

Housing Provision Systems and Power Dynamics: The Case of Khutsong


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It all starts here [™]



Declaration

I, Gift Mupambwa declare that

Housing Provision Systems and Power Dynamics: The Case of Khutsong

Is solely my academic work, all academic sources and academic resources utilised in the study have been duly acknowledged through proper referencing and this work has not been submitted elsewhere for the awarding of a degree.

Acknowledgement

In this long scholarly journey many have been the relentless efforts of different individuals in ensuring that this whole academic treatise becomes a success. As such I would like to convey my sincere acknowledgements to all the people who have shaped my life throughout this academic discourse, I feel highly indebted to their actions and (in) actions in this scholarly journey.

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Abstract

“Who dominates whom?” This is a perennial and most contested question in power studies. The researcher conducted a qualitative case study focusing on a housing project in Khutsong. The aim was to develop a deeper understanding of the way in which power relationships amongst actors, evident in their conflicting interpretations, actions and inactions, may have contributed to the outcome of the said project. To this end, in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions were held with community members and leaders, local politicians, contractors and municipality officials, in order to grasp how their power relationships impacted the Khutsong housing project.

A critical scholarly examination was done of Lukes’ political theorising, as well as urban power political and housing discourses in an attempt to understand housing provision in urban South Africa and how power relationships affect housing delivery. Lukes (2005), chosen as the main theoretical anchor of the study, would have proposed that the power relations are dominated by powerful actors through their ability to shape the cognitions, preferences and perceptions of the powerless to such an extent that the latter wilfully consent to being dominated. However, evidence from the case study indicates that in pluralistic and radicalised contexts such as Khutsong, different actors’ interpretations and varying expectations influence their actions and inactions in the praxis of housing policies. This context has engendered power to be fluid, dynamic and multi-directional, which shift power dynamics from conceptions of domination as binary, asymmetric and uni-directional, to an understanding that in local development contexts there can be a plurality of actors. These actors influence policies through active (re)interpretations and reciprocation, which contribute to more volatile and multi-directional power exercises. In this way, the thesis broadens scholarly understandings of hegemony and how it is counter-acted by multiple interest groups’ reinterpretations of the localised processes of development policy.

These mentioned volatile and unsettled relationships in power exercises within policy spaces, are found to be based largely on the internalisation of radicalised democratic ideals and the fact that actors in local development can be identified easier. The rife contestations and over-politicisation of housing provision in South Africa has been characterised by incessant community protests and violence. This has become the normative urban political dynamics for inhabitants perceiving and pursuing their entitlement. Khutsong is a typical example, as a township which is well documented for its aggressive and severe community struggles over varying societal issues.

In the new South African dispensation, Khutsong community members have internalised radical democratic values, and as such they have viewed the housing provision as spaces for struggle through contestations over rights and entitlements. Their active reinterpretations and violent reciprocation in the praxis of the housing project have challenged the initial interpretations of the project to a fluid and more dynamic understanding. This ultimately contributed to unexpected outcomes in the project. In this regard, the thesis reveals that it is through varying interpretations and reciprocations in contexts of radicalised local democracy that domination becomes more fluid, dynamic and multi-directional by various actors.

Keywords

- Housing Provision
- Power Dynamics
- Khutsong
- Lukes
- Reciprocity
- Multi-directionality
- Three-dimensional power
- Lukes
- Community power
- Domination
- Urban Development
- Interpretations

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
BNG	Breaking New Ground
CDE	Centre for Development and Enterprise
CDS	Centre for Development Support
CTLC	Carletonville Transitional Local Council
DoH	Department of Housing
DoHS	Department of Human Settlements
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
EDP	Economic Development and Planning
FFC	Financial & Fiscal Commission
FCH	Fuller Center for Housing
GHS	General Household Survey
GGLN	Good Governance Learning Network
GP	Gauteng Province
HDA	Housing Development Agency
HWP	White Paper on Housing
IDT	International Development Trust
MCLM	Merafong City Local Council
NDC	National Disaster Center
NDMC	National Disaster Management Centre
NDoH	National Department of Housing
NDoHS	National Department of Human Settlements
NWP	North West Province
PPCE	ProPlan Consulting Engineers
PHP	People's Housing Process
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSCM	Project Steering Committee Minutes
PRV	Power: A Radical View
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SAAIR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SACP	South African Communist Party

SACN South African Cities Network
SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes
UF Urban Foundation
WRDM West Rand District Municipality

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Chapter 1: Study introduction, background and summary

1.1 Introduction

The present study examined how various interpretations, actions and in-actions by actors in the Khutsong housing project contributed to several outcomes. Through the case study of Khutsong, it was revealed that the various actors' conflicting constructions of meanings and reinterpretations of the housing process within the localised nature of the Khutsong housing project, produced more volatile, dynamic and multi-directional power reconfigurations in housing policy spaces. The study focused on Khutsong, a township on the outskirts of Greater Johannesburg and located outside the mining centre of Carletonville served by the Merafong City Local Municipality (MCLM). As will be argued in chapters 6 and 7, the housing project reveals how multiple actors engage in socio-political power relations, thereby influencing the outcome of the project.

In this regard, the study reinterpreted and broadened the third dimension of power according to Lukes' design. The aim was to include fluid, dynamic and multi-directionality resulting from the different role-players' conflicting interpretations and meaning constructions of the praxis of housing policy.

It is the scale and propensity of housing as a global and local socio-economic challenge that provided the need for the present study. Studies in this field do indicate that the global housing backlog is approximately one billion (1/7th of total world's population) and this is expected to double within the next 25 years (Tibaijuka, 2005; UN-Habitat, 2003; Rhiney, 2012). According to Martinez *et al.* (2008), since 2007, more than half of the world's population reside in cities and one out of three individuals amongst them have to attend with inadequate housing conditions. This indicates the magnitude of the housing challenge facing the world as the incidence of slums has mushroomed around city fringes.

Fox (2013:191) reports that the inadequacy of housing or "slum incidence" is particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Over 60% of sub-Saharan Africa's urban population lives in poor slum conditions, which is the highest level of slum incidence of any major world region. This incidence is significantly higher than the developing world's average of 32.7% (UN-Habitat, 2008, 2010). Such conditions pose a huge challenge for governments and countries within the Sub-Saharan region, who have to resolve this housing challenge. Closer examination

of these housing statistics reveals the need for concerted efforts to ensure an efficient, effective and responsive policy praxis guiding housing delivery.

Housing is generally argued to be a challenge for the South African society (Mafukidze, 2009; Phago, 2010). The provision of low-cost housing to the poor has been a severe and acute problem in urban areas globally, especially in developing countries such as South Africa. This has led the South African government to promote developmental local governments that have the mandate to deliver and provide housing to the public. However, the provincial and local governments seemingly failed to develop and deliver services on housing provision systems (Zuma, 2010; Govender *et al.*, 2011; Tissington, 2011). Prior studies on housing have indicated that approximately a fifth of South Africa's population are homeless (Olufemi, 2000) and that during the first decades of the 21st century, a quarter can be classified as informal settlements (UN-Habitat, 2008 cited in Fox, 2013:192). The mining township of Khutsong is a typical case in question, with a high concentration of informal settlements. In particular, this residential area is the site of one of the largest housing projects launched in South Africa to date. The unique context of Khutsong makes it an interesting case study to analyse power dynamics in light of the massive gains or losses at stake for the various role-players.

It can be argued that housing provision has become a popular theme for academics, policy makers, non-government organisation (NGOs), governments and statesmen. However, it would be worthwhile to pose the question, "Why is housing provision important, and why such concerted efforts to provide these residences?" Housing serves several functions and purposes in the world, within nation's policies, and in society. According to Gunter (2008:278) the provision of housing to the urban poor is imperative in an urbanised age. In this regard, Boudreaux (2008) observes that housing is often an economic and political issue, where provision can contribute to financial and physical security for a vulnerable group of individuals. In concurrence, Du Plessis and Leckie (2006) and Ho and Kwong (2002) point out that housing is vital as it enhances the livelihoods and living standards of the poor, who are affected the most by the challenges of inadequate living space in the industrialised world.

Lawrence (2004) reiterates that housing provision is a fundamental development process, as it enhances individual or public well-being. Basorun and Fadairo (2013) concur that the housing sector is a key component of development with a universal appeal. This is argued further by Gulyani and Talukdah (2010), who point out that housing reduces poverty and is a pro-poor development stratagem. Other scholars have indicated that housing promotes citizen's

empowerment or co-sovereignty amongst the poor and the general public (Rukwaro & Olima, 2003; De Soto & Cheneval, 2006; Gunter, 2011). After briefly arguing the important aspects of providing housing to the poor and public at large, it should be stressed that governments need to implement policies to ensure responsive housing-delivery systems.

Beforehand, it is necessary to consider the reasons behind the problem of housing globally and locally. According to Basorun and Fedairo (2012:31), the issue of housing in several Sub-Saharan African countries emerges mainly from urbanisation by the poor without prospects of economic growth in these areas. This process occurred during the 1990s in a number of developing nations. Such a phenomenon is termed “dis-jointed modernisation” (Fox, 2013). Furthermore, numerous scholars indicate that the housing challenge has been exacerbated by rapid rural-to-urban migration during industrialisation, which has resulted in the burgeoning illegal settlements in numerous countries (Choguill, 2007; Viratkapan & Perera, 2006; Majale, 2008; Takeuchi *et al.*, 2008). In this regard, scholars have attributed the housing challenge and the rise in informal settlements within urban boundaries, to rapid urbanisation (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002; Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002).

From another point of departure, scholars argue that the housing challenge is a result of government inefficiencies and defective policies meant to supply adequate housing to low-income people (De Soto, 2000; Otiso, 2003; Davis, 2007). Interestingly, Beall *et al.* (2002) and Bond (2003) view the present crisis in housing provision and the growth in the informal settlement as a result of governments’ neo-liberal economic policies, which have led to the marginalisation of the poor. Huchzeyer (2003) asserts that these policies caused underfunded public welfare programmes, which deliver poor quality and peripheralised housing for the poor. However, with regard to the South African context, Goebel (2007:293, 294) suggests that colonialism and the historical dispensation of apartheid have produced the urban peripheralised housing for the Blacks or the poor. This seemed to have continued even after democracy in the new dispensation, seeing that most new development of low-cost housing still takes place on the urban periphery.

Numerous studies on housing have been overly policy-oriented (Kemeny, 1992; Bengtsson & Kemeny, 1995; Kemeny, 1999; Allen, 2005; Huchzermeyer, 2000; Khan & Thring, 2003; Tomlinson, 2006). Thus, such researchers seldom concentrate on the political dynamics within the housing policy praxis (Bengtsson, 2009). Typically, when exploring the subject of power academically, scholars often over-accentuate macro-level power exercises (Brennan & Israel,

2008), whilst others scrutinise the formal structures of power (Barnard, 1938; Watson, 2003; Harrison, 2006). Most studies do not consider the micro-level of power, such as the implementation of housing projects. In addition, in instances where studies do consider the lower-level power relations, there is a preoccupation with the creation of power through mechanisations such as empowerment, civic engagement or capacity building (Gaventa, 1980; Beaver & Cohen, 2004; Fisher & Sonn, 2007; Brennan & Israel, 2008). As a result, local-level and more contextualised policies such as the Khutsong case are seldom considered in power studies.

Kemeny (1992:20) thus argues for academic interests by focusing on the more “fundamental prior questions concerning the grounds of knowledge of housing studies: questions which have rarely, if ever, been addressed by housing researchers”. This requires more theoretical insights on the problematisation of housing issues and policy processes. In this regard, power dynamics in housing research receives an impetus as an area that saw only limited prior scholarly research. Kemeny (1995; 2001; 2006) thus advocates for an explicit analysis of power dynamics in housing research. Foucault (1979) also points out researchers’ silence on local political or power dynamics. In this respect, power is an area that has not been researched sufficiently, and numerous housing and community studies are silent on this matter.

Typically, the examination and analysis of the subject of power in housing provision systems, focus especially on housing policies with the view to enhance service delivery. Moreover, as indicated above, power studies have mostly considered the macro-level, with scant research on local power play amongst different actors through varying interpretations, actions and inactions. There has been limited attention on the mechanisms and processes through which local residents interact with power structures, and subsequently acquire the power to address important social issues such as housing.

In light of the exposition above, the purpose of the present study was contributing to the power debate by offering a fitting perspective on how power can be conceptualised and understood in the context of housing provision in Khutsong. The present study’s aim was augmenting the current discourse on housing provision systems by focusing on the influence the various role-players exert through their (re)interpretations and (in)actions on the outcome of the Khutsong housing project. To accomplish this, the study critically assessed the abstract conceptualisation of power in the Lukes’ (2005a) third dimension, as applied empirically to the case study of Khutsong.

1.2 Orientation and problem statement

The post-apartheid government in South Africa is faced with severe challenges of which housing ranks highest amongst the immediate needs of the people. In particular, the problem of housing ranges from the lack of access to improved and adequate shelter, to administrative challenges of the limited available housing units (Department of Housing [DoH], 2006; Mafukidze, 2009). Phago (2010) notes that South Africa, as with several other nations, is faced with a severe backlog of housing provision. Therefore, there is a need to reconceptualise and change the discourse on the housing-delivery systems for people in the new dispensation. The government has introduced various housing programmes and managed to erect large numbers of low-cost houses. However, it appears that these programmes are failing to address the immense housing challenge adequately (Rust, 2006; Govender *et al.*, 2011). This has produced mixed reactions on the state's success in promoting access to adequate shelter. On the one hand, some researchers indicate that South Africa has made huge strides in addressing the housing backlog (Rust, 2006; Goebel, 2007; Lizarralde & Massyn, 2008). On the other hand, numerous researchers point out the continued existing and persisting housing shortage amongst the poor and marginalised in the society (UN-Habitat, 2008; National Department of Housing [NDoH], 2009; Zuma, 2010; Sexwale, 2010; Tissington, 2011). As a result, the South African Government implementing policy stratagems that reportedly were aimed at overcoming this backlog by 2014 (Del Ministro & Hensher, 2009:333).

However, despite a concerted focus on housing by various actors (governments, policy makers, academics, NGOs, private sector and international bodies), the housing backlog has not been reduced. This condition has placed housing at the centre in the 21st century's development agenda. There has thus been rapidly expanding informal settlements and backyard dwellings in South Africa. Housing has become a contested terrain where actors violently claim entitlement to access and rights. Housing delivery has been marked by continuous concerns over its poor quality and criticised by its various beneficiaries. People are dissatisfied with the sizes and state of the housing units, which often attest to poor-quality construction (Poulsen & Silverman, 2005:2). In this regard, scholars have argued that housing provision for the poor in South Africa has drawn a negative response from the beneficiaries, who dislike the models of housing provided by the state (Charlton & Kihato 2006; Goebel, 2007:292; Charlton 2009; Aigbavboa 2010; Aigbavboa & Thwala, 2013). This has often led to the recipients of housing from the state selling these new units and remain staying in *umkhukhus* (shacks) since they perceive the RDP houses as not meeting their needs.

Providing the focus for the present study, the occurrence of sinkholes (dolines) in Khutsong made it necessary to move housing settlements from the doline-risks areas to more safe settlements. Gubula and Mboyisa (cited in Oversight Forum, 2013:7) point out that large numbers of South African residences have been built on dolomite land. Dolomite poses a serious challenge to houses in various areas in South Africa. This is prevalent in areas such as Centurion, Midvaal, Merafong and Soweto, which are situated on extensive pockets of dolomite land. Nieuwoudt (2013:13) indicates that approximately 90% of Khutsong is situated in high-risk dolomitic unstable zones.

Furthermore, as has been indicated, regarding the centrality of power in human life, most studies seemingly are more societal oriented or community-based. As a result, the concept of power and power relations remain under-studied (Domhoff, 2007; Fisher & Sonn, 2007; Gaventa, 1980; Stone, 1986; Brennan & Israel, 2008). Scholars do indicate the relevance or importance of the concept of power, however, to date, limited studies were undertaken to understand of how power emerges and evolves at a local community level (Beaver & Cohen, 2004; Fisher & Sonn, 2007; Gaventa, 1980).

In this regard, the present study seeks to understand how power is integral to the key stakeholders of Khutsong's interaction and how the use of power determined the present outcomes of the housing project. This research was given impetus by the housing challenge and the occurrences of sinkholes in Khutsong, which has led the whole area where the township is situated currently to be declared geologically unstable (Nieuwoudt, 2013). Due to the doline hazard in Khutsong, MCLM initially agreed to resettle the entire township since it was deemed unstable and unsuitable for residence (Nieuwoudt, 2013).

Since 1996, the Merafong Municipality has embarked on a relocation programme for the residents of Khutsong. The Khutsong relocation became a presidentially funded (R1.5 billion) initiative in 2003 with approximately 18 000 houses to be relocated. However, since the programme began, observations and interviews with residents and key municipal officials have indicated that the project is fraught with numerous challenges. Interviews with community members and municipal officials also indicated that the municipality currently is resettling only the residents from the informal housing sector (Interviews with officials, 2013; 2015). Furthermore, the resettlement programme has failed since 2003 to deliver the mandated 18 000 houses. The main problem for the study, therefore, was to understand why, given the favourable conditions noted, the planned housing scheme in Khutsong has not been realised. The present

study thus investigated whether there were some underlying conceptions in the formulation of the Khutsong Resettlement Project, which determined the negative outcome of the project.

Therefore, the focus was on the interpretations and actions (as well as inactions) of key role-players that contributed to and determined the present outcome in the system of housing delivery in Khutsong. The specific aim of the research was to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics of power relations amongst the community, local government officials, contractors, and the state. The major focus was on underlying dynamics that determined role-players' interpretations of the project and how it impacted the present outcomes of the Khutsong Resettlement Project. The study, therefore, through an in-depth case study, endeavoured to interpret the housing crisis that Khutsong and South Africa is facing. This case study aimed to examine and analyse the power dynamics amongst the role players. Numerous studies on housing have over-accentuated the following aspects:

- access to housing;
- interplay between supply and demand;
- focused on informal settlements;
- post-apartheid housing policy and practice;
- cooperative governance
- participation and empowerment
- stakeholders' influence on housing.

(Abbott, 2002; Charlton, 2006; Huchzermeyer, 2010; Pillay, 2004; Tomlinson, 2007; Rust, 2006; Marais & Mokoena, 2007; Mafukidze & Hoosen, 2009; Gunter, 2011; Mohlasedi & Nkado, 1997).

Furthermore, an extensive review of literature on housing reveals a stronger focus on policy studies (Bengtsson & Kemeny, 1995; Kemeny, 1999; Huchzermeyer, 2000; Marais, 2001; Khan & Thring, 2003; Allen, 2005; Tomlinson, 2006; Bengtsson, 2009) and less on power play amongst local key stakeholders (e.g., local government, provincial government, contractors, community members, councillors). It was also found that studies on the shifting of power amongst actors or agencies in given social processes, have been under-researched (Contu & Willmott, 2003; Levina & Orlikowski, 2009). Moreover, scholarly work on power has mostly been dominated by macro-studies (Brennan & Israel, 2008). Kemeny (1992) suggests that researchers should pay more attention to studying questions on housing research, which rarely

have been addressed in the literature on housing provision. In addition, Bengtsson (2009) argues that the study on power relationships surrounding housing is of significance as it will help explicate the problem and expand the concept of democracy (the analysis of public participation and local governance).

The brief review above, shows that power has been under-studied in housing research. It is clear that numerous scholars focus on the point at which the public and other key stakeholders interact within wider structures of housing provision to produce a specific type of outcome. In this regard, the present study sought to investigate empirically how the interpretations and perspectives of the stakeholders within the praxis of housing policy has contributed to the current outcome of the project in the case study of Khutsong.

In light of the foregoing background, the problem under investigation is:

Ascertaining how, in the major Khutsong housing project, do role-players engage with socio-political power dynamics and thereby influence the outcome of the project?

In this sense, the present study contributes to the corpus of knowledge by pointing out how various interpretations amongst actors in housing-policy projects influence the outcomes of development projects at local level. This includes conceptualisations of power in development spaces. The investigated problem was that power dynamics determine the outcome of a project more than original well-founded decisions of public management. If these dynamics can be understood better, this sociological knowledge may assist public management processes in dealing with such major projects.

1.3 Research questions

The main research question the present study attempted to answer was:

How do role-players in the Khutsong housing project engage in socio-political power relations, which influence the outcome of the entire project?

The study, therefore, investigated the power relationships and dynamics related to this specific housing policy as presented by the various role-players. The following secondary research questions have been identified that inform the objectives and methodology of the present study:

1. What is the current sociological theorising on power dynamics?

2. What are the applicable urban theories that can be utilised in understanding power dynamics?
3. What are approaches in provision of housing specifically related to the case study?
4. How do the power dynamics impact on the Khutsong Housing project?
5. How can the findings of this study be used to develop an analytical understanding of power dynamics related to local projects?
6. What conclusions and recommendations can be made on power dynamics amongst key role players in housing provision systems?

1.4 Research aim and objectives

The main aim of the research was:

Develop a deeper understanding of power relations and dynamics amongst the key role-players of the Khutsong housing project (as an example of a housing provision system) by means of power theories, and especially Lukes' (2005a) framework of power.

For this reason, the following objectives were pursued:

1. To analyse the current sociological theories on power dynamics in human relations.
2. To analyse applicable urban political theories so as to create an understanding of power dynamics
3. To examine the approaches in provision of housing specifically related to the case study.
4. To critically analyse and examine the power relationships and dynamics amongst the role players within the Khutsong housing project and how that impact on the outcome of the housing project.
5. To present an analytical framework for the understanding of power dynamics related to local projects.
6. To make conclusions and also suggest recommendations on power dynamics amongst key role players in housing provision systems.

1.5 Theoretical framework

Power as such is a contested concept (Lukes, 2005a:14, Navarro, 2006:12). Thus, various approaches or theories to the study of power could be used for the present study. The purpose was to examine the power dynamics amongst the key role-players of the Khutsong housing project and how these relations have contributed to the present housing outcomes. Therefore, the three dimension of power (decision-making, agenda-manipulation and interpretations) by Steven Lukes was utilised as the theoretical anchor of the study. Lukes perceives power as more than mere overt outcomes and controlling of the agenda; he also incorporates a view of power that involves consent through wilful compliance. Theoretically Lukes (1970; 2005a:29) identifies three levels of power relationships:

- the one-dimensional (pluralist) view by Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby;
- the two-dimensional view (elitist) by Bachrach and Baratz;
- Lukes' proposed third dimension of power.

Lukes (1970:19) identifies the pluralist model of power as one-dimensional as it concentrates on observable conflict and outcomes and does not allow for unarticulated or unobservable interests. The two-dimensional view by Bachrach and Baratz concentrates on the “extent to which a person or group consciously or unconsciously creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:8). However, according to Lukes (1970:25; 2005a:25), this elite view of power is still too connected to behaviourism, or linked to the overt, outcome-based model of decision- (and non-decision) making. The elite model fails to incorporate the bias of social systems and also to acknowledge that conflict is unnecessary for power.

Lukes (1970, 2005a:25) thus critiques the approaches of the first and second dimension limit power to the following aspects:

- overt and observable, actual behaviour;
- decision-making or avoiding decision making; and
- situations of observable conflict.

However, the third dimension of power focuses on decision-making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions), observable (overt or covert) and latent conflict, but through subjective and real interests of agents (Lukes, 2005a:29; Bentley &

Murphy, 2006). According to Heyward (2007), the third view of power involves the ability to persuade the less powerful to conspire for their own domination by adopting the interest of the powerful ones as their own. Pluralist theories focus on behaviour in the making of decisions over key or important issues that involve actual, observable conflict (Lukes, 2005a:18). In contrast, the present study sought an in-depth understanding of the power dynamics amongst key role players. Thus, it required a more dynamic theoretical model for power. In this regard, Lukes' (2005a) third dimension of power has the potential to unveil the power dynamics and their effect on the Khutsong Resettlement Project. Lukes' theoretical approach to power examines how the powerful secure (willing and unwilling) compliance over those they dominate. It also sheds light on the mechanisms the dominators use to secure such power (Lukes, 2005a). According to Lukes (2005a:65-73), power is defined by capacity and abilities. Lorenzi (2006) further indicates that Lukes views power as imposing internal constraints, and inducing beliefs in the subjects leading to their consent or their adaptation to domination, by either coercive or non-coercive forms.

According to Scott (2001 cited in Bentley & Murphy 2006:294), Lukes' conceptualisation of power is appealing since it takes ideas about power beyond the realm of pluralism and behaviourism and incorporates a critique of societal structures and the relationship between these structures and agency. Such a theory offers broad conceptions of power relationships, which help researchers understand critiques of modern society and progress advanced by those who traditionally are marginalised by the political system (Scott cited in Bentley & Murphy 2006:294). This view is relevant for the present study, which aimed to understand the power dynamics and the interpretations of these relationships applied to the Khutsong Resettlement Project. In this context, Lukes' three faces of power were utilised as theoretical arguments on which the present study was built.

The study sought to understand how different role-players in the Khutsong housing project actively engage within the praxis of development. The findings revealed that the actors' involvement in interpreting, and their active engagement in the processes, produced more fluid, dynamic and multi-directional power exercises. Such expressions of power operate best in a radicalised democratic context and local-level power spaces where actors are able to identify each other, and who endeavours to dominate them.

As indicated, for an in-depth understanding of the power dynamics and their effects on the project, Luke's above-mentioned three faces of power were employed to understand how

power shifts from one group to another and how this impacts the housing project. The study confirmed the exercise of power in the housing project through decisions, agenda settings and varying interpretations. This new understanding lead to an expansion on Lukes' third face of power (as indicated in ch 7). This corrective implied the shift from uni-directional dominance towards multi-directional power exercise by the actors in the housing project. Thus, the major contribution of the present research was assessing whether Lukes' third face of power could be applied to the complex housing situation in Khutsong. In this regard, the study proposed a multi-directional power framework which broadens Lukes' third dimension to include instances in which power can be more fluid (volatile) and dynamic amongst actors, thus impacting outcomes of developmental projects.

1.6 Methodology

As was mentioned, the present research's aim was understanding how power dynamics and the (re)interpretation of key role-players influence outcomes of given social processes, in particular, housing. Therefore, the study examined the relationship between power dynamics and the social housing-delivery system (low-cost housing) in South Africa. The paucity of literature examining how power dynamics amongst key-role players influence the outcomes of housing projects, identified a gap for undertaking the present study. Therefore, the envisaged methodological orientations of such a study are expounded below.

1.6.1. Literature review

Literature reviews are important to help understand the current debates as well as gaps that exist in a given area of a research problem. According to De Wet *et al.* (1981:80), a literature review or study aims to gather current and prior scholarly views about a given topic. Bhattacharjee (2012:21) argues that literature reviews are conducted for three main purposes:

- Survey the current state of knowledge in the area of inquiry.
- Identify key authors, articles, theories, and findings in that area.
- Ascertain gaps regarding the knowledge in the area of concern.

Creswell (2009:25) explains that a literature review accomplishes several purposes, such as relating a study to the larger on-going dialogue in the literature, filling in gaps, extending prior studies, and establishing the importance of the study.

For the purposes of the present study, the researcher consulted articles related to the issues of power dynamics or power in housing. Furthermore, the literature study was undertaken on all the main key terms of the study in order to give the research a scholarly-informed lens. This helped anchor the study on the current debates about housing and power. The literature review comprised a critical analysis and examination of scholarly studies conducted at an international, continental, regional and local level. In addition, the research undertook a thorough document analysis, which involved studying government documents, newspaper articles, MCLM reports and South African housing legislation. In the process, the researcher analysed relevant documents such as the Merafong Housing plan, Merafong's Integrated Development Plans (IDP), Khutsong Resettlement Plan and its implementation, newspapers, and executive documents. This was done to understand the nature of power dynamics in housing provision systems, with particular reference to the Khutsong housing project.

1.6.2 Research design

The current research had a phenomenological or interpretivist orientation. It was based on both a literature review and an empirical study. According to Cooper and Schindler (2003:38), research methodology refers to the way in which data is gathered for a research project. In this regard, Babbie (1992:32) explains that research methodology is the philosophy of the research process, which includes the assumptions and values that serve as a rationale for study and the standards or criteria the researcher uses to interpret data and draw conclusions. In brief, a research methodology can be defined as the plan or blueprint for a given study (Huysamen 1994:10; Kumar, 2005) According to this plan, data is collected to test a research hypothesis, or investigate a research problem in the most cost-effective way.

For its research design, the present study employed a qualitative methodology. According to Creswell (2009:4), the qualitative approach entails the collection and analysis of in-depth information regarding a small group of respondents. Usually the results of this type of research cannot be generalised to the whole population or beyond the numbers of the respondents. The present research utilised a qualitative approach since it allowed the researcher an in-depth understanding of the Khutsong role-players' (re)interpretation and understanding of how power dynamics impacted on the housing project. Furthermore, the qualitative methodological orientation has been chosen since it studies social phenomena to gain a deep understanding of the activities and perceptions of people and processes (Marshall & Rossmans, 1999:2).

The chosen qualitative approach was thus employed to capture fully the power relationships, processes, interpretations and perceptions of the key role-players involved in the Khutsong relocation project, for this study. Numerous major studies on housing issues in South Africa have used a predominantly qualitative method (Goebel, 2007; Gulyani & Talukdah, 2010; Phago, 2010; Govender, 2011; Fox, 2013), whilst other studies have employed quantitative surveys (Govender *et al.*, 2011; Basorun & Fadairo, 2012). Other scholars have undertaken literature reviews (Rust, 2006; Cross, 2006; Marais & Ntema, 2013). Furthermore, according to Bengtsson (2009:17), the socio-political construction of housing policy in different national and international contexts may be investigated both at the local (micro-) level of the citizens and of political elite (macro), by using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Following these prior researches, the present study used a qualitative method with semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus groups as its key strategy to collect data from the stakeholders of the Khutsong Resettlement Project.

1.6.3 Population and sampling of the study

The population of the study comprised the following: all the inhabitants of old Khutsong (informal and formal settlement), new Khutsong resettlement, councillors, municipal officials, contractors (local and private contractors), and construction workers of the Khutsong relocation project. The study involved the councillors from the old Khutsong Township and those from the new township. Through the help of the Speaker of the Municipality and community informants, a list was made of the previous and current councillors who have and still are playing a major role within the Khutsong housing project, to be considered as participants in the study. The municipal officials were from various departments (e.g. spatial and town planning department, human settlement department, mayor's office, Local Economic Department [LED]). Sampling of respondents for participation in the study was done through purposive sampling, principally typical and snowball sampling techniques were employed as stratagems for eliciting participants. De Vos (2000) and Patton (2015) point out that purposive sampling and snowball sampling are valuable in exploratory research. (For more detail on the data collection, see ch 5).

1.6.4 Data collection

The aim of the study was gaining an in-depth, insider perspective of the power dynamics and the interpretation of these relationships by key role-players. Thus, the following qualitative

instruments were used for data collection: document analysis, focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Individual interviews were employed as it allowed the respondents (interviewees) to express themselves clearly and as freely as possible on their view of power dynamics' impact on the present outcomes of the Khutsong housing project. The researcher provided contexts conducive for participants to air their views freely on this matter. Focus groups were held, allowing the researcher to reach a significant number of the community members and other stakeholders who impact the Khutsong project. The participants' responses provided a clear understanding of the stakeholders' interpretations of the power plays and how it has contributed to the outcome of the project. The researcher also enlisted trained field workers to help gather data for the study. (See ch 5 for a more detailed description of methodological aspects.)

1.6.5 Data analysis

The qualitative research analysis was conducted manually. De Vos *et al.* (2005:333) define data analysis as the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to mass-collected data. From the in-depth interviews and focus groups, the researcher transcribed, coded and generated themes from the raw data, which later were analysed thematically in line with the main research aim of the study.

1.6.6 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations are widely held principles that demarcate the acceptable professional research behaviour that is expected from researchers (Babbie, 2007). Lutabingwa and Nethonzhe (2006:694) explain that since most researchers use humans as subjects in their investigations, they need to conform to the ethical norms and values guiding research. These scholars further identify three broad areas of ethical concern in research: data collection and analysis; the treatment of participants; responsibility to the society. In the present study, therefore, the researcher adhered strictly to the stipulated ethical considerations for involving human subjects in research. The following considerations were followed in this study:

- **Authorisation to conduct study:** The researcher sought authorisation or access from the Merafong Municipality to conduct the study. An application letter was written to the municipality in this regard. The letter clearly indicated the purpose of the study, its significance, time-frame, type of participants, and the expected outcome of the study, if granted access.

- **University ethical clearance:** The researcher applied for ethical clearance from the University. This was to ensure that the study, data collection technique, and research methods were approved by the University's Ethical Committee.
- **Informed consent:** Prior to data collection, the researcher ensured the participants were debriefed about the research project and informed about their right to participate voluntarily. They were, therefore, asked to consent or opt out from participating in the study. The (informed consent form) confirms that the rights of participation of subjects were not infringed.
- **No harm to participants:** The privacy of the respondents was promoted throughout the data collection. For anonymity and confidentiality, respondents were not asked to provide their names, and their responses remained confidential
- **Accuracy of reporting:** When analysing the findings, the researcher was objective and as accurate as possible, thus the analysis provided a true reflection of the data that were collected from the respondents.

1.7 Significance of the study

This study has both theoretical (body of knowledge) and practical value (housing policy praxis). The academic value lies in the fact that housing has become a major issue of research. Numerous scholars are seeking to understand and explain why strategies implemented to promote successful provision of adequate shelters, have not been realised. The present study adds to the existing housing debate by explaining how power plays can constrain as well as enable housing projects from realising its intended outcomes.

Onukwugha (cited by Onukwugha, 2000:6) argues that the major challenges or problems in housing delivery are not due to the allocation system or co-ordination subsystem, but lies in the process to deliver the housing. In this regard, the present study is significant as it adds to the on-going debate on policies for the effective delivery of public housing (Abbott, 2002; Charlton, 2006; Huchzermeyer, 2004; 2009; 2010; Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006; Charlton & Kihato, 2006; Rust, 2006; Marais, 2006; Goebel, 2007; Oversight Forum, 2013; Fox, 2013).

In addition, the study offers a theoretical contribution regarding the dynamics of power relations and how power can shift amongst various actors to develop more volatile, dynamic and multi-directional, as well as positive-sum, relationships. Kemeny (1992) asserts that the

development of theory in the various research disciplines stands to gain from empirical studies. Regarding studies on housing, Bengtsson (2009:18) states “conceptual and empirical studies of housing politics could contribute to the development of concepts like democracy, citizenship and social justice or political theorising about local governance and enhance policies at the local and national levels”. In this regard, the present study has theoretical value as it investigated and critically examined the power dynamics of the key role-players or stakeholders in the Khutsong Resettlement Project. The findings make strong contributions to the power theories by falsifying, validating or contributing to the existing major power theories and, in particular, to Luke’s design in his elucidating work *Power: A Radical Approach*. This was done by an in-depth and unique case study of the Khutsong Resettlement Project. The study therefore, broadens the third dimension of power in Lukes to incorporate the conflictual interpretations amongst actors, which form preferences and shape cognitions. The present study’s new focus introduces fluidity and dynamism in power relationships, which entails a shift from uni-directional to multidirectional power exercises.

With respect to policy and practice, the results from the study are useful in shaping the policy formulation in housing developments to inclusion how power plays also impact housing. The findings (see ch 6) reveal how given power contexts produces contestations and varying interpretations amongst actors. The policy recommendations as proposed in the present study, are useful to improve future strategies and planning for the provision of housing in South Africa.

1.8 Structure of thesis

The layout of the thesis consists of the following six chapters:

Chapter 1: Gives a general introduction to the study and problem statement, and offers a succinct discussion of the study as a whole.

Chapter 2: Provides greater detail on the theoretical structures on which the study is built: power theories, focus particularly on Lukes’ (1974; 2005a) ‘three dimensions of power’. First, the chapter gives an explanatory overview of Lukes’ theory that informs the methodological and analytical dimensions of this thesis (chs 5, 6 & 7). The chapter defines and explores the analytical meaning of the three dimensions of power according to Lukes. It also explains how Luke’s framework can be operationalised for the purpose of the study.

Chapter 3: Considers the urban political theories as a substantiation of how the three-dimensional power is expressed in urban political spaces. This includes an explication of the nature of actors' power plays in the struggle to access and influence urban spaces.

Chapter 4: Provides an overview of the different approaches that are followed globally and in South Africa in the provision of housing. It also characterises the South African housing crisis from a historical view. This is followed by a discussion on housing legislation, the nature of housing in South Africa in general, and in the Khutsong Township in particular, by focusing on specific challenges in the arena of housing policy. The chapter links the Khutsong housing issue with the housing crisis that South Africa and the rest of the world is facing.

Chapter 5: Describes how the study conducted the empirical examination of power dynamics' impact on housing policy alternatives. The chapter highlights methodological orientations of the study, as well as mechanisms for data collection and analysis. This includes the challenges that the researcher incurred personally during data collection.

Chapter 6: Presents the analysis of the results from the empirical study. These findings indicate how the power relationships, interpretations and actions of key role-players contributed to and shaped the current Khutsong Resettlement Project outcomes. The focus is on thematic descriptive and analytical areas of pluralistic power dynamics, as well as the various perceptions and interpretations of the actors, and its outcome on the housing project.

Chapter 7: Utilises the findings from the study to argue for a framework for multi-directional power exercise in more localised and radicalised development spaces. The chapter will also propose an analytical instrument for the analysis of power in major projects at local level.

Chapter 8: Summaries the major findings, the contributions of the study, identifies the limitations of the research, and make recommendations by providing directions for future studies.

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter gave an introductory overview of the study. Furthermore, it has problematised the study as an academic initiative influenced by the unique context of the Khutsong housing process. The chapter indicated the study's aim to examine how different actors' interpretations of the housing project have helped broaden the power discourse to include more instances of

interlayer and multi-directional power shifts in housing and localised development initiatives. The thesis of the study, as noted above, is that the interplay of different actors in processes of housing policies tend to produce more fluid, dynamic and multi-directional power exercises.

The following chapter (ch 2) explains how power has been conceptualised and how the Lukesian design is the best approach to understand power exercises amongst different actors in a development context.

Chapter 2 Power: A theoretical overview

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided a background to the study and gave impetus to the current discussion on housing and power dynamics in South Africa. Against this background, the chapter critically examines and analyses power theories that may be applicable to the provision of housing. This study therefore builds on the main thesis by examining scholarly definitions and understandings that underpin the conceptualisation of power. Power seemingly is part of every human relationship, and in this regard the current chapter seeks to understand the nature and definitions of power with reference to the Khutsong Housing project. A major challenge amongst scholars was how to understand power, or to explain or define it the best. In light of this need, a critical discussion follows of the concept of power in this chapter.

Various scholars (Berenskoetter, 2007:2; Clegg & Haugaard, 2009:4; Haugaard, 2010:424; Haugaard & Ryan, 2012:12) argue that power is a contested concept with clusters of interpretations held together more by a “family resemblance” (Wittgensteinian) than a core meaning. In addition, Clegg *et al.* (2006) explain that power is a multi-dimensional construct, which depends on the specific situation and the positions of the individuals in a social relation. Therefore, the focus is on a critical discussion of the conceptualisation of power in social relations or dynamics.

Scholarly work on the conceptualisation, definition and explanations of power’s operation shows that the concept has different connotations to various scholars. For instance, Lukes (1986) argues that the pervasive nature of power makes it problematic to define. Others contend that overarching definitions of power inevitably fail to propose fully commensurable conceptualisations. Keltner *et al.* (2000:4, 5) explains it as follows:

“It can be argued that definitions of power vary according to the question of interest (How is it produced? Where is it located? How is it distributed?) and unit of analysis (e.g., institutions, groups, dyads, the individual). Some definitions focus on the actor (e.g., power as motive) or the actor’s actions (e.g., power as dominance). Other definitions emphasise the target’s response to the actor (e.g., power as influence)”

Furthermore, Haugaard and Ryan (2012:9) argue that the complexity of the concept has led certain theorists to propose that power is identifiable through “its exercise” (Dahl, 1957),

“subject dispositions” (Foucault, 1982; Dean, 2010), “domination” (Lukes, 2005a), “freedom” (Morriss, 1989) and “empowerment” (Arendt, 1970”).

This chapter attempts to synthesize main philosophical and sociological arguments about power. Power is a historical concept that have fascinated people thorough the ages, Nietzsche *et al.* (1968) indicated that the wish for power pervades all aspects of human behaviour. He argued that “we need to see all life, not just human life, as united by a common striving for power” (Sprinks, 2003:134). This shows the captivation and significance of power in human relations, however, the main impasse emerges when conceptualising and attempting to establish the meaning of power as a concept. As noted by Bachrach and Baratz (1973:3) and Morriss, there is consensus on the understanding of the word “power” when it is employed in a sentence, however, when its meaning is sought, it “remains elusive” (Morriss, 1987).

This demonstrates why the debates on the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of power remain the central foci in the social sciences as well as other disciplines. As mentioned previously, researchers are divided in their arguments about the conceptualisation of power. Therefore, the chapter provides a wide-ranging literature review on the conceptualisation of power. Zartman and Rubin (2003 cited in Theesfield, 2011:88) argue that power presents various forms, entangled in numerous definitions, therefore, the concept must be broken down into its components before the whole can be understood properly.

In addition, the research has a specific focus on power. As stated in the objectives, the present study works toward an analytical framework that would help understand power dynamics as related to local projects. From the power theories the design of Steven Lukes regarding the *three dimensions of power* is chosen as basis for such an analytical framework. This entails a critical discussion regarding the academic perspectives of power is built on an evaluation of Lukes’ three dimensions of power. Such an approach takes ideas about power beyond the realm of pluralism and behaviourism and incorporates a critique of societal structures and the relationship between these structures and agency (Scott, 2001). Hayward and Lukes (2008) typifies this radical view as a critical, agent-centred approach to power.

Therefore, by choosing this approach as the point of departure for an analytical framework, it provides insight into ways power can impact on given developmental projects either overtly or covertly Furthermore, as shall be noted, Lukes’ theory offers broader conceptions on power dynamics, which can help critique modern socio-economic and political-policy praxis.

2.2 Reasons for studying power dynamics

Human relationships have an essential relation to power, and studies in social sciences have focused on understanding the nature of this phenomenon, power. This is affirmed by Russell (1938:10) who emphasises that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same way that Energy is the fundamental concept in physics. Therefore, the laws of social dynamics can only be stated in terms of power. Clegg and Haugaard (2009:1) concur by pointing out that “power, or the cluster of concepts to which it refers, should be seen as the central concept of the social sciences”. This notion is confirmed by Fiske (1993) and Kemper (1991) who argue that power is a basic force in social relationships. In this regard, Hawley (1963:68) states that every social act is an exercise of power, every social relationship is a power equation, and every social group or system is an organisation of power. This shows the importance of power in social dynamics as it explains who gets what, when and how (Laswell, 1965); it also gives a clear picture of the context and environment in which power is constructed.

Morriss (2002) in *Power: A philosophical analysis* suggests an answer to the question why there should be orchestrated efforts to understand or study power. He offers three explanations, namely for practical, moral and evaluative purposes.

- **Practically:** people need to be cognisant of their own and other’s capacities, in order to realise certain societal goals. For example, this may indicate the need of knowing whom to manipulate through propaganda in election manifestos.
- **Morally:** people need to study and understand power in order to know whom to hold responsible (praise or blame) when outcomes or results do affect other’s interests.
- **Evaluative:** people want to understand whether social systems are increasing the freedom of citizens, and whether citizens have influence over socio-economic and political processes.

Accordingly, power is worth studying as it allows people to appraise morally, indicate practically their capacitation levels, and in evaluative terms help them analyse social systems as mechanisms or vanguards of societal freedom and development. Lukes (2005a:50) explains the process as follows, “We are concerned with finding out what the exercise of power prevents people from doing, and sometimes even thinking. In this regard, we should examine how people react to opportunities – or more precisely perceived opportunities – when these occur, to escape from subordinate positions in hierarchical systems.”

In light of the exposition above, the present study examines how the exercise of power makes people to consent in their own domination and accept being prevailed over in issues of conflictual and varying interests. The following section critically examines the different conceptualisations and frameworks of power, and eventually adopts of Steven Lukes' three power dimensions as the theoretical lens for the study.

2.3 Power and its nature

Power is a well-established concept in the social sciences, especially in political sciences. Even though the notion of power is used extensively in the scientific discourse, there still are different definitions and perspectives of this concept (Zaaiman, 2007:357). Studies on power are rife with continuous and seemingly intractable disagreements amongst philosophers, social and political theorists, who have devoted their careers to analyse and conceptualise this phenomenon. (Such exponents include the following: Hobbes, 1651, 2009; Russell, 1938; Arendt, 1986; Gramsci, 1957; Mills, 1959; Max, 1959; Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Hawley, 1963; Dahl, 1957; Giddens, 1979; Locke, 1979; Foucault, 1982; Conolly, 1983; Bourdieu, 1986; Freire, 1987; Moriss, 1987; Taylor, 1998; Machiavelli, 1952, 1998; Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 1974, 2005a; Haugaard & Clegg, 2009; Haugaard, 2010; 2013; Thompson, 2013; Hearn, 2014, Clegg, 2014).

These diverse definitions have led Casey (1984) to call power a “difficult concept”, Waltz (1986:333) states that it is the most troublesome and controversial concept, whilst March (1966 cited in Casey, 1984:61) mentions that it is a “disappointing concept”. According to Ball (1993:548) it is a “peculiarly problematic concept” and Latour (1984:268) viewed power as an “illusion” and argued for the abandonment of the concept altogether (1984:278).

A number of scholars have characterised power as an “essentially contested concept” (Lukes, 1974:9; Conolly, 1983; Wartenberg, 1990; Evans & Newnham, 1998:446; Lukes 2005a:63; Berenskoetter, 2007:2; Hauggard, 2010:424), to some it is merely a “contested concept” (Clegg, 1968; Zeitoun & Allan, 2008; Cerbaro, 2011; Haugaard & Ryan, 2012). Furthermore, scholars such as Galbraith (1983:2) indicate that the concept of power has such a common-sense meaning that is used too often with seemingly scant need for definition. Follett (1926:9) further asserts that no word is employed more carelessly by people than the word ‘power’. This is in line with Baldwin (1979; 2002) who observes that power as a concept is used often without a clear understanding of its meaning. In concurrence, Wartenberg (1990:12) points out that the

academic discourse on power has been characterised by conflicting assumptions, which impose a challenge on the “the possibility of developing a theory of power”. In the same vein, Zeitoun and Allan (2008:7) are of the view that in the interminable discourse of power, there still is no single accepted structuring of the features of power.

In this regard, Lukes (2005a:61) suggests that “*power* is polysemic: like, say, the words ‘social’ and ‘political’, it has multiple and diverse meanings, appropriate to different settings and concerns”. Diamond (2012:2), points out that the widespread literature about power and its meaning, produced over centuries, attest to the lack of concrete definitions. As a result, the literature on power is extensive and are the central focus of numerous disciplines such as political science, political economy, sociology, law and philosophy (Burgoon & Hale, 1984; Gale, 1996). These extensive and diverse views are examined subsequently to propose an applicable definition of power.

Wrong (1972:2) points out that “there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of more recent definitions of power”, of which a few will be highlighted below. The modern discourse on power can be traced to conceptualisations of Nicollo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. These writings on power are deemed classical and the contrasts between them have contributed to the current theories on power.

2.3.1 Machiavelli: Manipulative dynamics

Machiavelli in *The Prince* (1981) views power as domination and control, which works in subtle ways as the Prince manages his subjects through manipulative strategies of power dynamics (Haugaard & Clegg, 2009:2). In this narrative the Prince states:

“[I]t is well to seem too merciful, humane, sincere, religious, and also to be so, you must have in mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite qualities ... it is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to have all the above mentioned qualities, but it is very necessary to seem to have them ... I would even be bold to say that to possess them and always to observe them is dangerous, but to appear to possess them is useful” (Machiavelli, 1952:93).

Machiavelli seems to suggest that the Prince as a powerful individual within the society exercised power over others through strategic forms of domination, which in certain cases could be displayed without coercion. In this sense, it can be argued that Machiavelli sought to explain how power was acquired, maintained, and expanded in the society. To him the powerful

(Prince) can acquire his power either through detestable violations of societal moral norms, or through more humane forms of influence. In this regard, Machiavelli summarises his view: “[I]n the action of men, and especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the end justifies the means” (Machiavelli, 1952:94). Arguably, according to this philosopher, power can be exercised over others through any means possible, as he emphasises:

“[W]hether it better to be loved more than feared, or feared more than loved? ... I conclude, however, with regard to being feared and loved, that men love at their own free will, but fear at the will of the Prince, that a wise prince must rely on what is in his power and not what is in the power of others, and he must only contrive to avoid incurring hatred ...” (Machiavelli, 1952:91).

