that moral conduct falls within both spheres, with the consequence that one sphere could dominate the other sphere. It is therefore important to understand how Locke managed to distinguish between these spheres. The first is that of religion. In Locke's explanation of this sphere, he distinguishes between two core theories as regards the understanding of tolerance, namely free conscience, which I categorised under the permission theory, and the epistemological distinction between different normative spheres, which I categorised under normative differences.³⁴

In Locke's (2003:241) understanding of the freedom of conscience, he wrote: 'True faith springs from insight alone.' Anything else, he argued, leads to contravention of the will of God. One cannot be compelled to believe (non-coercion), because every person's redemption depends on himself and none other. The argument that a person cannot be compelled to believe, was extensively discussed during Locke's debates with Proast. For example, Locke (2003:37) once said to Proast:

'The one only narrow way which leads to Heaven is not better known to the Magistrate than to private Persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my Guide, who may properly be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who is certainly less concerned for my salvation than I myself am.'

According to Locke, people cannot be compelled to believe. At best, attempts can only be made to convince them of a specific teaching or persuasion of faith (Locke, 2003:242). Forst (2013:189) argues that Locke tried, in this regard, to privatise religion by granting freedom of religion to every person.

In Locke's third letter to Proast, *Third Letter for Toleration to the Author of the Third Letter Concerning Toleration (1692)*, new thinking appears in the dialogue regarding tolerance – away from the dialogue about free conscience, towards what could best be called an epistemological argument. By using this argument, Locke (1963:144) attempts to relativise religious truth by explaining that reason is the highest authority when it comes to religion and revelation. He also seeks to set boundaries to religious fanaticism, for example, that one's religion might allow one to sacrifice children. Locke (1963:144) explained the epistemological argument as follows:

'To you and me the Christian religion is the true (religion) ... Now do you or I know this? I do not ask with what assurance we believe it, for that in the highest degree not being knowledge, is not what we now inquire after ... For whatever is not capable of demonstration, as such remote matters of fact are not, is not, unless it be self-evident, capable to produce knowledge; persuasion, and not certainty.'

³⁴ Forst (2013:414) uses the concept normative difference to illustrate a separation between different normative spheres, for example the public and the private.

The second sphere within which tolerance must be understood is that of public interest. According to Locke (2003:243), this includes aspects such as external possessions, money, land and furniture. Every person must act in public in order to acquire these things. The common interest is a community of people who are joined together for the protection and promotion of their own public interests. Locke (2003:244) states: 'The jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concerns and it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the soul and its pursuit of salvation³⁵.' He argues that the public sphere relates to the person's temporal life on earth, where s/he needs material things in order to live (Locke, 2003:244). The individual then enters the public community in order to protect her or his material interests.

Locke (2003:244) makes a clear distinction between religion, which is part of the spiritual sphere of the human soul and which is free from any human authority or laws, and the public interest, which is part of the temporal sphere and which is subject to the legislative authority of the magistrate³⁶. This distinction, according to De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008:530), is the clear distinction that developed from the Protestant political theology, founded in the tenets of the Augustinian Two Kingdoms theory.

The distinction between the sphere of religion and the sphere of public government is, however, complicated by the fact that they are theoretical structures, which, in practice, gives rise to numerous problems. De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008:527) point out, for example, that one of these issues has to do with the distinction that splits into two spheres the existence of people who act within the private religious sphere and the public political sphere. De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008:527) assert that the division between the two spheres causes people to 'suffer from a corresponding split of identity: as citizens we are subject to state coercion in the public sphere; as private people we are free.' These problems created the platform for subsequent dialogue with regard to tolerance, which is evident in the thinking of Bayle, Kant and Mill.

The dual distinction that Locke makes (between different normative spheres, the public and the private) gives rise to a further problem: how to distinguish between the two spheres. Where should the boundaries of the normative level be drawn? Surely not all behaviour can be tolerated? Where does the sphere of freedom end, and where and at what point should the state start intervening on behalf of its citizens? These are pivotal issues over which liberal

³⁵ By magistrate, Locke means the highest legislative authority in a community.

³⁶ For an in-depth exposition of Locke's distinction between the spiritual and temporal spheres, refer Locke's *Civil and Ecclesiastical Power* (1997:216).

scholars have been pondering for a long time (McClure, 1990:363). It is clear that it is impossible to separate these two spheres from each other at the normative level.

It is precisely in respect of the dialogue about the boundaries of tolerance between the two spheres where Locke is most fiercely criticised. For example, the title of an article by Biess (2010) is 'Locke's Theory of Intolerance'. The reason why Biess describes Locke's theories regarding tolerance as intolerant, is that Locke alleged that Roman Catholics and atheists could not be tolerated. In his view (Locke, 2003:245), the Roman Catholics could not be tolerated because they demanded obedience to the Pope in the temporal sphere. Locke explained:

'That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince.'

Locke also did not wish to extend tolerance to atheists. According to Locke (2003:246), atheists could not be tolerated because they denied the existence of God. Pledges, covenants or oaths which were the legal bonds of a society therefore exerted no constraints on atheists, because they were unable to take the oath before God. Granting tolerance to atheists was, to Locke, a sign of moral degeneration in a society because, by his lights (Locke, 2003:51), there first had to be obedience to God and thereafter to human laws. The granting of tolerance to atheists would lead to Locke's fear of moral degeneration in society; this is known as '*Locke's fear*' (Forst, 2013:223).

Although Locke made a recognised contribution to the systematic codification of scholarly reflection with regard to tolerance, the following points can be highlighted as having strongly influenced further thinking in this respect:

- The distinction between the two spheres: the spheres of religion and of civil government, which raised the notion that authority or the powers that be had to justify themselves before intruding upon the private domain of religion.
- Locke attempted to relativise religious truth and to recognise that religious faith is only faith and not established knowledge, *per se*.

3.4.4.2 Bayle (1647-1706)

Forst (2013:481) describes Bayle as 'the greatest thinker of tolerance' because Bayle drew a distinction between a religious-ethical and a moral person, something which Locke did not do. Bayle was the first person in the scholarly dialogue regarding tolerance to detach morality from its religious foundations (Forst, 2013:223). The distinction that Bayle made between morality

and religion is, in my view, why Bayle can be called the primary scholar on liberal tolerance, because the distinction between morality and religion is the core principle of liberal tolerance.³⁷

Bayle tried to negate '*Locke's fear*' by using the distinction between morality and religion to justify atheism. According to Bayle (1965a:9.2), morality is a human strength that stands on its own. It is free from any religion. He (Bayle, 1966:172) argues that it is not only fear of God that obliges people to act morally, but also other aspects, such as fear of the law and the desire for recognition by other people. On this basis, Bayle reasoned that atheists also have the capacity to conduct themselves morally.

The conflict over the question of whether tolerance should be extended to atheists paved the way for development of the concept of autonomous morality. Bayle (1965b:8) based this concept on the principle of *reciprocity*. As previously mentioned, reciprocity requires a person to do to other people what s/he would want them to do to him or her. The only difference is that Bayle (1965b:379) understood reciprocity from the epistemological position of making a distinction between morality and religion and in so doing relativising the absolute demands of religious truth. According to Bayle (1987:13), there could not be one true church or even something like an absolute truth. He argues (Bayle, 1987:32) that reciprocity is the only 'natural revelation' and 'universal ray of light', which no one can dispute, because God has enlightened all human beings with it. I have subsumed Bayle's theory on tolerance under the theory of normative difference, because his theory on tolerance boils down to the epistemological distinction between morality and religion.

3.4.4.3 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

In Feuerbach's monograph (1967:103) on Bayle, he argues that Bayle's thinking with regard to autonomous morality anticipated the moral philosophy of Kant, the philosopher who formulated the rationalisation of morality (Brown, 2009:152). Philosophers such as Kant, Rousseau and Voltaire all promoted the autonomous use of public reasoning (Brown, 2009:152). As already mentioned in par. 2.2.2.7 (in Chapter 2), the use of autonomous thinking in public was a fundamental issue for Kant, and the use of autonomous thinking in public as well as public dialogue about aspects of religion played an important role in his philosophy (Pomerleau, 2011:1).

Kant (1996a:54) was of the opinion that the concept of autonomous morality involved the application of a person's own reasoning without the guidance of others. By arguing this, Kant believed that a higher authority like the church, king or state should not command people as to

³⁷ 'Moral autonomy is widely understood by theorists regarding tolerance to constitute the underlying value of the principle of liberal tolerance' (Brown, 2009:154).

how they should think. According to Habermas (1991:3-4) this reasoning of Kant, the rationalisation of morality – critical in respect of any authority – required ‘public dialogue’ as a prerequisite. Autonomous morality would then, according to Kant (1996b:6), be formed through the free use of public dialogue – public reflection on the concepts of metaphysics, autonomy, morality and immorality.

An aspect brought by Kant to the understanding of tolerance was the public importance of the concept of respect. He avers (Kant, 1996a:41) that the defining mark of the Enlightenment’s morality was respect for the autonomously moral, reasonable person (1996a:42), i.e. a person who, within the ‘public dialogue’ or ‘public reason’, could provide and accept reasons for specific types of moral behaviour. Although people developed and functioned within the ‘public reason’ from the vantage point of various ethical and religious identity positions, there was one identity that was required of all people: every person was essentially a moral being. The reason why people needed to have and to show respect for the autonomous moral reasonable person, was because every person him-/herself was such a person. It is for this reason that I understand Kant’s theory of public reason to be a sub-theory of normative difference. I have therefore captured his theory under the inclusivist tolerance theories, as can be seen in figure 3.6:




Figure 3:6 Inclusivist tolerance theories of Kant

3.4.4.4 Mill (1806-1873)

Numerous theories regarding tolerance are combined by Mill in his work entitled *On Liberty*. Mill devised a secularised basis for tolerance, saying (Mill, 1974:30) there were too few rational

grounds that could serve as proof of the truth of any religion. The only reasonable attitude towards religion would therefore be public agnosticism. People should therefore, according to him (Mill, 1974:31), be tolerant towards any religion, not because this was the best way to arrive at the truth – whatever the truth may be – but because there was insufficient evidence that would allow anyone to arrive at the truth.

Mill is known particularly for his ‘Harm principle’, which is described by De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008:527) as the core principle in use today for public dialogue³⁸. In terms of the ‘Harm principle’, any social or political restriction with regard to public religious behaviour should always be justified. Only the avoidance of harm to others, through the principle of reciprocity, would be an acceptable legal justification for particular social or political restrictions (Mill, 1974:50). It is for this reason that I understand Mill’s theory of the harm principle to be a sub-theory of normative difference. I have therefore captured his theory under the inclusivist tolerance theories, as can be seen in figure 3.7:




Figure 3:7 Inclusivist tolerance theories of Mill

3.4.5 Postmodern tolerance (1900-including current thinking)

Afdal (2010:606-610) describes important theories on tolerance which developed during the twentieth century and divides it into the following three theories:

³⁸ As previously discussed, two other principles that played a role in Kant’s ‘public dialogue’ were reciprocity and respect.

- Critical tolerance theories: Afdal (2010:607) refers to critical tolerance theories as theories which are critical towards particular aspects of tolerance. Critical tolerance theories distinguish, for example, between false and true tolerance and 'pure' and 'impure' tolerance. This kind of tolerance is best explained by Herbert Marcuse's essay, *Repressive tolerance* (1965). Marcuse (1965:134) did not want to dismiss the ideal of tolerance, but he pleaded for it to be changed. According to him, tolerance has to take sides and must be defined in the light of truth, freedom and liberation. Anyone trying to avert truth, freedom, and liberation, should not be tolerated (Marcuse, 1965:100), a notion that could obviously be frowned upon, not only from an epistemological point of view, but also from a moral one. Tolerance can therefore not be extended to everyone as the pure liberal concept of tolerance suggests. Marcuse's thoughts regarding tolerance highlighted the constant conflict necessary for tolerance to be understood as true (resp. 'authentic') tolerance.
- Communitarian tolerance theories: When Afdal (2010:609) refers to Communitarian tolerance theories he refers to tolerance as being determined by the particular social context or contexts of a particular community. Communitarian tolerance theories therefore claim that tolerance takes shape differently in various social contexts. For instance, tolerance in nation states takes shape differently from tolerance in immigrant societies (Afdal, 2010:609). Communitarian tolerance of tolerance is best explained by Waltzer's (1997) contextual understanding thereof. Waltzer (1997:10-11) draws attention to the importance of the context in which each theory of tolerance should be understood. He explains significant concepts such as resigned acceptance, indifference to difference, recognition of others' rights, openness and respect.
- Postmodern tolerance theories: This kind of tolerance is described in Richard Rorty's *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (1989). Rorty's understanding of difference is an important contribution to understanding tolerance. Difference, according to him (Rorty, 1989: xvi), is all pervasive and is not an aspect that should or could be overcome. There is also no neutral position from which difference could be evaluated or understood, and this is the main reason why it is referred to as 'postmodern' in nature.

The increase in terrorism in the late twentieth century has exerted a significant influence on studies with regard to the concept of tolerance. Jones (2006:123) enquires whether tolerance is not an ideal that has now come to a standstill. To gain a better understanding of the current thinking on tolerance one should take note of the scholarly critique on exclusivist and inclusivist tolerance theories.

3.4.5.1 Scholarly critique against exclusivist tolerance theories

Exclusivist tolerance theories arise from the premise of the permission theory. The latter exists when the majority of the population tolerates the minority living within the same environment. Forst (2013:28) describes this theory as follows: 'Tolerance is understood accordingly as *permissio mali*, as putting up with a conviction or practice which is regarded as neither worthy nor deserving of equal treatment, even though it does not exceed the 'limits of the bearable'.' Paetzold (2008: 943) refers to the previously mentioned, well-known historical example of the *Edict of Nantes*, which was issued by the King of France, Henri IV, in 1568. This edict allowed the Protestant Huguenots to live in relative safety and peace in a country in which they were the minority.

Scholarly critique against the permission theory originated with opposition to Augustine, who had laid the basis for a particular understanding of this theory. The reason for the critique was that his thoughts regarding tolerance were believed to have shifted during his dispute with the Donatists. Augustine initially attempted to resolve differences in a peaceful manner, but during the early part of the fifth century his thinking regarding tolerance changed, because he considered it necessary to 'coerce' the Donatists to believe in the authority of the Church. By 'coercion' to belief, Augustine did not mean physical coercion or torture – he understood it as application of the governing power to 'coerce' those who did not believe in the 'truth' or listened to the 'truth'. Augustine said, on the grounds of his understanding of eternal life and eternal death, that it was better for people to be 'coerced' (and hence treated somewhat intolerantly) to listen and perhaps thereby to inherit eternal life, than to leave them alone, as this would lead to eternal death (Augustine, 1989:93,2).

Also inherent in the understanding of exclusivist tolerance theories, is the duty of a person or group to be intolerant of aspects and conduct that might be in contrast to his/her/their own moral principles. This can be explained simply by means of a father's education of his children. A father who believes that there is a 'right way of living' leads his children to live within this 'right way of living'; this then requires the father to act intolerantly against the 'wrong way of living'. An aspect of premodern tolerance is the Two Kingdoms theory, implying that there is a 'right' kingdom and a 'wrong' kingdom. Although there is a measure of tolerance towards the 'wrong' kingdom, in the interests of maintaining peace within a society, there are also limits of tolerance towards the 'wrong' kingdom. The reason for the limits of tolerance exercised by the 'right' kingdom towards the 'wrong' kingdom is that the thinking of the 'wrong' kingdom is considered to be polluted and immoral (Forst, 2013:406).

Further scholarly critique against the permission theory, categorised under exclusivist tolerance that arises from its concept of tolerance, is that tolerance is simply used to hoodwink

people by inviting them in so that they can be proselytised, evangelised or informed of the one and only, singular, 'truth' (Turner, 2011:267). Subsequently, within the permission theory there is a particular kind of deafness towards those who may hold different opinions, and this inhibits any religious discussion at the level of authentic dialogue (Raath, 1994:537). The sharp scholarly critique of Hawkins (1971:354), who criticised Christian universities as being 'mediocre in their teachings, and narrow-minded', seems particularly apt in this regard.

Further scholarly critique against exclusivist tolerance theories is that any pressure on the limits of tolerance emanating from outside the permission theory may lead to a form of fundamentalism (Greenberg, 1997:389). This is the claim of a specific group that it alone knows the truth and how it should be protected, and refers to the contextual condition of a group of people who view the role of their religion as more significant than that of any other religion (Potgieter & Van der Walt, 2014a:3). Emerson and Hartman (2006:129) define fundamentalism as follows:

'Groups that want their religion practised purely are called fundamentalist, as are groups pushing for an overhaul of the national or global political system who are at best culturally connected to a religion.'

The aim of fundamentalism's protection of the truth against any threat is to restore the exclusivist credibility of the 'original faith'. According to Greenberg (1997:390), the fundamentalist is then driven to suppress any alternative religion, even through the use of political or military power, which then leads to forms of intolerance. Some well-known and previously mentioned examples of fundamentalist thinking leading to intolerance by means of violent action, include that of the Muslim fundamentalist attacks by Al-Qaeda on the American World Trade Centre (11 September 2001); the current strife in Syria, the recent 'Arab Spring' uprisings as well as the conflicts in Nigeria between the Muslim North and the Christian South (cf. Potgieter *et al.*, 2014(b):1 for further details).

3.4.5.2 Scholarly critique against inclusivist tolerance theories

According to Brown (2009:46), inclusivist tolerance theories require that those people who are being tolerated no longer lay any claim to the public or political life developing out of their 'differences'. The people who are being tolerated are therefore accepted only insofar as they do not make any political statements, and as long as they live and practise their differences in their private capacities. According to Laegaard (2008:293), inclusivist tolerance theories are interpreted as the need to maintain neutrality and blindness to differences. The so-called 'blindness to differences' is an essential condition for the neutrality of liberal tolerance, so that liberal state policies cannot grant or withhold rights or privileges in respect of, for example, culture, religion, gender or race. According to Galeotti (2006:573), such theories (inclusivist tolerance theories) typecast minorities in a manner that the norms of members of the minority

group differ from those of the dominant social group.³⁹ Since norms relate to rights and appropriate conduct in the social community, 'normative differences' are not perceived as different, but as wrong.

In light of this understanding of inclusivist tolerance theories, the well-known scholarly critique of Von Goethe (2005:116) against tolerance seems relevant here. He avers: 'To tolerate means to insult.' Hans Oberdiek (2001:18) concurs when he states:

'No one likes being tolerated; most resent it. To be tolerated is to be an object of contempt, condescension or patronizing suffocation. The alleged virtue of tolerance encourages tolerators to indulge in a groundless, smug complacency celebrating their own superiority. While it is surely better to be tolerated than persecuted, at least persecutors regard those whom they persecute as being worthy of persecution. The tolerant often like to present themselves as displaying great forbearance and magnanimity of soul by not letting up how offensive, childlike or otherwise deficient they actually find the objects of their tolerance.'

In the same sense, the historian Zeldin (2012:272) argues:

'The tolerated are increasingly demanding to be appreciated, not ignored, and becoming more sensitive to suggestions of contempt lurking behind the condescension. They do not want to be told that differences do not matter, that they can think what they like, provided they keep to themselves, out of the way of the majority. ...The ideal of tolerance can now be seen to be not a goal, but a stepping-stone. Understanding others is the great adventure that lies beyond it.'

One important consequence of the inclusivist liberal understanding with regard to tolerance is that the original liberal promises of openness to culture, language, religion, race or gender alter, change into a reservedness and a resistance against the complete inclusion of minority groups. According to Galeotti (2006:571), this resistance is explained by the apparent threat against the neutral public sphere by groups that do not accept the principle of neutrality. Mouritsen and Olsen (2013:137) argue that the neutral liberal promises of a free liberal society are rapidly nullified, because they avoid the fact that not all differences can fit into the private-public distinction.

The scholarly critique of Galeotti (2002:96-97) against liberal tolerance implies, that in ignoring differences between citizens, liberal tolerance is unable to combat the exclusion of members of minorities, since it cannot even address citizens as members of minorities; furthermore, it indirectly sustains and reinforces the dominance of the societal standards of the majority, and

³⁹ The relative power of minority and majority groups should not be understood only in the democratic sense of the numbers in the group; it relates rather to that of the dominant group. The dominant group is the group that has the right of speech. This can perhaps be best explained by referring to Apartheid in South Africa, where the minority group in respect of numbers (the whites) had the right of speech as a result of their occupying the powerful position of the oppressor.

hence upholds exclusion. Inclusivist liberal tolerance that relies on openness and inclusivity for all therefore contradicts itself by being blind to differences, regarding, e.g., culture, race, religion or gender.

According to Enns *et al.* (2005:21), one of the dangers of inclusivist liberal tolerance is that it engenders a feeling of uncertainty among minority groups. Enns *et al.* (2005:21) explain that, in religiously and ideologically neutral states, people have so-called 'patchwork identities', with the result that identity, as an ontological construct, becomes relative. At the same time, the demands of tolerance are absolute (contradicting its so called inclusivist stance) and there is intolerance towards any form of identity. The reaction of fundamentalism to the liberal blindness towards identity, and to the inclusivist liberal intolerance of identity, results in fundamentalists proclaiming loud and clear: 'Do you know who I am?' as they are flying aircraft into buildings (September 11, 2001), and decapitating foreign journalists (although hiding behind black masks) for the purpose of making their voices heard⁴⁰. Hence, 'In the Arab world, as well as in conservative Christian circles, intolerant fundamentalism has become a counter-reaction to the manifold threat to one's own identity.' (Enns *et al.*, 2005:21)

Goudzwaard and Van der Vennen (2007:66) explain that almost every intellectual Muslim was in love with the West in the early 20th century, but that in the 21st century the love-relationship of the Muslims with the West has shifted into one of hatred.⁴¹ According to Goudzwaard and Van der Vennen (2007:67), the fundamentalist Muslim hatred towards the West has its origins in the blindness of the West to identity differences and intolerance towards any form of religious or cultural identity.

Lastly, the 'blindness to differences' practised by inclusivist liberal tolerance is primarily a blindness towards 'conceptions of the good' (Laegaard, 2008:295). The 'difference blindness' of inclusivist liberal tolerance could also lead to a tolerance without limits – where it is clear that tolerance should have limits, because there are deviant, immoral practices that cannot be tolerated, such as murder, rape, theft or molestation (Galeotti, 2002:22).

Tolerance without limits often leads to a version of moral decay, as previously mentioned – it is commonly known as 'Locke's Fear', 'the fear that too much tolerance could destroy the normative foundations of society' (Forst, 2013:518). It is ironical that a liberal state's own emphasis on neutrality leads to challenges to the ethical-moral values of the majority which ultimately undermine the very foundation of the liberal state (Forst, 2013:551). According to

⁴⁰ For the reaction of Fundamentalism to the pressure from Pluralism or the relativisation of identity, refer Greenberg (1997:389).

⁴¹ Although I use the example of the Muslims, Goudzwaard and Van der Vennen (2007:68) make it clear that this should not be limited to the Muslims, but that it also includes Christian fundamentalism and that of any other faith as well.

Charles (2007:212), inclusivist liberal tolerance is a culture in which people believe nothing, possess no clear concept of right and wrong, and are remarkably indifferent to this precarious state of affairs. Tolerance of this kind therefore becomes an absolute good that gains the power to erode other cultural differences, including moral and religious differences, without clarity of terms for what might be permitted, legally or intellectually. Such tolerance thereby rushes in to support moral relativism.

According to Carson (2012:163,) the increase in studies regarding tolerance, as well as questions about the relevance of inclusivist liberal tolerance, all reflect a longing for clear orientation with regard to what may be considered as right and wrong respectively, as well as a search for a worldview that clearly distinguishes between right and wrong, including a quest for a basis to, of and for morality. In his book *Why the rest hates the West: Understanding the roots of global rage*, Meic Pearse explains how the inclusivist liberal understanding of tolerance is perceived as a threat to other cultures:

‘The currency of the term tolerance has become badly debased. Where it used to mean the respecting of real, hard differences, it has come to mean instead a dogmatic abdication of truth-claims and a moralistic adherence to moral relativism. Where premodern tolerance allowed hard differences on religion and morality to rub shoulders and compete freely in the public square, liberal tolerance wishes to lock them all indoors as matters of private judgment; the public square must be given over to indistinctness.’ (Pearse, 2004:12).

3.4.5.3 The postmodern responses to the epistemological dilemma

The aforementioned scholarly critique of exclusivist and inclusivist tolerance theories is proof of the growing body of scholarly critique against the concept of tolerance, *per se*. Various scholars are investigating the possibility of rethinking or even rejecting the notion of tolerance. Paetzold (2008:944), for example, asks ‘whether the concept of tolerance is still relevant’. Exclusivist critique on inclusivist tolerance and inclusivist critique on exclusivist tolerance form part of the different responses to the epistemological dilemma caused by the absolutistic and relativistic theories of knowledge (as explained in chapter 2.3). Ewick (2001:22) suggested in his article ‘Mending Fences: Beyond the Epistemological dilemma’, that there are three kinds of responses to this dilemma:

- Those who choose an exclusivist approach to tolerance.
- Those who choose an inclusivist approach to tolerance.
- Those who look for positive alternatives between the exclusivist and inclusivist tolerance theories.

Based on the above-mentioned responses to the epistemological dilemma highlighted by Ewick (2001:22), I decided to categorise the current responses to the epistemological dilemma into three groups:

- The scholars working with the concept of exclusivist tolerance theories deal with theories on identity and reflect on the notion of tolerance within the epistemic boundaries of the permission theories. Academics who work within this epistemological approach to tolerance include, amongst others,: Brewer and Pierce (2005), *Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance*; Schellenberg and Geddert (2005), *Phinehas and the Pharisees: Identity and Tolerance in Biblical Perspective*; Ringenberg (2006), *The Christian College*; Masroori (2009), *An Islamic Language of Toleration*; Setran (2012), *More Religion in Education and More Education in Religion*; Carson (2012), *The Intolerance of Tolerance* and Van der Walt (2013), *How not to internationalize – and perhaps secularize – Christian Higher Education*.
- The scholars operating within the epistemological approach to inclusivist tolerance theories investigate the principle of normative differences, with its sub-theories, for example theories on public reasoning, respect and the 'harm principle'. Academics who work within this epistemological approach to tolerance include, amongst others: Keaten and Soukup (2009), *Dialogue and Religious Otherness*; Green (2010), *Two Worries about Respect for Persons*; Tate (2010), *Toleration, neutrality and historical illiteracy*; Swaine (2011), *The ascendant liberal conscience: a response to three critics*; Dobbernack and Modood (2013), *Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect* and Brincat (2013), *The Harm Principle and Recognition Theory*.
- Those scholars who doubt whether exclusivist tolerance theories and inclusivist tolerance theories are attainable ideals, are in search of a variety of positive alternatives to tolerance. Academics who function within this epistemological approach to tolerance include, amongst others: Deveaux (2000), *Cultural pluralism and dilemmas of justice*; Galeotti (2002), *Toleration as Recognition*; Creppell (2003), *Toleration and identity: foundations of early modern thought*; Bohman (2003), *Reflexive toleration in a deliberative democracy*; Collins (2009), *Redeeming the Enlightenment: New Histories of Religious Toleration*; Afdal (2010), *The Maze of Tolerance*; Forst (2013), *Toleration in Conflict* and Dastmalchian (2013), *The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion*.

3.5 Conceptualisation of religious tolerance

So then, what is tolerance? The current escalation in acts of terrorism and war has seen such an increase in calls for more tolerance that the word 'tolerance' has been steadily diluted in meaning, and is even perceived by some academics to be meaningless and, consequently, worthless (Jones, 2006:123). Collins (2009:608) argues that tolerance should be positioned within the context of its historical development. According to him (2009:609) the expanding collection of scholarly works regarding tolerance is in urgent need of 'professional historians' capable of marshalling the work already done with respect to tolerance.

From the historical review, it became clear that multidimensional concepts of tolerance currently co-exist. It is important for any scholarly attempt at conceptualising tolerance also to understand it in terms of its historical development. Such a historical review enhances understanding of the various nuances surrounding the phenomenon. It also enhances understanding of the various problems surrounding a phenomenon, and finally, a historical overview of a phenomenon casts an important light on the current context within which the phenomenon is discussed. It still has to be further reduced or narrowed down to its core thoughts or ideas (building blocks), which could then be used in the development of practical guidelines for religious tolerance in, for example, mono-religious higher education institutions like AROS. In the historical overview (discussed and explained in par. 3.4.1-3.4.5), I identified a variety of tolerance theories, which I subsequently categorised in terms of either exclusivist, or inclusivist theories of tolerance.

Under exclusivist tolerance theories I identified the main theory as the permission theory, with its sub-theories perfectionism, freedom of conscience and finitude of reason (these theories are discussed and explained in par.3.4.1.1). Under the inclusivist tolerance theories I identified two main theories. Firstly, I discussed ethical moral unity theories with their sub-theories adiaphora and competitive unity, and secondly, normative difference theories with their sub-theories, namely respect theories, public reason and the harm principle (these theories are discussed and explained in par. 3.4.4.4)⁴². The tolerance theories captured under these two categories (exclusivist tolerance theories and inclusivist tolerance theories) may be conceptually illustrated in the following manner (Figure 3.8):

⁴² Although the harm principle is not a *principle*, but a theory, most scholars refer to it as the harm principle and therefore I decided to maintain the status quo.




Figure 3:8 Exclusivist and inclusivist tolerance theories

The following table (Table 3.1) illustrates different philosophers' ideas and theories with respect to religious tolerance, and provides a summary of their thinking. The tables that follow were compiled using the 'justification principle' of Forst (2013), and are arranged in chronological order according to the birthdate of the philosopher.

During the period from Tertullian to Luther, only the permission theory and the theory of ethical and moral unity manifested in the various philosophers' scholarly reflections about tolerance. The clear distinction between the period of premodern tolerance and the period of liberal tolerance is noticeable, as no theories on normative difference appears before Sebastian Franck. Liberal tolerance emerged only after the writings of Sebastian Franck and Sebastian Castellio's on tolerance were published. This table explains that the 16th century's religious wars, and the debates and thinking with regard to tolerance that stemmed from them, had an enduring influence on the philosophers of the 17th and 18th century. The classification of tolerance in the tables suggests that Rawls (1999: XXIV) might just have been correct to interpret liberalism as a result of tolerance, instead of accepting the prevailing idea that tolerance was a result of liberalism. The theory of normative value (virtue) of liberalism therefore represents liberal tolerance, which addresses the so-called normative differences between universal morality and religious dogma, in which universal morality seems to hold the highest value.

Table 3:1 Exclusivist and inclusivist tolerance theories and philosophers' with respect to religious tolerance

	Exclusivist tolerance theories			Inclusivist tolerance theories				
	Permission Theory			Ethical and moral unity		Normative difference		
	Perfectionism	Freedom of conscience	Finitude of reason	Adiaphora	Competitive unity	Respect theories	Public reason	Harm principle
Person								
Tertullian (160-225)	x							
Lactantius (240-320)	x							
Augustine (354-430)	x	x	x					
Abelard (1079-1142)				x				
Maimonides(1135-1204)				x				
Averroës (1126-1198)				x	x			
Aquinas (1225-1274)	x	x						
Llull (1232-1315)				x				
Marsilius of Padua (1275-1342)				x				
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464)				x				
Ficino (1433-1499)				x				
Pico (1463–1494)				x				
Erasmus (1466-1536)	x			x	x			

Machiavelli (1469-1527)		x						
Luther (1483-1546)	x	x						
	Exclusivist tolerance theories			Inclusivist tolerance theories				
	Permission Theory			Ethical and moral unity		Normative difference		
	Perfectionism	Freedom of conscience	Finitude of reason	Adiaphora	Competitive unity	Respect theories	Public reason	Harm principle
Person								
Franck (1499 -1543)						x		
Castellio (1515-1563)				x	x	x		
Coornhert (1522-1590)			x					
Bodin (1530-1596)						x		
Politiques (dates)						x		
Montaigne (1533-1592)			x					
Althusius (1563 -1638)				x				
Hobbes (1588-1679)	x	x		x				
Milton (1608-1674)							x	
Spinoza (1632-1677)	x	x						
Locke (1632-1704)	x	x			x	x		
Proast (1640-1710)	x	x						
Bayle (1647-1706)		x				x		
Montesquieu (1689-1755)		x				x		

Voltaire (1694-1778)					x				
Rousseau (1712-1778)					x				
Holbach (1723-1789)							x		
Kant (1724-1804)							x	x	
Lessing (1729-1781)						x	x		
Herder (1744-1803)					x			x	
Humboldt (1767-1835)							x		
Schleiermacher (1768-1834)					x				
Mill (1806–1873)			x			x	x	x	x
Kelsen (1881-1973)							x		

From the table above it is easy to distinguish between the old and the so-called new theories pertaining to tolerance. According to Forst (2013:358), the basic principle of an alternative for the understanding of tolerance had already been worked out before the modernism of the 19th century. Since the Enlightenment, tolerance theories have only been applied in accordance with changing social conditions. All of the debates regarding tolerance today are, according to that author (Forst, 2013:518), mere repetitions of longstanding debates, particularly the debates between scholars in favour of the permission theories and those who are in favour of the normative differences theories.

The historical overview of, and the conceptual framework of scholarly reflections, on tolerance provide us with a workable overview of the complexity of tolerance and how the call for more tolerance needs to be more specifically qualified in terms of the different concepts of tolerance. According to Afdal (2010:599), it becomes clear upon examining the historical overview of tolerance, that there are cases where tolerance can be deemed 'expectable' and others where it can be deemed 'unacceptable'. The same applies to intolerance. Afdal (2010:599) explains:

'No serious person or theory operates with absolute tolerance. Even the most tolerant person would admit that there are limits to tolerance and acceptance. This means that both tolerance and intolerance may be legitimate and illegitimate, according to the theory and the understanding of the situation in question.'

According to Afdal (2010:603), we still find two main concepts with regard to intolerance that accuse each other of intolerant conduct. As mentioned above (par. 3.4.5.3) Ewick (2001:22) explains that there are three kinds of responses to the epistemological dilemma caused by the absolutistic and relativistic theory of knowledge: those who choose or behave according to an exclusivist tolerance theory, those who choose or behave according to an inclusivist tolerance theory and those who look for positive alternatives between these two polarities.

Personally, I am of the opinion that the thought of doing away with scholarly reflection on tolerance is unfounded, and considers neither its historical development, nor various epistemological approaches associated with the subject. Scholarly reflection with regard to tolerance should rather seek to answer the question posed by Paetzold (2008:945): 'How can we attribute new relevance to the concept of tolerance?' This leads us to the epistemological approach to tolerance in the last group, as suggested by Ewick, namely those in search of a variety of positive alternatives to tolerance. Such alternatives, according to Afdal (2010:601), mean doing something active towards tolerating people, actions, or phenomena. In this sense, theories about tolerance should, through the behaviour of people, manifest in a variety of tolerance practices.

As explained in chapter 2 (par. 2.4) there is an argument to be made that tolerance (as in religious tolerance) represents a critical behavioural outcome of a person's epistemological stance towards his or her religion. To conceptualise religious tolerance, it is not only important to understand the different theories on tolerance, but also the 'everyday language of (religious) tolerance', as Afdal (2010:598) refers to tolerance behaviour.

Afdal (2010:610) is also of the opinion that tolerance has, since the Enlightenment, been developed as a liberal idea, although 'today, tolerance can, however, be understood within a number of different theoretical perspectives.' Some of the divergent theoretical perspectives on tolerance of the twentieth century are the recognition, respect and hospitality theories, which are important contributions to positive alternatives in this regard. The recognition, respect and hospitality theories address important concepts regarding tolerance for the nature and purpose of my study. In turn, these have assisted me to formulate a theory of religious tolerance for mono-religious higher education institutions, including possible guidelines for religious tolerance practice in mono-religious higher education institutions.

According to Von Goethe (2005:116), 'tolerance is an insult' if it does not lead to recognition. Tolerance-as-recognition is, however, not a new idea. It has been reconceptualised and redeveloped by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti. It also offers an important approach to the concept of religious tolerance. The reason why I specifically highlight tolerance-as-recognition, is because I am of the opinion that tolerance-as-recognition, as developed by Galeotti, creates an important dialogic and multilogic⁴³ space in which Derrida's (2000), Keet's (2010) and Potgieter's (2015) respect and hospitality theories could be used to offer an important perspective on current scholarly attempts at reconsidering this concept. Tolerance-as-recognition is, furthermore, more than just a theory, because it is also based upon the behavioural outcome of religious tolerance (see par. 3.5.1 below). Finally, I believe that the theory of tolerance-as-recognition could also contribute to a better understanding of tolerance, specifically in the South African context, given the nature and scope of our own lingering cultural and religious differences.

3.5.1 Tolerance as recognition

Galeotti (2002:20) describes religious tolerance as a social value and a political principle that ensures the peaceful coexistence of individuals and groups who have different religious

⁴³ Religious respect and hospitality-related multiloguing intentionally seeks to extend the conventional notion of dialogue between, for example, a lecturer and his/her students by introducing additional "voices" (besides that of the lecturer and his/her students) for the duration of any teaching-learning opportunity. Besides the lecturer and his/her students, these voices might, therefore, also take the form of a variety of pedagogic tools and strategies of and for mediation between the lecturer and his/her students. They might, for example, include (depending on the higher education institution itself, as well as on the nature and scope of its curricula and concomitant subject matter) material artefacts, theoretical cognifacts, political, traditional, lifestyle and communal cultifacts, values-driven teleofacts, or even practical tasks.

understandings and practices. She proposes that we should rethink the concept of tolerance-as-recognition. The concept of tolerance-as-recognition, she believes, affords tolerance a particular kind of instrumental value within contemporary liberal democratic communities (Galeotti, 2002:20). She (Galeotti, 2002:10) makes the point that the changed circumstances in social communities mean that we should review and rethink tolerance, rather than do away with this ideal.

To 'recognise' a person means to '**RE**-cognise' that person, which is to reconsider – anew and through regular practice – the person whom you think you already know. Galeotti (2002) and Jones (2006:127) use recognition in the sense of awareness; in other words to accept and to value. According to Forst (2008:79), recognition implies the positive acknowledgement of a religion which for some reason one might not find as attractive as one's own. Specific aspects of a religious faith different from one's own could perhaps look attractive, yet one may eventually find other aspects to be misleading. Jones (2006:123) explains that the search for tolerance is usually a search for the recognition of identity. To be recognised indicates a positive form of tolerance, which connects better with the appreciation and embracing of diversity. According to Walzer (1997:10), recognition moves one along a normative continuum which causes an attitude or behaviour that recognises diversity. All the following aspects, which I identified from the tolerance-as-recognition theory, move one along this normative continuum:

- Tolerance-as-recognition shifts religious, cultural, racial and gender differences from the private to the public sphere.
- Tolerance-as-recognition is a process that confers status upon a religious, cultural, racial and gender identity.
- Tolerance-as-recognition means that both tolerance and intolerance require public justification.
- Tolerance-as-recognition includes the recognition of conflict.
- Tolerance-as-recognition includes recognition of the self.
- Tolerance-as-recognition includes the recognition of others.
- Tolerance-as-recognition moves one from intolerance, to tolerating difference, to hospitality.