For Machiavelli, power is exercised over others and the society through domination by the strong. Machiavelli argues that power is the prospect of actors in a social relationship to realise their own will, irrespective of resistance. Thus, a ruler or the powerful group in society have authority to employ whatever means possible to acquire power.

2.3.2 Hobbes: Mutually agreeable goals

On the other hand, Hobbes (1651; 1948; 1968) aims to explain the nature and operation of power, unlike Machiavelli who was concerned with the means best suitable to acquire, retain, and enhance power. Hobbes (1946:53) asserts that “the power of a man is his present means to obtain some future apparent good”. Power therefore entails the ownership of the means and resources that are needed to attain certain goals. Ball (2014:25) explains that Hobbes perceived power as an individual’s ability to secure a personal advantage in order to achieve desired goals. Hobbes views power as an individual’s disposition or capacity. In this sense, his teleological view of power stresses the potential that individuals are able to achieve goals they set themselves. It can also be argued that Hobbes postulates the causal nature of power, in the sense that one person’s possession of power leads to another’s loss. In this case, power is considered as a zero-sum total.

Based on Hobbes’ approach, relationships of power in the society can be seen mainly for attaining specific goals, as he explains:

“[M]ankind has a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death and the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but because he cannot

assure the power and means to live well, which he has present, without the acquisition of more” (Hobbes, 1946:64).

This is because happiness in a world of endless desires depends largely on one’s power. Hobbes suggests that in a society human beings are in constant struggle over satisfying and preserving life that culminates only at death. Grcic (2007:373) explains that for Hobbes, the desire for power is a basic human drive since power is the necessary means for happiness and attaining what people desire. In the same vein, Lukes (2005a:66) states that for Hobbes the motive for power is to “assure the way of his future desires”. The more power someone possesses, the more the chances for this individual to attain his/her desires. This provides a perspective on the centrality of power in human lives. Hobbes (1946:53) further distinguishes two kinds of power, natural and instrumental.

- *Natural* power is the strength of a healthy body, intelligence and strength.
- *Instrumental* power is acquired by virtue of being born into a particular society and social class, and includes wealth, reputation, friends, political connections and knowledge.

Ball (2014:25) explains the interrelationship: natural power is the means to acquire instrumental power.

Hobbes further theorises that men are all born equal and have the same endless desire for power to satisfy their various needs (Hobbes, 1651:76-77; 1968:183). Therefore, in the natural state where every individual has the right to liberty, the desire for power results in a “condition of war; and such a war as is of every man against every man” (Hobbes, 1651:77; 1946: 82). He proposes that such war or conflicts can be evaded when human beings form a type of central power or government (Grcic, 2007:375). He motivates, “Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice” (1946:83). Thus, there is a need to control the consequences of the multidirectional exercise of power (in the state of nature) by different societal stakeholders. This leads to the formulation of a social contract in which power is entrusted to a sovereign. In effect the sovereign exercises power over the society, as Hobbes stresses, “The Power and Honour of Subjects vanisheth in the presence of the Power Sovereign” (1968:237). Therefore, Hobbes (1968:237-242) touches on the same notion of power equal to domination as viewed by Machiavelli (1952), as well as power centralised to the sovereignty (Haugaard & Clegg, 2009:2). However, Hobbes differs from Machiavelli, in terms of his solution to the power struggle, namely the social contract.

2.3.3 Russel: Intended effects

A further definition of power worth noting, is by Russell (1938:25) who argues that “power is the production of intended effects”. Russell introduces the notion of intention in the conceptualisation of power. To him power should produce certain desired latent outcomes or consequences. This leads Russell (1938) to assert that power works best when it is intentional. Russell (2004:23) views power as the production of intended effects that is quantitative in nature. For example, assuming two people have similar desires, if one achieves all his/her desires plus additional interests, this individual is deemed powerful, compared to the other one who achieves only his/her set desires. This can be explained as follows: A has more power than B, should A achieve several intended effects, and B manages only a few. Russell hereby argues that it is possible to measure power through its effects, and thus be able to know who has more power than the other.

Commenting, on the argument above, Lukes (1986) views power more as the *ability* to produce effects than the *production* of those effects as such. According to Zaaiman (2007:371), Lukes finds it difficult to identify which effects were the results of power processes, and which ones were not. However, Lukes (2005a:76) maintains that his definition delivers two alternative outcomes, the ability to bring about what an individual intends, or may intend hypothetically. Humans’ very actions may induce unintended consequences, but not in every instance do such actions denote the dynamics of power.

On the other hand, it can be argued that power involves responsibility for the outcomes of people’s actions or their intentions. As explained by Ball (1976:249), “When we say that someone has power or is powerful we are ... assigning responsibility to a human agent or agency for bringing (or failing to bring) about certain outcomes that impinge upon the interest of other human beings.” Furthermore, Morriss (2002:39) points out that the connections between power and responsibility are essentially negative. He argues that individuals can show they are not responsible for a given outcome by demonstrating a lack of power. Regarding the present study, a municipal official can claim that he could not prevent the community from burning property, by evidencing that the situation was beyond his control.

In light of the argument above, Lukes argues that holding someone morally responsible (praising or blaming), does not indicate that the person possesses power, since in such scenarios the focus will be on the person’s actions not power. In contrast, Lukes asserts that “the powerful

are the ones we can judge or hold to be responsible for significant outcomes ... to the extent that they fail to address remediable problems” (2005a:66-67). In this regard, Lukes view the powerful as individuals able to make significant decisions in the interest of society, but choose not to do so. Lukes, therefore, understands power as a moral responsibility that is negatively evaluative (Haugaard & Ryan, 2012:10)

2.3.4 Parsons: Collective interests

Power has also been explained as a mechanism operated to bring about changes in the action of other units, whether individually or collectively, during processes of social interaction (Parsons, 1967:299). For his definition of power, Parsons builds on Durkheim’s (1982) view regarding legitimisation of power by representatives. According to Durkheim (1982:51-52), power expresses itself latently when individuals are coerced unconsciously by social facts which are imposed on them. Parsons, therefore, postulates that power works best in situations of collective interest, consensus and authority. In this regard, he defines power as follows:

“The generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organizations when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions-whatever the actual agency of that enforcement” (Parsons, 1967:308).

It can be argued that in this definition Parsons equates power to authority (Brennan, 1997; Lukes, 2005a). For Brennan (1997), this emphasis on authority indicates that for Parsons, power exists only in the political arena. Lukes (1974:30) therefore, argues that “the conceptualization of power which Parsons offers allows him to shift the entire weight of his analysis from power as expressing a relation between individual or group towards seeing power as a system property”.

Furthermore, Parsons’ conceptualisation of power links it to authority, consensus and the pursuit of collective goals, which dissociates power from conflict of interests and in particular, from coercion and force (Lukes, 1974:28; 2005a:31). Parsons’ definition fails to consider the idea that collective mobilisation is difficult in a terrain or context of conflicting interests. In addition, Parsons is an adherent of the system theory or functionalist perspective. Therefore, any resistance to the mobilisation of resources to achieve collective goals, can be curtailed through sanctions. Giddens (1991 cited in Zaaiman, 2007:362) criticises Parsons’

conceptualisation of power. According to Giddens, Parsons sacrificed the understanding that power has no intrinsic relationship to sectional interests, and therefore also does not realise collective interests or goals. Giddens thus critiques Parsons on the notion of the social system functioning as agent of power. Lukes concur by explaining that theorists such as Parsons:

“Focus on the locution ‘power to’, ignoring ‘power over’. Thus power indicates a ‘capacity’, a ‘facility’, an ‘ability’, not a relationship. Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power – the fact that it is exercised *over* people – disappears altogether from view. And along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place – an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition” (Lukes, 1974:30; 2005a:34).

Parsons argues further that power can produce collective results when the ruled have justified confidence in their rulers (Lukes, 1974:31). In this sense, power does produce collective goals that are desirable to the relevant parties to an extent. However, this does not imply that power only occurs in collective consensus, it is also present in conflict. Power has been argued to exist in a situation of legitimatised dominance where resistance is either sanctioned or rewarded.

2.3.5 Weber: Legitimised domination

In light of the notions above, Weber (1968:180) defines power (*Macht*) as, “The chance of a man or a number of man to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.” In a previous definition, he explained power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber, 1947:152). According to Lukes (2005a:26), Weber’s definition highlights the realisation of one’s will, despite the resistance of others. Thus, Weber understands power as involving domination, which is legitimatised. Brennan (1997:73) argues that for Weber,

“the probability of enforcing one’s will over another is dependent on ownerships of different type of resources and the imposition of one’s will over others draws upon resources not available to subordinate actors”.

Following Weber, scholars such as French and Raven (1960:609) have defined power as the potential ability of one group or person to influence another within a given system. Zeitoun and Allen (2008:7) postulate that power is the material capacity of one party to gain the compliance of the other. In this respect, Dahl (1957:202-3) according to his “intuitive idea of

power” indicates that, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would otherwise not do.” Blau builds on this notion and views power as:

“The ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through the deterrence either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, in as much as the former, as well as the latter, constitute, in effect, a negative sanction” (Blau, 1967:117).

Scholars such as Beaver and Cohen (2004) and Fisher and Sonn (2007) suggest that power, in its most simple definition, reflects the ability to act or influence the ability of others either to act or choose a path of inaction. The main idea stemming from the definitions above, is that power involves domination and the ability to suppress or control resistance by mechanisms such as rewards and sanctions. These theorists seemingly also understand power as a disposition over the means to influence other actors within a context of coerced interaction.

2.3.6 Arendt: Capacity of a common will

In contrast, Arendt conceptualises power as the ability to agree upon a common course of action in unconstrained communication (Habermas & McCarthy, 1977:3). Arendt understands power in terms of potential, or a capacity, that is neither external to the subjects, nor at the subject’s disposal. Arendt explains her view:

“Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of the individual: it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say someone is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which power originated to begin with (*potestas in populo*, without a people or group there is no power), disappears, his power also vanishes” (Arendt, 1970:44).

Hereby Arendt emphasises that the fundamental goal of power does not lie in the instrumentalisation or domination of another’s will but in the creation of a common will. She thus dissociates power from the command-obedience relationship and the aspect of domination (Lukes, 2005a:32). According to Arendt, power is a concerted action and is legitimatised through collective agreements. Arendt (1970:51) further views power as the mechanism that provide a group the means to act in terms of the means-to reach a specific end. In this sense, Arendt reduces power to collective consensus through social structures, for example the government, as an alternative means for the realisation of societal goals (Haugaard, 1997:53).

Power as community consensus, therefore, institutionalises the government, where the goal of having power is to produce legitimation. She further indicates that violence is the force utilised as means to an end. In this way, violence is an instrument used to mobilise resources in order to realise collective goals. However, the main thrust of Arendt's work is the emphasis on consensus and collective goals.

Lukes (2005a:33) argues that Arendt and Parsons share the same understanding of power, and seemingly are not referring to 'power over', but 'power to'. In this sense, they fall short of an important criterion of keeping power relevant in a community, which ensures people's compliance by overcoming or avoiding their opposition (Zimmerings, 2005:35). Pitkin (1973:276) on the other hand, concurs with Arendt's suppositions, namely that, "Power is a something-anything which makes or renders somebody able to do, capable of doing something ... *it's a capacity, potential, ability ...*"

2.3.7 Bourdieu: Symbolic subjectification

A different approach to power is from Bourdieu. According to Swartz (1997:6), Bourdieu views power not as a separate study domain, but an aspect standing "at the heart of all social life". For Bourdieu, the idea is that power is ubiquitous and ever-present, and cannot be reduced to a single structure or entity. Bourdieu (1990; 1991) sought to explain the non-coercive, indirect or covert mechanisms that society employs to produce order and social restraint (Jenkins, 1992:104). For him domination and control in the society are manifested only through symbolic power, as he explains:

"In previous ages people refused to recognise it even where it was staring them in the face, without turning power into a 'circle whose centre is everywhere and nowhere', we have to be able to discover it in places where it is least visible, where it is most completely unrecognized" (Bourdieu, 1991:163).

Bourdieu suggests that, throughout, power has been exercised over the people in terms of symbolic forms that are more indirect and invisible to most people. He terms it subjectification of the society due to the covert operation of "symbolic power", which he explains as "a power of constructing reality and one which tends to establish ... the immediate meaning of the world" (Bourdieu, 1991:166). In this regard, Bourdieu (1987:13) adds that symbolic power is a "world making power", which imposes the "legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions". This leads to the definition of symbolic power as the "invisible power which can be exercised

only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu, 1991:164).

Regarding this invisible symbolic power, Bourdieu contends that its operations are influenced largely by the dynamics occurring within an individual’s habitus, capital and field. These terms are explicated below.

Habitus: The “partly taking in of rules values and dispositions, which are the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations which produces practices” (Bourdieu, 1977:78; 1990:53). This simply implies societal values and beliefs that individuals have internalised throughout the socialisation process. Habitus enables individuals to classify and stratify each other in society (Bourdieu, 1984:56).

Field: this entails “a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Wacquant & Bourdieu, 1992:97). It is the setting in which the habitus operates, and includes the rules, behaviours and practices associated with a given position (Wacquant, 2013:3). Fields create an objective imposition of prescribed practices and actions in the distribution of power, which cause people to accept being subjects. In this regard, fields form structures for the distribution of various types of capital in the society.

Capital: According to Bourdieu (1990; 1984), in a society there are several types of fields (e.g. politics, religion, literature, cultural, legal, housing policy, intellectual, higher education), which also can be termed “structures of struggle of resource control and ownership of capital” (Bourdieu, 1993:72; 1989:375). In these fields, actors struggle over the ownership and acquisition of the most powerful forms of capital and positions.

Bourdieu identifies various forms of capital, namely economic, social, cultural and symbolic. One form of capital can be used as a means to acquire another form of capital. Webb *et al.* (2002:23) argues that the amount of power an individual possesses depends on that person’s position within the field, and the amount of capital he/she possesses. Bourdieu (1992:229-230), however, points out that power struggles in the field focus more on the ownership and control of economic and cultural capital. Power dynamics in the society through Bourdieu’s lens, are marked by struggles about resources and accumulated capital, as individuals seek to acquire the most powerful and important forms of capital. Those with the most power will own capital and be able to influence the weaker agents.

Evidently, for Bourdieu, power is an element that can be possessed, accumulated or lost in the struggle of capital accumulation. He stresses that “agents possess power in proportion to their symbolic capital ... in proportion to the recognition they receive from the group” (1991: 164). As a result, individuals with low capital or extremely little of each type, of are less determined to change their social position, and thus appear more content with what they have. Bourdieu adds that people’s acceptance of social positions characterised by subordination leads to a reproduction of symbolic domination (Webb *et al.*, 2002:23). Symbolic systems, thereby, promote domination of one class over another where symbolic violence is employed to enforce ideologies of control and superiority amongst groups in the society (Bourdieu, 1991:167).

Through this design, Bourdieu also explains how class conflicts are shaped by exercising symbolic power. He argues that the different societal classes are engaged constantly in a symbolic struggle, as one interest group seeks to impose its own ideology on the other group. He explains, “The ideological stances adopted by the dominant are strategies of reproduction which tend to reinforce both within and outside the class the belief in the legitimacy of the dominant of that class” (Bourdieu, 1992:167). In this regard, the subjectification of the least powerful in the society is achieved through ideological mechanisms, which operate through modes of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1992:167). The employment of such violence promotes the realisation of the interests and class motives of the dominant groups in a particular society (Bourdieu, 1991:169).

From the above, it is clear that Bourdieu views power from a structural perspective, according to which structures and social systems function as vehicles for the exercise of power by a few individuals in the society (Calhoun *et al.*, 2002:276). Thus, symbolic power is “a structured and structuring medium tending to impose an apprehension of the established order as natural” (Bourdieu 1991:169). In short Bourdieu views power as an individual or structural capacity that operates cunningly to the extent that the weak or subordinated arbitrarily accept their position in society. Such power is legitimised using symbolic violence. Thus, for Bourdieu, power is an instrument or tool for domination.

2.3.8 Foucault: Securing total compliance

Foucault, is another theorist who investigated the notion of power and explains the mechanisms to secure compliance (Lukes, 2005a:88). He also aims to understand how societal structures determine individual’s actions. Foucault focuses on the microphysics of power, as he explains:

“In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary forms of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980:39).

Foucault reflects on the various forms and ways of domination and subordination that exist in the society. In explaining how social structures form power, Foucault argues that power is not the innate property of an individual. It is rather gained from a set of forces that influence people’s discourse and behaviour, and from which people acquire their social position (Danaher *et al.*, 2000). According to Lukes (2005a:89), Foucault concerns himself with the structural relationships, institutions, strategies and techniques. He views power as either productive or repressive. In *Discipline and punish* Foucault writes:

“Do not concentrate the study of the punitive mechanism on their repressive effects alone, on their punishment aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects, even if these seem marginal at first sight. As a consequence, regard punishment as a complex social function” (Foucault, 1978:23).

As is the case with Bourdieu, Foucault believes that power pervades social life and is not limited to the sphere of formal politics or open conflict (Garland, 1990 cited in Lukes 2005a:88). Therefore, for Foucault power exists anywhere in the society. Since power is fluid it is not exclusive to a certain privileged few, but instead expressed and enacted rather than possessed (Foucault, 1980). Foucault wants to understand how power is exercised rather than how it should be defined. Commenting on this notion, Cousins and Hussain (1984:227) indicate that Foucault avoided the question, “What is power?” since to him, this question is secondary to the question, “How is power exercised?” Central to his studies is the issue of how power is exercised and its effects on others, in this regard, the subjects (Foucault, 1982:217).

Foucault further maintains that power is tolerable only on the condition that it masks a substantial part of itself and its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms (Foucault, 1976:86). In this regard, Foucault focuses mostly on institutions such as prisons, the military, schools, hospitals and factories since these promoted the exercising of power by the dominant. He criticises these institutions as “a veritable technological take-off in the productivity of power” (Foucault, 1980:119).

As mentioned previously, for Foucault, power is exercised not possessed (Foucault, 1977:26). Or, stating it differently, possession is exercised through surveillance mechanisms which,

according to Foucault (1980:86), indicate that power is a total limit to social freedom. To him, therefore, surveillance plays a major role in the functions of power structures. Foucault (1980) contends that power exists and persists only through a system of practices which, after colonising all social spaces, exert a constant surveillance on the totality of individual lives. In this regard, surveillance is a mechanism employed in a hierarchical manner and seeks to regulate people (Foucault, 1979).

According to Foucault (1979:183), disciplinary power has the following functions: it compares, differentiates, homogenises, excludes and normalises. He seems to argue that the effects of disciplinary power contribute to conformity, or what Lukes (2005a) terms “willing compliance”. Furthermore, Foucault views power as positive and productive not only repressive, as he explains:

“If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really think one could be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force, that says no, but that it traverses and produces things; it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (Foucault, 1980:119).

Lukes (2005a:98) critiques Foucault regarding his notion of productive power through the social construction of subjects, that renders the governed governable as irrational. Nonetheless, Foucault can be appraised for his contribution on how power is exercised.

2.3.9 Zaaïman: Possibility of change

Other scholars have viewed power through different lenses. According to Buchanan and Badham (1999:52), power implies the potential to act. For Emerson (1999:354), power is the potential to influence others’ action.

In this regard, Zaaïman (2007:374) proposes a model for power. This entails the ability, in view of the possibility of change, to influence actions and opinions of individuals, thereby causing effects in affairs and people. This definition thus presupposes that power can only be possible within situations of change. The change should impact the actions and opinions of individuals. This means that individuals have the freedom to interpret (or not) the influence which also impacts their reaction. This leads Zaaïman (2007:374) to conclude that “power is an ability to

affect affairs and people, mediated by the process of influence and reaction, and it reflects, the reciprocal relations between power and its influence”.

In light of the discussion above, there clearly are various definitions and conceptualisation of power. The present study has indicated and explicated that power is an essentially contested concept with diverse meanings and interpretation in various contexts to different theorists.

The concept of power, therefore, has multiple connotations and different interpretations. An understanding of these diverse conceptualisations informs research in studies focusing on the notion of power. From this broad background, the present study seeks to add to the on-going discourse on power. This is done in particular by appraising/reinterpreting Lukes’ perspectives on power as basis for an analytical framework. Consequently, the following section will explore the various forms of power to broaden the discussion on the conceptualisation of power.

2.4 Mechanisms and forms of power

Firstly, the section explores the mechanisms utilised to secure or explain how power evolves. This is followed by an overview of the various forms of power.

One of the earliest explanations of how power evolves, derives from the reflection of Spinoza (1958:273,275) who explained:

“One man has another in his power when he holds him in bonds; when he has disarmed him and deprived him of the means of self-defence; when he has inspired him with fear; or when he has bound him so closely by a service that he would rather please his benefactor than himself, and rather be guided by his benefactor’s judgment than by his own. The man who has another in his power in the first or second way holds his body only, not his mind; whereas he who controls another in the third or fourth way has made the mind as well as the body of the other subject to his right; but only while the fear or hope remains. Once the one or the other has been removed, the second man is left in possession of his own right” (Spinoza cited in Diamond, 2012:2).

Spinoza’s view is that power can be expressed in both bodily and mental bonds. To Spinoza therefore, securing power means depriving individuals of physical resources, which make them powerless. This also instils fear of victimisation or physical control. Spinoza indicates further that the powerful secure domination by ensuring that their subjects are confined to a context

that makes them to rely solely on those in power. Lukes (2005a:87) indicates that these two dimensions denote power secured through force.

The third and fourth way, according to Spinoza, involves controlling the mind of the subject. Dahl (1968) in turn argues that power is exercised through the ability to influence decisions on key issues. In this regard, Dahl views the observable controlling decision-making as a mechanism for exerting power. Conversely, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) indicate that power operates well and is noticeable in situations of non-decision-making or agenda manipulation in which actors confine decisions to safe issues only. The powerful ones exercise power by controlling the communication channels, with the result that the policy-making processes are restricted to issues of interests that reinforce the influence and status of the dominant section.

From a different angle, scholars such as Weber view power as established through securing and possessing resources that others do not possess. On the other hand, Blau (1967:117) postulates that the powerful impose their will by withholding rewards and applying sanctions or give punishments to those who resist. This denotes rewarding or offering sanctions as mechanisms of securing power. In the study of social dynamics there are four main forms in which power can be exerted. These forms, according to Wrong (1979), are:

- **Force:** the creation of physical obstacles that restrict the freedom of another, the infliction of bodily pain or injury including the destruction of life itself, and the frustration of basic biological needs which must be satisfied if the capacity for voluntary choice and action is to remain unimpeded (Wrong, 1979:24).
- **Manipulation:** an act of negotiation that involves a measure of distortion, deception or exploitation – which may be intentional (wilful) or unintentional.
- **Persuasion:** argumentation coercing the respondent to accept the opinion of the controller (Sager, 1994:72).
- **Authority:** the institutional code within which the use of power as medium is organised and legitimised. Authority stands to power essentially as property, as an institution does to finances (Parsons, 1963:24).

Gaventa (2006) in *Power Cube* indicates that there are three forms of power, namely visible, hidden and invisible.

Visible power: denotes observable decision-making, or strategies that entail the ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘what’ of policy-making. This form of power is defined by statutes, legislation or policy

(Gaventa, 2006). Gaventa (2006:28) explains visible power as an “embodiment of ‘power over’, viewed as legitimate authority, usually exercised by bureaucracy, people presumed to have expertise, and political representatives inhabiting various structures of governance”. It is, therefore, a legitimised form of power, which is common in bureaucratic channels.

Hidden power: relates to Wrong’s (1979) idea of manipulation, or to the perspective of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) of power as agenda setting. Gaventa (2006) argues that hidden power involves certain powerful individuals and institutions that maintain their influence by controlling who makes decisions and what are included on the agenda.

Invisible power: is described as the most “insidious form of power as it shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation” (Gaventa, 2006:29). In this regard, this invisible form of power could be equated to Lukes (2006) third dimension of power. This dimension involves the powerful employment of mechanisms to secure dominance. This is done by creating a false consciousness amongst their subjects and making them internalise the dominant actors’ agenda, thereby securing power without conflict.

In addition, Lukes (2005) proposes a typology by concentrating on several arenas of power. He views power as *potentia* (Latin concept derived from Spinoza), and indicates that power involves the ability to exist and act. Table 2.1 below presents Lukes’ proposed conceptual map of power.

Table 2.1: Lukes’ conceptual map of power

Issue scope	Contextual range	Intentionality	Activity
Single-issue	Context-bound	Intended consequences	Active exercise
Multi-issue	Context-transcending	Unintended consequences	Inactive enjoyment

Adopted from Lukes (2005a:79)

According to Lukes (2005a:74), power can be viewed from an “issue-scope” point. In this regard, he argues that power refers to “the range of issues” that someone controls or effects by determining an outcome. From this view, power can involve a single or multiple issues. In other words, power can be restricted by affecting the outcome of a single policy, or power can be exerted over a wide scope of issues.

Lukes (2005a:75) further indicates that power can also be ranging according to contexts, which can be subdivided into incidents that are bound to the context, or transcending it. In this regard, power can also be seen as operating under given circumstances or within specific environments. Context-bound means a party is able to achieve certain outcomes in a specific place and time, whilst context-transcending denotes the ability to achieve goals across various contexts (Lukes, 2005a:75). As explained previously (section 2.3), power can manifest intentionally or unintentionally.

Intentional: power produces anticipated outcomes or goals (Lukes, 2005a; 2005b). This also connects with Russell (1938:25), who conceptualises power as the production of intended effects, and Weber's (1978:926) definition focusing on the intention or will of the powerful. The power of the powerful implies that they intentionally draw the actions of others towards given results.

This typology also reflects the following models: Bourdieu (1991) on symbolic power; Lukes' (1974; 2005a) third dimension of power; Gramsci's (1971) idea of cultural hegemony; Marx and Engels (1967) on false consciousness; Foucault's (1980) productive power; and Freire's (1985) culture of silence.

Unintentional: Lukes (2005a:76) suggests that this occurs in instances when the powerful evoke or induce differential behaviours in others which they did not intend to.

An investigation of power further reveals a compendium of approaches and models regarding this phenomenon. Lukes (2005a:77; 2005b:479) proposes that power can be active or inactive: either performing actions, or power as an exercise, or simply deciding not to act. The latter response is considered as a form or act of power since it has attributable consequences to others by making activities unnecessary (Lukes, 2005a).

Furthermore, Scott (1990:28-9) "indicates that power is mostly visible in acts of deference, subordination and ingratiation. Hence he defines power as not having to act or, more precisely, the capacity to be casually negligent of any single performance". According to Haugaard and Ryan (2012:13), power can be either episodic or dispositional: entailing an exercise, or the innate capabilities of actors. In international relations, power can also manifest in hard or soft forms (Nye, 2011; Haugaard & Ryan, 2012). In this regard, *soft* power considers friendship and sociability as important techniques to attract people, whereas *hard* power is manifested through modes of domination.

From the discussion above, it is clear that power can be viewed through different lenses. To conclude, Lukes (2005a) points out: when ensuring or securing power, the powerful shape the perceptions, cognitions and preferences of their subjects to the extent that the dominated ones acquiesce in their domination. These mentioned motives are elaborated and explained in Section 2.5, which will focus on Lukes' three dimensions of power.

The current section investigated and discussed the forms and mechanism of power, by indicating that power can be achieved through various forms, ranging from force, manipulation, persuasion, rewards, decision-making, agenda setting and creating a false consciousness. The discussion highlighted the mechanisms that the powerful use to secure and maintain dominance. The following section focuses on the three distinct groups according to which discussions on power can be classified, for a clear understanding on the development of power as a concept.

2.5 Discourses on 'power over', 'power to' and 'power with'

The scholarly debate on power usually has been grouped into two contrasting schools of thought, namely 'power to' and 'power over' (Locke, 1690; Plato, 1960; Pitkin, 1972; Lukes, 1974; 2005; Wartenberg, 1990; Morris, 1987; 2006; Clegg & Haugaard, 2009; Göhler, 2009; Read, 2011; Haugaard, 2010; 2012; Haugaard & Ryan, 2012; Pansardi, 2012; Pearce, 2012). According to Pansardi (2012:73), an extensive review of contemporary literature on power shows that there is no single approach to the term, rather a grouping of power discourses in two directions, generally labelled as 'power to' and 'power over'. This is in line with Haugaard's (2012:33) explanation that the discourse of power is dominated by two contrasting views, namely power as domination (i.e. 'power over') and power as empowerment (i.e. 'power to'). Karlberg (2005:2) points out that in the latter half of the 20th century, debates centred on two distinguishable ways to conceptualise and explain power. In this regard, Wartenberg explains:

“The expressions *power-to* and *power-over* are a shorthand way of making a distinction between two fundamentally different ordinary-language locutions within which the term “power” occurs. Depending upon which locution one takes as the basis of one’s theory of power, one will arrive at a very different model of the role of power in the social world” (Wartenberg, 1990:27).

Pansard (2012:73) argues further that the distinction between the two usages shows scholars' expressions in the continuing discourse over the nature of power. In the debate, scholars

distinguish conceptualisation of power based on ability from a relational view of power. Göhler (2009:23) notes that the two distinctions ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ are the core dimensions that have helped scholars form a coherent understanding of power despite its complex nature.

2.5.1 Power over

This is viewed as a social relationship in which an actor affects or influences the action of the other (Weber, 1947; 1968; 1978; Spinoza, 1958; Dahl, 1957; 1961; Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 1974; 2005; Wrong, 1979; Oppenheim, 1981; Giddens, 1984; Clegg, 2000; Stoppino, 2007). According to Göhler (2009:29), “Power over covers all concepts of power which relate to power as prevailing over others.” The ‘power-over’ discourse can be traced to scholars such as Spinoza who argued that a person is subject to the power of the other for as long as that individual remains subject to the other’s power.

This view is espoused by theorists such as Weber (1978) who understands power as the wilful imposition of one’s will and interests over another regardless of the actions or resistance from the other actor. Dahl (1957: 202-203) elaborates by typifying power as a relationship in which, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Therefore, this indicates power as domination in which A exercises his power over B to the extent that B reacts or produces the desired behaviour that A wants. This formula summarises the school of thought that views power as domination.

Commenting on the mentioned view, Kalberg (2005) asserts that Western political and social scientists have focused throughout on issues where power equates to dominance, noticeably in forms of social conflict, control, and coercion. Kalberg (2005) further suggests that the paradigm of power as domination can be traced to the writings of prominent scholars such as Weber (1947; 1986); Dahl (1957); Bachrach and Baratz (1970); Machiavelli (1961); Hobbes (1968); Marx and Engels (1967); Bourdieu (1994); and Lukes (1974; 2005). Giddens (1984:256-257, cited in Kalberg, 2005:3) asserts that this conflictual model of thinking about power underlies virtually all major traditions of Western social and political theory, from the left and the right.

2.5.2 Power to

Other theorists such as Locke (1690), Plato (1960), Pitkin (1972), Hobbes (1998) and Morriss (2002) conceptualised power as a disposition, with its the main focus the abilities of

individuals, rather than the consequences of their actions on others. In this regard, Plato's (Morrow, 1960:46) approach implies that "anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however a small degree by the most insignificant agent, though it be once". Locke (1690:8) connects to this approach explaining that power can be viewed as a reflection of the ability to effect or undergo any change.

Giddens (1991:257) concurs by emphasising that power is a capacity to achieve outcomes. Thus, Giddens also viewed power "as the ability of an agent with ability to make a difference in the present state of affairs" (Zaaiman, 2007:359). It can be inferred that Giddens (1991) and Morriss (1987; 2002) presuppose that the most applicable conceptualisation of power should explain it in terms of abilities to affect change in others. Morriss (2002:32) who also endorses the notion of 'power to', argues that power has to be explicated in terms of what gives people the power 'to do', rather than 'over whom' they have power. In his earlier reflection of 'power to', Morriss (1987:xiii) remarks, "It is now also probably the dominant view that power is best thought of as a capacity or disposition of some sort, and that 'power-to' is more basic than 'power-over'". This concurs with Pitkin's (1973) position that power should be understood as an ability or capacity to do something or to achieve an end. Individuals can exercise 'power to' regardless of being subjectified or experiencing asymmetric power relationships.

Nevertheless, Pearce (2012:4) points out that domination remains the most commonly used form of power. Wartenberg (1990:17) cautions against such statements and argues that scholars should understand and accept that the debate on the forms, 'power over' and 'power to', "may be talking of different aspects of social reality". Wartenberg (1990:27) posits that despite their lexical similarity, the two phrases do not refer to the same concept. Accordingly, Dowding (1991:48) suggests that the two phrases express two distinct definitions of power. Thus, Dowding (1991) identifies 'power to' as outcome-power, whereas 'power over' connects to social power. Thus, 'power to' implies outcome-power as it brings about outcomes; 'power over' reflects a social relationship amongst two different people. This indicates that both 'power to', and 'power over', entails the realisation of outcomes. However, Dowding (1991:4) specifies that 'power to' is the most basic interpretation of power, with social power as a subset of 'power to'.

Therefore, in following Morriss (2009:55), Dowding asserts that 'power to' is the main conceptualisation and explanation of power. The reason is that an exercise of 'power over'

indicates 'power to' on the part of the agent. Furthermore, an agent can dominate another one only to the extent that he/she has 'power to' exercise that 'power over' another. In the same vein, Isaac (1987:5, 15), critiques Lukes (1974) by indicating that the conception of "'power over' (...) is parasitic upon a 'power to' conception", meaning that "the power one agent exercises over another agent in interaction is parasitic upon the powers to act which the agents possess".

Seemingly, 'power over' is the main paradigm that has been utilised to explain and conceptualise power (as will be evident from section 2.5: *Lukes: three dimensions of power*). Thus, the paradigm of 'power over' or as domination, has structured the theoretical landscape of major theorists such as Dahl, (1969:80) who conceptualised power as a relationship of dominance. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) elaborated by positing that 'power over' others can also be noted in more subtle instances of bias within socio-economic and political praxis. To Bachrach and Baratz (1970:70) true power is controlling the agenda, or agenda setting, by creating or reinforcing barriers against considering other people's opinions when making decisions. However, Lukes (1974:23) discarded both views of Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz as too simplistic (as will be indicated in the following sections). For Lukes, 'power over' could also be exercised by coercing the subjects to accept the ideas of the powerful, or fail to recognise their own interests, which amounts to accepting those of the powerful.

Kalrberg (2005:3) makes the point that although Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes each did present a different perspective of power, notably all their definitions and explanations were still confined to the domination paradigm. This line of thought was also followed by Foucault (1980) who even specified how the powerful manage to secure compliance from their subjects.

In recent times, the dominance paradigm of power has been challenged by feminists, who have argued for a re-conceptualisation and a shift of the power debate's focus away from male-centred perspectives. It can be argued that Karlberg (2005:5) pre-empted this approach, by pointing out that the domination paradigm has been argued to serve as a subtler structure of male privilege. Thus, although feminist scholars have diverse perspectives on power, the majority have challenged the structuring of power relationships to disadvantage mostly women.

2.5.3 Power with

In light of the views above, Dowding (2011:527) points out that since the 1990's the discourse on power has seen an increasing usage of the locution 'power with', mostly amongst feminist

and social activists. ‘Power with’ has been the underlying theme of prominent scholars such as Arendt (1969), Follet (1942), Miller (1976, 1983), and Hartstock (1983). According to Follet (1942:101-106), one has to distinguish coercive from coercive power, or what is widely known as *power* and *power with*. The reason for the latter label is that in certain instances power is exercised in concert by a group. This corresponds to Arendt’s (1969:44) argument that power relates to the “human ability not just to act but to act in concert”. She argues that an exclusive focus on power as domination means turning a blind eye to social reality, seeing that human affairs occur in collective associations. Therefore, power can also be exercised with others in a group or collective.

Dowding (2011) further indicates that ‘power with’ is a form of power that focuses on people’s collective actions. Townsend *et al.* (1999), therefore, defines ‘power with’ as emerging from the collaboration within the group. In this regard, Dowding (2011) views power as empowerment. Acting in collaboration can be seen as an effort to further the interests of every group member, hence individual empowerment. Even though empowerment aims to give power to the powerless, ‘power with’ entails a group of people who resist and overturn a situation of domination (Dowding, 2011:528). This is done to ensure that power is concentrated widely amongst a group or community.

The discussions above have shown that the present study’s point of departure was the paradigm of power as domination, after which the main forms of power was discussed briefly. The discussions centred on the following aspects: the conditions under which agents can have the capacity to act in order to achieve goals, the underlying dynamics for the exercise of power, and the way goals can be achieved. Furthermore, the various distinctions of power were investigated. In accordance with the research’s focus, the discussion dealt with the nature and conditions in which power can be exercised over others, and can function outcome-based and empowering. The discussion thus elucidated how the discourse on power has changed over time.

In light of these changes, the present study examines the dimensions of ‘power over’, ‘power to’, and ‘power with’ in the contemporary discourse. This includes an assessment of the design of Lukes (1974, 2005) as adherent of the ‘power over’ school of thought. These mentioned dimensions provide a foundation to ground the present study. The research investigated how power is exercised in Khutsong – whether the stakeholders’ interactions in the housing project

reflect the dimensions of 'power over', 'power to' or 'power with', and how this relationship has affected the outcome of the project.

As indicated previously, the present study takes Lukes theory as a theoretical point of departure. Thus, the following section considers Lukes' three dimensions of power.

2.6 Lukes: Three dimensions of power

Steven Lukes in his seminal work *Power: A radical view*, (1974 and a 2nd ed. in 2005) proposes a three-dimensional approach to the power debate. He elaborates on this motive and explains how power is exercised by moving beyond the pluralist notions of Dahl (1957:202-203) who linked power to the causal, rational and behavioural aspects in decision-making, as well as the elitist design of Bachrach and Baratz (1970:8) regarding the political process of non-decisions or decisions. Zimmerling (2005:34) points out that Lukes' contribution to the field of power is twofold since he not only adds his own proposal to the existing ones, but also provides excellent summaries of the different conceptions developed by those preceding him. Therefore, Lukes (1974; 2005) acknowledges Dahl's view (1957; 1961) on the exercising of power, which can be seen when people are engaged in decision-making. Lukes also affirms the proposition of Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970), namely that power can be noted and understood to occur within arenas or situations where certain issues are removed from the agenda or where there is non-decision-making.

Lukes (1974; 2005a) advances his theory by introducing a third dimension, which at the same time critiques the behaviourist focus of the first two approaches. In this regard, Lukes (1974:24; 2005a:28) explains that the three dimensions of power "allows for consideration of the many ways in which *potential issues* are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions'." Elaborating on this point, Lukes (2005a:37) defines power as an asymmetric relationship in which "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests."

In his publication *Power: A radical view* (hereafter abbreviated as *PRV*), Lukes presents the three different conceptualisations according to which power is exercised as domination. This work, written in 1974, was a concise, precise version, whereas the 2005 edition expands on the theme, and includes two new chapters, aimed at clarifying certain contested issues which he had addressed in his previous book. The crucial point he dealt with in the second edition is how the powerful secure compliance from those they dominate, in such a way that they prevent

conflict in the first place (Lukes, 2005a:27). For a full understanding of Lukes' contribution to the debate on power, the following sections will argue and discuss each of the mentioned dimensions of power.

2.6.1 One-dimensional view

The first dimension can be traced to the pluralist perspectives of power (as will be shown in the following chapter). These perspectives have been influenced by the works of theorists such as Dahl (1957; 1961; 1963; 1968) and Polsby (1960; 1963; 1980). These exponents argued that power in American political processes was distributed more pluralistically and not concentrated in the hands of limited group of elites (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950). The one-dimensional perspective focuses "on behaviour in the making of decisions over key or important issues as involving actual, observable conflict" (Lukes 1974:13; 2005:17).

This dimension of power is operationalised through empirical observation of actors in decision-making. Polsby (1960:476; 1963:113) explains that from a methodological orientation "... an attempt is made to study specific outcomes, in order to determine who actually prevails in community decision-making". This scholar adds (1963:121) that from a pluralist perspective the researcher "should study actual behaviour from documents, informants, newspapers and other appropriate sources". The first dimension of power emphasises the observable actions of actors in policy-making contexts. It can therefore be argued that for the pluralist, the main issue is observable behaviour in decision-making and the actual visible exercise of power which results in intended empirical effects.

In terms of the pluralist approach, Dahl (1957:202-204) views power as "a successful attempt by A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do". Polsby (1963:3-4) further indicates that for the pluralists, power refers to "the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events". Thus, for Polsby, the study of conflicts is "the best way to determine which individuals and groups have 'more' power in social life, because direct conflict between actors presents a situation most closely approximating an experimental test of their capacities to affect outcomes" (1963:4).

It can thus be argued that in the first dimension, the methodological understanding and measurement of power rests solely on the produced effects (responses). Hence, to these scholars the powerful are the ones who prevail in key decisions over conflicting preferential issues (Dahl, 1961; Gaventa, 2006; Berenksoeter, 2007). Dahl (1958:466) concurs and explains

that “power can only be identified through careful examination of a series of concrete decisions” on key issues. In this regard, Mumby (2001:588) points out that Dahl’s focus is on the exercise of asymmetrical power that manifests in decision-making. In this sense, it is evident that, for Dahl (1957:202-203), power is relational and is exercised in decision-making through various parties of interest.

Dahl conducted a study in New Haven, which was known mostly as the “decisional method” (as will be discussed in more detail below). This study launched his argument that the power in the political processes is exercised by a broad group of actors. They specialise in influencing the outcome of distinct decisions or outcomes of major issues on major issues on the best development options. According to Dahl (1961:102), the decisional approach was the best strategy to identify the influential groups in the community political process. Power in the first dimension was operationalised by determining the following:

“[F]or each decision which participants had initiated alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives initiated by others, or had proposed alternatives that were turned down. These actions were then tabulated as individual ‘successes’ or ‘defeats’. The participants with the greatest proportion of successes out of the total number of successes were then considered to be influential” (Dahl 1961:336).

From the exposition above, it is clear that Dahl based his conceptualisation of power on the premises of observable actions in decision-making. In this regard, Shemer and Schmid (2007:126) consider the main question as, “Who governs?” This is about who causes others to act according to his/her will, controls decisions over central issues, or who activates political resources such as votes, positions, and negotiations. Dahl investigated US senators in the decision-making process. He found that because they prevail, their observable behaviour in the political policy arena with its overt conflicts truly depicts their possession of power over other social actors. Furthermore, Dahl (1961:102) argues that in the political processes of New Haven, power is distributed pluralistically as certain interest groups and citizens exert different levels of influence over the outcome of the local policy processes. In this context, Dahl viewed power as distributed equally across society and exercised without constraints in a community with infinite interests.

In Lukes’ (2005a:19-18) assessment he points out that Dahl’s model views interests expressed as preferences and revealed in political participation and, as such, providing a test of an actor’s capacity to impact outcomes. This is in line with Caine and Krogman (2010) who maintain that

decision making in democratic and pluralistic arenas is open to all. This means the choice or decision to decline participation is akin to agreeing. Furthermore, the overt conflicts in the praxis of local development signifies power.

The pluralist perspectives also posits that the powerful maintain their power by successfully mobilising resources in decision-making. In such a case, mobilisation and ownership of resources become a powerful tool in the political arena. Dahl (1957:203) suggests that this exercising of power might take the form of a threat to exploit resources. These resources reflect visible and notable aspects such as authority, charisma, influence due to official position, knowledge, rewards or political influence (Dahl, 1957; Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008; Cully & Angelique, 2011). Dahl (1961:226) defines ‘resource’ as anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of other individuals. An example would be how the powerful employ authority to affect the behaviours of those whom they dominate (Dahl, 1957).

It should, however, be emphasised that the one-dimensional perspective centres on visible conflict in decision-making through a strong focus on the observable decision-making process. As indicated previously, the emphasis is on conflict that emerges in the political arena when decisions are made. This approach also posits that society is equal and presupposes an environment where actors are free to mobilise their interests within the public debate (Gaventa, 2006). Accordingly, Gaventa (2006) argues that when one seeks to challenge power in the first dimension, the focus should be on visible forms of power in public arenas, and the political praxis. This entails advocacy approaches such as public debates, informed research, and concerted efforts to influence public representatives.

However, the pluralist approach has been refuted on various grounds, some of which will be discussed further in the following chapter. For instance, Lukes (1974; 2005) rejects the single dimension since it over-concentrates on behaviour. Morriss (1972) refutes the approach on the basis that it concentrates on aspects of power in which one actor successfully imposes his/her will over that of the others. In his criticism, Morriss argues that in equating the above-mentioned action with power, researchers overlook other explanations of this phenomenon. Zimmerling (2005:36) concurs and indicates that a one-dimensional view should be rejected since it excludes other situations and explanations that would fit within the ‘power-as-ability’ definition, hence limiting Dahl’s conception of power.

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) challenge the one-dimensional approach for being silent on “what does not happen” in decision-making settings; namely, those issues that are unwittingly neglected or purposely excluded from the agenda. The reason is that power can be exercised through non-issues and by evading decision-making as well. Lukes (1974; 2005) explains: to ask who is responsible for decision-making is a clue to identifying where the power lies. However, limiting the study of power only to decisions, would ignore the more hidden aspects of power as exerted in social relationships.

In conclusion, Lukes (1986:2) stipulates that the one-dimensional view of power is “relevant in the sense that, if it is actualized, it provides the test by which one can measure relative power, where parties conflict over an issue”. On the other hand, Zimmerling (2005:36) remarks that the recognition of certain shortcomings led to the extension of the two-dimensional view, which besides the one just presented, also takes into account a ‘second dimension’. This shifts the focus to the second dimension of power, which reflects the elitist perspective.

2.6.2 Two-dimensional view

The issue of power being related to observable conflicts in decision-making led scholars such as to argue against the one-dimensional approach by querying:

“How can one be certain in any given situation that the ‘unmeasurable elements’ are inconsequential, are not of decisive importance? Cast in slightly different terms, can a sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that power is totally embodied and fully reflected in ‘concrete decisions’ or in activity bearing directly upon their making?” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962:948.)

It can be argued that Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970) have refuted the two-dimensional approach on two main points of concern. Firstly, it does not allow for the fact that power may be exercised by confining political decision-making to issues that are of little or no relevance to the holder(s) of power. Secondly, the one-dimension or first dimension of power does not provide an indication of the key issues or areas of interest in decision-making (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970). To these scholars the second dimension of power is noticeable in instances where other actors are excluded from decision-making or their ideas are taken out of the agenda. Freedman (2014:321) elaborates on this second dimension by pointing out that it takes the exercise of power to more critically subtle ways. This includes the ability of actors to influence what is discussed or ignored in policy airing. Therefore, the analysis of power focuses

on determining how the political processes manifest a form of blocking power. Bachrach and Baratz elucidates:

“The other side of the coin is non-decision-making. When the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination, effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions, it can be said that a non-decision-making situation exists. This phenomenon is clearly distinguishable from the negative aspects of decision-making (deciding not to act or deciding not to decide), since the mere existence of the ‘mobilization of bias’ [...] is sufficient to prevent a latent issue from becoming a question for decision” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963: 641).

2.6.2.1 Non-decision-making

According to Lukes (2005:20), the central point raised here is that power reflects the “extent to which a person or group consciously or unconsciously creates or reinforces barriers to the airing of policy conflicts”. This motive is confirmed by Zimmerling (2005:3) mentioning that Bachrach and Baratz establish that agents may be affected negatively in the pursuit of their interests about certain issues. This takes place not only by unfavourable policy-decisions, but also by being prevented totally from demanding the discussion of an issue (and a subsequent decision taken on it). In this context, power also implies non-decision-making. Therefore, Lukes (2005:22) indicates that non-decision is a form of decision that results in the suppression of alternative issues in order to limit the decision-making to safe issues.

For Bachrach and Baratz (1963:632), acts of non-decision are promoted by manipulating structural bias – the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures – in favour of the powerful and by restricting the dominated ones. Power in its second dimension can be exercised in political arenas when:

“A devotes his energies in creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional structures that limit the scope of the political process to public considerations of issues that are comparatively innocuous to A ... To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes from bringing to the fore any issues that might be in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A set of preferences” (Bacharach & Bratz, 1962:948; Lukes, 1974:49).