The recognition theory as a positive response to the epistemological dilemma with its different components is conceptually captured in Figure 3.9 below:




Figure 3:9 Recognition theory as a positive response to the epistemological dilemma

3.5.1.1 Shift differences from the private to the public

The first aspect of tolerance-as-recognition highlighted by Galeotti (2002:10) is that any difference, whether religious, cultural, racial or gender, must shift from the private to the public domain of tolerance. What should consequently be tolerated is the presence of different forms of conduct in public, such as in schools, the army or the police. According to Galeotti (2006:573), laws and policies on public tolerance will typically include those laws and policies that allow for different forms of social conduct in public.

By ‘public’, Galeotti means tolerance that is widely recognisable, so that tolerance extends across social areas. Social areas, by default, extend further than the traditional private areas. By allowing tolerance to extend (in)to the public domain, Galeotti (2006:574) seeks to bring positive change to the negative aspect – ‘blindness to differences’ – of relativistic tolerance theories, by altering tolerance into a form of public recognition. Galeotti regards tolerance as

recognition, acceptance and inclusion of different forms of social conduct, religious convictions and identities in an open society⁴⁴.

3.5.1.2 *Confers status upon an identity*

The second aspect of Galeotti's (2002:133) theory on tolerance-as-recognition is that tolerance is more than just acceptance of a person, group or idea; it includes actively coming to know and creating space for the person, group or idea. According to her (2002:223), recognition plays a more constructive role than exclusivist and inclusivist tolerance theories. She regards tolerance-as-recognition as a process that confers status upon an identity: 'Recognition confers, rather than merely notices, value.' A society's public rules and mutual agreements can therefore recognise a specific group by conferring formal recognition upon it within the society. This can, for example, be done by granting special recognition and concessions to that group. By adding the aspect of recognition to tolerance, one confers status or standing to the person or group from whom one happens to differ.

Galeotti's tolerance-as-recognition theory represents a good example of what Nancy Fraser (2001:23) had in mind when she proposed her 'status model of recognition'. Fraser's status model of recognition is not concerned with different identities *per se*, but rather with the social inclusion of different identities. This takes place, according to Fraser (2001:23), by conferring status or standing upon people or groups through offering them the opportunity to live as full, mature and responsible, whole members (displaying integrity of character) of society.

3.5.1.3 *Tolerance requires public justification*

The third aspect of the recognition theory is that tolerance-as-recognition should justify both intolerant and tolerant conduct in public. According to Galeotti (2002:101), the reason for intolerant conduct in respect of differences should be a public concern. As soon as tolerance-as-recognition is grounded in public recognition, deeds of public tolerance will receive a symbolical meaning as far as the inclusion of minorities in the public sphere is concerned (Galeotti, 2002:104-105). Any policy that moves away from the concept of 'blindness to differences', with the explicit purpose of including minorities, falls within the concept of tolerance-as-recognition.

In respect of public justification of tolerance, it is important to mention that tolerant people or groups need not have regard for other perspectives as being more or less equal in truth to their own. Tolerant people should only be able to recognise whether other perspectives are reasonable and not immoral (Forst, 2013:460). Tolerant people or groups should

⁴⁴ By 'open society' Galeotti (2006:574) refers to aspects such as religion, culture, race and gender enjoying public attention; not only private attention.

acknowledge that there are various reasonable religious and non-religious ethical perspectives that might nevertheless lead to conflict. These conflicts are rationally resolvable only within the limits of reciprocity and justified public norms, values and demands of propriety (Forst, 2013:483).

3.5.1.4 Recognition of conflict

Tolerance-as-recognition also includes the recognition of conflict. The plea for more tolerance is, however, not without disadvantages. When people share divergent points of view with regard to what should be recognised as right or good, and when they view these differences in the context of different identities, those clashing concepts will become stumbling blocks to mutual recognition. The German philosopher, Rainer Forst, has formulated what is probably the most advanced theory of tolerance to date. In his work, he analyses the long and complicated history of scholarly reflection regarding tolerance. In his book, *Tolerance in conflict* (Forst, 2013), the author localises tolerance in its historical, political and cultural contexts. In my opinion, he convincingly demonstrates that tolerance remains a controversial concept, notion and subject.

Tolerance as a behavioural phenomenon always harbours a component of rejection. A person tolerates someone or something with whom or with which s/he cannot agree; this could even include a different faith or way of living. It is important, however, to notice that the component of rejection needs to be coupled with a component of recognition or acceptance, as far as tolerance-as-recognition is concerned (Paetzold, 2008:943). Galeotti (2002:22) describes tolerance-as-recognition as the principle of a society that lives in peace, even though there may happen to be irreconcilable and clashing differences in such a society.

Forst (2013:399) demonstrates that if conflict arises, understanding of the other person's reasons is not only possible, but also essential to tolerance, because reasonable conflict is better than unreasonable conflict. Reasonable people realise and recognise that other people have reasons for their ethical convictions. Such a person should nevertheless realise that, in the interest of peace, s/he should at least try to understand the ethical convictions of the other person, as well as the other person's reasons for embracing those convictions.

3.5.1.5 Recognition of the self

The development of tolerance-as-recognition also includes recognition of people's own identity. One of Galeotti's central arguments is that members of any minority group are increasingly excluded by liberal tolerance from full citizenship in particular societies, as a consequence of their identity which is usually judged negatively by the majority in those societies. According to Galeotti (2002:97), this exclusion of the minority is a consequence of the majority constantly subjecting the minority to a negative feeling about themselves.

Galeotti (2006:573) explains that the negative evaluation of the minority by the majority leads to members of the minority beginning to rate themselves negatively. Laegaard (2008:296) points out that Galeotti's argument concerning the minority's negative identity is aligned with Taylor's theory of the 'dialogical constitution of identity', meaning that the way in which other people perceive a person has a meaningful influence on the way that person perceives him-/herself.

According to Schwöbel (2002:25), one's ethical orientation is composed of one's understanding of one's own identity. By recognising one's own identity, one will be able to see that one belongs to a particular group or community; and through realising that one is always in some kind of relationship with someone else, one no longer sees oneself as an isolated individual. Recognition of a person's own identity will assist that person to counter his/her negative evaluation and modify it into a positive evaluation. A lack of identity, on the other hand, might lead to rejection of anything that is peculiar or strange, because its difference could be interpreted as a threat to one's own identity. The effect is intolerance towards the other, simply because the other is not understood.

Mavunduse and Oxley (2002:12) argue that one of the necessary means through which violence can be overcome is by starting to clarify a person or a group's identity. As soon as identities are threatened, a culture of violence develops. According to Enns (2005:22), an identity that is suppressed morphs over time into some form of violent social behaviour. Of course, this cannot be perceived as a justifiable explanation for terrorist attacks. Sustained humiliation based on the denial of identity leads to frustration in many minorities⁴⁵. This frustration is caused by the fact that minorities are often ignored, and such frustration easily converts into a form of fundamentalism, a fundamentalism that cries out to be heard. Moreover, Enns (2005:22) contends that fundamentalism always attempts, in its cry to be heard, to justify violence.

Enns (2005:24) also avers that equanimity about one's own identity enables one to judge what is acceptable, what is bearable and what should be rejected. Only if this judgement is based on one's own identity, will one be able to tolerate the differences of and in others. Tolerance is therefore not possible if a person or group is unsure of his/her/their own identity (2005:24). It will lead to general relativism and hence to a greater divide between differences. This increased divide will then lead to a growing inability to engage in reasonable, authentic dialogue (Enns, 2005:24).

⁴⁵ The solution proposed by Kazanjian (2000); Jarvis (2009); de Freitas (2011) and Raditoaneng (2011) to avoid identity or do away with it will therefore lead to intolerance, rather than to tolerance.

3.5.1.6 Recognition of others

The last aspect to which I wish to draw attention, regards the recognition of others. Tolerance-as-recognition will lead to openness to differences, and will therefore invite every culture, religion or race to share their arguments with the public from their own perspectives (Conway, 2014:28). Only through such open discussion will we be able to determine what is acceptable, what is bearable, as well as what should be rejected, and on what grounds. We shall, in doing so, learn together how different cultures or religions could contribute to the establishment and preservation of a society, and also what we can reasonably expect and not expect from a particular culture or religion. Enns (2005:29) argues that we cannot do without dialogue between cultures and religions in the public sphere, otherwise we shall have to make use of legislative steps to deal with differences. Juridical or legislative steps cannot, however, deal with conflict; they can only regulate it. It is consequently wrong to argue that culture and religion are 'private matters'. Culture and religion will always force their way into the public sphere (Enns, 2005:29).

It is clear from history that communities with diverse identities can live together in one society, without becoming aggressive, discriminatory or violent. If we look at the European Union in general, or at Canada, we see communities whose varying identities function strongly, without becoming aggressive, discriminatory or violent toward each other. Respect for identity and its history, and the right to express one's identity, hold the possibility of overcoming violence. Within the theory of tolerance-as-recognition, being different is understood not as a burden to society, but as enrichment of and for society. The loss of religious diversity would lead to an impoverished society. Goosen (2007:180) refers to the loss of diversity as a world loss (*wêreldverlies*). The intelligentsia (and not only the scholarly community) of the Western world are, in general, in agreement that diversity should be embraced and celebrated. The diversity of differentness should be accommodated in a positive manner.

The National Council of Churches in Germany set up a programme together with the Jewish community and some Muslim organisations, entitled: 'Do you know who I am?' (Enns, 2005:29). The title indicates the purpose. Before judging the differentness of others too harshly, let us first come to know and acknowledge each other. Different cultures, religions or races should first of all know their own identities and from those foundations, start to learn about the differentness of others. By these means, the self will not feel uncertain or threatened by the other, but will also be in a position to learn from the other.

3.5.1.7 Moving from intolerance, to tolerating difference, to hospitality

According to Ignatieff (2000:83) intolerance sets a primal opposition between 'them' and 'us', between the 'self' and the 'other'. Intolerance is thus not allowing the other to be. Tolerance,

on the other hand, implies letting the other be, but it still does not mean that there is interaction between the self and the other. Tolerance as recognition requires that there shall be an interaction between the self and the other within a designated and marked dialogic space. Rule (2004:1) describes this dialogic space as a 'cognitive and socio-conventional space where role-players can mediate within a non-threatening environment'. Tolerance as recognition thus includes more than just tolerance, as Michael Walzer (1997:52) says: 'In ordinary speech, it is often said that toleration is a relationship in inequality where the tolerated groups of individuals are cast in an inferior position. To tolerate someone else is an act of power, to be tolerated is an acceptance of weakness.' For this reason, people do not merely want to be tolerated.

Walzer (1997:12) refers to the dialogic space in which the self and the other meet as the 'shared space'. Walzer's (1997:52) plea is that there should not only be tolerance of difference within the shared space, but rather 'something better, beyond tolerance, that entails mutual respect and hospitality.' Gülen (2006:26) indicates the importance of the virtue of hospitality and how it has enjoyed very little attention in the literature of the Western philosophers. The only Western philosopher who has really paid attention to the opinions of Gülen (2006:26) on the virtue of hospitality is the contemporary philosopher Derrida.

Derrida (2000:71) presents an interesting discussion on the concept of hospitality, following his analysis of Kant's thoughts on tolerance, and specifically his thoughts on respect. Derrida (2000:151) describes hospitality as ethics itself, and he does not regard hospitality simply as one type of ethic amongst a group of ethics. Derrida (1999:27) speaks of hospitality as an ethos, thus as something that is fundamentally a part of life. To Derrida, ethics commences in the recognition, receiving and welcoming of others, and herein lies hospitality. According to Derrida (1999:27), it is essential that within the concept of tolerance, there is movement from intolerance to tolerance and from tolerance to hospitality. Tolerance as recognition includes the concept of hospitality. Conway (2014:28) describes hospitality as a way of dwelling with others. He continues:

'The hospitable response begins with the simple, but powerful, act of perceptual recognition that the other is present, saying 'I am here; recognize me'. Grievous harm-doing may be rooted in this fundamental failure to recognize persons, that each of us is a human being among other human beings.'

Hospitality is an important aspect within tolerance as recognition, because it acknowledges the presence of the other as a human being who has a face, a voice and a point of view to be heard. Hospitality as an aspect within tolerance as recognition proceeds to the positive

involvement of the other through interaction, thereby creating a dialogic space that previously did not exist.

3.6 Summary

To explain the complexity of the teachings on tolerance, I made use of Forst's 'critical historical method of argumentation'. What also emerged during this part of the study was the complexity of a purely chronological classification of tolerance, because philosophers such as Averroës, Castellio and Bayle were arguably ahead of their respective times. For this reason I also made use of Afdal's thematic-chronological classification of tolerance. Afdal (2010:603) uses three main classifications, namely the period prior to the Reformation and Renaissance (0-1600 AD), the period from the Enlightenment until the nineteenth century (1700-1900 AD) and thirdly, the period after the modern Enlightenment (1900-current thinking). By merging Afdal's thematic classification with Forst's chronological classification, I observed that two additional time classifications should be added to Afdal's thematic classification. I subsequently added the period of tolerance during the Middle Ages, as well as the period of Humanistic and Reformational tolerance (1500-1700 AD). In my view, these two periods served as important links between the periods of premodern and liberal tolerance respectively.

The first thematic-chronological classification that I discussed was what Afdal called the period of premodern tolerance. Forst (2013:544) refers to this form of tolerance as the classical exclusivist permission conception. The permission theory refers to a situation in which one group, for whatever reason, permits another group to exist, even though the two groups differ from each other on the basis of religion, culture, race or gender. The founder of the permission theory was Augustine. The permission theory was the first brick in my constructed concept-wall of tolerance.

A second period within the thematic-chronological classification is that of the Middle Ages. Bejczy (1997) has revealed that the Medieval era has been badly neglected in the scholarly thinking regarding tolerance, and that the Enlightenment's conceptualisation of tolerance cannot really be understood without reference to the Middle Ages. Bejczy (1997:367) says:

'Medieval tolerantia is a full-fledged example of what tolerance could be.'

The important contribution of the Medieval view of tolerance is particularly evident in the thinking of the Muslim philosopher Averroës. In his philosophy, Averroës perceived religions such as Islam, Judaism and Christianity as equal, and attempted to find an ethical moral unity between them. I regard this theory of ethical moral unity as the second important brick in the

wall of scholarly reflection on religious tolerance, and I have named this brick in my constructed concept-wall of tolerance the 'search for ethical and moral unity'.

The third period within the thematic-chronological classification is the Humanistic and Reformational (1500-1700 AD) thinking regarding tolerance. In this thinking, three core lines of argument were developed:

- The Humanistic notion, best contained in the thinking of Erasmus, who sought to resolve conflict by relying upon a religious foundation that is allegedly shared by all parties.
- The Reformational notion, best contained in the thinking of Luther, who emphasised individual responsibility before God and freedom that is bound to the will of God (notion of the unfree free conscience).
- Thirdly, Castellio's work, which emphasised universal morality as being above any religious dogmatic differences in human thinking.

The period of Humanism and the Reformation enhanced the search for new thinking on tolerance. This quest is well contained in Castellio's epistemological distinction between the two normative spheres. His distinction can be seen as the key to understanding of liberal tolerance and I regarded it as the third brick to place in my constructed concept-wall of tolerance.

According to academics such as Powell and Clarke (2013:5), and Forst (2013:170), the core scholars with regard to liberal tolerance were the three Enlightenment philosophers, namely John Locke, Pierre Bayle and John Stuart Mill. I made one addition to this list, namely the contribution of Immanuel Kant. In my view, the conceptual spectrum of liberal tolerance is covered by Locke, Bayle, Kant and Mill. All of these philosophers worked not only with, but also within the concept of tolerance that I would like to refer to as 'normative differences'. Their work also forms the basis of our present thinking with regard to theories such as reciprocal respect, public dialogue and the 'harm principle'. In my conceptualisation of tolerance I divided the different tolerance theories with their sub-theories into two main categories, namely exclusivist and inclusivist theories.

3.7 Conclusion

Arising from the global increase in incidences of terrorism, particularly after the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, the debates and thinking regarding tolerance have been reopened; within these postmodern debates, the responses to both absolutistic and relativistic theories of knowledge cause an epistemological dilemma. Such a dilemma is the conflict between

different theories of knowledge trying to give alternatives to the two extreme theories of knowledge, namely absolutism and relativism. I conclude that in the words of Ewick (2001:22), there are three kinds of responses to the epistemological dilemma:

- The people and groups who are in favour of exclusivist tolerance theories.
- Those in favour of inclusivist tolerance theories.
- The last group, who are in search of new positive alternatives to tolerance.

The scholarly critique against these tolerance theories does, indeed, serve as a solid basis for people or groups within either of these schools of thought to identify and address possible intolerance within their own thinking. I am of the opinion that the scholarly critique against both premodern and liberal tolerance carries considerable weight, although I do not believe that the solution lies in back-and-forth scholarly disagreement and academic mud-slinging. I am therefore inclined to rely on the third group of scholars who are seeking a range of positive alternatives to tolerance. In this regard, I share (amongst others) the views of Von Goethe (2005:116), Derrida (2000), Galeotti (2002), Keet (2010) and Potgieter (2015): that tolerance should lead to reciprocal recognition. Arising from the theory of 'tolerance as recognition', I presented the following points, which in my opinion offer positive alternatives to 'religious tolerance':

Tolerance as recognition:

- shifts differences from the private to the public.
- is a process that confers status upon identity.
- asserts that tolerance and intolerance require public justification.
- includes the recognition of conflict.
- includes recognition of the self.
- includes the recognition of others.
- moves one from intolerance, to tolerating difference, to hospitality.

As explained in Chapter 2, tolerance as behavioural outcome or response manifests itself in terms of particular distinctive human attributes, such as individual(-ised) attitudes, capacities, actions, forms of behaviour or responses. Religious tolerance can, therefore, also be plotted on a spectrum or normative continuum. In terms of the one extreme of this particular

normative continuum, tolerance may be understood to reflect a fanaticist, fundamentalist and completely exclusivist attitude towards the religious opinions and practices of people who may differ from one's own. At the other end of this spectrum, tolerance may be understood to reflect a permissive, *laissez-faire* and a completely inclusivist attitude towards the religious opinions and practices of people who may differ from one's own. The positive alternative of both the recognition and the hospitality theories with regard to religious tolerance implies moving one along this normative continuum, plotting oneself somewhere between either an exclusivist or an inclusivist preference as far as (religious) tolerant attitudes or behaviours are concerned. This interpretation is captured in figure 3.10 below:




Figure 3:10 Part 2: Plotting religious tolerance behaviour

Based on all of the above, the following critical questions arise from my reading of the available body of scholarship in and for this chapter:

- Do mono-religious higher education institutions tend to be more exclusivist or inclusivist in their understanding and practice of religious tolerance?
- What would the effect (with regard to religious tolerance praxis) of either the recognition theory or the hospitality theory be when implemented in a mono-religious education institution?

Religious tolerance as either exclusivist or inclusivist behaviour or response on a normative continuum should now be compared with as well as assessed and evaluated against, a religious institution's openness or reservedness as far as its epistemological stance with regard to religion is concerned. This will be unpacked in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4: Nature and essential characteristics of a mono-religious higher education institution and how it conceptualises and operationalises religious tolerance

4.1 Introduction

The main purpose of my study was to develop guidelines for religious tolerance in mono-religious higher education institutions. In my literature study the various aspects of religion, tolerance and a mono-religious higher education institution are brought together. My initial focus was on the nature and essential characteristics of mono-religious higher education institutions, meaning that I attempted to explore, understand and explain the possible ontic features of these in the hope that that this would provide me with some kind of indication of their possible identities. In doing so, I was striving to answer the ontological question of what makes an institution of this type mono-religious and not multi-religious.

By determining the ontic features and the foundational ontological reasoning with regard to a mono-religious education institution, I decided to concentrate on three aspects of significance for further consideration regarding religious tolerance in such institutions:

- Possible criticism that can be levelled against mono-religious higher education institutions.
- The historical milieu of mono-religious higher education institutions.
- Possible problems that these kinds of institutions might experience within the present educational context in South-Africa.

Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, the purpose of this particular chapter is to draft a conceptual framework which could be used to derive possible guidelines for religious tolerance in mono-religious higher education institutions. Working from the recognition theory as my basis, I developed my own theory, namely the dramaturgical theory of tolerance⁴⁶. The conceptual framework builds on the conceptualisation of religion and tolerance that was done in Chapters 2 and 3. Conceptually, it could be captured as demonstrated in Figure 4.1 below:

⁴⁶ See discussion and explication later on in this chapter, par. 4.6.3.




Figure 4:1 Conceptual framework of literature study, highlighting chapter 4

4.2 Nature and essential characteristics of a mono-religious higher education institution

When enquiring what a mono-religious higher education institution is, the question could also be formulated as: 'When is a higher education institution not mono-religious, and what features should it comply with in order for it to be essentially mono-religious?' These questions relate to the identity of the institution. When I refer to the identity of a mono-religious higher education institution (hereafter referred to as the 'institutional identity') in this study, I specifically refer to the institution's mission, vision and values which are visible in its (the institution's) policies⁴⁷ and which the institution communicates to others through, for example, marketing materials and public communications. According to Loseke (2007:664), whether the workers at the institution agree or do not agree with the institutional identity contained in its public policies, the institutional identity can become a part of institutional principles and logic. Lamont and Molnar (2002:169) explain that the institutional identity has powerful social functions, because they serve as justifications for policy. They categorise people into two groups:

⁴⁷ As Loseke (2007:662) explains: '...[the] consequences of institutional identities become durable when they are located in the policies.'

...‘those who are, and those who are not, included in policy target populations. Narratives of institutional identities in public policy therefore construct social boundaries, objectified forms of social differences creating unequal access to and unequal distribution of social resources and opportunities.’

It should be noted from the outset that there is a dearth of published academic works (books and academic journals) that specifically address the concept of ‘mono-religiousness’. One prominent study on the concept of ‘mono-religiousness’ is the work of Hermans (2003), called *Participatory learning: Religious education in a globalizing society*.⁴⁸ In this book, Hermans (2003:337-341) specifically discusses the concept of ‘mono-religious education’, *per se*.

According to Hermans (2003:337) and Goldberg (2010:351), mono-religious education focuses mainly on one religion. They describe this method as the ‘transmission model’, because it has the objective of transmitting one specific religion to students. As it is derived from the name ‘mono-religious’, Hermans highlights the fact that education of this kind is distinguished from that presented by other types of higher education institutions because it focuses on one (mono) religion only. He also points out that the mono-religious higher education institution’s focus on one religion does not necessarily imply disdain for, or even intolerance of, other religions.

Hermans (2003:337) distinguishes between two types of mono-religious higher education institutions, namely soft and hard mono-religious higher education institutions. He describes a hard mono-religious⁴⁹ institution as one which is exclusive or reserved towards any other religion. According to this distinction, a hard institution makes no allowance for redemption outside of the religion that the members of that particular hard institution follow. The normative basis of a hard mono-religious higher education institution is exclusivism. The adherents believe that, by some or other means, whether via revelation from God or because of some kind of hermeneutical conviction, there is only one true religion. Hermans (2003:338) avers that any other view of religion is irrelevant to a hard mono-religious higher education institution. If other religions are mentioned, a hard mono-religious higher education institution can speak only *about* and not *with* the religions concerned. Later in this chapter (cf. 4.6.1), reference is made to a hard mono-religious higher education institution as a *reserved* mono-religious higher education institution.

⁴⁸ Many other academics build further on the work of Hermans, for example Goldberg (2010), *Developing Pedagogies for Inter-religious Teaching and Learning*; Ter Avest & Miedema (2010), *Learn Young, Learn Fair. Interreligious Encounter and Learning in Dutch Kindergartens*; Nanji (2010), *Balancing the Particular and the Universal in Inter-religious Education*.

⁴⁹ I refer to what Hermans calls a hard mono-religious higher education institution as a *reserved* mono-religious institution, because it has religious, moral, ethical, pragmatic, scientific and academic reservations about religion and they are conservative, preserving (maintaining), with regard to their own religious biases.

He (Hermans, 2003:338) goes on to describe a soft mono-religious higher education institution as an institution which looks at other religions from the perspective of its own religion. Hermans (2003:338) says, for example: 'Other religions are embraced on the basis of one's own truth.' To these institutions, dialogue is perceived as essential to deeper self-understanding: 'To use the metaphor, it is a kind of religious ventriloquism: one hears the other via one's own voice.' (Hermans, 2003:338). Later in this chapter (cf. 4.6.2), reference is made to a soft mono-religious higher education institution as an open mono-religious higher education institution.

To examine the nature and essential characteristics of a mono-religious educational institution more closely, let us look briefly at the purpose of a mono-religious education institution. In Chapter 2, I indicated that a person's theory of knowledge (including a group's or institution's theory of knowledge) portrays the way in which that person perceives religion. The first building-block with which to distinguish between a mono-religious higher education institution and, for example a multi-religious higher education institution, comprises the respective mono-religious and multi-religious concepts of where knowledge originates from and what knowledge is understood to be and represent.

In this regard, I specifically highlighted the differences between Edwards and Kant in Chapter 2 and indicated that Edwards's theory of knowledge portrays more of a monotheistic understanding of religion, because he believed in one (mono) religion, and that such a (mono) religion fixed and guided humankind's view of life and the world. In contrast, Kant's theory of knowledge portrays a multi-religious understanding, because he did not believe that humankind's view of life and of the world was fixed and guided by one religion only. The objective of my study is, as stated earlier, not to judge which theory of knowledge might happen to be right or wrong, but instead to indicate what a mono-religious higher education institution's theory of knowledge needs to assume in order for that institution to be regarded as mono-religious in nature and identity.⁵⁰

From the description by Hermans (2003:338) regarding the objective of a mono-religious higher education institution, hard or soft, it is clear that such an institution elevates one specific religion to a position above other religions. Whether a particular institution of this kind locates its religion above other religions in a hard, absolutist way or in a soft way which merely prefers one religion above others, a core characteristic of this kind of institution remains the fact that it regards one religion to be of a higher status than another religion.

An institution can therefore be regarded as a mono-religious one only if it regards one (mono) religion to be of a higher status than another religion, irrespective of whether the institution

⁵⁰ I do, however, offer some criticism later in this chapter against mono-religious higher education institutions.

regards its religion as the truth or simply as a better way of understanding life, or even as a basis from which life and the world can be viewed. As Runzo (1989:51) explains in his article *World-Views and the Epistemic Foundations of Theism*:

‘From an epistemological point, the whole reason for having any world-view and for attempting to achieve a better world-view, is to provide a unifying conception of the universe for present understanding and future action. Consequently, it will not only be natural but rational for the person of mature monotheistic faith to hold the fundamental suppositions of their world-view with utter commitment.’

By ‘fundamental suppositions’, Runzo means the basic convictions that determine the life and world-view of any person, group or institution. Fredericks (2004), Van der Walt (2005) and Miranda (2010) establish that the religion of a mono-religious educational institution not only serves as the basis for the teaching of religion, but that it also affects the entire teaching and learning of the institution. Van der Walt (2005:373) explains, referring to a mono-religious, Christian higher education institution, that the praxis of any such institution cannot be simply linked to any form of scientific practice, but that the content of various subject disciplines must be transformed in the light of, for example, God’s revelation, Christian life- and world-views, and Christian philosophy. Van der Walt (2005:373) argues that a mono-religious higher education institution is not different only in its teaching of religion, but that its fundamental religious presuppositions and thereby its theory of knowledge differ entirely from, for example, those of multi-religious institutions.

4.3 Possible criticism against mono-religious training

Before looking at a historical overview of mono-religious higher education institutions, let us first look at criticism that has been levelled against such institutions through the centuries. The reason why I am initially pointing out the criticism is that it will be useful to see how these institutions have reacted and are still reacting to it. Although various aspects of criticism can be considered, most of these can be consolidated into two predominant arguments. These can respectively be labelled the irrelevance of mono-religious higher education institutions, and the danger of fundamentalism.

4.3.1 Irrelevance of mono-religious higher education institutions

Many higher education institutions and individuals have been opposed to mono-religious higher education institutions, and have even displayed intolerant behaviour towards them. Some of the more common and also valid criticisms include the argument that certain mono-religious higher education institutions might, in fact, be irrelevant in the present postmodern academic climate. Kazanjian (2005:1) argues that religion needs to be reasoned in an academic manner and not simply accepted in a ‘closed’ manner by mono-religious higher

education institutions on the basis of the holy books of their own faith. According to Kazanjian (2005:7), it is of crucial importance to any educational institution to deal with religion in an academic manner. Relevant academic discussion of religion is, in Kazanjian's view, the most important purpose of an educational institution. Academic discussion should be conducted in a manner that will equip students with the ability to analyse and reflect on the self, on others and on the world, and also to make a meaningful contribution to the world. Kazanjian (2005:7) continues:

'Perhaps if we could set aside the distorted institutional orthodoxies that claim exclusive authority in defining the realm of human knowing, then we could begin to design new partnerships to realize our common goal.'

Hermans (2003:338) describes exclusivist institutions as employing a 'fortress strategy'. He avers that these institutions have the tendency to sideline all other religions and institutions outside of their own school of thought and religion, and regard them as irrelevant. Many exclusivist institutions consequently find it difficult to involve themselves in open dialogue with other institutions. According to Eck (2003:174), exclusivism is the ideological foundation of isolationism. Miranda (2010:9) describes an isolated group as a collection of people who listen to a particular structured reality, described by its adherents as the only true reality. Believing in this structured reality as the only true reality, which leads to the exclusion of all other realities, members of the group have difficulty in taking serious note of other realities.

Miranda (2010:9) argues that the cause of this struggle is that it is not a form of exclusivism that merely provides religions with the opportunity to practise religion, but the kind that leads to isolation, causing one group's religion to be regarded as absolute and final, i.e. 'superior', to the religions of other groups. Miranda describes this as a dangerous form of exclusivism (2010:10), as it leads to a negative attitude towards other religions and traditions.

According to Goldberg (2010:341), one of the greatest challenges for mono-religious higher education institutions should be their capacity to expose their students to other religions and also to enter into authentic dialogue with other religions. Goldberg (2010:342) further asserts that the possible inability of these institutions to conduct effective, authentic dialogue does not provide their students with the opportunity to break down religious barriers and to probe the inner thinking of students of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. Miranda (2010:10) makes the point that a redemptory religion like Christianity can be abused to restrict any openness to dialogue through not really showing any interest in other religions. Their only interest in conducting dialogue is focussed on convincing members of the other religion of their own cause and trying to convert them to their own religion.

The reserved attitude of many mono-religious higher education institutions towards other religions and schools of thought has the effect that such institutions are regarded by many academics as irrelevant, because the said institutions are not willing or able to participate in authentic academic dialogue with other religious institutions and their members. Henck (2011:196) emphasises the need, in a time of change, for mono-religious higher education institutions to adapt and to take part in the wider academic dialogue on religion, and hence to rethink their own identity.

4.3.2 Fundamentalism

There is a misconception that fundamentalism is present only in religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Oz (2012:39) explains that fundamentalism occurs in any religion or ideological school of thought that elevates its own thinking, religion or ideology above that of others, and that this kind of thinking is usually accompanied by fanaticism and sometimes even by militarist behaviour. This occurs when the fundamental ideal is defended by means of military action (Williams *et al.*, 2006:17).

Koch and Ramirez (2010:402) explain that mono-religious higher education institutions, with specific reference to Christian higher education institutions, are inclined to easily develop some form of fundamentalism, and that Christian fundamentalism can easily lead to the support of violence. It is therefore understandable that fundamentalism, as well as the incitement of fundamentalist behaviour by students, is considered to be dangerous in mono-religious higher education institutions. These institutions should guard against the promotion of any kind of fundamentalism which could hypothetically lead to fanaticism or militarism. Any higher education institution of this kind should, therefore, consider formulating in its official policy on religious tolerance, its own stance towards the question of fundamentalism and how that particular institution will deal with fundamentalism.

4.4 Historical oversight of mono-religious higher education institutions

An overview of such higher education institutions demands a particularly broad study, because virtually each religion could possibly relate endlessly about its own religious education throughout the centuries. In my own research, I decided to restrict myself to the historical development of Christian higher education institutions because, for the purposes of this particular study, I report on an empirical study of AROS, which is a mono-religious, Christian higher education institution. In addition, my study was deliberately restricted to a historical overview of Christian higher education institutions as my epistemological paradigm, which served as the basis for my study, is the interpretivist paradigm. As explained in Chapter 1, this paradigm seeks to understand a specific phenomenon within the context of its own lived experience(s) (Mertens, 2005:12).

In the historical overview of Christian higher education institutions, I make use of the classification of Marsden and Longfield (1992), Adrian (2003) and Ringenberg (2006) because it endorses the historical classification of religion in Chapter 2 as well as the historical classification of tolerance in Chapter 3. The historical overview of Christian education is discussed under the following headings: the Middle Ages, the early American Protestant university, the German university of the 1800-1900s, the Western university of the 1990s and present-day Christian universities.

4.4.1 The university of the Middle Ages (1000-1600)⁵¹

A study of the first Christian universities takes us back to the universities in Bologna and Paris that were established during the tenth century. Universities were regarded as instruments of the church, and developed into organisational structures that set examinations and issued diplomas. The education offered was mainly theologically and medically oriented. Graduates who received this training were required (and at times even compelled) to apply their skills in the service of the church (Adrian, 2003:16).

Medieval Christian universities can be described as reserved universities that, for example, prohibited any academic work that happened to contradict or oppose that of the church itself. The criticism of irrelevance that can be levelled against today's mono-religious universities was also discernible in medieval universities. On the basis of public texts such as the Bible, the church set ontological, epistemological, anthropological and even theological boundaries with regard to any scientific discoveries that were contrary to the teachings of the Bible or to the church's interpretation of the Bible (Adrian, 2003:17).

The dichotomy between faith and reason was established at the end of the Middle Ages. According to Haskins (1957:51), the distinction between the supernatural order and the natural order led to a conflict between faith and reason. Faith was then viewed as an aspect that belonged to revelation, and revelation was believed to belong to the realm of the supernatural. Any 'new' scientific development was therefore grouped together with reason and the so-called natural order.

4.4.2 American Protestant universities of the 1600-1700s

The American settlers were mostly Christians with a strong missionary outlook. They undertook their missionary work mainly through the establishment of higher education institutions such as schools, colleges and universities. Ringenberg (2006:20) points out that it is clear from the history of Christian universities that the establishment of higher education

⁵¹ Although the medieval university according to most sources dates back to the year 894 A.D. it only really began to have a social impact after the year 1000 A.D. (Adrian, 2003:16).

institutions is part of the DNA of the Christian faith. Miranda (2010:6) notes that this is a characteristic not only of the Christian religion but of all religions. Most religions feel that their religion offers the best outlook on life and the world and therefore seek to impart their outlook to others via, amongst others, higher education institutions.

Early American Protestant universities represent an important beacon in the development of Christian universities. The universities that arose during the colonial period in America are great universities today, enjoying prominence in the world (Adrian, 2003:18). These universities include Boston, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford and Yale.

All of the above-mentioned universities started out as Christian universities and developed from church confessions and dogmas. All of them commenced as reserved universities which only Christians could attend as students or lecturers. However, together with the increase in Enlightenment thinking and the emphasis of the Enlightenment on reason above faith, and on individualisation and freedom of conscience, all these universities eventually migrated away from their original faith-based roots (Marsden & Longfield, 1992:40). Glanzer *et al.* (2011:729) record the fact that today there are only thirteen universities in the world which commenced in the 1600s and earlier, which still happen to be exclusively Christian to the present day. Over the years, all other universities have gradually migrated away from their faith-based roots.

4.4.3 The German university of the 1800-1900s

The German university model probably exerted the greatest influence on the university thinking of the 1900s. The ethos of German universities took root in the early 19th century, and its influence later spread to America. According to Adrian (2003:21), the German university model had three main ideals, namely:

- Wissenschaft: Original scientific research.
- *Lehrfreiheit*: Freedom of academics (to teach).
- *Lernfreiheit*: Freedom of students (to learn).

The German university was established mainly on three principles (Adrian, 2003:22):

- Enlightenment thoughts.
- Scientific methodology.
- Reason and intellect.

Adrian (2003:21) describes the German university as a symbol of scientific victory over religion. This became ever more apparent in the middle of the 20th century when the unity

objective of the university fell by the wayside and the notion of the so-called 'multiversity' emerged.⁵² Along with the discarding of the unity ethos of the universities, all reference to the Christian character of the university also disappeared. According to Adrian (2003:21), the abolition of the Christian character was particularly discernible in the name changes of the universities or in the amendment of their respective institutions' mission statements.

4.4.4 The American multiversity of 1950-2010

A feature brought about by the American universities of the 19th century was the establishment of state universities. The 1862 'Morrill Act' set aside land for every state in America to establish a college. By 1969 a total of 69 such colleges had already been established (Ringenberg, 2006:83).

In the late 1900s, Clark Kerr (2001[1966]:18) started to speak of the modern university as the multiversity. By this he meant that the universities no longer had a unitary (uni) structure serving as the basis for the university's ethos, but had become multiversities with multi-ethos's and multiple approaches to knowledge and service delivery.

According to Adrian (2003:23), the American multiversities replaced the German universities in the 1950s. One characteristic of the American multiversities was that they became servants of the government and prominent influential business communities. A good example of this was when the state started to use the universities during World War II to design weapons for the army. Universities such as the University of California were, for example, used to help develop and design the atomic bomb (Smyth 1945:7; Rhodes 2012:288). According to Kerr (2001:36), the multiversities became instruments of the state.

4.4.5 The Christian universities of 1900-2010

According to Adrian (2003:24), the multiversities dominated the teaching and education of the 20th century. However, at the end of the 20th century and at the start of the 21st century, a substantial increase in numbers of Christian universities and colleges occurred worldwide. This is evident in the work by Glanzer *et al.* (2011), from which the following table is extracted (2011:729):

⁵² The term multiversity is discussed in par. 4.4.4 below.

Table 4:1 The establishment of Christian higher education institutions, year of establishment and number

Years	Africa	Asia-NE	Asia-SE	Asia-South	Europe	Latin America	Middle East	Oceania
Pre 1600			1		6	1		
1600s			2		1	2		
1700s								
1800–1850				4				
1850–1859		1	1	4	1		1	
1860–1869		2		2	1			
1870–1879		1		2	3		1	
1880–1889		3		8	2	2		
1890–1899	1	2		3	2			1
1900–1909		2	9	3	1			
1910–1919		3	4	5	2	2		
1920–1929		1	2	10	3	4		
1930–1939		1	3	2	3	4	1	
1940–1949	2	11	8	19	1	8		
1950–1959	3	18	9	24	2	17	1	
1960–1969	3	8	12	39	4	26	1	1
1970–1979	5	1	1	11	1	11	1	1
1980–1989	5	5	5	17	5	15	1	3
1990–1999	20	8	4	12	15	24	1	3
2000–2009	28	3	2	1	3	4		
Total	67	70	64	165	56	120	8	9

The years-column in Table 4.1 represents the year in which a particular Christian university or college concerned was established. Because considerable research had already been done with regard to the growth of Christian universities and colleges in America and Canada,⁵³ Glanzer *et al.* (2011) focused their research on Christian higher education outside of these two countries.⁵⁴ There seem to be three periods that particularly stand out in this table. The first is from 1940-1969 when Christian universities in Southern Asia increased radically in number. The second period covers 1950-1999 when there was a noteworthy increase in the number of Christian universities and colleges in Latin America. The final period, 1990-2009, is of considerable importance to this study, because in the past two decades there has been

⁵³ For research on the growth of Christian colleges and universities in America and Canada, see Ringenberg (2006).