As was explained above, this second dimension of power is exercised by confining the decision-making process to safe issues. As a consequence, power becomes a mechanism to

oust opponents from the decision-making process (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; 1963; 1970). Accordingly, Dasuki and Abbott (2015:6) indicate that non-decision-making in a political process follows two paths, namely “mobilisation of bias” and “organisation out”. Schattschneider (1960) suggests that bias is mobilised by affirming that all forms of political organisation favour the exploitation of certain types of conflict, and the suppression of others. In this regard, organisation implies the mobilisation of bias. Schattschneider (1960:71) elaborates by stating that “organization [itself] is the mobilization of bias”, in the sense that certain types of conflict are accepted and explored (i.e., “organized into politics”) while others are not accepted as valid and therefore suppressed (i.e., “organized out”). Barry (1991) also gives preference to the two-dimensional view of power by indicating that its superiority over the one-dimensional perspective lies in discerning that the ability to control the agenda is observable power.

2.6.2.2 Elitist position

Furthermore, this perspective proposes that power is in the hands of a few people or a minority who make policies and decide on behalf of the general public. This minority group is referred to as the elites, hence, the two-dimensional view typically is referred to as the elitist approach to power. This approach presupposes conflict of interests, B’s compliance to A, and the use of observable threats in securing power. Lukes (2005:21) concurs and adds that power in the second dimension is conceived of as all forms of successful control of A over B. Commenting on this motive, Bachrach & Baratz (1963) find that control is secured through coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation.

Based on these findings, Bachrach and Baratz (1963:636) deduce that coercion, influence and authority are all forms of control, which catapult the exercise of power as domination. This means force and manipulation are forms of control which the powerful elites exert over their subjects, thus constraining the latter’s choices. Bachrach and Baratz (1963:640) see manipulation occurring when the dominated ones conform without or with no full awareness of doing so. This is elaborated by Lukes (2005a:21-22) by defining the following concepts:

- **Coercion** involves a threat of sanctions.
- **Influence** is the ability to change B’s course of action without the use of a threat.
- **Authority** is B’s recognition of A’s control as legitimate.
- **Force** is to secure compliance by removing choice.

2.6.2.3 Structural bias

Regarding domination by manipulation, Bachrach and Baratz (1962:918) argue that the powerful may engage in structural biases in order to exclude and/or limit the scope of political process to safe issues. This implies bias embedded in the values, myths, established political procedures and rules surrounding the political activity. Structural barriers can include complex procedures or information that may limit participation in decision-making, either by over-complicating the process, or reducing the information needed by other agents to participate (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008). According to Culley and Angelique (2011), structural bias may occur when meetings marginalise other participants due to inconvenient meeting times or purposely failing to inform them of meeting venues. Furthermore, Cully and Hughey (2008) points out that failing to read the minutes from previous meetings or the agenda, causes members to be uninformed of the discussion, hence they are unable to contribute during the meeting.

2.6.2.4 Crucial criticisms

The two-dimensional perspective of Bachrach and Baratz has been criticised widely through different scholarly lenses. Wolfinger (1971) and Scott (1994) have rejected the notion of a second dimension on the premise that it is difficult to identify non-decisions. As a result, this perspective posits power as an unobservable concept, which makes it a ‘useless property’ in empirical studies.

Furthermore, the two-dimensional view of power was proposed to overcome the behaviouristic and individualistic shortfalls of the prior one-dimensional approach. Unfortunately, the approach seemingly still links its explanations to those of Dahl and the pluralists (Lukes, 2005a:25-28). Lukes reflects this critique in his summary of this second power dimension:

“So I conclude that the two-dimensional view of power involves a *qualified critique* of the *behavioural focus* of the first view (I say qualified because it is still assumed that non-decision-making is a form of decision-making) and it allows for consideration of the ways in which *decisions* are prevented from being taken on *potential issues* over which there is an observable *conflict* of (subjective) *interests*, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances” (Lukes, 2005a:24-25).

Lukes (2005a:40) argues further that the two-dimensional approach of power neglects the complex and subtle ways in which political, industrial or educational structures keep agents’

minds away from issues, and thereby influences inactivity. The criticism of Dowding (2011:45) is that the design of Bachrach and Baratz excludes or does fails to explain the formation of interests in political processes. Even though Bachrach and Baratz do consider preference formation as important to include, to them the emphasis is supposed to be on examining the struggles engaging agents in the exercise of power (1970).

As was explained, the second dimension implies the exercise and capture of power by elites. Athreya and Chaturvedi (2006) rejects this approach citing that in political processes small interest groups are also able to capture power through lobbying. Bernhagen (2002:9) critiqued the notion of a second power dimension since it fails to explain purposive and unintentional non-decisions. This is in line with Strange's (1988) prior query whether agenda setting was a conscious activity, and if not, why the lack of reference to un-intentional power (cited in Berenksoetter, 2007:11). In this regard, the two-dimensional approach fails to provide a clear analytical distinction between the purposive exercise of power in agenda setting and its exercise unconsciously.

Lukes (2005) attempts to bridge the above-mentioned gap by critically considering the insidious and elusive operation of power that shapes political processes and forms the actors. After exposing the shortcoming of both the pluralist and elitist perspectives to power, Lukes proposes a third or radical dimension to the debate on power. The aim is to provide a better explanation and answer to the classical query, "How do the powerful elite secure their subjects compliance to domination?" (Lukes, 2005a:111.) He found the answer in positing a third dimension of power.

The following subsection concentrates on Lukes' (1974; 2005a) added third dimension of power and offer a critique and evaluation of this theory. Furthermore, Lukes' three-dimensional view of power are applied to the analysis of power dynamics in housing provision systems, leading to the following chapter (ch 4) that focuses on housing.

2.6.3 Three-dimensional view of power

Lukes' theoretical elaboration of the concept of power focuses on how the powerful actors shape their subjects' interests and preferences to the extent that the latter will accept being dominated. He summarises this third dimension as follows:

“Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? [...] is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things [...]?” (Lukes, 1974:28; 2005a:23-24.)

Thus, Lukes’ third view of power involves shaping the perceptions, cognitions and preferences of subjects or actors in such a way that the latter accept their roles in the prevailing social systems. According to Caine and Krugman (2010), Lukes’ notion of the third dimension implies the influence of collective forces and social arrangements over the preferences, cognitions and perceptions of agents. In their assessment, Vromen *et al.* (2009) find that Lukes’ third face of power is largely invisible and shapes preferences and individual values through ideological hegemonic stratagems to secure compliance. As a result, actors fail to recognise their interests, seeing that a false consciousness is created, which let them accept being dominated.

The main thrust of Lukes’ radical thesis is that individuals are aware of their subjective interests. The powerful ones, therefore, use mechanisms to influence and manipulate their subjects. Therefore, power in the third dimension is exerted in the most insidious ways in getting subjects accepting their dominion, thereby preventing conflicts over interests. Lukes elaborates on and explains his approach:

“In summary, the three-dimensional view of power involves a thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus of the first two views as too individualistic and allows for the consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions. This, moreover, can occur in the absence of actual, observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted – though there remains here an implicit reference to potential conflict. This potential, however, may never in fact be actualised. What one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” (Lukes, 2005a:28).

According to Zimmerling (2005:41), Lukes’ conception of power does not differ from those proposing the previous dimensions. He has still followed the ‘power-over’ discourse, but added the issue of interest by focusing on the difference between subjective and objective interests.

Furthermore, it is evident from his conception of power, that he accepts conflict as part of the power relationship, but in silenced or suppressed form. This takes place through the shaping of cognitions, preferences and perceptions of dominated individuals, thus creating consent that can be coupled with the following forms: false consciousness (Marx & Engels, 1967), cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1971), ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 1971), undiscussables (Argyris, 1975), quiescence (Gaventa, 1980), culture of silence (Freire, 1985), and discourses of normality and disciplinary power (Foucault, 1988). In this sense, Lukes' theory and explanation overlaps with those of earlier philosophers and scholars on the exercise of power and its effects.

Lukes explains that, in the third dimension, conflict is present, however, latently since the powerful have managed to suppress it. Nevertheless, the latent conflict can become manifest in instances when the dominated ones realise that their interests have not been met because the dominators had subjugated them into acquiescence. When the dominated, therefore, realise their real interests, it will force them to change their policy preferences, which may result in visible conflict. In this way, the third dimension of power proposes that power is not about keeping issues out of the agenda, but rather away from the cognitions (minds) of the dominated. In this regard, Lukes follows Marx and Engels who postulate:

“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it” (Marx & Engels, 1970:64).

This notion features throughout the work of Gaventa and Cornwall (2008) as well as that of Foucault (1980), who all posit that in the third dimension, power is exercised by controlling knowledge through social institutions such as the media and education. These institutions allow the dissemination of assumed truths, myths and symbolic imagery, which can legitimise certain behaviours, preferences or issues as normal or unchangeable (Cully & Angelique, 2011). The idea is that the cognitive preferences of the dominated are manipulated to the extent that these actors have a constructed view of good or bad by shaping political beliefs and ideologies as well (Lukes, 2005a; Gaventa, 2006; Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008; Berenksoeter, 2007; Zeitou & Allan, 2008). On this point Lukes explains that the naturalisation of domination or the power to mislead is enhanced by the following power strategies:

“Blocking or impairing its subjects’ capacity to reason well, not least by instilling misleading or illusory ideas of what is ‘natural’ and what sort of life their distinctive ‘nature’ dictates, and, in general, by stunting or blunting their capacity for rational judgement. Power can induce or encourage failures of rationality ... straightforward censorship and disinformation to the various forms of institutionalized and personal ways there are of infantilizing judgment, and the promotion and sustenance of all kinds of failures of rationality and illusory thinking, among them the ‘naturalization’ of what could be otherwise and the misrecognition of the sources of desire and belief” (Lukes, 2005:115, 149).

The third dimension of power is ideological also incorporates the mechanism of the powerful ones that (un)consciously shape their interests and cognitions to the dominated ones’ wilful, non-violent acceptance of power. Lukes adds that this entails the ideological hegemony of the powerful, which are secured through the media, education and socialisation. As a result, the disadvantaged ones internalise the false or subjective interests, and consent to being dominated. In this sense, the third dimension of power involves keeping issues out of the minds of the dominated and promoting wilful compliance.

Lukes (1974) has contributed widely to the understanding of the powerful ones’ strategy to secure (un)willing compliance over those they dominate. Nevertheless, his work has been subjected to criticisms, which he sought to address through his second edition. Lukes (2005: 64) acknowledges that in the first edition of *Power: A radical view (PRV)* he provided a partial and one-sided account. He rectifies this deficiency in the second edition by clarifying a few issues.

Firstly, the conceptualisation of power offered in the first *PRV* was limited, and he had committed an “exercise fallacy” (Lukes, 2005a:109), in other words, he had concentrated on the notion that power exists by being exercised. On the other hand, in his second edition Lukes (2005a:109) reaches the understanding that power is “an ability or capacity, which may or may not even be exercised”. This is in line with the definitions by Clegg (1975) and Isaac (1987) that power can be viewed as a property (disposition) ability, or capacity (*puissance*) to effect change, as it derives from the Latin term *potere* (being able).

Secondly, according to Clegg (1989) and Ribeiro (2003), in the first edition Lukes excludes instances of ‘power to’. However, it can be argued that this definition suggests that power involves the production of effects that may either be good or bad. This highlights the second

limitation to Lukes' (1974) conceptualisation of power which seemingly he has followed in his second edition by concentrating on power as domination.

Thirdly, Lukes (2005a) concedes that the concentration only on the negative aspect of power indicated another limitation in his first edition. In this regard, Lukes (2005:64) argues that he had dealt "with asymmetric power (the power of some *over* others) and, moreover, with only a sub-type of this, namely, the securing of compliance to domination". Thereby Lukes (1974) concentrated on power as a zero-sum, which implies a relationship where instances of one person having power automatically results in the other being deprived of or lacking any power. In contrast, Lukes in the second edition (2005a:84) accepted that "domination may sometimes favour, or at least not disfavour, the interests of those who are subject to it", resulting in a positive-sum location of power.

In this regard, Lukes follows the works of Wartenberg (1990 cited in Lukes, 2005a:84), for instance on the paternalism in legislature which requires the wearing of seat belts. In this case, A, seeking to avert harm yet simultaneously promoting a benefit to B, will have to act against B's preferences and wants. This also follows Foucault's (1977; 1980) assertion that power as domination is also a productive force. Lukes (2005a:109), therefore, accepts that it is possible "to be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests; power over others can be productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity". Clegg *et al.* endorses this notion by asserting:

"The positive uses of power make things happen that wouldn't otherwise have happened, not by stopping some things from occurring, but by bringing new things into creation, involving less force and more listening, working with, rather than against, others" (Clegg *et al.*, 2005:184).

Power if harnessed properly, can yield not only domineering or negative results, but also positive beneficial outcomes that are in favour of all the actors. In this regard, power should be viewed as transformative and positive though it can also involve instances of dominance.

A further limitation or area that needed clarity in Lukes' first edition, was understanding or explaining who has or possess the power. The main theories on power addressed in the three dimensional views of power all did indicate power as located amongst a few or a select group of agents. In this context, the relationship has been explained in terms of: As having power and the Bs lacking power. However, in his second edition, Lukes (2005:64) discards these notions

by indicating that in the 1974 edition he had treated “binary relations between actors who are assumed to have unitary interests”. He concedes that such assumptions should be relaxed and more concentration placed on multiple actors with various divergent interests.

Despite the corrections mentioned above, Lukes still considers the uni-directional view of power (Clegg, 1987), where power is viewed as concentrated in the hands of the ruling class only. As shall be elaborated later, Hayward (Hayward & Lukes, 2008:6, 12) critiques Lukes’ view of power as being agent-centred and lacking focus on the role of social structures in affecting power dynamics. Lukes, however (Hayward & Lukes, 2008:120) emphasised that he narrowed his framework as an intrinsic criticism of the powerful who often blame the system to escape their own responsibility.

Furthermore, Lukes (2005) aims to clarify the epistemological issues coupled with identifying power in terms of his three-dimensional views. This is in answer to Lukes’ (1974) own recognition of possible difficulties in identifying power based on his three-dimensional view. However, even though Lukes (1974) experiences challenges in operationalising his theoretical approach, he argues that his radical view still offer the most appropriate understanding of power’s manifestation and how to study the phenomenon of power.

Operationalising the three dimensions of power

The first dimension of power can be operationalised by concentrating on the observable power mechanisms active in decision-making as the mobilisation of resources. The present study focused on objective, visible behaviour and concrete decisions made on actual issues. Regarding the first dimension of power, the study focused on decisions that are made and decided upon as policy preferences by actors participating in political policy issues. The focus was on the examination of key decisions made in the praxis of housing policy and establishing who the actors were that influenced such decisions. In this way the powerful are the ones who influenced key decisions in the project.

The second dimension of power can thus be operationalised by examining the power mechanism inherent in non-decisions. These are intentional actions, which are covert in nature, but also noticeable in expressed policy preferences which encompasses sub-political grievances on key issues. In this case the analysis of power will, therefore, interpret actors who influenced non-decisions to be influential in agenda mobilisation as a form of power exercise

The analysis of the third dimension of power would be the most challenging since, according to this design, power is exercised consciously or unconsciously as inaction or action by actors. This challenge can be overcome by focusing on locating the responsible party, or establishing responsibility for the exercise of power (Lukes, 2005a: 53-59). In this respect, the issue is whether it can be inferred that the powerful ones were aware of the consequences of their actions or inactions. The research on the third dimension of power therefore focuses on evaluations of expressed policy preferences and ‘real interests’. The emphasis being on how interests in political arenas review the latent or manifest conflict. In the current study the analysis of the third dimension of power concentration on examining the differential interpretations and (in) actions of the key role players in the project and how these influenced the outcome of the project.

It is worth noting that Lukes (2005a) does provide an explanation of how the powerful ones secure willing or unwilling compliance from their subjects. In this regard, it can be argued that Lukes’ model synthesises the power discourses that was started by such prominent theorists as Plato (1960) and Locke (1690). The following tables (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) provide a simplified outline of the three dimensions of power as proposed by Lukes (1974; 2005).

Table 2.2: Distinctive features of the three dimensions of power

Dimensions of power	Focus on
First dimension of power	Behaviour
	Decision-making
	Key (issues)
	Observable (overt) conflict
	(Subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences revealed by political participation
Second dimension of power (qualified critique on behavioural focus)	Decision-making and non-decision-making
	Issues and potential issues
	Observable (overt and covert) conflict
	(Subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences
Three-dimensional view (critique on behavioural focus)	Decision-making and control over political agenda (not necessarily through decision)
	Issues and potential issues
	Observable (overt and covert), and latent conflict
	Subjective and real interests

Source: Adapted from Lukes (1974: 25).

In summary, Lukes (2005:111) postulates that the first face of power in his conceptualisation represents the pluralist visible mobilisation of resources in decision-making. His second face of power demonstrates how the political elites exclude others and control issues on the agenda. The third face entails the shaping of preferences, perceptions and cognitions of the least powerful in order for the latter to wilfully accept their domination and quiescence Haugaard and Ryan (2012:23) point out that Lukes wanted to explain how power is exercised in a manner that makes domination non-coercive and acceptable to other actors in political dynamics. In this regard, Table 2.3 below summarises the exercise, epistemological foci, and conceptualisation of power in Lukes' three-dimensional model.

Table 2.3: Outline of the three dimensions of power

	One-dimensional view	Two-dimensional view	Three-dimensional view
Proponents	Dahl, Polsby, classic pluralists	Bachrach and Baratz, neo-elitists	Lukes, Marxists, neo-Marxists and radical elitists/pluralists
Conception of power	Power as decision making	Power as decision making and agenda setting	Power as decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping
Focus of analysis	The formal political arena	The formal political arena and the informal process surrounding it (the 'corridors of power')	Civil society more generally, especially the public sphere (in which preferences are shaped)
Methodological approach	Counting of votes and decisions in decision-making arena	Ethnography of the 'corridors of power' to elucidate the informal processes through which the agenda is set	Ideology critique – to demonstrate how actors come to misperceive their own material interests
Nature of power	Visible, transparent and easily measured	Both invisible and visible (visible only to agenda setters), but can be rendered visible by gaining inside information	Largely invisible – power distorts perceptions and shapes preferences; it must be demystified

Source: Hay (2002:180)

Having considered the three faces of power and how these are exercised, the following section gives a general critique of Lukes' *PRV*. This will include an evaluation of his work amidst the criticism of other scholars.

2.7 An evaluation of the three dimensions of power

The three-dimensional perspective has been criticised widely by scholars. These criticisms highlight the theoretical limitations that need to be addressed when applying the three dimensions of power to explain power dynamics in the praxis of societal policy. Therefore, first Lukes' *PRV* will be critiqued to assess its shortfalls, after which the discussion endorsed Lukes' approach as the useful theory for understanding local level power relationships in development policy context.

2.7.1 Methodological issues

Several scholars have criticised the operational applicability of Lukes approach. For example, Shapiro (2006:146) remarked, "Lukes' third dimension of power defies the possibility of scientific evaluation on the grounds that it depends on unobservable real interests." In this respect, Shapiro is questioning the possibility of observing and measuring covert issues (non-decisions, hidden agendas, and latent conflict). It has also been argued that the approach focuses on 'interests', which in their own right are difficult to measure among individuals since people have different interests. Furthermore, critics have questioned whether it is possible to identify an individual or group's 'real interests'. In response, Lukes (2005a:146, 148) explains:

"the very idea of power's third dimension requires an external standpoint ... difficulties associated with identifying real interests become less serious if one simply takes what count as 'real interests' to be a function of one's explanatory purpose, framework, and methods, which have in turn to be justified. There is no reason to believe that there exists a canonical set of such interests that will constitute 'the last word on the matter' – that will resolve moral conflicts and set the seal on proffered explanations, confirming them as true" (Lukes, 2005a:146, 148).

Lukes clarifies and lessens the methodological burden amongst scholars and researchers alike, avoiding a fruitless debate on how to examine real interests. In addition, Lukes (2005a:50) proposes another, simpler method of operationalising real interests. This entails the examination of how individuals react to perceived opportunities which help them escape subjectification. Despite this insight and further studies on the three-dimensional perspective, Shapiro advocates on-going empirical research to test the limits or relevance of Lukes'

approach. On the other hand, Hoy (1981) indicates that the problem of identifying ‘real interest’ can be addressed by searching for instances where the marginalised people react to oppression, upheaval and to perceived opportunities. The aim would be to disclose dominant power dynamics commonly present in typical patterns of power interactions. Furthermore, several studies have had success in empirically testing the usefulness of the Lukesian thesis on power. Such studies include Gaventa’s (1980) research of acquiescence amongst the oppressed poor Appalachian Valley miners who struggled against the ruling elites who used different mechanisms to shape the perceptions and cognitions of the miners to wilfully embrace subjectification.

On the other hand, Hay (2002) also dismisses Lukes’ explanation of the possibility to investigate interests. Hay queries, “Who is to know what (an agent’s) interests are if he is capable of misperceiving them?” (2002:179). Lukes errs in his argument that researchers would be able to find or observe real or objective interests of the powerless, who in Lukes’ terms would experience a false consciousness or would have been indoctrinated and pacified by the dominant ones. Hay points out that finding objective interests depends on perceptions, which leads to highly subjective and problematic epistemologically. In the same vein, Shapiro (2006:147) queries the mere possibility to debate or have a scholarly discussion about *false* consciousness when it is not established what the *true* consciousness of an individual entails. This impossibility, he argues, deprives researchers of a reference point when studying issues about real interests and of exercising the third dimension of power.

Hay (2002:183) summarises the problem: Lukes does not clearly distinguish *analysis* from *critique* when discussing power. Consequently, from a Lukesian perspective, “power is not so much an analytical category as a critical category whose identification is reliant upon an irredeemably normative judgement” (Hay, 2002:183). In this respect, Heyward (2007:49) reports that critics of Lukes recommend that the conceptualisation of interests should be justified by empirical studies before scholars can infer or critique individuals’ real interests.

2.7.2 Structure and agency

Lukes’ *PRV* has also been criticised for being agent-oriented, with insufficient focus on the effects of structures on the conceptualisation of power relationships (Clegg, 1989; Hay, 2002; Hayward, 2000; Shapiro, 2005; Hayward and Lukes 2008; Dowding, 2011; Haugaard & Ryan, 2012). In this regard, Hay (2002:84) argues that the problematic nature of *PRV* stems from

Lukes' failure to reject and replace the actor-oriented conceptualisation of power. Previously, Clegg (1989) remarked that in *PRV's* 1974 edition, Lukes does not dialectically incorporate agency and structures as modes of exercising power. As a result, structure was pushed to the background as Lukes concentrated on the asymmetrical power relationship between actors, which merely typifies his agent-centred conceptualisation of power. Subsequently, Shapiro (2005:150) points out that in Lukes' *PRV*, in the index to *Power*, there is "no mention of institutions or institutional design". Shapiro adds that Lukes did incorporate the effects of structures and institutional designs on the exercise of power, which limited his discourse on power dynamics. In this regard, Dowding (2011:394) asserts that Lukes still grapples with the agency-structure issues in his conceptualisation of power.

This has also been the subject of Clarissa Hayward's debate with Lukes in the work *Nobody to shoot? Power structure, and agency*. In this debate, Lukes seemingly maintains that the exercise or effect of power can only be evaluated if there is someone to hold responsible (Haugaard and Ryan, 2012:24). Conversely, Hayward argues that in most cases power (domination) can be reproduced without the overt influence of responsible individuals. She affirms that domination is also reproduced through "the routine reproduction of social structures which create intersubjective understandings and meanings which are central to the reproduction of relations of domination" (Hayward & Lukes 2008:14). Structures constrain and define people's actions and preferences (Giddens, 1984). Hence, social structures, expectations and meanings are predicates of structures and agency (Hayward & Lukes, 2008:10). Hayward therefore controverts Lukes' agent-centric view of power and argues for the incorporation of the political evaluation of structures since they impact on power relationships.

2.7.3 Power and responsibility (paranoid fallacy)

Lukes (2005a:66 citing Ball, 1976) indicates that the powerful are those who can be held responsible for bringing about (or not) outcomes that impact others' interests. This also indicates the moral context within which social scientists ought to debate issues about power. However, as mentioned previously (Section 2.1), Morriss (2002: 128-129) identifies three different 'contexts' for which scholars may need concepts of power. These are the practical, moral and evaluative contexts. Lukes is concerned with understanding power from the evaluative and moral contexts. Morris (2006:128) is of the view that Lukes does not separate the two contexts but joins them, which creates an analytical problem. The moral context, as

explicated in Morris (2002:38-40), is concerned with blaming individuals in power dynamics, whilst the evaluative context focuses on assessing social structures and institutions. Morriss (2006) in *Power: A philosophical analysis* argues that the relationship between power and responsibility only becomes visible within the moral context. Morris (2006:129) thus refutes Lukes on his use of the moral responsibility and notes that *PRV* was positioned more within the evaluative context.

In this regard, Morris (2006:129) accuses Lukes of having committed the ‘paranoid fallacy’, by equating powerlessness with being dominated. Lukes responds that the assumption of Morriss is correct, namely that in societies people are mostly rendered powerless through the machinations of others. However, Morriss (2006) and Dowding (1991) still rejects Lukes’ view, as it appears that he did not grasp the conceptual distinction between being powerless and dominated. Lukes err by not considering those in the societies who are powerless yet never have been dominated. Hence Lukes’ criteria to demarcate or evaluate powerlessness or power relationships in societies is found wanting. Morriss (2002:41-42) remarks that since Lukes seeks to offer a radical approach to power, he is supposed to have radically critiqued (evaluate) society and not apportion blame or appraise individuals. Morriss (2006:130) cites the example of Marxism that perceives capitalism as a social evil, but never held or blamed any individual as responsible for capitalism. In contrast, Lukes (2005a: 68) maintains that people are always kept powerless by the conscious or unconscious choices and actions of others. Lukes further argues that the powerful are the ones who contribute to powerlessness and who are in a position to remedy conditions of domination.

2.7.4 Power: Essential contestedness

Lukes asserts that in *PRV*, his conceptualisation and definition of power is essentially contested. Dowding (2006:137-138) refutes this claim, and points out that being open to judgement and dispute does not make any account of power essentially contested. Dowding (2006:143) reasons that scholars may have different views, explanations and understandings of power, which makes it a contested concept but not *essentially* contested. According to Gallie (1955:169) and Ball (1993:553), a concept is ‘essentially contested’ if its meaning and criteria for application evoke considerable disputes and disagreements amongst its various users.

In terms of the exposition above, essential contentedness, therefore, implies situations where the meaning and criteria of application of a term are continually open to dispute and

disagreement (Zimmerling, 2005:18). Dowding (2006) points out that Lukes' equating power with dominance makes his conceptualisation contested, albeit not essentially contested. Power as dominance as advocated in Lukes' *PRV*, evokes several scholarly debates, but that does not imply that it is an essentially contested concept. In this regard, Dowding (2006) corrects Lukes by critically advancing the discussion into the philosophical narratives of 'contested' and 'essentially contested', thereby indicating that the Lukesian view of power is contested.

2.7.5 Exercise fallacy

Furthermore, *PRV* has been discredited by Morriss (1987; 2002; 2006; Bentley & Murphy, 2006; Dowding, 2008; Kaminsky, 2015) for its one-sided focus on the asymmetric exercise of power or 'power over'. This is indicated by the relationship of domination, which presupposes that A exercise power over actor B as A intentionally seeks to further his/her interests by domineering B. In this case, Morris (1987; 2002; 2006) accuses Lukes of an exercise fallacy. According to Lukes (2005a:109) and Morris (2006:131), the exercise fallacy implies overlooking the notion that power is a dispositional concept, namely a capacity or ability which may or may never be exercised.

Regarding the mentioned fallacy, Morris (2006:131) refutes Lukes for over-concentrating on one subset of the power field which is 'power over', and not to consider power as a capacity to effect changes. In the same vein, Dowding (2008) remarks that Lukes' exercise fallacy was because he equated the concept of power with domination. *PRV* by Lukes (1974; 2005) does not view power as productive or in terms of a positive-sum relation but more from a zero-sum stance. In this regard, Morriss (1987; 2006) questions Lukes about instances where power can be productive and implies a positive sum. In addition, Bentley and Murphy (2006:294) refute *PRV*'s approach for concentrating on binary, asymmetric power relations, rather than those that involves multiple players and are intertwined.

Morriss (2006:131) points out that Lukes, in his second edition of *PRV* (Lukes, 2005a:69-70), does concede to committing an exercise fallacy, and accepts that power is a concept of disposition ('power to'). This fact is reiterated by Haugaard and Ryan (2012:26-27) who argue that the missing facet in *PRV* is 'power to', which is a necessary condition for promoting agency within the power relation. As argued by Morris (2009), to conceptualise power as 'power to', is one of the primary conditions of freedom. Nevertheless, as noted by Morris (2006), and Haugaard and Ryan (2012), in *PRV*'s second edition, Lukes merely admits his flaw

but does not rectify his original thesis. In addition, Haugaard (2010:2-3) following the works of Amy Allen, argues that the ‘power over’ thesis by Lukes can also be seen as not only equating power to domination but also inextricably linked to the exercising of ‘power with’ (acting in concert) and ‘power to’ (capacity for action).

2.7.6 Overlooking resistance by the powerless

In another sense, Lukes’ *PRV* can be discredited (as indicated previously) for overlooking the contexts and mechanisms in which power can shift from being uni-directional (asymmetric) to multi-directional and positive-sum. Merely a few years after Lukes’ seminal work, Scott (1985) published *Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance*. In this publication he illustrated that the exercise of power by the dominant can be met by counter-hegemonic stratagems of the weak. Scott (1990) notes that the disadvantaged, or powerless ones, engage in forms of informal everyday resistance through a range of durable and partly coordinated schemes. His case study of the Malayan peasantry revealed that the peasants as a powerless group chose to evade tax payments as a way to challenge those in power.

On the same topic, Clegg (1989) and Ewick and Silbey (2002) indicate that the exercise of power is not only asymmetric but is also dialectic and allows for counter actions amongst actors. In this regard, Ewick and Silbey (2002) suggest that the arenas of politics or policy practice may allow or promote bargaining and resistance amongst actors. Furthermore, Bell and Stevenson (2006:20, 21) reject Lukes’ approach in *PRV*, due to its hierarchal conceptualisation of the exercise of power. They argue that Lukes’ view fails to factor in how policy processes can be influenced by voices from below.

2.7.7 False and true interests

Several scholars have refuted *PRV* due to Lukes’ unrealistic operationalising and conceptualising of individuals’ ‘real interests’ (Bradshaw, 1976; Benton, 1981; Clegg, 1989; Kernohan, 1989; Zimmerling, 2005). The issue of interests is central to Lukes’ conceptualisation of the three-dimensional exercise of power. Regarding the first and second faces of power, Lukes focuses mostly on subjective interests, whilst in the third dimension he concentrates on objective and real interests. As advanced in the previous criticism, Lukes’ notion of real interests raises several epistemological and ontological issues. Shortly after publishing his first edition of *PRV*, he was refuted for promoting a subjectivism since he assigned to researchers the privileged position of determining the ‘real interests’ of the

powerless (Bradshaw, 1976; Brenton, 1981; Clegg 1989). This deficiency has been explained more in terms of the methodological or epistemological limitations of *PRV*.

Berenskoetter (2007:12) points out that *PRV* has been subjected to criticism since Lukes' assertions do not indicate how the powerful or dominant engage or go about shaping the interests of the powerless. Bradshaw (1976) explains further that Lukes' perspective requires the assumption of 'real interests', however, as has been argued previously, the major issue is how to determine people's true interests, and whether helping people overcome false consciousness can be presumed an exercise of power in itself. This sentiment is shared by Shapiro (2006:150) who questions Lukes for not identifying the methods or mechanisms that can be used to reduce and expose the exercise of the third dimension of power.

These are pertinent questions. It is difficult from Lukes' exposition (2005a) to understand clearly how the powerless develop a true consciousness of their interests; Lukes is also vague on ways this false consciousness is revealed. Therefore, Haugaard (2012:46) raised the question, "By what criteria do we claim to possess true consciousness?" Correspondingly, Shapiro (2006:150) views it as unfortunate that *PRV* gives no indication of whether the power to recognise these interests sprouts from an emancipatory class, or from other parties. Furthermore, Shapiro refutes *PRV* for not paying attention to institutional arrangements as vehicles for the transformative exercise of power, according to which the powerless can realise their own interests. Nevertheless, on the issue of interests, Lukes should be commended for contributing an important aspect to the debate on the concept of power (Zimmerling, 2005:43).

2.7.8 Narrowed focus

From the criticisms above, it can be inferred that Lukes' approach in *PRV* has a narrow focus. Morris (2006:132) suggests that Lukes has concentrated on a sub-set of power, namely 'power over' and thereby examined its other subset (domination). This is because Lukes (2005a:109) is not interested in defining 'power' as a concept, but rather explains how power secures compliance to domination. This signifies the limitation and narrowness of his focus in *PRV*. Morris (2006:134), therefore, indicates that *PRV* does not discuss power fully as his view over-concentrates on domination, hence overlooking power as a capacity and ignoring other forms of power.

However, Lukes justifies his usage of 'power over' by maintaining that writings of historians and earlier philosophers commonly have viewed power from a domination perspective. On the

other hand, Hindess (2006:116, 119) points out that Lukes overlooks “other important configurations of power” such as the informal network systems, as well as public and private partnerships, which influence the attainment and realisation of interests in modern societies. Lukes (2006:164) admits whilst defensively citing Whitehead (1933:54), “Each mode of consideration is a sort of searchlight elucidating some of the facts and retreating the remainder into an omitted background.” Thus, Lukes’ justification for narrowing his focus in *PRV* is that it helped him focus on the main questions about power that he sought to address.

2.7.9 Endorsing the Lukesian approach to power

As was indicated above, Lukes’ approach to power has been criticised by several scholars such as Shapiro (2006), Hindess (2006), Heyward (2007), Morris (2006), Dowding (2006), and Haugaard (2012). Nevertheless, the approach seems much more plausible to employ in studies of power. In this regard, Plaw states:

“The appropriate standard for assessing the continued salience of Lukes’ three dimensional model of power should not be whether it offers a perfect method for illuminating the insidious operations of third-dimensional power. A more sensible standard is whether these power effects do indeed exist and whether anyone else has offered a more compelling approach to tracing them [...And,] while there remains extensive controversy among scholars regarding how best to identify and analyse third-dimensional power, Lukes’ revised approach is plausible, and in some respects more promising, than its competitors” (Plaw, 2007:498-500).

Irrespective of scholarly views with ultra-critical stances to Lukes’ *PRV*, most importantly, *PRV* has proven its worth in explaining and conceptualising power. While, power can still be perceived as an essentially contested concept (Lukes, 1974:9; 2005a:63; Evans & Newnham, 1998:446; Berenskoetter, 2007:2; Hauggard, 2010:424), Lukes’ theoretical conceptualisation remains a meaningful approach and useful way to viewing power. His approach has been widely appraised and applied across different disciplines such as sociology (Gaventa, 1980; 2006; Bentley & Murphy, 2006; Scott, 2007; Schema & Schmid, 2007, Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008; Murray, 2009), education (Bell & Stevenson, 2008), political science (Robinson, 2006; Vromen *et al.*, 2009; Nye, 2011; Rye, 2012), health (Kaminsky, 2015), environmental management (Brey, 2007; Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Aitken, 2008; Zeitoun & Allan, 2008; Theesfield, 2011), management (Ribeiro, 2003; Caine & Krogman, 2010; Rodriguez *et al.*, 2007; Donovan, 2014), information technology (Athreye & Chatuvedi, 2006), communication (Freedman), psychology (Cully & Angelique, 2011; Cully & Hughey, 2008). These and

numerous other studies conducted in unique contexts have highlighted the usefulness and applicability of the Lukesian approach to explain how power is exercised in different socio-economic and political processes.

Surprisingly, even scholars who have questioned aspects of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of power in *PRV*, have also in certain instances endorsed Lukes' view and agreed that the third dimension of power exists. Lukes himself (2006:166) reveals that his main critics have agreed and accepted that this third dimension is possible. Hayward (2006:156) states that Lukes' design in *PRV* is noticeable through the "gentle suppression of conflict by shaping people's wants and desires, their beliefs and perceptions". This also contributes to the motive that people wilfully consent to being dominated. Hindess (2006:118) concedes that power indeed may occur in contexts of covert conflict. From his side, Dowding (2006:137) notes that the third face can lead to both 'thick' and 'thin' forms of acquiescence, and can be defended by pointing to the intentional stance. Although Shapiro and Morris have refuted *PRV* on several angles, they also appreciate it for revealing the mechanisms and ways in which power occurs (Lukes, 2006:166).

Lukes' approach simplifies the conceptualisation and presentation of power (Keminsky, 2015: 27). This is a major attribute to be applied in a wide range of disciplines and contexts. The three dimensions as posited by Lukes provide an explanatory lens for discussions regarding the exercise of power in the political process. The reason is that Lukes' view offers different conceptualisations of power and gives a broad explanation of how power can be exercised. This also widens the discourse on power. Lukes' approach goes beyond the orthodox understanding of power and invites theorists to consider other covert and unintentional ways in which power operates. It helps scholars understand the forces that promote the normalisation of subjectification (e.g. Berrenksoetter (2007:11). Following Dowding (2011:394), it can be argued that *PRV* will be more useful to help examine the effects of power that is exercised covertly and overtly in the praxis of housing policy.

The Lukesian approach provides an insightful and useful framework to analyse power relationships at both micro and macro level, by identifying the multi-dimensional function of power to influence decision-making, manipulate agendas and bring about acquiescence. In this regard, Lukes should be commended for offering a better and more understandable way to understand the exercise of power more visibly but also subtly in development policy processes. With regard to the present study, the approach is simple and enables the researcher to examine

stakeholders' relationships critically regarding the housing project. The focus is on the ways their agency contributes to the action and inactions of other interest groups. Hence, the clarity of Lukes' work enables a theoretically and empirically assessment and even reinterpretation of socio-economic and political processes where power is concerned.

The purpose of the present study is contributing to the debate on dimensions of power by moving beyond the asymmetrical conceptualisation of power relations to an incorporation of power shifts that do not constitute domination. The power dynamics within the Khutsong Housing project are presented as the basis to broaden the Lukesian approach. This includes the notion of a multi-directional exercise of power, which are rife with violent reciprocal contestations amongst multiplayer interests groups. The aim is also to help create an awareness of how actors are able to move from shaping false preferences to a true consciousness. In this regard, the study seeks to reconfigure the three dimensions of power to incorporate episodic, relational power shifts amongst actors in a more nuanced dynamism of positive-sum. The study's point of departure is to argue that the Lukesian notion of power as domination ('power over') has instances where it manifests or equates to more fluid dynamic and multi-directional instances of 'power with' and 'power to' amongst different actors, rather than mere domination, as assumed by Lukes and his critics.

2.8 Conclusion

The chapter has indicated that power is to some extent an essentially contested concept. The researcher examined this concept in light of the ideas of various theorists. Central to the argument was the idea that power can only be viewed as a social phenomenon, which most scholars have interpreted in terms of zero-sum dynamics. It was shown that the discourse on power follows two different schools of thought, namely that of 'power over' and 'power to'. This section of the study has indicated that the most prominent approach is 'power over', which to date has informed most scholarly studies on power.

The chapter also followed the debates on power as outlined and discussed in Lukes' rendition (1974; 2005a). Lukes proposes a radical view of power, which also informs the present study and is accepted as its theoretical framework. Lukes' conceptualisation differentiates between three dimensions of power, which involves elements such as 'power over' decisions, non-decisions and manipulation of agents' interests. These dimensions can be explicated as follows:

- *First dimension:* Lukes (1974; 2005a) relates this dimension to situations where power has control over decision-making and the focus is on the analysis of overt behaviours.
- *Second dimension:* This can be found in arenas for agenda setting, where the select powerful have control over what is included or excluded from the agenda.
- *Third dimension:* According to Lukes (2005a), this involves the insidious ways used by the powerful to shape the preferences, cognitions and perceptions of the powerless to the extent that they consent willingly to domination.

The discussion throughout has examined how the dominant ones maintain or secure the dominated parties' compliance.

Furthermore, it was indicated that the three dimensions of power have been criticised in numerous ways. These include the following areas: the exercise fallacy, paranoid fallacy, methodological challenges, the interests debate, agent-centrism, essential contested nature of power, narrowed focus and overlooking resistance. Throughout this chapter the researcher has suggested that Lukes' theory of power is the most applicable analytical framework to employ when studying power relationships in the policy and practice of development.

However, the three-dimensional perspective needs to be reworked to incorporate positive-sum reciprocity in power relationships. The silence of the Lukesian framework on issues of positive-sum power shifts and the nature or environment in which such power shifts occur, are re-examined critically in the present study. Therefore, even though Lukes' typology is useful to help explain how power is exercised through decision-making, agenda setting and preference shaping, the study still argues for a restructuring of the approach.

The following chapter (chapter 4) will continue the discussion on power by discussing the different theoretical lenses for power dynamics in urban developmental policies. This will provide additional understanding and explanation of power relationships in policy processes of the metropolis or urban areas. The chapter will focus on power relationships amongst stakeholders in urban developmental policies. The aim is to synthesise the Lukesian perspective with interpretations of the exercise of power in urban processes. Consequently, the chapter will provide a clearer view and explanation how Lukes' approach functions as the macro perspective for the present study, and thereby connects with the theorising of urban politics as applied in the Khutsong urban housing project.

Chapter 3: Power theories in urban housing

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted different scholars' interpretations and understandings of power, showing that power is a contested concept. However, the chapter argued in favour of Lukes' three-dimensional view of power as the theoretical lens to be used as focus of this study. The current chapter seeks to give a scholarly discussion of the various main theoretical perspectives on urban politics, to expand the study's thesis on power dynamics in urban housing. In this regard, the chapter will seek to align the tenets of urban theories with the Lukesian perspective on power relationships.

3.2 Reasons for studying urban politics

The question remains, 'Why urban politics?' John (2009:17) explains that, "Urban politics is concerned with the authoritative decision-making at a smaller scale than national units; it is the politics of the subnational level." It is the politics in urbanised communities (Stoker, 1998:120). Essentially, the study of urban politics focuses on the "different ways of thinking about, defining, theorizing and researching the city" (Hall & Barnett, 2012:19).

In addition, Brenner *et al.* (2009:176) are of the opinion that urban politics involves "arenas where the conflicts and contradictions associated with historically and geographically specific accumulation strategies are expressed and fought out". Against this background, it can be argued that urban politics as a study field seeks to answer questions such as the following:

- 'Who *really* has the power to influence and decide on which policies to implement in the city?
- To what extent does power influence urban policies?
- How is power exercised in urban politics?' (Eisinger, 1997:4; Ross & Levine, 2010:7; John, 2009:17; Wang, 2010:101; Jones, 2009:17)

From another point of departure, Rogers *et al.* (2014:1553) question why certain scholars limit urban politics to the urban areas, local government or business interests, as, it is argued, these politics extend to other regions, and even to rural areas which bear some characteristics of the urban in the modern era. Furthermore, these localised politics affect the national and the global spheres as they are the context for the expressions of national politics. This is affirmed by Sassen (2011) who argues that the local political spaces or arenas are not just areas of

expressions but constitute the conditions for political action, as many national uprisings have found their roots in the urban areas. In support of Sassen's assertion, Magnusson (2014:1563) points out that the urban space is not merely a site for specific politics, but the 'very form of the political' as they have proximate diversity. In this regard, Magnusson (2014) suggests that politics should be viewed through the perspective of the urban environment since contemporary politics have an 'urban feel' (Rogers *et al.*, 2014:1553).

Urban politics can also be considered as deliberations on the structure of power in the urban and its underlying areas. This is reiterated by Eisinger (1997:4) who states that, "to understand how the structure of power shapes the city, one must know not only the resource endowments of the participants in the competition to promote interests and ideas but also their strategies and goals." Following Eisinger, it can be said that the nature of politics in the urban arena is characterised by competition and conflicts amongst different actors on accessing socio-economic and political development resources. This conflict and competition reveals the patterns of domination, subordination and coalition in processes of urban development. In this regard, Diouf (1996:228) suggests that "the city is the seat of power, the terrain for expressing the imaginary ... a field of no possibilities other than confrontation and negotiation." Castell (1977) elaborates by arguing that urban politics are rife with struggles orchestrated around social services. In urban politics policy-making is conducted through conflict and struggle as the various actors have their own interests that they aim to advance in the arena of policy making.

Therefore, this chapter engages with several theoretical schools of thought. The aim is to understand and explain the nature of urban politics, and the characteristics and influence that role players have in urban political processes. This is important seeing that the case study for the present research was conducted in an urban area. Therefore, the theoretical constructs on urban politics are more useful in explaining the power dynamics surrounding the Khutsong Housing project.

Along the same line, this chapter examines the urban areas as political spaces that are transformative, democratising, engendering, marginalising or battlegrounds for local development. This follows Rossi and Vanolo's (2012:13-9) assertion that urban politics are normally identified in the thematic areas of the politics of representation, governance and contestation. Furthermore, the chapter focuses on how different theories explain and interpret urban politics, and help identify the main role-players in the power structures of urban areas.

3.3 Theories of urban politics

Several theories can be used to illustrate the power relationships in urban areas. In following Low (2006:3), this chapter concentrates on the following theories: pluralist theory; elite theory; Marxism; public choice theory; regulation theory; regime theory; and feminist perspectives on urban politics.

3.3.1 Pluralist theory

In studies of urban politics theorists agree that the pluralist approach addresses scholarly concerns on the distribution of power, and that the theory has been the foundational perspective for various urban political studies (Sayre & Kaufman, 1960; Dahl, 1961; Hunter, 1963; Presthus, 1964; Wildavsky, 1964; Waste, 1986; Wikstrom, 1993; Judge *et al.*, 1995; Okoth, 2014). According to Judge *et al.* (1995:13), scholars agree that pluralism is central to a study of city politics, not because “[It] is more ‘correct’ or ‘convincing’ ... than other theories, but because pluralism is the theory from which many perspectives on urban politics have developed, or against which many others have set themselves.” This theory has been the dominant paradigm utilised to explain the distribution of power in the American society (Waste, 1986:117) as well as in other areas.

The pluralist approach has its roots in Western democracies (Judge, 1995:16; Okoth, 2014:95). Commenting on this, Judge (1995:16) argues that the pluralist perspective, irrespective of its various modifications, is anchored upon Western liberal-democratic ethos which presuppose the participation of various groups in local development decision-making. The origins of the pluralist theory can be traced back to the group theory of Arthur Bentley (1908). Bentley argued that all public policies were the result of political activity by groups who pursue various interests. According to him, a group was formed on the basis of shared experiences, preferences and attitudes amongst community members. In this regard, a community or society would be composed of several distinct groups who have to compete in their bid to influence local public policies. From the premise of the group theory, several pluralists (e.g. Bentley, Dahl, Polsby, and Worfinger) argue that power in a community is distributed amongst interest groups who make decisions on behalf of the community

However, others argue that pluralism emerged from debates in the 1950s and 1960s on power structures in communities of, which saw incompatible arguments amongst scholars on who governed the American cities. Accordingly, Judge (1995:15) asserts that pluralism emerged as

a theory in reaction to Hunter's reputational study aligned with the elite theory. Hunter's study concluded on a structural view of power. According to this approach, power in Atlanta was seen to be concentrated in the hands of a small group of economically and socially prominent men. Their study, therefore, point to an elite holding power.

It is crucial to understand which the groups had power and agency in American cities, or: 'Who Governs?' Dahl conducted a study in New Haven, Connecticut. According to Judge (1995:17), Dahl's methodology was known widely as the 'decisional', 'positional' or 'issue outcome method', since he concentrated on the processes of decision-making in New Haven as predictors of who had power. Judge (1995:17) further indicates that the pluralist perspective sought to answer questions such as 'Who/How are important decisions made?' These scholars sought to determine whether "social pluralism, or the number of groups and actors, was correlated with political pluralism, expressed as the way in which power is diffused across groups and actors" (Judge, 1995:24). Dahl's (1961:103) decisional method examines decisions to ascertain which power processes (influences) were at work in developmental policy-making in New Haven. The approach also identified the participants in local policy praxis and described their work (Judge, 1995:17). Dahl's (1961) study focused on three themes: urban redevelopment, public education, and political nominations. These issues or themes were selected since it were considered as vital decisional foci that required consensus of local government officials (Dahl, 1961). According to Polsby (cited in Judge, 1995:17), "[U]rban development was chosen as it was a huge development issue in New Haven, whilst public education was the largest item of the municipal budget, and public nominations was of importance as public offices had an influence on policy outcomes."

In the 'decisional' study on New Haven, Dahl employed a mixed-method research. This entails both qualitative techniques (historical surveys, interviews and re-interviews, participatory observation) and quantitative approaches (questionnaires, analysis of voting and census data). The results of his research show that in New Haven, urban centres had become more pluralistic than before, thus decision-making was specialised. The political system of New Haven was stratified, as was the case with other political systems, meaning that a small group of individuals (elites) were highly involved in the political process (Dahl, 1961:60). According to Dahl (1961:102), the New Haven political system was more pluralistic, as interest groups and citizens exerted different levels of influence on the local policy processes. Notably, he remarked that should leaders take control, they themselves are also controlled (1961:102) and

“... even if the policies of political associations are controlled by a tiny minority ... decisions of political associations are themselves influenced ... by their assumptions as to what the voting populace wants” (Dahl, 1956:101).

Thus, it was concluded that in New Haven only a small number of people exerted influence on areas such as urban development, public education and public nominations. On the other side of the coin, other citizens had moderate indirect influence seeing that the leaders continually had to protect “the real or imagined preferences of constituents ... in deciding what policies to adopt” (Dahl, 1961:164). The elites or officials had to ensure that through democratic structures and in the spirit of democracy the interest of other stakeholders was of prime importance, especially that of the voting populace. The latter was a group that exerted influence over the future election of other officials. As a result, even though it was a small group, they had significant impact on the policy process, New Haven residents and other interested parties also influenced the outcome of local municipal decisions. This fact is confirmed by Waste (1987:126) that in New Haven “it was pluralism for and among active citizens”. This implies that Dahl’s study revealed multiple groups of elites and citizens who were decision-makers for different issues, unlike the single homogenous group that was the theme of Hunter’s reputational study.

Alluding to the above, Polsby (1980:90, cited in Judge, 1995:20) notes that in each problem area “different actors appeared, their roles were different and the kinds of alternatives which they had to choose among were different”. Therefore, in a society, from a pluralistic perspective, decisions on developmental issues are influenced by various groups of stakeholders. The pluralistic nature of societal political systems is expounded further in the following statement of Dahl:

“The goals and motives of animate leaders are evidently as varied as the dreams of men ... there is no convincing evidence at present that any single common denominator of motives can be singled out in leaders of association” (1961:95-96).

Therefore, a group of elites on their own cannot influence all spheres of development. Thus, there is a need that power be devolved to various groups in the society. Commenting further, Dahl (1958:465) criticises the situation, “Neither logically nor empirically does it follow that a group with a high degree of influence over one scope will necessarily have a high degree of influence over another scope within the same system.”

Applying Dahl's argument to the Khutsong Housing Project as an example, the group of people responsible for the construction of the low-cost houses will not be the same who will be constructing bridges or shopping malls. Power is, therefore, considered as fragmented and dispersed unequally amongst competing interest groups or actors in the society. According to the pluralist approach, interest groups are viewed as influencing different policy outcomes, therefore specialising.

For Dahl (1961:228) dispersed inequalities are characterised by the unequal capacities and distribution of resources among residents. In support, Jordan (1990:223) argues further that "pluralism focuses on the fragmentation and decentralisation of power, unequal dispersion of power and resources beyond the formal institutional structures and elective positions, to the various interest groups in the society." The resources are meant to influence the municipal policies. However, due to unequal contribution and distribution of resources, which produces insufficiency amongst individuals, each interest group will have a limited scope of policies to influence. Through the pluralistic lens no one group has monopoly over power and resources to influence decision-making in processes of development policy. This suggests that local urban politics are influenced by various interest groups and not by a single group of elites. According to Dahl (1986:189), "New Haven was and is a community in which a diversity of groups exists and bears on making of public policy."

Applied to the present study, it will thus be important to examine how the different interest groups influence the decision-making process in Khutsong. This will be done by considering how in their distinct approaches they overtly shape the processes of the housing policy. Moreover, since the pluralist perspective argues that urban policy-making is informed by diverse group interests, the study seeks to understand how the different groups exercise power mutually, and how the groups or stakeholders make decisions on major developmental projects such as housing.

This perspective exemplifies the nature of power dynamics and outcomes that Lukes (2005) presents in his first dimension of power. Luke posits that pluralists are concerned with decision-making processes in the praxis of developmental policy as a measure of 'Who rules?' and 'How is power exercised?' The first dimension of power involves interest groups engaging in observable dynamics of zero-sum power. The pluralist perspective is based on the decisional method or the issue-outcome method, which both presuppose that the powerful are the ones who command given policy decisions.

In addition, as indicated previously, the pluralists perceive actors or interest groups as specialising in diverse issues when deciding on which policies to implement. The most powerful actors or groups are the ones who clearly can be observed to have made the noticeable decisions on development. In such an arena, the groups seek to control the major urban political decision-making. Certain groups dominate specific issues whilst others have influence over other issues. The pluralist approach also acknowledges that the nature of power dynamics amongst the different interest groups involves manifest conflict, as actors seek to possess and control the available resources. The actors in control of the resources will be able to influence the outcomes of major decisions, and specifically are able to use their decision-making power to prevail over others. Following Dahl, through the pluralistic lens, one group or actor (A) has power over the other (B) to the extent that the group can make the other group (B) act in a manner that it would not do otherwise (Lukes, 1974:11). This implies that the power an actor has relates to the frequency of prevailing successes or failures over another actor on key issues of interest.

Therefore, the theory argues, political outcomes in democratic institutions will reflect the different interests, varying processes and unique groups of actors that have informed such policies. According to Judge (1995:15), as argued earlier, pluralists refute Hunter's study on reputation done in Atlanta. The findings indicated that decision-making in communities was restricted to a limited number of influential people, or elites. Pluralists argue that individuals have different interests; even amongst the elites themselves there are varying unique interests. This suggests that society is composed of groups with different interests who can only influence distinct areas of developmental policy.

As has been indicated previously, pluralists perceive society to have a democratic ethos. This belief led Dahl (1986, cited in Judge, 1995:15) to argue that the political system is accessible to all societal interest groups. On the other hand, it can be argued that Dahl agrees that power is vested in the hands of a few elites. Accordingly, he contends that, "Writers from the earliest times have understood that popular regimes, like other regimes, would inevitably have leaders, which is to say men of more authority, and very likely more power and influence, than ordinary citizens" (1966:297).

Nevertheless, Dahl's view allows for the power of the few elites to be checked by the influence that other interest groups can have on various issues, the voting public and the government. In this case in a pluralist democracy, there is no outright ruler as different issues bring into action

diverse groups and combinations of interest (Gunnell, 2004). The competing interest groups, in their need to be given future decision-making roles, will ensure continually that they consider the views of all stakeholders, and thus will not have total control over the entire policy praxis. In this regard, power in decision-making and policy issues is seen to be fragmented and dispersed unequally amongst different interest groups. The pluralist approach, therefore, suggest that in policy-making different interest groups exercise power over each other, depending on the developmental issue they plan to address.

3.3.1.1 Types of pluralisms

The pluralist approach has undergone several modifications over time. The focus is on various forms of pluralism, depending on the discipline and issues being addressed. Pluralism can be viewed as either social or political. The former entails the “number of groups” whilst the latter refers to “the diffusion of power” (Judge, 1995:24). On the diffusion of power and the number of groups, pluralists have noted the existence of three forms of pluralism: stratified pluralism, hyper-pluralism and neo-pluralism.

Stratified pluralism is the form that was found in New Haven by Dahl’s decisional study. According to stratified pluralism, policy-making is influenced by a few interest groups who have different resources and endowments. These interest groups influence distinctive policy issues. Power is fragmented and dispersed unequally amongst them in such a way that each group only has influence and resources to affect certain issues. This implies competition among groups which is regulated by responsive political leadership (Judge, 1995). Decision-making is, therefore, stratified, seeing that different decision-making processes and participants are involved in the various developmental programmes (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980; Waste, 1987; Judge, 1995).

Later, studies were carried out in New Haven and other towns by numerous scholars (Talbot, 1970); Yates, 1977; Troustine & Christenson, 1982); Wirt, 1983; Thomas & Savitch, 1991; Ross *et al.*, 1991; Rae, 2003; Hayward *et al.*, 2003; Bowie, 2009; Prevost, 2014). These studies indicate that, unlike Dahl who understood decision-making as conducted by a few active interest groups, policy-making by several groups and participants acquired over time, exert an uncontrollable influence. Various factors had to be considered: growth, diversification, protests, migration and the increase of different ethnic groups in cities. This led to a new form of pluralism, namely hyper-pluralism. According to Thomas and Savicth (1991 quoted in

Judge, 1995:24), this “Signalled an expansion in the number, power and stridency of political groups in America’s big cities.”

Hyper-pluralism involves diversity and an increased scope of organised interests, with reduced capacity by public officials to control policy processes. As Yates notes (1977:85 cited in Judge, 1995:24), in hyper-pluralism, the outcomes of policy-making are a product of “highly fragmented and unstable problem and policy contexts”. He adds that this is “an extreme pluralism of political, administrative, and community interests ... producing a form of street fighting pluralism” (Yates, 1977:34). According to this model, power is shared amongst several actors and groups, which produces a more diverse, complex and unstable policy-making process.

Hyper-pluralism is, however, not accommodated in the Lukesian perspective on power. Lukes, in his first dimension which typifies pluralism, acknowledges the presence of observable conflict between or amongst interest groups. The nature of the conflict is not chaotic and uncontrollable, which reflects a limitation in Lukes’ one-dimensional view, or pluralistic approach to power. Hyper-pluralism emphasises different stakeholders’ engagement in violent struggles in order to exercise power in the decision-making games. This notion reflects a gap in Lukes’ theorising of power dynamics within pluralistic arenas. Actors are seen to be competing over issues of interest as the various stakeholders have different policy preferences. However, the result of such a struggle is that the interests dominate of a few selected groups of people (elites).

The pluralistic nature of decision-making in hyper-pluralism accommodates conflicts, struggles and protests by various actors related to given outcomes of developmental preferences. The process of selecting preferences for urban policies becomes more chaotic and is handicapped by hyper-pluralist voices as interest groups clash increasingly in the praxis of urban policy. According to Yates (1977, cited in Judges *et al.*, 1995:24), conflicts and power-games in hyper-pluralism are unstable, complicated, diversified and based on interdependence of stakeholder interests. In contrast, Lukes’ (2005a) first dimension of power focuses on interest groups’ observable struggles and conflictual behaviours. Therefore, he only equates pluralism with elite-controlled democratic decision-making in which various groups of elites control different policy issues.

Pluralism can also emerge in the form of a regime, an anti-regime or neo-pluralism:

- **Regime** involves the coalition of different interest groups who cooperate and influence given urban policy preferences.
- **Anti-regime** is formed when interest groups in coalition with the local government create a defensive government system aimed at blocking oligarchical business powers from influencing municipal or developmental policies. Thereby the anti-regime safeguards the interests of the majority social groups who may not have sufficient resources to influence decision-making.
- **Neo-pluralism** stems from Stoker (1991) who suggests that unlike in the earliest pluralist times, the local authorities and the interest groups presently have institutionalised ways of exercising power. The local officials seek the involvement of interest groups in decision-making. This implies community activism, tender processes and other participatory initiatives designed to ensure that both the private and public interest groups participate in local policy processes.

3.3.1.2 A critique of the pluralist theory

The pluralist perspective of power in local policy-making has been criticised from different angles; some have concentrated on the insufficiency of the methodological techniques, whilst others have focused on the setting of the agenda (decision-making process) and the results of Dahl's study. According to Judge (1995:17), from a methodological stance the pluralists have been accused of concentrating on too few issues. Bachrach and Baratz (1970:10) refute Dahl claiming his results were predetermined as he "accepted as issues what are reputed to be issues". According to Bachrach and Baratz, numerous community matters are not contested as public issues. In other words, certain important issues do not form the agenda of public policies as they are covertly manoeuvred out of the decision-making process. In this regard, the pluralist perspective ignores the more subtle ways in which power is exercised (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 1974, 2005a). Knocke (1990) further argues that influential covert actors from their hidden strategic positions are able to prevent issues from being made part of the agenda. Knocke (1990) explains that stakeholders who are involved in decision-making are not necessarily the most powerful in the community. As a result, several issues that are important to the community never make it to the agenda in pluralistic arenas.

Several scholars refute the pluralists for having an overly optimistic view of the diverse distribution of power (e.g., Wang, 2010; Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974; 2005a). As noted by Wang (2010:102), there is a limited chance for a perfect environment where equal

power distribution takes place in a real political process. In addition, most policy outcomes are manipulated by a few powerful policy elites. Thus, regardless of pluralism allowing for dispersed groups to influence policies, ultimately, a few elites decide on the outcome of policies. Moreover, Gaventa (1980) indicates that the pluralist approach has failed to explain how individual and group interests are misunderstood and under-expressed. The pluralist perspective has also been questioned on the issue of agenda modification and compromises. Critics have debated whether it is sufficient to argue that one has power over the other if the other interest groups choose to compromise for the sake of progress in decision-making.

Adding to the criticism above and considering that certain decisions are modified, a crucial question remains, How is it possible to ascertain which interest group had influence over a given policy outcome? Boogers (2014:4) points out that Dahl and the pluralists were criticised for paying little attention to the aims of agents wielding power. Booger (2014) maintains that should the pluralists have considered the motives behind possession of power, they would have managed to explain the growth and disintegration of interest groups.

Despite the criticism, the pluralistic perspective did play a crucial role in laying the foundational theoretical prism of Lukes' radical theorising. The three-dimensional perspective builds on the debates on community power and offers a multi-dimensional approach to the conceptualisation of power exercises in urban development. Lukes' (1974, 2005a) radical critique of the pluralists' explanations, as influenced by behaviourism, provides a theoretical anchor needed for the formulation of multidimensional power. Whereas Lukes critiqued pluralism for being overly behavioural-centred, his own theory operated with a methodological reductionism of decision-making and overt conflict as part of the first dimension in which power is exercised. Lukes accepts that power in urban development processes can be exercised through observable conflicts and decision-making, which forms one of the possible ways for domination.

Nevertheless, Lukes advances his approach by building on the interests-and-conflict argument, as originated from Dahl. As shown previously, this argument indicates that power can also operate when conflict is latent and the powerful in society shape the interests of other actors. Furthermore, Lukes solves the methodological challenge that theorists face when examining power exercise. He does this by moving beyond decision-making to include the examination of bias or agenda shaping and false consciousness.

To summarise, Lukes still views conflict of interests as a precondition for the exercise of power, although he argues that this conflict can be latent. This can be seen when the third dimension of power is exercised through the suppression of the real interests of people to the extent that they (un)willingly consent to being dominated. Thus, Lukes constructs his radical approach from the aforementioned shortfalls of Dahl's pluralist approach.

3.3.2 Elite theory

According to Wang (2010:103), the elite theory emerged from dissatisfaction with liberal democracy and pluralism. Judge *et al.* (1995) and Harding (1995) assert that according to the elite theory, societal policies and others processes are run by a relatively small group of influential and prominent business-minded elites or wealthy group. It postulates that the "nature and structure of urban politics resemble a pyramid, with a relatively small number of very powerful people at the top gradually giving way to a large mass of unpowerful [sic] individuals at the bottom" (Harding, 1995:35). Judge *et al.* (1995) further explains that the elite perspective entails a ranking where a small group of individual elites is at the top holding the reins to power, and the masses or the ruled ones are at the bottom of the strata. The theory, therefore, emphasises the hierarchical ordering of the socio-economic and political relations between the rulers and the ruled, the powerful and the powerless (Harding, 1995:35).

The power-elite theory argues that it is the endowments in resources and the positions occupied by a few elites in the society that make them more influential in socio-economic and political processes. In this regard, Mills (1956:3-4) mentions that decisions in community or local governments are made by individuals "whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences."

This above-mentioned approach is in contrast with, the pluralists who view power in urban politics as fragmented and dispersed unequally amongst groups of actors. The elite perspective, on the other hand, perceives power to be concentrated in the hands of financial, business, military, religious and educational elites (Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953). Other scholars such as Moffett and Freund (2004:134) are of the opinion that the emergence of the modernisation theory with its belief that economic and political changes could be best addressed through the influence of a few elites has made an impact. Since then, adherents of the theory allowed for little or no participation of the masses when deciding on a community's course of action, rendering them quite powerless.

The influential positions the elite enjoy the society is argued to be a result mostly of wealthy possessions. Notably, Miller (1987) suggests that wealth possession is the most important power attribute, in addition to resources such as religious affiliation, military power, or technical skills and knowledge. Due to the elites resource endowments, society accepts that the this interest group would control and influence policies and control decision-making.. This is supported by Harding (1995) who notes that the elite theory explains the community processes on the basis of what this interest group as elected leaders or policy-makers are contributing to the society. Elaborating on this motive, Arowolo and Aluko (2012:799) assert that the elite theory is a “philosophical explanation of the role of the leadership in governance as it affects public policy including all socioeconomic and political matters.” This has led other scholars to typify the history of politics as that of elites (Prewitt & Stone, 1973:4). Social progress is thus determined by elites, unlike in the ‘democratic’ pluralistic thinking that envisions different interest groups having sufficient power to decide on developmental issues in the community.

More generally, the elite approach argues that there are shared interests amongst the influential or powerful in the society. This motive stems from Mills (1956:276) postulation about an “overarching coincidence of interest between those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of violence”. In this regard, both the military and business owners have unified interests, resulting in less competition and establishing protectionism amongst the elites. Hunter (1959:191) suggests that even in a democratic system envisioned by the pluralists, “Systems of power are in a series of interlaced and coordinated power structures where those at the apexes of power become generally known to each other.”

From the explanation above, it can be argued that the elites are unified, homogenous, and collaborate in influencing different local development programmes. This notion is confirmed by Mills (1956:179) who states that most of the elites are from the upper class, some occupying higher prestige positions which connect them to individuals in the upper strata of the society. The interactions amongst the elite in clubs, parties, neighbourhoods and occupations cement their relationships as they realise their common interests (Mills 1956:281). However, Mills does not support the idea that all elites share the same interest. Notably he states that “Men from high places may be ideological representatives of the poor and humble, hence we must be very careful on inferring from one’s origin and career to political character and policy” (Mills, 1956:280). The elite, therefore, can have different ideological or policy choices, seeing that certain individuals may be more focused on the plight of the poor whilst others will be more capitalistic in their outlook.

It can be argued that the elite approach was influenced largely by the work of Hunter in Atlanta. However, several scholars are of the view that elitism can be traced back to the work of earlier classical political theories (Higley, 2010:161; Harding, 1995:36; Booger, 2014:1). According to these scholars, the elite theory's origins are noticeable from the writings of theorists such as Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Robert Michels (1876-1936). Vergara (2013:35) points out that Pareto was one of the first classical sociologists who conducted an analysis of the role the elites held in the Italian aristocracy. Vergara (2013:35) further argues that "Pareto was the first sociologist to have defined the concept of a ruling elite, which he saw as a small and selected political set of people with superior personal qualities that governed the other societal members." Earlier, Mosca stated in *The Ruling Class*:

"In all societies, from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawning of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies two classes of people appear, a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first" (Mosca, 1930:50).

From the times of Mosca, Plato, Pareto and Michels, the elite theory was utilised mostly to explain the nature of individuals or groups of people with power and also to critique the Marxist concept of an egalitarian society. In addition, Helen and Robert Lynd (1929) in their seminal work *Middletown* were the first to pose the question, "Who has the power to make decisions?" They found that local decision-making in Muncie was being influenced by elites. Their earlier findings revealed that in Muncie, a small local business family had financial interests and dominance to the extent that public policies were largely influenced by them and reflected their preferences. Stein (2003:223) notes that Lynds' "analysis concentrated on economic elites, arguing that those who owned capital and hired labour were instrumental, if not dominant in the public sector."

Another view on the origin of the elite theory is held by scholars such as Booger (2014:1) and Harding (1995:38). They argue that it is through the subsequent work done by Floyd Hunter (1953) in Atlanta, Georgia, that studies on elites shifted. The movement was from the classification of elites to mostly methodological debates (community-power debates) on identifying the influential group or powerful ones in an urban environment.

In 1953, Hunter conducted a study known as the *Community Power Structure*. His aim was to ascertain who wielded more power in the policy processes of Atlanta. In so doing he employed for the first time what came to be known as the ‘reputational’ approach. According to Harding (1995:38) in the reputational technique Hunter wanted to prove that the power individuals hold is part of their reputation for possessing that power. He started off by identifying several influential community entities by classifying them in terms of four groups, namely: business, government, civic associations and “society activities” (Harding, 1995:38). The initial list had 175 people drawn from newspapers, organisational lists, key contacts and his personal knowledge. The list was later given to a panel of 14 judges to rank the people (Hunter, 1953), and was reduced to 40 influential people. The top 40 people were interviewed to determine who amongst them was perceived significantly influential. Hunter also sought to know their interactional patterns, manner of stratification in relation to major community projects and their influence over such projects. Judge (1995) reports Hunter’s finding that his group of influential people formed a ‘crowd’ depending on their issues of interest, and they constituted a coherent reputable influential policy-makers group.

Thus, Hunter found that most of the top structure of power or influential people in Atlanta were senior executives in business. The mayor was also part of this group, which was seldom seen by the general community masses. Hunter (1953:30) rightfully states that, “Most of the top personnel in the power structure are rarely seen in the meetings attended by the associational understructure in the Regional City.” This implies that the policy makers, as the top level elites, are “stable, closed, and invisible” (Hunter, 1953:110), whilst the elected officials who implement policies are the ones who interact frequently with the other societal members. Moreover, Hunter contends that the community “power structure is kept intact through shared interests, mutual obligations, money, life style and habit ... as well as coercion and force” (Hunter, 1953:6). Hunter further observes that in Atlanta, policy-making processes were influenced largely by economic interests; this suggests that without the approval of the elite, development and other processes would be at a standstill.

Hunter’s empirical findings produced a theoretical anchor for theorists of the modern elite theory. His results affirmed the views of Mosca, Pareto and Michels who suggested that in society power is exercised by a small number of elites (Hunter, 1953:262-271; Knoke, 1990:120-122). Several scholars carried out consecutive national and local studies on power elites (e.g., Mills, 1956; Miller, 1976; Domhoff, 1976; Fainstein & Campbell, 1997. Their

studies echo the findings of Hunter, therefore solidifying the elite thesis of decision-making in the praxis of developmental policy. Elite theorists' argument that power is concentrated in the hands of a few in the society does not suggest that the political systems in urban localities do not represent the interests of the masses. These findings only indicate that elites are the ones who determine the representativeness and responsiveness of policies in the urban settings (Mills, 1956; Higley, 2010). This approach, however, is useful as a theoretical perspective to support the section regarding the analysis of the Khutsong housing project. In this regard, the elite theory will help determine who the influential stakeholders are and how their power is concentrated in the processes of urban policy-making and implementation.

The elite approach to urban politics forms the second dimension of power, as argued by Lukes. In this case the approach suggests that the powerful, through their mobilisation of bias in agenda setting, are able to organise themselves in such a manner that they ensure only their agendas feature in local politics. Lukes (2005:20) comments that the elite approach presupposes that decision-making in urban settings is conducted by a few elites who consciously or unconsciously obstruct decision-making and agendas that reflect the community's policy preferences. This enables the elites to suppress other societal members by mobilising bias and the creating barriers in conflictual policy preferences, thus making the entire agenda-setting processes unrepresentative of community interests. In this sense, urban policy preference reflects to a large extent the economic influence of a small number of elites, as developmental processes occur only through the control and authority of this powerful clique. The elite approach, therefore, describes the second dimension of power as it shifts the focus of studies on power from observable conflict to considering how the powerful are able to promote non-decision-making over potential conflictual issues.

3.3.2.1 Criticism of the elite theory

The elite theory that commenced with Hunter's reputational methodology has come under heavy criticism. This section will highlight only a few of these critiques. According to Harding (1995:39) the elite theory's use of the reputational method can be refuted on grounds of predetermination and inadequacy. For his research, Hunter utilised a list of influential people, which may already suggest where the concentration of power lies, thereby making his study predetermined. Furthermore, Polsby (1963, cited in Stein, 2003:224) repudiated the elite theory on the grounds that it is non-falsifiable. In other words, it assumes the existence of elites and argues that failure to identify them is a methodological issue, not a theoretical one.

Moreover, Harding (1995:35) criticises Hunter for overlooking the positional attributes of the few people he characterised as powerful elites. The latter's conclusions suggest that power is simply the property of the reputed elites. As a result, scholars have argued that Hunter's reputational approach should have been supported by evidence of elites exercising the power in particular instances. However, as argued by Harding, both the pluralists and adherents to the elite perspective were criticised for their methodology. A closer look would indicate that the methodologies they employed sought to answer certain types of questions ('Who rules?' and 'Does anybody rule?') and were useful at making hypothesis about the nature of relationships in the urban field (Harding, 1995:40). This initiated an extensive debate amongst scholars on the conceptualisations and measurements of power. Reactions to the shortfalls of the elite theory led to the emergence of the pluralist and urban regime theory (Harding, 1995:35), which will be elucidated in the following section.

On the other hand, Lukes affirms the existence of power exercise by the elite through obstructing the airing of alternative policies and the shaping of agendas. As argued in the preceding chapter, Lukes criticises the adherents to the elite perspective, similar to the pluralists, for being too behaviouristic. Lukes (2005a:25, 25) argues that the second dimension of power brings to light the non-decision-making which occurs over issues of conflicting policy preference amongst developmental actors. He therefore moves a step further and adds his third dimension as the conceptualisation of hidden power, where the powerful attempts to prevent conflict amongst actors by insidious shaping of processes and the perceptions of other interest groups. The second dimension of Lukes' theory (in the form of the elite approach) fails to give a theoretical and empirical explanation on how the powerful secure wilful compliance from those they dominate. In light of the arguments above, the approach of the adherents to the elite theory – as is the case with the pluralist's approach – help provide the basis to discuss the third dimension of power in the present research.

3.3.3 Urban regime theory

Regime theory has entailed the major school of thought dominating urban political studies; it has been utilised widely to examine policy processes and decision-making by numerous scholars in the field (Stone, 1980; 1989; 2005; Stoker, 1995; Fainstein, 1995; Harding, 1994; 1995; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Dowding, 2005; Zunino, 2006; Mossberger, 2009; Belligni & Ravazzi, 2013). It has been typified as the dominant theory in urban politics (Imbroscio, 1998, cited in Davies, 2002:1). The theory developed from the work of Clarence Stone (1989)

Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988 which sought to describe governing in Atlanta. However, the concept of a 'regime' and its relevance in the urban political sphere had been central in earlier scholarly work (e.g., Stone, 1980; Fainstein & Fainsten, 1983; Elkin, 1987). Stone's (1989) work on governance in Atlanta popularised the urban regime theory. According to Stone (1989), this theory was developed as an instrument to explain how dynamics in the public and private sector regarding policy-making can affect the local urban areas, independent of wider economic forces. Kwok (2011:87) explains, "Regime theory is a good urban theoretical premise ... it thus looks to comprehend the structural bridges between public control of government and private control of economic resources."

Mosserberger and Stoker (2001:812) argue that regime theory, as is the case with the pluralist approach, views power as fragmented, and emphasises collaboration between local governments and private business stakeholders in governing urban development projects. Correspondingly, Jones-Correa and Wong (2015:161) view regimes as a necessary response to the need for concerted action aimed at promoting lasting socio-economic and political relationships in local practices. This is echoed by Judge *et al.* (1995) who assert that even though development issues have been addressed, the regime will continue as partners, as they see value in its continuation.

Inferred from the arguments above there is a need to ensure that local authorities have to cooperate and co-exist in formal and informal networks involving a wide spectrum of interest groups such as the business elites (Basset *et al.*, 2002:1757). The theory, therefore, argues for a "broader base of coalition partners" (Dowding, 2001:8) which makes it more acceptable and useful in understanding the nature of urban politics. It puts more weight on concerted efforts between the public and private sectors in promoting local metropolitan governance.

Similarly, Stone (1989:229) outlines a regime as an "informal arrangement by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions." In succinct terms he explains that a regime can be "relationships (informal as well as formal) by which a community is governed" (Stone, 2006:4). In the same vein, Shatkin (2007) expresses that a regime refers to relationships in which governmental and non-governmental actors form alliances to achieve specific goals. The relationships are primarily between the business elites and the public officials. This is noticeable in the approach of Stone (1989:7) that posits the elected officials and private business as the chief participants of governing regimes, due to the resources they possess. Therefore, it can be argued that power

in the regime theory is seen to be anchored in the notion of coalition. Stone elaborates on this notion:

“Regime theory starts with the proposition that governing capacity is not easily captured through the electoral process. Governing capacity is created and maintained by bringing together coalition partners with appropriate resources, nongovernmental as well as governmental. If a governing coalition is to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda” (Stone, 1993:1).

The coalition between the local government and business elites is viewed as based on the interdependence of the participants to the regime. According to Stone (2004:12), interdependence is “the foundation for coalition building that brings together congruent purposes and sought-after resources”. He points out that interdependence can only be successful when actors choose to cooperate. Homan (2007:9) adds that “interdependence is a key driving factor that requires co-operation in order to get actors, with their complementary resources”, to work together. Explaining the concept of interdependence, Judge *et al.* (1995:59) and Pierre (2014:870-871) argue that regimes are formed because local governments are able to reach policy goals. In the process, they form (in)formal coalitions with the business interest groups who have the required resources to achieve the goals of the government. It can be noticed that the coalition is also based on the accessibility and possession of required resources. Stone elaborates by stating that “in order for a governing coalition to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda” (Stone, 1993:21), and requires a stable coalition to provide resources (Stone, 2015:103). This is in line with Markle (2012:11) who argues that the regime theory accentuates the significance of non-governmental partners and resources on promoting social transformation.

According to Stone, the success of regimes in addressing agendas for urban development is predicated on trust and loyalty amongst the coalition actors. Stone asserts that in time and continued interaction in urban governance, regime participants will have an enhanced capacity and “loyalty to the arrangements that put them and their allies in the position of making key decisions” (Stone, 2006:4). Homan (2007:9) suggests that the presence of resources is not a sufficient cause for collaboration; it is trust, however, that should be built in regime structures which will ensure decision-making and policy-related matters are dealt with efficiently and effectively.

In light of the above, Stone's view can be applied to urban policy practices, such as the Khutsong Housing Project. In this regard, power entails the capacity of actors to partner and influence local governance on this project. Stoker, a proponent of the regime theory, states that "in a complex, fragmented urban world the paradigmatic form of power is that which enables certain interests to blend their capacities to achieve common purposes" (Stoker, 1995:55). This implies that the regime theory argues for 'power to' against the elite and plural theories' concept of 'power over'. Stone (1989:229) explains that in urban political dynamics, "The struggle is not about control and resistance, but about gaining and fusing a capacity to act, 'power to' not 'power over'." The participants in urban regimes have to prioritise the establishment and maintenance of the capacity to govern (Stone, 2015:114).

It is thus clear that the regime perspective discredits the control of power by a group of elites and decision-makers in urban governance (Stone, 2006), and rather advocates for urban policy-making to be collaborative in its governance where actors have 'power to' make decisions (power as social production). From this perspective, the MCLM in Khutsong, in cooperation with the resourced members of the community, formulates and implements its housing policies.

Furthermore, the regime approach recognises that, besides the business interest group, there are other interest groups, and therefore, several forms and types of regimes. Belligni and Ravazzi (2013:4) distinguish urban regimes as either pro-growth or pro-welfare:

- **Pro-growth:** economic growth as its main focus;
- **Pro-welfare:** promoting equity, social quality and citizen empowerment.

Markle (2012:12) notes that Stone outlines four types of regimes, namely maintenance, development, middle-class progressive, and those devoted to the expansion of lower-class opportunities. He argues further that the roles of citizens vary in each regime due to the degree of difficulty in promoting synergy and sustaining participation. The pro-growth regimes are similar to what Stone (1993:18) terms "development regimes", as they represent efforts to change government's established social and economic patterns by connecting private goals with public ones. Stone (1993:19) further identifies the middle-class progressive regime, which focuses on issues such as environmental protection, affordable housing, affirmative action and the funding for various social purposes. Dowding (2001, cited in CDC, 2004:9-10) also classifies regimes into directive, concessionary, elitist and entrepreneurial. Applied to the situation in Khutsong there are various types of regime that are collaborating in different areas

to address development issues such as service delivery, employment, environmental risk management, gender, social inclusion and empowerment.

The regime theory with its focus on coalitions or groupings of different stakeholders to influence given development outcomes, can be considered as an affirmation of the existence of Lukes' first dimensional view of power. The first dimension to power, as typified through the pluralist perspective, argues that in urban policy processes there are various stakeholders with different interests who control and influence policy preferences. Stoker (1995:55) argues that a regime occurs when interest groups blend their capacities to realise collective goals. Similar to the first dimension of power where different interest groups influence policy alternatives, the regime approach also claims that urban governance is a collaborative venture controlled by various actors. Power in the conception and execution of urban development resides in a given regime or coalition.

In this regard, Judge (1995:26-27) explains that pluralism can be in the form of a regime, which is characteristic of the centred coalition that occurs in Dahl's *Who Governs*. Dahl (1961:186), as a proponent of pluralism, recognises the apparent interrelationships between the public and private spheres, since governing coalitions of both spheres reflect the interests and preferences of the various community regimes. Furthermore, the existence of an anti-regime in the dynamics of urban politics suggests that the regime theory resembles Lukes' first dimension of power as observable interest groups or coalition behaviours in urban policy decision-making. On the other hand, regime theory advocates for 'power to', unlike pluralism's 'power over' which forms part of the first dimension of power. Conversely to Lukes' view, the regime approach shifts the focus of power from dominance to collective actions aimed at promoting the capacity to govern for the furtherance of a common cause (Stone, 1989, 2006, 2015).

As argued previously in the section on pluralism, by institutionalising the exercising of power it becomes possible for local authorities and interested parties in decision-making to cooperate. The processes of developing urban policy have thus become democratic and inclusive of the views of different coalitions. The first dimension of power considers power as exercised by interest groups in democratic institutions. In congruence with this view the regime approach argues for collaborative governance in which different coalitions have control over diverse issues. Both approaches refute the idea that the conception and execution of urban policy are controlled by a group of elites.

Although the regime theory helped explain the nature of political relationships in a local government setting, this theory is not exempted from scholarly criticism. It has been critiqued for downplaying democratic mobilisation in urban development processes. This affirms the noticeable conflict that is present in Lukes' first dimension. The regime approach does not really consider how urban policy-making can be characterised by struggles as actors have different interests.

As was mentioned previously, Lukes in his three-dimensional perspective accepts and concentrates on 'power over' but overlooks 'power to', where a regime is highly dependent on the concerted efforts of stakeholders. According to this view, power is a disposition, a capacity which actors may or may not exercise. Therefore, the Lukesian approach needs to be modified by incorporating 'power to' in his conceptualisation of the power dimensions. According to Jones-Correa and Wong (2015:162) the theory limits the role of other grassroots groups on influencing the urban political economy, since it gives credibility to the elites' engagements. In this sense, Lukes' first dimension of power is credible as it suggests that policies are shaped or influenced by the various interest groups who distinctively affect policy issues. In addition, Godwin (2014:10) notes that the regime theory has been accused of over-concentrating on development issues at the expense of other issues. It is argued that certain external influences on city politics are ignored, and there is a failure to understand fully the impacts of racial issues on the success of urban politics in a diverse society.

Other scholars particularly from Britain, have critiqued the regime theory severely as an abstraction of American political economy, and therefore, view it as inapplicable to other contexts such as Britain (Harding (1995:46-47). In this regard, Davies (2003) points out that, due to major political and institutional differences between the United States and Europe, the regime theory becomes irrelevant in analysing urban politics in Britain. However, on the other hand, it can be noted that several British theorists on urban politics are utilising the urban regime theory (e.g., Saunders, 1979; Ward, 1996; Harding, 1995, 2000; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994; Stoker, 1995; Davies, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). This is the case, even though the scholarly work on urban regimes in Britain seems understudied.

Davies further labels the regime approach as ethnocentric. Moreover, Pierre (2014) notes that since the urban regime theory emerged from the behaviours and strategies of public and private actors typical to the industrial period in America, the theory is indifferent to deviations in institutional hierarchies, economic globalisation, and the rise of new groups of actors and issues

in urban politics. In addition, Brenner (2014:134) accuses the regime thesis of a “methodological trap of localism” in which he sees the theory viewing the urban context as a “pre-given, relatively discrete container of political-economic processes”. He argues further that the regime theory is excessively localistic, by assuming that cities are self-contained.

3.3.4 Marxist urban theory

Several perspectives from the Marxist tradition attempt to explain urban politics and housing-related issues. According to Pickvance (1995:253), “Marxist theories of urban politics show a strong family resemblance but display considerable diversity ... reflecting the absence of a worked-out theory of politics by Marx.” In contrast, Geddes (2009:55) defines that Marxist theories of urban politics are those which situate the ‘urban’ and ‘politics’ within a Marxist theorisation of capitalism. Geddes further expounds this notion:

- The urban is conceived as a locus of the contradictory and crisis-ridden process of capital accumulation.
- Capitalist class relations provide a fundamental perspective on urban politics.
- The ideological content is recognised of categories such as ‘urban’ and of the ‘bourgeois’ separation of the political, the social and the economic (Geddes, 2009:55).

Pickvance (1995:253) states that when investigating urban politics, scholars should understand that urban political institutions are part of the state apparatus. Thus, the urban is seen as a microcosm of the entire national politics, where also the dominant class contradictions of capitalism manifest itself. Marxists views urban politics as perpetuating the accumulation of capital (Pickvance 1995:267). Domhoff (2005) elaborates by commenting that in urban political theorising, Marxism stresses issues of accumulation, class struggle and reproduction of labour power in the creation of urban development space. The core argument of the Marxist theory is that in urban areas a small group of ‘bourgeois’ accumulate capital at the expense of the working class, producing unequal relations in the accumulation of capital. This is similar to the elite theory, which argues that power is in the hands of a few individuals who share similar interests. According to Davies (2009:3), Marxism views the ruling class as a cohesive elite, capable of identifying decisions crucial to its interest and acting to realise them. From a Marxist perspective, decision-making in the urban areas is seen to be in the hands of the wealthy class, and therefore they dictate the policy initiatives for the general urban population, the masses.

Most studies on Marxism and urban politics derive from the works of Karl Marx, Henry Lefebvre, Manuel Castells and David Harvey (Geddes, 2009:56). Lefebvre concentrated on the capitalist production of space; to him the capitalist contradictions (capital/labour) had become the contradictions of the urban society in which the battle for and over urban space takes primacy as a characteristics of class struggle in the modern era (Merrifield, 2002). Lefebvre understood urban politics of space to have been the result of bureaucratic and political authoritarianism. However, he was criticised by Castells for notably moving away from Marxism by reducing industrialism to urbanism and exploitation to alienation in everyday life (Merrifield, 2002:116-117; Gedded, 2009:56). From his side, Castells concentrated on the mobility of capital, its role in the creation of a new urban structure of contradictions, class relations and their articulation of urban contradictions. Harvey (2005; 2006), on the other hand, concentrated on the politics of accumulation through dispossession as a manifestation of capitalism in urban politics.

In this regard, Geddes (2009:56-57) argues that Marxist urban political theories have been emphasising, “the lived and alienated everyday experience of urbanizing capital; the interventionist local state that is an object of protest from urban social movements; and the appropriation of land for rent, construction, [private] property, finance and landlordism.” Geddes (2009) expressively argues that Marxism in the urban political economy is concerned with changing the living experiences of the urban residents and promoting an envisioned space of equality. This is reiterated by Peet (1998:110) who argues that Marxism perceives urban social relations as unstable and bound to transform. Castells (1978) believes social transformation in the city areas emanates from urban social movements, which he parallels to urban trade unionism. Fainstein (1986:257) echoes the same sentiment and argues that social change that promotes the interest of the urban poor is possible through community conflicts, pressure-group activism and social movements, which she believes can help tilt metropolitan policies to be favourable to all interest groups.

It should be noted that Marxists view urban politics to be inclusive, not only involving the ‘bourgeois’ and working class, but also the state as a major player. To certain scholars the state plays an instrumental role in furthering class contradictions in the urban political economy, whilst to others it plays a more strategic role. According to Pickvance (1995) the government plays an integral role in promoting capital and profit accumulation by the ruling class; this is because the state provides a conducive environment for private interests and regulates social

order. O’Conner (1973) explains that the state’s function in urban political systems is that of accumulation and legitimation. Private interests dominate in the production of goods and services, and since the government will not be willing to offset the capitalist role in the development of the urban economy, the government facilitates the accumulation of wealth by the capitalists. Thereby the government favours private interests of capital accumulation.

According to Gilbert and Ward (1985:3), the government, as an actor in urban governance, can no longer freely decide on policy alternatives; due to its role in protecting private accumulation its choices are restricted. O’Connor (1973) asserts in this regard that the state intervenes in the interest of capital. Hill (2005:40) argues that even in urban policy-making the policy outcomes of governments are normally an abstraction of capitalist interests. In light of this postulation, Wang (2010:102) argues that urban Marxists perceive Government’s policy frameworks and decisions as determined throughout by dominant capitalistic interests, which are in favour of profiteering, and not social transformation. Pickvance (1995) claims that even political parties as actors in urban governance find it difficult to change the influential position of the government in promoting private accumulation. This has led Laumann and Knocke (1987:6) to maintain that policy-making in urban and surrounding areas is a “struggle between the capitalist and working class, and or is a result of political socio-political forces within the governance structures”.

Conversely, Marxists believe the urban political dynamics can also be pro-poor and responsive to the needs of the poor. Castells (1977) argues that from a structuralist perspective the government can also help transform the urban political interface to be in favour of the poor citizenry. This is because the state or government can ensure that private interest groups work on developmental programmes that are highly responsive to the needs of the poor or working class. The government, as a major player in Marxist urban power relationships, can produce and mobilise its own resources in favour of public interests. This, however, is a challenge since the state is always restricted in its endeavours to access priority resources for local development.

The Marxist approach, therefore, views urban political dynamics to be dominated by private interests and class conflicts. The state is seen to fulfil an instrumental function in promoting capitalistic accumulation, and thus a major regulator of the urban political economy. On the other end of the scale, the public or working class are viewed as objects of exploitation and spatial alienation. Marxist theory envisions change in the urban political spaces as a result of

group activism and social movements, and contends for an urban sphere where everyone has equal access and rights to space and development.

Understandably, the Marxist thesis on urban political dynamics has been criticised on several grounds. Pickvance (1995:271-272) attacks Marxist thought for viewing the state as mostly an instrument for capital accumulation and thus not taking into consideration the autonomy of the state in promoting responsive local development that addresses the needs of all residents. Linked to this, Gilbert and Ward (1985) suggest that the Marxists proponents fail to acknowledge that policy praxis are distinct in each locality, which causes certain local governments to act more bureaucratic and authoritarian, whilst others are more populist in character. Mollenkopf and Strom (2007) further argue that Marxists have ignored variations in policies and practices across various localities and time spaces. Pickvance (1995:272) further criticises the Marxists for abstracting concepts and endeavouring to apply them to concrete situations without paying enough attention to other mediating factors.

Storper (2001:158, cited in Geddes, 2009:61) censures the Marxists' ideas of capitalistic development. To him Marxism focusses too much on property relations and social relations in capitalism and does not take note of the analysis reviewing cause and effects of internal dynamics and processes in capitalism. Additionally, Storper (2001:158-159) criticises Marxism for its belief in a working-class revolution; for him the idea of a class revolution is currently void of any meaning, since in the current era "no Marxist metanarrative of social transformation is left". Similarly, Geddes (2009:62) claims that the Marxist approach has failed to translate meta-theory into a more acceptable and resounding micro-analytical approach. Therefore, he rejects the entire Marxist programme.

However, irrespective of the various criticisms of Marxist theory in explaining urban politics, the approach can be argued to have made significant strides in describing the nature of capital influences on urban policies. It has also helped unveil the urban political economy as mainly influenced by private interest, where the state mostly plays a pro-accumulation function and in some cases, mediates in favour of public gains. It can also be argued that the theory is helpful to explain the role of global and national capitalistic influences on climatic and environmental sustainability. The reason is that the theory interprets the current manifestation of environmental issues as capitalistic-induced urban political issues.

In light of the arguments above, the theory is used in explaining the Khutsong housing crisis, with a focus on how capitalistic accumulation amongst the various actors influenced the outcome of the housing project. In this sense, the Marxist urban political theory will be useful in explaining how the powerful ruling elites promote ‘false consciousness’, which results in the subjectification of the poor who (un-)willingly consent to act in ways contrary to their interests.

It is the unconscious or conscious acceptance of dominance by the powerless or poor that Lukes endeavours to explain with his third dimension of power. Lukes argues that in the third dimension the ruling class creates a “false consciousness” which manipulates the poor to perceive that the subjective interests of the wealthy are a reflection of the ‘real’ interests of the dominated. The interests of the poor or working class are distorted through ideological processes of domination. The Marxist approach typifies the zero-sum or ‘power over’ notion of power according to which the powerful dominate and benefit alone in their exercise of power over the political and economically marginalised. According to Swartz (2007) Lukes re-conceptualizes the Marxist notion of “false consciousness to indicate that power as domination entails any mechanism that misleads and compromises the individual autonomy of the powerless, dominated or marginalised”. However, unlike Marxism, Lukes fails to give an account or explanation of how the dominated come to have a consciousness of their own and whether such a shift or change will result in them exercising ‘power over’ or other forms of power such as ‘power to’ and ‘power with’.

3.3.5 Regulation theory

The regulation theory entails a neo-Marxist approach (Geddes, 2009:62); it was developed in the mid-1970s by a group of French economists (Michael Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz) to explain why and how the crisis in the capitalist system was not really developing into a huge problem. The theory sought to understand how capitalism was managing to normalise the crises in the economy and accumulation of wealth (Painter, 1995; Jessop, 1997; Goodwin, 2001). According to Goodwin (2001:72) and Painter (1995:277), the theory has been used so widely and loosely that there is no unified theory, and this has influenced scholars to rather call it an approach, not a theory. Scholars who have conducted studies utilising the approach have in several cases merely adopted its ideas and employed them in different socio-economic and political contexts.

The approach, it is argued, is a scholarly response to neo-classical economic ideas of market regulation and structural Marxist arguments on the decline of the capitalist system. The regulation theory argues that not only is the economy regulated by the market but also by other non-market forces (Aglietta, 1979; Jessop, 1997). It considers economic change to be the outcome of political, cultural and social forces (Painter, 1995:276). Correspondingly, Godwin (2001:72) contends that the regulation perspective examines the economy and suggests that continued capital accumulation is dependent on socio-cultural and political factors. He elaborates further:

“As a method of analysis, then, regulation theory starts from the premise that the reproduction of capitalist social relations is not guaranteed by the abstract relations that are the defining features of the capitalist mode of production. Rather, both crises in the accumulation process and phases of expanded production (when these occur) are the products of more concrete institutional structures, political and social processes and cultural discourses” (Godwin, 2001:72).

The theory seeks to account for some of the shortfalls of the Marxist urban theorisation, the failing to transcend contexts and geographical localities. This is explained further by Boyer (1990, cited in Goodwin, 2001:72) who states that the concern for variability of economic and social dynamics in space and time is the core theoretical issue that the approach seeks to answer. Furthermore, it recognises that crisis is an inherent feature of the capitalistic system and should be regulated properly by established institutional mechanisms (Painter & Godwin, 1995). Therefore, the theory emphasises the role of structural arrangements in controlling urban political dynamics.

According to Geddes (2009:62) and Painter (1995:277), the theory, aiming to explain how institutions manage to regulate capital accumulation by capitalists, focuses on two concepts, namely regime accumulation and modes of regulation, as explained below:

- **Regime accumulation:** relates to the nature of the economic association between investment, production and consumption (Geddes, 2009:62);
- **Modes of regulation:** refer to the social, political, and economic institutions that help create a stable and conducive regime of accumulation (Painter, 1995:277).

Painter (1995:277) explains further that a regime of accumulation is a set of macroeconomic dynamics which permits capital expansion without having disastrous effects on the economic system. He suggests that the regime of accumulation normally checks itself through different

economic cycles. A regime of accumulation may have crises and irregularities but these are stabilised through social and political institutions. These institutions constitute modes of regulation or modes of social regulation (Painter, 1995:278). Modes of regulations will not “completely alter the contradictions of capitalism but will translate serious crisis into crisis tendencies” (Painter, 1995:279).