⁵⁴ Glanzer *et al.* (2011) focused in their study of world Christian universities and colleges on open Christian higher education institutions. These authors (2011:721) identified 579 Christian universities and colleges outside of America and Canada. To arrive at this number, Glanzer *et al.* (2011:725) focused only on Christian colleges and universities that offered bachelor's degrees, and at least two degrees outside of their degrees in religious directions such as theology, Bible studies and church music. Further, they only included universities and colleges that had at least one non-theological faculty. Glanzer *et al.* also did not include Christian institutions that were affiliated to other non-Christian colleges and universities.

a remarkable increase in mono-religious Christian universities and colleges, specifically in Africa.

Along with the marked increase in the number of Christian universities and colleges in the 20th century, the search for different models, of specifically Christian education, began. The question relating to the way in which a Christian university should identify itself and how the Christian university should be identified in relation to other universities, has been the subject of ever-increasing research. For example, Marsden and Longfield (1992:107) argue that: 'Christian universities should not be narrow in a sectarian sense, but broad, open and inspiring.'. Adrian (2003:257) distinguishes between three types of Christian colleges and universities:

- Non-affirming education: This is education in which lecturers and students do not necessarily have to be drawn from a given religion's pool of followers. The problem with these higher education institutions is that they can soon lose their status as a mono-religious higher institution, although this is not necessarily viewed as a problem by all such institutions.
- Reserved higher education institutions: These are usually higher education institutions such as theological colleges. This kind of higher education institution is described as reserved because all of the lecturers, staff and students must be proven to be dedicated and committed, reserved followers of that particular school's declared religion. There is, however, a place for this kind of institution, because theological schools seek to educate the students in a specific religion.⁵⁵ The problem why the training they offer might be perceived as irrelevant (when it comes to the teaching of science) remains a constant one because the institution is usually epistemologically reserved with regard to any school of thought or religion that might differ from that of the institution itself.
- Open higher education institutions: This kind of institution is seen as open because in respect of its practice of science, it displays a particular openness towards other epistemologies or religions. According to Adrian (2003:25), open higher education institutions function within the component of 'faith and learning'. This is the component that usually displays how faith, and a person's life- and worldviews, influence his/her own approach to, for example, science.

⁵⁵ The Driestar Educatief in Gouda in the Netherlands (a university of teacher education) is a typical example of this kind of reserved educational institution.

I have summarised the historical overview of Christian mono-religious higher education institutions as follows: From as far back as the university of the Middle Ages, the dichotomy between faith and reason has been a continuous struggle within Christian higher education institutions. This dichotomy spilled over to the American Protestant universities of the 1600-1700s. All of the great American Protestant universities of the 17th and 18th centuries originated as reserved Christian higher education institutions, but with the passing of time they evolved progressively away from their original faith-based roots.

Miranda (2010:6) points out that a central characteristic of religion is its desire to inculcate its core set of beliefs in the new generation; to equip the new generation with the norms and values based on its own core sets of beliefs so that that particular religion's dogma is guaranteed to survive in future. For this reason Miranda argues that followers of a particular religion are usually keen to establish their own higher education institutions based on that religion; in other words, to establish mono-religious higher education institutions. Throughout history it has been clear that such institutions will invariably emerge, and time after time they will eventually have to re-think their own (corporate) identity within an ever-changing global context.

The rise of the state universities and American multiversities of the 20th century brought about a total reorganisation of mono-religious higher education institutions. Many of these chose to evolve away from their own faith-based roots such as, for example, Wellesley College (Kazanjian, 2006), whilst others tried to remain reserved higher education institutions, of service solely to their own faith communities (Ringenberg, 2006:130). The last group under discussion sought to be open higher education institutions, open to all religions but as an instrument neither of the church nor of the state. An example of this kind of higher education institution is the Russian-American Christian University (RACU) (Petrenko & Glanzer, 2005:81).

4.5 Possible problems that mono-religious higher education institutions can experience

In considering a potentially meaningful conceptualisation of religious tolerance for mono-religious higher education institutions, it is necessary to highlight a few practical aspects that make it possible for these institutions to function as fully-fledged higher education institutions. The following potential problems are posed, in general, and will differ from one such institution to another:

- Institutional identity: A mono-religious higher education institution will have to consider its own institutional identity. This will include the question of whether, as an institution,

it wishes to be an instrument of the state, church or business community, or to function on its own. It must also consider whether it wishes to be seen as a reserved or open higher education institution, in other words whether it wishes to be of service solely to its own religious community or to be open, instead, to the wider community.

- **Relevance:** Mono-religious higher education institutions will have to decide on the question of how to remain relevant within the changed global higher education environment. Petrenko and Glanzer (2005:92) explain that the great majority of such institutions in the world are obliged to gain accreditation for their degrees from an external entity which is usually an organ of the state. The body that oversees the accreditation of degrees must ensure the maintenance of an agreed-upon, mutually accepted academic standard within the higher education institutions of the country. The danger is that mono-religious higher education institutions might be so irrelevant in the teaching that they offer that they do not comply with the requirements of the accreditation body. Petrenko and Glanzer (2005:94) therefore conclude: 'Private higher education as a whole is only beginning to gain recognition from the general public and the governmental agencies. Most private institutes and universities are still viewed as providing education of a poor quality.'
- **Method of teaching:** The dangers of fundamentalism, fanaticism and militarism remain a real problem for mono-religious higher education institutions. Their method of teaching must be examined and they must be held accountable. They need, furthermore, to indicate in their instructional methodology how they would address fundamentalist conduct that could lead to violence.
- **Finance:** The fact that most mono-religious higher education institutions are private institutions holds numerous financial implications. Petrenko and Glanzer (2005:92-94) identify the following financial problems that they could experience:
- Many mono-religious higher education institutions are private institutions that do not receive a state subsidy for their teaching. This requires them to be funded through the levying of study fees, or through church- or business-based economic undertakings. If they are funded only through the levying of study fees, they are limited in respect of funds for expansion of, for example, research (library) facilities, premises, technological aids in classes, and the hiring of well- and appropriately qualified academics. Addressing these aspects requires an increase in study fees, with the result that fewer students might be enrolled.

- If mono-religious higher education institutions receive a large portion of their funding from a church community, they also run the danger of becoming an instrument of that particular church itself. This could, theoretically, restrict the said institution in respect of entering into open, authentic dialogue with other religious or state-related higher education institutions. Mono-religious higher education institutions run a similar risk if they happen to receive (some of) their funding from large business undertakings. They could easily become an instrument of the business concerned, with the result that they lack the freedom to engage in open, authentic, academic debate.

4.6 Towards a practicable conceptualisation of religious tolerance for mono-religious higher education institutions

The worldwide interest in mono-religious education emphasises the need, in the case of my study, to prepare guidelines for the religious tolerance praxis in institutions of this kind. From the research of Glanzer *et al.* (2011), it is interesting to note that the largest increase in history in the number of mono-religious higher education has occurred only within the past two decades. The demand for tolerant conduct and the way in which these institutions can act more tolerantly towards followers of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions, therefore constitutes an almost 'new' question that has yet to be answered satisfactorily by a significant and growing number of such institutions worldwide. Since the circumstances of every institution differ within the institution's own context, the purpose of my study is simply to offer guidelines for religious tolerance within mono-religious higher education institutions.

From the conceptualisation of religious tolerance that was done in Chapter 3, I propose to set out the framework within which tolerance might be understood to fit into the current thinking of the various mono-religious higher education institutions, reserved as well as open. I propose, furthermore, to draft a conceptual framework based on a theory which I developed from the tenets of the recognition and the respect and hospitality theories of religious tolerance, to which I will henceforth refer to as 'the dramaturgical theory of tolerance (the theory's name and contents are explained in par. 4.6.3. below). I believe that my theory of 'dramaturgical tolerance' could provide some useful information and scholarly insights with regard to the drafting of guidelines for the development and maintenance of religious tolerance in such institutions.

4.6.1 Reserved mono-religious higher education institutions

A reserved mono-religious higher education institution is my term for what Hermans (2003:337) refers to as a hard mono-religious higher education institution. As described above, reserved (hard) higher institutions are, for all ontological, epistemological and sometimes even anthropological purposes, reserved to and for any other religion that does not correspond with

their own. According to a reserved mono-religious higher institution, there can be no redemption outside of the religion in which it and its followers believe. For this reason, the normative basis of a reserved mono-religious higher education institution is exclusivism.

According to Panikkar (2008: XV), any exclusivist institution such as a reserved mono-religious higher education institution has a built-in, normatively calibrated form of institutionalised and institution-referenced intolerance. Miranda (2010:6) indicates that every religious system asserts that it is the best (and only) religious system. Even atheists consider their view that there is no God, to be the best and most tolerant view. According to Miranda (2010:7), every person's or group's faith in something can be understood and explained in terms of some or other aspect of exclusivism.

Eck (2003:173) attempts to articulate exclusivism more meticulously than Miranda. According to Eck, exclusivism should be regarded as the deliberate exclusion of followers of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. He says: 'The exclusivist position has been most extensively developed by the monotheistic Jewish, Christian and Muslim traditions, and they have been uncompromising in their emphases on the Oneness of God, the Oneness of truth, and the exclusivity of the way to truth and the community of truth.' Exclusivism, for Eck (2003:173), is determined by the question: 'Who is saved?', and when a person or group then answers: 'Only those who are within our religion,' Eck refers to that person or group and their religious practises as exclusivist.

Although I have already highlighted some dangers of and criticisms against exclusivist thinking, it is not the purpose of my study to establish which mono-religious higher education institution is the most acceptable one or has the best approach. A central purpose of this chapter is firstly to highlight the nature and essential characteristics of mono-religious higher education institutions and then to indicate the orientation with regard to tolerance that could best identify a particular mono-religious higher education institution, and also how the thinking regarding tolerance within such an institution can hypothetically be improved.

If we refer back to Chapter 3 (in which I conceptualised religious tolerance), it is clear that reserved mono-religious higher education institutions with an exclusivist approach seem to operate within the permission theory of tolerance, categorised under the exclusivist tolerance theories. The permission theory developed out of an epistemology which avers that religious knowledge is fixed and that the so-called 'truth' is knowable and absolute.

Emerging from Chapters 3 and 4 is my opinion that reserved mono-religious higher education institutions consider tolerance mainly within the permission theory, and that they formulate their thinking and conduct regarding tolerance on the basis of the said theory. This means that

their thinking and conduct concerning tolerance can be subsumed under the following three sub-theories already identified in Chapter 3, namely: perfectionism, free conscience and finitude of reason. These three aspects of the permission theory are discussed later in the chapter (cf. 4.6.3.2) when I write about 'positive alternatives' for more tolerance, specifically with regard to mono-religious higher education institutions. I am of the opinion that reserved mono-religious higher education institutions should examine and develop their own thinking and conduct regarding tolerance by making use of positive alternatives, and not simply by looking inward on the basis of, for example, the permission theory. What this means is that mono-religious higher education institutions, at some point in time, are bound to find themselves in the position where they will be obliged to shift in terms of their stance towards religious tolerance as behaviour.

4.6.2 Open mono-religious higher education institutions

I refer to the soft mono-religious higher educational institution of Hermans (2003:338) as an open mono-religious institution. Such an institution looks at other religions from the basis of its own religion. Open mono-religious higher education institutions are different from reserved mono-religious ones in the sense that they have a more embracing and inviting approach in respect of religious diversity. The open mono-religious higher education institution's embracing and inviting approach to other religions or traditions is, however, not so open that the institution can no longer be described as mono-religious. Open mono-religious higher education institutions therefore cannot be equated with multi-religious institutions, as in the case of, for example, Wellesley College, which has evolved over the years from being a mono-religious to a multi-religious college (Kazanjian, 2000).

The prefix 'mono' in the term 'mono-religious higher education institution' emphasises that there is a particular religion which the institution uses as its point of departure or basis, and from which it looks at other approaches and religions. Gellman (2000:52) and Platinga (2000:30) point out that there will always be a measure of exclusivism in mono-religious higher education institutions, although the people working at such institutions can be exclusivist without necessarily being closed-minded. Miranda (2010:11) furthermore, points out that a pluralist can also be narrow-minded in his/her thinking and behaviour with regard to religious tolerance. Metaphorically, religious tolerance is a continuous drama that is performed in the interaction between the two main actors: the Self and the Other, and their respective constituent homes, namely the private and the public spheres. The safe space in which this interplay takes place, takes the form of reciprocal dialogue. I will expand on this notion in the next paragraph.

4.6.3 Towards the dramaturgical theory of tolerance

I indicated in Chapter 3 that recognition offers an important framework for the positive *RE*-consideration of tolerance. The above mentioned critique highlights the vital need for positive reconsideration of tolerance in both reserved and open mono-religious higher education institutions. Henck (2011:196) explains that mono-religious higher education institutions (such as Christian colleges and universities) need to rethink their identity in a time of change. This includes their understanding, justification and application of (religious) tolerance.

I specifically use the recognition theory, respect theory and hospitality theory of tolerance as basis for my own theory on tolerance, because academic institutions, above all, are renowned for their ability to assess and evaluate, on a cognitive level, the kind of recognition, respect and hospitality that should be afforded to different epistemological perspectives and opinions. These can then be compared, discussed and analysed. The recognition theory, respect theory and hospitality theory of tolerance provide for the positive recognition and embracing of diversity – important aspects in the development of tolerant thinking. As such, these three theories are also immersed in the semantic values of unprejudiced respect, dignified communality and truthful, authentic engagement (cf. Keet, 2010: 7, 8). In Chapter 3, I developed positive alternatives for religious tolerance based on the above-mentioned three theories, and these are employed in the design my own theory for developing and maintaining religious tolerance in mono-religious higher education institutions.⁵⁶ I refer to this as ‘the dramaturgical theory of tolerance’.

The recognition theory, respect theory and hospitality theory of tolerance mainly involve two concepts: the self and the other, and the improvement of tolerance between the two. Goosen (2007:9) refers to the kind of encounter that takes place between the self and the other, as being dramaturgical in nature. According to Goosen (2007:10), dramaturgical encounter takes place through different dialogue theories between the self and the other. From Goosen’s (2007) concept of dramaturgy in his book on nihilism, I developed the theory of dramaturgical tolerance. When the dramaturgical encounter between self and the other stops because of intolerance or amalgamation, the world, Goosen (2007:200) says, becomes poorer because of a loss of diversity. Jansen’s (2009:255) appeal, for example, for understanding and enriching diversity, is an appeal for the self and the other to take part in the dramaturgical encounter.

When I refer to dramaturgical tolerance I refer to ‘life as a play or a drama’ and the necessity of interaction between the self and the other on the proverbial stage of life. In the case of a

⁵⁶ The term ‘mono-religious’ refers to both closed and open mono-religious higher education institutions.

mono-religious education institution the 'actors' are, for example, the management, staff members, lecturers, students, parents, accreditation authorities, the Department of Higher Education and schools. Dramaturgical tolerance not only emphasises the importance of dialogue between the self and the other, but it also emphasises the human need for interaction. Dramaturgical tolerance moves tolerance from being understood as an individual concept, for example as in the case of liberal tolerance (par. 3.4.4), to being a concept of communities (not only as in all the actors on the stage of life, but also with respect to everyone in the "audience", watching and interacting with the play on the stage). Dramaturgical tolerance also breaks with the concept of neutrality and it enhances the knowledge of worldview sensitivity.

Dramaturgical tolerance is characterised by the autonomy of the self and the other while taking part in the dramaturgical encounter. In the case of a mono-religious higher education institution, it is both the recognition of this institution's autonomy, and also the recognition of other religious communities or religious beliefs that should be recognised as legitimate role-players in the dramaturgical encounter. The act of taking part in the dramaturgical encounter demonstrates recognition, unprejudiced respect, honest and unbiased hospitality, as well as dignified communality and truthful, authentic engagement with the other, and, especially, for the sake of the other. Dramaturgical tolerance therefore serves as a theory which recognises and enhances diversity.

The actors in the dramaturgical encounter are the self and the other. The setting in which the dramaturgical encounter takes place is the dramaturgical space of openness and, as explained earlier the space in which it takes place is the safe space of reciprocal dialogue (others also refer to this space as a 'shared space' (Walzer 1997), 'dialogic and multilogic space' (Rule, 2004)). As the producer of the dramaturgical encounter I explain the role of each actor, the self and the other, and also the setting where the drama takes place. The following conceptual proposal serves as the framework for discussion of the implementation of religious tolerance in mono-religious education institutions:




Figure 4:2 Framework for the discussion of the possible implementation of religious tolerance in mono-religious higher education institutions

4.6.3.1 Recognition of the self

The first actor in my dramaturgical theory of tolerance is the self. Wardekker and Miedema (2001:76) indicate that the changed global circumstances of the 21st century and the process of secularisation, the plurality of cultures and the increasing search for diversity, are placing great pressure on mono-religious higher education institutions ‘...which want to foster the development of personal identity formation of their students.’ They come to the conclusion that an aspect of ‘integration diversity’ must be built into the development of personal identity, and that identity should be dynamic and reflexive (Wardekker & Miedema, 2001: 85).

Platinga (2000:190) explains that a requirement for identity to be dynamic and reflective is recognition of the self or, otherwise expressed, knowledge of the self. Platinga regards knowledge of the self as important because it is a precondition for reflection. What this means is that if a mono-religious higher education institution does not know what its own institutional identity is (i.e. it does not seem to have knowledge of its own identity as an institution), it will not be able to reflect effectively on its adopted religion (as a set of adopted convictions or beliefs), nor will it be able to evaluate the adopted convictions or beliefs of other institutions.

According to Panikkar (2008:408), the recognition and reconsideration of, as well as respect for and hospitality towards, an institution’s identity (self) should not be understood as a sign of that institution abandoning its own institutional identity. Instead, it is necessary to have knowledge and recognition of the institution’s identity to enable effective reflection and

dialogue with the institutional convictions or beliefs of other institutions. For this reason Panikkar (1999:408) says:

‘Reflection on one’s identity could imply the critical awareness that my identity – which for me may be ultimate and even intentionally exhaustive – does not preclude a free interval or an intellectual perspective (a step back, one may say) from which my own belief may be seen, judged and even criticized. It is not to give up one’s faith, but to dig deeper into its truths and mysteries and be enriched in trying to understand ourselves as we truly are.’

Recognition of the self is also closely linked to the honesty principle as set out by Nietzsche (1988:476) who explains that the concept of ‘tolerance’ is sometimes misunderstood as an attitude of not adopting any personal perspective. Thinking regarding tolerance can then, according to Nietzsche, lead to ‘selflessness’, giving the impression of cowardice, dishonesty and denial of the self. According to Nietzsche (1988:274), only those who have fundamental knowledge of themselves can be truly tolerant, because people or groups that are honest about what and, especially about WHO they are, have the capacity to engage in effective reflection and authentic debate. Nietzsche’s concept of the honesty of the self, says Forst (2013:386), makes of tolerance a deed of freedom and inner fortitude, in that one is able to reflect honestly and freely on one’s identity, and is able to set boundaries for oneself without relinquishing one’s own deepest convictions. For this reason, Forst (2013:387) argues:

‘Only a reflexively ordered self, who knows how to make negative and positive judgments, is capable of tolerance, it is true that in the virtue of tolerance a person encounters opposing convictions within herself which she can reconcile, if not entirely, only through tolerance.’

In reserved and open mono-religious higher education institutions, recognition of the self may imply that reserved and open mono-religious higher education institutions need to set in place clear and honest declarations of how they understand themselves (their own institutional identity). Their policies and constitutions should, therefore, be available for study by any person or group.

Recognition of the self should, in accordance with the recognition theory of Galeotti (2002:10), shift from the private to the public sphere. This means that a mono-religious higher institution’s identity, and application of that identity, must be lawful and therefore not contrary to the constitution of the country. Such institutions, as higher education institutions, issue diplomas or degrees to their students, and for this reason they must comply with the requirements of the country’s accreditation authorities. Mono-religious higher education institutions must also, in their marketing and recruitment of students, be honest about who they are, so that prospective students are aware of the religious identity of the institution in which they wish to be enrolled.

4.6.3.2 Recognition of others

The second actor within the theory of dramaturgical tolerance is the other. I wish to explain this by referring to the need of any institution, whether mono-religious or multi-religious, to grow in knowledge (including knowledge of itself). Miranda (2010:12) explains that this need cannot be satisfied without the desire for openness of the mind. According to him, this openness is characterised by a person or group that is prepared to listen to others. Miranda (2010:15) proceeds to argue that the process of arriving at knowledge of oneself can never be an isolated (closed) process. He also mentions that it would be simply arrogant to think that one, as a person or group, had reached the point of no longer having the need to reflect on one's thoughts and ideas with regard to those of others. This may be why Hermans poses the question: 'How do we evaluate mono-religious [higher] education in regard to the development of a religious self? The religious self develops through participation, in the sense of legitimate peripheral participation.' (Hermans, 2003:340).

Reserved mono-religious higher education institutions that function mainly within the ambit of the permission theory, usually work, within their understanding of tolerance, with the sub-theory of 'finitude of reason' (the third sub-theory of the permission theory). Within the theory of limited reasoning, such an institution should come to the logical conclusion that, indeed, it does not know everything and that it also has the need to grow in knowledge through critical reflection with respect to its own identity, as well as that of others. It is therefore important for the self to take part in the dramaturgical encounter with the other. Miranda (2010:16) explains that this openness to reflection should not be regarded by an institution as a manifestation of weakness or even as a threat to its own identity, but rather as the recognition of human limitation and of human dependence on others and their knowledge – albeit that such recognition and knowledge might differ from one's own.

Nussbaum and Chang (2013:5) explain that mono-religious higher education institutions have no option but to make the recognition of diversity a part of their vision and mission. Because these institutions educate students who will eventually be part of and living in a diverse society, those students should be prepared to play a full part in the diverse society that they will be entering. For this reason, mono-religious higher education institutions should increasingly reflect on the recognition of diversity. 'Building broad capacity of knowledge with regard to other religious ideas is critical for mono-religious Christian Higher Education institutions to accept, welcome, adopt and support diversity as an integral part of their institutional mission, values and ethos, and commitment to justice.' (Nussbaum & Chang 2013:5) It stands to reason that it should be done as effectively as possible.

In Chapter 3 I pointed out that the recognition theory, the respect theory and the hospitality theory should also lead to assigning status to identity, and public justification of tolerant and intolerant conduct. These two aspects emerge very strongly from Nussbaum and Chang's arguments with regard to embracing diversity (2013:8). A study of Nasir and Al-Amin (2006) on 'Creating Identity-Safe Spaces on College Campuses for Muslim Students' also explains how, in the recognition of, respect for, and hospitable treatment of, diversity, status should also be extended to minority groups, through which they should receive a particular social recognition, respect and hospitality. Nasir and Al-Amin (2006:25) speak of 'safe dialogic and multilogic spaces' which should be granted to minority groups within which they can practise their religion or culture.

4.6.3.3 Recognition of the dramaturgical space in which openness takes place

The last aspect of the dramaturgical theory of tolerance is the space of dramaturgical openness where the self and the other interact with each other; where the role-play between the self and other is enacted. Within the theories of recognition of, respect for and hospitality towards tolerance, this role-play between the self and the other cannot remain at the level of self-recognition, it must proceed and transcend itself, so that it results in a conduct of reciprocal openness, as in shared dialogue, mutual reflection and equal, authentic debate (i.e. the space in which this role-play is enacted). Miranda (2010:5) explains that the role-players' willingness to enter into authentic dialogue with others should be characterised by openness, and that this should be underpinned by total honesty regarding one's own convictions and differences. In Swidler's article '*The dialogue Decalogue*', he proposes 'ten commandments' for the manner in which dialogue should be conducted (Swidler, 1984). His 'third commandment' states: 'Each participant must come to the dialogue with complete honesty and sincerity. Conversely – each participant must assume similar complete honesty and sincerity in the other partners.' (Swidler, 1984:10) The baseline values for preparing this space in which dramaturgical openness can take place is therefore demarcated honesty and sincerity.

A mono-religious higher education institution that has the openness and need for dialogue cannot, of course, enter into any kind of dialogue with participants who happen to share different religious viewpoints without expecting conflict and differences to arise. Miranda (2010:12) explains that people and institutions enter into open dialogue with the participants for the purpose of identifying and debating differences. Such differences can be understood as knots in a cord that need to be un-knotted through authentic dialogue and honest, open reflection. In a similar fashion, the dynamic development of specifically religious tolerance differences can also be identified and debated.

The recognition of openness in an authentic dialogical environment is a core element for mono-religious higher education institutions, because to a large extent it can dampen down the criticism of irrelevance or poor academic standards that is often raised against mono-religious higher education institutions. Habermas (2006:5) sees the participation of a person or group in public dialogue as a social responsibility, because that person or group needs to share its knowledge and insight with the rest of society and likewise also share in others' knowledge. In his book *Islamism and Democracy*, Ahmad (2009:115) refers to the important influence that the mono-religious Aligarh Muslim University had on the democratic thinking of India. A mono-religious higher education institution should, therefore, also comply with its democratic duty to take part in the public debate by means of open, authentic dialogue.

I argue that it is for this reason that the dramaturgical theory (as developed from Galeotti's recognition theory and Derrida, Habermas, Keet and Potgieter's respect and hospitality theories) might be of value to a mono-religious higher education institution, particularly in the implementation of specific openness programmes.⁵⁷ The implementation of such openness programmes will lead to a more inclusivist approach to understanding religious tolerance. Such an inclusivist openness programme will not necessarily, according to Miranda (2010:16), erode the confidence of a believer in his or her own faith; instead it will offer the opportunity to identify particular openings in respect of links with people from different religious traditions. The implementation of particular openness programmes in mono-religious higher education institutions should also, according to Miranda (2010:16), allow for different religious traditions 'to speak on their own terms and to speak for themselves, and for others to listen and hear what is actually being said, assuming, rightly or wrongly, equal validity of all religions.'

An example of the implementation of openness programmes within mono-religious higher education institutions is the research that was done by Al-Mansoob. He (Al-Mansoob, 2012:43) explains how they implemented a programme called 'cognitive stylistics' in some literary subjects within a conservative Muslim university in Yemen, namely the Ibb University. According to Al-Mansoob (2012:61), it was found that in literature discussions the students enthusiastically share their opinions and experiences, draw inferences, present cultural connections and conclusions and raise relevant questions regarding religion and religious differences.

It seems that the implementation of openness programmes could hypothetically serve as an important antidote to fanaticism and fundamentalism within mono-religious higher education institutions. The purpose of an openness programme is to bring about critical reflection with

⁵⁷ By 'openness programmes' I have in mind any programme that has the objective of promoting unbiased inter-religious or inter-cultural discussion.

respect to one's own religious and cultural tradition. Meijer (2010:729) explains that hermeneutic religious education, which can include openness programmes, can play an important role in promoting effective reflection, and that the promotion of effective reflection is essential to the prevention of fanaticism and fundamentalism. For this reason, I argue that one way in which mono-religious higher education institutions can prevent possible fanatical and fundamental behaviour is through the implementation of openness programmes that might, amongst others, lead to effective critical (self-)reflection.

The concept of openness should also play an important role within reserved mono-religious higher education institutions. Reserved mono-religious higher education institutions' thinking with respect to tolerance, will arguably function best within the parameters of the permission principle (cf. chapter 3, par. 3.4.1.1). It can therefore be argued that the openness-thinking of such institutions falls primarily within the sub-theory of free conscience. I indicated in par. 3.4.1.1 (Chapter 3) that the theory of free conscience relates to the notion that every person's conscience should be answerable before God (or whatever highest form of moral and ethical authority), and that one therefore cannot judge another person's conscience.

The concept of a free conscience also relates to the notion of grace. Miranda (2010:10) explains, by referring to Christian mono-religious higher education institutions, that they should be open and inviting towards other religions, precisely because they wish to proclaim a merciful God. Miranda (2010:11) proceeds to explain that this aspect of grace is understood by many Christian higher education institutions as a gift, and that this gift should be shared openly as well as in openness with others. Openness within mono-religious higher education institutions should then, according to Miranda (2010:11), lead to openness in authentic dialogical contexts and not to hard exclusivism.

4.7 Summary

The main purpose of my study is to offer guidelines to mono-religious higher education institutions to develop and continually improve their religious tolerance praxis. For this reason I examined phenomena such as religion, tolerance and mono-religious higher education institutions in order to understand the various nuances and scholarly reflections concerning these concepts. In this chapter I looked specifically at the nature and essential characteristics of mono-religious higher education institutions. I indicated, from the literature, that little has been written on what constitutes mono-religious higher education institutions and that a principal work on the subject is that of Hermans (2003), which specifically discusses this particular concept.

Hermans (2003:337) indicates that mono-religious higher education focuses mainly on one religion for developing a life- and worldview. He distinguishes between two kinds of mono-religious higher education institutions, namely soft and hard ones which, in my study, I describe respectively as open and reserved mono-religious higher education institutions. Hermans describes a reserved mono-religious higher education institution as one that mostly acts exclusively towards people and institutions of different religious traditions. He refers to an open mono-religious higher education institution as one that looks at people and institutions of different religious traditions from the perspective of its own religious tradition. Within the open mono-religious higher education institution there is a more accepting, welcoming, adopting and supporting approach to diversity.

Important criticism has been advanced against mono-religious higher education institutions, which I summed up in two main points, namely irrelevance and the possible promotion of fundamentalism. Irrelevance can easily occur within such institutions if, as a result of their exclusivism, an institution retreats into isolationism, which could then lead to a limitation in growth and knowledge. I then indicated that fundamentalist conduct can easily develop within these kinds of institutions, which might, under particular conditions, even mutate into religious violence. This helps to explain why mono-religious higher education institutions might have to account for themselves in their avoidance of fundamentalism and the ways in which they should seek to address it in and through their own instructional programmes.

I indicated furthermore that such institutions should also be understood within the historical framework of the establishment of colleges and universities in a particular country. From the historical perspective, which I had personally adopted, it is clear that there has been a noticeable increase worldwide in the establishment of mono-religious higher education institutions in the world, such as colleges and universities. This increase emphasises the importance of this study, because the notion of religious tolerance within mono-religious higher education institutions is relatively new and has not yet been adequately engaged with, explored, understood, or explained.

From both the historical perspective and the present context in which mono-religious higher education institutions function, I highlighted a few practical aspects that make it complicated for mono-religious higher education institutions to behave and operate as fully-fledged higher education institutions. I categorised these complicating aspects in terms of institutional identity, relevance, method of teaching and finance.

The second focus of this chapter was to understand how a mono-religious education institution might conceptualise and operationalise religious tolerance. In order to arrive at such an understanding, I made use of the conceptual frameworks that I constructed in Chapter 2 (cf.

par. 2.4) and 3 (cf. par 3.6): I demonstrated in Chapter 2 that all religion-related epistemologies can be plotted on a normative continuum between the extremes of either absolutism and relativism. In Chapter 3 I demonstrated that religious tolerance can also be plotted on a spectrum or normative continuum between the extremes of either fanaticism, fundamentalism and complete exclusivism (expressed as behaviour or attitudes towards the religious opinions and practices of people that may differ from one's own), on the one hand, and permissiveness, *laissez-faire*ness and a complete inclusivism (expressed as behaviour or attitudes towards the religious opinions and practices of people that may differ from one's own), on the other.

4.8 Conclusion

From this chapter it is also apparent that, arising from their epistemology with regard to religion, mono-religious higher education institutions regard one specific religion as of greater value than (all) others. They tend, therefore, to be more absolutistic than relativistic in terms of their positioning on the normative continuum that I referred to above. I argued, however, that not all such institutions can simply be regarded in the same way. The reason is that such institutions are either reserved or open in terms of their institutional and collective behaviour and attitudes towards people and institutions of different religious traditions. From my conceptualisation of religious tolerance it was clear that reserved mono-religious higher education institutions tend to have a more exclusivist, fundamentalist approach towards people and institutions of different religious traditions and that they operate mainly in terms of and according to exclusivist tolerance theories. Open mono-religious higher education institutions, however, usually operate according to inclusivist tolerance theories, by demonstrating a more accepting, welcoming, adopting, supporting, open and inclusivist approach towards diversity. In terms of this conceptualisation, reserved and open mono-religious higher education institutions can therefore be plotted on a spectrum or normative continuum as captured in figure 4.3 below:




Figure 4:3 Part 3: Plotting reserved and open mono-religious higher education institutions in terms of openness and reservedness

In this chapter I continued developing my own theory on tolerance (which I termed the dramaturgical theory on tolerance). The purpose of this theory is to serve as a guideline for mono-religious higher education institutions in their efforts to move (or to shift) along the above mentioned normative continuum from an exclusivist set of attitudes or behaviour to a more embracing, inclusivist set of attitudes or behaviour, without losing their institutional identity. I developed the dramaturgical theory on tolerance by synthesising Galeotti's recognition theory with the respect theory and hospitality theory of Derrida, Habermas, Keet and Potgieter. For this purpose, I incorporated Goosen's (2007:9) notion of the dramaturgical encounter, which takes place between the self and the other. My theory investigates the role of each actor (the self and the other) and also the space in which these two actors inter-act. I refer to this space as the dramaturgical safe space of dialogical openness. This space is constituted by the values of honesty and sincerity; honesty about the self and sincerity towards the other. I also located the sub-theories according to which reserved mono-religious higher education institutions function within the dramaturgical theory on tolerance in order to suggest how such institutions should consider changing their collective behaviour and attitudes towards people and institutions of different religious traditions and persuasions.

The essence of the dramaturgical theory of tolerance can arguably be captured by the term 'openness'. According to Afdal (2010:612), tolerance as openness displays, amongst others, the characteristics of empathy and eagerness to learn. Tolerance as openness does not mean that a mono-religious higher education institution has to destroy itself or its own institutional identity. It does, however, mean that such an institution is and can be different from others.

Institutional identity, in the case of such an institution, should not therefore be understood as something that is fixed, but rather as something that is perpetually morphing and evolving. Afdal (2010:612) speaks of a 'never-ending story'. Tolerance as openness is always reflexive and pointed in the direction of the other. It is also pointed critically towards the self. Afdal (2010:614) concludes: 'The ultimate goal of tolerance is openness.' I also used the dramaturgical theory of tolerance with its division of the self, the other and openness as a framework for generating data during my empirical study.

Based on all of the above, the following critical questions arise from my reading of the body of scholarship in and for this chapter:

- What is the main purpose of a mono-religious education institution's institutional identity?
- Does a mono-religious education institution see its institutional identity as changeable or static?
- How does a mono-religious education institution prevent the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct among its students?
- Does a mono-religious education institution find that the relevant accreditation requirements make it easy or difficult for itself to give expression to its own institutional identity?
- How does a mono-religious education institution answer criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions by those who claim that mono-religious higher education institutions are irrelevant, particularly in respect of academic standards?
- Does a mono-religious education institution network with other academics in respect of its curriculum?
- Can financial limitations possibly restrain a mono-religious education institution from open dialogue with other institutions?
- Does a mono-religious education institution have the financial capacity to sufficiently support its lecturers to conduct relevant research?
- Does a mono-religious education institution have the financial capacity to sufficiently support its lecturers to take part in academic and scientific conferences?

- Does a mono-religious education institution participate in the country's educational debate, and if so, in what ways?
- Is there a need at a mono-religious education institution to liaise with other institutions that may be representative of a different religion?
- Does a mono-religious education institution believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religions?
- What image does a mono-religious education institution wish to communicate to its students about its own institutional identity?
- Does a mono-religious education institution create safe spaces for other faith communities on its own campus?
- How does a mono-religious education institution present itself to the public?
- Does a mono-religious education institution see itself as a state institution, church institution or business organisation? If none of these, how does it regard itself?
- How is anti-fundamentalist, fanatical and militaristic conduct addressed through the method of teaching?

Chapter 5: Research design and methodology

5.1 Introduction

Research design and methodology are not once-off events, conceived and drafted prior to commencement of the study and then followed undeviatingly. In this study, every question that was posed raised new questions, which in turn influenced my research design and methodology. My research design and methodology process therefore ran concurrent with my data analysis in an iterative manner. Yin (2014:73) states that in empirical research, one should pose and answer necessary questions on-the-go, as it were, as one progresses with one's study.

In this chapter I first set out my research philosophy and the way in which it influenced the research process. In substantiating the research process, I describe AROS as the demarcated area of and location for my research. The purpose of the data generation was to obtain data from which possible guidelines could be formulated to understand and improve religious tolerance within a mono-religious tertiary training institution.

5.2 Research Philosophy

The research reported in this thesis was conducted within the interpretive paradigm. Bertram & Christiansen (2014:25) explain that the social sciences (such as education, psychology and sociology) are relatively new sciences in the sense that they started to publish academic works only in the 1800s. The social sciences initially applied the same research methods as the physical sciences. From the 1950s and later, the research approach with regard to the social sciences started to change, because the subjects of research were human beings and their feelings and emotions, as opposed to the natural sciences which related only to the natural world, such as the human body, animals, plants and so forth. The purpose of the interpretive paradigm is to develop a better understanding of the way in which people make sense of the context within which they live and work. Weber (1922:7) explains this feature of the nature of the social sciences as follows:

‘The science whose object is to interpret the meaning of social action and thereby give a causal explanation of the way in which the action proceeds and the effects which it produces.’

The type of paradigm within which a researcher works, and the research that is done, mutually influence each other. Because I have undertaken a study on ‘mono-religious’ higher education institutions, and my study focuses specifically on AROS as a Christian private higher education institution, I found the interpretive approach to the research that I have done to be the best.

A primary presupposition of the interpretive approach towards social science is that there is no single set of truth claims concerning the social world, but rather a large number of truth claims that are historically limited to a given, specific, social context (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014:26). For this reason, I attempted to understand, in my own study, the limited historical context within which AROS functions as a mono-religious higher education institution. The historical approach to my study, in both my review of the body of scholarship and in my data generation, helped me to understand AROS better in terms of its given, specific, social context (cf. par. 5.3.1).

In the interpretive approach, data on the subject concerned should be generated and exploited in as much academic and scientific depth as possible. According to Bertram & Christiansen (2014:26), the data (in the interpretive approach) should not be seen as external data, but as having been (co-)created by the researcher's reflection on and interpretation of the very same data. Since the data have been created through the interpretation of the researcher, it is, according to Cohen *et al.* (2011:30), of paramount importance that researchers working within the interpretive method should attempt to understand the data as closely as possible from the viewpoint of the respondents themselves. This is why, with respect to the data that were generated, I made use of interviews to learn from the respondents at AROS themselves how they understood religious tolerance within their own specific context. In analysing the data, I therefore attempted to reflect also on the personal experiences of these respondents.

5.3 Research Process

5.3.1 Research Area

AROS (Academy of Reformed Studies and Training) represents, as previously indicated, the location of and for my case study and, as such, it determined the unit of analysis for my formal data generation. I chose AROS as my research site because it is a mono-religious higher education institution in South Africa, and mono-religious higher education institutions form a core component of my study. Furthermore, I chose AROS because my personal situation as a lecturer there facilitated the generation of data, which in a qualitative study also afforded me the opportunity to collect as much information as possible.⁵⁸ According to Yin (2014:86), the overview of the case study should include as much outline information as possible; and because I am involved at AROS, I was able to collect this information.⁵⁹

AROS was established in 2004 as a delivery point for selected academic programmes of the North-West University (NWU). AROS presented NWU's BEd foundation phase, intermediate

⁵⁸ Cf. Addendum 20 for foto's of the site, staff and students.