The regulation approach has typically been connected to Fordism, which was an extended period of economic flourishing in Western society after the Second World War (1945-1974). The crisis of the Keynesian-Fordist era led to the introduction of neo-liberal principles of regulation which resulted in numerous changes regarding the roles of the government in promoting local and economic development. According to Brenner and Theodore (2002), the neo-liberal agenda that came after the crisis of the Fordist era saw the state being forced to promote free-market developmental regulatory systems. National and local government was supposed to remove barriers and obstacles to the accumulation of private capital; the crisis therefore, contributed to unrestricted capital accumulations by private entrepreneurs at the expense of the masses.

Brenner and Theodore (2002:350) argue that regulation in the neo-liberal period of the 1980s and 1990s promoted a situation in which competition and increased commodification penetrated the economy. Neo-liberalism as a regulatory system promoted increased privatisation, deregulation, reduction in public spending and tariff cuts. Consequentially, the system produced huge unintended results which led to increased unemployment and increased poverty amongst the poor. Peck and Theodore (2007) argue that deregulation dismantled and weakened the state’s capacity to regulate the economy, as it advocated weak governance systems that concentrated on competition and capital accumulations. In addition, Painter and Goodwin (2000) argue that regulation contributed to four modes of local state restructuring, which coincided with shifts:

- from welfare to workfare;
- from government-centred political management to a mode of governance which is pro-entrepreneurial focusing on local leadership and public-private cooperation;
- to strict financial and monetary regulation; and
- to economic promotion through a range of local supply side policies (2000, cited in Geddes, 2009:62).

Regulation argues for private-public partnerships in urban governance. It augments private accumulation whilst ensuring that the public as consumers are entitled to responsive provisioning of goods and services. The state and local governments are considered as the main regulators of local economic development. The approach views the power of the state in regulating socio-economic development as scaled and spatially dispersed in its application of regulation (Brenner, 2004). Globalisation and the internationalisation of markets have also contributed to changes in the regulatory functions of the state and local government. According to Kipfer and Keil (2002), the national government and municipalities presently have to focus on promoting capital accumulation since they compete with other global cities and towns in attracting investors. Therefore, the approach reduces state and local government control of development to that of promoting the creation of the 'entrepreneurial city'. According to Franz (2000:36), the idea of an entrepreneurial city is best expressed in the state in its role of promulgating regulatory mechanisms that enhance its competitiveness within the global economy. It has to implement policies and development projects that give priority to private interests and accumulation. Similarly, local government promotes economic accumulation through private investors and in the process, seeks to provide the best social services.

With regard to planning and decision-making in the urban development programmes, the regulation approach argues for a compromise to balance public and private interests. As Sager (1994:145) notes, compromises and conflict resolution are an everyday experience of urban planners and decision-makers. Regulation of urban development processes is, therefore, done with public interests in mind, although in most urban areas, due to the wish to attract investors, capital accumulation has prevailed. In this sense the regulation approach signifies the first dimension of power, since it involves urban development stakeholders participating in planning processes. The approach argues that the urban regulation space is composed of various interest groups, key amongst them being the state, local government, private companies, environmental organisations and international organisations. The regulation approach typically promotes capital accumulation to prevail over public interests. In this light the approach expounds on the existence of the three dimensions of power, but mostly suggests the zero-sum power dynamics that are typical of the first dimension of power. The theory furthermore incorporates the overt conflictual policy processes that exemplify the first and second dimensions of power. This is noticeable as compromises and conflict resolution are inherent aspects of urban planning. Consequently, the regulatory power influences the urban development process to concentrate on safe issues through compromises. The regulation approach, akin to the second dimension of

power, promotes agenda shaping by enacting procedures and reinforcing barriers hindering other actors to participate. In this regard, there is an overlap in the way agendas are shaped in both Lukes' and the regulation approach.

On the other hand, the approach can be incorporated into the third dimension of power which involves the shaping, manipulation and shifting of the ideological interests of other groups, seeing that regulation reforms in urban areas are only successful when other actors acquiesce and wilfully comply. Private interests normally prevail in urban regulation politics as the other actors wilfully accept this as a way of attracting investors. In this sense, other stakeholders accept that capital accumulation by private companies prevail and are manipulated into believing that such investments will benefit all the stakeholders.

Continuing along the same line, Paster (2015:6) indicates that according to Stigler (1971), the theory of regulation capture reveals that market regulations by the government are a result of regulatory capture by private companies or organisations, rather than by pursuing collective urban interests. This can be explained more through Lukes' third dimension of power, which reveals how the powerful ones in society shape the cognitions, perceptions and preferences of other key actors in such a way that all actors succumb to the interests of capital as a collective goal.

The regulation approach also endeavours to control the urban environment and space so that sustainable economic growth can be achieved. In this regard, the regulation approach seeks to promote the involvement of the state and private sector to ensure urban areas and developmental projects reproduce capital accumulation and sustained social service delivery. In this light, Painter (1995:293) claims that a major strength of the regulation approach lies in its attempt to disclose and explain the links between the economic, political and socio-cultural spheres. Nonetheless, scholars have argued that the approach is more teleological as it perceives history as unfolding from one regime of accumulation to the other. Painter (1995:290) indicates that certain critics have seen this as lessening the space of political intervention and political conflict. This implies that existing political situations can be evaluated only according to their success in helping to realise the pre-supposed future (Post-Fordism).

In addition, Painter (1995) notes that the approach has been critiqued for its functionalistic nature. The regulation approach is functionalistic as it explains the emergence of its new mode

(Post-Fordism) in terms of its effects on securing capital accumulation; this implies that Post-Fordism is seen as a necessary development since the process of capital accumulation needed it. Critics, therefore, argue that the effects of a phenomenon cannot serve as an explanation for its origin (Painter, 1995:290). The approach has also been criticised for undermining social struggles during the period of a mode of regulation. This is because the approach assumes that a mode of regulation is coherent and that all the classes involved in it are willing to compromise, without any form of conflict or social struggles. Cochrane (cited in Peter, 1995:292) further criticises the regulation approach by stating that in most countries, including America, local governments showed the features of Post-Fordism during the Fordist period. This signifies that the regulation theorists have not managed to distinguish Post-Fordism clearly from Fordism, and have not given a clear description and time-frame for the emergence of their assumed Post-Fordist period.

3.3.6 Public choice theory

In the discussion on the regulation approach, it was argued that the state and local government officials act to support capital accumulation by private individuals and promote the realisation of public goals through basic service delivery. However, the public-theory thesis argues that politicians or government officials and public individuals are focusing on realising of their own interest when making local policy decisions (Crow, 2009:121). The theory contends that the political being is always seeking ways and stratagems to maximising his/her own utility (Brennan & Buchanan, 1984). Keating (1995:123) echoes the same sentiments by stating that the “central tenets of the public choice theory are based on individualistic premises and utilitarian philosophy.” Accordingly, the theory suggests that for individuals the public good is merely an aggregate of an individual’s interests. Self-interest is, therefore, “a strong motivating force in all human activity; and human action, if not bounded by ethical or moral restraints, is inclined more naturally to aim at the furtherance of individual or private interest” (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962:27). This is evidently a contrasting view to that of the regulation approach, namely the public focus, which emphasises that all individuals are rational actors and their actions are predicated on furthering individual interests.

On the other hand, the public choice theory argues that the municipality or government is concerned with promoting the realisation of public interests. This is explained by Tullock as follows, “The conventional wisdom holds that the market is made up of private citizens trying

to benefit themselves but that government is concerned with something called the public interest” (1977:3).

Judge *et al.* (1995:7) states that the theory perceives the municipality or government as producers of local goods and services, and individuals as consumers paying for these local goods through the tax system. Similarly, Tiebout (1956, cited in Keating, 1995:123) argues that the local government is analogous to a firm while citizens can be considered the consumers. The theory also understands the urban area or city as a market for public goods in which different municipalities compete to provide the right mix of goods and services to the public individuals at different prices (tax). The individuals are seen as making choices on their preferred mix by deciding to stay in a given urban centre or location. In this regard, Tiebout states:

“The consumer-voter maybe viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods ... if the community fails to satisfy the preferences of the individual, he will move (the act of ‘voting with his feet’)” (Tiebout, 1956:418).

Furthermore, according to the theory, the availability of different municipalities in the urban market to provide different forms of goods and services, can be seen as promoting efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. Efficiency from a public-choice perspective is based on the presence of competing service providers. In support of Tiebout *et al.* (1999:2238) argue that the public-choice perspective suggests that the creation of market forces in the public and non-profit sectors will lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness due to competition amongst service providers.

Keating (1995:123) views the competition in service provision to be helpful in shifting the focus from bureaucratic self-interest to that of public interest. Moreover, Keating (1995) explains that the competition promotes local development in the metropolitan areas as it also allows investors to choose an area that best guarantees their accumulation and profiteering interests. This has led Buchanan (2003) to comment that public choice theory is “politics without romance”, since in the political spaces of urban governance each actor seems to be concentrating on his or her interests. Engelen (2007:167) notes that public officials will typically seek to pursue their own interests instead of acting in favour of public interests. Contrastingly, it can be argued that the presence of metropolitan competition, the idea of politicians needing re-election, and the community composed of rational actors, will compel the local government to employ a variety of techniques so as to win more votes (consumers)

than their rivals. This is in line with Keating's (1995) assertion that local governments have to provide responsive services to the public at a minimum cost.

According to the public-choice theory, consumers are afforded the function of making rational choices when procuring goods and services. According to Tiebout (1956:422), public choice views individuals as engaging in a cost-benefit analysis when seeking to purchase public goods, such as housing, or to move to a new area or town. The approach perceives consumers as seeking a different service mix and taxes which correspond to their preferences (Keating 1995:126), which means that choices mostly differ with people. From this it can be inferred that urban policies are supposed to emphasise community interest when providing public goods such as housing, parks, football grounds, water and other social services. Furthermore, the theory argues that provision of social services is best possible by consolidating governments, since this increases the resource pool of governing bodies, ensuring they are able to provide public goods.

Thus, from the public-choice perspective, the urban political field is seen as more of a market place in which the local governments compete to provide different mixes of goods and services to the public. The community is perceived to be composed of rational actors who have to choose whether to buy a given social good depending on its utility value and its cost (tax). The approach also illustrates that all urban political actors have individual interests they seek to fulfil in the policy praxis of the metropolitan areas. Policy-making in the urban area is, therefore, influenced by various interest groups. However, as has been argued, competition and the desire for re-election motivate public officials to provide responsive, efficient and effective service delivery.

The nature of stakeholder relationships on which the public choice approach is based, is analogous to the Lukesian "three dimensions" of power. The first dimension of power corresponds to the urban environment perceived to be composed of different interest groups, such as competing local governments, private individuals, the state and community. The public choice approach asserts that local municipalities engage in overt competition in the conception and execution of different policy mixes, which encourages responsive service provision. The competition amongst the different municipalities in delivering the right mix of public goods and services translates into conflict. As a result, certain municipalities or stakeholders are compelled to influence decision-making and planning of vital urban policies.

As argued by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) the public-choice theory views power as the ability of actors with interests to secure distinct preferences in political decision-making through their individual actions. These scholars view the arena of urban market policy-making in terms of organisations competing on an uneven plane. Urban political decision-making, therefore, reflects non-decision-making as certain groups are prevented systematically from participating in service provision (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970:43). The competition amongst different actors stifles the promotion of public interests and establish private preferences in urban policy spaces. Following Lukes and Haglund (2005:59), it can be inferred that public choices are predisposed to the movement of Lukes' third dimension of power, as public interests may be manipulated and shaped by dominant individual or group preferences. According to Haglund (2014:45-46), public-choice planners may control community choices or inclinations by limiting the dissemination of information, knowledge production and interpretation of strategic development options.

The public-choice approach has had its fair share of criticism as well. Keating (1995:124) argues that the notion of human beings as maximisers of rational utility is not clear. He explains that humans in some cases have portrayed altruistic behaviour and have subordinated their own preferences to moral impulses. The theory has failed to acknowledge that most social and political behaviour is collective, rather than individually orientated. From this Keating (1995) asserts that the theory has concealed its normative judgement about events by utilising objective statements. Furthermore, Keating (1995:124) indicates that the notion of self-interest is problematic, since interests are embedded in structures; they are governed by the structures they find themselves in. This is noted by Stone (1993:10) who states that, "We radically alter our understanding of politics if we think about preferences as being formed not in the context of static social structures, but rather in a context of dynamic social interactions that sometimes reveal new possibilities and offer changing opportunities" (quoted in Keating, 1995:124-125).

Scholars have also criticised the public choice's issue of allocation and efficiency of services as difficult to measure (Keating, 1995). Green and Shapiro (1994:148) have contended that the public choice theory has not been able to justify its propositions empirically. They note that, "Subscribing to the view that elected officials act strategically to enhance their popularity among voters qualifies one as a rational choice theorist only in the loosest sense." They claim that although scholars may agree that self-interest exists amongst public officials, the theory with its various propositions has not proved to be an accurate reflection of urban politics.

3.3.7 Feminist perspective on urban politics

Women have been arguing for an equitable city where all voices are heard and all are able to influence local decision-making. Most of the urban theories that have been discussed in this chapter suggest that group interest and various actors shape urban political spaces. Clarke *et al.* (1995:205) points out that women are arguing for more gender-sensitive urban politics. They posit that most urban theories do not incorporate a gendered lens when considering urban politics (Clarke *et al.*, 1995:205-206). In addition, several feminist scholars argue that gender has been omitted frequently from urban planning and policy-making (Clark *et al.*, 1995; McDowell, 1999; Bondi, 2005; Fainstein & Servon, 2005; Garber, 2009). This is confirmed by Bondi (2005:1) who states that, “Gender is an integral, ubiquitous and taken-for-granted aspect of urban life. It is an influential dimension of urban identities, an axis of urban inequalities, and it animates the everyday practices that characterize and constitute cities and city life.” Feminism expresses issues of marginalisation and exclusion that face women in urban politics due to the patriarchal nature of urbanity. Feminist approaches are rooted in the critique of the androcentric or patriarchal nature of society and its economic system. They view urban politics as shaped by gendered social and economic relations (Clarke *et al.*, 1995:207), and that the patterning of gender is largely an urban issue.

Feminists assert that the goal of promoting an inclusionary city, and of empowering the marginalised voices and groups, cannot be separated from the overarching feminist objective of removing gender and sexual hierarchies in society (Garber, 2009:207-208). They argue that hierarchical dichotomies should be dismantled (Garber, 2009:206) and that the urban political systems should be more permeable to feminist and gay issues, and to their voices. Feminists therefore, advocate for a gender mainstreaming of the formulation and implementation of urban policy so that these policies can lead to the design of political representable institutions (Clarke *et al.*, 1995:217). Furthermore, Clarke *et al.* suggest that the participation of women in local politics should not only be notable in “the context of gendered changes in employment structures and work regimes,” but also through the emerging post-welfare governance arrangements and collective local interest groups (Clarke *et al.*, 1995:211).

Following the Lukesian approach to power, gender dynamics in urban development arenas demonstrate the prevalence of power as domination. The exercises of power in urban policy-making is largely dominated by masculine voices. From a feminist critique, power in an urban context occurs as a relation of domination, which has often been seen to be synonymous to

‘oppression’, ‘subjection’, ‘subordination’ and the marginalisation of women. Power is exercised over women as they are ascribed to positions which are labelled inferior, or to what Lukes (1997) refers to as “ascriptive humiliation”.

Lukes (1997) argues that women are ascribed devalued positions in the society, which construct them as normal subjects of patriarchal subordination. Women, consciously or unconsciously, acquiesce in subjectification, as power works “in the most effective and insidious [ways]... preventing grievances and shaping their [women’s] perceptions, cognition and preferences, in such a way that they accept their role in the existing social order” (Lukes, 1974:23, 24). Decisions in urban policy processes are made by men, and women (un)consciously accept these decisions as reflecting their real interests, therefore, perpetuating or reproducing dominance.

In light of the above, Thompson (2001:11) argues that ‘power over’ or domination is propelled by the unwitting and complicit actions of its victims. The reason is that domination is perceived as ‘business as usual’ or ‘taken for granted’ since women are seldom aware of their real interests. The patriarchal nature in the conception and execution of urban policy can only be overcome when women desist from accepting a false consciousness and regain an awareness of the real objective of feminist praxis, which involves studying patriarchy and seeking alternative mechanisms to empower women. Feminism therefore advocates for transformative urban political institutions that will best promote issues of gender mainstreaming and inclusiveness in socio-economic and political spaces. Similarly, feminism promotes the shift from ‘power over’ to ‘power to’ and ‘power with’ in metropolitan or urban political spheres. This limits the Lukesian approach and calls for a more robust conceptualization that will indicate the other forms of power.

As was pointed out previously, Lukes over-concentrated on power asymmetries, and overlooked ‘power to’ and ‘power with’. Following Allen and Haugaard, it can be argued that there is a need to rework and reinterpret the Lukesian approach in order to include an explanation of how power can shift from one form to another. This calls for a move from one-sided power as domination to multi-dimensional power, which include other explanations and forms of power. Allen (2007, cited in Haugaard, 2010:2, 3) argues that there needs to be a move away from equating power with domination; she suggests that the different forms of power constitute the different political interactions amongst actors. Thus, there is a need for the Lukesian approach to be broadened so as to incorporate a balanced conceptualization of power in which the notion of domination can shift to emancipation and collective action.

3. 4 Conclusion

The current chapter has highlighted the nature of power-games that are pervasive in urban politics. It has been established that there are various actors in urban power dynamics, and these include, and is not limited to the state, public officials, elites, urban developers, local politicians, women, private investors, community members and the global community. This strongly corroborated the Lukesian first dimension of power, which is atypical of a plurality of interested parties in urban policy processes. The chapter has indicated that the praxis of urban policy are predicated upon the influence of different stakeholder preferences and interests, as each group seeks to prevail over the other in swaying the outcome of planning and implementing policies . When interest groups make policies in the metropolitan areas they engage in power struggles and conflicts, as groups' objectives are the overall control over key developmental issues. This affirms Lukes characterisation of the second dimension of power. In these power games, actors exercise power over each other through decision-making, agenda-setting or non-decision-making and by creating a false consciousness of 'real' interests.

The chapter has extended the theoretical basis of the thesis by considering other theoretical lenses scholars have utilised to explaining urban political relationships. The various scholarly schools of thought that have been considered clearly illustrate the main actors and nature of relationships that exists amongst the interest groups in the execution and conceptions of metropolitan or urban development policy stratagems.

Concurring with Lukes, the theories have indicated that interest groups engage in observable and latent conflict by seeking control of key decision-making positions. The powerful in urban political spheres are the ones who are able to influence several key development issues such as the coalition of groups of people in urban settings who focus on successful execution of public policy preferences. Actors and interest groups have an unequal distribution of power. As has been pointed out, this condition have prompted the local government and the state to regulate the political dynamics in favour of the concerns and interests of the public (which is in line with Lukes' second face of power).

However, noticeable has been idea that actors can create a false conscious amongst the other subordinate groups or interest parties. This occurs to the extent that actors' real interests are hidden, and subjective interests are deemed to apply to all. Individual or private interests frequently are able to influence urban policy structures. Therefore, the choices made and

alternatives sought are normally a reflection of the overarching effects of gendered participation, elite capture, partisanship, market forces and structural arrangements. In this sense, the theories discussed in this chapter illustrated how the powerful or dominating interest groups are able to prevail in major urban decision-making, agenda-setting, and in the shaping other groups' preferences and interests .

However, it was pointed out in the present study that some alternative theories have revealed the gaps in Lukes' theorising of power. Lukes did not consider the chaotic and unstable conflicts as are common in hyper-pluralism. Lukes did not keep into account the interdependence and trust that occurs in urban development, which promotes concerted efforts (power to) and could help broaden his approach.

The present study has also indicated that unlike Marxism's distinction of false and true consciousness, Lukes' theory needs a reformulation to include instances of power shifts between the dominated and powerful with an explanation on whether such a change implies the exercise of other forms of power. There is a need to reconsider incorporating shifts from one form of power to the other, rather than equating every exercise of power with domination. This has also been indicated in the discussion on the feminist critique of Lukes' work *Power: A radical view (PRV)*.

The exercise of power in the praxis of development policy is rife with competition, conflicts and struggles. This will become clear in the following chapter, which examines the state and nature of housing provision in South Africa. It will attempt to situate the Khutsong housing problem in the broader global, regional and national housing provision systems. In this regard, focus will be on the challenges that states and local governments are facing in addressing the housing crisis.

In this chapter the socio-economic and political consequences of power dynamics in the delivery of housing in South Africa are explored. The chapter considers the manifest and latent characteristics of power dynamics in housing provision in South Africa. In this regard, it will also review the laws, conventions, legislatures and regulations that have been put in place to help provide affordable and decent housing. Finally, the chapter investigates the geological and environmental issues in Khutsong and attempts to situate these issues within the larger global framework of housing and environmental concerns.

Chapter 4: Low-cost housing provision in South Africa

4.1 Introduction

Continuing with the discussion of the previous chapters, this chapter builds on the theoretical and scholarly arguments examined in Chapters 2 and 3 on the discourses about urban housing policies. This study seeks to comprehend, describe and explain the power-play inherent in housing provision systems in the light of the Khutsong settlement project. This chapter discusses the various approaches that are used globally and nationally with respect to housing delivery. It also clarifies approaches which contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how housing is provided. It will also identify the various stakeholders involved in the praxis of housing policy. The focus is on the different policy approaches that have been implemented globally and in South Africa. The chapter analyses the inherent power dynamics (covert and overt) that propel housing and development processes towards given outcomes. The assumptions and ideological orientations of different approaches shape the nature of housing legislation and policy frameworks in a given socio-economic space.

Housing provision in the developing world (and especially in South Africa) is an intractable and often politically-contested issue. For this reason, this chapter explains the general nature of housing provision and the power struggles which characterise it as is shown in the Khutsong case study. This chapter also investigates the presuppositions of housing-delivery dynamics and links these with the positions and counter-positions inherent in the Khutsong housing project.

Such contestations are more pronounced in urban areas which are characterised mostly by acute shortages of adequate and affordable housing. As Castells (1977) explains, most urban political dynamics take the form of struggles around social services, or provision of commodities. One such social service is housing where providing residences to citizens has been one of the foci of urban conflicts and struggles in the world, and especially in South Africa. A critical reflection on the housing-provision problem in the world has led Rogers (2013) to argue that the continual manifestation of housing shortages in societies suggests that housing is a 'wicked problem'. Consequently, housing delivery has become an intractable problem characterised firstly, by inadequacy –housing backlogs, burgeoning informal settlements (shanty towns/shacks/slums) and backyard dwellings; and secondly, violent power struggles amongst stakeholders.

The discussion that follows provides a brief overview of global policies regarding low-cost housing and is followed by a critical examination of the policy approaches taken pre- and post-1994 (i.e., pre- and post-Apartheid). On the one hand, this will help locate the South African issue, particularly the Khutsong Settlement project, within a broad treatise of housing-policy development. On the other hand, it will place the South African housing crisis within a wider discursive context by examining its historical, global and local antecedents.

Finally, the chapter discusses the nature of housing in Khutsong. Leading to the conclusions, the discussion follows an analytical and more critical approach to understanding the causal forces behind the persistent housing crisis in Khutsong. The current scholarly debate draws its literature from documents on government policy and scholarly opinions for a comprehensive understanding of the nature of South Africa's low-cost housing policy. The discussion also contributes to a political theorising of housing studies.

4.2 Approaches to global housing

Approaches to urban housing have been changing due to major shifts in development discourses (Jenkins *et al.*, 2007; Choguill, 2007). Some approaches have recurred while others have been limited to a given period of socio-economic and political-development. Schwartz (2006:3) and Conway (2003:2) argue that housing policies are seldom only about adequacy and affordability, but rather are linked to social, political and economic factors. Early in the 19th century in the United States of America (USA), for example, housing provision was premised on notions of affordability and adequacy. The turn of the century, however, saw a shift towards incorporating mechanisms to regulate health regulatory and create employment as integral aspects of the approach to housing policy (Marcuse, 1986; Schwartz, 2006).

However, as noted by Balchin (2003:1) approaches to housing provision also reflect the reigning political ideology of any given state. Governments in central Europe, for example, tend to prefer less state intervention and prioritise support for socially-rented units, owner occupations and private land ownership. Conversely, governments geographically to the left of central Europe permit state intervention in the housing market, with local governments collaborating with other organisations to provide public housing (Balchin, 2003).

Approaches to housing policy also differ in terms of stakeholders' involvement. Certain approaches, for example, limit the role of the state, or government, to that of regulator, while others allow the state to be the guarantor and provider of housing subsidies. Housing

approaches, moreover, may support the establishment, or construction of specific housing structures, or households (e.g. low-income, elderly, homeless, slum dwellers) (Jenkins *et al.*, 2007).

Other approaches to housing policy may focus on the preservation, or renovation of existing structures (slum-upgrades, etc.), or creation of entirely new and different housing units (Schwartz, 2006:5). Different approaches to housing policy have differing goals and expectations of stakeholders' engagement in the process. In some cases, community members, the state and non-governmental development organisations collaborate as key role-players. In other cases, approaches to housing provision (such as low-income public housing) the government adopts an exclusive approach.

According to Ley (2009:12), global approaches to the provision of urban housing include state provided (supply-side), self-help, or market-provided approaches, while Hamdi (1995:26-32) and Croese *et al.* (2016:237) classify the major approaches to housing according to either supply driven, or enabling approaches (see section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 below). Jenkins and Smith (2001:486) argue that in the Third World, a major theme in housing discourse has been the interplay of the state, market and society in the approach to housing delivery.

The aim of the following section is to give an overview of and explain the underlying conception of the roles and capacities of various stakeholders in the evolution of housing-development processes.

4.2.1 Approaches to state-driven housing

State-led approaches to low-cost housing reached a global peak during the 1960s and 1970s when proponents of modernisation argued for economic growth with a trickledown effect. During this period, adherents of development argued that the rural sphere was more traditional and poverty-stricken. The need to enjoy the fruits of economic growth led most rural people to migrate to the cities and towns. This influx caused urban densification, which proliferated into the growth of informal settlements (explained later) and increased the demand for social services.

The state promoted large-scale, social housing schemes, as a way to address the growing demand for houses. In this regard, the state became the provider of low-cost, urban housing, which normally was located on the outskirts of urban settlements, or within the inner city. This

approach to housing provision is known as the supply-side approach. Kemeny (1995) suggests that the supply-side approach to housing allows the state to provide a safety net for the relatively poor. State-led, or supply-side approaches to housing provision focus on the quantitative reduction in adequate shelter deficits, with a predominant bias on quantity over quality, because standardised, low-income houses are mass-produced in order to reduce demand (Ehebrecht, 2014:41).

Supply-side approaches have been successful in certain countries owing to particular socio-economic and political factors. According to Schwartz (2006:6), as early as 1937, the USA began promoting project-based subsidies, or supply-side housing approaches for low-income earners. The USA supports low-income earners through the construction of different housing developments. This is done by, for example, paying rent on private properties and the government providing housing-developments grants. On the other end of the scale, as early as the 1920s, the government in South Africa commenced its public housing project which was exclusively for poor whites (Morris, 1981), with lower tax funding for blacks. In time, however, the South African government managed to incorporate various previously disadvantaged populations as beneficiaries into the pool for housing subsidies.

Approaches to the provision of housing in Britain have evolved over time. Conway (2003:18) traces the approaches to British housing policy back to the Industrial Revolution and indicates that increased urbanisation and densified population prompted the need for housing because most of the urban workers were staying in poorly and overcrowded units. Conway points out that prior provision was done mostly by the church and other charity organisations that sought to help the poor find accommodation.

State intervention in housing, however, started approximately 160 years ago in Britain. The government started by being involved indirectly in private housing through its regulation of the housing market nexus, and through direct state subsidies. Much of the state's need to provide housing was influenced by the economic and health explosions of the Industrial Revolution (1832 and 1849), because numerous workers perished of cholera and typhus. At this point, the state sought to provide better mass-driven, subsidised housing to the workers and the poor so as to avoid precarious economic growth and social unrest (Conway, 2003).

Prior to the health crisis, private developers had been the main providers of low-income houses (of back-to-back, rows, cellars, huddled courts and tenement blocks) which were constructed

with a view to profit. After World War I, there was an increased demand for housing as households grew exponentially. This created a challenge since construction was at a standstill, the state being at war. The state began constructing houses, however, shifting its focus to quality housing. Slum clearance became the norm as new, improved structures were built through subsidies granted to local municipalities. The housing policy in Britain, consequently, took different approaches, depending on the context and social order of the time.

During World War II, the state ceased providing housing, and several areas deteriorated into slums which were cleared later during the 1960s and 1970s. The discourse on housing provision took a turn in the 1980s, however, when housing became perceived through the 'rights' lens. Owing to this, the Conservative government of the time, promoted a market-driven approach to housing, where the state procured housing for the poor, while private interests and competition guaranteed the provision of housing (Conway, 2003:22). Housing approaches, consequently, were no longer based on state-supply/needs, but on what the market could afford.

In countries such as Switzerland and Germany, private-sector housing predominates. According to Balchin (2003:25), Switzerland and Germany have the highest proportion of rental houses in Europe. In Switzerland, the geographical terrain and its natural habitats have contributed largely to this phenomenon as construction is done according to strict regulations and codes. The monopolisation of construction and building resources has also made it extremely difficult to utilise green fields for housing for the poor.

In Germany, the state was mandated by legislation such as the Housing Construction Act (1950 and 1960) after World War II to provide housing for a large proportion of the poor. The German state worked alongside market-interest groups to deliver housing units. It withdrew from taking a direct provider role during its period of reunification in 1990. As noted by McCrone and Stephens (1995), however, since reunification, the German government has employed a more direct, or supply-side approach to housing provision (see also Balchin 2003:25).

According to Ehebrecht (2014:42), during the post-war era and up to the 1960s, the supply-side model was the dominant approach followed in providing houses for the poor in the Global South. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Croese *et al.* (2016:238) note that approaches to housing policy have not been uniform since they alternated continually between supply-side and support-side approaches. Croese *et al.* (2016) argues that during the 1950s and 1960s, modernisation promoted an interventionist function for the state regarding housing with the

urban areas being viewed as functionaries of economic growth (African Centre for Cities [ACC], 2015:7).

In conjunction with the prevailing development discourse, African nations began engaging in slum-clearance and the development of government rental housing stock in order to provide shelter to those who could not be accommodated in the formal housing market (Stren, 1990). In doing so, the global world viewed slum eradication as a ‘quick fix’ to informalise urban fringes. Such housing initiatives were captured by the middle class who benefitted, while the poor were marginalised further (ACC, 2015:7). Nevertheless, even after providing housing to the poor, the government could not sustain its efforts (Croese *et al.*, 2016:237; ACC, 2015:8; Choguill, 2007:146). The reason was that the state could not act as an efficient landlord, by setting extremely low rental prices and failing to recover rents from tenants (Jenkins *et al.*, 2007:154-156; Gilbert, 2007). The recipients of state-led housing also worsened the housing problem because they either sold their units, or chose to return to the slums where service provision was free. During the 1960s, the ‘solution’ of slum clearance and the provision of formal housing became a daunting and costly process.

There was a policy shift in the 1970s towards self-help-building housing, or support-led-construction of housing (Croese *et al.*, 2016:238). This came about due to the financial constraints of providing formal housing for the poor, as well as increased awareness of the importance of informal housing as an alternative for sheltering the poor.

The state-driven model has been the express approach adopted in the Global South’s shelter development. The South African housing landscape has seen the government functioning as the major player in the provision of low-cost housing during the pre- and post-1994 regimes. As noted by Croese *et al.* (2016:237), the main approach to housing policy that has been followed in most African countries is the massification of supply-driven models to shelter development. These have produced ‘urban fantasies’ (Watson, 2013) and outdated solutions to the housing problem (Buckley, 2015; Croese *et al.*, 2016). The supply-side approach to housing has dominated post-Apartheid housing policy praxis, but this model’s deficiencies have contributed to continual housing backlogs, community protests, burgeoning informal settlements and densely-populated backyard dwellings.

In order to trace the trajectory that has been followed in international approaches to housing policy, the support paradigm for housing provision is considered below. This gives the

background of the policy approach, seeing that its imprints are clearly visible in South Africa's stratagems for its shelter-policies.

4.2.2 Supporter- or self-assisted housing approaches

Increasingly states were struggling with growing financial costs due to public housing provision, as well as the growing realisation that informal housing was a form of shelter that could be developed and constructed into sustainable human settlements. This understanding made the state adopt approaches that favour self-help housing schemes (Fox, 2014). Consequently, in the 1970s, the overarching idea of housing policy was that public assistance is an integral component of housing development which could be harnessed to ensure that the poor have tenure of a secured shelter (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2005:235).

Self-help housing was influenced largely by the ideas of Charles Abrams (1966) and John Turner's self-styled anarchist approach (Pugh, 2001:402; Jenkins & Smith, 2001:487), although scholarly work indicates that even before the popularisation of this approach, it was historically a form and approach to housing delivery over the centuries (Ward, 1982; Parnell & Hart, 1999; Pugh, 2001). According to Harris (2003), as early as the 1930s Brazilian, Peruvian and Indian households already were utilising self-help.

The main thrust of the self-help approach was a radical shift in urban, socio-spatial thinking regarding informal settlements as urban problems, to a more enlightened view of them as the solution to the challenge of urban housing (Turner, 1972). The support-side model to housing development, therefore, acknowledges the growing informal sector as a strategic mechanism by the poor to address deficits in urban housing (Ehebrecht, 2014:42).

According to Pugh (2001:402), the ideological and philosophical understandings of Turner's housing approach were evident in the titles of his publications, viz. *Freedom to build* (1972) and *Housing by the people* (1976). According to Ward (1982), Turner argued that state-driven housing projects had failed since they were technocratic and highly bureaucratic, but could have been successful if these systems had allowed 'dweller control' and the 'freedom to build' regarding processes by the poor. Harris (2003:248), elaborates that with self-help housing approaches, households have total control of the design, construction and completion of their housing units which they are able to construct from their own efforts and within their own timeframe.

Through the self-help housing approach, the state or government's role is to provide support to squatter, or informal-settlement households. This is done by providing basic human settlement amenities such as land, roads, sewers, toilets, water, knowledge and financial assistance (Ward, 1982). Turner (1976) was of the view that providing only basic services and access to land by the poor allowed them to develop their units incrementally through individual savings and collective resource mobilisation. As such, the success of the support model was contingent on the capacitation of the poor with housing-development resources (Ebrehecht, 2014:42). The success of this approach was perceived to be due to the inhabitants of the slums being able to build far more cost-effectively compared to government contractors.

Accordingly, Jenkins and Smith (2001:487), suggest that self-help or self-managed projects at that time were premised on the potential of individual households and communities to provide more use value and efficiency in housing than state-led approaches. Turner, therefore, foresaw a situation in which urban migrants could easily progress from peripherals to inclusive citizens through incremental upgrading and housing consolidations. On account of this vision, housing provision was perceived as a progressive, development process (Harris, 2003) which is why Turner opposed clearance and eradication of slums.

Turner's ideas on self-help housing influenced major policy approaches to both Third world and First world urban settlements because the inhabitants of slums were then seen as residents of the urban landscape and were granted rights and privileges to determine the spatial standards of the urban geography (Smith, 1987). During the 1970s, consequently, informal settlements were perceived positively by different urban-housing stakeholders with the main focus on ensuring that these structures were integrated into the formal, urban spatial settings. The notion of co-operatives in housing delivery, as a form of institutionalised self-help, emerged from this self-help approach. (Khurana, 2001).

Turner's work influenced the World Bank's site-and-services approach in the 1970s since it was argued that granting the poor freedom to build and tenure would enable them to construct and develop their own housing structures individually. According to Harris (2003:167), through the idea of the self-help housing approach the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) became international institutions in housing provision.

In addition, Choguill (2007:146) explains how governments and international institutions realised that providing housing for the poor was highly unsustainable and would fail to resolve the burgeoning housing crisis. This led to policy shifts in the approach to self-help housing. The World Bank was a major supporter of this approach to housing and it argued that the role of the state was to provide services, plots, or sites which were to be given to the poor for further incremental developments. Self-help housing was considered the most reasonable strategy to allow the poor to customise housing resources and thereby overcome the challenges of unresponsive structures that were a recurrent feature of conventional formal housing (Afsha, 1991).

The World Bank, however, did take a more economic approach to the self-help housing ideas of Turner, emphasising its affordability (Jones & Ward, 1994; Pugh, 1992). According to the African Centre for Cities [ACC] (2015:9), approaches to self-help policies coincided with the developmental discourses on basic rights and redistribution with growth that were prominent issues in the 1970s and 1980s. As such, the international institutions such as the World Bank which were willing to promote urban economic transformation, saw the self-help paradigm as a strategy to enlist affordable housing for the poor.

Unlike the state-driven subsidised housing programmes, the World Bank's self-help approach was premised on the "provision of new tracts of urbanized land in convenient locations with the basic supporting services needed to produce viable low-income communities as well as upgrading schemes to improve conditions in existing squatter settlements through the provision of public utilities and community services" (World Bank, 1974, cited in ACC, 2015:9).

Consequently, the international institutions' version of self-help applied the concepts of slum upgrading and sites-and-services (Pillay, 1995). Slum upgrading meant a number of different things, but is generally associated with in-site improvement in an area by granting secure tenure and providing basic services (ACC, 2015:10; Croese *et al.*, 2016:238). This approach was followed by the apartheid government in South Africa between 1983 and 1990 (Huchzemeyer, 2001), and post-1994 through the People's Housing Process (PHP) (Gumbo, 2014; Rust, 2006).

Despite the influence of the self-help housing model, critics as well as empirical evidence questioned the relevance and significance of this approach to housing. Neo-Marxists such as Burgess (1992) questioned Turner's idea of the autonomy of poor households in self-help schemes. According to Mathey (1992), poor households depend largely on the state, or private

financial institutions which normally have the autonomy of the entire construction process, contrary to Turner's assertions on this matter. Self-help approaches were opposed because it did not offer the poor a number of choices, but was the only available option. Therefore, Turner erred to argue for housing freedom when there were no alternatives from which to choose.

According to Ward (1982), the romanticism of self-help obscured and perpetuated the suffering experienced by the poor. For them self-help building was not a choice, but often the only alternative. From a Marxist perspective, the self-help housing approach was seen as a strategy for social control and pacification of the masses (Burgess, 1992).

Self-help, on the one hand, concentrated on individual households and obscured the political dynamics that occur in the urban market. The reason is that housing is produced and exchanged under the influence of stakeholders such as the local government, elites, land owners, private individuals, local leaders and international agencies. On the other hand, Payne (1984 cited in Croese *et al.*, 2016:238), points out the fact that the sites and services, as well as the slum-upgrading approach, had detrimental outcomes. This process led to housing and sites captured by the middle class; the continued marginalisation of housing settlements; costly service provision; power dynamics amongst stakeholders and undue completion delays of projects. The World Bank (1978:16) also criticised this approach to housing policy as being too expensive and it, therefore, had to shift focus to a more pragmatic approach, which involved a more market-related focus, which is explained in the following section. [until here last]

4.2.3 Enabling approach

The crisis emerging from the failures of self-help and state-driven approaches, led to a reconfiguration of orientations for housing policies which merged both approaches. According to Pugh (1991), the enabling approach was more of an extension of the self-help housing approach, but with a broader and more structured allocation of the roles of different stakeholders. Jenkins *et al.* (2007:168) explains it as follows:

“Enablement was defined as providing legislative, institutional and financial frameworks for entrepreneurship of private sector, communities and individuals, and hence in this period the international agencies focused assistance on promoting the development of policies and programmes as opposed to projects.”

At the beginning of the enabling approach to housing, the government was tasked with setting up boundaries for the operation of market forces and relinquishing its control over housing markets. Angel (2000:12) notes that the enabling model to housing provision was predominant during the IMF and World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and early 1990s which saw a shift to *laissez faire* processes in housing. Angel (2000:13) adds that during the SAPs, there was reduced state intervention in the production of social commodities such as housing, seeing that the state was seen only as an enabler in the socio-economic environment.

Choguill (2007:146) notes that the enablement approach was directed at removing bottlenecks in the attempt to promote a balance between the supply and demand for housing. It was during this period, that the housing discourse began incorporating ideas of poverty alleviation. Especially noteworthy was the 1996 Istanbul Declaration, which adopted the goal of providing shelter to all, with a focus on poverty alleviation and sustainability (Croese *et al.*, 2016).

This change in policy saw a re-emergence of slum upgrading as a major approach in housing policies (Gilbert, 2007). The reason was that such policies was considered as a mechanism to reduce vulnerability and improve the livelihoods of slum dwellers. Major housing projects were, therefore, established as a move towards eradicating the stigma of inadequate shelter. The government was thereafter forced to reconfigure its role as a provider to that of an enabler. Jenkins and Smith (2001) and Pugh (1995) report that this approach saw a partnership between the private sector, communities, civil organisations and the public sector aimed at providing housing. The involvement of private market forces in low-income housing provision was seen as strengthening the state's inadequate resource and helped made the provision of housing more efficient. By transferring the role of housing provision to the private sector, the government's focus changed to that of providing affordable sites and services, loans and subsidies (Pugh, 1992; Srivanas, 2009).

As evidenced by several scholarly critics of the SAPs and the deregulation approach to social service provision, the enabling approach did not help address the housing crisis. In line with this reproach, Choguill (2007:146) points out that reduced state intervention in housing projects did not promote affordability and access to housing for the poor because the units constructed during the 1980s and early 1990s were still expensive for most urban slum inhabitants. Elaborating on this point, Sengupta and Ganesan (2004:53) claim that both the provider and enabler approaches to housing have failed dismally in attempting to solve the housing crisis.

Thus, there is a need for policy makers to restructure policies and scale up supply as well as affordability by enlisting the state as a proactive stakeholder in housing provision. Similarly, Croese *et al.* (2016:237), notes that the current discourse on housing provision in most developing countries has shown a return to supply-side, or state-driven approaches.

4.3 The current state of the global housing crisis

In considering the three main approaches that have dominated the housing discourses for decades, it would be insightful to establish whether the state had success in providing housing to the poor. Choguill (2007:146) notes that the population of slum dwellers is exponentially increasing, signalling the failure of the policies adopted to housing provision. The influx of slum dwellers to the urban fringes has heightened the need for housing. Scholars maintain that this urban population explosion will increase, for example, the UN-Habitat (2014), states that as many as 54% of the world's population will reside in cities in the future. Similarly, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2007:1, 9) and UNDP (2010:62) projects that approximately 3,3 billion people (more than half of the world's population) are urban dwellers will reach 5 billion by 2030 (Jiboye, 2011).

This population of urban dwellers is expected to grow by 1.4 billion people, with urban residents assumed to account for nearly 60% of this growth by 2030 (Jones *et al.*, 2014; USAID, 2013). This growing population also includes slum dwellers. Fox (2008) and Wekesa *et al.* (2011) estimate the number of urban slum dwellers around a billion. The UN-Habitat (2011: xii) points out that a third of the world's urban populations reside in slums. In a later report, the UN-Habitat (2012) notes that in 2010, 40% of the world's urban population was residing in slums, thus showing the dire need for augmented housing delivery if this population is to acquire safe accommodation. In the developing world, therefore, informal settlements are an exponential problem (Davis, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2008; 2012; 2014; UNDP, 2010; Grey, 2012; Fox, 2014), which needs to be addressed through a mix of different approaches to housing policy.

The population explosion in urban areas in the developing world has incapacitated numerous governments and states restricting their resources to provide housing. In the developing world, a major problem is noticeable, viz. the inadequacy of low cost, or social housing provision for the poor. The problem of adequate and affordable housing has been a central theme in countries of the Global South, particularly in Africa (Davis, 2007; Choguill, 2007; Jenkins *et al.*, 2007;

Harrison *et al.*, 2008; Watson, 2009; Lemanski, 2009; Jiboye, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2008; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2014; UNDESA, 2014; Grey, 2012; Grant, 2009; Bekker & Therborn, 2012; Muchadenyika, 2015; Buckley *et al.*, 2015; Croese *et al.*, 2016). This volume of work is due to the unprecedented rate at which Africa is urbanising. As argued by Van Huyssteen *et al.* (2013), this has left several governments with risks and vulnerabilities that are difficult to mitigate because the growth of the urban poor is a socio-economic and political dilemma.

This rate of urbanisation is beyond the capacity of governments for providing and delivering services in Africa (Sisule, 2005; Jiboye, 2011) thus resulting in the growth of informal settlements and the informalisation of urban, formal settlements (Muchadenyika, 2015). The discourse on African cities and towns, therefore, turned out to be overly concerned with inadequate housing, inequalities and burgeoning informal settlements.

The UN-Habitat (2013) reports that in 2012, the average African urban population living in slum areas was 61.7%, while in Asia it was 30%, and in Latin America (including the Caribbean) it was 24%. Sisulu (2005) notes that approximately 71.9% of Africans were living in slums. Davis (2007), further points out that over 75% of the urban population in Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan reside in slums. Furthermore, UN-Habitat (2014), find that China has approximately 180 million urban slum dwellers, while India has 104 million, Haiti 70% and Kenya over 71% (Wekesa *et al.*, 2011). Nearly half (40%) of the African population resides in cities and towns (African Centre for Cities (ACC), 2015; UN-Habitat, 2014; UNDESA, 2014; Croese *et al.*, 2016) signifying an increase in poverty and demand for free, or subsidised social goods. Fox (2013:1) gives an overview of the slum incidence (housing shortage in urban areas) in different regions.

UN-Habitat (2014:19) argues, furthermore, that despite economic growth in Africa over the past decade, income levels have remained low, as nearly 50% of Africans continue to earn below US\$1.25 per day, while only 4% earn over US\$10 per day (cited in Croese *et al.*, 2016:237). The dual nature of increases in urban population on one hand, and poverty levels on the other, means governments have a growing challenge in providing housing for the poor.

According to the UN-Habitat (2014) report entitled, *The state of African cities. Re-imagining sustainable urban transitions* the housing problem is acute in Africa. The extent of the shortage of housing is explained by Tibaijuka (2005), who argues that the need for housing provision in Third World urban areas is estimated at 35 million units per year. Grey (2012) further suggests

that this urban population explosion has forestalled significant property and developmental gains for the poor. Grey adds that the unabated population increase has limited housing initiatives from ensuring that most of the poor have access to sustainable and affordable housing. Urban poverty, therefore, has become the norm for most people residing in the cities and towns.

Similarly, Chen and Ravallion (2010:6, 26), report that globally 1.2 billion people were living in acute poverty in 2010, with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) having 51% of the global poor. Statistics on the problem of safe, affordable shelter, or slum incidence in SSA are not as clear, however. As early as 2001, the African Centre of Cities (2015:5-6) reported that SSA, compared to other regions, had as many as 71% of its urban population residing in slums, or shacks. Several scholars mention the acuteness of the slum development and housing shortage in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN-Habitat, 2008; 2014; Fox, 2014:191; Croese *et al.*, 2016:237). This condition is typified by the mushrooming of informal settlements at the fringes of cities and urban areas since the fringes are deemed cheap and accessible for housing by the poor (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009:101).

Sub-Saharan Africa comprise approximately 13% of the urban population of the developing world, which translates to 25% of the developing world's slum inhabitants (UN-Habitat, 2008). This shows the dire need for housing provision that SSA faces since apparently as many as 61.7% of its urban dwellers (Fox, 2014:191) are living in slums, or informal settlements. Commenting on this, the UN-Habitat (2008) asserts that this slum incidence is the highest compared to other global regions as it even surpasses the average of the entire developing world. This situation is shown in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: Slum incidence by region and for selected African countries

	Slum population as % of urban population				
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
<i>Region</i>					
Developing Regions	46.1	42.8	39.3	35.7	32.7
Northern Africa	34.4	28.3	20.3	13.4	13.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	70.0	67.6	65.0	63.0	61.7
Latin America & the Caribbean	33.7	31.5	29.2	25.5	23.5
Eastern Asia	43.7	40.6	37.4	33.0	28.2
Southern Asia	57.2	51.6	45.8	40.0	35.0
South-eastern Asia	49.5	44.8	39.6	34.2	31.0
Western Asia	22.5	21.6	20.6	25.8	24.6
<i>Selected African countries</i>					
Ethiopia	95.5	95.5	88.6	81.8	
Ghana	65.5	58.8	52.1	45.4	
Nigeria	77.3	73.5	69.6	65.8	
Tanzania	77.4	73.7	70.1	66.4	
South Africa	46.2	39.7	33.2	28.7	
Zimbabwe	4.0	3.7	3.3	17.9	

Source: Fox (2013) Adapted from UN-Habitat (2008)

Table 4.1 above illustrates the challenge of urbanisation and housing provision for the poor that SSA is facing. This prevalence and increased scale of slum growth in the metropolises and towns is a huge challenge for governments in the developing world. Jiboye, (2011) points out that the pace at which Africa is urbanising constitutes a strong delivery mandate for governments in the South, namely to provide more humane and sustainable settlements for all its citizens.