⁵⁹ The disadvantages of my involvement at AROS are discussed in par. 5.13, which deals with methodological constraints.

phase and senior phase degree programmes in Waverley, Pretoria (in the Gauteng province of South Africa), and students who successfully completed the prescribed modules, were awarded a bachelor's degree from the NWU. The agreement between NWU and AROS was terminated in 2010. AROS has since applied for accreditation from the Department of Higher Education and Training and in 2012 the institution was granted provisional accreditation to train students towards the Bachelor in Education degree in Foundation Phase Education (*Register of Private Higher Education Institutions*, 2014:81).

In 2012, AROS enrolled its first group of 120 first-year students in the BEd Foundation Phase programme. In 2013 the intake totalled 230 students and in 2014 AROS enrolled 280 students. By the end of 2014 a total of 580 students were engaged in Bachelor degree studies at AROS. AROS is registered as a telematic training institution⁶⁰ but with compulsory lecture attendance on Saturdays. During the week, lecturers communicate with the students on an e-platform named *e-classroom*. A total of 48 full-time staff members and a lecturer body of twelve are employed by AROS.

According to Mouton and Babbie (2014:282), the context within which a case study functions is of cardinal importance. To achieve a better understanding of AROS as the area of and location for my research and the context within which it functions, I looked up AROS in the Register of Private Higher Education Institutions (2014). There are at present 117 registered private institutions in South Africa. Of the 117 private institutions in South Africa, only four are accredited for educational qualifications, of which only AROS is primarily a religious institution (cf. Addendum 1).

5.3.2 Data generation

My formal data generation was determined by the title and the scope of my research. I narrowed down the title in my study of the available body of scholarship to the conceptualisation of three aspects, namely religion, tolerance and mono-religious higher education institutions. I limited the area of my research to an in-depth study of one research area, namely the mono-religious, private higher education institution, AROS. Identifying AROS as my research site played an important role in regard to the kind of information that I managed to generate for the study, was concerned.

I approached my study of AROS as a mono-religious higher education institution in the form of a case study. The purpose of a case study is that, ethically and legally, a researcher should collect as much relevant information on the particular case as possible (Yin, 2014:89). Miles

⁶⁰ A telematic training institution is an institution which deals with the long-distance transmission of computerised information.

et al. (2013:33) explain that a case study is like a detective's case, and that the researcher (detective) should generate and subsequently assemble as much data as possible. Furthermore, the data generated are not static, but representative of a process in which new information continually influences the information already collected.

Miles *et al.* (2013:33) indicate that formal data generation in a case study is theory-driven. The sources from which one generates one's data (i.e. the official documentation or interviews that are conducted) must therefore be theoretically determined. According to Yin (2014:72), one must not simply commence a case study and immediately generate data. Instead, one should rather conduct prior research in order to determine **where** one needs to do **what kind** of research, including the kind of questions that need to be formulated in order to accommodate different sections of data required.

Yin (2014:91) emphasises that it is important that the questions developed as a result of one's study of the available body of scholarship be answered as effectively as possible by the data. This means that one should put the correct questions to the correct interest groups. I extracted and categorised questions (based on the result of my study of the available body of scholarship) into themes, and from each theme I identified which interest groups in the mono-religious higher education institution AROS would best be able to answer the questions. From my study of the available body of scholarship with regard to religious tolerance for mono-religious higher education institutions, it soon became apparent that the questions which can be put to mono-religious higher education institutions to determine their understanding of (religious) tolerance can essentially be narrowed down to the following three:

- How does a mono-religious higher education institution understand itself?
- How does a mono-religious higher education institution understand other religions?
- How does a mono-religious higher education institution promote openness towards other religions?

The wording in these three questions is quite parsimonious, and in order to elicit the best possible answers to them, they need to be (re-)formulated in various ways. Subsequently, all of the questions that I formulated for my empirical study can be traced back theoretically and conceptually (cf. Addendum 2) to one of the above-mentioned questions. From my study of the available body of scholarship I formulated some accompanying questions, described by De Vos *et al.* (2013:306) as well as Mouton and Babbie (2014:282) as 'guiding principles', which directed and provided structure to my data generation and subsequent data analysis

process. I initially formulated the questions as a result of my interpretation of the available body of scholarship (cf. Chapter 4) and in no particular order, as can be seen in Addendum 2.

I organised these questions into the three categories, the self, the other, and openness which I identified in Chapter 4. To seek possible answers to the questions which I formulated as a result of my study of the available body of scholarship (cf. Addendum 2), I arranged the questions in the three categories of self, other, and openness, in each case stating the source from which I generated the data (cf. Addendum 3). The data sources are as follows: Official documentation (OD), Curriculum (C) and Interviews (I).

5.3.2.1 Methodology of data generation and analysis

Empirical data were generated from three sources, namely official documentation (the content of the official documentation is explained in par. 6.3), the AROS curriculum and interviews. The official documentation and the curriculum were subsequently subjected to a thorough document analysis. Rule and John (2011:67) aver that document analysis represents an important point from where one could commence when one is engaged in data generation for a case study, especially when the subject of research also includes other methods of data generation such as interviews. According to Rule and John (2011:67), document analysis provides a good introductory overview and background of the subject matter of the case study. According to Mouton and Babbie (2014:491), a thorough document analysis will provide guidelines for analysing the interviews, because it highlights particular thoughts, ideas and phenomena that are deemed to be relevant to the study.

5.3.2.2 Explanation of how data were generated from official documentation

As a wide variety of official documentation usually exist within a private higher education institution, I had to narrow down my generation of data from official documentation to the core aspects that were most relevant to my study. I consequently restricted myself to the questions that had been developed as a result of my study of the available body of scholarship. The questions served as guidelines for the kind of data that I was specifically interested in generating, for example the question: 'What guidelines are set for private institutions by accreditation authorities in respect of religion?' was categorised under the category of *self* and was directed towards the formal document. This particular question would, for example, most probably not have been a good question to put to the student council.

For the purpose of this study, I distinguish between official documentation from the accreditation authorities (FDAA) and official documentation from AROS itself (FDA) (cf. Addendum 4). Regarding the questions that I posed in respect of the official documentation of the accreditation authorities (FDAA) (cf. Addendum 5), I commenced by firstly looking at the guidelines provided by the Department of Higher Education & Training (DHET) for institutions

wishing to be registered as a Private Higher Education Institution (PHEI). The document was entitled *Interim guidelines on the registration and accreditation of private providers offering qualifications and part-qualifications in the trade and occupational sector* (2012). The guidelines indicated that all 'independent educational institutions' had to be registered by the state in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996).

For a PHEI to be registered by the state, this means that it had to be registered by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET). For an organisation to be registered by the DHET, it has to comply with specific laws and policies. Laws which a PHEI may not contravene, include the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and the National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996. Because my study is mainly focused on religion, I focused my data generation mainly on the guidelines which they provide in respect of religion.

A PHEI must furthermore comply with the National Qualifications Framework Act, (Act 67 of 2008) (NQF) before it can receive official accreditation and subsequent registration. The NQF is an important source of information and I used it in my study to generate data in respect of the understanding of religion within the PHEI. Three sub-frameworks serve as the Quality Council (QC), and these comprise:

- Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO),
- Council on Quality Assurance in General and Further Education and Training (Umalusi),
- The Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC) of the Council on Higher Education (CHE).

If an institution applies for accreditation, the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) places it with one of the three QCs. AROS was placed by SAQA with the HEQC. As such, AROS had to comply specifically with the guidelines set by the HEQC. Consequently, an important source of data generation for this thesis was the *Higher Education Quality Committee Criteria for Programme Accreditation* (2004).

Lastly, a PHEI must, in terms of the Higher Education Act, 1997 section 54(2)(a) (i), be introduced to the public. This introduction takes place via the office of the Register of Private Higher Education Institutions (2014) (hereinafter referred to simply as the Register), and provides the public with information on the registered status of the PHEI. The Register provided important information for my study on the number of PHEIs in the country, as well as the number of mono-religious higher education institutions in the country.

Miles *et al.* (2013:33) indicate that a core characteristic of data generation within any typical case study is that the data generated from the document analysis could influence the questions that will eventually be put to the participants. In the case of my study, this is exactly what happened when the analysis of the data that were generated from the official documentation of the accreditation authorities (FDAA) had an influence on the questions that were eventually put to the participants.

In the generation of data from the questions which relate to the official documentation of AROS (FDA) (cf. Addendum 6), I focused on information which is available to the public. Stake (2013:25) offers particular guidelines for the generation of data in a case study. These guidelines include, for example, that a comprehensive amount of data can be obtained prior to entering the research site for this particular case study. The data are available to the public for example via the Internet, organisation policies, marketing material and newsletters.

The AROS website provides an explication of AROS' vision and mission, history, designated field of scholarly endeavour, accreditation and registration, epistemological understanding of the nature and purpose of scientific endeavour and also of its annual reports. These data were helpful in obtaining a wide variety of responses to questions that relate specifically to the official documentation of AROS. AROS' policy documents were used, as well as relevant marketing material. The policy documents served as primary documents for data generation in respect of the official documentation of AROS (FDA).

5.3.2.3 Explanation of the way in which curricular data were generated

From the analysis of data generated from the official documentation from accreditation authorities (FDAA), new questions as well as more direct questions concerning AROS as research site were phrased. These questions, too, were incorporated in questions focussing specifically on the AROS curriculum (C) (cf. Addendum 7). The generation of data pertaining to the AROS curriculum was done by analysing the various academic subjects that are currently offered at AROS (cf. Addendum 8).

5.3.2.4 Data generation: interviews

According to Cohen *et al.* (2011:30), it is important that researchers working within the interpretive paradigm understand the data from the participant's viewpoint. That is why I also made use of individual interviews as part of my data generation process. Through the interviews I was able to understand for myself from the AROS staff members how they personally comprehend religious tolerance and associated aspects. In analysing the data, I therefore endeavoured to reflect the personal experience and understanding of the respondents.

One of my tasks as researcher was to acquire as much information as possible within the limited time available. One of the most important sources of data generation in and for a case study is interviews (Yin, 2014:110). For my study it was important, therefore, to ask the right questions to the right participants during the interviews. It was also important that some of my questions overlapped with others for me to be able to compare the data. According to Yin (2014:110), case study interviews are not necessarily regarded as so-called structured sources of information; instead, they should rather be viewed as discussions accompanying the literature. That is why I made use of what Rubin and Rubin (2011:30) describe as 'semi-structured interviews'. I followed Yin's (2014:110) instructions during my interviews, because he suggests that the researcher has mainly two duties to perform during semi-structured interviews, namely '(a) to follow your own line of inquiry, as reflected by your case study protocol, and (b) to ask your actual (conversational) questions in an unbiased manner that also serves the needs of your line of inquiry.' These two aspects played an important role in the way in which I formulated the questions and also as regards the kind of questions that I put to the respondents.

5.3.2.4.1 Participant selection and data generation

Purposive sampling was used to select the participants for my study. In particular, I selected three different groups of participants, namely the executive directors of AROS, lecturers of AROS and the Student Representative Council of AROS. The reason for choosing these groups of participants is that although they are all related to AROS in some hierarchical, managerial manner, they all fulfil different roles (which will be elaborated on in the next paragraph) that could assist me in generating rich and relevant data (De Vos *et al.*, 2013:329).

With regard to the three (3) executive directors of AROS, three individual semi-structured interviews were planned: one interview each with each of the three executive directors of AROS. The three directors with whom interviews were conducted, were the Financial Director (FD), the Director of Identity-development (DI) and the Academic Director (AD). I selected these three directors because they are the only three directors at AROS. From the body of scholarship with regard to religious tolerance in mono-religious higher education institutions, it emerged that senior office bearers in their respective executive roles would perhaps best be able to answer questions related to the identity of the mono-religious higher education institution that they are attached to, since they determine to a large extent the ethos of the institution. The executive directors are also representative of the highest form of executive authority at AROS. Through the recruitment and subsequent appointment of members of staff, they not only determine, but also help to maintain the particular, distinctly mono-religious and salvationist ethos and educational character of AROS. These were the reasons for selecting

the three directors for my case study. (Please refer to Addendum 10 in this regard for more detail.)

As far as the six (6) full-time AROS lecturers in the generic modules are concerned, individual semi-structured interviews were used to interview all six of them (excluding myself, of course, because I am the researcher). I specifically selected the lecturers in the generic modules such as Social Pedagogics, Religious Studies and Bible History, because according to AROS' credo, these modules not only constitute the ethical and educational backbone of AROS, but they also cover and deal with issues such as religion and religious tolerance.⁶¹ I furthermore decided to select all six of these lecturers because each of them lectures to students who come from different cultural and religious backgrounds, and they do so in different subject fields.

The five (5) students on the AROS Representative Student Council who took part in a focus group interview represent the entire AROS Student Representative Council (consisting of only five students). The reason for using a focus group interview was because focus groups endorse and encourage self-disclosure among participants (Tracy, 2013:149). In my study I wanted to understand the multiple viewpoints regarding, or responses to, issues of religious tolerance, and I decided therefore to listen to the voices and lived experiences of the members of the AROS Student Representative Council. They are, after all, the receivers of the teaching-learning inputs that AROS offers. The AROS Student Representative Council is democratically elected by the students themselves as their preferred representatives. A focus group interview with the AROS Student Representative Council assisted me to engage with, explore, explain and understand some of the major issues that the students experience with regard to religious tolerance while studying at AROS.

The questions arising from my study of the available body of scholarship which could specifically be put to the participants, are categorised under: Interviews with Board (IB), Interviews with Lecturing Staff (ILS) and Interviews with Student Council (ISC) (cf. Addendum 9).

According to Mouton and Babbie (2014:289), the purpose of interviews during a case study is not simply to run through a list of questions and receive feedback in the form of tendered 'answers' to them, but to engage in a conversation with the participants in order to generate as much data as possible relating to the study. Heystek (2015:7) offers concise but important interview guidelines to keep in mind when the researcher engages in an interview. He says it is important to practise interview techniques as often as possible, 'because research-related

⁶¹cf. http://www.aros.ac.za/images/aros/pdfs-2015/inligting-vir/voornemende-studente/PROSPEKTUS_2016.pdf

interviews simply don't come naturally.' The guidelines that he suggests, include the following aspects:

- Have a clear and unambiguous list of questions available and listen carefully to the participants so that you can ask the right probing questions.
- Keep in mind what your leading questions are and make sure they are asked and explained to your participants in clear, simple and unambiguous language.
- Keep in mind that not all participants are talkative participants, and that some of the participants may even appear to be stubborn. It is, therefore, important that the researcher should conduct some kind of pilot study (see paragraph 5.3.2.4.7 below, that reports on the pilot study that was done) beforehand to help him/her practise the interviews.

These guidelines, as Heystek (2015:8) explains, help the researcher to prepare for different kinds of interviews as thoroughly as possible. The purpose of my interviews was therefore not simply to elicit concise responses to a list of related questions, but to facilitate the generation of as much relevant data as possible. To facilitate the interviews, I drafted the following questions. They were purposively based on the questions that had been developed as a result of my study of the available body of scholarship (see Addendum 2 for relevant details of these initial questions).

5.3.2.4.2 Director: Identity Development (DI)

Self

- Does AROS see its institutional identity (cf. paragraph 4.2) as changeable or static? Please justify your answer.
- Is AROS open to students of another religion, should they wish to come and study here?
- How does AROS prevent the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct among its students?
- Does AROS find that the accreditation requirements make it difficult or easy to give expression to its institutional identity?
- As what kind of institution does AROS regard itself? Is it, for example, a governmental institution, clerical institution, business organisation, or is it any other kind of institution?

Others

- Does AROS participate in the country's educational debate, and if so, in what ways?
- Is there a need at AROS to liaise with other institutions that may be representative of a different religion?
- How does AROS present itself to the public?
- With what other institutions in the world does it associate, and why?
- Does embracement of diversity form part of AROS' mission and vision?
- Do you think AROS will create a space for other faith communities on its own campus?

Openness

- Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?
- How does AROS believe that a person acquires knowledge? For example, how does a lecturer acquire knowledge in and of his/her subject?

5.3.2.4.3 Academic Director (AD)

Self

- Which religion does AROS regard as of higher value than other religions, and why?
- Does AROS see its institutional identity as changeable or static? Please justify your answer.
- Is AROS open to students of another religion, should they wish to come and study here?
- How does AROS prevent the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct among its students?
- Does AROS find that the accreditation requirements make it difficult or easy to give expression to its institutional identity?

Others

- How does AROS answer criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions by those who claim that mono-religious higher education institutions are irrelevant, particularly in respect of academic standards?
- Does AROS participate in the country's educational debate and, if so, in what ways?

- Is there a need at AROS to liaise with other institutions that may be representative of a different religion?
- How could financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue?
- Does AROS have the financial capacity to sufficiently support their lecturers to conduct relevant research?
- Does AROS have the financial capacity to support their lecturers sufficiently to take part in academic and scientific conferences?

Openness

- Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?
- How does AROS believe that a person acquires knowledge? For example, how does a lecturer acquire knowledge in and of his/her subject?
- Does AROS believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religions?

5.3.2.4.4 Financial Director (FD)

Self

- Which religion does AROS regard as of higher value than other religions, and why?
- Does AROS see its institutional identity as changeable or static? Please justify your answer.
- Does finance possibly play a role in determining institutional identity?
- Might AROS be reliant on another institution that can possibly exert an influence on its institutional identity?

Others

- Can financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue?
- Does AROS have the financial capacity to sufficiently support their lecturers to conduct relevant research?
- Does AROS have the financial capacity to sufficiently support their lecturers to take part in academic and scientific conferences?

5.3.2.4.5 Lecturing Staff (ILS)

Self

- What would you say is the main purpose of AROS' institutional identity?
- Does AROS see its institutional identity as changeable or static? Please justify your answer.
- How does AROS prevent the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct among its students?
- Do you as a lecturer find that the relevant accreditation requirements make it easy or difficult for lecturers to give expression to their institutional identity?

Others

- How does AROS answer criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions by those who claim that mono-religious higher education institutions are irrelevant, particularly in respect of academic standards?
- Does AROS network with other academics in respect of its curriculum?
- Can financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue with other institutions?
- Does AROS have the financial capacity to sufficiently support their lecturers to conduct relevant research?
- Does AROS have the financial capacity to sufficiently support their lecturers to take part in academic and scientific conferences?
- Does AROS participate in the country's educational debate and, if so, in what ways?
- Is there a need at AROS to liaise with other institutions that may be representative of a different religion?

Openness

- Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?
- How does AROS believe that a person acquires knowledge? For example, how does a lecturer acquire knowledge in and of his/her subject?
- Does AROS think that its religion concerns all aspects of life, including academic subjects that are not religious in nature, e.g. Mathematics?
- Does AROS believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religions?

- Student Council (ISC)

Self

- What image does AROS wish to communicate to its students about its institutional identity?
- What do you think is the main objective of the teaching that is on offer at AROS?

Others

- What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of religion and faith?
- Do you think AROS has a need to liaise with people of other faiths?
- Do you think AROS will create a space for other faith communities on its own campus?
- How does AROS present itself to the public, and why are you studying at AROS?

Openness

- Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?

5.3.2.4.6 Pilot study

I made use of a pilot study in order to assess the reliability and validity of the questions that I intended putting to the candidates during the interviews, and also to enhance and hone my own interview skills, especially as regards formulating the questions to be put to the participants during the interviews in simple, accurate and parsimonious English. The pilot study comprised of three components. Firstly, I tested the intended interview questions with my designated thesis supervisor. The people who would be participating in the interviews were not philosophers, and for this reason he assisted me particularly with regard to parsimonious and uncomplicated phrasing (in English) of the questions.

The second aspect of my pilot study was to search for ways in which I could formulate my final selection of questions in an ethically justifiable manner. To ensure that the questions which I would be putting to the participants during the interviews were ethical and reasonable, I tested them beforehand with the official Ethics Committee of North West University, that granted me approval to proceed with the interviews. The third aspect of my pilot study was to extract, as indicated by Bertram and Christiansen (2014:49), as much information as possible from the interviews by ensuring that the questions were well understood by the participants. For this purpose, I made use of pilot study interviews with one of my fellow students and two lecturers at AROS. Their feedback assisted me in rephrasing some of my questions in order to elicit as much information as possible from the interviews.

5.3.3 Declaration of ethics

The North West University (NWU) has a renowned and particularly thorough ethical clearance process which helps prevent any possible ethical misconduct by the researcher. I have undergone the ethical clearance process for this study and I have received official permission from the NWU's Ethics Committee to proceed with the study and also with the generation of empirical data. The evidence of this ethics-related approval of my study is captured in a formal ethics declaration, numbered NWU-00029-15-S2 (cf. Addendum 13).

Participants were requested to participate in semi-structured individual interviews conducted according to the interview schedule (cf. Addendum 14). They were required to participate in the full interview with an expected duration of twenty to forty (20-40) minutes. During the interview each participant was expected to answer the semi-structured questions as provided in the interview schedule, as well as possible further clarifying questions.

The following measures were put in place to reduce any concern and to ensure the welfare of all the participants. A written notice with an informed approval request was sent to all participants beforehand (cf. Addendum 15). Each participant was approached with the request to sign a written consent form, confirming his/her consent to participating in the interview. I also clearly explained the purpose of the study and the time duration of the interviews. In the written consent form, the participants were informed that the interview would be recorded with a digital voice recorder and that the interviewer or researcher would take field notes while interviewing them. I assured the participants that their right to privacy would be respected at all times and under all circumstances. All information would be kept confidential, and confidentiality would be assured.⁶² The participants were also informed that they could withdraw from the interview at any time. If a participant decided to withdraw from the interview, s/he was also assured that there would be no consequences of any kind.

Due to the fact that the research process consisted of semi-structured individual and focus group interviews on a research topic that is essentially not sensitive or harmful in nature, the data generation process was not regarded as being in any way hazardous to the participants. All participants completed the consent form prior to the interviews and were given the assurance that the researcher would be sensitive towards the data generated, to ensure that no participant would suffer any conceivable disadvantage (cf. Addendum 15).

⁶² King and Horrocks (2010:117) explain the difference between confidentiality and anonymity: 'Confidentiality and anonymity are often taken to mean the same thing in research. This is a mistake. While the concepts are related, they have quite distinct meanings that are critical in relation to qualitative interviewing...' Anonymity refers to concealing the identity of the participants in all documents resulting from the research, therefore actively protecting the identity of the participants...While in the ethics literature, confidentiality is commonly viewed as equivalent to the principle of privacy. Therefore, to assure someone's confidentiality appears to suggest that what is said in the qualitative interview will remain private and not be repeated.'

The researcher furthermore ensured the confidentiality of data and participant information before, during and after the study. Participants' information also remains confidential at all times – particularly with regard to reporting the results of the study. Confidentiality for the purpose of the research was a prerequisite for participation.

Data would be stored electronically for a minimum period of seven years and several copies of the final research report (thesis) would be made available to the North West University's Potchefstroom campus, in strict accordance with all relevant institutional instructions and regulations of the NWU.

5.3.4 Qualitative data analysis

Mouton and Babbie (2014:490) claim that 'there is no one neat and tidy approach to qualitative data analysis, nor even one approach to each specific type of qualitative data analysis.' The challenge of a qualitative study is therefore to shape a large amount of disorganised data into a meaningful and neatly packaged unit. For the data and analysis process of my study I made use of Creswell's (2013:199) data analysis spiral and Tracy's (2013:218) flowchart describing the data analysis process. Creswell's data analysis spiral and Tracy's flowchart take one through the data in an iterative process. What follows is an illustration of a synthesis between Creswell's data analysis spiral and Tracy's flowchart describing the data analysis process that I followed:




Figure 5:1 Flowchart describing the data analysis process of and for this study

The data analysis process of my study can be divided into the following steps:

5.3.4.1 *Begin focused analysis*

Organise and prepare data: Tracy (2013:184) describes the qualitative data analysis process as 'giving your brain's gray matter quite a workout.' My data analysis process started as soon as I read the raw data. As I continued to re-read the data, I started recording analytic reflections, transcribing and reviewing transcriptions of interviews, and systematically organising the data. In order to get the most from the focused analysis stage, it makes sense, according to Tracy (2013:184), to organise and prepare the data systematically. The data were systematically organised in different folders on my computer, using the type of data generated as a criterion: I entered and saved the official documentation, curriculum, transcribed texts of the interviews and field notes in different folders on my computer. Tracy (2013:185) explains that the whole organising process is an important part of the interpretive activity, and the way in which the data have been organised implicitly encourages the researcher to recognise particular and relevant comparisons and overlook others. In short, the organisation of my data also influenced the way in which I interpreted my data.

Learn about analysis technologies: I decided to use computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) for the data analysis process. CAQDAS is a collective term for computer software that is specifically designed for the analysis of qualitative data. The software provides options for organising, managing, coding⁶³, sorting, and reconfiguring data, such as transcribed textual documents as well as digital audio/video files, in complex ways (Tracy, 2013:185). CAQDAS provides options for creating theoretical models that might emerge from the coded data at hand; it does not, however, analyse data on its own. Instead, CAQDAS merely facilitates qualitative data analysis. The reason why I used CAQDAS was for its capability to code, sort, query, and retrieve data through the use of Boolean ('and/or/not') searches. Boolean ('and/or/not') searches enabled me to find and code large amounts of data in a relatively short period of time. Furthermore, CAQDAS enabled me to write analytical memos within the software and code them.

Decide on analysis technology: According to Gibbs (2007) and Saldaña (2009), the three most popular CAQDAS programs are: Atlas.ti™: www.atlatic.com, MAXQDA: www.maxqda.com and NVivo: www.qsrinternational.com. For my data analysis I chose Atlas.ti™. The reason I chose Atlas.ti™ is because I, my peers, colleagues, and mentors have already used it with success, and I also went for training in Atlas.ti™ at the North West University (NWU).

⁶³ Tracy (2013:186) describes coding as the process of 'labelling and systematising the data'.

5.3.4.2 Data immersion

Primary-cycle coding: According to Tracy (2013:187) 'in all immersion activities, the goal is to absorb and marinate in the data, jotting down reflections and hunches, but reserving judgment.' I studied the data a number of times in order to gain a comprehensive overview of it. To focus my thoughts on specific themes within the data, I also made use of the Word Cruncher function of the Atlas.ti™ program. Word Cruncher extracted the words that were most frequently used by the participants in my study (See Addendum 16 for an example). While reading through the data, I deliberately allowed for the possibility of multiple meanings to emerge. To ensure that I stayed open to multiple meanings, I used Creswell's (2013:153) open-ended questions such as: 'What is happening here?' or 'What strikes me?' According to Tracy (2013:188), answering these questions begins the process of coding.

Saldaña (2009:3) describes codes as words or short phrases that capture a 'summative, salient, essential, and/or evocative attribute for language-based or visual data'. Tracy (2013:189) explains that coding is the active process of identifying data as belonging to, or representing, types of phenomena and, for example, behaviour. In the case of my own study, the phenomena included religion and mono-religious education institutions, while the behaviour was limited to religious tolerance only.

Scholars like Charmaz (2006) as well as Glaser and Strauss (1967), who work with the notion of grounded theory, refer to the first activities of the coding processes as 'open coding' and 'initial coding', while Saldaña (2009) refers to it as 'first cycle coding'. For the purpose of my study I refer to what Tracy (2013:190) calls 'primary-cycle coding' to describe the initial cycles of data analysis (i.e. when the researcher is trying to extract meaning from the data). During the primary stage of the data analysis I read and coded the data several times. I began this primary-cycle coding by examining the data and assigning words or phrases that captured their essence. According to Mouton and Babbie (2014:496), the first type of coding that the Atlas.ti™ program offers is 'open coding' or what I refer to as 'primary-cycle coding'. Primary-cycle coding afforded me the opportunity to write memos relating to specific sections of the data during my initial overview thereof. These memos started to organise my thinking in terms of the emergence of possible themes.

Focusing and displaying activities: As I engaged in primary-cycle coding, I created a list of codes and a brief definition or representative example of each code. My 'start-list' of codes consisted of 75 different codes. This might seem to be rather a lot, but considering Miles and Huberman's (2013:50) observation that a 'start-list' of codes may range from 30 to 300 and even more, my 'start-list' is acceptable for qualitative research of this kind.

As my data analysis became more focused, I developed what Tracy (2013:191) refers to as a 'systematic codebook'. Tracy describes a codebook as a data display that lists key codes, definitions, and examples that are used in data analysis. Throughout the data analysis process, my codebook was augmented and improved. It also served as a chronological map, registering how the codes emerged and changed over time (cf. Addendum 19). I used Bernard and Ryan's (2010: 99) list of what needs to be in a codebook as a guideline for my own codebook:

- short description of a code,
- detailed description of a code,
- inclusion criteria (features that must be present to include data with a specific code),
- exclusion criteria (features that would automatically exclude data from a specific code),
- examples of a specific code, and
- examples that may seem like a specific code but are not.

Secondary cycle coding: Tracy (2013:192) explains where first-level codes are generated by the data, researchers use 'first-level codes coupled with interpretive creativity and theoretical knowledge to generate second-level codes.' In my secondary-cycle coding, I critically examined the codes which had already been identified during the primary cycle and began to organise, synthesise, and categorise them into interpretive concepts. My secondary-cycle coding moved beyond my first-level descriptive codes to include analytic and interpretive second-level codes. In my second-level coding I started to interpret and identify patterns, rules, and cause–effect progressions.

Tracy (2013:193) explains that second-level codes are often derived from disciplinary concepts, and this is why a thorough study of the body of scholarship is crucial for analysing and understanding the data intimately. I used second level codes such as self, other and openness. These codes are derived from the body of scholarship that I studied, including the dramaturgical theory of tolerance (cf. chapter 4.6.3.). In my second-level cycle of coding, I began identifying patterns or groupings of codes within the data. I started, for instance, to identify codes that continually reappeared in the data, and I linked them together in a specific way. Tracy (2013:193) refers to the process of reassembling data that were broken up during open coding, as 'axial coding'. According to Mouton & Babbie (2014:496), Atlas.ti™ allows for three types of coding, namely open coding, axial coding and selective coding. In this case I

made use of axial coding. The result was that I used the three main themes that had emerged from my literature study, namely, self, others and openness. I furthermore categorised the remainder of my codes into and according to these main themes. In the secondary cycle of coding I started to understand the alignment between my data analysis and my research questions.

Synthesising and summarising data: According to Tracy (2013:196), the first important part of any synthesising and summarising of data throughout the coding process, is that the researcher should record the thoughts and ideas that emerge, systematically. Throughout my reading and coding of the data, I had lots of ideas which I documented. It is not a pretty document, but it certainly helped me to organise and capture my own thoughts and ideas in summarising the data in a comprehensible manner. Secondly I made use of analytical memos. Tracy (2013:196) explains that qualitative researchers should write analytic memos, both as a part of the analysis process and as an analysis outcome. My analytical memos represent a kind of conversation, where I could think about my data or what Saldaña (2009:32) refers to as a place to 'dump my brain'. My analytical memos are a longer version of my field notes and they were focused on the meaning of the codes that had been assigned, as well as on the connections among these different codes. My analytic memos also helped me to figure out the fundamental aspects and concepts in the data, and they served as a key intermediary step between coding the data and recording the data analysis.

5.3.5 Personal role in the research process

I have, since 2009, been engaged as a lecturer in Religious Studies at AROS (the specific mono-religious higher education training institution that represents the area of and location for [i.e. the unit of analysis for] this specific study). I have always been curious to learn whether my teaching of religion has aided my students at all to understand the preferred kind of relationship between people who happen to belong to different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions and whether I might have contributed to a better understanding of religious tolerance in these students. It is against this backdrop that my role as researcher should be assessed.

My role as researcher may therefore be viewed as that of a budding academic who has sought to step back from all the peculiarities that make up a mono-religious higher education institution in order to obtain a broad overview of the phenomena of religious tolerance and mono-religious higher education institutions. Bertram and Christiansen (2014:183) describe this situation as the problem of the 'objective outsider' or an 'informed insider'. Of course, my personal involvement at and with AROS as a higher education institution has its advantages, as well as its disadvantages. (I discuss the disadvantages under par. 5.4: Methodological

constraints.) The advantages of my involvement with the institution greatly increased the volume of data and the kind of data that I was able to generate, because I had easy access to the different official documentation of AROS, the electronic version of the AROS curriculum and the staff involved in the accreditation of AROS gave me access to all the necessary documentation from governmental authorities. As a doctoral student, I was myself responsible for:

- developing the conceptual framework based on a thorough reading of the relevant body of scholarship, which was subsequently used to focus the process of data generation,
- obtaining permission from North West University's Ethics Committee to proceed with the study,
- obtaining the necessary permission from the mono-religious higher education institution concerned to gain access to the relevant document archives of the institution,
- obtaining the necessary permission from the staff involved in the interviews, to participate in the interviews,
- conducting the interviews,
- transcribing the recorded interviews data,
- verification of the transcribed texts with the participants with whom the interviews were conducted, and
- coding of all the data with the use of Atlasti™; keeping field notes to record my observations and thinking.

5.3.6 Instruments used in the research process

Mertens (2014:270) states that the most important instrument in the qualitative research process is the researcher himself. Although I am reluctant to describe myself as a research instrument, I gradually got to understand, during the course of my study, what Mertens means. The one instrument that started to gain ever more value in the course of my study was, in fact, my field notes. As advised by my supervisor, I purchased a thick notebook right at the start of my study in which I recorded all of my thoughts and observations. The book eventually became so valuable to me that I started locking it in the safe, because it recorded the story of my own, personal journey and subsequent development as a budding academic through (and

throughout) the research process. I was able to detect clear relationships between themes in my field notes as well as aspects that I needed to research further and find answers to.

I used two voice recorders during the interviews which I had conducted with the Directors, Lecturing Staff, and Student Council of AROS. Because there is always a great risk that a voice recorder might be faulty or may be malfunctioning during the interview, I ensured that both voice recorders were properly charged and that they were able to produce recordings of high quality to assist in the transcription of the interviews.

After the interviews had been conducted and transcribed, I went for further training with regard to the Atlasti™ software program. This program facilitated the coding process and also provided me with the opportunity to conduct in-depth data analysis.

5.3.7 Strategies for improving the credibility of the study

According to Tracy (2013:233) credibility refers to dependability, trustworthiness, validity and expressing a reality that is plausible. Qualitative credibility is achieved through thick description, triangulation or crystallization, multivocality, and engaging in member reflections with participants (Tracy, 2013:233).

González (2000:629) explains that in qualitative research 'things get bigger, not smaller and tighter, as we understand them.' By this González means that in qualitative research it is necessary to provide thick descriptions and concrete detail of the specific phenomenon at hand. Tracy (2013:234) avers that thick description and concrete detail are related to the 'ability of qualitative research to tap into tacit knowledge, which is the body of hidden meanings floating just below the surface.' Tacit knowledge is like the base of an iceberg. If one thinks of an iceberg, all one may see is its top tip sticking out of the water. This tip is the explicit and visible knowledge. However, the largest and most powerful part of an iceberg lies underneath, covered by water. Tacit knowledge is like this huge base (Tracy, 2013:235).

To reach this tacit knowledge, one needs to dig below the surface to understand the depth of the phenomenon. In order to recognise and obtain tacit knowledge with regard to my research questions, I tried to engage with, explore, explain and understand the nature and essential features of religion, religious tolerance and mono-religious higher education institutions. My historical reflection on each of these concepts helped me to provide detailed descriptions of each concept. To arrive at a thick description of the data of my empirical study, I furthermore needed to understand deeply and intimately the private education institution, AROS, the site where my study was conducted. Being an employee at AROS enabled me to understand thoroughly the site of my study, as well as its political, religious and academic environment.

Tracy (2013:235) makes a case that another key way of achieving credibility is by gathering multiple types of data, viewed through multiple lenses. As stated above, triangulation forms part of the process of determining the credibility of a study. In this regard, Tracy (2013:235) together with Noble and Smith (2015:35) explain that triangulation comprises the use of different methods, the engagement with multiple theoretical positions in data analysis, the use of several sampling strategies, and the use of more than one investigator in the field to triangulate different data sets to help clarify the same kind/category of data. According to Richardson (2000:934) and Maree (2013:81) one should, in a qualitative study, speak of crystallisation instead of triangulation, because triangulation developed from earlier research attempts to compare quantitative data sets with qualitative data sets. Tracy explains (2013:235) that, through crystallisation, researchers are encouraged to engage in multiple types of data generation in order to construct a multi-faceted, more complicated, and therefore more credible picture of the context or phenomenon being studied. In my own study I indeed engaged in multiple types of data generation. For this purpose I sourced empirical data from government documents (cf. 5.3.2.2), the mono-religious higher education institution's own policy documents (cf. 5.3.2.2), the curriculum (cf. 5.3.2.3), and interviews with members of the academic staff and the Student Representative Council (cf. 5.3.2.4). In order to construct a multi-faceted, more complicated, and therefore more credible picture of AROS as the site for my case study, I compared the data that I had generated from the different sources, and aligned the results with the results of my study of the relevant body of scholarship.

Tracy (2013:236) explains that one way of practising crystallization is through multivocality. Multivocality refers to the inclusion of multiple voices. This means analysing social action from a variety of participants' points of view, and highlighting divergent or disagreeable viewpoints. According to her (2013:236), multivocality requires that authors be self-aware of their own bias, and also of their participants' subjective views with regard to the phenomenon being studied. To enhance the credibility of my study, I stated my own bias, which is that I am a lecturer in the institution where the empirical study was conducted (cf. par. 1.7.8). Furthermore, I indicated clearly that my research was located within the interpretivist paradigm, which allowed me to consider different groups' perspectives, explanations and understandings of religious tolerance (cf. par. 1.7.1.). Noble and Smith (2015:34) explain that another aspect which contributes to the multivocality of the study has to do with discussing the results with other researchers. The credibility of my study was also enhanced by regular reflection with the assistance of critical readers such as my supervisor and a senior research professor in Education Methodology at UNISA (cf. Addendum 17).

In relation to multivocality, Tracy (2013:237) explains that researchers can also include participants in the analysis of their data and findings. Tracy (2010:844) uses the phrase

member reflections to refer to occasions that ‘allow for sharing and dialoguing with participants about the study’s findings, providing opportunities for questions, critique, feedback, affirmation and even collaboration.’ In my study I also made use of member reflections, rather than member ‘checks’. According to Lindlof and Taylor (2011:135) member reflections are different from ‘member checks, member validation, and host verification’, because member reflections suggest that participant feedback is valuable, not only as a measure of validity, but above all as a space for additional insight and credibility. After transcribing the interviews, I provided the participants with the transcriptions, requesting them to verify these. For this purpose, I provided them with a verification form (cf. Addendum 18). Subsequently, I made use of another form of member reflection, by sitting down with my participants and sharing with them my interim analyses and conclusions, by making notes of their responses, and by including these responses in further cycles of my data analysis.

5.4 Methodological constraints

Bertram and Christiansen (2014:183-184) identify three areas where methodological constraints could possibly be hidden during the study: with the researcher, with the participants, or within the context of the study. In respect of myself as the researcher, there are particular constraints that should, in all fairness, be highlighted. The first is that I am, at this moment in time, still regarded as an inexperienced researcher, and that I did not (initially) command sufficient relevant knowledge prior to the study as far as the generation of empirical data was concerned, because my master’s degree comprised a literature study only, not an empirical study. A possible positive aspect of my own study is the fact that I sought to eliminate this constraint by receiving as much training in empirical data generation and analysis as possible. A further relevant aspect, with which I as the researcher could have experienced some limitations, is that I am employed at the mono-religious higher education institution where I conducted the empirical study. As already mentioned above (cf. par. 5.3.5), Bertram and Christiansen (2014:183) refer to this predicament in which I as the researcher found myself, as the problem of the ‘objective outsider’ or the ‘informed insider’. As researcher, I must allow for the fact that I could not possibly be unbiased. I must also allow for the possibility that my own presuppositions might have influenced my research results, as well as the chosen research design and methodology of my study. I tried to approach the study as objectively as possible, and my supervisor assisted me in these efforts by questioning all so-called ‘sweeping statements’ and pushing me to be more critical of my own ideas.

A second aspect that might possibly be interpreted as a methodological constraint, lies in the relationship between myself and the participants. Because I work with all these participants on almost a daily basis, this could also have exerted an influence (during the interviews) on

the manner in which they chose to answer the questions. However, I feel that the widely deviating answers of the staff members to the questions that I put to them (cf. par. 6.5) indicated that they felt confident that they had the freedom to answer my questions as honestly as possible.

A third aspect, highlighted by Bertram and Christiansen (2014:184) as a possible methodological constraint, addresses the context within which the study was done. There are not many tertiary training institutions in South Africa that are mono-religious, apart from an identifiable number of theological training institutions countrywide. Although there are many mono-religious higher education institutions in other countries, my own work- and career-related responsibilities, including some financial limitations, compelled me to limit my study to South Africa. Because I chose AROS as the area of and location for my research (as my chosen unit of analysis), I opted for a more in-depth approach, since, being an employee of AROS I spent a sufficient amount of time at the area of and location for my research. This immediately implied a number of limitations with regard to my study. Among others, the limitations included the fact that AROS is still a relatively young institution, having existed for only ten years. This possibly limited the amount (i.e. scope) of data that I was able to generate. The institution AROS furthermore does not yet have a clear understanding of its own institutional identity as in the case of higher education institutions that might have existed for a longer period. All of these aspects could be regarded as methodological constraints to my study.

Chapter 6: Results and discussion of the data analysis

6.1 On an explanatory note

Besides reporting on (and subsequently discussing) the results of the empirical part of my study in this particular chapter, I will also be drafting (what I consider to be relevant) guidelines that AROS could consider with regard to its future religious tolerance praxis as a mono-religious higher education institution in South Africa.

Since the title of my study is **GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE PRAXIS IN MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS**, understanding what a guideline is and what the criteria for developing guidelines require, is therefore important. According to the American Psychological Association (APA) (2002:1048) the 'term guideline refers to statements that suggests or recommend specific professional behaviour.' I used the following three criteria from the APA (2002:10480-1050) to articulate the guidelines that will follow later in this chapter:

- Guidelines are intended to assist the continued, systematic development of a specific profession or institution. Guidelines should, therefore, be formulated in such a way that it recognises the professional judgment of each person or institution (APA, 2002:1048).
- Practical guidelines take into consideration the current best practices, theories and research so as to provide a defensible basis for the suggested practice (APA, 2002:1049).
- Practical guidelines are also accompanied by a general introductory section in which the need for the proposed guideline is explained, as well as the process by which it was developed (APA, 2002:1050).

Leading up to this point I will, in the paragraphs that follow firstly, report on and, secondly, discuss the results of the empirical part of my study.

6.2 A note regarding my data analysis

In my analysis of the data below, I made use of the three aspects of (a) self, (b) the other and (c) openness which had been derived from the body of scholarship that I have studied, including from the dramaturgical theory of tolerance (cf. par. 4.6.3.). These three aspects: the self, the other and openness could be understood in the following manner:

- Self: Any data relating to an institution's or people's understanding of themselves, or any knowledge about their own, or the institutional identity, were categorised and discussed under the self.

- Other: Any data relating to an institution's or people's understanding of others, or any knowledge or perception of others' religious traditions were categorised and discussed under the other.
- Openness: Any data relating to an institution's or people's feelings or communication towards differences of opinion, and how these feelings or communications pertaining to differences of opinion are dealt with, were categorised and discussed under openness.

As the reader will soon see, the data analysis revealed (almost immediately) the pivotal theme of 'epistemological dilemma'. Categorising the data under the self, the other and openness aided the identification of contradicting statements and differences of opinion. These contradicting statements and differences of opinion in the data are, as will be shown, caused by the oscillation⁶⁴ between the self and the other with regard to the relevant extreme (normative) polarities that will be discussed. When I report on the results of my analysis of the data in the paragraphs that follow, I will highlight these contradicting statements and differences of opinion in the data by referring to it using the words: 'epistemological dilemma'. By doing so, my intension was not to start interpreting the data already, but only to guide my readers in their recognition and subsequent understanding of what I believe to be a significant finding of this research, namely that of the epistemological dilemma. The results from the data analysis of the official documentation in par. 6.3. below set the scene for this pivotal theme of the 'epistemological dilemma' that will be highlighted in subsequent paragraphs.

6.3 Results of the data analysis of the official documentation

6.3.1 Results of the data analysis of the official documentation of relevant authorities

6.3.1.1 Self

To answer the first question, namely 'What guidelines are set by accreditation authorities for private higher education institutions in respect of their religion and teaching of religion?', the *National Policy on Religion and Education* (NPRE) serves as an important starting point.

⁶⁴ In this study I refer to oscillation (cf. par. 1.3) as the back and forth movement between two normative polarities: either the back and forth movement of the self and the other between (a) absolutism and relativism, (b) exclusivism and inclusivism, or between openness and reservedness. The results of my study clearly show that this oscillating movement is causing the epistemological dilemma (cf. par. 2.3).

According to the NPRE (2003:16), every South African citizen has the right to set up a private educational institution, based on whatever religion, at his/her own cost. The institution must, however, comply with the requirements of Section 29(3) of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* (CRSA). This, in turn, sets the requirement that private higher education institutions may not discriminate on the basis of, for example, race. They must also be registered by the state and they must maintain academic and professional standards that comply with the minimum requirements set by the state. Public and private higher education institutions must also comply with the minimum outcomes for the provision of Religion Education.

The NPRE (2003:19) describes the outcomes of Religion Education as follows:

‘Religion Education is therefore an educational programme with clearly defined and transferable skills, values and attitudes as the outcomes. It is a programme for teaching and learning about religion in its broadest sense, about religions, and about religious diversity in South Africa and the world. Religion Education should enable pupils to engage with a variety of religious traditions in a way that encourages them to grow in their inner spiritual and moral dimensions. It must affirm their own identity, while leading them to an informed understanding of the religious identities of others.’

Articles 34-42 of the NPRE are particularly important in designing and delivering curricula and lesson plans for and in Religious Education, because this section focuses on the role of teachers in providing Religion Education. According to the NPRE (2003:34), instruction with regard to Religion Education must be presented by well-trained professional educators who are registered with the South African Council of Educators (SACE).

AROS trains students to function as professional educators in public as well as in private schools. For this reason, its graduates must be equipped, in terms of the NPRE (2003:35), to develop programmes/curricula in Religion Education that also serve the educational missions of public schools in a democratic South Africa. The educator must be able to teach learners (who might attend a multicultural public school) about different religions. In addition, the educator must have the ability to instruct learners to have respect for and be able to demonstrate (amongst others) their moral responsibility towards one another.

The NPRE (2003:37) also addresses the lack of ‘religious literacy’ among many teachers. As a private higher education institution, AROS will have to support teachers with regard to their classroom pedagogical practices as far as religion is concerned.

Epistemological dilemma

The above-mentioned statement is the first example of the epistemological dilemma mentioned at the start of this chapter, that I wish to highlight. AROS is a mono-religious higher education institution that trains Christian teachers for a variety of multi-religious schools in a democratic South Africa. The question that could be asked, is how does AROS seek to equip its students to teach learners in multi-religious education environments, while at the same time promoting mono-religious education?

6.3.1.2 Others

If we look at the official documentation and the requirements they contain regarding the way in which a higher education institution should present itself to the public, we notice the following. According to the Higher Education Act, 1997, section 56(1)(b), the public has the right to see the registered status of all registered private higher education institutions. This provides important data for my study in that the DHET affords public recognition to PHEIs. This public recognition plays an important role as far as positive alternatives with respect to religious tolerance are concerned (cf. chapter 3, par 3.4.5.1). The fact that the DHET of the Republic of South Africa has granted recognition to a private higher education institution such as AROS, means that the PHEI must have complied with all of the legal aspects with respect to accreditation.

Accreditation is therefore an important aspect of my study, because it means that the DHET regards the registered PHEI as sufficiently tolerant and that it is able to offer the public a particular academic qualification programme (NPPE, 2003:16). Public recognition by the DHET takes place by means of a public document that contains the details of the accredited institution. This document is known as the Register of Private Higher Education Institutions (2014). AROS is introduced in the Register (2014:81) in the following manner:

Table 6:1 AROS introduced in the Register of Private Higher Education Institutions (2014)

Name	Site of delivery	Registration no.	Province	Qualifications
AROS (Akademie Reformatoriese Opleiding en Studies) (Association incorporated in terms of section 21/ Vereniging ingelyf kragtens artikel 21)	Pretoria: 1180 Dickensonlaan, Waverley, Pretoria.	2012/HE08/001	Gauteng	(The following programme is registered in terms of section 54(3) of the Higher Education Act until 31 December 2015)

CONTACT PERSON: Dr Lourens Marthinus Erasmus Executive Head: Academic (012) 332 3228 (T) 0867184911 (F)				Bachelor of Education (Foundation Phase)
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6.3.1.3 Openness

The *Criteria for Programme Accreditation 2004* of the *Council on Higher Education Quality Committee* set the following requirements for accreditation in respect of openness towards others as far as religion and religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions are concerned. The admission of students must be in line with the academic requirements of the programme and it must be based on the aspect of ‘widened access and promoting equity.’ (p. 8). The entire programme’s criteria for accreditation in respect of religion can be summarised in these two concepts, namely ‘widened access and promoting equity’. The following quotations serve as examples:

‘The programme’s admission criteria are in line with the National Plan for Higher Education’s (NPHE’s) goal of widening access to higher education. Equity targets are clearly stated, as are the plans for attaining them.’ (p.8)

‘Admission requirements are in line with the degree of complexity of learning required in the programme, within the context of widening access and promoting equity.’ (p.9)

A higher education institution must therefore take particular note of these two concepts (i.e. ‘widened access and promoting equity’) in its policy and implementation of policy regarding religion. By ‘widened access’ is meant that the higher education institution must continuously ensure that students with different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions are not excluded from being admitted to study at (in this case) AROS, should they wish to apply. In respect of the concept ‘promoting equity’, the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2013:9)*, provides a reasonable synopsis of what is intended. It says that there may not be unfair discrimination against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language or birth. This thought of ‘widened access and promoting equity’ specifically in respect of religion and different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions is further underlined in two documents, namely the National Qualifications Framework Act 67 of 2008 and the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 (cf. Higher Education Laws Amendment Act 26 of 2010).

6.3.2 Results of the data analysis of the official documentation of AROS

6.3.2.1 Self

From AROS' policies and webpage, it is clear that AROS is a Christian-reformational higher education institution. AROS' institutional identity in respect of its religion is clearly discernible to any person. In AROS' policy documents, the purpose of the institution as a higher education institution is best summed up in its Staff policy, which states that AROS is a mission-driven and non-profit-making institution, for the purpose of providing Christian-oriented (reformational) higher education, focused on teacher training. All staff members of AROS are expected to share this supposedly divine vocation (resp. Godly 'calling') and to subscribe to its mission and vision. This forms the primary consideration in and with respect to all staff matters, and all policy is subject to it (cf. AROS Staff Policy, 1).

To determine whether AROS is an open or reserved institution according to the model posed by Hermans (2003:337-338), I looked at its staff recruitment, student recruitment and admission policies. I also looked specifically at AROS' admission policy to see if it included or excluded students of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. From AROS' staff recruitment policy, it is clear that it wishes to be a Christian-based higher education institution in South Africa which functions on the basis of a Christian-reformational life- and worldview. AROS strives, therefore, to appoint staff who subscribe with their whole being to the Scriptures (cf. AROS' Staff Recruitment Policy, 1). It is clear from AROS' Staff Recruitment Policy that the institution will not appoint members of staff who are not avowed Christians; more specifically, they should be members of staff who are followers of a specific Christian, Calvinist, protestant and reformed religious persuasion. AROS also states clearly that it seeks to recruit and appoint the best possible candidates available and that it prohibits unreasonable discrimination (cf. AROS' Staff Recruitment Policy, par. 6.6).

Epistemological dilemma

According to AROS' Staff Recruitment Policy the institution will not appoint members of staff who are not Christians (specifically Christians who belong to a specific Calvinist, protestant and reformed religious persuasion), but AROS also seeks to recruit and appoint the best possible candidates. A logical question arising out of this contradicting epistemological dilemma is what if the best candidate happens to belong to a different religious denomination or does not subscribe to a specific specific Calvinist, protestant and reformed religious persuasion?

In AROS' recruitment of students, it wishes to comply with the present legislation set by the *Criteria for Programme Accreditation 2004* of the *Council on Higher Education Quality Committee*. Selection and admission of students at AROS take place in light of the programme's academic requirements, within a framework of widened access and promoting equity (cf. AROS' Student Recruitment Policy, par. 5). AROS' programme is primarily focused on recruiting prospective students who subscribe to a Christian religious perspective (cf. AROS' Student Recruitment Policy, par. 6.2). The Student Recruitment Policy and the Admission Policy relate closely to each other. The AROS Admission Policy states that prospective students who wish to study at AROS must be interested in a teaching qualification that is founded on a Christian-reformational religious perspective (cf. AROS' Admission Policy, par. 2). Besides being required to comply with particular requirements set by AROS in respect of qualifications, such as a senior certificate, prospective AROS students must also subscribe to the vision, mission and values of AROS, and 'the applicant must be able to convince the board that s/he wishes to follow a course of study that is in accordance with a reformed life-view.' (cf. AROS' Admission Policy, par. 17). Only students who subscribe to AROS' vision, mission and values are therefore admitted to the institution.

Epistemological dilemma

In the above-mentioned paragraph, AROS indicates that it wants to comply with the present legislation regarding 'widened access and promoting equity' set by the *Criteria for Programme Accreditation 2004* of the *Council on Higher Education Quality Committee*. As explained above (cf. par. 6.3.1.3) 'widened access' means that the higher education institution is obliged to ensure continuously that students with different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions are not excluded from being admitted to study at AROS. On the other hand, from AROS' Admission policy, only students who subscribe to AROS' vision, mission and values are likely to be admitted into the institution. This is clearly a contraction that needs to be discussed, explained and addressed by the institution.

6.3.2.2 Others

To understand what AROS wishes to convey to its students in respect of religion, requires the reading of two of AROS' policies, namely its Teaching and Learning Policy and its Research Policy. These two policies should preferably also be read together with the vision and mission statements of AROS. In terms of the Teaching and Learning policy, lecturers at AROS must have a good understanding of the vision and mission of AROS and they must be able to integrate these in their own teaching and learning practices. Lecturers must also bring to life

the vision and mission (of AROS) for their students through their own classroom conduct (cf. AROS Teaching and Learning Policy, 2).

To understand from AROS' official documentation the way in which the institution presents itself to the public, it is necessary to focus on the institution's webpage and Student Recruitment Policy. The institution's vision and mission statements, which it announces to the public, are available on its webpage. The institution's vision is worded as follows on its webpage: 'A thriving South Africa through Christian teacher training.' (<http://www.aros.ac.za/>). In respect of conveying their institutional identity to students, AROS' mission can be summarised as follows:

The mission of AROS is to present and expand Christian-reformational education and teacher training by, amongst others,

- the pursuit and realisation of a Biblical reformational life- and worldview
- reflecting the Christian-reformational character of AROS as the point of departure in everything that is taught, researched, done and communicated
- the provision of Biblically-based, affordable learning material of high academic quality which is suitable for all fields of education (<http://www.aros.ac.za/>).

AROS' Research Policy expresses its purpose in more detail in respect of religion, namely that AROS considers the core of its teaching to be the training and guiding of Christian teachers based on the Ministry of Christ, in their (supposedly 'divine') vocation (resp. Godly 'calling') as Christian teachers (cf. AROS' Research Policy, par. 5.2).

AROS' marketing strategy is expressed in the institution's Student Recruitment Policy (cf. par. 10.3). The marketing strategy comprises various aspects of the way in which AROS presents itself to the public. AROS, as an institution, wishes to introduce its Christian character to the public. Three main aspects must be highlighted in any advertisement placed by AROS, namely its Christian character, its model of service delivery, and the academic degree programme that it offers (i.e. the Bachelor degree (BEd) in Foundation Phase studies).

It is not clear from AROS' vision and mission statements whether the institution is in favour of welcoming, adopting, including and taking advantage of the notion of diversity or not. All that we can deduce from the mission statement of AROS is that it wishes to comply with the national statutory requirements for accreditation (i.e. the Council on Higher Education, SAQA and the Department of Higher Education and Training), which effectively state the requirements for welcoming, adopting, including and taking advantage of a diverse group of

staff members. From AROS' policies, we see that the institution also aspires to maintaining a diverse staff complement throughout the institution (cf. AROS' Policy on Employment Equity, par. 1.1).⁶⁵

In trying to understand how AROS relates to others, it is important to recognise that AROS' lecturers are also encouraged, in terms of its Research Policy, to publish in recognised accredited research journals (cf. AROS' Research Policy, par. 8.4). Part of AROS' vision is to make a positive contribution to education in South Africa by means of Christian education (<http://www.aros.ac.za/>). A question which I couldn't answer from the official documentation of AROS, was whether the institution wishes to grant recognition status to other religions on its campus, or not (by allowing, for example, Muslim students to have a designated space on campus where they could worship).

6.3.2.3 Openness

AROS' understanding of knowledge and science serves as a guide to understanding the institution's openness towards other religions and religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. I made use of information that is available on AROS' webpage to generate data on the institution's understanding of openness. The following is a summary of AROS' view of science. (cf. <http://www.aros.ac.za/index.php/oor-aros-christelike-wetenskap>).

AROS' approach to science can be described as a Christian scientific approach. Christian Science avers that everything belongs to the Triune God, and that the Triune God can be known through His works, including His works of creation. When looking at nature or creation, Christian scientists should ask: What does the Triune God reveal of Himself in and through these particular works of His?

According to the document on AROS' website (cf. <http://www.aros.ac.za/index.php/oor-aros-christelike-wetenskap>) AROS' basic principle for practising science is honest science. The core of honest science, according to AROS, lies firstly in acknowledging one's life- and worldview. AROS' life- and worldview is clearly reflected in its name, which is: *Akademie vir Reformatoriese Opleiding en Studies* (Academy for Reformed Studies and Training). AROS is a Christian-reformational higher education institution that positions itself with other Christian-reformational higher education institutions worldwide. AROS' practising of science cannot testify to anything other than God the Creator, because AROS would otherwise be

⁶⁵ As already mentioned above (cf. par. 6.3.2.1) this paragraph describes essentially the same epistemological dilemma. In AROS' Policy on Employment Equity we notice that AROS wants to embrace a diverse group of staff members, but in the AROS Staff Recruitment Policy, AROS contradicts itself by claiming that it will not appoint staff members who are not avowed, professed Christians.

engaged in dishonest science. According to AROS, the honest practising of science is not possible without the Word of the Triune God (the Holy Bible).

AROS (<http://www.aros.ac.za/index.php/oor-aros-christelike-wetenskap>) also acknowledges that an organisation should accept in honesty and with humility that it does not know everything. Within this thought lies AROS' openness towards other organisations: According to AROS they wish to enter into discussion with other higher education institutions, even though they might not share AROS' views on the practise of science. Through conducting discussions, AROS wishes to strengthen its life- and worldview and challenge itself to revert continuously to the Word of the Triune God. According to AROS it is dangerous to practise science in isolation; this could easily lead to scientific arrogance (<http://www.aros.ac.za/index.php/oor-aros-christelike-wetenskap>).

6.4 Results of curriculum data analysis

6.4.1 Self

In examining AROS' curriculum and the way in which it conveys its institutional identity as a Christian-reformational higher education institution to the students, the following observations need to be recorded. From their first year until their final year of studies, students study modules in Biblical Studies. In this subject, they deal intensively with the history of the Bible from Genesis until the last book, Revelations. Looking at these modules, it is clear that AROS does indeed have an exclusivist view of salvation, because the students are taught that salvation leading to eternal life comes only to those who believe in Jesus Christ as the Redeemer (cf. Biblical Studies 211, pp.6, 9 and 15). The main purpose of the Biblical Studies modules is to provide students with a fundamental knowledge of the Bible as a religious book and also to guide them to apply the knowledge that they have learnt via the various Biblical Studies modules in (and to) their own lives (cf. Biblical Studies 221, p.1).

Every module has the purpose of articulating and conveying to the students – from a Biblical perspective – a Christian foundation for every academic subject. The following modules can, for example, be highlighted: In Sociopedagogics 311 (p.2), a normative Biblical theory is articulated with regard to what a community should be, and what pedagogics should entail, as a consequence of that. In Educational Philosophy 321 (p.34) students are guided to evaluate educational philosophies from a Christian perspective. In Teaching Life Skills 221 (p.16), students are expected, from a Christian Science point of view, to understand why, for example, music is important for the practising of religion.

AROS expects the teachers that they have trained to apply the values and principles that have been articulated (and which have all been derived from the Bible) in their own classroom

contexts - especially with respect to the delivery of the curriculum, *per se*. In Classroom Management 211 (p.2) students are guided how to implement Christian values in their own classrooms, as well as in their own professional assessment practices. In Curriculum Studies 311 (p.52) the students are expected to develop and demonstrate skills in the development of a Christian curriculum that is based on Biblical values.

A further aspect in which the students receive instruction is the ability to compare the Christian values that they have acquired from the Bible to different policies on education in the South African educational context. In Education in South Africa 111 (p.26), students are taught how to apply the current South African educational policies within a Christian context. In Classroom Management 121 (p.8) the students receive instruction on how to maintain discipline in a school within a Christian framework, the school's own policies and other relevant legislative aspects.

Epistemological dilemma

In the paragraphs above, one again finds the epistemological dilemma in the sense that AROS teaches the Bible and other subjects from a specific Christian-reformational life- and worldview. The dilemma presents itself in the fact that the students are expected to apply what they have been taught in and through the AROS-curriculum in (and to) their own lives. The logical question that could then be asked, is what if the student does not, necessarily, share the same life- and worldview as AROS and does not want to apply the knowledge that s/he has learnt in (and to) his/her own life? One could also elaborate on this question and ask whether the students will be penalised or disciplined (by AROS) if they don't apply the knowledge they have learnt in (and to) their own lives?

6.4.2 Others

In its curriculum, AROS attempts to engage in discussion with other religions only in the following modules: In the module Religious Studies 111 (p.1-8), students learn of the five greatest (greatest in terms of the number of followers) religions in the world, namely Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism. Students are furthermore instructed with regard to the religious practices of these five religions (cf. Religious Studies 111, p.37-42).

AROS teaches its students that religion is an important aspect of the global and local social framework, and also how religion fits into the social context of each person. In the module Sociopedagogics 311 (p.20), students are equipped to assist learners to understand their own

religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions better. In the module Classroom Management 121 (p.12), students are taught to have respect for the parents of their learners and for the parents' religious convictions, and in the module Learner Support 321 (p.16, 22), students are taught to treat all people with respect, irrespective of their religion.

Epistemological dilemma

In par. 6.4.1 I explained that AROS has an exclusivist view of salvation, because the students are taught that salvation leading to eternal life comes only to those who believe in Jesus Christ as the Redeemer. A logical question that could be raised at this point is whether it constitutes an epistemological and/or a transcendental contradiction in the curriculum to teach students an exclusivist view of salvation, while teaching them, on the other hand, to have respect for religions other than their own?

6.4.3 Openness

Considering the current, general South African classroom scenario which comprises diverse multicultural and religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions, students are taught in the modules Teaching Practice 311 and 321 how to deal with cultural and religious diversity. In the module Sociopedagogics 311 (p. 5), diversity is addressed and emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of every person in God's eyes. Students are taught to respect the values, attitudes, habits and life- and worldview of every person. Students are introduced to the various relevant laws and policies in respect of equality, equity and diversity in schools, and are also equipped to teach young learners in a non-discriminatory way (cf. Education in South Africa 111 (p.20) and Sociopedagogics 311 (p.30)). In the module Community Development 411 (p.25), the focus is on the diversity of communities as well as on common values which they might share.⁶⁶

6.5 Analysis of the data that were generated during the interviews

I divide the analysis of the data that were generated during the interviews again into the three main themes, namely self, others and openness. This thematic division, which I had already developed as an outcome of my literature chapters, provided me with the most appropriate guidelines for the categorisation of my data. Because the confidentiality of the participants are regarded as extremely important, their names and gender will not be revealed. All the directors who participated in the interviews are male and I refer to each of them with a letter of the alphabet, e.g. Director A. All of the lecturers who participated in the interviews are female and

⁶⁶ The same epistemological dilemma as was discussed in par. 6.4.2 above, can be recognised in this paragraph.

I refer each of them with a letter, e.g. Lecturer B. All of the students who participated in the interviews were also female and I refer to each of them with a letter, e.g. Student C.

6.5.1 Self

It is notable that when reference is made to the self or the institutional identity of AROS, all of the participants perceived AROS as an exclusivist institution. By exclusivist, the AROS staff members believe there is only one true faith and, furthermore, that there is only one way in which a person can be saved. It is from this exclusivist point of view, therefore, that the participants' thoughts about the self should be understood.

6.5.1.1 Exclusivism

It is noteworthy that during the interviews with the directors, lecturers and students of AROS, the same kind of response to the question of exclusivity repeated itself. The question was put to all of these groups of participants:

'Do you think that AROS has an exclusivist viewpoint on something such as salvation?'

All three of the directors perceived AROS as an exclusivist institution, and yet they did not want AROS to be known as exclusivist and were also not comfortable with references to AROS' viewpoints as being exclusivist in nature and intent. All three of the directors said that AROS' exclusivism resides within the person of Jesus Christ (one of the Holy Trinity). Director A said:

'The people within AROS understand their salvation within a person, the Person of Jesus Christ himself.'

All of the directors explained that there was a close connection between exclusivism and inclusivism. Director B said that AROS was an exclusively Christian institution, but that he did not wish to call AROS exclusivist. Instead, he would rather describe its exclusivist position as a particular conservative point of departure. He explained further that although he saw salvation exclusively within Christ, he nevertheless saw the institutional identity of AROS in a missionary light and that there was a dynamic connection between AROS' conventional position and its missionary task.

All of the lecturers replied 'yes' to the question whether AROS regarded its own Christian, Calvinist, protestant, reformed view of salvation as being exclusivist in nature. The lecturers themselves also took a very strong stand on this. Lecturer D said:

'Yes, AROS has an out-and-out exclusivist view of salvation.'

The lecturers explained further than they did not wish to be typecast as exclusivist. Lecturer E explained that there was a certain negative connotation attached to the thought of exclusivism,

namely that people who took an exclusivist stance were sometimes regarded as being intolerant, and that she as a lecturer did not wish to be regarded as someone who might be intolerant.

The same thinking emerged in the focus group interview with the students. This was that AROS was indeed exclusivist as an institution, but did not wish to be known as some or other Christian fundamentalist cult. To the question that was put to the students whether they thought that AROS' staff and the teaching that AROS presented represented an exclusivist view on salvation, Student A replied:

'Well, they do, but it's in line with Christianity. So, it is exclusive, but I mean it's not a cult type of thing.'

Epistemological dilemma

The data presented above, is yet another clear example of the epistemological dilemma. Although all the participants proclaim an exclusivist point of view, they don't wish to be typecast as being exclusivist.

6.5.1.2 Institutional Identity

As explained in par. 4.2, the institutional identity of an organisation and its vision and mission statements (or its purpose) are very closely interlinked. The question was therefore put to all participants:

'What do you see as the main purpose of AROS?'

All of the participants said the main purpose of AROS was the training of Christian teachers. Student C added that the purpose of AROS was to change the world through Christian education. All of the directors gave further information on the purpose of AROS as being a Christian-reformational higher education institution, by referring to the so-called basic 'premise' on which AROS is founded. Director B explained that there was a clear distinction between a Christian-reformational higher education institution such as AROS and a non-Christian higher education institution, and Director C added that all higher education institutions had a particular ultimate (i.e. a 'more-than-rational') commitment or premise, and even if a higher education institution might claim to be neutral, that would then be its ultimate (more-than-rational) commitment or premise. The directors of AROS emphasised that its ultimate (more-than-rational) commitment or premise had developed historically from a particular life- and worldview that is, in turn, based on a set of particular faith-based beliefs,

persuasions and convictions. According to the directors, the premise of faith that AROS subscribes to, had developed out of the Reformation of the 16th century.

Director A explained that AROS' ultimate (more-than-rational) commitment or premise was not only clearly related to a Christian ethos, but that it also represents a unique approach to science. He said it was this unique approach to science that gave AROS its right of existence, and provided its institutional identity. This unique approach to science was described by most of the participants as Christian Science. Most of the participants saw a close connection between AROS' institutional identity and its approach to science. I was able to glean the following characteristics of Christian Science from the interviews:

- The teaching of a particular understanding of the way in which a person acquires knowledge: Director C explained that the Christian scientific way in which a person acquires knowledge was through the revelation of God. He said: 'The word revelation means the ways in which God reveals Himself to us and of course this also comes naturally to us through the NGB (Nederlandse Geloofsbelydenis). This is that God revealed Himself to man in nature and in the Scriptures. Those are mainly the ways in which God reveals Himself to us and how we acquire knowledge of a given matter.'
- The teaching of the connection between unity and diversity: Director A said he believed that it was only through Christian Science and the Protestant tradition that a balanced answer to unity and diversity could be presented.
- The teaching of God as the Creator of all things.
- The teaching of Christ and who He is: Student B's comment on this is notable. She said: 'The teaching on Christ as the centre-point of everything is important to AROS. One of the lecturers indeed calls this the golden thread. From the beginning, the reference is always to Christ, of Christ, and that everything in life revolves around Him.'
- The teaching on vocation: This was particularly notable during the interview with the students. They view the teaching on vocation at AROS as a very positive aspect. Student A said it 'leads to success amongst us, because we're here because it is our 'calling' and not because we have nothing else to study.'
- The teaching that faith touches all aspects of life, including one's view of science: Lecturer C said, for example, 'I think that if you look at science, as science is practised, it is a separate subject for many people, but to a Christian, science is part of your faith.'

The institutional identity of AROS can therefore be summed up from the interviews as the provision of training in Christian education, presented on the basis of a specific ultimate (more-than-rational) commitment or premise that developed out of the Reformation period with a specific scientific approach, namely Christian Science.

6.5.1.3 *Static or changeable identity*

The question was put to the participants:

‘Do you see AROS’ institutional identity as static or changeable?’

The participants’ answers to this question introduced a dynamic new element into the interviews. To me, this dynamic element was the participants’ deeper reflection on the link between institutional identity and the development thereof. Two directors attempted to explain the link between the static and changeable, whilst one Director in no way wished to regard institutional identity as static, but as constantly changing. The directors who indicated a link between the static identity and the changeable identity explained that AROS’ institutional identity was static in the sense that the foundation of AROS should not change, because the faith of the people employed at the institution was constant in Jesus Christ and should not change. They regarded the basis and the principles of AROS as firm and unchangeable. They saw the changeable or dynamic element in the continuous development of the basis of the institution’s principles, implying that they saw a deepening and a growth in institutional identity. The Director who was of the opinion that institutional identity was constantly changing, attributed static thinking to a lack of effective debate and believed that static thinking did not articulate the way in which institutional identity should be understood in society.

By contrast, the lecturers unanimously explained that they saw AROS’ institutional identity as being simultaneously static as well as changeable. All of the lecturers linked the static aspect of institutional identity to the institution’s Christian principles, which they felt may not be changed. However, they offered important nuances in explaining the institutional identity as changeable. Lecturer A said good communication was necessary to prevent static thinking, and said that immutable static thinking on institutional identity alienated and excluded other people. Lecturer A saw that change in institutional identity was necessary because it accommodated other people. Lecturer B said that institutional identity needed to change because it always needed to adapt to the environment. Lecturer C said that even though a people’s view of God rarely changed over time, an individual person’s life- and worldview often changes on short notice, and because one’s worldview formed part of one’s identity, one’s identity can therefore also change on short notice. Lecturer D said:

'I find our identity in the Christian understanding of identity, but it makes provision for an element of change specifically because the Christian identity and view of identity implies change.'

Lecturer D explained further that an institution that saw its identity as immutably static would form a uniform staff body, and that such an institution could easily develop a fundamentalist life- and worldview which then, in turn, could well lead to belligerent, confrontational conduct.⁶⁷

Lecturer E explained that a static institutional identity provided the framework within which a person could change, because ideas can be tested against the framework; the framework can be evaluated and the framework can then be developed further.

Although the students were all of the opinion that AROS had a static institutional identity, they nevertheless perceived this as something positive. They furthermore viewed AROS' static institutional identity as a criterion against which to measure their own lives, to find out if their own, personal conduct was correct or incorrect. They saw AROS' institutional identity as something that addressed their conscience, but they did not understand AROS to be some kind of church-like institution. Student C said:

'So, this is the thing that I like about AROS – they remind you every time what is right and wrong.'

6.5.1.4 Epistemological dilemma

In the questions on the matter of whether AROS' institutional identity is static or changeable, I detected a certain tension in the participants' answers. I want to refer to this tension also as the epistemological dilemma. In their responses to the questions on the connection between the static and changing institutional identity, the participants began to speak of minorities and majorities in the organisation, older and newer thinking in the organisation, two types of people within the organisation, or that there might be a particular grouping that perceives a certain matter in one particular way, while another grouping might view it differently.

The directors do not find these differences to be acceptable. Director B does not think there is clarity on the identity of the institution, and sees this as a general problem among mono-religious higher education institutions. He said:

'I think this is perhaps the danger of a mono-religious higher education institution. That is why I said we should conduct an internal audit on the nature of our presuppositions.'

⁶⁷ Refer to the first epistemological dilemma that was pointed out in par. 6.3.2.1, where it was highlighted that 'according to AROS' Staff Recruitment Policy the institution will not appoint members of staff who are not Christians with a reformed and reformational religious persuasion.' Lecturer D explains in this paragraph that it is not preferable to have a uniform staff body, for 'such institutions could easily develop a fundamentalist worldview.'

In contrast, some of the lecturers regarded the differences to be entirely acceptable and stimulating to the organisation; they saw the balance between the different ways of thinking within the organisation as something positive. One lecturer felt that there should be different thoughts on institutional identity, although that there had to be a sound balance. Lecturer E said:

‘There should be a sound balance between the different thinking in the organisation; there should, but I don’t think there is one at present.’

Among the students too, differences had begun to arise on the issue of static versus changeable identity. When the students’ focus group discussion began to lean towards the direction of change and the reasons why change and accommodation were important, Student A cautioned:

‘On the other side in another breath (sic) I also want to say, but not to go down on our morals, we shall not be part of the world and I think it is important to stay focused on who we are in Jesus. So yes, we need to be humble; we need to be graceful; we need to be quiet; we need to be calm, but also very strong about where we stand and let’s be honest, we’re not very willing that way, I don’t think.’

6.5.1.5 Criticism on changeability

Arising from the interviews, there was clearly a fear of aspects that could pose a threat to the identity of an institution such as AROS. These dangers were regarded by the participants as possible changes which could occur in the institution, changing its institutional identity. I identified four aspects from the interviews which the participants perceived as potential dangers to the institutional identity of a mono-religious higher education institution:

- **Finances:** Although not all of the participants felt that finances held a threat to the institutional identity of a mono-religious higher education institution, the majority of participants felt that this did indeed pose a threat. Director C stated that finances did not at this stage pose a threat to AROS’ institutional identity, but that it could happen in the future and that this should specifically be guarded against. The participants who perceived finances as a threat were of the opinion that financial wellbeing and survival could possibly become the ultimate pragmatic objective of the institution and that this could lead to AROS taking its eyes off its present purpose, which was the training of Christian teachers.
- **Materialism:** An aspect that related to the financial threat to the institutional identity of a mono-religious higher education institution was materialism. Some lecturers specifically highlighted this particular aspect. Lecturer D said it was important to break with materialism, because material things should only be a means to an end and

should never become an end in itself, because that would change the identity of the institution.

- Accreditation requirements: There was clearly a difference of opinion between the participants as regards the way in which they understood AROS' accreditation requirements and the influence thereof on the identity of the institution. Some of the participants were of the opinion that the accreditation requirements were no threat whatsoever to its institutional identity, and that a mono-religious higher education institution could easily express its faith-based beliefs and convictions without any problems, despite the prevailing accreditation requirements. Others felt, however, that the accreditation requirements limited the development of a mono-religious higher education institution. Director C said that AROS worded its applications for accreditation with care in order to take society's pursuit of equality and equity into account. Lecturer D expressed herself very strongly against the accreditation process. She said:

'Yes, I think there are definitely many elements in the present accreditation system in South Africa that in themselves favour certain ideologies, and in my understanding this practice makes it terribly difficult to gain accreditation of a Christian institution within the broader tertiary environment in South Africa. I thus definitely see this as a problem.'

- Secularisation: Some participants saw the world's and specifically South Africa's secularisation as a threat to the institutional identity of a mono-religious higher education institution. Director C and Lecturer E saw the current trend towards multiculturalism and multi-religiosity as a form of secularisation that strives towards the equality of all cultures and all religions. They saw this kind of secularisation as a threat to the identity of a mono-religious higher education institution.

6.5.1.6 Criticism of static identity

During the questions on the static and changeable identity of the institution, the participants raised some criticisms regarding static identity. Some of the participants felt that there was limited openness within a Christian institution, which led to restriction in the institution's growth in knowledge and academic quality. Lecturer E felt that fundamentalist thinking could easily arise within a Christian institution, and that there was conflict between the fundamentalist thinking and more liberal thinking. Lastly, Lecturer F felt that static thinking could lead to a poorer understanding of society and that societal involvement would be reduced if one reflected only statically on institutional identity. This criticism is further expanded upon in the discussion with respect to the other and openness below.

6.5.2 Others

During the questions that dealt with the way in which the participants thought about others, including people who might belong to different faiths and religious views than those held by the people at AROS, important opinions emerged regarding the process in which the participants felt one's attitude towards others should be shaped. I identified five aspects from the interviews which the participants regarded as important in respect of the relationships that should exist between oneself and others. These aspects are love, peace, critical thinking, respect and honesty. These aspects are described below.