Faced, however, with the challenge of ensuring affordable housing for all and particularly the poor, Bekker and Therborn (2012:194) assert that governments in Sub-Saharan Africa cities have failed in this task. These governments have proven to be powerless in the face of massive urban flows of people, pervasive informality, ethno-political conflicts and basic service demands, thus making slums and urban housing a visible character of urbanity.

The unprecedented growth of informal settlements in Africa, therefore, increases the demand for affordable housing while also augmenting a new form of urban poverty that is mostly noticeable on the outskirts of urban areas while urban development stakeholders struggle to address the problem. Relating to this condition, UN-Habitat (2008) states, “Urban areas are now characterized by some combination of tenuous dwelling structures, overcrowding and lack of access to adequate water and sanitation facilities” (cited in Fox, 2014:191).

Murray and Myers (2006:1) view it as follows, “Infrastructure challenges, absence of basic social services, pauperisation, criminality, negligent city-management, and increasing inequalities are the normative account of urban informal settlements.” Urban areas in the developing world are, therefore, currently facing immense challenges that are largely noticeable in their failure to provide social, or low-cost housing for the poor.

Although governments in Sub-Saharan Africa have responded to this crisis, there is a gaping disjuncture between housing supply and demand (Mosha, 1995). There is a persistent backlog of housing for urban dwellers on the one hand, and burgeoning informal settlements on the other. This has led Muchadenyika (2015:1220) to point out that the housing backlogs and slums are a true reflection of what he terms “an urban crisis in perpetuity”. The perpetuating crisis also implies that the housing problem is no novelty to the urban landscape of cities in the Global South (Mosha, 1995; Lemanski, 2009:472; Muchadenyika, 2015:1219). It is a condition which Africa has inherited over different eras and regimes and which governments have attempted to redress by granting housing subsidies, or through slum-clearance and upgrading, site and services, as well as through rental housing and co-operative housing development.

After examining the pervasiveness of urban slums as major indicator of the housing problem that the world is facing, the following section will give a historical overview and current status of the housing challenge that South Africa as a nation is encountering. The discussion is followed by several sections that seek to clarify the nature of the discourse about policies on low-cost housing. In this regard the researcher also considers the power contestations and conflicts embedded in the housing delivery process within South Africa.

4.4 An overview of the low-cost housing policy in South Africa

Housing provision in South Africa is one of the development mandates of the post-apartheid government (RSA, 1996; Karis *et al.*, 1977; Le Roux, 2011; Mulaudzi, *et al.*, 2016). The aim of the mandate is to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their language, race, ethnicity, gender, or culture, have adequate housing (Karis *et al.*, 1977; ANC, 1994; RSA, 1996; Huchzemeyer, 2003; Khan, 2004). To further the realisation of this goal, the state has formulated various forms of legislation (e.g. the Housing Act No. 107 of 1997; Comprehensive Plan for Housing Delivery of 2004, the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 and the Social Housing Policy of 2009). This legislation is aimed at transforming the lives of its citizens and according them housing-provision freedoms and privileges.

Post-apartheid South Africa has endorsed the right to adequate housing as a major freedom, or development good that every citizen is entitled to. Adequate shelter, or housing provision is a main focus of attention in many non-governmental organisations (NGOs), public and private institutions, international bodies, scholarly and civil societies. All individuals deserve to enjoy the benefits of development in a country (Evans & Klasing, 2012). To this end, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) elaborates:

“Adequate shelter means more than a roof over one’s head. It also means adequate privacy; adequate space; physical accessibility; adequate security; security of tenure; structural stability and durability; adequate lighting, heating and ventilation; adequate basic infrastructure, such as water supply, sanitation and health related factors; and adequate and accessible location with regard to work and basic facilities: all of which should be available at an affordable cost. Adequacy should be determined together with the people concerned, bearing in mind the prospect for gradual development. Adequacy often varies from country to country, since it depends on specific cultural, social, environmental and economic factors. Gender specific and age factors, such as the exposure of children and women to toxic substances, should be considered in this context” (UN-Habitat, 2000:185).

In line with this view, both pre- and post-1994 South African governments formulated and enacted various policy documents and legislation to promote access to adequate housing for its diverse citizens. These legal instruments include: The Native Land Act 27 of 1913, Housing Act 35 of 1920, Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 1951, Urban Bantu Councils Act 79 of 1961, White Paper on Housing of 1994, the Housing Act 107 of 1997, Comprehensive Plan for Housing Delivery of 2004, the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 and the Social Housing Policy of 2009.

It is significant that The South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996 under Section 26(1) stipulates access to housing as one of the rights to which individuals are to as part of the transformatory ethos of post-apartheid South Africa. As highlighted in the section on promises and reciprocity, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to adequate shelter and a secure place. It places the obligation for the provision and realisation of this right on the government. According to Khan (2003:20), the government is obliged to enhance the enjoyment of entitlements, freedoms and capabilities to lead a life that one values, as stated in the Constitution.

Access to housing for citizens, especially the poor, is an integral developmental task of the government. The Housing Act 107 of 1997 points out that the different tiers of government all have to ensure that housing is affordable and sustainable in the various socio-economic realms. To understand fully the dynamics of provision that augmented such a conceptualisation of housing as an entitlement, the nature of housing-policy approaches and legislations prior to 1994 are discussed in the following subsection. This will help elucidate the arguments presented in this chapter that on the one hand, the post-1994 South African government has reproduced the socio-spatial arrangements of the colonial and apartheid eras. On the other hand, a discussion of the pre-1994 approaches highlights the policy and legislative frameworks that have contributed to the housing and developmental challenges South Africa is facing currently.

4.4.1 Housing policy approaches pre-1994

“History is reflected in contemporary residential patterns, forms of tenure, systems of subsidy and political attitudes” (Lund 1996:ix, cited in Conway, 2003:2).

Contemporary approaches and problems regarding housing policies can be traced back to the pre-apartheid era (Goebel 2007; Knight 2001). Franklin (2011) and Herve (2009) indicate that apartheid’s segregation policies determined the state and nature of housing policies during the pre-1994 era. However, their impact has carried over to the current dispensation as the disparities and fragmentation it promoted are still evident in democratic South Africa.

When examining the emergence of housing policies and problems in urban South Africa, it can be traced back to the discovery of gold, diamonds and mineral deposits. These changes prompted industrialisation and the influx of migrants who needed to work in the mines for wages. This meant a transition from a traditional economy to a more capitalistic economy (Demise, 1998; Cate, 2005).

According to Legasick (1974:264), the migrants from the homelands and rural areas had to stay in compounds which were overcrowded and considered moderately accessible to sanitary services. The compounds were located on the outskirts of the urban built landscape, where there was controlled movement and access to and from the places. Demise (1998), suggests that the approach to housing was through the segregation policies of pre-apartheid governments where Blacks were confined to the squatter settlements, or compounds and were only allowed to move to other areas of the towns when carrying of identification documents called ‘passes’.

In this regard, Du Plessis and Landman (2002:2) note that the separation of human settlements along racial lines had commenced long before Apartheid.

According to Gusler (2000), as early as 1913, the enactment of the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913, saw the nation being divided along racial lines with the Whites being allocated 87% of the predominantly urban land, while Africans were allocated 13% of the land, but in mainly rural South Africa. The alienation of land made integrative urban human settlements a challenge as Africans were confined to informal settlements and rural areas. Undoubtedly the Act contributed to urban sprawl and a housing crisis because informal settlements rapidly increased to accommodate the housing demand of the African wage labourers. South African industrialisation during World War 1 also increased the outflow of migrants from rural areas (who were considered as cheap labour) to cities and towns, thus creating squatter camps in the limited urban spaces reserved for Africans (Mkondo, 1993).

A noteworthy event was the policy and legislative approaches that arose after the national outbreak of flu and tuberculosis in 1918, which saw Dr Mitchell's commission making resounding arguments that permitted Africans "who are intrinsically and culturally unhygienic" to reside in the urban space which would prevent the outbreak of these pestilences (Davies, 1981:65; Morris, 1981:15-6). Dr Mitchell's recommendations resulted in the relocation of Africans to rural areas through the Public Health Act 13 of 1919.

Regarding housing legislation and policies, there was an explicit policy which favoured the provision of urban housing for poor Whites. The Housing Act 35 of 1920 promoted the development of urban housing settlements for the Whites, while Blacks had to settle in squatter camps. It was through the Native Urban Areas Act 21 of 1923, that the Union Government sought to provide housing for Blacks. Local governments were tasked with ensuring that the various taxes they collected were utilised to develop housing for Blacks (Morris, 1981:23-26).

The housing stock for Blacks was limited, seeing that the contribution from fines was not enough for the development of sufficient units for migrant workers. Morris (1981:17-23) argues further that the governments that came between colonialism and apartheid engaged in major discussions on the implications of granting Africans permanent urban residence status and what could be the cost of such policy ramifications. Sabela (2014:92), alludes to and indicates that the urban housing crisis for Blacks was exacerbated by both the pre- and post-apartheid governments' assumption that Blacks were temporary sojourners and part-time

labourers who could be repatriated easily to homelands, or reserves. It was evident that the then government discouraged permanent settlements in the urban areas. Summarily, during the pre-apartheid era housing for blacks was the responsibility of local authorities and varied from cities to cities in terms of quality and quantity.

The urban, socio-spatial fragmentation and disparities in housing provision worsened with the 1948 Nationalist Party's (NP) introduction of apartheid policies. According to Price (1991:15-16), South Africa after World War II experienced a decline in industrialisation and rapid African influxes to the urban areas. As a result, the National Party (NP) sought to control this decline in economic growth by controlling the movement of people to the urban areas through influx control. These policies were also aimed at designating labour to specific locales and controlling insurgent politics as the Nationalist Party, in similar fashion to Marx, saw the city as a major space for working class uprisings (Price, 1991:16-17).

To curb and control revolutionary politics and promote exclusive accumulation of capital, the NP introduced the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. This Act demarcated the urban landscape into several ethnic zones (Whites, Coloureds, Indians, and Africans). It also permitted municipalities to expropriate property rights, evict forcefully and relocate ethnic groups in line with their designated areas (Hendler *et al.*, 1985; Ndinda, 2002).

According to Ndinda (2002:45), this Act, "led to forced removal of people in areas such as Cato Manor in Durban, District Six in Cape Town and Sophiatown in Johannesburg". Hart (1990:124) states that the "Implementation of the Group Areas Act has seen the destruction and remaking of countless urban landscapes and the displacement of many thousands of ... people from their homes, communities, and local environments" (quoted in Ndinda, 2002:45).

The government had to compensate the evicted, however normally the compensation was insufficient to allow the people to construct their own houses in their new locations. The NP had to provide housing for the migrant labourers whom it had relocated in reserves and homelands far away from white settlements (Cox, 2005). It is important to note that although the state was playing the role of a housing provider to urban migrant workers, the urban non-white population surpassed the stock of housing being delivered because the housing approach was highly centralised (top-down) and unresponsive to the growing population.

The policies of the NP aimed to ensure separate development which is evidenced in the housing policies that developed during Apartheid. In 1951, the apartheid government passed the

Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 which made it unlawful for people to occupy any public, or private structures and land. The Act resulted in the creation of the National Housing Foundation, the National Housing Commission and the Bantu Housing Board (Morris, 1981). The Act led to stringent measures being taken regarding the provision of housing loans because poor Blacks could only access housing loans from the National Housing Fund (SAIRR, 1961:159). The 1960s saw the passing of the Urban Bantu Councils Act 79 of 1961 which aggravated the housing crisis because it gave officials the right to demolish houses and evict people.

Apartheid housing policies, especially in the urban areas, were influenced predominantly by the demand of industries and companies that needed an accessible, available and stable pool of workers (Lupton & Murphy, 1995; Maylam, 1995). Consequently, houses were constructed and townships built to cater for the needs of industrial workers. Most of the architects of urban housing during Apartheid, however, sought to promote a self-help housing approach as they argued that it was costly to spend money on Blacks. Most of the houses that the state constructed were for Coloureds and Indians, thus worsening the housing crisis that the Blacks were facing (Maylam, 1995).

Lupton and Murphy (1995:144) note that housing provision categorised urban Blacks into ‘insiders’ (those who were a beneficiary of state and private sector housing) and ‘outsiders’ forming the spreading informal settlement. Lupton and Murphy (1995:145) maintain that the apartheid government detested the permanence of blacks in the urban spaces and had to prevent them from purchasing land.

Apartheid housing budgets for Blacks were inelastic to housing demand which was noticeable even in its redundant production of ‘matchbox’ houses (Tomlinson, 1998:138). These were constructed to ensure Blacks dissociate themselves from the idea of seeking permanent residence in the urban areas and thus continue identifying with the Bantustans, from which they migrated. Such precarious housing provision stimulated an enhanced informalisation of urban spaces which has persisted even in the post-apartheid era (Jenkins, 1994; ANC, 1994).

4.4.2. Urban uprisings and shifts in housing policies

The Apartheid regime, in its attempt to destabilise urban socio-economic and political conflicts, forced most Blacks to be moved to the homelands. This was made possible by the NP’s decision to halt the provision of housing for urban Blacks and the increased (state) delivery of houses

to homelands. This policy contributed to migrant, or commuter labour as most people who could get jobs were the urban insiders residing in the already-built-up formal units.

Nonetheless, political unrest became the order of the day because there was a densification of polarised urbanites who, through their political parties, questioned the nature and character of the socio-economic and political spaces fragmented by the apartheid policies. Wolpe (1972) notes that during the 1970s, African workers had concentrated their struggles on accessing the urban space and through various political organisations and activisms challenged the systematic provision of housing, which largely created a housing crisis for the poor migrants.

According to Ntema (2011:51), the labour protest of 1973 and the Soweto uprisings of 1976, contributed to two main developments in urban housing policies. Firstly, there was a shift from Development Boards to Black Local Authorities, and secondly, the state was then compelled to work with the Urban Foundation in ensuring that Blacks had access to urban spaces. The result was a major shift in housing policies which had implications on the role of the apartheid state in housing provision and also major societal transformation.

4.4.3 The Urban Foundation (UF)

It was through pressure from the education sector and protests for worker's rights of the 1970s that the urban crisis worsened. Todes *et al.* (2008:41) argues that the state's influx control mechanism relegated Blacks to the shanty towns and prevented a rapid urbanising population. On the one hand, the majority of urban poor residing in the slums was encountering increased transport costs and inadequate social amenities as NP policies considered black townships to be self-financed from taxes and administrative recoups. On the other hand, the global economic recession also aggravated the plight of the urban Africans. This prompted the emergence of the Urban Foundation (UF) in December 1976 (Smit, 1992). This was established as an organisation, or platform for the transformation of urban policies towards more enabling and market-oriented approaches to urban social services such as housing, education, water, health and sanitary provision (Todes *et al.*, 2008:42).

The UF (1982) explains its focus: "the structure of our society ... results in millions being deprived of their basic rights and dignity as human beings" and sought to assist the black community to realise "housing and associated rights and facilities". Thus, the UF encouraged the NP to adopt reformist approaches and to accept the reality of the African urban crisis

(Huchzermeyer 2004:122; Todes *et al.*, 2008:42) and claimed that if proper policies were put in place to manage the crisis, South Africa could achieve economic growth.

The UF opposed the industrial de-centralisation policy of the NP and argued in favour of bottom-up approaches and local economic development, which would generate more sustainable, competitive and responsive development. Todes *et al.* (2008) report that the UF promoted individual ownership of housing, self-help housing (site-and-services) and informal, settlement housing, and appealed for the removal of influx controls (SAIRR, 1986).

The UF followed a policy approach that was premised on Turner's (1976) incremental housing scheme, as well as the World Bank's site-and-service approach. The World Bank argued for a more de-centralised housing policy approach in which the citizens were provided with serviced sites located close to key socio-economic service centres and the upgrading of slums. This was adopted by the UF which aligned its housing policy strategy with the prevailing notion of slum recognition as a form of urban shelter that needs upgrading.

The NP's acceptance, moreover, of the UF's policy intents in 1986 led to the promulgation of the White Paper on Urbanisation and the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986 (SAIRR, 1986), which tasked the government with the creation of well-structured urbanisation spatial policing and the upgrading of informal settlements. The state, therefore, took a more enabling approach to urban housing provision (Gusler, 2000), which has also been instrumental in the development of post-apartheid housing policies.

The NP's acceptance of a more enabling approach to housing provision was also premised on the idea that homeownership prevents urban residents, particularly Blacks, from engaging in militant behaviour (Bond, 2000:128). According to Tomlinson (1999), the White Paper on Housing saw the private sector and the public playing a major role in housing construction in this experiment of a self-help approach. The beneficiaries of the self-aided housing schemes, however, were mainly middle class urban residents, as opposed to the majority of the poor who comprised the urban housing demand. This approach deprived poorer households from access to adequate housing (Tomlinson, 1999).

The UF also contributed to other changes in urban governance and housing policies such as the introduction of Black township administrators who continued to discriminate against the poor. Wilkinson (1998:222), indicates that the UF was instrumental in the emergence of the 99-year

leasehold scheme in 1978 through the enactments of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 97 of 1978.

The UF's policy demands, however, did not pre-empt the urban housing crisis, but contributed to the emergence of both a Black elite and an extremely poor majority of urban workers. This was because the middle class was the only group able to purchase houses in the townships during what became known as the Great Housing Sale of the 1980s. Furthermore, building materials are easily accessible to the upper classes rather than the poor, thus entrenching social disparities.

Gusler (2000) notes that despite the policy reforms of the UF, the 1980s continued to experience the informalisation of site-and-service targeted areas. Efforts to curb the housing crisis and promote homeownership led the state to permit the selling of state-owned, rental houses at low and affordable prices (Mabin, 1983; Wilkinson, 1998) through the "Big Sale". As was the case with most of the apartheid approaches to housing, it failed to respond to the increasing demand for shelter because it did not augment the already-existing housing stock.

Wilkinson (1998:222) argues that urban policy makers failed to comprehend the dynamics of urban housing since their housing approach did not cater for the needs of the poor, thus demand was undoubtedly their major constraint. Despite its failures, Todes *et al.* (2008:42), commends the UF on playing a key role in redefining South African policy processes by including the concerns of the daily living and housing needs of segregated poor urbanites. Similarly, Bond (2000:127), asserts that the UF left its imprints which is evidenced by the neo-liberal, or market-driven approach of post-apartheid South Africa.

4.4.4 The Independent Development Trust

The late 1980s and early 1990s was a period in which housing debates focused on the questions regarding the role the state, the private sector and the beneficiaries should play in housing provision (Wilkinson 1998:223). Turok (2014) maintains that, during this period, grassroots political opposition and other activists became hyper-militant, towns became sites of protests, with riots erupting and boycotts leading to the deterioration of urban infrastructure and major service delivery constraints.

Simultaneously, there was an increasing mushrooming of informal settlements and a rapid growth in the numbers of urban poor which prompted swift remedial action. Consequently, the

president at the time (1990), FW de Klerk, authorised the De Loor Commission (Gusler, 2000:11) to investigate the state of urban housing in black townships (Gusler, 2000:11). According to Prinsloo (1995:9-10), the Commission identified the different approaches which were being taken by the state, communities, the private sector, local governments and developmental institutions in housing provision such as self-help, informal housing, assisted self-help, site and services and mass social housing.

Gusler (2000:11) points out that irrespective of the different forms of housing strategies that were in place, the Commission concluded that there was a huge discrepancy between housing supply and demand. The state viewed this as a threat to its vision of promoting homeownership for Blacks. Accordingly, policy makers and the government realised the need for extending the reach of the state subsidy, as well as broadening access to housing. The Independent Development Trust (IDT) was thus established in 1990 (Wilkinson, 1998). According to Prinsloo (1995:9-10), the state could follow a wide array of delivery systems such as: self-help, assisted-self-help, site and service schemes, informal housing and mass housing programmes (Gusler, 2000:11).

The IDT was funded by the treasury, but funds were also solicited from the private sector. The IDT, in similar fashion to the policy intent of the Urban Foundation, promoted a market-driven approach to housing provision in which the state takes a more supportive role. The IDT launched a capital approach in which housing developers were given the subsidy once they had been listed as a beneficiary (Nuttall 1979:36). Wilkinson (1998:223) explains that the IDT acknowledged that African housing consolidation would be financially cumbersome. Therefore, the scheme promoted the acquisition of serviced sites through once-off capital grants of R7500.

The IDT, consequently, reproduced the same socio-spatial imbalances that were rife during the Urban Foundation's policy implementation. Tomlinson (1998:138) criticised the IDT for simply servicing informal settlements through a "toilets in the veld approach". This reverberates with Mayekiso (1996:241-248) who argues that the privileged white spatial formations and the negated/relegated Black urban structuring were entrenched further and reproduced through this imposed approach, resulting in an "undemocratic, non-participatory housing policy, characterised by site and services and the toilet policy". The reason was (according to Mayekiso), that the once-off capital subsidy was granted without an

understanding of the socio-economic condition of the urban poor who are not able to consolidate their houses.

The IDT also entrenched the spatial formations derived from apartheid because the locations of the sites and services stands were normally on the urban peripheries (Parnell & Hart, 1999). Nonetheless, the IDT played an influential role in the bargaining processes that led the transition from apartheid-housing policies to the more democratic approaches, i.e. post-apartheid housing approaches.

4.4.5 The National Housing Forum

The De Loor Report's findings in 1992 contributed to the formulation of key ideas that were incorporated in the post-apartheid housing policy (Wilkinson, 1998). From this report, in August 1992, the National Housing Forum (NHF) was instituted after strategic plans for a democratic housing provision policy were discussed and implemented (Mackjay, 1994).

The NHF period was noteworthy for institutional restructuring and multi-party negotiations comprising major stakeholders in housing provision, such as members of opposition political parties, trade unions, banks, local government, business, NGOs and other interest groups (Jenkins & Smith, 2001:491). The NHF was influenced largely by the ideas of the Urban Foundation and the Independent Development Trust which saw housing policy recommendations for the transition to democracy hinged on market-oriented, or neoliberal approaches such as self-help housing with the state as an enabler in housing provision (Huchzermeyer, 2004; Jones & Datta, 2000).

Discussions in the NHF centred in the rights discourse to housing. According to the SAAIR (1993), political and labour organisations viewed housing as a fundamental right that every citizen was supposed to enjoy and it was argued that the state is a vanguard to help realise this right. Political and labour organisations were at odds with the market-driven approach of the Urban Foundation (UF) and the Independent Development Trust (IDT) since they argued that housing should be predicated upon demand, not accumulation of profits. Debates in the NHF were also focused on whether delivery could be sustained through the supportive role of the state, or through unregulated market forces (Sikota, 2015:4; Tissington, 2011:58-59) and whether units to be built ought to be a standardised four-roomed house, or incremental houses.

According to Mayekiso (1996), civil societies argued in favour of a more welfare-based approach to low-cost housing since they perceived housing to be a social good with use-value. The acquisition of inner city land in order to promote integrated human settlements would help to reduce the financial strain on the urban poor (SAAIR, 1993). The ANC, however, which came to power in 1994, favoured the NHF's idea of capital subsidy and private-sector involvement in the housing-delivery process, seeing that it promoted self-sustenance and cooperative action in the housing crisis (Gilbert 2002:1925-6).

The previous policy approaches had proved detrimental in promoting the right to adequate shelter for the poor. The idea, therefore, of promoting both capital subsidies and market approaches to housing delivery would have been much more acceptable to urban and rural poor since it would ensure that the provision system is well financed and resourced to respond to the housing demand.

In order to promote equitable and redistributive housing delivery policies, the NHF had to disband the different racially-based housing departments and form a single department headed by the Minister at the time, Joe Slovo. The new housing department sought to address the legacy of apartheid socio-spatial fragmentation of cities (Wilkinson, 1998:224). Slovo organised a summit on housing delivery which later resulted in the adoption of what came to be known as the White Paper on Housing of 1994 (Wilkinson, 1998:224; Marais & Krige, 2000:605; Jenkins & Smith, 2010:491).

The NHF housing policy was rebutted for awarding inadequate, or meagre subsidies which would not allow the beneficiary to have a decent, or adequate shelter (Marais & Krige, 2000), while Tomlinson (2006) argued that the policy processes of the NHF excluded marginalised groups such as women, tenants, rural people and shanty-town residents. As shall be argued in the following sections, the NHF housing policy was judged to be inadequate in the face of the growing demand for houses in post-1994 South Africa.

4.4.6 Post-apartheid approaches to housing policies

Arguments in the previous subsections have highlighted the fact that apartheid housing policies promoted disjointed urbanisation and fractured spatial arrangement of housing settlements. The NHF discussions veered towards realising democratic and participatory housing-delivery processes and also intended to effect transformatory changes. In this regard, Huchzermeyer and Karam (2015:70) argue that "South Africa's housing policy has its roots not directly in the

ANC's RDP, but in the 1992-1994 National Housing Forum (NHF) negotiations". It was through the NHF debates that the White Paper on Housing was developed in 1994 as a policy guideline to promote access to a once-off capital housing subsidy for the poor in South Africa (Marais & Krige, 2000:605; Jenkins & Smith, 2001:491). The NHF was a process that influenced certain approaches in the post-apartheid housing policy in South Africa.

Several policy approaches and pieces of legislation were enacted such as the Housing Act 107 of 1997, People's Housing Process (PHP) of 1998, National Housing Code of 2000, Breaking New Ground of 2004 and the National Housing Code of 2009. The general aim was to promote the poor's access to adequate shelter. The housing policy in post-apartheid South Africa have evolved over time with a combination of different approaches in a bid to address the issues of housing backlog, increasing shacks and the informalisation of formal structures.

Following the FCC (2013:14), South African housing policy reform can be classified into three major policy episodes (1992-2003; 2004-2009 and 2010-2013), which are expounded below.

4.4.6.1 Transition phase (1992 to 2003)

During the first period, two main transformatory policy shifts were developed, viz. the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the White Paper on Housing of 1994.

Reconstruction and Development Programme

The policy framework of the RDP concentrated on enlarging and enhancing human development. The government utilised this framework to help provide social housing to its citizens as a strategy to redress past imbalances and inequalities. The framework of the RDP sought to promote a more people-centred approach to development (RSA, 1994) because it envisioned housing provision as a tool to promote reconstruction and development in South Africa. The RDP policy housing framework was anchored on people-centred development, integration, democratisation and access to basic needs (RSA, 1994). It is through the RDP that local government was considered a major actor in development (Ley, 2009:36).

According to Pillay (2008:115), the RDP emphasised the role of the state in meeting the basic needs of the public which included providing shelters. Thus, through the RDP policy people were promised that they would be assisted in building houses and acquiring new houses known as RDP houses (Kellet, 2002:23) or low-cost houses that are affordable to the poor (Mulok &

Kogid, 2008). Napier (2005) views these as core houses that are normally characterised by one or two rooms with a bathroom and kitchen.

White Paper on Housing

Contrary to the RDP's wider angle, the White Paper on Housing (HWP) of 1994 focused mainly on creating stable housing environments, rationalised institutional capacities of the government in housing delivery. This also entailed establishing a housing subsidy, mobilising housing credit, support to different housing initiatives (People's Housing Process), speedy release of housing land and co-ordinated government investment programmes (Napier, 2006:4).

The HWP stated that large-scale development of housing for the poor was assumed as based on a capital subsidy which was a once-off, non-repayable grant awarded to people earning below R3 500 per month in order to promote access to adequate shelter (DoH, 1994). Adebayo (2011:8) and Ley (2009:30) indicate that the capital subsidy provided for a housing package, included a starter house of 30 m² with provision for individual incremental upgrading. Barlow (2011:144) reports that the state implemented several subsidies such as the Individual Subsidy, the Project Linked Subsidy, the Consolidation Subsidy, the Institutional Subsidy, the Relocation Assistance Subsidy and the Rural Subsidy.

When the HWP was instituted, however, the South African state had a backlog of nearly 1.5 million houses (Mafukidze, 2009; Tissington *et al.*, 2013), which it had inherited from the apartheid era. In addition, the state inherited the urban disparities in social-service provision and spatial planning (Adebayo, 2010). This led the United Nations (UN, 2004), to state that "colonial and apartheid planning had left an extremely negative legacy in the settlements of South Africa" (cited in Khoza, 2014:34).

The HWP was supposed to ensure that post-apartheid settlements were more sustainable and integrated. As early as 1993, the South Africa government had sought to implement an enabling housing approach in line with international policy demands (Croese *et al.*, 2016). According to Walker (1993:iii) in *Breaking new ground* [BSG] it entailed the following:

"It is envisaged that the state's role in the provision of housing will largely be geared towards managing the housing sector in ways that enables all to have access to housing. The private sector, non-profit sector and the users themselves will be responsible for the actual provision of housing. The way these four groups interact with each other will inevitably vary from project

to project and be influenced by what is being delivered, where, by whom and who it is being delivered to. In all projects, it is recommended that the principle of shifting control towards the users be evident. Also, that the terms of the partnerships be mutually beneficial and based on negotiated contracts between the different parties.”

In this regard, the government envisaged a participatory approach to housing provision in which the state was viewed as an enabler and the vanguard of inclusive stakeholder involvement in the praxis of housing policies (Charlton, 2013:132). The invited spaces for housing, however, were highly exclusive and did not produce the intended results as the units produced were non-participatory and unresponsive to the needs of the beneficiaries. This caused wide-spread national dissatisfaction as the units were of poor quality and small size (Huchzermeyer, 2001; 2003; Gadner, 2003; FCC, 2013; Govender *et al.*, 2011; Goebel, 2007; Bailey, 2011; Tissington, 2011; Khoza, 2014). Failure to transform the urban spatial patterning of human settlements caused people to rent, or sell their RDP units and return to the shacks, or informal settlement. which are located within the proximity of major economic processes, transport and jobs (Goebel, 2007:4).

The RDP capital subsidy, however, also reconfigured the role of the state to that of a supporter in housing provision because citizens are assisted in acquiring a housing package which they are supposed to develop incrementally (Adebayo, 2011:7). In line with the 1992-1994 NHF housing negotiations, the HWP promoted the ideals of the World Bank’s enabling approach to housing in which the state provided legislature and capital to implement its housing policy (Khan & Thurman, 2001) whilst the private sector constructed the RDP houses (Tomlinson, 1999:84; Tissington, 2011:58). This allowed the piece-meal development of houses since the state only facilitated the production of massive small housing units (Rust, 2004; Sikota, 2015). The reason was that individuals were expected to extend their housing units through help from state and other financial lending institutions. According to Barlow (2011), incremental houses are advantageous since it allow beneficiaries to consolidate their housing needs according to their individual preferences.

This approach, however, promoted the mass production of poor quality and peripherally-located structures (Gilbert, 2000; Goebel, 2007; Adebayo, 2011; Ehebrect, 2014). The adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme in June 1996 as a neoliberal approach to development, saw housing provision being reduced from its status as an integral part of economic development (Bailey, 2011:2). The government was led to

deprioritise housing provision for the poor, thus allowing market forces to regulate development of shelters. This led to a reduction in government spending on social housing (Hamdi, 1991; Losier, 2009; Barlow, 2011). Only high-income and middle-income earners were then catered for through GEAR's market-side approach to housing. As a result, the poor encountered delays in housing delivery, shoddy structures, peripheralisation and polarisation (Huchzermeyer, 2003). Consequently, the state-driven and market-assisted housing approaches did not help realise the 1994-aim of providing over a million housing to the poor (FCC, 2013:14).

The Housing Act 107 of 1997, legislated the policy provisions of the HWP. This Act became the supreme law of all housing legislation. According to Bond (2000:247-250), the Act promoted the advancement of housing provision as a right in contemporary South Africa and thus gave the state the major task of ensuring citizens' access to adequate, sustainable shelter. The Housing Act's vision was:

“... the establishment and maintenance of habitable, stable and sustainable public and private residential environments to ensure viable households and communities, in areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities, health services, educational and social amenities, in which all citizen and permanent residents of the Republic will have access to” (Barlow, 2011:139).

Broadly speaking, the mentioned Act laid down the principles for housing developments that address integrative human settlements by locating low-cost houses in areas that are close to social and economic opportunities. However, this policy's intent proved futile within the first ten years of its implementation as scholarly evidence and observable social phenomena (strikes, protests) indicated dissatisfaction among beneficiaries with the locations and quality of the housing units (Harris *et al.*, 2003; Huchzermeyer, 2003; 2004; Napier, 2005; Charlton & Kihato, 2006).

Bauman (2001:21) notes that the supply-side approach failed to comprehend housing provision as paramount to addressing the multi-dimensional nature of poverty. The state, through its implementation of the housing policy, failed to incorporate the opinions and views of the public from within the South African policy praxis. After only a decade after it began, there was a need to consider reviewing housing policy approaches in South Africa. The problem was a growing disjuncture between supply and demand, escalating shacks and backyard dwellings, community protests and unrests.

Apart from the HWP and the Housing Act 107 of 1997, the People's Housing Process (PHP) of 1998 also sought to institutionalise self-help in South Africa's housing development by enhancing beneficiaries' involvement in the housing process (Napier, 2003; 2006; DoH, 1998; 2005; 2007; Ntema, 2011). Bailey (2011:5) maintains that the PHP, as a form of self-help approach to housing, saw communities playing a key role in the supervision of their RDP housing projects. Supporters of the approach, such as civil society and NGOs, viewed PHP as building citizenship, social cohesion, effective partnerships, skills, and involving people directly in the development of their communities through the self-provision of human settlements (DoH, 2005:20; Carey, 2009:1; Bailey, 2011:5).

Barlow (2011) indicates that the PHP was a response to GEAR's economic efficiency policies which had reduced the state's funding in the provision of low-cost housing. Conversely, a number of scholars suggest that the policy was influenced directly by international organisations and community-based organisations (Huchzermeyer, 2001; Napier, 2003).

According to Clark (2011:29) and Ntema (2011:64), the PHP funding was granted to support groups, or community-based organisations comprising individuals who qualified for the RDP capital subsidy. The PHP approach, however, was still not participatory and did not give the beneficiary control over the entire housing process (Tissington, 2010:39) since the government still had total control over the choice of land and the layout of housing structures.

Although this process is supposed to be participatory in nature, the implementation was extremely limited. The reason is that the state (local municipality) still has control over the location and layout in these developments although individuals in communities could become involved in the construction of their own houses. Clark (2011:29) and the DoH (2004:17) further highlight the fact that community involvement in the PHP was only noticeable in the construction phase, as the policy approach was highly bureaucratic, delivery-driven, paternalistic and not policy-oriented (Huchzermeyer, 2006; Mani, 2009; Bailey, 2011). It did not consider the housing provision as a process, but rather concentrated on the outcomes (product delivery). Marais *et al.* (n.d.) elaborates that the Housing Code's phrase "that if beneficiaries are given the chance ..." was implicit in granting dwellers control of the PHP. This implied that the state could, if it wishes, give the beneficiaries the chance to participate, it does not clearly outline that residents were allowed to participate in the PHP process as equal partners with the government.

As argued previously, however, the policy approaches of the first decade of post-apartheid South Africa, were highly centralised with less involvement of other major key stakeholders such as the community (Gadner, 2003:6). As a result, scholars, activists, communities and policy makers criticised the practice of housing development in South Africa, calling for new policy alternatives. This has created the Breaking New Ground (BNG) as a comprehensive plan for sustainable human settlements.

4.4.6.2 Towards sustainable human settlements (2004-2009)

The state-driven and developer-oriented housing approach was criticised for promoting the skewed social spatial patterns of racial and elite privilege (Huchzermeyer, 2003; 2004). Goebel (2009:294) notes that pre-1994 racial and class disparities in social service production are still dominant in the type of housing and the quality of basic services given to different urban settlement mixes. This is also noted by Bierman and Van Ryneveld (2007:2) who express that “not only is delivery failing to keep pace with demand, but also the locality and form of delivery is not achieving objectives of spatial restructuring”.

According to Aigbavboa and Thwala (2013:17), low cost housing provision has been notably a peripheralised, urban development. An observation of the current urban geography and spatial plans shows that the government has failed to restructure and integrate low-cost houses into the main spatial urban structures of the city. What happened is that most social houses are negated and located on the outskirts of the city, far from jobs and other economic opportunities (Aigbavboa & Thwala, 2013:17; Mokoena & Marais, 2007:313) thus perpetuating urban poverty. This confirmed by Tomlinson (1999:292), who notes that, although the inhabitants of shacks at present enjoy low-cost houses, they have remained similarly impoverished and marginalised as if they still reside in shacks. It is not only impoverishment and negation, but housing development has not contributed to the restructuring of apartheid urban spaces from a geographical and socio-economic angle.

The spatialised nature of RDP housing settlement, beneficiary dissatisfaction, persisting backlogs, expanding informal settlements and augmented informality stimulated the need to review the shortcomings of the housing policy (Jenkins, 1999; Seekings, 2000; Huchzermeyer, 2000; 2004; 2006; Khan & Thring, 2003; Lemanski, 2008; Barlow, 2011; Sikota, 2015; Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2015). A new policy framework known as the Breaking New Ground (BNG) housing policy was adopted in October 2004, which emphasised the delivery of housing

settlements, or the shift from housing delivery to the production of sustainable and integrated neighbourhoods and sustainable human settlements (DoH, 2004; Huchzermeyer, 2006; Bradlow, 2011; Bailey, 2011; Tissington, 2011).

According to Tissington (2010; 2011), the BNG focused more on the delivery of houses with a focus on the long-term sustainability of the units. Therefore, this approach is oriented more towards the quality of the housing settlement and choice of structures than the massification (supply-driven) of housing which dominated the earlier implementation of the HWP (Tissington, 2011:66). Tissington (2010:29) further argues that the BNG is an attempt to redress the former failures of the housing policy, which perceives housing as more than simply housing provision, but a comprehensive process of sustainable residential and community creation.

Ntema (2011:60) and Sikota (2015:12) state that the BNG concentrates on the integration and access to economic opportunities as a way to bridge disparities in social services between the low-income units and the market-produced houses. The Social Housing Fund (SHF, 2010:7) restates that the BNG, as a housing policy approach, was enacted in order to promote qualitative and integrated *low-cost* (researcher's own insertion) human settlements through a shift from a supply-side policy approach to demand-driven one which is responsive to the needs of the people.

BNG encourages private sector involvement in low-cost housing (DoH, 2004:5) and takes a more enabling approach to housing development. DoH (2004:7; 2008:31) and Ehebrect (2015:76) further summarises the intent of the BNG policy in terms of six aspects:

- accelerating housing delivery;
- linking housing provision to job creation;
- promoting social cohesion and reducing crime;
- utilising housing as an instrument to help create sustainable human settlement;
- encouraging property accessibility and community empowerment;
- approaching housing as a strategy to alleviate poverty.

BNG did not, however, alter the fundamental principles of the HWP (Ndinda, 2006; Tissington, 2010; 2011). The HWP had, as its goal, the creation of sustainable human settlements, but its housing approach could not promote its realisation. The BNG, however, reformulated certain aspects of the HWP to ensure that the quality and sustainability of neighbourhoods changed to

more economically viable settlements. During the second phase of post-apartheid housing legislation, the Social Housing Policy was introduced in 2005 to address challenges emanating from social housing provision. In addition, the Rental Housing Amendment Act 43 of 2007 was enacted as an amendment to the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (that regulates relationships between landlords and tenants) in order to promote fair rights to access and controlled evictions.

In 2008, the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 was promulgated which has, as its mandate, the creation and promotion of sustainable rental housing environments. This led to the development of the Social Housing Regulatory Authority (SHRA) in 2009 as the regulator of all Social Housing Institutions (SHI) that have obtained and are yet to obtain public funds (Tissington, 2011:20).

The BNG approach to housing provision also led to the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP) in 2008 (DoH, 2004; FCC, 2013). This programme was tasked with ensuring informal settlements are incorporated into formal housing structures since it was realised that it was highly unfeasible to eradicate informal settlements (FCC, 2013; Rust, 2006).

The BNG proposed the upgrading of informal settlements as a way to reduce the prevalence of squalor settlements by granting entitlement, social services delivery and resources for incremental, or in-situ housing development. Its principle of upgrading was built on cooperative governance with an increased focus on community involvement and cooperation amongst the different spheres of the government (Huchzermeyer, 2006:49; DoHS, 2009a:13-15). UISP also provides for the resettlement of informal communities if it appears that upgrading is not feasible in the current establishments (DoHS, 2009a:23).

Broadly speaking, the demand-driven approach of BNG contributed to a more bottom-up praxis of housing development that is anchored in community participation. Unlike its predecessor, however, BNG concentrated on the development of human settlements that are more inclusive and offer dignified housing units, which are more accessible to an integrated network of social amenities and economic services (DoH, 2004).

To reduce the challenges of convenient land access for housing development, BNG followed the HWP's negotiated process for land access and introduced land appropriation by the state in the case of stalemates with private owners (DoH, 2004). In this light, the approach allowed for the development of more integrated human settlements that are in close proximity to major

socio-economic services, unlike the HWP, which promoted the edging out of the poor to the outskirts of cities and towns.

4.4.6.3 Revisiting sustainable human settlements (2010 to present)

The revision of the Housing Code in 2009 was an initiative towards transformatory policy shifts intending to involve all stakeholders, both private and public, in the provision of housing for the poor in South Africa. Since the Housing Code is replete with the principles of BNG, it can be argued that the policy changes aims at encouraging demand-driven housing provision which is different from the HWP's developer-driven approach. In other words, the policy change has sought to ensure the responsiveness of housing delivery to the needs of the citizens.

In addition to the revision of the Housing Code, during the period 2012-2013, the government adopted Outcome 8 that specifically focuses on efforts towards the accelerated delivery of sustainable human settlements and improved household livelihoods. Its objectives were the upgrading of 400 000 informal units, enhancing access to basic amenities, facilitating the provision of 600 000 gap-market housing structures (those earning between R3 500-R12 500) and the mobilisation of well-located land for development into low-income settlements (FCC, 2013:18). The main thrust of the revised Housing Code was to promote growth and pro-poor-development in informal settlements. Thus, Huchzemeyer and Karam (2015:77) state that "towards the end of the second decade, informal settlement upgrading had become a central mandate of the national Department of Human Settlements".

This section has broadly outlined the housing approaches of post-apartheid South Africa with a focus on how the state has attempted, through policies, to address the challenge of housing provision. It has shown that in South Africa, low-cost housing systems have developed through alternating approaches that are aimed at ensuring that the poor get adequate shelter. The discussion thus far, however, has overlooked one major approach to housing that has influenced the nature of post-apartheid housing contestations, viz. the rights approach to housing. The following section thus seeks to explore entitlements (rights) and reciprocity (protests) in housing provision.

4.4.7 Rights approach to housing, and related protests

Low-cost housing provision in South Africa is reminiscent of the ethos of the Freedom Charter and South Africa's Bill of Rights and has thus initiated a rights discourse to housing provision.

In a bid to garner majority acceptance and victory, the South African Congress Alliance (SACA) drew up the *Freedom Charter* in 1955 as a document stating the revolutionary, ideological and philosophical underpinnings of a free South Africa. The Freedom Charter envisioned a democratic society in which people were allowed to exercise their freedoms and claim certain predisposed rights. Among these major rights that the South African Congress Alliance sought to entitle, or grant to the citizenry of a free South Africa, the right to housing was included and stated as follows:

“There shall be houses, security and comfort! All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security; Unused housing space to be made available to the people” (Karis *et al.*, 1977:207).

In these proclamations, the Freedom Charter promised the masses that in a post-apartheid society, government will promote the realisation of state-driven and accessible housing for all. In post-apartheid South Africa, the Freedom Charter could become reality for the majority of people who had been excluded from the socio-economic and political processes of the apartheid era. The Freedom Charter and the ANC campaigning strategy promised the electorate free social housing. The policy strategy for transforming and redressing the apartheid imbalances, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), was formulated nearly 40 years after the Charter, but still proposed the enjoyment of basic needs such as housing for all (ANC, 1994). The dawn of majority rule saw the ANC making promises to the electorate that it was going to build one million houses for the poor within five years or 200 000 per annum (ANC, 1994:22; Jenkins, 1999). Tomlinson (1998:142), points out that ANC politicians referred to the construction of four-roomed houses for the electorate.

The right to housing was also broadened through the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa which clearly expresses that housing is a right that every citizen can enjoy. Section 26 of the Bill of Rights states that:

“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.

(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.

(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” (RSA 1996).

These privileges can also be traced to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which in Article 17 and 25 states that: “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others; everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself ...” (United Nations, 1948).

The United Nations has emphasised the importance of the right to shelter because it promotes the realisation of other freedoms. In line with this focus, UN-Habitat (1996), points out that “access to safe and healthy shelter and basic services is essential to a person's physical, psychological, social and economic well-being and should be a fundamental part of our urgent actions for the more than one billion people without decent living conditions”.

In the words of Attiola (2000:10), the right to housing and its realisation is a measure of the human development of any given society. According to Kellet and Moore (2008) and Khan (2003), adequate, or affordable housing promotes a sense of belonging, security and citizenship among the people because they feel more legitimatised as part of a given locale (Burgoyne, 2008). In addition, the importance of housing in South Africa can be seen as a policy aim to redress the country's historical discriminatory practices (Luyenge, 2011).

The importance of safe and affordable shelter for people and the promises about its delivery have, however, generated extensive political and community contestations. The government was unable to fulfil its delivery expectation (FCH, 2014:2), which has been compounded by the increasing urbanising population increasing the demands for housing.

Bradlow *et al.* (2011:268) argues that the South African housing policy has been rife with the rhetoric of policy intent, rather than practice, which has contributed to the increase in housing shortages in South Africa. Khan (2003:43) states that, “housing is a highly politicised and contentious issue, particularly in developing countries like South Africa, which experience rapid urbanisation and where, as a result, huge competition for housing exists”. Ndinda *et al.* (2010) further indicates that low-cost housing is a serious political subject, which has led to incessant, violent community protests. Castells (1977; 1983) reiterates this by indicating that issues of collective consumables have become the major theme of contemporary, urban power dynamics and political conflicts.

In this way, cities have become arenas of contested politics (Robinson, 2006 in Muchadenyika, 2015:1221) since citizens seek to hold the government accountable over its promises of housing delivery. In this sense, Porteous *et al.* (2005:1) asserts that even after the dawn of democratic

rule, land issues and *housing* (researcher's own emphasis) remains largely complex, contested and politicised.

Most South African citizens, (as will be argued in Ch 6 & 7) have a misconception of the right to housing and feel that they deserve free, low-cost housing from the state. The constitutional entitlement of the right to adequate housing has to some extent been misunderstood by numerous people. Whether the state has the role to ensure that everyone has free shelter, or the state has to play an enabling approach towards the realisation of this right has been a major, often over-politicised and contested terrain in modern day South Africa. The UN-Habitat (2009), for example, indicates that the right to adequate housing is often misconceived, the state only has to play an enabling approach to shelter provision, not to provide housing for all free of charge.

Evans (2007) claims that the right to adequate shelter does not make it the prerogative of the state to ensure that everyone has free housing. The state has to be a facilitator, but in South Africa the state has followed the supply-side approach, which makes it more oriented towards social welfarism in shelter provision for the poor (FCC, 2013). It is questionable and even impossible whether it is feasible to fulfil this obligation, considering the rapid urbanisation and densification of the poor who are either homeless, or residing in shacks.

This misconception of the right to adequate housing has been the context of major social services' protests in South African townships (Ballard *et al.*, 2006:404; Porteous *et al.*, 2005:1; Khan, 2003:43; Ramovha, 2012:4; Muchadenyika, 2015:1221). The mentioned misunderstanding over the right to adequate shelter has been exacerbated by influxes of the poor to urban centres since they need access to free housing and improved service delivery. Most low-income earners and poor who moves to the city and towns expect the state to provide them with a RDP house, thereby increasing housing demand. Whenever the government is under-resourced to deliver, the destitute urbanites take to the streets and even destroy infrastructure in protest against what they perceive as a denial of their constitutional privilege. There has, however, been growing concern over this free delivery of houses to the poor who do not contribute to fiscal growth.

Sexwale (2010), has argued that the state cannot sustain the current policy for social housing provision and argued that there is need of a cut-off date for free housing to the poor. In the same vein, the President of South Africa (Pres Zuma) has stated that "we cannot sustain a

situation where social grants are growing all the time and think it can be a permanent feature the government cannot afford to indefinitely pay social grants to people who are not elderly and who have no physical defects ...” (Ramovha, 2012:4).

The narratives and perspectives of the various housing stakeholders will continue to produce struggles and protests as a major feature of the politics of promises and reciprocity. As such there is a need to revisit the right to adequate shelter so that it clearly outlines the roles of the government and those of the public in housing delivery, seeing that the current policy has promoted passive recipients and a culture of privileged begging. Consequently, instead of mobilising personal resources and constructing their own houses the poor await the state to build them RDP houses (Sexwale, 2009).

This misconception of the right to housing and space, coupled with the political promises of the ruling party, ANC, has resulted in increased protests and conflicts over housing provision. Consequently, the mobilisation of urbanites from below the capital formations have been calling for the right to space (Lefebvre 1968; Harvey, 2008) in the urban areas through entitlements and claims to their constitutional rights to housing, endeavouring to live where they chose (*Freedom Charter* see Karis *et al.*, 1977). Accordingly, Lefebvre (2003:89), views the urban space as “a terrain suitable for defence or attack, for struggle”. Wehrhahn (2015:97) argues that the struggle for housing by the poor/excluded/working class/alienated/insecure has deliberately proliferated into protests and disobedience (in informal settlements) while a new form of contentious politics gains momentum.

The urban settings/ghetto of the poor are both spaces of exclusion and freedom (Castells, 1983:67). The reason it that these spaces dialectically allow the realisation of political freedom, or the entitlements of rights whilst simultaneously resulting in the peripheralisation of the poor who end up protesting as a way to claim their right to urban space and housing. Lefebvre (1991:57) adds that urban spaces function as both conditioning and being conditioned. In this way, through protest and claiming the right to space, the poor can also negate, challenge and subvert the existing urban processes such as housing delivery. By their protests regarding the delivery of social services and housing, the poor in South Africa have sought to subvert and challenge their omission from the opportunity to access affordable housing.

On the rate of protests over housing, Powel (2010, cited in Bailey, 2011:4), points out that an article on trends in social services protests revealed that in 190 instances, protestors decried the

lack of accessibility and affordability of adequate shelter (also see Bailey, 2011:4). Powell (2010) notes that protestors also indicated growing impatience with the promises of housing delivery by the state. Thus Williams (2004:7) states: “Public housing created a bridge between the private daily living and the political sphere of government. It linked individual rights with social rights and familial duties with community participation and political activism.”

Ballard *et al.* (2006:404), argues further that, irrespective of the academic discourse in practice, there continually are protests directed against the state and negotiations with the state in post-apartheid South Africa. This has led Holston (2008) to argue that current claims and entitlements in South Africa have created “insurgent citizenship” since individuals, dissatisfied with the current mismatch between policy intent and practice, at present are resorting to litigation and protests.

Citizens who participate in these protests are the poor who feel that they have been excluded from progressive transformation and that, if they remain silent, no change will come their way. As a result, political promises, propaganda and violent reciprocation constitute the themes of modern-day South African power dynamics. In South Africa, the use of protests as a strategy for drawing attention to government failures in fulfilling its promises has largely been successful. The reason is that the state has felt compelled to mobilise its collective resources to help provide affordable housing and so prevent an impasse between the state and its citizens.

Deceptions and policy promises are a commonality that has transcended time. It has been highlighted in this section that South African citizens did not take these promises for granted, Through protests and political struggles they sought to hold the government accountable for the realisation of its promises of housing and right to space. Politicians’ promises of furthering pro-poor, transformatory policies aimed at changing the lives of the majority, have morphed into community protests, xenophobic attacks, looting and social unrest, seeing that the government has failed to deliver due to various reasons that shall be explored in the following section.

The discussion below illustrates the nature of the housing crisis facing South Africa. The discussion seeks to locate the need for sustainable, adequate shelter amid the crisis of delivery, quality, growing urban population and increasing informalisation of urban spaces. The following discussion also highlights some of the factors that have contributed to the current low-cost housing predicament.

4.4.8 Manifestation of post-apartheid housing

Despite several attempts by the state to provide adequate housing for its citizens, the South African discourse articulates continuous challenges in low-cost housing provision (Manie, 2013; Rodgers, 2013; Huychzeymer, 2006, UN-Habitat, 2010; Choguil, 2007; Kamete, 2006; Ramovha, 2012; Ritchey, 2005; Pillay & Naude, 2006; Pieterse, 2009; Rust, 2014; Charlton & Kihato, 2006; Joboye, 2011; Walley, 2010).

Scholarly evidence indicates that this problem is pervasive and can be typified as a ‘wicked problem’ (Rodgers, 2013), with a ‘wicked nature’ (Ritchey, 2005). The reason is that it manifests across societies, perpetuating various forms of polarisations, pauperisation and peripheralisation in an already-fragmented society to the detriment of the poor. The South African housing crisis, or challenge, relates not only to “an enormous backlog, but also about a dysfunctional market, torn communities and a strained social fabric, spatial as well as social segregation, and a host of other problems” (DoH, 2000:15).

The protracted nature of the South African housing crisis is evidenced by the growing housing backlog, which “refers to the persistent shortfall in housing delivery” (Ojo-Aromokudu, 2013:1). The imprints of this housing backlog are visible in the overcrowded, expanding and augmented informalisation of urban settlements, amidst recurrent violent social service protests (Luyenge, 2011; Ramovha, 2012). Since 1994, the housing problem, or backlog in South Africa has risen exponentially (DHS, 2012), regardless of the efforts by the state and various housing stakeholders to eradicate the housing shortage. Tissington (2011), for example, states that in 1999, South African housing had a backlog of approximately 3 to 3.7 million households. Pillay and Naude (2006) note that South Africa was facing a housing backlog of over three million low-cost housing units in 2006. This is confirmed by Mafukidze and Hooysen (2009:380) and Bradlow *et al.* (2011:268) who point out that South Africa is experiencing huge, low-cost housing shortages reminiscent of 1994 (Chirau, 2014).

Accordingly, the HDA (2013) states that, although the state has provided more than 3 million houses, approximately 14% of households still are living in the informal settlement sector and are in dire need of housing. The UN-Habitat (2014) and the Housing Development Agency (HDA, 2013) further indicate that an estimated 30% of South Africa’s urban population resides in slums. In this light, it can be argued that the slum incidence shown in Table 4.1 has largely been reduced by the state’s efforts in low-income housing provision for the poor, seeing that

in 2013, less than a third (30%) of people in urban areas resided in slums as compared to the 46.2% in 1990.

The current housing shortage questions post-apartheid South Africa's democratic gains as most of the poor have not accessed adequate housing. In a bid to ensure that the poor and previously marginalised attain their right to adequate housing, the state has reassured citizens of its commitment to keep on providing of social housing. The current Minister of Human Settlements, Lindiwe Sisulu (2014), pointed out that the government has set aside R1 billion to deliver 1.5 million low-cost housing units by 2019. The question remains: Will the commitment by the Department of Human Settlement (DoHS) reduce the exponential urban housing crisis? The answer will become evident over time.

Earlier in 2007, approximately R253 billion was needed to eradicate the housing backlog completely by 2016 (DoH, 2007). The FCC (2013), argues that South Africa needs at least R800 billion, whilst Ndenze (2013), suggest that South Africa needs a "miracle" to clear the backlog within the following seven years (FCH, 2014:14). Additionally, this is even made unfeasible as the state is only able to clear 10% of the housing backlog annually (Sexwale, 2010). Sexwale argues further that the state's capacity is limited since the urban population in need of housing is increasing faster than the available government resources. Thus, the FCC (2013:3) asserts that, despite the post-apartheid government having delivered over three million subsidised houses, its current budget allocation for housing is not sufficient to arrest the backlogs completely.

The pronounced nature of the urban housing crisis is evident firstly, from the rapidly expanding informal housing structures that are looming in the peri-urban landscapes of cities and towns, and secondly, through the formation of backyard houses within formal residential settlements. Shapurjee and Charlton (2013:2), for example, state that:

"... informal settlements have several forms ranging from informal settlements (*slums/shacks*) to multiple rental housing configurations: sub-divided rooms in inner city areas; rooms and flats in multi-storey tenements ... rooms in various low-income settlements ... sub-let units on rented land ... and tenant-built units in the backyards of dwellings ..."

It is in the urban spaces that an inevitable encounter with the various forms of informal houses exists. The UN-Habitat (2010), describes these as peri-urban, built-up structures constructed with durable materials, which have access to trunk infrastructure (electricity, portable water

supply, etc.). Kaminer (2006), states that these settlements, or houses have been given several names such as “slums, *favelas* (Brazil), *aashwa’i* (Egypt) and *ciudades perdidas* (Spanish, “lost cities”) and *mukhukhu/shacks* (South Africa)”. These settlements are clearly distinguishable by aspects such as illegality and informality, environmental hazards, poverty and vulnerability, social stress, violence and protests (Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006; Godhart & Vaughan, 2008; Van Huyssteen *et al.*, 2013; Rust, 2014; Jones, *et al.*, 2014; Chirau, 2014).

Informal settlements are well known because of the structures, or materials that are used in their construction (See Fig 4.1 below). Most of these houses are made of zinc, or galvanised iron sheets, some out of cardboard while others are formed out of mud and grass, or with a range of ready available materials.

Figure 4.1: An image of a shack/*umukhukhu*



Photo: Taken in Khutsong during preliminary fieldwork in 2013

As the population of urban dwellers has increased, informal housing has grown in order to cater for the urban poor who are unable to access the housing market. In such environments and circumstances of inadequacy, another form of housing informalisation took place. There has been an increase in backyard dwellings that are normally erected on the grounds of RDP houses

(Robins, 2002; Lemanski, 2009; Shapurjee & Charlton, 2013). As argued by Lemanski (2009:1), backyard dwellings (shack/flats/rooms) are an “augmented informality” as these housing structures demonstrate the failures of the current housing policy to deliver low-cost housing to the increasing number of urbanites.

These backyard structures augment informality because they connect informal housing structures with the formal structures. People chose to use these forms of augmented informality as ‘*houses in transit*’ (researcher’s own terminology) since most of the backyard dwellers will be awaiting the construction, or allocation of an RDP house (Bell *et al.*, 2002:164), or their own individually-built houses. Consequently, these different forms of housing offer an entry and waiting point for the poor and low-income earners who endeavour to access the formal, urban processes (Sharpujee & Charlton, 2013:4). These structures are sometimes built in informal housing settlements and rented to others, or used to accommodate extended family members (Lemanski, 2009; Shapurjee & Charlton, 2013).

In South Africa, millions of households in towns and cities reside in informal settlements, seeing that these settlement structures and their respective locales have free access to basic facilities, socio-economic opportunities and development networks (Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006:41; Ehebrecht, 2014:40). This has ensured that most of the migrants who move to the urban areas decide to stay in an informal settlement. When faced with the challenges of getting affordable housing in urban areas where most people migrate to in search of better economic opportunities, the urban fringes present locales that are highly accessible to the poor (Moser & Satterthwaite, 2008).

Families choose informal settlements because setting up structures in these urban spaces are usually cheap and land is easily available, making this more of a social process than the persistent manifestation of illegality (Huchzemeyer, 2009). As a result, the urban fringes have been captured by large masses of the poor who have failed to access the urban housing market. The attractiveness of these locales to the poor have resulted in over-expanding shacks on the periphery of urban areas. This informalisation of urban peripheral settlement is a concern for the South African government (Baker *et al.*, 2010; Huchzermeyer & Kamar, 2006).

The intensification of this informalisation of urban peripheries has been largely due to the growing urban population comprising an increasing population of poor people, thus adding to the urban housing challenge. According to the DoH (2009), the urban population has been

increasing at a rate of 5, 8% annually, thus contributing to the gloomy nature of the urban housing shortage and the looming informalisation of urban fringes. Table 4.2 below highlights the contested nature of urban housing statistics as Table 4.1 previously indicated that slum incidence had dropped from 46.2% in 1990 to 28.7% in 2010. The HDA census statistics reflect a more elaborate description of the nature of housing types present in South Africa amid an increasing urbanising population.

Table 4.2: households living in urban areas – tenure by status of main dwelling

Urban areas: South Africa	Census 2001			Census 2011			
	Owned	Rented	Occupied rent-free	Owned	Rented	Occupied rent-free	Other
Formal dwelling	64%	27%	9%	54%	32%	11%	3%
Traditional dwelling	53%	22%	25%	46%	28%	22%	4%
Shack in backyard	28%	52%	20%	22%	58%	17%	3%
Shack not in backyard	36%	13%	51%	39%	17%	39%	5%
Other	40%	28%	32%	29%	44%	20%	7%
Total	57%	26%	17%	50%	32%	15%	3%

Source: Adopted from HDA (2013:17)

The table above (Table 4.2), shows a review of the Census 2011 findings and indicates that in nearly a decade (2001-2011) the urban population owning formal houses has decreased whilst there has been a growth in urbanites owning shacks (shacks not in backyard). This can be argued to be an indicator of the crisis for urban housing as more and more people are compelled to seek backyard dwellings as immediate housing option whilst looking for their own shelter. Yet also it can be noted from Table 4.2 that informal settlements (rented and owned) outside the main formal housing structures. It can thus be deduced from the above table that informal settlements are a huge challenge for urban areas in South Africa.

Earlier, South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR, 2008) calculated that between 1996 and 2007, there was a 24.2% increase in households residing in slums (i.e. from 1.45 million to 1.8 million) as more and more people migrated to the cities, while there was a 46% increase in the number of backyard informal dwellers (i.e. 403 000 to 590 000). This shows that the

number of backyard dwellers, or informal structures has been increasing in South Africa (SAIRR, 2008).

Contrastingly, the HDA (2013:14), data from the GHS for 2001 shows that there were 1.38 million shack dwellers (shacks not in backyards) in contrast to 1.25 million in 2011. Thus reflecting a decline in households residing in slums. While the findings also show that a total of 712 956 households in 2011 were residing in backyards as compared to 459 526 in 2001.

More interestingly, Stats SA (2013:124) reports that, at a provincial level, Gauteng has the highest number of informal houses. It has approximately 373 000 households residing in backyard shacks, 323 000 households in backyard flats, or rooms while around 484 000 households reside in shacks (not in the backyards).

The province with the lowest rate of informal housing is the Northern Cape with approximately 4 000 thousand households living in backyard flats, approximately 5 000 households in backyard shacks and an estimate of 32 000 households residing in shacks, or informal settlements.

Stats SA (2013:124) further found that in South Africa, approximately 1.35 million households live in informal settlements, or shacks, around 400 000 households occupy the backyards flats, or rooms and about 700 000 households reside in backyard shacks.

The HDA (2013:18) identifies the slum population (shacks not in backyards) as constituting 1 249 777 households which translates to 3 306 697 individuals. This demonstrates the South African urban housing problem because urban backyards are increasingly becoming popular.

Echoing the same sentiments, Chirau (2014) goes as far as to say that there is no good story to tell about social housing delivery in South Africa as informal settlements have *quantitatively and qualitatively* (researcher's own insertion) remained the same as they were during the apartheid era. These increases can be a reaction to the inadequacy of state-led housing approaches. According to Turner (1968) and Mangin (1963), the poor have responded to the housing crisis by constructing squatter, or informal settlements as a way of self-improvement.

Consequently, as long as the housing crisis remains, the poor will resort to creating their own structures for habitation. Against this background, Knight (2006) and Bailey (2011) propose that informal settlements are "here to stay", meaning that the state and other housing

stakeholders have to find strategies to ensure that housing structures are equipped with the necessary basic amenities and are accommodated in future, urban land planning.

As a result, Manie (2008:1) points out that “in our celebrations of democracy we are constantly reminded of how far we have come and yet on a daily basis we are faced with the reality of how much we still have to do”. Thus, the enduring nature of the South African housing crisis depicted by the visible mushrooming of slum settlements, informalisation of formal structures and housing backlogs, calls for collective action from various non-governmental, public and private actors.

There are mixed thoughts when it comes to the statistics of South Africa’s housing delivery process. Some scholars are of the view that the South African government, has delivered approximately over 2 million social, or low-cost houses (Osman & Karuselt, 2008; Sexwale, 2010; Prinsloo, 2010; Mitlin & Mogaladi, 2013; FCC, 2013; FCH, 2014; Aigbavboa, 2014). Yet some like Osman and Karuselt (2008) say that from 1994 to 2007 about 2 355 913 houses have been constructed. Prinsloo (2010), notes that since the dawn of majority independence, South Africa has provided over 2.3 million houses to approximately 11 million people. The Fuller Centre for Housing (FCH, 2014:3) concurring highlights that from 1994 to 2003, the government constructed 1.5 million RDP houses, which rose to 2.8 million houses by 2010. For a clear and more descriptive summary of the government’s low-cost housing delivery output see Table 4.3 below:

Table 4.3: The provincial housing output for a decade (2003-2013)

Housing output	2003/04-2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	Total 2008/09-2012/13
Eastern Cape	133 678	18 424	18 695	10 784	14 498	16 726	79 397
Free State	85 873	13 854	12 526	15 931	25 000	14 015	81 326
Gauteng	343 012	40 288	32 407	25 876	21 494	29 884	149 951
KwaZulu-Natal	179 035	36 068	23 587	19 873	25 987	43 000	148 515
Limpopo	121 716	16 868	18 500	15 555	13 410	12 000	76 333
Mpumalanga	81 438	17 626	8 204	9 860	7 702	10 985	54 377
Northern Cape	28 618	4 914	34 55	3 077	3 683	2 704	17 833
North West	90 953	15 912	16 557	16 816	16 333	10 932	76 550
Western Cape	107 543	31 011	16 566	11 860	11 065	15 567	86 069
Total	1 171 886	194 965	150 767	129 632	139 174	155 813	770 351

Source: Adopted from Chiweshe (2014:6)

From Table 4.3 above, it is clear that South Africa has delivered nearly 2 million houses within a decade (2003-2013). It can also be seen that the highest delivery period was from 2003 to 2008 because within this period the government prioritised affordable housing provision for the previously disadvantaged and low-income earners.

Chiweshe (2014:6) indicates that since majority rule in 1994 to 2012, the DoHS reported that the state had delivered more than 2,6 million low-cost houses with an additional 825 341 serviced sites. Aigbavboa (2014:103) states that in 2010, DHS disclosed that it had completed and allocated 3 million houses, thereby providing shelter to over 13.5 million people. The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC, 2013:2) and Maota (2011) report that the South African government has provisioned more than 3 million RDP houses to the poor and low-income households. Alluding to these facts, the General Household Survey (GHS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA, 2013:35) shows that at least 15,3% of South African households at present were residing in RDP houses, while at least 13,6% had been a member on the waiting list. StatsSA (2013), furthermore, express a growth in housing subsidy from 5,5% in 2002 to 13.3% in 2013.

The statistics above highlight the huge role the government, as a major stakeholder in social housing, has played in ensuring large numbers of poor people are provided adequate and safe shelter. The demand for housing, however, has risen beyond the state's capacity to supply, resulting in an increased housing backlog, as well as the expanding and augmented informality in urban areas.

This inability to meet South Africa's housing needs, can be attributed to the country's rapid urbanisation rate. South Africa, as is the case with other developing nations in Africa, is rapidly urbanising which has detrimental effects on its capacity to deliver social services to its urban populace. Olayiwola *et al.* (2005:2) notes that developing countries have been characterised by unplanned urbanisation which has worsened the already-dire question of housing provision. Franklin (2011) asserts that Third World cities are facing a precarious development situation, seeing that rapid urbanisation has brought to their economic hubs predominantly the poor who are in need of social welfare. Olayiwola *et al.* (2005), argues further that the experiences of the housing crisis are not an accident, but a historical crisis which has been based on the systematic structuring of development. Development has mostly been centred in the metropolises and as such there has been a profound movement of people from underdeveloped rural areas to urban spaces.

Scholars point out that internal migration has greatly contributed to the population explosion in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2005:3; Ziolkoski, 2014:2-3; Mafukidze & Hoosen, 2009:380; Rhiney, 2012; Josie & Chetty, 2015:2; Muchadenyika, 2015:1219-1220). Bell *et al.* (2002:23) argues that this massive influx of people to urban areas are the result of the dismantling of the apartheid regime's influx and segregation laws (Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986 and Group Area Act 21 of 1923) which limited South Africans from moving from one region, or place to the other. South African cities and town are thus experiencing accelerated and rapid urbanisation as all individuals assert the right to habitation within the metropolises since it is perceived centres of economic growth and multifaceted livelihood opportunities. This is reiterated by Kramer (2006) and Sexwale (2010), who note that urban slum dwellers have migrated from the countryside with optimistic, cosmopolitan prospects.

This rural exodus to urban centres has been met with low job opportunities and unemployment as the internal growth of cities exceeds the job opportunities by far (Godehart & Vaughan, 2008:10). Consequently, the current housing problem has been driven by the expanding population of the poor together with limited state capacity. The latter is due to powerlessness and lack of proactive planning for the challenges of urbanisation (UN-Habitat, 2011: xviv, 2; Bekker & Therborn, 2012:194).

The housing crisis can thus be attributed to the state's failure and incapacitation regarding the policy process of urbanisation. Sexwale (2010:3), Makamu (2010:39) and Yeboah (2005:147) point out this lack of capacity amid of rapid urbanisation. The reason it that the influx of the poor to the cities creates service delivery constraints on local governments, seeing that these migrants create an additional unbudgeted demand on service provision. Jenkins *et al.* (2007:2209) adds that influxes of poor urbanites has led the state to reduce its engagement in the provision of low-cost housing. This perpetuated the housing crisis as the surge in numbers of poor urbanites has increased the financial and delivery burden of the government. Exponential population growth without complementary economic growth stretches the already inadequate resources of urban development processes. As was pointed out, this has been termed "urban crisis in perpetuity" (Muchadenyika, 2015:1220). The reason for the continual crisis is that massive migrant populations have reduced the state's delivery capacities and have also caused increases in urban services delivery protests in South Africa as well as the informalisation of the urban landscape.

While internal migration has been the main contributor to the rapid urban housing crisis, South African cities are also experiencing the influx of international migrants from within the continent and around the globe. According to Landau (2005) and Sisulu (2008), the position of South Africa as the economic hub of the African continent and also its democratic system has attracted scores of migrants from neighbouring states fleeing from economic and political strife in their countries. In this regard Sisulu (2008) maintains that the current legislation such as the Immigrant's Act 13 of 2002 and the Refugee's Act 130 of 1998, grant prerogatives, or access for foreign nationals to qualify for government housing subsidy. This suggest that instead of being a source of cheap labour, migrants currently are increasing the already huge housing demand. This has resulted in South African socio-economic and political spaces being rife with xenophobic and ethno-conflicts as competition for scarce social resources (including housing) ensue (Ndinda *et al.*, 2010; Bailey, 2011; Ramovha, 2012; Chirau, 2014; Muchadenyika, 2015).

Post-occupant narratives on RDP housing reveal that most of these capital subsidy units are of poor quality. This is evidenced by defects such as incomplete flooring, defective roofing, poor workmanship, ceiling issues, gaps between window frames and walls, cracks, doors not fitting properly, slated wooden doors allowing outsiders to look in damp walls which are rapidly deteriorating (Aigbavboa & Thwala, 2013:20-22; Goebel, 2007:292). This has largely led dissatisfied recipients to opt for renting out the RDP houses, or choosing to reside in the informal settlements, or using them as tuckshops (Goebel, 2007:292; Good Governance and Learning Network [GGLN], 2010:2; Aigbavboa & Thwala, 2013:17).

The poor quality of some RDP houses has aggravated the housing crisis as people have preferred to move back to the informal settlements due to the dilapidated, subsidised units with seemingly continuous maintenance requirements (Huchzermeyer, 2000; Govender *et al.*, 2011) even though staying in shacks is cost-effective and free. The UN-Habitat (2011:74) states that, despite informal settlements being substandard locales, people find it preferable as they are free, without service charges and are mostly located close to the work place of the poor urbanites.

On the one hand, the supply-driven approach to low-cost housing in South Africa sacrificed quality at the expense of quantity because the government was pressurised by the citizens to fulfil its socio-economic and political promises. On the other hand, the shoddiness and poor quality of the RDP houses has also been exacerbated by the increasing minimum standards and contractors desire to accumulate profits (Pithouse, 2009). When contractors realised that the

government was not willing to pay large sums, they turned to producing substandard units and cutting operational expenses. As a result, Bailey (2011:2) points out that even after nearly two decades, the state still prefers using contractors to deliver its housing without including the intended beneficiaries. This has largely contributed to the production of substandard, low-cost houses as the contractors cut costs and are not fully monitored, or evaluated.

Commenting on this condition, the Fuller Centre for Housing (FCH, 2014:2), stresses that substandard housing has become a legacy since the ANC took power. Sexwale confirmed this finding, “We should admit ... we started on a wrong foot. These RDP houses that people are saying are falling [down], not a good job was done there ...” (cited in FCH, 2014:14). The government had to demolish a number of these RDPs. Mabula (2011), notes, for example, in Gauteng alone between 2006 and 2011, 80 648 RDP units were demolished. This has intensified the already- growing housing problem (Khoza, 2014:32). The provision of these poor quality, low-income units indicated the failure of the mass-scale, supply-driven approach to housing when considering a solid house as the embodiment of a family’s current and future settlement.

When people move into a house they expect sustainable structures that can be used even by future generations. The twin process of demolishing and reconstructing, or repairing poorly-constructed houses perpetuates the housing crisis, as the reason is that the state has to duplicate the mobilisation of its resources in providing housing to the same recipients. Recipients’ narratives of the small size of the RDP structures as ”matchbox houses”, as well as the failure to consider the average size of African families through the state’s one-size-fits-all approach, has also prevented the successful delivery of adequate housing to the poor in this regard (Burguone, 2008:2; Goebel, 2007:298; Poulsen & Silverman, 2005:2).

The government was supposed to have acquire knowledge about the traditional family patterns of Africans before building these small, inadequate shelters for low-income earners. The house sizes have contributed to the excessive informalisation of both regulated and unregulated housing settlements. Marais (2007:84) reports that the size of the RDP units has further inhibited the success of housing delivery efforts. The reason is that people have either built backyard shacks, or flats (Lemanski, 2009; Crankshaw *et al.*, 2000), or left the other family members in the informal settlements seeing that the RDP cannot accommodate large African families.

In addition, the post-apartheid, housing provided by the state has operated on limited stakeholder involvement. This led to the creation of urban fantasies about free housing for all (Watson, 2013), or the reproduction of already-failed solutions to the housing crisis (Croese *et al.*, 2016:237) because the approach is not responsive to the housing needs of the poor. The non-participatory nature of these RDP houses, moreover, has contributed to corruption. The reason is clear: the public is less involved in the praxis of the housing-policies and cannot, therefore, hold housing developers accountable (Mafunisa, 2007:261; Powell *et al.*, 2009:24).

Sexwale (2009) argues that due to a lack of community participation, protests have arisen as a form of struggle for the right to access information about the development processes of RDP houses. In support of this, Goebel (2007:296) points out that major housing projects in Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) have failed dismally due to a lack of public participation. Officials were guilty of misappropriating resources and of incompetence.

Corruption in the awarding of tenders has also aggravated the low-cost housing challenges. Accordingly, Ikejiofor (1999) notes that government officials in Africa have co-opted and captured development projects by choosing to be ‘shadow contractors’ and ‘ghost contractors’ in major housing projects as they award themselves tenders, or other people acting on their behalf. This has caused backlogs as certain ‘tenderpreneurs’ swindle housing funds and produce poor structures, or even fail to deliver houses within the stipulated timeframes.

In addition, Ikejiofor (1999) points out that most of these bureaucrats and government officials have resigned from their occupations and have moved into construction without any previous training or experience. This has resulted in increased corruption, maladministration, incompetence and the embezzlement of state funds, fraudulent land acquisitions as well as insufficient site surveying and poor procurement of building material. Even during the allocation of the houses there has been several reported cases of corruption since officials are bribed to allocate the unit to someone other than the intended beneficiary. The DoH (2009:4) reports numerous irregularities that occur during the allocation and occupation of RDP houses such as fraud, corruption and maladministration.

This brief overview of the state of housing in South Africa and the factors inhibiting the successful provision of low-cost housing has suggested that the current crisis is an inherited problem, which has been exacerbated by modern-day failures on the part of the state to plan for urban migrant flows. Broadly speaking, housing challenges have hinged upon disjointed

modernisation, corruption and the non-participatory nature of the current policy approaches. The subsequent section presents a succinct discussion of Khutsong which is the main focus of the current thesis as the case study under investigation.


4.5 The Khutsong housing settlement project

The objective of the present study is to focus particularly on the township of Khutsong. The aim is to obtain a deeper understanding of the power relations and dynamics among the key role-players with regard to the housing project.

Khutsong is a township located on the far western outskirts of Greater Johannesburg and outside the mining centre of Carletonville in the Merafong City local municipality which is part of the Gauteng Province (see Figure 4.2 below). Khutsong is found in Carletonville which is a predominantly a mining town (Van Eeden & Brink, 2007:699; CDE, 2007), established to accommodate black mining workers in 1958 (Johnson & Bernstein, 2007; Kirshner & Phokela, 2010).

Khutsong Township is located 75 km from Johannesburg and 50 km from Potchefstroom (Mazembo, 2011). It is divided further into Khutsong North and Khutsong South (Merafong City, 2009; Niewoudt, 2013). It is a heterogenic township because it houses people from different ethnic groups and nationalities. Kishner and Phokela, (2010) note that since its establishment Mozambicans and other foreign nationals have moved into the mining settlement as workers. This has been largely due to the fact that the township has been welcoming foreigners so that the May-2008 wave of xenophobic violence did not occur in Khutsong (Kirshner and Phokela, 2010; Kirshner, 2011). The name Khutsong is a Tswana word for a 'resting place' (Johnston and Bernstein, 2007) while to some it terms it a 'place of peace' (CDE, 2007:8; Matebesi & Botes, 2011:5).

Figure 4.2: Map of Merafong City Municipality



Source: Kirshner (2011:26)

The township, however, is not as peaceful as its name suggests; it has been marked with several protests and violent community unrests. This was evident in the ferocious and severe forms of community contestations that occurred during 2005 to 2009 as a result of provincial demarcation issues (Ndaba & Maphumalo, 2005; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; CDE, 2007; Philp, 2009; Bishop, 2009; Kirshner & Phokela, 2010, Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Mazembo, 2011; 2012).

As further illustration of the Khutsong community's aggressive stance on this matter, CDE (2007:9-10) and Kirshner (2011:2, 9) report that when the government passed legislation on the abolition of cross-border municipalities in 2005, unrest ensued. The Khutsong community, led by a local activist from the South African Communist Party (SACP), unleashed a wave of violent protests against the government.

Between 2005 and 2007 the Khutsong protests were mentioned regularly on the national news. CDE (2007:10) indicates that in less than 10 months Khutsong unrests had generated 80 national news reports and approximately R70 million worth of damages to both public and private property. It also led to municipal election boycotts and the culture of non-payment for social services (payment decreased from 50% to 12% in 2006). From this situation it can be

inferred that Khutsong is an explosive and potentially violent community where community problems are met with collective mobilisations, protests and radical resistance. The demarcation issue has, however, been well documented, but low-cost housing development in Khutsong is another major, contentious terrain of struggle which remains under-researched.

4.5.1 Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Khutsong

Merafong City previously formed part of the West Rand District Municipality in Gauteng. Merafong City Municipality had approximately 210 480 residents in 2001, of which Khutsong comprises 32% of the municipality's population (CDE, 2007; Stats SA, 2007; Merafong City, 2009). The population of the municipality increased to 215 860 in 2007 (Stats SA, 2007) with Khutsong consisting of a population of 139 850, or above 60% of the municipality's population (Merafong City, 2009). The current statistics on the population of Khutsong indicate an increase to 149 850 people (Merafong City ITP, 2010-2015) whilst Census 2011 indicated a 6% decline in the population of Merafong from 210 480 in 2001 to 197 520 in 2011 (Stats SA, 2011).

The economic base of Merafong seems to be diminishing since its major economic sector is mining (CDE, 2007; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Merafong City, 2009). In 2007, for example, the Merafong IDP indicated a decrease in the gross geographic product of mining from 31% in 2005 to 28% in 2007 (Merafong City, 2009). In this way, the decrease in mining productivity presents a challenge to Khutsong because most of its inhabitants rely solely on employment in the mining industry and unemployment is estimated to be over 20.5% (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007:32; Kirshner, 2011:6-7).

CDE (2007) points out that most of the inhabitants of Khutsong have attained only lower education, contributing to the dire livelihood challenges they face as they only have mining employment to rely on which seldom demands qualifications, or skills. Since Khutsong is a predominantly Black settlement, it has poor infrastructure services. Stats SA (2011) reports that in 2011, as many as 59% household in formal dwellings had access to basic services, while 41% of those in informal units had access to social amenities. These statistics show the multi-dimensional nature of poverty that exists in Khutsong.

The land in Khutsong is not conducive to human settlements, since 90% of the land is dolomitic and prone to sinkholes (CDE, 2007:32; Urban-Econo, 2008:3; Niewoudt, 2013:13). Human settlements, or housing development has, therefore, been a challenge due to the geological

unstable, dolomitic landscape that covers much of Khutsong. The influx of migrants in search of employment in the mining sector has also worsened the state of social service provision in Khutsong seeing that the informal sector has grown rapidly (Merafong City, 2013).

As is the case in the rest of South Africa, Khutsong is faced with housing shortages for the poor and this is seen in the large number of informal structures as compared to formal structures (see Table 4.4 below). In 2007, for example, there was a total of 13 061 informal settlements in the Merafong Municipality with around 84% (11 000) being in Khutsong (Merafong City, 2009).

Table 4.4: Housing state in Khutsong

Number of houses	8 487
Informal structures	15 000
Backyard dwellers	8 487

Source: Merafong City IDP 2010

The municipality, however, has made efforts to provide low-cost housing to the poor in Khutsong. This has largely been done through the Khutsong Settlement project.

4.5.2 The Khutsong project's policy processes

The Khutsong project was influenced largely by the occurrence of dolomite and sinkholes. Urban-Econo (2008) and Nieuwoudt (2013) report that the continued prevalence of sinkholes which were destroying houses and infrastructure, prompted the municipality to commission a geo-technical survey, which concluded that approximately 90% of Khutsong was located in a high-risk zone of sinkhole formation. High-risk areas in which the existence of dolomite needed to be managed were found mostly in Khutsong South and, in particular, the informal settlements (Zone 3 and 4) that were on the outskirts, but also part of the formal settlement (Nieuwoudt, 2013). Through the formation of Merafong City Local Municipality in December 2000, the dolomitic crisis was given priority status and numerous studies were conducted to determine its prevalence. After several incidents where sinkholes occurred in 2002, the municipality realised the severity of dolomitic instability and had to halt all development on geologically unstable areas (Urban-Econo, 2008; Nieuwoudt, 2013).

The municipality, with the help of local leaders, started community awareness programmes on the dolomitic instability of Khutsong (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007). This was done through

fliers, road shows and public meetings. Certain key stakeholders, however, such as local leaders and construction companies, were seen developing the risky residential areas. This confused inhabitants more and led them to distrust the notion of an assumed geological risk of the place (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007:36-37; Matebesi, 2011:95). This resulted in stakeholders interpreting the project from their own standpoint, which increased the housing shortage in Khutsong.

Nieuwoudt (2013), indicates further that when new sinkholes were reported in 2002 the municipality had to inform the West Rand District Municipality (WRDM) Disaster Management Department. Accordingly, the WRDM reported the sinkhole issue to the National Disaster Centre, which alerted the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG).

The National Disaster Centre, however, advised the WRDM and DPLG not to declare Khutsong a disaster area because this would impact negatively on economic growth and investment prospects. This led to an agreement on the relocation of the households to high-risks zones (Zone 3 and 4). The municipality had to draft a Resettlement Strategic Plan as the project was supposed to be implemented urgently. Urban-Econo (2008:7) mentions that approximately 25 000 households needed to be relocated to safe zones, or settlements. The Khutsong Resettlement project sought to promote sustainable settlement with integrated infrastructure and social services in line with the policy imperatives of BNG and HWP (Urban-Econo, 2008).

In 2003, a business plan to the value of R1 573 400 000 was developed and submitted to the WRDM as well as to the provincial and national government for funding (Nieuwoudt, 2013). At first, a project of 4 700 housing subsidies was agreed upon which was later extended to 18 000 by the Gauteng Department of Housing (Urban-Econo, 2008; Nieuwoudt, 2013). Due to the severe geological instability, the Merafong Municipality agreed to relocate the entire township (Nieuwoudt, 2013), which included 21 485 informal settlement households and 3 600 formal housing households (Urban-Econo, 2008; Nieuwoudt, 2013; PSCM, 2008-2016).

The Khutsong Housing project also known as Khutsong South Ext 1, 2 and 3 became a major presidential project in 2003, when President Mbeki agreed to support it with R2 billion. In the community, there were suspicions that these finances were a pacifier ('sweetener') enticing inhabitants to accept the demarcation proposal to become part of North-West Province. Immediately after the presidential funding, a Regional Professional Team (RPT) was appointed

as a taskforce to spearhead the housing project, but it realised that only 14 854 stands were suitable for township establishment. This implied that land for housing development was a challenge in Khutsong. This fact is reiterated by Bayat (cited in Tau 2009) who stated that the major challenge in the Khutsong project has been the issue of accessing land for housing development seeing that a number of private owners were unwilling to sell their land.

Mbeki's signing of the Twelfth Amendment Bill on 22 December 2005, resulted in Khutsong being relocated to North-West Province. This sparked community protests as residents were of the opinion this would stifle economic growth because North West is well documented as a poverty-stricken province. This resulted in prolonged community unrests, infrastructure destruction as schools and libraries were burnt down. The housing project was halted since the entire focus shifted the demarcation crisis.

The demarcation decision also resulted in a reduction in the output of the housing project because North West could only manage to finance 5 500 units within the two phases of the housing delivery programmes (Nieuwoudt, 2013). Citizens knew that relocating them to North West would delay progress in their socio-economic transformation, thus they had rallied around being rezoned as part of Gauteng. Finally on 15 January, the demarcation matter was resolved and Khutsong was relocated to Gauteng through the Constitution Sixteenth Amendment Act (B1 of 2009) which paved the way for a resurgence of the Khutsong housing crisis.

According to Tau (2009), the Khutsong project thus became a "Priority Project" in 2009, in which the National Department of Human Settlements (NDoHS) started to monitor the project while the three spheres of government managed the housing process through cooperative governance. The approach that has been followed in the Khutsong housing project has, therefore, followed participatory development. As shall be seen in Chapters 6 and 7, however, the spaces of engagements have been rife with power plays by different stakeholders. The housing project has followed the principles of the BNG and has sought to produce a more-integrated human settlement. This happened because the current housing settlement is located between Welverdiend and Olberhozer, which are well-established affluent locations.

Unfortunately, the project, as was the case with the other RDP and BNG housing developments, has been characterised by badly built housing units, poor drainage facilities, cracking structures, disintegrated infrastructure and the slow delivery of social amenities (bridges, schools, clinics, shops, electricity, burial sites). Interviews conducted with the Merafong Town

Planning officials between September and October 2013, revealed that the housing project had also been hindered by issues of land access, inexperienced contracting, poor synergy between the various government departments, and stakeholders' contradictory interpretations of the project.

To date, 5 500 housing units have been constructed as well as a new shopping centre, library, primary school and bridges (PSCM, May 2016; PPCE, May 2016). Nearly all the roads have been tarred and the houses provided electricity (PSCM, 2008-2016). Although there has been achievements, these are slowing due to the prevailing political dynamics that are evident in the actions and inactions of various key stakeholders.

To conclude, the Khutsong Resettlement Project presents a typical example of the multi-variegated nature of socio-economic and political factors that impact housing development. The Khutsong project has followed an enabling approach to settlement provision in which the private sector partners with local government, local politicians and the community in the provision of low-cost housing. The housing policy processes are, however, rife with stakeholder's overt and covert power-plays that obstruct the achievement of the Khutsong settlement project objectives.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented an in-depth discussion of low cost housing provision by outlining policies in general, how it was implemented in South Africa, and in particular, how the policies were applied in the Khutsong housing project. Following Kemeny (1992), Castells (1977) and Lefebvre (1968), conclusions can also be drawn on power contestation and resistance that involves the state, local leaders, community members and the developers in housing delivery processes. There were clear power shifts identified amongst actors as approaches to housing development changed within given policy eras.

In the discussion, housing provision was indicated as a space dominated by the government whilst other actors such as the private sectors have influenced policy shifts. Examples of these are a movement to the enabling approach in order to limit the state's influence in housing delivery systems. Furthermore, it has been found that public influence in housing globally has been facilitated through Turner's and the World Bank's self-help schemes whilst in South Africa the public have mobilised collectively to access to the spaces of housing policy.

As a result, housing development, as with most urban social services, became terrains for defence, attack or struggle. In this regard, the policy praxis became a context that is both conditioning and at the same time promote shifts in domineering. Thus, it was indicated that the low-cost housing approach in South Africa has often shown a more top-down, centralised influence whilst on the other hand, the policy approaches have become intertwined more with stakeholder dynamics in housing.

Therefore, the social issue of housing provision fluctuated between various approaches: enabling, provider or market-centred, and with a corresponding overlap in the roles of various actors such as the state, private sector, local government, local leaders and communities. The South African housing approach during the colonial and apartheid eras were mainly centralised as the state was the overall *provider*. However, self-help schemes towards the 1960s and 1970s saw the state functioning as key actor to help provide *enabling* environments for incremental housing. Post-apartheid housing policies have predominantly alternated between various approaches: state driven, self-help, enabling, and the rights approach as well as participatory stratagems.

Significant from the discussion is that inadequate housing has become a prevalent feature of the South African urban landscape. This include certain inherited characteristics from the previous dispensation such as the socio-spatial formations permeating post-apartheid South Africa. Although attempts were made to cater for some housing needs of the majority urban poor, shacks, backyard houses and informal settlements were inescapable spaces for the poor as the state-led provision was inelastic to the growing housing demand. This led to activist politics of space and rights characterised by protests and contestations. These aspects have provided the discourse on South African housing a new narrative. The poor are focused on claims and entitlement to fulfil their perceived rights as enshrined in the Freedom Charter and the South African Constitution's Bill of Rights.

This chapter examined and discussed the enduring nature of this housing crisis as characterised by the large backlogs, overflowing informal settlements, the informalisation of formal housing (augmented informality), everyday scenes of protests and peripheralised settlements. It was noted that housing is a highly politicised social commodity as is shown by contestation over struggles for space and right to adequate shelter.

Within the mentioned ambit of promoting all citizen's rights to adequate housing, the South African government has enacted various legislations. However, as was indicated, low-cost housing provision remains a highly-contested terrain which has led even the state to admit that the current policy initiatives were not viable and were promoting increased dependence on the state on social provisioning of housing. Therefore, the researcher argues for an infusion of power theories in discourses of housing provision as it appears that housing has been mostly oriented to a particular policy.

The following chapter (Chapter 5), focuses on the methodological aspects of the empirical study of housing provision in Khutsong. This provides a comprehensive explanation and description of how the research was undertaken empirically in view of the research objectives and aims of the present study.

Chapter 5: Methodology of the Khutsong empirical study

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter (ch 4) provided an overview and discussed the various approaches to housing policies with a particular focus on the South African approaches, while introducing the Khutsong project. In turn, the present chapter gives a comprehensive description of the methodological approach that the researcher utilised to gather data for the Khutsong housing study, elaborating on the discussion in chapter 1. The research sought to understand how power dynamics and the interpretation of key role-players may influence outcomes of the Khutsong housing project. The present study focused particularly on the relationship between power dynamics and the social housing delivery systems (low-cost housing) in South Africa. This chapter examines how this topic was studied methodologically.

5.2 Research design and methodology

Crotty (2009:3) defines methodology as the “strategy or plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of a particular method and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcome”. Cooper and Schindler (2003:38) explain methodology as the way in which data is gathered for a research project. Fellows and Liu (1997) point out that methodology refers to the principles and procedures involved in logical thought processes that are applied in an inquiry. This is echoed by Babbie (1983:32) who argues that methodology relates to the research philosophy, since it includes the assumptions and values that serve as the rationale of a study as well as the criteria to interpret findings. Thus, methodology is a collective term typifying the various approaches, data-collection instruments and analysis techniques employed in a given study.

On this basis, a research design can be defined as the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to the study’s initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusions (Yin, 2009:29). The research design embodies the entire research process from the formulation of a problem to writing the research question, data collection, analysis, interpretation and drawing conclusions (Bodgan & Taylor, 1975; Creswell, 2013). Mouton (1996:107) notes that the design normally develops from a research problem. In this light, Babbie (2001:90) argues that designing a study means specifying exactly what, who, when and how research phenomena is to be studied. In summary, such a design can be termed a blueprint, plan, structure and strategic framework for providing answers to the research questions and problem (Denzin, 1994;

Huysamen, 1994; Kumar, 2005; Mouton, 2006; Yin, 2009; 2014). According to Kumar (2005) the research design fulfils a vital function in identifying and developing the procedural and logistical structuring of the study. In this regard, the design provides guidance to the research on the entire process and sets boundaries or limits for the research (De Vos, 2005:132). Thus, the research design permits the researcher to employ the appropriate methodological orientation to answer a set of research questions.

Mouton (1996) and Silverman (2005) point out that there basically are two approaches that can be used in social science research, namely quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Creswell (2009:12-15) also mentions the mixed-methods approach as the third methodological strategy for research in the social sciences.

Quantitative: This approach works with analysed numerical data (Struwing, 2004:41). It uses a variety of measurement techniques to record and investigate social issues (Bless and Higson-Smith, 2000:156). This approach is employed to “answer questions about relationships amongst variables with the purpose of explaining, predicting and controlling phenomena and it also known as the positivist approach” (Leed & Omrod, 2005:94).

Qualitative: This research, on the other side of the scale, can be explained as an approach to:

“Answer questions about the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and understanding the phenomena from the participants point of view... also referred to as the interpretive, constructivist, anti-positivist approach” (Leed & Omrod, 2005:94).

Mixed method: This design seeks to reduce or control the inadequacies of the positivist and interpretivist approaches. According to Creswell (2015:2), in the mixed-methods approach the investigator gathers both quantitative and qualitative data, combines the two and then draws on interpretations and conclusions that are based on the collective strengths of the two approaches.

The present study follows a qualitative approach. The approach entails a situated activity that locates the researcher in a world and allows him/her to interpret this life sphere, thus making it more visible (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011:3). It further allows representations of the world or social phenomena through studies conducted in natural settings or within the localised context of a given phenomenon. In this regard, interpretations and explications are linked closely to the meanings that respondents or participants attribute to phenomena.

Creswell (2013:44-47) indicates that the qualitative approach begins with research assumptions and the use of theoretical frameworks that inform the study problem and seeks to unveil the meanings that individuals ascribe to a social issue. It allows for the collection of data in its sensitive natural settings, where participants experience the issue or problem. The data as such are collected by the researcher with his/her main instruments interviews, focus groups, observations and document analysis. Creswell argues further that qualitative techniques allow for the gathering of data through the “bottom-up” approach as data patterns follow an inductive-deductive logic (Creswell, 2013:45).

Therefore, the qualitative approach was more preferable for the present study as it allowed the researcher an in-depth understanding of the Khutsong role-players’ interpretation, actions/(in)actions and how their power dynamics (covertly/overtly) impacted the outcome of the housing project. The study concentrated specifically on the actors’ interpretations of relationships, where the qualitative approach allowed the researcher to uncover their understandings and explanations of the entire housing process. This entails in-depth insight that could not be foreseen or predetermined this easily. As argued by De Vos *et al.* (2011:308) the qualitative view is “concerned with understanding (*verstehen*) rather than explanation and with the subjective exploration of reality from the perspective of an insider”. Thus, the nature of such a design promotes an interpretivist approach that help understand and explain the impact of key players’ power dynamics on the outcome of the Khutsong housing project.