6.5.2.1 Love

A core feeling that prevailed in all of the interviews was that the Christian attitude towards others should always be based on love. Director A said:

'AROS sees itself absolutely as part of the mainstream, and arising out of the commandment to love one's neighbour; this means that there can be no withdrawal and avoidance of the world.'

The reason why there should be an attitude of love towards others was, according to most of the participants, that God loved humankind, and this required of humankind to love others. The participants saw this as a direct commandment from God. Lecturer E felt that fundamentalist conduct could really only be prevented through the demonstration of true love towards one's neighbour, an aspect that Director C also highlighted by referring to vengeance that was God's alone, and that we should love our neighbours as ourselves. The students spoke of the importance of love as a way of attracting other people to your faith and way of thinking. This response is potentially problematic, because it suggests a certain degree of epistemological insincerity and even anthropologically untruthful behaviour: 'I will love you in an attempt to persuade you into coming over to my faith.' If love is used as an ulterior motive in this fashion then, ontically, it cannot be love, *per se*. The ultimate (i.e. more-than-rational) commitment or premise of love can never be to serve or to benefit the self. Ontically, love is always directed away from the self, towards the other, for the sake of the other. (As will be seen later, in paragraph 6.5.3.2, all the participants believed that there was ethically and morally nothing wrong with such a view of and on love, because they are convinced that they are merely obeying the missionary command of the Triune God.)

This is why the second aspect of the disposition of love can be referred to as active love, which can be summed up in the service ethic of AROS. Director A described one of the objectives of AROS as service to others. Lecturer D described this service rendering as a gift that you as a human being have received and which you may not selfishly keep to yourself but should share with others. However, I detected in the interviews a clear hierarchy as far as service rendering is concerned: Participants believed Christian service to the Triune God as being of

a higher order than service to their fellow-men. To the question of whether AROS should offer recognition status to other religions on campus (for example by making a prayer room available for Muslim students on campus), all of the participants answered 'no'. Clearly demonstrating an essentially intolerant attitude, Director A answered this question as follows:

'No. We assume that the terrain (sic) that we have, was given to us by God for a specific purpose of service, and therefore we shall not offer status to other religions because they do not serve God, but idols.'

6.5.2.2 Peace

An important attitude that Christians should maintain towards others who might differ from them in terms of religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions, was described by the participants as peace. As in the case of love, the participants believed the maintenance of peace as being a command from the Triune God. Director A saw the maintenance of peace in the command that God gave to his disciples, to the effect that the disciples must reach out to all people and make them disciples of God. One knows that the making of disciples can take place through violence or indoctrination, but Director A pointed out that the making of disciples may not take place under compulsion, because that would represent fundamentalist behaviour.⁶⁸ It must take place in love through the working of the Holy Spirit. A number of the participants associated themselves with this, saying that true proselytising (i.e. 'disciple-making') could not take place through compulsion but only through God revealing Himself to humankind. Director A said:

'God wishes to be worshipped in love and not under compulsion.'

Lecturer E emphasised that one must live through faith and attract people by the manner in which you live, but that one may not compel other people in any way whatsoever to believe the same, or in the same way. The students concurred with this and said they in no way regarded the faith-based teachings that they receive as faith being rammed down their throats.

6.5.2.3 Critical thinking

The majority of the participants deem it important for AROS to take a critical attitude towards other faiths and those who might happen to think differently. The participants view this critical attitude mainly in two ways: firstly, that you need to know the other thinkers really well, and secondly that you need to draw a clear distinction between your own and their religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions.

⁶⁸ Refer back to the epistemological dilemma that was pointed out in par. 6.3.2.1. From AROS' Admission policy, only students who subscribe to AROS' vision, mission and values are admitted to the institution. A question that the institution should answer, is whether this does not constitute a particular form of compulsion or undue pressure?

Regarding the first observation, the only way you can really get to know people is to engage with them in conversation. Director A said one needed to seek out people with a different religious foundation or different religious principles from yours, and engage with them in conversation. Director B said the reason why you need to engage in conversation with people who happen to be thinking differently, is to get to the core of these differences and to see if there are not perhaps some points of common understanding possible, despite the differences.

The second aspect of a critical attitude emerged particularly strongly during the interview with the students. They felt that a critical attitude towards those who think differently created a clear boundary between oneself and the other, which most of the students described as necessary. Students expressed themselves very strongly against any influences from other faiths on campus, and felt that the mono-religious higher education institution should set boundaries within which all students (for example) were then expected to function. If people did not wish to function within those boundaries, they should not study at the mono-religious higher education institution concerned. This clearly suggests an embedded propensity for intolerant behaviour. Student A said, for example:

'Look, every time there are a lot of people who come and study here that know this is a Christian university and definitely aren't Christians. So, I think for them it's a little bit difficult, because according to them there's all these rules and regulations according to AROS which they don't agree with, but yet they're still here. Even though they grumble and moan and complain and whatever, you need to understand that if you study here it's a Christian university and we believe in God and everything that goes with that.'

Director B regarded AROS' admission policy, which refuses no student of any faith permission to study at AROS, as a critical admission policy.⁶⁹ According to him, institutions who are at peace with themselves, their clientele and their stakeholders do not feel threatened in their institutional identity by those who might think differently. Instead, they actually encourage differences and then try to resolve them.

6.5.2.4 Respect

It emerged from the interviews that most of the participants were agreed that the basis of respect could be found in the acceptance and support of diversity. Director A believed that the acceptance and support of diversity is representative of the essence of the Triune God himself, because (according to Him) the Christian God is a unity and diversity within Himself in

⁶⁹ This is another clear example of the epistemological dilemma, because from AROS' Admission policy (cf. par. 6.3.2.1) only students who subscribe to AROS' vision, mission and values are admitted to the institution, yet according to Director B the admission policy refuses no student of any faith permission to study at AROS.

therefore within his Trinity. Because the Triune God, in essence, is three persons in one, Director A felt that Christians should also accept and support diversity, and that out of this understanding of diversity, the thought of respect for others should arise. Student D contributed the thought that when you have (and show) respect for others, respect can then also be expected from them.

According to the participants, respect involves not thinking of yourself to be better than others, not cutting yourself off from others, not looking down on others and adopting a humble attitude towards others. According to Lecturer A, respect also involves a willingness to learn more from others. She said:

‘Christians can very often learn things from non-Christians such as humility, tolerance, love for your neighbour, etc.’

Student A said that a mono-religious higher education institution should also seek in the classroom to teach respect to its students and thereby they would, in turn, teach their learners how to act more respectfully towards their classmates who might come from different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions.

6.5.2.5 Honesty

All of the participants were of the opinion that AROS informed prospective students very clearly and honestly with regard to its identity, and that this actually facilitated the pedagogic atmosphere in the class because the students knew what they could expect and the lecturers understood what they could and should teach. Lecturer A opined that AROS was very open to anyone who arrived there, whether they happen to be Christian or not. Lecturer A said that at AROS ‘it really revolves around the honest meeting of needs and answering of questions according to the Christian point of view, but to the best of my knowledge no one is discriminated against for not agreeing with you. On the contrary, we encourage debate on various aspects.’

Lecturer F believed that the honest answering of questions from a certain point of departure was essential to prevent indoctrination which could lead to fundamentalism. Lecturer F drew a distinction between indoctrination and proclamation of the truth. This participant averred that the proclamation of the truth deals with the addressing of a person’s conscience. A person then needed to decide for him-/herself whether or not to obey his/her conscience. On this aspect, the students felt that everyone’s conscience was already being addressed at AROS and they experienced this as something positive.

An important debate regarding the aspect of honesty in a mono-religious higher education institution arose, however, between the students during the interview. This debate revolved

mainly around the honest conscience of the students with respect to two aspects, namely the opening of classes with a Scriptural reflection (and prayer) and the answering of exam questions. Regarding the Scripturally-based opening of classes, some of the students believed that attendance should be compulsory, while others thought that they could not always attend these opportunities either with a clear conscience, or with an honesty of purpose. Regarding the second aspect, namely the answering of exam papers, some of the students indicated that they often wish that they could tender a different answer to the one that they are expected to provide, because doing so would almost certainly mean that the lecturer would mark it as incorrect. The consequence was that they were unable to answer the questions completely honestly. This meant that they were essentially obliged to be dishonest and insincere.

Epistemological dilemma

An important aspect that I have identified and which I am of the opinion is necessary for enhancing tolerance, is honesty (cf. par. 3.5.1.3). The paragraphs above relate to the epistemological dilemma which I had mentioned in par. 6.4.1. From the discussion in these paragraphs, it is clear that some of the students felt that they are being coerced (unduly pressurised or obliged) to answer questions in their exam papers that will reflect the life- and worldview of AROS. If they don't answer the questions with regard to their religious persuasions according to the life- and worldview of AROS or according to the particular life- and worldview of the lecturer, the lecturer will mark it incorrectly. The result is that the students are of the opinion that they are realistically being coerced by AROS and their lecturers to answer particular exam questions in a dishonest manner.

6.5.3 Openness

6.5.3.1 Reservedness

The reason why I discuss reservedness first under the heading of openness, is because there was a clear sentiment among the participants against a reserved institution. The participants did not at all wish to have AROS become known as a reserved institution. They were of the opinion that reserved institutions had a particular fragmented understanding of reality, and that such a fragmented understanding not only restricted knowledge, but also limited academic quality.

According to Director A, if you wished to express your Christian love in practice, you could not and should not withdraw yourself from the public debate. You should also not set yourself up

on an island in respect of your thinking. Director B said that when you proclaimed that you wished, as an institution, to reform or transform society, you could not allow yourself to be isolated on an island, because you are obliged to know the society that you wish to change. Lecturer A felt that she as a lecturer did not wish to isolate herself on an island, but that it was part of the Christian faith to reach out to others.

Director A linked the danger of fundamentalism and propaganda to a reserved system, and this was why he did not wish an institution such as AROS to function within a closed system of thought with regard to religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. Lecturer E said that an institution that functioned within a reserved system of thought with regard to religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions could easily fall into exclusivism and consequently be viewed as an intolerant institution.

6.5.3.2 *Open attitude*

All of the participants thought that it was important for AROS to be recognised as an open institution, instead of a reserved one. This became clear when some of the participants made remarks such as that AROS should invite other universities to engage in conversation with it regarding its religious position and academic depth, or that AROS should show its democratic side and participate in public debates on education. All of the participants agreed that openness towards those who think differently, was a Christian command. I identified two reasons why the participants wanted openness towards people of other faiths and those who might think differently. The first reason was because they wished to convey a certain truth to them, namely their (i.e. AROS' – see below) version of religious truth. The second reason was because the participants believed that they themselves too, should learn from other faiths or from those who happen to think differently.

The first reason why the participants wanted AROS to be known as an open institution was so that they could convey a certain truth to others. Conveying of the truth was non-negotiable for all of the participants who shared in the missionary command to deliver the gospel to other people, because they regarded the missionary command as a command of the Triune God. The participants also saw it as their responsibility towards the Triune God to maintain an open attitude towards others. Some of the participants articulated this responsibility as what was required to express their faith towards all people, or as Student A put it, to proclaim a Christian way of living to others through their deeds and thereby influence them (i.e. proselytising them) into becoming disciples of the Christian faith. A certain reservedness could still be found in this kind of thinking, as is evident in the following remark, made by Lecturer F:

'The only reason why one should engage in conversation with others is to proclaim the truth to them.'

The second reason related to the group of participants who argued that one should also learn from those who think differently. The participants said there was no need to reinvent the wheel, since people of other faiths had already discovered a number of things about themselves and the world that did not have to be re-discovered. In this regard, Lecturer C said, for example, that no single person or institution possessed all knowledge. We should learn together and different versions of the truth, as well as different 'truths' could, therefore, also be gleaned from interaction with people of different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. Director B said reality had not been granted to Christians alone, but also to non-Christians. If Christians were not to share in the knowledge of the non-Christians, the Christians would impoverish themselves in respect of knowledge.

6.5.3.3 Defined openness

It was interesting that some of the students did not relate openness to Christians, *per se*, but to non-Christians, instead. Student A, for example, specifically said:

'I think there is, regardless of the fact that we're a Christian institution, I think there's really a lot of open-minded students here who aren't Christians.'

Although all of the participants wanted an institution such as AROS to be recognised as an open institution, they nevertheless were unyielding in their belief that this openness should be defined. By 'defined', the participants meant that there should be a certain foundation (i.e. an ultimate, more-than-rational commitment or premise) on which (and for which) AROS stood if they were to engage in conversation with people of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions, or with people who might happen to think differently. Director A articulated it as follows:

'The criticism that we have regarding democratic debate is that in our view the truth is not determined by democratic means, but with our revelation ideal. We would like to take part powerfully in the democratic debate, but we make no secret that we would like to change the basis of the discussion.'

There was also a fear among some of the participants that total openness would cause AROS to deviate from its principles and suffer moral decay. Student A argued that AROS should be careful not to lose its vision and thereby also its strong moral values. The envisaged openness must therefore, according to the participants, not result in a mono-religious higher education institution losing its institutional identity. Director A articulated it as follows:

'I think that AROS should be an institution that does not doubt itself, that does not try to be everything to everyone, but which would like to bring everyone to the only God.'

6.5.3.4 Quality of teaching

The interviews all demonstrate a clear link between a reserved institution and perceived low academic standards, and an open institution and perceived high academic standards. These two links are explored in the following two paragraphs.

6.5.3.4.1 Low academic standards

An institution that is associated with an island perspective or which is seen as a reserved institution is sometimes also associated with poor academic standards. This notion came clearly to the fore in the interviews. I identified a few aspects from the interviews that, according to the participants, can lead to low academic standards. The first aspect involves financial limitations, which can be the cause of poor facilities and infrastructure. Lecturer E argued that poor facilities and infrastructure could reduce academic standards because, for example, lecturers might struggle to prepare properly for their classes and/or to conduct effective research. Lecturer A also argued that financial limitations could pose a problem for lecturers in that their workload can be reduced if better financial assistance became available. Better funding could help lecturers to spend more time on research and less time on assessment and evaluation-related duties.

A further aspect that can contribute to low academic standards, according to some participants, is rapid growth. An institution that is growing too fast (especially in terms of student-intake) prevents staff members from devoting sufficient time to reflecting on their own work. This also prevents staff members from entering into discussions about their own work with people who might hold different views, such as, for example, lecturers discussing their subject content with other people. A final aspect that participants identified as possibly contributing to low academic standards was self-satisfaction or complacency. Some of the lecturers indicated that smugness and self-satisfaction could reduce the academic and scientific standards of an institution. Lecturer C described a complacent attitude as that of a staff member who did not benchmark his or her thinking against that of people who held different views and therefore was not open for scholarly reflection (together) with them.

6.5.3.4.2 High academic standards

An open institution is usually associated with high academic standards (Srikanthan & Dalrymple, 2002:220). Institutions of excellence are not seen as reserved institutions. The participants unanimously believed that a mono-religious higher education institution should strive for high academic quality and high academic standards. Director B opined that private higher education institutions should strive even more (than public higher education institutions) to be institutions of high academic quality, while the standards of state-owned and parastatal

higher education institutions were steadily in decline. Private higher education institutions should, accordingly, start discussing how to become pockets of excellence.

I identified two aspects from the interviews which the participants deemed as important as regards the raising of standards, namely good research and a high-quality curriculum. The first aspect raised by the participants was that of good research. Lecturer D said:

‘I believe that we should really be at the forefront in our research; we must conduct good research. When other institutions that think differently from you conduct good research, you must be aware of it and identify elements of the truth in it. We must not blind ourselves to it.’

The participants identified the following aspects as necessary for good research: good library facilities, good technology and easy Internet-access. According to the participants, these aspects would enhance the academic and scientific standards of an organisation. The next aspect was that of sufficient funding for staff members to participate in national and international seminars and conferences so as to enable them to measure their own research against those of people who might think differently. The final aspect that the participants highlighted was that an institution’s research must be professionally and scientifically respectable, and that it should, for this reason, be benchmarked against the research produced by similar institutions (nationally, as well as internationally).

The participants also indicated that the curriculum should be of high academic quality. According to some of the participants, external moderators or members of an external Advisory Board were essential for assessing and evaluating the institution’s curriculum. Some of the participants also pointed out that all higher education institutions should incorporate a quality assurance division as part of their own institutional make-up, which could then be employed to help enhance the institution’s quality of, amongst others, academic programme delivery. Lecturer E pointed out that lecturers themselves should benchmark their own teaching and research by making use of external moderators of (inter)national repute. The students also averred that a culture of sound, authentic dialogue and honest, open debate in their classes would help to encourage a high quality of learning and that this, too, might eventually enhance the academic and scientific standards of a particular higher education institution.

6.6 Discussion of research results

The results of the empirical part of my research will be discussed below on the basis of the dramaturgical theory of tolerance which I had developed and processed as a result of my study of the available body of scholarship. From the dramaturgical theory of tolerance, I again made use of three aspects of the self, the other and openness to discuss the results. Each

aspect will also be discussed with reference to the network diagram created on Atlas.ti (cf. figure 6.1). This network diagram illustrates the outcome and logical coherence of my analysis of the data. The results are discussed in accordance with the guidelines that were offered by Layla Cassim ERS Consultants CC (2015:20) for the treatment of qualitative data. These guidelines include:

- The in-depth, yet concise, discussion of the data
- Comparison of the results with the international body of scholarship
- Bringing the results into context with similar studies done elsewhere.




Figure 6:1 Network diagram from Atlas.ti: the discussion of data with reference to the self, other and openness

6.6.1 Discussion of the data with reference to the self

The results as regards the self, arising from the data that had been generated, will be discussed with reference to the following hierarchical diagram:




Figure 6:2 Network diagram: the discussion of data with reference to the self

There are many similarities between Figure 6.2 and the models of interreligious tolerance of Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:4), who distinguish between four interreligious tolerance models, namely: Exclusivism, Lifeview-coexistence, Pluralism and Inclusivism. Each of these interreligious tolerance models refers to modes of behavioural action or practice which function as responses to the epistemological dilemma (described in Chapter 3). Lifeview-coexistence and Pluralism, for example, are models that attempt to avoid either Exclusivism or Inclusivism, and attempt, in the same manner as the dramaturgical theory of tolerance which I had developed, to serve as a positive behavioural response to the epistemological dilemma (described in Chapter 3). Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:7) explain that Lifeview-coexistence seeks ways in which to position one's own (e.g. Christian) religion within societal and cultural circumstances and contexts, based on the assumption that this can assist in our attempts to create and interpret meaning. Everyone involved in the (Christian) school is encouraged to engage in authentic dialogue, and on occasion, engage in confrontation with one's own, as well as other faiths and religions. In the Lifeview-coexistence model we consequently find oscillation between the self (one's own) and other's religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:7) describe the oscillation between oneself and the other as encouragement to enter into dialogue and also as the occasion for confrontation and possible conflict.

It is clear from the data that AROS adopts and supports a decidedly absolutist viewpoint, understanding or dogma as regards its institutional identity and that this viewpoint or identity exerts an influence on the entire ethos of the organisation. AROS also has a more exclusivist life- and worldview that reflects throughout the organisation and this manifests throughout its curriculum. Scope is, however, provided within national legislation in South Africa for religious or life- and worldview-exclusivist higher education, because legally, every person in South Africa has the right to establish his/her own private higher education institution. From the results it is, however, clear that there is a definite problem with the practical realisation and operationalisation of the concept of exclusivism. Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:4) relate exclusivism to people who regard their own religion as the only correct and acceptable lifestyle.

The reaction to the epistemological dilemma appears clearly in the frame when we consider the life- and worldview(s) held by members of staff at AROS. During the interviews, staff members and students of AROS described the institution as an exclusivist one, and yet the staff members did not want to be labelled as being exclusivist because an exclusivist person – according to them – is easily perceived as an intolerant person. On the other hand, the description of a Lifeview-coexistence model by Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:7), which proclaims that one's own religion (for example the Christian religion) is but one religion amidst a multitude of religions in a pluralistic societal framework, was not acceptable to the members of staff at AROS, or to its students who participated in the interviews, because they see the absolutistic confession in Jesus Christ as the only Redeemer, as an exclusivist confession that must be obeyed at all costs. This again signals a clear propensity for intolerant behaviour, despite the participants' claims to the contrary.

This is a problem in the hearts and minds of the participants with whom the interviews were conducted. Although the participants involved in the interviews have a clear understanding of AROS' institutional identity, there is a need to see AROS' institutional identity rather as dynamically growing and not simply as static. When the static and the changing institutional identity was discussed, an interesting (and in my view positive) interaction arose between absolutist and relativist viewpoints. When the participants were confronted with the epistemological dilemma, the oscillation didn't only take place between the polarities of the self and the other, but also (and perhaps more importantly), inside the self of each participant. During the interviews, some participants' responses had changed from being exclusive to becoming more open, adopting, accepting and inviting. The interviews furthermore evolved from simple straightforward yes/no-type responses, with relatively abrupt and short explanations, to more open, free-flowing and critical discussions. This can be described as an oscillation inside the self among all of the participants. This kind of oscillation took place between the self's own, inward-directed life- and worldview-based beliefs, persuasions and convictions and its outward-directed professional identity and behaviour. This oscillation inside the self is what Hermans (2001:244) refers to as the Dialogical Self Theory (DTS). The dialogical self is a psychological concept describing the mind's ability to imagine different viewpoints while engaged

in an internal dialogue. These different viewpoints could, for example, refer to issues of a religious, cultural, race or gender nature.

This interaction was similar to the one that occurs in the inter-religion tolerance models of Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:4), in which the Lifeview-coexistence model is raised as an alternative to predominantly exclusivist or predominantly inclusivist thinking and behaviour. I am of the opinion that the Lifeview-coexistence model is a better approach to our current understanding and practice of religion than the purely exclusivist or inclusivist model. It is clear from the interviews that the staff members and students of AROS view the institution from a particular life- and worldview vantage point, and that other life- and worldview models are only engaged with in discussion from the viewpoint of this particular model. Because the participants at AROS believe that their life- and worldview model is the best way in which to view (and engage with) the world and, in respect of my study, to view (and engage with) religion and religious tolerance, I do not think that they can ever be completely free from these predominantly exclusivist thought patterns. The important aspect brought to the fore by the Lifeview-coexistence model is the relationship between a static institutional identity and a changing institutional identity, which causes oscillation between the polarities of exclusivist and inclusivist thinking and behaviour, fore-grounding an epistemological dilemma that the institution is obliged to address if it wishes to remain relevant in the future.

During the interviews an important dynamic emerged. I refer to this dynamic as the epistemological dilemma which was caused by the oscillation between the static and the changing institutional identity. This, in turn, brought the subject of diversity within the organisation itself to the surface. Where at the start of the interviews there was agreement among the participants that clearly could be identified as support of and for exclusivism, the oscillation between the static and changing identity of the organisation saw the staff moving ever closer towards the Lifeview-coexistence model, or, what I prefer to refer to as dramaturgical tolerance. An important characteristic of the Lifeview-coexistence model is described by Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:7) as the recognition of diversity. This diversity was clearly perceptible in the diverse reactions of the staff and students to the issue of static versus changing institutional identity. Arising from these diverse reactions, a further important aspect of critical thinking emerged – highlighting, for example, aspects of the problem of essentially static thinking versus essentially changing thinking as indicated in Figure 6.2 above. The development of critical thinking is important for engagement in authentic dialogue and improved thinking with regard to tolerance, as indicated in my literature study (cf. par. 4.6.3.3). Critical thinking arising from the above-mentioned epistemological dilemma should therefore not be suppressed or even avoided within a mono-religious higher education institution. The epistemological dilemma gives rise not only to critical thinking towards others' life- and worldviews, but also towards one's own life- and worldview.

It is against this backdrop that the guidelines that I have drafted and that I will be discussing in the paragraphs that follow, should be understood.

6.6.1.1 Drafting guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institution from the discussion of research results regarding the self

I noted that acknowledgement of the self, and peace of mind concerning the self, are important components in all efforts directed at the improvement of tolerant behaviour (cf. par. 3.5.1.2). In practice, this means that a mono-religious higher education institution should inform its members of staff as exhaustively and effectively as possible of and with regard to its own institutional identity (mission and vision of the institution). From this observation, I wish to articulate the first guideline as follows:

An orientation and induction programme should be implemented for all new members of staff, which, amongst others, will provide a clear explanation of the institutional identity of the mono-religious higher education institution.

I have drafted the next guideline because I noted that the people involved in and with the mono-religious higher education institution, AROS, did not want the institution to be recognised as an exclusivist one (in respect of its religious practices); instead they wanted the organisation to proclaim its institutional identity (vision and mission) clearly in all discussions and deliberations with other interested parties. The reason why the staff members do not want AROS as a mono-religious higher education institution to be recognised as an exclusivist one is because exclusivist institutions are usually (as indicated in the literature, cf. par. 6.6.1.) regarded as intolerant institutions. Furthermore, an institution that clearly communicates its mission and vision to others is regarded as being more accessible. Arising from these observations, I wish to articulate the second guideline as follows:

A mono-religious higher education institution should compile a clear and simple description of its vision and mission statements that communicates clearly its institutional identity to all interested parties. These interested parties would typically include the accreditation authorities, prospective and present students, the staff members themselves, as well as all other legitimate stakeholders and role-players.

The third and last guideline that I have developed from the discussion of the data on the self, is aligned with my observation that the reaction on the epistemological dilemma caused by absolutist thinking versus relativist thinking brought a positive development to the surface. What emerged from this interaction and subsequent movement towards, as well as oscillation between a static institutional identity (absolutistic) and a changeable institutional identity (relativistic), was diversity (in terms of personal viewpoints). Where, at the start of the interviews there was consensus among the participants with regard to the institutional identity of AROS, the further the interviews progressed, the more the participants and the staff members

were confronted by the epistemological dilemma – and the more diverse the participants’ individual viewpoints became. Diverse views and the reciprocal acknowledgement (and tolerance) thereof is, however, an important component of my dramaturgical theory on tolerance (cf. par. 4.6.3). It is therefore, in my own view, important that a mono-religious higher education institution should provide safe dialogical (even multilogical) spaces where staff can be confronted with an epistemological dilemma and where they are consequently placed in situations where they will be obliged to compare not only their own religious identities, but also the articulated identity of the institution they happen to work for with that of other people and/or institutions. Arising from this conclusion, I wish to articulate the third guideline as follows:

Mono-religious higher education institutions should host regular in-house debates about their institutional identities, and they should exchange academic programmes and site visits with other higher education institutions so that they may learn from each other.

6.6.2 Discussion of the data with reference to the other

I discuss the results of the data with reference to the other on the basis of the following radial diagram:




Figure 6:3 Radial diagram on the discussion of the data with reference to the other

The aspects discussed with reference to the other, namely love, peace, critical thinking, respect, hospitality and honesty are, admittedly, also found in various theories about dialogue (cf. for example Sleep and

Sener, 2013, Derezotes, 2013:23 and Forst, 2013:386). These aspects are categorised in terms of the mindset that (normatively speaking) should exist when authentic dialogue is conducted between different parties. Wood (2015:79) explains that aspects such as love, peace, critical thinking, respect, hospitality and honesty (cf. par. 6.5.2, where these aspects all emerged as a result of my coding of the relevant data), should be defined by the person using them. It is clear from the results (cf. par. 6.5.2.1 and 6.5.2.2) of the data that a mindset of love or peace as a prerequisite for more tolerant behaviour is more or less meaningless unless it is clearly defined. To declare that love or peace is a prerequisite for tolerance will not assist a person to be (or to become) more tolerant. This aspect is discussed at length in my literature study, when I referred to Augustine's concept of love (cf. par. 3.4.1.1). Although Augustine understood love to be an essential principle of tolerance, he also regarded conduct which was not in line with God's Word as wrong and said such conduct needed in some cases to be strictly punished. If strong action is not taken, there is no love for the person who contravened; disobedient conduct should, therefore, not be tolerated in order to testify to love.

Emerging from the interviews, the aspects of love leading to improved tolerance, include the following:

- Love that leads to improved tolerance leads to active outreach towards others.
- Love is never selfishly directed towards the ego and the 'I'; instead it is always directed outwards – towards the other. (Love is never about 'me'; it is always about 'you'.)
- Love towards others is also seen as actively resisting fundamentalism, extremism and militaristic conduct.
- (Persistent) love towards others should, eventually, prompt and stimulate reciprocal, inviting behaviour.
- Love clearly has a limit when it comes to religion, in that a particular hierarchy of love emerged during the interviews. The participants with whom the interviews were conducted believed that love towards God came first, and thereafter love for one's neighbour. Where the love towards God came under threat from the other, the element of tolerance also became jeopardised.

It was clear from the interviews that love needs to be defined in terms of a person's life- and worldview; in this respect, too, a particular limit to love might be expected.

Another aspect that emerged during the interviews was the aspect of critical thinking. I indicated in my literature study that oscillation between the self and the other required and/or leads to critical thinking (cf. par. 4.6.3.3). The reason for the immense emphasis on critical thinking during the interviews seems to me to lie in the fact that the staff members of AROS have a strong feeling of self-awareness, even though they also feel the need (or even the obligation) to engage in discourse with others. From the official AROS documentation, as well as from the interviews, the aspect of critical thinking arising from the oscillation

between the the self and the other came strongly to the surface. Emerging from my literature study (cf. par. 4.6.3.3), I indicated that critical thinking – the stimulation and development thereof – plays an important role in the improvement of thinking with regard to tolerance and tolerant behaviour. According to Hare (2002:108) learning to think critically helps a person truly to get to know differently-minded people.

More knowledge of others can also lead to more tolerance. By this I don't mean that more knowledge of the other will simply resolve conflict. Instead, I argue that more knowledge of the other should, in most cases, contribute to better understanding of the other's points of view, which can then lead to the improvement in (and of) tolerance. In his lecture on openness of the heart (Raath, 1994:537)⁷⁰ Stoker states that when one is confronted with the antithesis of the differently-thinking towards oneself, it requires of the self to retest and re-evaluate one's own contexts, views and suppositions critically and honestly, because one could, in fact, be wrong (Stoker, as transcribed by Raath, 1994:537).

It is clear from Stoker's remark that knowledge of the other has an effect on knowledge of oneself. Knowledge of others is therefore essential for growth in one's own self-understanding. Mavunduse and Oxley (2002:12) indicate that reduction of belligerent, confrontational behaviour within a group can take place, provided that a clear knowledge of oneself and/or the group's identity exists (cf. par. 3.4.5). However, what I wish to add to the above, from the results of my data, is that institutional identity cannot focus solely on knowledge of the self (this could easily lead to fundamentalism). Instead, knowledge of the other should be embedded in thorough self-understanding, as well as in the development of institutional identity. Knowledge of the self cannot exist without knowledge of the other. In my study of the relevant literature (cf. par. 3.5.1.5), I also indicated that mutual recognition and knowledge of the self and the other is not only essential to self-understanding, but also to one's own inner peace. Institutions which are only inwardly focused can therefore easily start to panic about their own institutional identity, experiencing an identity crisis as it were, because self-understanding can be achieved only through mutual recognition and knowledge of the self and the other. Breaking contact with the other causes identity crises, leading, easily, to inner anxiety and, more often than not, to subsequent fundamentalist behaviour (Enns *et al.* 2005:21).

It seems that besides the development of critical thinking, the clear setting of boundaries is also important. According to Goosen (2015:23), boundaries between communities and different identities are unavoidable. Goosen says:

'Indeed, boundaries are absolutely essential. Without them, there cannot be an own community with its own integrity. But, and herein lies a paradox, there can simultaneously not be an own community if, within its boundaries towards others, it is not also intrinsically open to the others.'

What I refer to as the 'epistemological dilemma' in this thesis, Goosen (2015:23) calls the 'paradoxical community'. Goosen describes this as a community characterised by its own demarcated integrity as well

⁷⁰ Raath published an annotated transcription of Stoker's lecture on 'Openness of the heart'.

as openness towards others. From the results of my own data, I have inferred that boundaries are, indeed, necessary for peace, and that a lack of boundaries can cause even more intolerance and conflict. A clear indication of this is, for example, a mono-religious higher education institution such as AROS, which has restrictions in respect of student admission and conditions for students to study at the institution concerned. These restrictions regarding student admission and conditions for students to study at the institution concerned, create a boundary line which could prevent confusion and possible conflict. If this boundary line is clearly communicated to the students, students will be able to evaluate whether they could act in accordance with the institutional identity of a specific mono-religious higher education institution or not.

On the other hand, the mere establishment of boundaries without openness can easily lead to fundamentalist behaviour which, in turn, can result in fanaticism or even militarism. According to Goosen (2015:20), fundamentalism and globalism represent the two sides of one and the same complex phenomenon. Although they might profess to be alternatives to each other, they implicate each other. Both fundamentalism and globalism believe in a monotone world in which everything must be brought together in the interests of 'togetherness' – whether the undifferentiated particularity (single identity) of fundamentalism, in which all identities must conform to that single identity, or the undifferentiated globalism (boundarylessness) in which all identities must disappear, leading – yet again – to one single identity.

When considering the determination of institutional identity boundaries, the aspect of openness should be taken into account. This paradoxical relationship between institutional identity boundaries and openness is essentially the same relationship as that between the absolute and relativistic theories of knowledge which, according to my study, cause an epistemological dilemma with regard to religious tolerance. From the results of my data, aspects such as love, peace, critical thinking, respect, hospitality and honesty represent essential components that can be employed to help construct the bridge between the self and the other. These aspects are necessary for creating a safe dialogic and multilogic space, or what I refer to as a safe dramaturgical sanctuary for (and of) openness (cf. par. 4.6.3.3), which creates an atmosphere where tolerant behaviour between the self and the other not only becomes possible, but is encouraged.

The overarching, all-embracing aspect that combines all of these aspects (love, peace, critical thinking, respect and honesty) is hospitality. This is, however, an aspect which did not emerge from the data that were generated during the interviews. In my literature study I have indicated (cf. par. 4.6.3) that hospitality as a preconditional behavioural nuance of ultimate, selfless and genuine, authentic tolerance, serves as an important catalyst for improving the dramaturgical sanctuary of dialogical openness. Lyon (2008:89) explains that hospitality is the attitude of the self, taking unreserved responsibility for the other. Hospitality serves as a catalyst moving one beyond ordinary tolerance or even intolerance, because tolerance and intolerance essentially only focus on the self, whereas tolerance as **RE**-cognition (when undergirded by the overarching, all-embracing aspect of hospitality) moves one from the self in the direction of the other. Hospitality then serves as a catalyst for enabling and accelerating the narrowing (and eventual closing) of the epistemological gap between the self and the other.

Hospitality is the overarching, all-embracing catalyst for creating the dramaturgical sanctuary in which the other aspects necessary for dialogue can be enacted between the different parties. Let us look, for example, at 'honesty'. It is clear from the results of my data (cf. par. 6.5.2.5) that honesty in respect of a given identity brings about composure, calmness and level-headedness in people. It is noteworthy that honest acknowledgement of a mono-religious higher education institution's identity enhances the perception of such an institution's openness. In my literature study (cf. par. 4.6.3.1), I indicated that recognition of the self is closely linked with the notion of honesty, and that only people who have fundamental knowledge of themselves can be truly tolerant. The reason for this is that people or groups who are honest about themselves usually have the capacity to engage in effective, authentic debate and reflection. However, if this debate and reflection takes place in an honest but not a hospitable and welcoming space, it could result in a situation where the self starts telling the other in an honest, yet rude manner, who they supposedly 'are'. This could then result in even more intolerant behaviour (for an example of this kind of intolerant behaviour, refer to the epistemological dilemma described in par. 6.5.2.5 above). For this reason, hospitality is an overarching, all-embracing factor creating a more tolerant space in which love, peace, critical thinking, respect and honesty can be employed to conduct honest, authentic dialogue between the self and the other.

6.6.2.1 *Drafting guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institution from the discussion of research results regarding the other*

The relationship between the self and the other is crucially important in our attempts at understanding tolerance. However, the problem that emerged from the literature was that the mere expression of love and peace between oneself and others does not necessarily lead to greater tolerance; concepts such as love and peace also need to be actively and, above all, accurately engaged with, explored, explained and taught. For the practical improvement of tolerance in a mono-religious higher education institution, the institution can (as in the example that I presented in par. 6.6.2) articulate an informed understanding of what is intended by its values, and these values could then also be brought to the attention of all staff members. As a result of this conclusion, I drafted the following practical guideline:

Mono-religious higher education institutions should adopt and include the following values for improving their own thinking with regard to tolerance: love, peace, critical thinking, respect, honesty and hospitality. These values should, however, also be included in the curriculum and official policies of the institution; they should be accurately phrased and they should seek to provide a clear understanding of each of these values. These values (love, peace, critical thinking, respect, honesty and hospitality) should be phrased in such a manner that they reflect the institution's identity as clearly as possible.

A subsequent guideline that also emerged from the discussion of the data on the other, concerned the development of critical thinking. In my discussion of the relevant literature (cf. par. 4.6.3.3), I indicated that the stimulation and development of critical thinking represented an important step towards improving our thinking with regard to tolerance. I indicated that critical thinking usually becomes possible as soon as honest and authentic dialogical oscillation takes place between the self and the other. This oscillation occurs when there is dialogical interaction between the self and the other. However, besides the interaction between the self and the other, honest reflection with respect to the self (once the moment of interaction has officially ended) is equally important to the development of critical thinking. The following can therefore serve as another possible guideline for the practical improvement of tolerance within a mono-religious higher education institution:

The development of critical thinking should be built into the institution's policies, curricula, inter-staff communications and staff development programmes. This could also be achieved by, for example, encouraging lecturers to participate in national and international academic seminars and conferences. Lecturers should also be encouraged to conduct in-depth research on the work of different scholars with different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions and thereby gain real understanding of and appreciation for their work and their understanding of religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. This knowledge could then be utilised to improve, design and draft the institution's own curricula on a continuous basis.

6.6.3 Discussion of the data with reference to openness

From the data that were generated, the results on openness can be discussed with reference to the following network diagram:




Figure 6:4 Network diagram on the discussion of data regarding openness

It is clear from the results of the data that the staff members of the mono-religious higher education institution AROS do not wish it to be perceived as an 'island-type' institution. The 'island' concept can be explained by means of the following scenario. A person who is born on an island and who grows to maturity on that island alone, probably has a great amount of knowledge of that island. Such a person might possibly regard the island as the world, in which case s/he might not even be aware of the fact that s/he has many limitations with regard to his/her own growth in terms of knowledge. This could result in a perception of reservedness, or what some of the staff members at AROS described during the interviews as 'island thinking', transmitting a message of stagnation in knowledge and academic quality (in par. 4.3.1 of my literature study I refer to this kind of thinking as isolationism). In his book *No university is an island: Saving academic freedom*, Nelson (2010) describes the danger inherent to the limitation of academic freedom, and how academics can easily allow themselves to be restricted in their thinking by slavishly following economic or political influences.

An open attitude and sharing in the knowledge of others are two aspects that, emerging from the data, are linked to each other. The participants explained this openness towards others in two different ways. The first reason that the participants advanced for an open attitude towards others was because they felt (from a Christian-reformational perspective) that they had something valuable that they wished to share with others. In my literature study (cf. par. 3.4.5.1), I also identified the aspect of openness towards others as a form of criticism against the permission theory. Wolhuter *et al.* (2014:4) similarly categorise this reason for openness towards others under the exclusivist approach. They say, for example, that the exclusivist reason for openness towards others relate solely to preaching of the truth (missionary zeal), for the purpose of converting (proselytising) people of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions to one's own set of religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions.

I am of the opinion that, from an educational point of view, there is indeed the intention on the part of teachers who happen to be working at a mono-religious education institution to convey something of value to the child. Schindler (2013:88) doubts whether information can be conveyed at all if people don't choose – deliberately – to adopt such viewpoints or claims of truth. If a person adopts a viewpoint and proclaims it in public, whether by means of an academic article, the Internet, Facebook, Twitter or other social media, this person is then taking a stand on the matter concerned in the hope that another person will also adopt the viewpoint together with him, or perhaps will challenge it. Within this discussion on the viewpoint, the viewpoint is deepened, improved or even amended. It is this oscillating discussion between various viewpoints that Van Wyk Louw (1986:411) refers to when he talks about an 'open discussion' or 'open dialogue'. Boshoff (2014:145) said that, over time, Louw indeed made certain adaptations to his own initial viewpoints, sometimes more and sometimes less obviously. A viewpoint provides the incentivising opportunity for an open discussion between the self and the other to take place.

The full sum of openness can therefore never lie in the acquisition of knowledge alone, but also in the interpretation and transfer of knowledge. This links up with the second aspect that emerged from the

interviews, namely to learn from others. To entertain openness towards others because you want to preach the truth is an impoverishing attitude that can limit your own growth in knowledge. The whole purpose of opening yourself to others is to promote the growth of knowledge. Growth of knowledge in oneself and in others also enhances understanding of different points of view.

A mono-religious higher education institution such as AROS can, however, not be regarded as an open institution. Certain aspects have to be reserved, otherwise it cannot be recognised as a mono-religious higher education institution. Any scholarly thinking on tolerance or identity is subject to boundaries (as indicated in par. 6.6.3). Openness should therefore not be viewed as openness without boundaries. This is why I spoke in my discussion of the results of the data of *defined* openness. Defined openness is a kind of openness that should be built into a mono-religious higher education institution's institutional identity, with a view to providing a clear indication of the nature of the institution itself. In my literature study (*cf. par. 4.6.3.3*) I referred to the example of some openness programmes that could be implemented as part of a mono-religious higher education institution's academic curricula. The purpose of such openness programmes will be to make students aware of the ethical and moral necessity of authentic dialogical interaction between the self and the other. This should prompt a possible epistemological dilemma in the students, to which they will then be obliged to respond.

The last aspect that is important in discussing the results of the data on openness, is the link between openness and quality. An institution which is perceived as a reserved institution is, according to the staff members with whom interviews were conducted, more easily associated with low academic standards. Arising from the literature, openness and open thinking are more easily associated with high academic quality. In the article by Srikanthan & Dalrymple (2002:220) on quality in higher education, they describe one of the quality models (the transformation model) as 'a quality system that drives improvement from the staff-student interface governed by an academic professionalism that embraces openness, dialogue and transparency.' It is clear that Srikanthan & Dalrymple associate high academic quality and academic professionalism with openness, dialogue and transparency.

Furthermore, any institution which considers itself an institution that upholds high academic standards should not have a problem to make its academic curricula available for critical assessment and subsequent moderation and evaluation by external academic moderators or advisory boards. In the literature, open-mindedness is understood as an important aspect of high academic quality. Open-mindedness relates to the willingness to subject one's own perspectives to critical reflection and also to gain insights from the viewpoints of others. Miller (2004:31-32) regards open-mindedness as a quality that all academics should possess. Habermas (2006:5) prefers the word fair-mindedness to open-mindedness. He regards fair-mindedness as the willingness to listen to others and to decide in good judgement which viewpoints and arguments of others can be accommodated. Habermas' concept of fair-mindedness is semantically and epistemologically closer to the concept of defined openness to which I have referred in this thesis, than it might be to open-mindedness, *per se*, because fair-mindedness does not suggest an unlimited, permissive

and non-interventionist acceptance of any viewpoint or argument. Fair-mindedness relates, instead, to the reasonable consideration and accommodation of various viewpoints and arguments. Quality assurance in a mono-religious higher education institution could, for example, play a pivotal role in ensuring open-mindedness or, as Habermas indicates, fair-mindedness, by making the academic curricula and related policies of the institution available for external moderation and subsequent benchmarking against those of other academic institutions.

6.6.3.1 *Drafting guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institution from the discussion of research results regarding openness*

An important component which I identified for improving our understanding of tolerance was the growth in knowledge of the self and the other. The teaching and learning materials that a mono-religious higher education institution develops should, after all, include the underpinning set of values or the so-called 'ethos' that the institution wishes to convey to its students. This ethos which the institution wishes to teach its students provides (as indicated in par. 6.6.3 of my discussion of the relevant literature) the opportunity for open discussion between the self and the other, because the full sum of openness lies not in the acquisition of knowledge alone, but also in the interpretation and transfer thereof. This open discussion or honest, authentic dialogue, as well as the growth in knowledge that is expected to arise from it, forms an important component of the dramaturgical theory of tolerance (as indicated in par. 4.6.3.3). The following could then serve as a possible guideline for the practical improvement of tolerance within a mono-religious higher education institution:

Academic programmes which could improve the understanding and importance of honest, authentic dialogue, should form an integral part of the curricula of the mono-religious education institution.

A subsequent component that is also important within the dramaturgical theory of tolerance is that of open-mindedness (resp. fair-mindedness). From the discussion on the results of openness, I noted that a link could be drawn between open-mindedness and high academic quality, and closed-mindedness and low academic quality (cf. par. 6.6.3). The reason for this is that any institution of high academic standards ought not to have a problem in making its academic curricula available for critical assessment and evaluation by external moderators or advisory boards. Quality assurance of academic programme development and delivery could play an important role in establishing the concept of open-mindedness or fair-mindedness within a mono-religious education institution, because the academic curricula and related policies of the mono-religious higher education institution could thereby be benchmarked against those of other institutions, or they can be subjected to external moderation. The following could therefore serve as another possible guideline for the practical improvement of tolerance within a mono-religious higher education institution:

Mono-religious higher education institutions should include a quality assurance division within the institution itself, for the purpose of subjecting policies and academic curricula to critical reflection and benchmarking by other academic institutions. This reflection will improve not only knowledge of the self, but also knowledge of the other, and thereby possibly enhance the academic quality and openness of the institution.

6.7 Guidelines for the development and operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions

The contribution of my study to the scholarly community regarding the understanding of the operationalisation of religious tolerance praxis in mono-religious higher education institutions involves, firstly, the implementation of the dramaturgical theory of tolerance. The dramaturgical theory of tolerance enables a mono-religious higher education institution to think about themselves and others, including their own staff members' openness towards others. The dynamic and interaction between these three aspects; self, others and openness cause an epistemological dilemma. The epistemological dilemma elevates contradictions, unanswered questions or paradoxes that are present in the mono-religious higher education institution's policies, curriculum and behaviour towards others, their students and their members of staff. When confronting the mono-religious higher education institution directly with these contradictions, unanswered questions or paradoxes, one will be able to plot the institution in terms of its relative openness and reservedness on a normative continuum, which I had developed in par. 4.8 above. From this plotting, one can then determine whether a particular mono-religious higher education institution should be viewed as an open or reserved institution and, pending the answer, whether such an institution might be obliged to making the necessary adjustments so that it can become more hospitable, tolerant and open.

In the case of my own study, AROS should, for example, be classified as a reserved mono-religious higher education institution. The reason why I classify AROS as a reserved mono-religious higher education institution, is because, as I explained in par. 4.6.1, according to any reserved mono-religious higher institution, there can be no redemption outside of the religion in which it and its followers believe. For this reason, the normative basis of a reserved mono-religious higher education institution is exclusivism, as is indeed the case with respect to AROS (cf. par. 6.5.1.1). As explained in paragraph 4.6.1, when one understands the nature and essential characteristics of mono-religious higher education institutions, one will be able to indicate the orientation with regard to tolerance that could best identify a particular mono-religious higher education institution, and also how the thinking regarding tolerance within such an institution can hypothetically be improved.

If we refer back to Chapter 3 (where I conceptualised religious tolerance), it is clear that reserved mono-religious higher education institutions, such as AROS, with an exclusivist approach seem to operate largely within the permission theory of tolerance (a theory that can be categorised under the exclusivist tolerance

theories). In paragraph 4.6.1 I explained in detail how and why reserved mono-religious higher education institutions consider tolerance mainly within the permission theory. I also indicated in Chapter 3 that their thinking and conduct concerning tolerance can be subsumed under the following three sub-theories, namely: perfectionism, free conscience and finitude of reason. I am of the opinion that reserved mono-religious higher education institutions should examine and develop their own thinking and conduct regarding tolerance by making use of positive alternatives (cf. 4.6.3.2), and not simply by looking inward on the basis of, for example, the permission theory. What this means, is that mono-religious higher education institutions, at some point in time, are bound to find themselves in the position where they will be obliged to shift in terms of their stance towards religious tolerance as a mode of behaviour towards the other.

To improve tolerance in a reserved mono-religious higher education institution such as AROS, it is therefore necessary for them to consider moving beyond their initial, embedded understanding of tolerance as permission, towards understanding tolerance within an open, shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuary of honest, unreserved hospitality.

This notion of an open, shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuary should be built into the institution's policies, curricula, inter-staff communications and staff development programmes. To create such an open, shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuary, the following guidelines are now drafted (based on the discussion of the results above). It is believed that these can aid the development of religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions:⁷¹

- An orientation and induction programme should be implemented for all new members of staff, which, amongst others, will provide a clear explanation of the institutional identity of the mono-religious higher education institution.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should compile a clear and simple description of their vision and mission statements that communicate clearly their institutional identities with all interested parties. These interested parties would typically include the accreditation authorities, prospective and present students, the staff members themselves, as well as all other legitimate stakeholders and role-players.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should have in-house debates about their institutional identities, and they should exchange academic programmes and site visits with other higher education institutions so that they may learn from each other.

⁷¹ Although I have already drafted these guidelines above, in their respective text-blocks, I wish to list them again here. The reason is because I am of the opinion that this might assist the reader in visualising and understanding all the guidelines as an integrated whole.

- Mono-religious higher education institutions should include the following values for improving their own thinking with regard to tolerance: love, peace, critical thinking, respect, honesty and hospitality. These values should, however, also be included in the curriculum and policies of the institution and they should be accurately phrased and seek to provide a clear understanding of each of these values.
- The development of critical thinking should be built into the institution's policies, curricula, inter-staff communications and staff development programmes. This could also be achieved by, for example, encouraging lecturers to participate in national and international academic seminars and conferences. Lecturers should also be encouraged to conduct in-depth research on the work of different scholars with different religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions and thereby gain real understanding of and appreciation for their work and their understanding of religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions. This knowledge could then be utilised to improve, design and draft the institution's own curricula on a continuous basis.
- Academic programmes which could improve the understanding and importance of honest, authentic dialogue should form an integral part of the curricula of the mono-religious education institution.
- Mono-religious higher education institutions should include a quality assurance division within the institution itself, for the purpose of subjecting policies and academic curricula to critical reflection and benchmarking by other academic institutions. This reflection will improve not only knowledge of the self, but also knowledge of the other, and thereby possibly enhance the academic quality and openness of the institution.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

'Welcome to the conclusion of this, my thesis, for I want to know you to know me, in order for you to know who I am and for myself to know you.'

Are you confused? Well this is essentially the kind of epistemological dilemma that is necessary for enhancing more tolerant behaviour in a mono-religious higher education institution. An epistemological dilemma is caused by critically evaluating the self and the other and this is invariably caused by an oscillation between the self and the other in terms of some or other set of opposing normative polarities.

The starting point for all theories on tolerance should be to think of all of them as possible activators of the epistemological dilemma: if an epistemological dilemma does not exist, one would then either resort to absolutism or relativism. Within absolutist or fundamentalist theories of knowledge recognition of others is rarely possible and therefore tolerance is also hardly ever possible, because in absolutism or fundamentalism all identities must conform to that single identity. On the other hand, without the epistemological dilemma one could also gravitate towards the other extreme theory of knowledge, namely relativism. Within relativism, recognition of the other's identity or institutional identity is also virtually impossible. Relativism causes an identity crisis, as well as a certain forfeiture of boundaries, in which all identities essentially disappear, leading – yet again – to one single identity. The epistemological dilemma is therefore necessary for enhancing religious tolerance, because it causes a decision-making battle between different theories of knowledge trying to offer alternatives to two extreme normative polarities, e.g. between the absolutistic and relativistic theories of knowledge.

I am obliged to conclude that although most of the existing (and relevant) theories on tolerance might purport to examine the catalysts causing the epistemological dilemma that my study has identified, not one of them actually seeks to address it with a view to resolving it. From the recognition theory, respect theory and hospitality theory of (and about) tolerance I have developed the dramaturgical theory of tolerance. Its main purpose is to emphasise the need for dialogic and multilogic interaction between the self and the other as a result and on the basis of the epistemological dilemma. Dramaturgical tolerance is characterised by the autonomy of the self and the other while engaged in the dramaturgical encounter: It is this dramaturgical engagement between the self and the other that is responsible for the epistemological dilemma.

Based largely on the findings with regard to the empirical part of my study, it could be concluded that the activation of an epistemological dilemma merely represents the starting point for any theory on tolerance and that one should always strive to move beyond basic, ordinary religious tolerance towards tolerance as **RE**-cognition and hospitality. The dramaturgical theory of tolerance not only activates the epistemological dilemma by practically triggering oscillation between the self and the other, but also moves beyond basic,

ordinary tolerance by creating an open, dialogic and multilogic sanctuary where the self and the other could interact and experience authentic conversational safety from pursuit, persecution, disrespect, ridicule or any other danger or form of personal embarrassment or indignity. The act of taking part in the dramaturgical encounter demonstrates recognition (as **RE**-cognising the other), unprejudiced respect, honest and unbiased hospitality, as well as dignified communality and truthful, authentic engagement with the other and, especially, for the sake of the other. Dramaturgical tolerance therefore serves as a theory which is aiming towards the development of recognizing and enhancing diversity in mono-religious educational settings.

Since commencing with my study on religious tolerance, I have taken note almost on a daily basis of the world news concerning religious conflicts. My observation is that over the past three years there has been a significant increase globally in religious conflicts. A telling example is that of the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa (a fundamentalist and militaristic Islamic group), the name of which means 'Western education is prohibited'. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) furthermore serves as an example of the growing increase in religious wars. The book of Sekulow *et al.* (2014) titled *Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore*, which is a bestseller in New York, also emphasises the actuality of the subject of religious tolerance.⁷²

Arising from the fact that there is an increasing trend in global religious conflict, and given my situation as a lecturer in Religion Studies at the mono-religious higher education institution AROS (Academy of Reformed Training and Studies), my study always focused specifically on the articulation and enunciation of specific guidelines for a mono-religious higher education institution that could possibly enhance the religious tolerance profile and associated behaviour of such institution. To articulate these guidelines, I conceptualised four research questions to guide my research, namely:

- Question 1: What are the nature and essential features of religion?
- Question 2: What are the nature and essential features of religious tolerance?
- Question 3: What are the nature and essential features of mono-religious higher education institutions, and how does a particular salvationist, mono-religious higher education institution conceptualise and operationalise religious tolerance theories?
- Question 4: What guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis could be drafted for mono-religious higher education institution, and why?

⁷² Although my study focused on religious tolerance and religious conflict, it is clear from my study that these subjects cannot be investigated as phenomena on their own, but that aspects such as political, economic and sociological developments invariably have a direct influence on religious tolerance and religious conflict. Academic works that deal with community thinking, political thinking and economics have had an increasing influence on my own thinking concerning the subjects of religious tolerance and religious conflict.

I addressed questions 1 to 3 by devoting separate chapters to the themes concerned. Question 4 was answered through the data that I managed to generate, interpret, construct and understand from Chapters 1 to 4, and on the basis of which I have developed the framework for my empirical study. In Chapter 5, I discussed the methodology of my empirical study, while Chapter 6 dealt with the results and discussion thereof.

In discussing the themes relating to the nature and essential features of religion, religious tolerance and mono-religious higher education institutions, I presented in each case a historical overview of the phenomenon concerned. I trust that these historical reviews would have enhanced our collective scholarly understanding of the various nuances surrounding these phenomena. I furthermore trust that it would also have enhanced our collective understanding of the various intellectual conundrums that might surround these phenomena. Lastly, I believe that these historical overviews of the phenomena cast important light on the current scholarly contexts within which these phenomena are being discussed. In looking, for example, at the historical overview of the nature and essential features of religion in Chapter 2, I identified three main lines of scholarly thought, namely:

- awareness of the divine
- being bound to the divine
- worshipping the divine.

From my historical overview of religion in the period of the Reformation and Renaissance, I started to recognise distinct changes in the scholarly thinking concerning religion. The Reformation and Renaissance symbolise, as it were, two important watersheds in the thinking on religion which developed out of two diverse theories of knowledge. By making use of the heuristic 'epistemology of religious belief', I explained how the nature and essential features of religion were linked with each scholar's theory of knowledge. I identified two extreme theoretical polarities of such knowledge, namely absolutism and relativism. By referring to absolutism and relativism as extreme theoretical polarities of knowledge concerning religion, I came to understand them as two boundary concepts in epistemology, with all the other notions of epistemology subsumable within these two boundaries.

The epistemological tension between the absolutist theory of knowledge and the relativist theory of knowledge with regard to religion is known as the epistemological dilemma, described by authors like Forst (2013:22) as the 'epistemological paradox' and Goosen (2015:23) as the 'paradoxical community'. Alexander (1990:52) describes the epistemological dilemma as the struggle between the various theories of knowledge seeking to offer alternatives to the two extreme forms, namely the absolutist and relativist theories.

In Chapter 3 I sought to answer the second research question of my study, namely ‘What are the nature and essential features of religious tolerance?’ Here, I used the two extreme theories on tolerance, namely exclusivism and inclusivism to categorise the various theories with regard to religious tolerance. I identified these theories by making use of both the ‘critical historical method of argumentation’ of Forst (2013:4) and the ‘thematic classification of tolerance’ of Afdal (2010). I then combined them, making use of the thematic-chronological method. In my thematic-chronological categorisation of the various theories on religious tolerance, I identified a total of five relevant historical phases, namely:

1. Premodern tolerance (0-500 AD)
2. Medieval tolerance (500-1500 AD)
3. Humanistic and Reformational tolerance (1500-1700 AD)
4. Liberal tolerance (1700-1900 AD)
5. Postmodern tolerance (1900- current thinking on tolerance).

I subsequently categorised all of the theories with regard to tolerance that had been identified as a result of my thematic-chronological categorisation either under the exclusivist or inclusivist theories on tolerance, as demonstrated in Figure 7.1 on the overpage:




Figure 7:1 Exclusivist tolerance theories and Inclusivist tolerance theories

Referring to the Postmodern tolerance theories (cf. 3.4.5), I indicated that exclusivist critique on inclusivist tolerance and inclusivist critique on exclusivist tolerance form part of the different responses to the epistemological dilemma caused by the absolutistic and relativistic theories of knowledge. I indicated further (cf. 3.4.5.3) that there are essentially only three possibilities of responding to the epistemological dilemma, namely:

- Those who gravitate towards an exclusivist theory with respect to tolerance
- Those who gravitate towards an inclusivist theory with respect to tolerance
- Those who look for positive alternatives between the polarities of exclusivist and inclusivist tolerance theories.

I am of the opinion that in the view of Von Goethe (2005:116) tolerance should lead to **RE**-cognition. Tolerance leading to **RE**-cognition offers an important positive alternative to both the exclusivist and inclusivist theories on tolerance. From the theories of recognition, respect and hospitality with regard to tolerance, I have developed the dramaturgical theory of tolerance. This served as a scientifically justifiable basis for further scholarly reflection on tolerance specifically within mono-religious education institutions.

In Chapter 4 I endeavoured to answer the third research question, namely: 'What are the nature and essential features of mono-religious higher education institutions and how does a particular salvationist, mono-religious higher education institution conceptualise and operationalise religious theories regarding tolerance?' Here, I distinguished between two types of mono-religious higher education institutions, namely open and reserved institutions. I described a reserved mono-religious higher education institution as one which acts mostly exclusively towards other religions, and an open mono-religious higher education institution as one which looks at other religions from the epistemological vantage point of its own religion. The focus of my study was, however, on the improvement of religious tolerance in a mono-religious higher education institution through the articulation and enunciation of particular guidelines, and not on which type of mono-religious higher education institution is or was – epistemologically speaking – right or wrong.

I contributed to the recognition theory as a positive alternative to the essentially exclusivist and inclusivist thinking on tolerance and contextualised it with reference to mono-religious higher education institutions. As a consequence of my conceptualisation of religious tolerance for mono-religious higher education institutions, I developed my own theory on tolerance, and I named it the dramaturgical theory on tolerance. I developed it from my reading and understanding of the recognition theory and, more specifically, the thoughts of Goosen (2007:9) with respect to the dramaturgical encounter between the self and the other in safe dialogic spaces. My study investigated the role of each participant: the self and the other, and also the space in which these two actors might encounter and interact with each other. I referred to this space as the dramaturgical space of openness. This space is essentially dramaturgical in nature, because it embraces the metaphor of a play on a stage, in front of an audience, in which the actors take each other into consideration, in which each one recognises the role of the other and where the self and the other need to interpret and reinvent their own roles as the interplay between them unfolds and unravels. The relationship between the self and the other is therefore perhaps best captured in the concept of openness between the self and the other.

The dramaturgical theory of tolerance with its subdivision into the self, others and openness served as the framework for generating data during the empirical part of my study. The purpose of the empirical part of my study was to answer the last research question, namely 'What guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis could be drafted for mono-religious higher education institutions, and why?' To answer this final question, I intentionally decided to conduct the empirical part of my study in the form of a case study. The case that I selected was that of AROS, a mono-religious higher education institution situated in Pretoria, South Africa. AROS received official accreditation in 2012 for the delivery of a Bachelor of Education degree in Foundation Phase Studies, and by 2015 it already had approximately 750 registered students. To generate data for my empirical study, I made use of three different data sources, namely: official documentation, the curriculum of AROS, as well as structured and semi-structured interviews (including a focus group discussion).

In articulating my conclusions, I made provision for multiple constructions upon which the data could be engaged with, explored, explained and understood. According to Bertram & Christiansen (2014:27), scope should be provided within the interpretive paradigm for 'multiple constructions' that can perceive the data differently, with the result that more than one conclusion can be drawn. The conclusions that I have drawn in my study could, therefore, also be generalised to apply to other mono-religious higher education institutions. In qualitative research, the fundamental principle of data analysis (Onwuegbuzie *et al.*, 2009:120; Christ, 2011: 2) requires that data analysis techniques be '...shaped by an attempt to analyse the data in a way that yields at least one type of generalisation' (*ibid.*).

I am, therefore, acutely aware of the fact that some qualitative researchers still choose to disagree – sometimes vehemently so – on the topic of the so-called 'generalisability' of qualitative data. Nevertheless, I am quietly confident that the academic and scientific integrity of what I am about to say in the next paragraph will survive the heat of scholarly scrutiny, because I have done my best to consult with some of most the recognised and accomplished scholars in research methodology in the world.

My research design therefore favours, firstly, *naturalistic* generalisation (Onwuegbuzie *et al.*, 2009: *passim*; 117; Van der Westhuizen, *et al.*, 2010: 3; Christ, 2011: 2; Van der Walt & Potgieter, 2011: 7). This means, rather than I (the researcher) generalising my findings, it should be my reader who generalises my findings based on and with reference to his or her own past experience (Onwuegbuzie *et al.*, 2009:120; Van der Westhuizen, Van der Walt & Wolhuter, 2010: 3; Christ, 2011: 2; Van der Walt & Potgieter, 2011: 7). This is a form of 'fuzzy generalisation', in the sense that 'something (that) happened in one place ... might also happen elsewhere'. Secondly, this study sought to generalise its findings to my research population, i.e. *internal* generalisation (to the sample only) (cf. Van der Westhuizen, *et al.*, 2010: 3; Christ, 2011: 2; Van der Walt & Potgieter, 2011: 7). Thirdly, *analytic* generalisation of my findings might also be possible under particular circumstances (because I worked specifically within an interpretivist paradigm, using a predominantly constructivist and hermeneutic phenomenological epistemological approach and

concomitant methodology) (cf. Onwuegbuzie *et al.*, 2009:120-123; Van der Westhuizen, *et al.*, 2010: 3; Christ, 2011: 2; Van der Walt & Potgieter, 2011: 7).

From the results I can therefore conclude that tolerance requires oscillation between the self and the other. If I apply it to a mono-religious higher education institution such as AROS, it means that for the improvement of tolerance within such an institution it is essential that there is oscillation between the institution's own institutional identity (the self) and another institution's institutional identity (the other).

My findings are, however, not only important for AROS as a mono-religious higher education institution, or for other mono-religious higher education institutions in South Africa, *per se*. I am of the opinion that they are also important for all other higher education institutions across the globe. My findings provide a scientifically credible framework for reflecting and acting upon religious tolerance that can be employed by any higher education institution anywhere, irrespective of where its lecturing staff and students might locate themselves with reference to absolutistic or relativistic theories of knowledge, exclusivist or inclusivist theories on tolerance, or open or reserved higher education institutions. In principle, it should be possible for every higher education institution to plot itself in terms of the above-mentioned on the framework of religious tolerance which I had developed as a result of my study (cf. Chapter 4, figure 4.3).

By plotting any higher education institution on the three identified normative continuums, one is enabled to identify the possible intellectual conundrums and everyday, practical drawbacks and obstructions that an institution could face with respect to religious tolerance. On the other hand, by plotting a higher education institution on the three identified normative continuums, it also enables one to identify contradictions or paradoxes within the institution itself with regard to religious tolerance. I refer to these contradictions or paradoxes as the epistemological dilemma and I explained in my study that for improving tolerance in any higher education institution the epistemological dilemma represents an essential catalyst.

Activating the epistemological dilemma in a higher education institution by identifying contradictions and paradoxes in the institution's policies, curriculum and practices is, however, only the starting point for improving religious tolerance in a higher education institution. An institution should, eventually, move beyond the initial step of merely identifying such contradictions or paradoxes. This is done by creating an open dialogic and multilogic space. I refer to this open dialogic and multilogic space as the dramaturgical sanctuary of openness. In this dramaturgical sanctuary of openness the institutional identity is engaged with, explored, explained, understood, and critically reflected upon by the institutional self (including, for example, the institution's policies, curriculum, staff members and students), in interaction with the other (including, for example, other institutions, accreditation authorities, schools, the government, other relevant role-players and stakeholders, etc.). The purpose of the dramaturgical sanctuary of openness is to enhance diversity, creating a safe space for honest, authentic dialogue as well as multilogue.

For a higher education institution to be in any way relevant or to be heard, it should take part as an actor in this dramaturgical sanctuary of openness. What happens in this space and on this life-stage is, however, not a monologue but a multilogue in which the higher education institution should, amongst others, interpret its role as being only one of a wide variety of many possible actors and voices. In order to interpret this specific role, the higher education institution should, as one of the actors, also take note of the role of the other actor/s, including, as it were, those who might happen to be different in their thinking when compared with the thinking of the particular higher education institution itself. It stands to reason, then, that the higher education institution should, on the dramaturgical stage of openness, interpret its own role as effectively as possible, while, at the same time, it acknowledges and respects the roles of the other – without any ulterior motive of any kind.

As a result of my development of the dramaturgical theory of tolerance and based on my interpretation of the body of scholarship and the discussion of the results of my empirical study, I have articulated guidelines for the development of religious tolerance praxis for mono-religious higher education institutions. The purpose of these guidelines is to serve as a catalyst for mono-religious higher education institutions in their attempts at creating shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuaries of honest, unreserved hospitality. This notion of an open, shared dialogic and multilogic sanctuary, should be worked into the institution's policies, curricula, inter-staff communications and staff development programmes. It is believed that these guidelines can aid the development of religious tolerance praxis in (and for) mono-religious higher education institutions.

My study forms part of the research that is being conducted at present in the Edu-HRight Unit (Education and Human Rights in Diversity) in the Research Focus Area of the Faculty of Education Sciences at North-West University (Potchefstroom campus, South Africa). As such, it was conducted in the sub-project, called ***Social Justice, Religion and Spiritual Capital***. My study should, therefore, be viewed as yet another brick in this particular sub-project's wall: helping to construct a scientifically justifiable understanding of religious tolerance in the world.

Hopefully these guidelines will contribute to our collective scholarly knowledge: not only for mono-religious higher education institutions and their subsequent conceptualisation and operationalisation of religious tolerance, but also for the broader international scholarly debate on religious tolerance. Salvationist religion is often the battleground where defences of tolerance versus intolerance face their most difficult challenges. Because AROS represents mainly a salvationist, mono-religious higher education institution, my study is aimed right at the heart of the current scholarly debate on religious tolerance. My study will, therefore, hopefully contribute substantially to scholarly knowledge by assisting mono-religious higher education institutions (through the development of guidelines for religious tolerance praxis for their own contexts and situations) and thereby support them in building communities of exemplary and effective religious tolerance praxis.

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ADDENDUM 1: THE FOUR PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT OFFER BACHELOR OF EDUCATION DEGREE PROGRAMMES

Name	Registration no.	Qualifications
SANTS Private Higher Education Institution (Pty) Ltd (p.9)	2012/HE07/003	a) <i>Bachelor of Education (Foundation Phase)</i> b) <i>Bachelor of Education (Intermediate Phase)</i> c) <i>Diploma in Grade R Teaching</i>
Centre for Creative Education/Iziko La Bantu Be Afrika NPC (p.17)	2000/HE08/003	a) <i>Certificate in Early Childhood Development (HEQSF Aligned : Contact Mode)</i> b) <i>Diploma in Early Childhood Development</i> c) <i>Bachelor of Education (Foundation and Intermediate Phases)</i> d) <i>Bachelor of Arts (Dance)</i>
Embury Institute for Teacher Education (Pty) Ltd (p. 29)	2008/HE07/004	a) <i>Higher Certificate in Education in Grade R [A,B] (HEQSF Aligned : Contact Mode)</i> b) <i>Diploma in Pre-school and Foundation Phase Teacher assistant [A,B]</i> m) <i>Bachelor of Education Foundation Phase [A,B] (HEQSF Aligned 360 credits: Contact Mode)</i>
AROS (Akademie Reformatoriese Opleiding en Studies) (p.81)	2012/HE08/001	<i>Bachelor of Education (Foundation Phase)</i>

From the *Register of Private Higher Education Institutions* (2014).

ADDENDUM 2: QUESTIONS DERIVED FROM THE LITERATURE TO HELP TOWARDS THE GENERATION OF DATA DURING THE INTERVIEWS

	From my review of the body of scholarship
1. Which religious persuasion does AROS regard as of higher value than other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions?	4.6.2
2. Why does AROS regard one specific religious persuasion as being of higher value than other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions?	4.6.2
3. Is AROS within the model of Hermans (2003:337-338) an open or reserved mono-religious higher education institution; and does AROS allow students of other faiths to come and study with it?	4.2
4. What is AROS' understanding concerning the origin of knowledge?	2.4
5. Does AROS think that its religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions concern all aspects of life, including subjects that are not religious subjects, e.g. mathematics?	2.4
6. How does AROS answer the criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions, namely that they are irrelevant particularly in respect of academic standards, and how does AROS seek to address this criticism?	4.3.1
7. How does AROS avoid isolation from other institutions, or does AROS specifically seek to isolate itself from other institutions that do not think as it does?	4.3.1
8. What, according to AROS, is the purpose of discussion with other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions?	4.6.3.2
9. Does AROS avoid the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct, and if so, how does it do so?	4.3.2
10. Does AROS see itself as a state institution, church institution or business organisation? If none of these, how does it regard itself?	4.5
11. How is anti-fundamentalist, fanatical and militaristic conduct addressed through the method of tuition?	4.7
12. Do financial issues possibly play a role in determining its identity, such that for example it is dependent on another institution that can possibly exert an influence on its identity?	4.5

13. Can financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue? For example that it does not have the financial capacity to conduct relevant research with its library facilities, or that lecturers are unable to sufficiently take part in congresses due to a lack of finance?	4.5
14. Does AROS find that the requirements of accreditation make it difficult to give expression to its identity?	4.5
15. Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?	4.6.2
16. Does AROS understand its identity as changeable?	4.6.3.1
17. Is AROS afraid of a changeable identity and if so why?	4.6.3.1
18. Is AROS' understanding of its identity clearly available to all?	4.6.3.1
19. Is AROS in dialogue with other academics in respect of its curriculum, and if so, how does the process take place?	4.6.3.2
20. Does AROS also participate in the country's educational debate to represent its share of democracy?	4.6.3.3
21. Do any openness programmes (as explained in Chapter 4.6.3.3) figure in AROS' curriculum, and is it open to implementation of such plans?	4.6.3.3
22. Is there a need at AROS to make contact with institutions of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions?	4.6.3.2
23. How do the lecturers at AROS believe a person can attain knowledge of religion?	2.4
24. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its religious persuasion?	4.6.3.1
25. Does AROS believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions?	4.6.3.2
26. Is the embracing of diversity part of AROS' mission and vision?	4.6.3.2
27. Does AROS give status to other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions on its campus, such as for example by making a prayer room available for Muslims on campus?	4.6.3.2
28. What guidelines are set for private institutions by accreditation authorities in respect of religious persuasion?	4.5
29. What requirements do accreditation authorities set in respect of openness towards others?	4.6.3.2
30. How does AROS present itself to the public?	4.6.3.2

31. With what other training institutions in South Africa and the world does AROS identify?	4.6.3.2
32. What is the main objective of AROS' tuition?	4.6.3.1

ADDENDUM 3: CATEGORISATION OF QUESTIONS BASED ON THE LITERATURE STUDY

The data sources are as follows: Official documentation (OD), Curriculum (C) and Interviews (I).

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. Which religion does AROS regard as of higher value than other religions?	I
	2. Why does AROS regard one specific religion as being of higher value than other religions?	I
	3. Is AROS within the model of Hermans (2003:337-338) an open or reserved mono-religious higher education institution, and does AROS thus allow students of other faiths to come and study with it?	FD, I,
	4. Does AROS see itself as a state institution, church institution or business organisation? If none of these, how does it regard itself?	I
	5. Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?	I, C
	6. Does finance possibly play a role in determining its identity, such that for example it is dependent on another institution that can possibly exert an influence on its identity?	I
	7. Does AROS find that the requirements of accreditation make it difficult to give expression to its identity?	I
	8. Does AROS understand its identity as changeable?	I
	9. Is AROS afraid of a changeable identity and if so why?	I
	10. Is AROS' understanding of its identity clearly available to all?	FD
	11. What is the main objective of AROS' tuition?	I, FD

	12. What guidelines are set for private institutions by accreditation authorities in respect of religion?	FD
Others	1. How does AROS answer the criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions, namely that they are irrelevant particularly in respect of academic standards, and how does AROS seek to address this criticism?	I
	2. How does AROS avoid isolation from other institutions, or does AROS specifically seek to isolate itself from other institutions that do not think as it does?	I
	3. What, according to AROS, is the purpose of discussion with other religions?	I
	4. Can financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue, for example that it does not have the financial capacity to conduct relevant research with its library facilities, or that lecturers are unable to sufficiently take part in congresses due to a lack of finance?	I
	5. Is AROS in reflection with other academics in respect of its curriculum, and if so how does the process take place?	I
	6. Does AROS also participate in the country's educational debate, to represent its share of democracy?	I, FD
	7. Is there a need at AROS to make contact with institutions of other faiths?	I
	8. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its religion?	I, C, FD
	9. Is the embracing of diversity part of AROS' mission and vision?	FD, I
	10. Does AROS give status to other religions on its campus, such as for example by making a prayer room available for Muslims on campus?	I, FD
	11. How does AROS present itself to the public?	I, FD
	12. With what other training institutions in South Africa and the world does AROS identify?	I

Openness	1. What is AROS' understanding concerning the origin of knowledge?	I, FD
	2. Does AROS think that its religion concerns all aspects of life, including subjects that are not religious subjects, e.g. mathematics?	I
	3. How is anti-fundamentalist, fanatical and militaristic conduct addressed through the method of tuition?	I, C
	4. Does AROS avoid the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct, and if so how does it do so?	I, C
	5. How does AROS believe a person can attain knowledge of something? For example, a lecturer in his subject.	I
	6. Does AROS believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religions?	I
	7. What requirements do accreditation authorities set in respect of openness towards others?	FD
	8. Do any openness programmes figure in AROS' curriculum and is it open to implementation of such plans?	C, I

ADDENDUM 4: QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION FROM THE ACCREDITATION AUTHORITIES (FDAA) AS WELL AS FROM AROS ITSELF (FDA)

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. Is AROS within the model of Hermans (2003:337-338) an open or reserved mono-religious higher education institution, and does AROS thus allow students of other faiths to come and study with it?	FDA
	2. Is AROS' understanding of its identity clearly available to all?	FDA
	3. What is the main objective of AROS' tuition?	FDA
	4. What guidelines are set for private institutions by accreditation authorities in respect of religion?	FDAA
Others	1. Does AROS also participate in the country's educational debate, to represent its share of democracy?	FDA
	2. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its religion?	FDA
	3. Is the embracing of diversity part of AROS' mission and vision?	FDA
	4. Does AROS give status to other religions on its campus, such as for example by making a prayer room available for Muslims on campus?	FDA
	5. How does AROS present itself to the public?	FDA, FDAA
Openness	1. What is AROS' understanding concerning the origin of knowledge?	FDA
	2. What requirements do accreditation authorities set in respect of openness towards others?	FDAA

**ADDENDUM 5: QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION OF
THE ACCREDITATION AUTHORITIES**

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. What requirements are set by accreditation authorities for private institutions in respect of religion?	FDAA
Others	2. How does AROS present itself to the public?	FDAA
Openness	3. What requirements do accreditation authorities set in respect of openness towards others?	FDAA

ADDENDUM 6: QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION OF AROS (FDA)

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. From the analysis of data generated by the Official documentation from Accreditation Authorities (FDAA), it became apparent that the question: <i>Is AROS within the model of Hermans (2003:337-338) an open or reserved mono-religious higher education institution, and does AROS therefore allow students of other faith orientations to come and study there?</i> , had to be stated more specifically and that I would get a more purposeful answer if I formulated the question as follows: By `widened access' it is assumed that the tertiary institution continuously ensures that in its admission policies, students belonging to religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions other than that of AROS itself, are not excluded. Does AROS exclude students who happen to belong to other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions in its own admission of students?	FDA
	1. Is AROS' understanding of its identity clearly available to all?	FDA
	2. What is the main objective of AROS' tuition?	FDA
Others	1. Does AROS also participate in the country's educational debate, to represent its share of democratic participation?	FDA
	2. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its declared religious ethos?	FDA
	3. Is the embracing of diversity part of AROS' mission and vision?	FDA
	4. Does AROS give status to students with other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions on its campus, by making, for example a prayer room for Muslims available on campus?	FDA
	5. How does AROS present itself to the public?	FDA
Openness	1. What is AROS' understanding concerning the origin of knowledge?	FDA

ADDENDUM 7: QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE AROS CURRICULUM (C)

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?	C
Others	1. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its declared religious ethos, <i>and are the students of AROS equipped to teach the children of different faith communities within a pluralistic public school environment?</i>	C
Openness	1. Does AROS avoid the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct, and if so, how does it do so?	C
	2. How is anti-fundamentalist, fanatical and militaristic conduct addressed through the method of tuition?	C
	3. Do any openness programmes figure in AROS' curriculum, and is it open to implementation of such plans?	C

ADDENDUM 8: THE VARIOUS SUBJECTS THAT ARE CURRENTLY ON OFFER AT AROS

First year	Afrikaans; Academic Literacy; Biblical Science 1; Didactics; Introduction to Information Technology; Teaching management; Teaching of Home Language 1; Teaching in South Africa; Teaching of Mathematics 1; Educational Psychology 1; Teaching Practise 1; Religious Studies.
Second year	Assessment; Biblical Science 2; English; Teaching of Home Language 2 + 3; Teaching of Life Skills: Movement, Arts and Music; Teaching of Mathematics 2; Educational Psychology 2 + 3; Teaching Practice 2.
Third year	Biblical Science 3; Philosophy of Education 1; Curriculum Studies; Learner Support 1; Teaching of Additional Language; Teaching of Life Skills: Science and Health Education; Teaching of Mathematics 3; Teaching practice 3; Socio-pedagogics; Sepedi Communication level.
Fourth year	Biblical Science 4; Philosophy of Education 2; Elementary Mathematics; Learner Support 2 + 3; Research Project; Research Theory; Teaching of Life Skills: Life Orientation; Teaching Practice 4.

ADDENDUM 9: CATEGORISATION OF QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE INTERVIEWS

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. Which religion does AROS regard as of higher value than other religions?	IB
	2. Why does AROS regard one specific religion as being of higher value than other religions?	IB
	3. Is AROS (when evaluated against the model of Hermans (2003:337-338)) an open or reserved mono-religious higher education institution, and does AROS allow students of other religious beliefs, persuasions and convictions therefore to come and study at AROS?	IB
	4. Does AROS avoid the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct, and if so how does it do so?	IB
	5. Does AROS see itself as a state institution, church institution or business organisation? If none of these, how does it regard itself?	IB
	6. How is anti-fundamentalist, fanatical and militaristic conduct addressed through the method of tuition?	ILS
	7. Does finance possibly play a role in determining its identity, such that, for example, it is dependent on another institution that can possibly exert an influence on its identity?	IB
	8. Does AROS find that the relevant accreditation requirements make it difficult to give expression to its own ethos and identity?	IB, ILS
	9. Does AROS understand its identity as changeable?	IB, ILS
	10. Is AROS afraid of a changeable identity and if so why?	IB, ILS, ISC
	11. What is the main objective of AROS' tuition?	ILS, ISC

Others	1. How does AROS answer the criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions, namely that they are irrelevant particularly in respect of academic standards, and how does AROS seek to address this criticism?	IB, ILS
	2. How does AROS avoid isolation from other institutions, or does AROS specifically seek to isolate itself from other institutions that do not think as it does?	IB
	3. What, according to AROS, is the purpose of discussion with other religions?	IB, ILS
	4. Can financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue, for example that it does not have the financial capacity to conduct relevant research with its library facilities, or that lecturers are unable to sufficiently take part in congresses due to a lack of finance?	IB, ILS
	5. Is AROS in reflecton with other academics in respect of its curriculum, and if so, how does the process take place?	ILS
	6. Does AROS also participate in the country's educational debate, to represent its share of democracy?	IB, ILS
	7. Do any openness programmes figure in AROS' curriculum and is it open to implementation of such plans?	ILS
	8. Is there a need at AROS to make contact with institutions of other faiths?	IB, ISC
	9. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its religion?	ILS, ISC
	10. Is the embracing of diversity part of AROS' mission and vision?	IB, ISC
	11. Does AROS give status to other religions on its campus, such as, for example, by making available a prayer room for Muslims on campus?	IB, ISC
	12. How does AROS present itself to the public?	IB, ISC

	13. With which other training institutions in South Africa and the world does AROS identify / align itself and why?	IB
Openness	1. What is AROS' understanding concerning the origin of knowledge?	IB, ILS
	2. Does AROS think that its religion concerns all aspects of life, including subjects that are not religious subjects, e.g. mathematics?	ILS
	3. Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?	IB, ILS, ISC
	4. How does AROS believe a person can attain knowledge of something? For example, a lecturer in his subject.	ILS
	5. Does AROS believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religions?	ILS,ISC

ADDENDUM 10: CATEGORISATION OF QUESTIONS PUT TO THE DIRECTORS DURING THE INTERVIEWS

The three directors with whom interviews were conducted, were the Financial Director (FD), the Director Identity-development (DI) and the Academic Director (AD).

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. Which religion does AROS regard as of higher value than other religions?	DI
	2. Why does AROS regard one specific religion as being of higher value than other religions?	DI, AD, FD
	3. Is AROS (when evaluated against the model of Hermans (2003:337-338)) an open or reserved mono-religious higher education institution?	DI, AD
	4. Does AROS avoid the incitement of fundamentalist, fanatical or militant conduct, and if so how does it do so?	DI, AD
	5. Does AROS see itself as a state institution, church institution or business organisation? If none of these, how does it regard itself?	DI, FD
	6. Does finance possibly play a role in determining its identity, such that for example it is dependent on another institution that can possibly exert an influence on its identity?	FD
	7. Does AROS find that the relevant accreditation requirements make it difficult to give expression to its own ethos and identity?	DI, AD
	8. Does AROS understand its identity as changeable?	DI, AD, FD
	9. Is AROS afraid of a changeable identity and if so why?	DI, AD, FD
Others	1. How does AROS answer the criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions, namely that they are irrelevant particularly in respect of academic	AD

	standards, and how does AROS seek to address this criticism?	
	2. How does AROS avoid isolation from other institutions, or does AROS specifically seek to isolate itself from other institutions that do not think as it does?	DI
	3. What, according to AROS, is the purpose of discussion with other religions?	DI, AD
	4. Can financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue, for example that it does not have the financial capacity to conduct relevant research with its library facilities, or that lecturers are unable to sufficiently take part in congresses due to a lack of finance?	FD,AD
	5. Does AROS also participate in the country's educational debate, to represent its share of democracy?	DI
	6. Is there a need at AROS to make contact with institutions of other faiths?	DI, AD
	7. Is the embracing of diversity part of AROS' mission and vision?	DI
	8. Does AROS give status to other religions on its campus, such as for example by making a prayer room available for Muslims on campus?	DI
	9. How does AROS present itself to the public?	DI
	10. With what other training institutions in South Africa and the world does AROS identify / align itself and why?	DI, AD
Openness	1. What is AROS' understanding concerning the origin of knowledge?	DI, AD
	2. Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?	DI, AD

ADDENDUM 11: CATEGORISATION OF QUESTIONS PUT TO THE LECTURING STAFF DURING THE INTERVIEWS

Category	Question	Source of data generation
	1. How is anti-fundamentalist, fanatical and militaristic conduct addressed through the method of tuition?	ILS
	2. Does AROS find that the relevant accreditation requirements make it difficult to give expression to its identity?	ILS
	3. Does AROS understand its identity as changeable?	ILS
	10. Is AROS afraid of a changeable identity and if so why?	ILS
	4. What is the main objective of AROS' tuition?	ILS
Others	1. How does AROS answer the criticism against mono-religious higher education institutions, namely that they are irrelevant particularly in respect of academic standards, and how does AROS seek to address this criticism?	ILS
	2. What, according to AROS, is the purpose of discussion with other religions?	ILS
	3. Can financial limitations possibly restrain AROS from open dialogue, for example that it does not have the financial capacity to conduct relevant research with its library facilities, or that lecturers are unable to sufficiently take part in congresses due to a lack of finance?	ILS
	4. Is AROS in reflection with other academics in respect of its curriculum, and if so how does the process take place?	ILS
	5. Does AROS also participate in the country's educational debate, to represent its share of democracy?	ILS

	6. Do any openness programmes figure in AROS' curriculum and is it open to implementation of such plans?	ILS
	7. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its religion?	ILS
Openness	1. What is AROS' understanding concerning the origin of knowledge?	ILS
	2. Does AROS think that its religion concerns all aspects of life, including subjects that are not religious subjects, e.g. mathematics?	ILS
	3. Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?	ILS
	4. How does AROS believe a person can attain knowledge of something? For example, a lecturer in his subject.	ILS
	5. Does AROS believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religions?	ILS

ADDENDUM 12: CATEGORISATION OF QUESTIONS PUT TO THE STUDENT COUNCIL DURING THE FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW

Category	Question	Source of data generation
Self	1. Is AROS afraid of a changeable identity, and if so why?	ISC
	2. What is the main objective of AROS' tuition?	ISC
Others	1. Is there a need at AROS to make contact with institutions of other faiths?	ISC
	2. What does AROS wish to convey to its students in respect of its religion?	ISC
	3. Is the embracing of diversity part of AROS' mission and vision?	ISC
	4. Does AROS give status to other religions on its campus, such as, for example, by making available a prayer room for Muslims on campus?	ISC
	5. How does AROS present itself to the public?	ISC
Openness	1. Does AROS have an exclusivist view of salvation?	ISC
	2. Does AROS believe that it can gain more knowledge from other religions?	ISC

Private Bag X6001, Potchefstroom
South Africa 2520

Tel: (018) 299-4900
Faks: (018) 299-4910
Web: <http://www.nwu.ac.za>

**Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory
Committee**

Tel +27 18 299 4849
Email Ethics@nwu.ac.za

ADDENDUM 13: APPROVAL OF ETHICS APPLICATION

ETHICS APPROVAL CERTIFICATE OF PROJECT

Based on approval by **Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Education Sciences**, the North-West University Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (NWU-IRERC) hereby approves your project as indicated below. This implies that the NWU-IRERC grants its permission that, provided the special conditions specified below are met and pending any other authorisation that may be necessary, the project may be initiated, using the ethics number below.

Project title: Guidelines for the Development of Religious Tolerance Praxis in Mono-Religious Education Institutions			
Project Leader: Prof FJ Potgieter			
Student: Mr M Diedericks			
Ethics number:	N	W	U
	-	0	0
	0	0	2
	9	-	1
	5	-	A
			2
	Status: S = Submission; R = Re-Submission; P = Provisional Authorisation; A = Authorisation		
Approval date: 2015-03-26	Expiry date: 2020-03-25	Category	N/A

Special conditions of the approval (if any): None

General conditions:

While this ethics approval is subject to all declarations, undertakings and agreements incorporated and signed in the application form, please note the following:

- x The project leader (principle investigator) must report in the prescribed format to the NWU-IRERC:
 - annually (or as otherwise requested) on the progress of the project,
 - without any delay in case of any adverse event (or any matter that interrupts sound ethical principles) during the course of the project.
- x The approval applies strictly to the protocol as stipulated in the application form. Would any changes to the protocol be deemed necessary during the course of the project, the project leader must apply for approval of these changes at the NWU-IRERC. Would there be deviations from the project protocol without the necessary approval of such changes, the ethics approval is immediately and automatically forfeited.
- x The date of approval indicates the first date that the project may be started. Would the project have to continue after the expiry date, a new application must be made to the NWU-IRERC and new approval received before or on the expiry date.
- x In the interest of ethical responsibility the NWU-IRERC retains the right to:
 - request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project;
 - withdraw or postpone approval if:
 - any unethical principles or practices of the project are revealed or suspected,
 - it becomes apparent that any relevant information was withheld from the NWU-IRERC or that information has been false or misrepresented,
 - the required annual report and reporting of adverse events was not done timely and accurately,
 - new institutional rules, national legislation or international conventions deem it necessary.

The IRERC would like to remain at your service as scientist and researcher, and wishes you well with your project. Please do not hesitate to contact the IRERC for any further enquiries or requests for assistance.

Yours sincerely

Linda du Plessis
Digitally signed by Linda du Plessis
DN: cn=Linda du Plessis, o=NWU,
ou=Vaal Triangle Campus,
email=linda.duplessis@nwu.ac.za,
c=ZA
Date: 2015.07.13 10:45:31 +02'00'



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
POTCHEFSTROOM CAMPUS

Fakulteit Opvoedingswetenskappe / Faculty Education Sciences
Privaatsak / Private Bag X6001, Potchefstroom
Suid-Afrika / South Africa 2520
Prof. Ferdinand J Potgieter
T: +27 18 299-1992
F: +27 18 299-4712
<http://www.nwu.ac.za>

ADDENDUM 14: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Die volgende vrae (met moontlike opklarende vrae) sal gedurende die onderskeie individuele- en fokusgroeponderhoude aan die deelnemer(s) gestel word.

Titel van studie: Riglyne vir die ontwikkeling van religieuse verdraagsaamheid in praktyk vir mono-religieuse opvoedkunde instansies.

Navorsingsvrae

Vanuit my literatuuroorsig het ek die volgende vrae geformuleer:

Vraag 1: Wat is die natuur en essensiële eienskappe van religieuse verdraagsaamheid?

Vraag 2: Wat is die natuur en essensiële eienskappe van 'n mono-religieuse opvoedkunde instansie.

Vraag 3: Hoe konseptualiseer en operasionaliseer 'n spesifieke verlossing-gedrewe, mono-religieuse opvoedkunde instansie religieuse verdraagsaamheidsteorieë?

Vraag 4: Watter riglyne vir die ontwikkeling van religieuse verdraagsaamheid in praktyk kan vir mono-religieuse opvoedkunde instansies opgestel word en waarom?

Die volgende kategorisering het geskied deur al die vrae wat ingedeel is onder die onderhoude uit te haal en apart te kategoriseer. Die vrae is gekategoriseer onder: Onderhoude met Direksie (OD), Onderhoude met Doserende Personeel (ODP) en Onderhoude met Studenteraad (OSR). Hierdie indeling word in Tabel 2 geïllustreer:

Tabel 2: Kategorisering van vrae gerig op onderhoude

Kategorie	Vraag	Gebied van data- versameling
Self	10. Watter religie ag AROS van hoër waarde as ander religieë?	OD
	11. Hoekom ag AROS een bepaalde religie van hoër waarde as ander religieë?	OD
	12. Is AROS binne die model van Hermans (2003:337-338) 'n oop- of geslote-mono-religieuse instansies, dus laat AROS studente van ander gelowe toe om by hulle te studeer?	OD
	13. Vermy AROS die opwekking van fundamentalistiese, fanatistiese of militaristiese gedrag en indien wel hoe doen hulle dit?	OD
	14. Sien AROS hulleself as 'n staatsinstansies, kerkinstansie of besigheidsinstansies. Indien nie een nie, hoe beskou hulle dan hulself?	OD
	15. Hoe word anti- fundamentalistiese, fanatistiese en militaristiese gedrag deur die metode van onderrig aangespreek?	ODP
	16. Speel finansies moontlik 'n rol in die bepaling van hulle identiteit, dat hulle byvoorbeeld afhanklik is van 'n ander instelling wat moontlik 'n invloed op hulle identiteit kan hê?	OD
	17. Vind AROS dat die akrediteringsvereistes dit vir hulle moeilik maak om hul identiteit uit te leef?	OD, ODP
	18. Verstaan AROS hulle identiteit as veranderend?	OD, ODP
	19. Is AROS bang vir 'n veranderende identiteit en indien wel hoekom?	OD, ODP, OSR
	20. Wat is die hoofdoel van AROS se onderrig?	ODP, OSR

Ander	14. Hoe beantwoord AROS die kritiek teen mono-religieuse instansies wat sê dat mono-religieuse instansies irrelevant is, veral ten opsigte van akademiese standaard en hoe poog AROS om die kritiek aan te spreek?	OD, ODP
	15. Hoe vermy AROS isolasie van ander organisasies of wil AROS juis hulleself isoleer van ander organisasies wat nie soos hulle dink nie?	OD
	16. Wat is volgens AROS die doel van gesprekke met ander religieë?	OD, ODP
	17. Kan finansiële beperkings AROS moontlik beperk tot oop-dialoog voering, byvoorbeeld dat AROS nie die finansiële vermoë het om met die biblioteek geriewe relevante navorsing te doen nie, of dat dosente a.g.v. 'n gebrek aan finansies nie aan voldoende kongresse kan deelneem nie.	OD, ODP
	18. Is AROS met hul kurrikulum in refleksie met ander akademië en indien wel hoe geskied die proses?	ODP
	19. Deel AROS ook in die land se onderwysdebat, om hul deel van die demokrasie te verteenwoordig.	OD, ODP
	20. Is daar enige oopheidsprogramme deel van AROS se kurrikulum en is hulle oop om sulke planne te implementeer?	ODP
	21. Is daar by AROS 'n behoefte om met instansies van ander gelowe in kontak te tree?	OD, OSR
	22. Wat wil AROS ten opsigte van hul religie oordra aan hul studente?	ODP, OSR
	23. Is die omhelsing van diversiteit deel van AROS se missie en visie?	OD, OSR
	24. Gee AROS status aan ander religieë op hul kampus, soos byvoorbeeld deur vir Moslems bidplek te maak op kampus?	OD, OSR
	25. Hoe stel AROS homself aan die publiek bekend?	OD, OSR
	26. Met watter ander opleidingsinstansies in Suid-Afrika en in die wêreld identifiseer AROS?	OD

Oopheid	6. Wat is AROS se teorie oor kennis?	OD, ODP
	7. Dink AROS dat hulle religie alle aspekte van die lewe raak, ook vakke wat nie religieuse vakke is nie, vakke soos byvoorbeeld wiskunde?	ODP
	8. Het AROS 'n eksklusivistiese uitkyk op redding?	OD, ODP, OSR
	9. Hoe glo AROS kan 'n persoon tot kennis kom van iets? Byvoorbeeld 'n dosent in sy vakrigting.	ODP
	10. Glo AROS dat hulle by ander religieë meer kennis kan opdoen?	ODP, OSR

ADDENDUM 15: INFORMED LETTER OF CONSENT: PARTICIPATION IN INTERVIEW

Navorsers

Morné Diedericks

morne.diedericks@AROS.ac.za

07251044066

Studieleier

Prof. Ferdinand J. Potgieter

Telefoonnommer: 0797955212

E-posadres: Ferdinand.Potgieter@nwu.ac.za

Titel van die ondersoek: Riglyne vir die ontwikkeling van religieuse verdraagsaamheid in praktyk vir mono-religieuse opvoedkunde instansies. (*GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE PRACTICE IN MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS*)

Die doel van die studie: Morné Diedericks (Navorsers) is tans besig met my Ph.D. in die Filosofie van die Opvoedkunde by die Noordwes-universiteit (NWU). Met die geweldige toename in religieuse onverdraagsaamheid die afgelope twee dekades het die ondersoek na religieuse verdraagsaamheid toegeneem. Die doel van hierdie studie is om te kyk hoe mono-religieuse opvoedkunde instansies die vraagstuk van religieuse verdraagsaamheid verstaan en aanspreek binne hulle onderrig en leer opset. Die bestuur het goedgekeur dat AROS as 'n navorsingsgebied gebruik word vir hierdie studie.

Prosedures

- Daar word van u as deelnemer verwag om 'n aantal vrae te beantwoord na gelang van u betrokkenheid by AROS. Hoewel die onderhoud semi-gestruktureerde onderhoud is, is die voorlopige onderhoudskedule wat aangeheg is (Addendum D), 'n aanduiding van die soort vrae wat aan u die deelnemer gevra kan word.
- Daar word van u as deelnemer verwag om deel te neem aan die onderhoud en om die vrae wat aan u gestel word so goed moontlik te beantwoord.
- Verder word daar van u verwag dat u tussen 30-60 minute sal gebruik om deel te neem aan die onderhoud.
- Daar word van u as deelnemer verwag om vrywillig deel te neem aan die onderhoud met die wete dat die onderhoud met 'n digitale bandopnemer opgeneem gaan word en dat die navorsers veldnotas gaan neem tydens die onderhoud.
- Dat u as deelnemer slegs aan die onderhoud sal deelneem indien hierdie toestemmingsbrief deur u en die navorsers onderteken is.

Voordele

Die navorsingsresultate van die studie sal aan AROS beskikbaar gestel word. AROS kan moontlik baat by die resultate en daarvan gebruik maak soos die organisasie dit goedvind. Die Ph.D. verhandeling is egter die eiendom die NWU en mag nie sonder die wete van die NWU gebruik word nie.

Regte van die deelnemer

- As deelnemer kry u die voorneme dat u reg op privaatheid nie in gedrang sal kom tydens die onderhoude nie.
- Verder sal u naam nie bekend gemaak word met die verwerking van die data nie.
- As deelnemer sal daar aan u 'n volledige getranskribeerde teks verskaf word, waarop u toestemming moet gee dat die transkripsie die korrekte inligting vervat (Addendum E).
- As deelnemer het u die reg om ter enige tyd sonder rede u van die onderhoud te onttrek en indien u as deelnemer van die onderhoud onttrek dit nie teen u gehou sal word nie.
- Dat 'n geskikte lokaal vir die onderhoude voorsien sal word.

Baie dankie dat u bereid is om deel te neem aan die navorsingsprojek.

Hiermee verklaar ek, _____ (deelnemer) dat ek goed kennis dra van die bostaande toestemmingsbrief en bewus is van my regte as deelnemer aan die onderhoud vir die navorsingsprojek *GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE PRAXIS IN MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS*. Ek verklaar ook met die ondertekening van hierdie Ingeligte toestemmingsbrief dat ek vrywillig deelneem aan die navorsingprojek en dat ek bewus is dat die onderhoud met 'n digitale bandopnemer opgeneem word.

_____	_____	_____
Naam	Handtekening	Datum
(Deelnemer)	(Deelnemer)	
_____	_____	_____
Naam	Handtekening	Datum
(Navorsers)	(Navorsers)	

ADDENDUM 16: EXAMPLE OF WORDS FROM THE WORD CRUNCHER FUNCTION IN ATLAS.ti

WORDS	Direkteur A	Direkteur B	Direkteur C	Dosent A	Dosent B	Dosent C	Dosent D	Dosent E	Dosent F	Studente	Total Count
bybel	1	1	2	0	4	2	0	0	1	14	25
bybelkennis	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
bybelklas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
bybelkunde	5	4	1	0	1	0	2	2	1	3	19
bybelkundevakke	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
bybelse	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
bybelstudie	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
debat	3	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	6	13
debate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
debateer	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
debatte	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	6
debatvoering	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
diskoers	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
diskoerse	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
diskussie	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
diskussies	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
eerlik	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
eerlike	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
eksklusief	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
eksklusiewe	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
eksklusiwiteit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
eksklusiwisties	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ekskluwisties	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	4
ekskluwistiese	1	3	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	11

ekslusief	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
ekslusiwistiese	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
eksluwistiese	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
epistimologie	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
epistomologie	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
equity	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
eties	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
etos	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
fundalentisme	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
fundamentalisme	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4
fundamentalisties	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	4
fundamentalistiese	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	1	0	8
fundamenteel	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
fundamentele	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
geweld	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
gewelddadig	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
gewelddadige	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
grens	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
grondslag	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
grondslagfase	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
grondwet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
identiteit	4	11	8	3	4	3	9	10	2	0	54
identiteitsbeskouing	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
identiteitsontwikkelingbeleid	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ideologie	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
ideologieë	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
inrigting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
inrigtings	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
instansie	3	3	9	7	6	6	2	1	2	0	39

kwaliteit	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5
kwaliteite	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
kwaliteitversekering	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
lewe	0	0	1	4	3	2	0	1	1	3	15
lewens	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
lewensbeskouing	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4
lewensbeskouings	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
lewensoriënteringvakke	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
lewensvisie	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
lief	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
liefde	3	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	8
liefdesgebod	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
liefhê	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
onverdraagsaamheid	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
oop	9	3	1	4	1	1	2	11	4	4	40
oopheid	3	2	2	1	2	1	4	1	2	1	19
religious	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
religieuse	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
religie	6	4	4	4	2	1	1	1	1	2	26
religieë	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
religieë	4	4	2	2	4	1	3	4	2	0	26
religiestudies	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	2	11
religius	1	0	5	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	9
religieuse	5	4	8	6	7	6	4	4	3	0	47
religions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
religous	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
respect	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
respek	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5
sekulêr	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	5

sekulêre	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	4
self	9	3	4	4	2	2	1	5	2	3	35
selfopenbaring	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
selfpratende	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
sending	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
sendingaspek	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
sendingbevel	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
sendinggesprek	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
standaard	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	5
standaarde	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	3	2	0	10
standardisering	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
standardiseringrol	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
standardiseringsreël	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
staties	1	3	4	5	1	1	2	3	2	0	22
verander	3	1	5	0	8	2	0	3	3	6	31
veranderend	1	1	6	3	1	2	1	1	2	0	18
veranderende	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
verandering	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	1	0	2	9
verdraagsaam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
verdraagsaamheid	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
wetenbskap	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
wetenskap	4	5	2	0	0	5	3	0	2	0	21
wetenskapbeskouing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
wetenskaplik	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
wetenskaplike	1	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	8
wetenskaplikes	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
wetenskaplikheid	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
wetenskappe	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
wetgewing	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

wettiese	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
wêreld	3	7	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	5	25	
wêreldse	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	
wêreldvermyding	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
wêreldverskil	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
wêreldwyd	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
wêreldwye	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	

ADDENDUM 17: EXAMPLES OF CRITICAL FEEDBACK ON STUDY

 Reply  Reply All  Forward



Wed 2014-07-09 12:43 PM

Ferdinand Potgieter <Ferdinand.Potgieter@nwu.ac.za>

Morne's Chapter 3 and 4

To morne.diedericks@aros.ac.za

 Message  Morne's Chapter 3 and 4.docx (458 KB)

Morne

Aangeheg, my kommentaar.

Oorweeg dit om hierdie twee hoofstukke tot een hoofstuk met twee hoofdele, te collapse.

Ferdinand

Vrywaringklousule / Disclaimer: <http://www.nwu.ac.za/it/gov-man/disclaimer.html>

 Ferdinand Potgieter Re: Vraag



 Reply  Reply All  Forward



Wed 2015-03-04 02:34 PM

B Smit <bsmit@mweb.co.za>

my 2 cents :-)

To morne.diedericks@aros.ac.za; 'Ferdinand Potgieter'

 You replied to this message on 2015-03-04 02:45 PM.

This message was sent with High importance.

Click here to download pictures. To help protect your privacy, Outlook prevented automatic download of some pictures in this message. 

 Message  Diedericks Chapter 6.doc (143 KB)  Chapter 5 Morne Diedericks.docx (66 KB)

Brigitte Smit (PhD)
Professor
Department of Educational Leadership and Management
College of Education
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA
(working from home)
bsmit@mweb.co.za or smitb@unisa.ac.za

Atlas ti Consultant for Southern Africa

B Smit No items





NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
 YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
 NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
 POTCHEFSTROOM CAMPUS

Fakulteit Opvoedingswetenskappe / Faculty Education Sciences
 Privaatsak / Private Bag X6001, Potchefstroom
 Suid-Afrika / South Africa 2520
 Prof. Ferdinand J Potgieter
 T: +27 18 299-1992
 F: +27 18 299-4712
<http://www.nwu.ac.za>

ADDENDUM 18: VERIFICATION OF TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW-CONTENT

Geagte _____(Deelnemer)

U het die getranskribeerde teks ontvang wat tydens die onderhoud op _____(datum) aangaande die navorsingprojek *GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE PRAXIS IN MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS* gehou is. Indien u tevrede is met die getranskribeerde teks sal u hierdie verifiëring van die getranskribeerde onderhoud inhoud dokument onderteken.

Baie dankie dat u bereid was om deel te neem aan die navorsingsprojek.

Morné Diedericks

Hiermee verklaar ek, _____(deelnemer) dat ek die bostaande getranskribeerde teks 'n getroue weergawe is van die onderhoud, wat deel vorm van die navorsingsprojek *GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE PRAXIS IN MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS*.

Naam

Handtekening

Datum

(Deelnemer)

(Deelnemer)

ADDENDUM 19: CODES EMERGING AND CHANGES MADE OVER TIME

Onderhoude

staps 1: Lees deur die onderhoude
en identifiseer temas wat gesoek
kan word op Atlas t.i.

~~Q Mono-Religieus~~

→ ~~Self~~ → Hier binne word die
grense gestel

Christus

uitverkiesing

woord en Gees

stappers

Seun

Christelike ~~teos~~

Christelike wetenskap

Jesus

openbaring — Be-kend maak — Kenteoriese

aanbid

Epistemologiese

Christen

Twaal artikels

kerk

verlosser

waarde

* Protestantie

Eensdenkende organisaties

Gerformeerd. + Gereformeerde

Drie-enig

Christelijke filosofie

mono

mult.

grond → gegee

Ekklasiësties + Ekklasiëf

Levens en wereld beskouing.

konvensionele

Voorveronderstelling

A-priori

Christelike oëtersigings

Interne audit oor voorveronderstellings.

Reform Bybel

Niet een ware godsdiens

Nederlands geloofs belydenis

Skrituur +

Natuur

Identiteit en staties ✓

Basis - grondslag

Beginsels

Waarheen ~~gaat~~ Financiering met die ~~betrekking~~
van die ~~zaak~~ de beginsels van die instansie
beinloed.

Weg → het 1 weg tot verlossing

gebofts begronding → Ken

Reformatie

Christelike onderysers

Studies → Opleiding aan studies naas omdat daer
eind is einddoel van die is.

- ~~Christen~~ ~~schap~~ ~~wordt~~ ~~kef~~
- Heilige Gees
- ^{Geest} ~~Plaak~~ van geloof is wie ~~in ons hunde~~
nie
- Christendom is niet te beperken
dit omdat alle aspecten van die heilige
→ Reformeer
- Christelijke beginsels
- Beginsels veranderen moet
- missie moet duidelijk verantwoord wees.
- geloofs beginsels
- wetenschap is deel van geloof
- Akrediterings vereisten beperken identiteit
- Materialisme kan doel worden en identiteit
bepalen
- sekularisme kan identiteit beïnvloeden.
- Staat macht.
- Reël } Fundamentalisme
- wet }
- AKOS biedt in traanvelden waarden en normen
leert.
- Andere religies moet weet AKOS is


- in christelijke inspanning.
- Sterke in ~~een~~ identiteit
- Met een manier van redding is ononderhandelbaar.
- Christelijke wetenschappelijke beschouwing
- Christelijke karakter van cursus
- Christen wetenschappelijke

~~Studenten~~ Christene Fokus te min op gemeenschap

- Christian base
- **Roeping**
 - ↳ ~~waars~~ studenten nie **in** getonseer nie
- Christelike-gebaseerde onderwys sisteen.
- Christian University
- Beantwoording van vrae
 - stelle tek dit soms moeilik ~~gemak~~
 - ↳ Nie almal eruan dit so nie.
- Oopde bakcoening word dekritief gesien as 'n positieve thing.



- alles dalkette Christus is die kern
- ↳ Baie duidelike boodskap gaan uit dat Christus die waarheid is.
- **Tolerante** is die kern begrip!
 - ↳ thuis aan by ander
- Alas remind ee jou elke keer wat reg en verkeerd is. → ~~dit~~ sal dit nie weer doen nie
- Alas raen da alles ~~terug~~ gaan na

Houding → Rede vir houding



Nu verband

1. Waarom oop?
2. Hoe staanmes teenoor ander?



Ander

→ Eer van God dan ander behoudende
waard

* Daar is 'n nuwe verlegging van dat d
tussen die self - ander - ooptheid.

→ Diensbaar dan ander wense

→ Ander moet nie militaristies of geweldadig
handaan word nie.

→ Rooms-katolisisme.

→ Liede + Liede van Christus

→ Naaiste

→ wêreld van myding → wêreld onreine.

→ Wit basis van gesprek verander.

→ Nie duurg nie

→ Nie geweld nie

→ Opdrag van God om net ander wense iets
te make te he

→ Eitland as gedagte = Laertrek.

→ Sending → beel van verorsinskeid

→ Nie dieselde Belydenisgrondslag = Wetson
kollepe

→ wêreld nye vereniging

In gesprek met ander
nie hoër as ander

Interne denke oor ander → nog nie
geroep na gedink nie

As grootste korps van aansoekers
is nie Christene.

Samelening → Ke formeet en eensform-
meer.

Moet in interaksie kom met ander.

- ARoS praat op 'n ander manier oor redding
as ander in stansies.
- Daar bestaan nie ander gode nie
- On verdraag saamheid
- Optrede teenoor ander is dat jy jou
waaspe lief het moet hê soos jenseff. → lê
liew hierop.
- Die strewe na die gelykheid van alles maak
dat ARoS versigtig is in sy indiening
van absolute kerings verstaan
- Iemand wat in neutrale stand praat in een
of in persoon wat in bepaalde geloofs stand praat
in een of in neutrale kof, die een bestuudig

die arden en visa versde van irrede versie.

- ~~Quer is met weg tot de lassing~~
- Indie sin van God se woord en openbaaring kan daar nie by ander iets diereste iets geleer word. → oopheid
- Liefde wat Christus openbaar kan nie by ander geloue geleer word nie.
- Doel van AROS verkondiging van Christus se liefde aan die wat hom nie ken nie.
- Nie diskrimineer nie
- Die wese van die Christelike gebot is om die grens te oorbryg.
"omait te wih"
- Raak punte ontwikkel en in gesprek kan free
- Missie moet duidelik bewoerd wees.
- Mens het is (verantwoordelijkheid) om deel te ween aan die onder nys debat.
- Nie gebrein speel nie
- Mens is nie alwys nie, moet by ander leer, moet in betrefde en soeke na ween kennis he

→ Hoef nie niel te herontwerp nie

→ is gefragmenteerde beskouing van die werklikheid veroorsaak.

→ unieke personeelkorps

* Iets van die mens se eienskappe van die identiteit vereis oopheid.

↳ kom by self

→ Ideologie, sekuler, regering

→ Wanneer jy iets anders beleef leer jy jouself beter ken.

→ waarheidswoorde

→ Naaste liefde

→ nie afdwing op ander mense nie

→ ~~in aksie bied in~~ ~~aanmerk~~ ~~waars~~
nase ker.

→ oop vir ander

→ adverteer → eerlikheid

→ gesbtenheid / nie verdraagsaam word gebind aan rassisme.

⊖ Ander leef → leef geloof uit word positief verstaan.

→ geen nie gedwing of onder dwang

↳ hierdie konsepte kultureel verskillend

- leer by mekaar
- moet nie uitstaai nie
- Ag jou self beter as ander.
- Indoktrineer nie studente nie.

→ Bv. Bidplek vir ander
 → Dit moet gedeeltes word

↳ Breinspoeling

- Eerder ander
- Nooi van ander universiteite
- Behalwe as jy die waarheid van ander geloue wil verhoedig is daar geen rede om met ander geloue
- sending gesprek
- kritiek → krieties
- lewe
- moet ook voorstaan teenoor ander.
- kan leer by koslems

studente

- verander wêreld.
- Christ-like attitude
- wys vir ander met jou lewe, jy is a in Christen, (ACTIONS)
- redelik teenoor ander
- Die punt van eerlik

→ Honest bind met die
 Eerlikheid Honest NB!!
 → aggressive honest

do not go down on morals

dade is belangrik
 studente nie positief oor bidplek vir ander gelouenie.
 Duidelike grense
 ↳ want dit is
 in toe Ander toelaat op kampus. Weer ander geloue toe te laat op

Oopheid.

Pyramiese

Groei in kennis.

Twee voorwaardes = 1. Studente moet 'n Christelike

↳ duidelike
grense

etos erken

2. Afrikaans

↳ Hierdie grense moet

deel wees van Akkreditering

→ Oopheid is indie opdrag van Jesus
gaan heen tot alle nasies en maak dissipels

Dissipels → navorsers

↳ mag nie ge maak word deur propaganda
of fundamentalisme of geweld.

Grens → Die twaalf artikels dien
as 'n grens

Staat → Christus gee gesag aan die
Akkreditering staat.

Owerheid → Het beperkte gesag.

↳ sy hoofrol is standardisering

As die staat die oopheid van 'n Mono-Religieuse
instelling beperk tot. Christelike wetenskap
dan moet die instelling steeds voortgaan met sy

werk

~~Protestant~~

Democratie

AKOS maakt nie is geheim daer vandat hy die basis van die gesprek wil verander nie.

Altemere moet weet wie is leed en op alle vlakke.

Grens = Organisasie wat nie almalles alles in almal wil wees nie.

Daar is Respek vir eenheid en respek vir verskei derheid.

Masa is in interaksie met ander

Die gedagte van 'n interne diskoers
↳ interne debat

- Die beleid en praktiese verskil → wie het verskeis equity → want AKOS is nie noodwendig oop om moslem studente toe te laat nie.
- Nie oopheid om ander godsdiens toe te laat nie.
- Binne die Christelike instellings het dieselfde oopheid as Moslem instellings nie.


Wetgeving is nie in bedreiging vir AKOS se Identiteit.

- Wetenskaplike Aanbeid van hoë standaard het te doen met die oopheid.
- Werklikheid. → Is daar vir die Christen endie nie - (Christen).
- Gesprek
 - Finansiële beperkinge
 - Private instellings word volkome van uitse hand leid → Hoë kwaliteit
- Kwaliteit
 - Uitnemendheid
 - Missionêre opdrag
- Interaksie
 - Identiteit bou voort en ontwikkel
 - Beginsels wat groei
 - Biblioteek geriewe behoort voorheen te geniet.
 - Ruimte moet geniet word vir Seminare konferensies en debatte
 - Beweg in in ruimte in
 - Toelatingsbeleid is in oop toelatings:

beleid.

- Gevoegsamere **kommu-nikasie** voorheen **staties-dentae**.
- Geloofswittek moet nie nense uitstoot nie
- Oop
- ~~die~~ gedistansier
- **professioneel** → teenoor nete afpried-tenings vereistes
- **Refleksie**, wat word bedoel met refleksie
- **te sinnige groei** bele maner **kommu-nikasie**
- **tegnologie** help met oopheid
- **Groot werkstas** teen oopheid
- **openbare debat**
- **stem** laet hoor
- **Besig** nie alle kennis. **het** nie volwante wrel ontwerp nie.
- **nie** e. land
- **Identiteit** moet aanpas, **beginsels** nie
- **Spreek** **militaristiese** gedrag en **fundamentele** ne aan ^{deur} **die** manier wat jy **klas gee**
- **Kwaliteit** beheer stel sel verbeter

Code	Ander → Fami
1. Liefde	Diens baer, naaste
2. Vrede	Nie dwang, nie geweld, heel af- druk nie, to
3. Krities	→ ken die ander, weet wie is die ander, selfde belydenis grondslag/nie, nog nie gereg nagedink aan ^{aan} ander virander gebuiges → stel grense vas ^{→ 15. d. b. k.} toe lating op kampus
4. Respek	→ Nie hoogmoedig, nie beter as ander, hoër ag, onverdrag saam, tolerance nederig
5. Eer- likheid	→ honest, nie indoktrinering, bein- spoel, openinge maak dit moeilik. Vraestelle maak dit moeilik, toe ad- verkeer jy jouself.



ADDENDUM 20: PHOTOGRAPHS OF AROS (THE SITE), ITS STAFF AND STUDENTS



"AROS' main building in the photograph above"



AROS' staff members and students in the photograph above



AROS students in classroom above