Following De Vos *et al.* (2013:310), the approach is based on the assumption that reality can only be interpreted best from the perspectives and views of research participants themselves. Concurring, Ritchie and Lewis (2003:4) explains that it takes an *emic* perspective to social research that views social life in terms of processes and in a holistic empathy-neutral manner. In this way, the qualitative approach seeks to explore activities and social processes (Marshall & Rossmans, 1999:2) for a more comprehensive or in-depth understanding of social issues. In this sense, it proves to be the best approach to explore, describe and explain the nature of power relationships within the Khutsong settlement project. The aim is to explicate the impact of such power plays on housing delivery systems and future development processes in the context under investigation.

Therefore, the present study employed a qualitative approach to capture fully the various aspects involved in the Khutsong settlement project such as power relationships, processes, interpretations and perceptions of the key role-players. Numerous studies on housing issues in

South Africa have used a predominantly qualitative method (Napier, 2005; Goebel, 2007; Leyi, 2009; Greyling, 2009; Gulyani & Talukdah, 2010; Phago, 2010; FCC, 2013; Chalton, 2013; Govender, 2011; Tissington *et al.*, 2013; Fox, 2013). Other studies on housing have utilised quantitative approaches (Burgoyne, 2008; Govender *et al.*, 2011; Basorun & Fadairo, 2012); mixed-methods (Mia & Othman, 2007; Theuns, 2013; Ajayi, 2012; Aigbavboa & Thwala, 2014); or literature reviews (Rust, 2006; Cross, 2006; Marais & Ntema, 2013).

However, this is not a complete list of the studies on housing conducted in South Africa. The present research seeks only to locate the current approach within the various methodological approaches that have been followed in studies of this nature. Furthermore, according to Bengtsson (2009:17), the socio-political construction of housing policy in different national and international contexts may be investigated both at the level of citizens and the political elite and by using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

Creswell (2013:7) explains that qualitative research provides the option of several approaches that a researcher can follow for a research study (cf. also Samkange 2012:610). These range from ethnography, case studies, grounded theory, phenomenology and experience narratives (Creswell, 2013; Willis, 2007; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Such approaches are utilised widely by social scientists (Creswell, 2013). Even though the various design strategies can be typified as qualitative, they have different foci, question formulations, sample selection, as well as data-collection and analysis techniques (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016: 23).

The present study chose the case-study approach as it allowed the researcher a contextually in-depth understanding and description of the Khutsong housing phenomenon. Following Merriam and Tisdell (2016:39), the case study approach allowed the researcher to examine the functioning (Stake, 2006:1) of the Khutsong housing project through delineated data-collection processes. In addition, the uniqueness and typicality of the Khutsong process calls for the use of a case-study approach, which helped describe and understand role-players interpretations of the power-relationships within the housing development.

5.3 Case-study research

The aim was to understand and explain the power dynamics and its effect on the success of approaches to low-cost housing policies in South Africa. To accomplish this, both a descriptive and instrumental type of case study was conducted at Khutsong between August 2013 and 31 July 2016 (in three different phases). According to Merriam and Tisdell (2016:37), “A case

study is an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded systems.” Yin (2003) indicates that a case study allows the studying of specific cases of phenomena for example, groups, or organisations such as schools. Yin (2014:16) adds that a “study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident”.

From the exposition above, it is clear that a case-study approach is characterised by a visible delimitation of a given study (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016:38). It seeks to study a given research issue well and thus delimits or sets boundaries to what it focuses on. However, Fouche and Schurink (2011:320) and Stacke (2005:443) argue that the case-study approach “is more of a choice of what is to be studied than a methodological one”. Fouche and Schurink (2011) explain that the need for an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon encourages researchers to conduct case studies. Furthermore, the choice for a case study should be based on the bounded system and uniqueness or typicality of a given research topic or issue (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016:38-39). In this regard, the Khutsong settlement project presents unique forms of citizen engagement, power dynamics and reciprocity struggles. Even the nature of the processes occurring in the housing project present a unique context in which to understand stakeholder relationships and developmental project outcomes.

Furthermore, since the research sought to highlight the power dynamics amongst different actors in the Khutsong settlement project, as such the study show characteristics of the descriptive or intrinsic case study. According to Yin (2003), this type of case study aims to describe, analyse and interpret a given social issue. Thomas (2004 cited in Fouche & Schurink, 2011:321) indicates the approach may be an intensive study of one instance or several of a given social phenomenon for a detailed description of the case. It can, however, be inferred that the present study also functioned as an instrumental or explanatory case study, seeing that it focused on both theory modification and testing. Fouche and Schurink (2011:321) note that case studies are useful approaches for generating theories or new knowledge to inform future policies. The present case study aimed to reinterpret and broaden through recommendations Lukes’ third face of power by assessing how his discourse on power could be applied to the complex housing situation in Khutsong. Against this background, the case study was operationalised through an extensive review of scholarly material and housing policy documents, observations, as well as structured and focus-group interviews.

5.4 Population and sampling

The population of the study consisted of the following: community members of old Khutsong (informal and formal settlement), new Khutsong resettlement, councillors, municipal officials and contractors or housing developers (local and private contractors) of the Khutsong settlement project. Purposive sampling was employed to select participants for the study. According to Merriam and Tisdell (2016:96), this is the most common sampling technique employed in qualitative studies and is based on the assumption that the researcher endeavours to discover, understand and gain insight regarding an issue. Therefore, the aim is to select a sample from which most can be learned about a given context/situation. Purposive sampling relies on the researcher's knowledge of the study's purpose. Therefore, actors' power relationships could only be grasped through an informative, rich or in-depth understanding of the Khutsong housing crisis. Patton (2015:53) alludes that with purposive sampling emphasis is on in-depth understanding of information-rich cases. There are several forms of purposive sampling, ranging from typical, unique, maximum variation, convenience to snowball (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).

The present study used a combination of typical and snowball sampling to select participants for the research. The sampling strategy was employed by classifying participants of the study who clearly reflected the stakeholders or actors within the Khutsong settlement project. As a result, municipal officials, councillors, ward committee members (local leaders), community members, contractors and community members were selected to be participants of the study. This was the first stage of the sampling process, which commenced during the preliminary study on housing that was carried out from August to September 2013 by the researcher, Prof Johan Zaaiman (Supervisor) and Mr Sello Seitholo (Department Administrator).

The second sampling stage was conducted from May to June 2015. Snowball sampling was employed to select study participants through the help of key informants who came to the fore during the 2013 study. These are: Speaker of the Municipality; Executive Director of Merafong Municipality Economic Development and Planning; and the Councillor for Ward 8. Through these individuals, the researcher managed to assemble 55 participants for individual interviews and 30 people for four focus-group interviews. These categories are shown in the Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1: Categories of participants per data technique

Data-collection technique	Category	Number of participants	Gender	
Individual interviews	Municipal officials	5	Male	4
			Female	1
	Community leaders	3	Female	1
			Male	2
	Councillors	2	Female	1
			Male	1
	Contractors	2	Male	2
Community members	43	Female	26	
		Male	17	
Focus groups	Community members, officials and leaders	30	Female	20
			Male	10

5.5 Development of interview schedules

Prior to conducting the empirical data collection, the researcher formulated interview schedules for the different participants, namely community members, local leaders, municipal officials and housing contractors. The preparation of such an interview schedule provides the researcher with a set of predetermined questions that may be used to gauge or decipher the participant's knowledge or perception of the issue under investigation (Greef, 2011: 352). The interview guides for the present study were framed logically following the theoretical study, consultations with the study promoter and a preliminary pilot testing in April 2015.

The schedules that were formulated represented the study's research questions (ch 1), theory (ch 2) and literature reviews (ch 3 and 4). Therefore, the final interview guides covered a broad range of themes on the Khutsong housing project and power dynamics. These themes entail: the history and objectives of the project, progress and challenges, project actors, extent of control and involvement in the housing policy processes, tensions amongst actors, power relationships amongst actors, pre- and post-occupancy experiences, environmental factors, and contribution of the settlement to Khutsong, and finally, recommendations. Furthermore, since the study was conducted in multi-lingual community, the interview guide was translated into isiZulu (a language in which the researcher is fluent) and Setswana (for the field workers) before it was administered to the case study.

5.6 Data collection

In gathering data to answer the research questions (see ch 1), the study had to use interviews and focus groups supplemented by an extensive literature review. This review refined and redefined the research questions by locating them within the broader themes of housing and power. According to Rubin and Babbie (2001:121), a literature review ensures that “the study is seen as part of a cumulative knowledge-building effort”, and in this case the literature review helped position the study within the discourses on power and housing. Creswell (2009:25) explains that the literature review has several purposes. These include: relating a study to the larger on-going dialogue in the literature, filling in gaps, extending prior studies and establishing the importance of the study. Babbie and Mouton (2001:282) point out that literature and theoretical reviews function as guiding principles to help structure the data collection. In this sense, the researcher critically examined and analysed scholarly articles on power and housing.

In addition, the researcher undertook a thorough review of government documents, newspaper articles and legislation regarding approaches to housing provision in South Africa, as well as on power dynamics. For the Khutsong settlement project, the researcher consulted the following documents: the Merafong Housing plan, Merafong IDP, Khutsong Resettlement plan and implementation, newspapers, and the minutes or reports regarding the settlement processes. Thereby data was ‘mined’ from the Merafong Municipality documents as part of a data-collection process.

The aim of the present study was an in-depth insider perspective of the power dynamics and the interpretation of these relationships by key role-players. Therefore, the primary data for this study was collected through the following: observations, focus groups and semi-structured interviews in 2013 (20 Aug.-10 Sept.), 2015 (20 May and 21 June) as well as reviews of Merafong City Local Municipality (MCLM) executive reports on the housing project (22-29 July 2016). Structured interviews were conducted at Khutsong with the help of a field assistants who were trained in posing and probing questions. According to Cohen *et al.* (2007:349), interviews are a flexible tool for gathering information, discussing the interpretations of interviewees, and understanding their personal experiences. Patton (2015:426) explains this process as follows:

“We interview people to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe ... we cannot observe feeling thoughts and intentions. We cannot observe behaviours that took place at some previous point ... situations that preclude the observer ... how people have organised the world and the meanings they attach to what goes in the world. We have to ask people about those things ... the purpose of an interview is thus to enter into the other person’s perspective” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016:108).

Silverman (2004) adds that interviews enable researchers to produce contemporary experiences and knowledge (Samkange, 2012:614). Thus, for the present study, the researcher interviewed stakeholders of the Khutsong settlement project to understand how their perceptions of the power relationships impacted the outcome of the project. The steps that were followed are outlined below.

Firstly, the researcher had to acquire permission from the municipality. The Executive Director of Economic Development and Planning (ED) aided by the municipal manager, provided the researcher authorisation to conduct the study. Once granted permission, the researcher sought and trained a field worker and asked her to assist in translating the interview schedule to Setswana for a user-friendly version to use during the individual interviews. However, the fieldworker had to be replaced due to technical challenges encountered during the research.

As indicated previously, the interview guide was translated into isiZulu seeing that this is the language used by a number of Khutsong residents. Prior to the main data-collection, a pilot study was conducted with the ED and the municipal official responsible for electrification in the Khutsong settlement. The pilot study showed that the interview guide was applicable to the housing project and could help collect data for the study.

For the present study, the researcher conducted 55 individual interviews successfully, aided by the field workers. The researcher was the main interviewer whilst the field workers assisted especially if participants were unable to communicate in either isiZulu or English. This meant the field workers would pose the questions and translate the responses to the researcher, thus allowing for probing questions and in-depth engagement with the interviewees. The individual interviews took an average of 35-60 minutes, while some took nearly 90 minutes.

A series of individual interviews were conducted with participants from Khutsong South (both formal and informal sections). From the formal section in Khutsong South the researcher managed to attract 6 interviewees, and 14 were involved from the *mkhukhus*/shacks. In

Khutsong's resettlement section, or Extension 5, interviews commenced with people from the newly constructed RDP houses that had no electricity and no tarred roads. In this section of the Khutsong settlement, the researcher conducted 12 individual interviews, followed by 14 interviews with participants from the well-developed and municipal serviced section of the settlement. At the municipality, the researcher interviewed 5 municipal officials who have been key actors in the housing project, and who also referred the researcher to the local councillors (n=2) and contractors (n=2) who were interviewed at a later stage in this study.

Furthermore, the researcher utilised focus groups as a data-collection technique for the study. According to Greef (2011:341), focus groups are useful to explore the participants' thoughts and feeling about a given social phenomenon. These thoughts may have been difficult to capture from individual interviews, seeing that individuals tend to shy away from sensitive issues. Therefore, the group dynamics of focus groups permit the eliciting of information that was difficult to gather from individual interviews. Merriam and Tisdell (2016:114) explain that focus groups are interviews with groups of people who are familiar with a given social issue.

The environment where the focus groups are held, should allow and be conducive for participants to engage freely in discussions on seemingly sensitive issues (Greef, 2011). Applied to the present study, this method helped discussions on the housing phenomena to flow, seeing that the participants felt safer to disclose their personal interpretations and thoughts of the given process. In addition, focus groups were used since it made it more cost-effective to reach and involve participant for the study (Kroll *et al.*, 2007). The focus groups had varying numbers of respondents. The sessions held with municipal officials only managed to attract two participants who were experts and key actors in the settlement process. On the other hand, the three focus groups conducted with community members and leaders involved seven, nine, and 12 participants respectively.

Researchers differ on the number or size of focus groups (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016:114). For example, Merriam and Tisdell (2016) and Greef (2011) maintain that the number of people in a single focus group can range from between six and ten participants. Babbie (2001:294) notes that focus groups typically involve 12 to 15 people brought together in a room or place to discuss a specific issue. Bless and Higson-Smith (2000:110) view the number of respondents in a focus group as between four and eight participants. In light of the various accepted sizes of a typical focus group, the present study can be argued to have maintained the average

scholarly scope of participants, with the exception of the session with municipality officials, where only two members participated.

5.7 Archival and empirical data analysis

De Vos *et al.* (2005:333) defines data analysis as the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to mass-collected data. For the data emerging from the interviews and focus groups, the researcher first had to consider the key issues that the research aimed to address based on the research questions, literature and theory. Data were then transcribed and organised into two main categories – the responses with similar themes, and those that differed. From these responses, the data were organised into the main categories and then coded and arranged into themes which later were analysed manually and interpreted against the research questions, aims and theoretical underpinnings of the study. The findings of the study are presented and discussed in Chapter 6. Following Leed and Omrod (2005:135), the data analysis for the present study sought to compare the case study with other contexts, build on the Lukesian power approach, and propose theoretical modifications to his theoretical construct.

In a following phase, the researcher hermeneutically analysed the archival reports of the Merafong City Local Municipality Council meetings and related documents reflecting agendas, decisions and issues in the Khutsong Settlement project. This was to ascertain the nature of housing, actors' relationships of power and how these relationships affected the outcome of the project. This documentary review of reports and minutes provided a clear picture of the longitudinal context of the Khutsong settlement development, actors' power games, resource mobilisations, as well as instances of decision-making and non-decision-making. This entailed a thorough and critical examination of the municipality's housing council's minutes and reports (January 2008-July 2016) although the project commenced earlier. This was in line with Miles and Huberman (1994) who point out that case-study documents need to be reviewed in its entirety, coded for key or major trends and facticity.

Furthermore, the researcher followed the time-series analysis approach (Yin, 2009:16) by critically describing and analysing the Khutsong Extension 1, 2 and 3 development processes. Key was the chronological sequence of events in the housing project with a major focus on the shifts in actors' relationships, decision making, resources and agendas. Central issues were identified of decisions that were taken and those that have seen inaction, by using categories derived from the Lukesian approach to power. In this regard the analysis focused on actors' expectations and matters of decision, and how it deviates from the issues discussed by the

stakeholders. These responses were coded systematically in line with the themes emerging from the data.

This meant that the data analysis was hermeneutical, seeing that the analysis of the minutes and reports shed light on the analysis of interviews. The mentioned aim of the study was to understand the power relationships amongst actors and their interpretation of the housing-development process. Thus, the themes emerging from the document review were used to corroborate data from the interviews as well as describe key issues, decisions and non-decisions, which occurred during the project. This is in line with Lukes' three-dimensional view of power. This meant that the analysis process entailed discussion of the data captured from thorough examination of the relevant documents of the Merafong City Local Municipality housing council, integrated with findings from the Khutsong empirical study, which will be discussed further (ch 6 & 7) in line with the Lukesian approach to power.

5.8 Research ethics

Ethical considerations can be defined as widely held principles that demarcate the acceptable professional research behaviour expected from researchers (Babbie, 2007). According to Strydom (2011:114), these considerations serve as standards and guideline for a researcher's conduct in the study process. Ethics determine the expected conduct of researchers. Lutabingwa and Nethonzhe (2006:694) point out that since most researchers use humans as subjects in their investigations, they adhere to certain basic ethical norms and values of conducting research. These scholars further identify three broad areas of ethical concern in research: of data collection and analysis; of the treatment of participants; and of responsibility to the society. For the present study, the researcher strictly followed the ethical considerations for studies that use human beings as subjects of examination.

Prior to conducting the study, the researcher had to ensure that it complies with the NWU research standards and ethics, and thus applied for ethical clearance from the university's Ethics Committee. The study was granted institutional ethical clearance and approved, allocated the ethical number: NWU-00113-14-A7. Thereafter, the researcher applied for authorisation from the Merafong Municipality to conduct the study at Khutsong; approved initially on 27 September 2013 and reapproved on 20 February 2015 by the municipal manager. This gave the researcher access to the study site and meant that the empirical study was considered legal under the jurisdiction of the municipality.

The present study adhered to the basic guidelines for ethical research, as explicated in the below mentioned discussion. Participants took part out of free will. The researcher informed the participants of the purpose of the study, their roles and their right to withdraw at any stage from the study, without repercussions. This meant the informed consent of the participants was sought and they were assured of anonymity and confidentiality in the study. The researcher ensured no harm could come to the study subjects since their names were not mentioned during the interviews and focus groups. Even though some agreed to have their names appear in the study, the researcher made an effort to protect most of the subjects by using pseudonyms during the analysis process. To avoid racial or cultural bias, the interview guides were formulated in such a way that it did not categorise or classify respondents amongst ethnic or racial lines. The subjects were assembled into groups of participants who were identified as important actors in the settlement project.

Furthermore, it was necessary to ensure the findings were reported objectively without subjective inferences or manipulations. To establish credibility or trustworthiness of the study's findings, the researcher followed Creswell's (2013:53, 246) advice to use multiple approaches in collecting data (structural corroboration) and to allow participants and other scholars to review the study (consensual validation). Furthermore, the study findings will be cross-examined by the study supervisor and examiners to ensure consensual validation.

As argued previously, the researcher had to corroborate the minutes, reports and documents of the Merafong City Local Municipality housing council with the findings from the empirical study. Thereby the researcher ensured the trustworthiness of the study. The trustworthiness was also strengthened by ensuring that the collected data and the emerging findings were saturated (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016:246, 248) before analysing and interpreting the findings.

Data collection was completed only when the researcher felt that the responses from the participants were alike and no new information was emerging. In addition, the thesis was peer-reviewed by the study promoter and Subject-group leaders at the North-West University, to promote what Eisner (1991:112) terms "referential adequacy", and which entails "an agreement amongst other competent others that the description, interpretation, evaluation, and thematics ... are right" (Creswell, 2013:246). The voice-recording of interviews and focus

groups as well as the audit trail of the field work strengthened the dependability of the study findings.

5.9 Challenges faced during the empirical study

The current section gives an overview of the challenges that the researcher encountered from the field work. The following were identified as the major issues that proved predicaments during the field work:

5.9.1 Languages and interpretation challenges

The language barrier was a challenge in the present study. The researcher is not a native of South Africa, however, he has command over certain local languages such as isiZulu and isiXhosa. The residents of Khutsong who form part of the respondents of the study are predominantly Setswana speaking and partly Zulu, with a small number who use isiXhosa. On the one hand, the majority of the respondents speaking Setswana made the interviewing process challenging; on the other hand, the selected field workers were well versed in the local languages. However, the field workers in turn experienced challenges in interpreting or translating the Setswana responses into English or isiZulu, in order for the researcher to follow up or probe. The need to probe more and the language barrier compelled the researcher to change the first field worker and consider one that commanded both English and Setswana. Nevertheless, as a precautionary strategy the researcher requested an individual to translate the questionnaire into isiZulu and the field worker to translate the responses to either simple English or isiZulu.

Both the use of a new field worker who was fluent in Setswana and English, and the interview guides in simple isiZulu, made communication as well as the data collection easier. The researcher was able to converse sensibly in Xhosa, English or Zulu. Furthermore, if the interviewee was comfortable with Setswana, the researcher posed the questions whilst the fieldworker translated both ways, and the researcher could then probe with further questions. Overall, the data collection was a success, seeing that most of the respondents were able to communicate in simple English. Therefore, translations were mostly employed when the researcher felt that the participant did not understand the question clearly.

5.9.2 Community frustrations with municipality's service delivery

As indicated in Chapter 4, Khutsong is a community well-known for protests and violent engagements with the municipality, which they argue has failed to deliver on its promises (Ndaba & Maphumalo, 2005; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Bishop, 2009; Kirshner & Phokela, 2010, Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Mazembo, 2011). Therefore, the residents are highly emotional and willing to engage in further forms of violent behaviour (e.g. necklacing) to demonstrate their frustration, mistrust and disillusionment (Kirshner, 2011; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2008; Kings, 2013). The following incident from the research demonstrates the severe, and even life-threatening challenges.

At one instance the researcher and field worker were threatened by necklacing or community torture. This occurred in an encounter with a group of angry women whom the researcher approached for interviews, but they experienced it as a threat since they perceived them to be municipality employees. Even though the researcher assured them that they were not affiliated to the municipality, but from the North-West University in Potchefstroom conducting an academic study on the housing issue, they were shouted down. The anger of the women worsened when the researcher informed them that the study had been granted permission by the municipal manager and that other officials were also aware of his research in Khutsong. Their agitation came to a head when the name of a certain official was mentioned, whom they considered a 'sell-out' who had abandoned them since his co-option into the municipality. However, the researcher managed to overcome this emotional encounter with the group by calling the municipality in their presence and through the intervention of elders who understood that he was only a student doing his research. This example illustrates the community's frustrations and high level of agitation, which hindered a completely free data-collection process.

5.9.3 Sensitive information regarding the role-players

During the interviews, certain community members, especially men, refused to be interviewed. They stated that the information about the housing project was highly sensitive as it concentrated on the nature of relationships amongst the different actors in the housing process.

Even after de-briefing them on the purpose of the study and explaining that it was not politically related and assuring them of confidentiality and anonymity, most of the respondents felt that participation would jeopardise their access to housing. Furthermore, they were afraid to be seen

as ‘whistle-blowers’ or selling out and, therefore, chose rather not be interviewed. The researcher maintained consent to participate or to opt out, if they felt uncomfortable. Thus, participant’s rights were acknowledged throughout the research process.

Furthermore, other respondents could not complete the interviews when questions arose about issues of control and influence in the project. The researcher, therefore, had to avoid direct questions and overcame this by using synonyms for these concepts. In practice, the study managed to conduct 22 individual interviews successfully with men in Khutsong, with the exception of interviews with the municipal official. Furthermore, women were found to be more willing to participate and speak out fearlessly, discussing the housing process (with exceptions as mentioned above). Therefore, 28 individual interviews were conducted successfully with females in Khutsong (councillor, community members and leaders).

5.9.4 Unavailability of key participants

Unfortunately, certain key participants such as the councillors and contractors were not available during the days of interviews and kept on postponing the interviews or made the researcher wait. Therefore, the researcher had to resort to phone interviews with them.

The above-mentioned challenges, however, did not harm the study’s findings, seeing that the researcher managed to implement several strategies to overcome the various pitfalls incurred in the present study.

5.10 Conclusion

The current chapter has presented the methodological orientation of the Khutsong resettlement housing project. This was done by demonstrating how the interpretivist or qualitative research design was employed in seeking answers to the research questions and objectives of the study. It has been argued that the qualitative approach, through a case-study design, is appropriate to help understand the Khutsong settlement actors’ interpretation of how their inaction and action has contributed to the current outcome of the project. Since the case study approach gives an in-depth description of the housing process in its natural context it was chosen as the applicable qualitative technique for this study.

Furthermore, purposive sampling was employed through a typical and snowball approach, in which a sample of community members, local leaders, municipal officials and contractors were drawn for participation in semi-structured interviews and focus groups. It was also highlighted

that the researcher adhered to the ethical considerations for research with human subjects. In the process, the study encountered several challenges, which were addressed during the empirical phase. Finally, findings from the minutes of municipality's housing council, as well as the interviews and focus groups were analysed manually.

The following chapter (ch 6) presents data from the empirical study, analysis of municipality minutes, by reporting and providing a scholarly interpretation of the findings. As argued previously, the discussion of the findings was enhanced through secondary data and theoretical explanations. Therefore, the data analysis was completed in line with the research aims, questions, objectives and the theoretical assumptions of the study.

Chapter 6: Role-players' power discourses and interpretations of the Khutsong project

6.1 Introduction

When we are interested in power – in studying, acquiring, maintaining, increasing, reducing or destroying it – what is it that we are interested in? Answering this question turns out to be far from simple (Lukes, 1986:1).

The previous chapter (ch 5) explained how the study was conducted. The present chapter discusses the findings from the Khutsong Settlement Project's interviews, focus groups and documentary reviews. This is done to understand the nature of the housing project, the main actors, interpretations and their (in)actions, in order to determine its influence on the project's outcome. The chapter aims to examine the findings from the empirical and secondary study of the Khutsong Settlement Project to ascertain how the stakeholders' interpretations of their recurrent actions and inactions contribute to a more elaborate understanding of urban politological theorising.

In this regard, the quiescence of the powerless as part of an exercise of power is questioned and power shifts amongst actors unveiled as the result of conflicting interpretations amongst actors of the housing project. It explores the pertinent issue of shifts from subordination to resistance/rebellion and the multidirectional power exercises. The discussion of the findings thus sought to link the exercise of power within the researched area to the broader sociological theorising of power. This was done by applying the Lukesian concept of power to the entire power relationships of the Khutsong Settlement Project.

Drawing predominantly from the fieldwork and a review of Merafong Local City Municipality documents, the chapter establishes the complex power relationships embedded in narratives and exercises, which have shaped the outcome of the housing project since its beginning. The chapter starts off by describing the main actors in the housing project, by focusing in particular on the decisions that were made in formulating and implementing the Khutsong Settlement Housing policy. In this regard, the study explores the various forms of actions and inactions taken by key actors in the praxis of the housing policy to understand who gained from the process and dominated the other parties in the decision-making of the Khutsong Settlement Project as a whole. This is in line with the practicing of Lukes' first dimension of power.

Furthermore, the focus is on the 'mobilisation of bias' by actors on issues within the project as a feature of Lukes' second dimension of power. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of

the key stakeholder's conflicting interpretations, actions and inactions regarding the project – which relates to Lukes' third dimension of power.

As indicated in chapters 1-2, the thesis seeks to reinterpret and revisit the third dimension of power. The aim is, therefore, to demonstrate how the differing expectation and interpretations of key actors have contributed to the outcomes of the project. This insight also build on uni-directional focus of Lukes' theory.

6.2 Characterising the Khutsong Settlement Project

As indicated in chapter 4, the project resulted from the continual geological instability of the area around Khutsong. This condition led the Carletonville Transitional Local Council in 1997 to commission Intraconsult to conduct geotechnical surveys of the entire Carletonville Township. These surveys established that 90% of Khutsong was situated on dolomitic unstable areas and required resettlement (Nieuwoudt, 2013).

From an interview with one municipal official it was noted that since 2000, democratisation of local municipalities, has compelled the Merafong City Local Municipality (MCLM) to ensure its citizens enjoy the right of access to safe shelter where there are low incidences of sinkholes and dolomite hazards. Therefore, several geotechnical studies were conducted which underlined the need to resettle the Khutsong township. However, the analysis of the main actors' interpretations of the housing project showed that the project was launched as relocation but later was turned into a settlement approach.

After the geotechnical surveys commissioned by the MCLM, a final decision was made on the nature of housing and the (un)development of the area (as indicated in ch 4). In 2002 the recurrence of sinkholes compelled the municipality to increase the geotechnical surveys. The MCLM later agreed to halt any further developments in Khutsong South, while a detailed report was submitted to the West Rand District Municipality (WRDC), with a call to report the problem to the National Disaster Center (NDC) and the Gauteng Provincial Government. However, the NDC maintained that the crisis should not be proclaimed a national disaster as this would discourage investors (Nieuwoudt, 2013).

The MCLM duly informed the community through successive meetings, campaigns and workshops about the dolomitic-suspect state of their settlement. The municipality also stressed the need for pragmatic cooperation between the community and municipality in reporting any land subsidence and water leakages, which were deemed the main cause of sinkholes. An

interview with the Human Settlement and Economic Development officials in 2013, revealed that the MCLM later compiled an Emergency Reaction Plan. This plan recommended the training of rescue personnel, community safety groups and community members on the formation of sinkholes, ways to address the problem and facilitating evacuation processes.

With a view to the risk of dolomite and sink formation, the MCLM planned an intervention. In 2003, the MCLM drew up a comprehensive business plan detailing the relocation of Khutsong to a new settlement with estimated costs projected at approximately R2 billion. These costs comprised the bulk service, internal services, environmental authorisation, a bridge over the railway line, a pedestrian bridge, social amenities, et cetera (Nieuwoudt, 2013). However, the findings from the minutes of the Project Steering Committee (PSCM, 2008-2016) and ProPlan Consulting Engineers (PPCE, 2008-2016) indicate that the planned budget of the entire project has been less than the expenditure in 2016 and financial approximations of the project, which indicated that nearly R8.6 billion were needed in capital investment to ensure the completion of the project.

Responses from MCLM officials interviewed in 2013 and 2015 respectively, indicated that Gauteng Province (GP) was a key actor in the implementation of the project, and initially had chosen to fund 4 700 units, which later were extended to 18 000. However, as will be explained later, Gauteng could not comply, which severely hampered the delivery of the Khutsong Settlement houses (PSCM, 2008-2016). As indicated previously, in 2004 President Mbeki declared the project a presidential priority and it was placed under the administration of a Regional Professional Team, which consisted mostly of role-players from the Gauteng Province (GP) and later North West Province (NWP). However, due to different perceptions and conflicting interpretations, the community members did not perceive this intervention as mere funding for the resettlement project. They viewed it as monetary aid aiming to manipulate them into accepting the provincial demarcation (Interviewee 15 & 16, 2015).

As noted through interviews with officials from the Economic Development and Planning Department and Housing Department, the project came to a standstill during the demarcation debacle. This crisis intensified between 2005 and 2009 when Khutsong citizens protested violently against being relocated to NWP, which they viewed as under-resourced to take on additional socio-economic development in Khutsong (Interviews with officials, 2013; 2015). Housing was an issue in the demarcation debacle as community members felt they would forfeit their residences once relocated to NWP. The reason was that they did not believe this

province had the financial capacity to deliver. This perception became clear during an interview when a one young man (ward committee member) confirmed, “Yes the long protests between 2005 and 2009 was about not wanting to be under NWP also if you take the housing project we knew that NWP would not be able to provide us housing so we preferred Gauteng ...” (Interviewee 16, 2015).

These protests about demarcation issues occurred at a time when the municipality was busy carrying forward the awareness, communication and planning phase of the Khutsong project, as an official explained:

“During the consultation with community, education on sinkholes, relocation planning at advanced staged everything moving, then Merafong was relocated to the NWP ... this made our progress slow as people violently protested and even perceived the project as part of an initiative to bring them into the North-West project as the Khutsong Resettlement Project is located on your way to Potchefstroom.”

Only after nearly three years, in 2008, the MCLM commenced the housing project (PSCM, January, 2008; PPCE, 2008-2016). It is thus evident that the demarcation was a particular issue that hindered the project, however (as will be indicated), the interpretation and (in)actions of various actors also stalled the project. The combination of the mentioned factors contributed to the current outcome of the project in which from its start only the first 5 500 houses have been constructed and the other phases have not yet begun.

To grasp the nature of power relationships within the Khutsong Resettlement project better, the following section provides an overview of the pluralistic nature of the Khutsong housing project. The discussion highlights major decisions by key actors that impact the project.

6.2 Pluralistic and multi-level decision-making in the Khutsong Resettlement Project

Pluralists such as Dahl, Bentley, Dahl, Polsby and Worfinger view decision-making in a developmental project as influenced by conflicting group interests. Similar to the case of New Haven, Khutsong presents a scenario in which various groups of individuals with often conflicting interests are included in decision-making. In Khutsong, as can be inferred from the PSCM (2008-2016) and PPCE (2008-2016), the policy praxis of the housing project involves numerous key role-players namely: MCLM, provincial and national departments, councillors, contractors, ward committee members, and community liaison officers (CLO). In this regard, Judge (1995:6) indicates that pluralism is based on a democratic ethos of inclusive decision-

making in which power is distributed amongst interest groups who decide on behalf of the community.

It can be noted that the Khutsong housing project took place within overlapping pluralistic spaces, which were mostly in the form of ‘invited’, ‘closed’ and ‘claimed’ spaces of participation (Conwall, 2002; Gaventa, 2005; 2006). Since the formation of sinkholes and the acknowledgeability about such hazards, the MCLM has chosen to use invited spaces as a way to reach out to the affected community of Khutsong. However, at the same time the municipality kept closed spaces of engagement (inaccessible to community) with the provincial and national government regarding the Khutsong project. This is noticeable in the negotiations that took place between the MCLM, NWP, GP and the national government about the control and funding of the project (PSCM, 2008-2016).

Noticeably, the participation of the general community in the policy processes of the Khutsong housing project has been limited only to community representatives, community contractors and local councillors. However, as will be noted on the discussion of the third dimension of power, the community has often violently claimed its own space in the entire decision-making process. This concurs with Dahl’s (1961) study, which argued that even though decision-making was influenced by a small group, New Haven and other interested parties also influenced the outcome of local municipal developments. In this regard, the Khutsong housing project function as pluralism for and amongst active citizens (Waste, 1987:126), in which different role-players affect the outcome of decisions.

Regarding decision-making in Khutsong, most of the key actors were involved who formed part of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), except for community members who had representation. These role-players participated in the major policy formulations and implementation of the project. Table 6.1 below highlights the pluralistic nature of decision-making in the Khutsong housing project, by including the decisions made in the project by the various actors. The particular focus is on decisions made on general housing policies and excludes most of the decisions on bulk services. The nature of the actors’ engagement corroborates Polsby’s (1980:90) assertion that from a pluralistic lens “different actors appeared, their roles were different and the kinds of alternatives which they had to choose among were different”. As a result, the control of the housing development project saw a specialisation amongst the key actors in addressing the housing issues.

A closer examination of this Khutsong power structure reveals the concerted efforts by both the public and private interest groups to promote housing and local economic development. Stone (1989) terms this form of dynamics as an “urban regime”. As is the case with the pluralist approach, the urban regime in Khutsong over accentuated the collaboration between the MCLM and private stakeholders such as contractors. The Khutsong urban regimes have continued to operate even though some of the role-players may have completed their given tasks. For instance, in the maintenance of sewage pipes, roads, water taps and vandalised infrastructure, regimes of contractors, MCLM and the community have continued to operate (PSCM, 2008-2016).

The result is that the Khutsong power structure was also made up of various informal and formal networks between the private and public sector. This is affirmed by the following response by one of the local contractors:

“We always work together with the municipality, yes sometimes we may have completed our given task but the need for ensuring that we produce quality human settlement in this Khutsong community makes us to continuously work together even in the repairing of bursting sewer pipes or vandalised houses even in the allocation of houses ...” (Interview 17, 2015).

The Khutsong project, therefore, does not only reflect the power contestations amongst different key actors, but also the concerted actions of the various actors aimed at the progressive development of the settlement.

Table 6.1: Key decisions and actors in the project, 1994-2016

Year	Decision’s description	Key decision-maker(s)
1997	Geotechnical survey finds 90% of Khutsong proper situated in risky areas of dolomite hazards.	Intraconsult
2000	Inform residents that many are in danger of their housing collapsing and will be relocated.	Councillors
2002	Reports submitted to the municipal council, recommended freezing of all developments in Khutsong South. Communicating to the community (awareness, workshops, fliers, etc.). WRDC to report the escalating geological crisis to the National Disaster Management Centre. Khutsong not to be declared a disaster area.	MCLM WRDC NDMC, The Presidency
2003	Business plan for relocating Khutsong. Approval for the 4 700 and later 18 000 units. Project made a Presidential priority.	MCLM GP The Presidency
2005	President signs to relocates Carletonville to NW.	The Presidency
2008	Tender processes for housing and bulk services.	PPCE, MCLM

	Beneficiary allocation transfer from GP to NW. Agreement on utilising subcontractors and labour-intensive contracting. Advice community representatives and councillor to attend meetings.	Councillor MCLM
2009	Project made a National Priority programme. Main contractor appointed, also 20% to be subcontracted. Agreement to involve community representatives on PSC. Khutsong retained to Gauteng.	NDoHS MCLM, PPEC Parliament, Judiciary
2010	Beneficiary administration to be communicated to community through councillors and liaison officers. Social amenities to be discussed through DPLG and sector Departments with PPEC. Labour issues to be decided by the Council. DoE funding only available for completed houses in blocs of 500.	MCLM, PPCE PSC members MCLM
2011	Housing not to be distributed until permanent water provision was assured. Type C housing chosen as the model to be constructed for all. Amendment of contracts for contractors.	PSC members PSC members
2012	Approval for extended working hours. PSC to take over the stronger planning functions of the township development. Cost of water for contractors to be quantified as this will explain the 'unaccounted for water'. Area near Welverdiend to be used for GAP housing as a transitional zone. 1 500 sites given to community contractors only, although FT is assisting. A penalty of R5 000 per month to be levied against the main contractor until the municipal account is opened. Starting 1 Nov 2012. Municipality responsible for the management of backup contractors. Meeting to be chaired by national government and to be attended by NW, MCLM and GP, to fast-track change of ownership. A blacklist to be compiled of contractors not remunerating their employees.	GP PSC members
2013	Mayor suggests MCLM manages the project. Allocation and awarding of keys by to be done by the main contractor Construction to start on all stands regardless whether a beneficiary is listed. This exclude stands allocated to backup contractors. All contractors to open water accounts.	Mayor PSC members MCLM PSC members

	Parallel activities are deemed essential to implement the Khutsong Resettlement Programme successfully.	
2014	PPEC to appoint a drilling contractor. Contractor for the pedestrian bridge to be issued with notice of termination.	MCLM
2015	Conflicts amongst contractors to be resolved by the contractors themselves signing an agreement. List of missing beneficiaries to be published in the newspapers and if there still are missing beneficiaries within three weeks, new ones to be allocated. Untraceable beneficiaries to be removed from the list and replaced once new ones are allocated. Traffic bridge not to be suspended until there is clarity over funding.	PSC Urban dynamics, PSC
2016	Traffic bridge to be fast-tracked as there will be no funding from human settlements for the project since it need to be completed by June 2016.	PPCE, MCLM and contractors

Source: Own construction from PSCM (2008-2016)

From the major issues on which actors in the project decided, it can be established that diverse interest groups or stakeholders focused on different issues of interest. The findings showed that the project's funding initially was controlled by the Presidential fund between 2003 and 2008. This was the case, even though the NWP (housing department and treasury) were supposed to influence the funding during and after the demarcation until 2010 when the NWP had to hand over the project to GP. During this process, the NDoH was the main sponsor of other interrelated projects such as bulk services in the Khutsong project (PSCM, 2008-2016; Interview with officials, 2013: 2015).

Viewed in terms of the decisional method, all the actors involved exercised control and influence in the project as a whole. The contractors, for example, influenced the progress in the delivery of the project, whilst this development also depended on the willingness of the GP housing department and National Department of Human Settlements (NDoHS) to fund the project. Findings from the PSCM (2008-2016) and the PPEC (2008-2016) indicate that in most cases the GP housing department, the NWP housing department and NDoHS controlled the funding of the project. Actors such as the municipality mayor were also influential in decision-making about terminating contractors' contracts in the housing project (PSCM, 2008-2016).

The progress of the project can be considered as predicated upon the asymmetrical relationships and resource endowments of the various actors. Commenting on such a situation, Giddens (1991:15) indicates that "resources are a medium through which power is exercised as a routine element of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction". For instance, the demarcation

debacle which saw the President signing the Constitution Twelfth Amendment bill and the Cross Boundary Municipalities Laws Repeal and Related Matters Act of 2005, which relocated MCLM to North West, led to a series of power contestations and configurations between the different spheres of the government and the community members. The community aggressively showed disdain for the government's actions. To demonstrate their anger, for the local elections of 1 March 2006, only 232 people out of 29 540 registered voters cast their ballots. In this way, the Khutsong community demonstrated total control of their political resource (voting ability) – a useful instrument needed to legitimise the power of politicians. Thereby the resources endowment (e.g., voting ability) enable and constrict the actions of actors, as they impact the production of social reality.

Furthermore, the exercise of power was also apparent in the scenario of 2012, where the main contractor who managed the subcontractors terminated the contract of one subcontractor and replaced him (PSCM, February 2008). Through this action, the main contractor had the ability or was endowed with the right to fire other contractors. This denotes an exercise of power as the contractor demonstrated the capacity to punish the one subcontractor and reward another. This is also exemplified by the Gauteng Housing Department which has been controlling the funding process and thereby has been allocating R100 million annually. This indicate that the capital provision is its tool to create dependence and thus exercise its authority in the project. Nevertheless, even during the allocation of backup contractors, all the other stakeholders had to wait for the GP to select the agents and do the allocation (PSCM, May 2013).

The municipality claimed to promote community participation in the policy processes through frequently inviting community leaders and representatives to its meetings (PSCM, Sept. 2013). The question that can be posed whether such a group of people will have the same knowledgeable that is available to MCLM officials regarding the matter. Therefore, evidently the inclusion of community individuals to the PSC's invited spaces does not imply that all the role-players functioned as equal partners in the spaces of participation. Such spaces typically have embedded predispositions, which automatically favour the interests of one actor over another. Thus, it promotes a zero-sum relationship of power in which the less powerful are forced to accept the interests of the controlling actors. This is in line with Dahl (1961; 1968) who predicates such a relationship on the autonomy of agents.

On the other hand, nearly all the community respondents in the individual interviews and focus groups seemingly shared a feeling of ambiguity regarding the actors who influence the project

and make the decisions. Respondents stated that the municipality was the party that influenced the entire project. This view was even clearer from the interviews with the ward committee members who concurred that in all the meetings they have attended the municipality has been at the forefront and, therefore, has influence in the project (Interviewees, 16 & 22, 2015). Respondents such as the subcontractor indicated a limited understanding of the different groups that influence the housing project. One contractor explained it as follows:

“There is no clear-cut line of influence in the project, for I as a contractor, I have influence in the progress of the housing project; sometimes I tend to feel that also the workers have control in the project as they can strike for nearly two weeks and cause standstill of the project ... also the municipality has power as it controls our payment, of which also they get the money from Gauteng housing department and the national housing department, even the consultancy has a degree of control over our contracts as they manage our contracts. So, I feel that in the project everyone has control to some extent” (Interviewee 13, 2015).

However, considering the variegated nature and magnitude of the Khutsong Project, not only were numerous actors involved, but decision-making occurred at different levels. In terms of Cornwall’s (2002) view of the three spaces (i.e. invited, closed and created), power (influence/control) occurs at three different levels: local, national and global. Translated to the Khutsong case-study, these comprise the community, municipal and provincial levels. Gaventa (2006:30) further notes that “the dynamics of power depend on type of space in which it is found, the level at which it operates and the form it takes”.

Findings showed that overt power was exercised in the Khutsong housing project through the decisional approach and the use of the various spaces of influence. At the provincial level, power dynamics are noticeable in the counter play of regional bodies and provinces in making decisions that affect the project through closed spaces. An interview with municipal officials revealed that the project’s outcome has been affected by the failure of NWP to hand over the project to GP, with the result that GP could make no budget allocation for the project (Interview with officials, 2015). At a joint provincial and local level, NWP was not willing to be summoned to a meeting by Merafong and Gauteng. Only after an agreement by the PSC, a meeting was convened under the directorship of the national government (involving the national level) that NWP decided to attend (PSCM, September 2012).

At a local level, PSC meetings where the various actors in the housing project were represented denote Gaventa (2006) invited spaces as various interest groups were encouraged to participate

in the policy-making processes of the Khutsong project. In such interrelationships, actors engage in more visible confrontations over decision options, and the powerful prevail by enforcing their subjective interests onto other groups. Noticeably, the PSCM (2008-2016) and PPCE (2008-2016) indicates that at Khutsong housing project meetings the community and other excluded members were invited in the process, yet only a few powerful actors (interests of ProPlan Consulting Engineers, Merafong Municipality and the main contractor) in the PSC impacted largely on key decisions in the praxis of the housing policies. This unequal distribution, and thus fragmentation, of power has typically led to the community claiming its own space of engagement through protests and social unrests.

Noteworthy from the discussion above, is the competition amongst the various actors in affecting change in the praxis of the Khutsong housing project policy. The urban political terrain thus embodied social dynamics such as configurations of dominance, subordination and coalitions as actors with conflicting interests sought to influence the housing project. Diouf (1996:228) posits that, in such a scenario, the urban becomes a terrain for expressing the imaginary and a field of no possibilities other than confrontation and negotiations as actors engage in visible conflicts over mobilisation of resources and achievement of goals.

The dispersion and fragmentation of power as argued by Dahl (1961) and Lukes (1974; 2005) to constitute the first dimension of power, becomes questionable in the context of hyper-pluralism. In Khutsong, the hyper-pluralistic actions and contestations among actors to influence key housing issues has resulted in reconfigurations of power, thus indicating multilayers in its exercise, as attested to by social action: protests and strikes. Yates (1974:34) elaborates by suggesting that policy outcomes become a product of a highly fragmented and unstable policy environment, which manifest in a form of continued struggle or street-fighting pluralism. This form of pluralism will be explored further in the discussion on the third dimension of power.

The brief discussion above, highlighted the operation of power through the decisional approach. The focus was on major decisions made as a reflection of how power was exercised and who influenced the project's policy preferences. It can thus be deduced that power in Khutsong's housing policies is affected by a configuration of actors' confrontations over decision-making where the most powerful ones influenced major decisions. However, contrary to the view of Dahl (1961) and the pluralists, in Khutsong apparently a more patterned, uniform interest group has been in control of the direction and outcome of the housing development.

This situation is explored further by considering the operation of the second dimension of power or the mobilisation of bias by different powerful actors within this housing project.

6.4 Agenda setting and mobilisation of bias in the Khutsong Project

In exercises of power there are certain instances in which overt decision-making as such is limited within the construct of dominance and subordination processes. This has also been evident from the formulation and implementation of the Khutsong housing policy. Power in its second face is considered to be in the hands of a minority, the elites who through capture and their mobilisation of resources, dictate policy preferences. According to Lukes (2005:20), power in its second dimension presupposes that policy preferences are the acts of a few elites through conscious and unconscious obstruction of decision-making and agenda setting. This has led to Schattschneider's (1960) conclusion that organisation entails the "mobilisation of bias". This is because rules and procedures are mediated in a given organisational context which may lead to exclusion and negation from policy spaces. In the Khutsong housing practices, however, the exercise of the second dimension of power becomes clear when examining the structures of decision-making and the protracted nature of such engagement. This dimension is not easily visible but can be inferred from the minutes and progress reports of the project. A way to understand the exercise of power in decision-making is thus to consider how policies and non-decisions were binding or not, as shaped by actors in the project.

In Khutsong, the majority of actors who participate in the decision-making processes do not have full control over the exercise of power within the strategic policy apparatuses. Instead, the reported evidence gathered through review of the project minutes, indicated that few actors did influence a wide range of the project's policy approaches. Findings from the PSCM (2008-2016) and the PPCE (2008-2016) shows that most of the decisions were made by the following actors: the Gauteng Housing Department, Merafong Local Economic Development official, DME, PPCE, national government and Merafong Housing Department, the mayor, MCLM manager and the main contractor. The decisions on the housing project mostly reflect the conflicting ideals and preferences of these actors, as coercion and manipulation were rife in controlling the processes of the housing policy. However, to comprehend the nature of the elites' exercise of power it will be worthwhile to highlight a few cases from the PSCM (2008-2016). These cases indicate how non-decisions took place. In addition the primary data from interviews and focus groups help affirm the practice of agenda shaping and non-decision-making.

During the early years of the project after it was launched, the MCLM decided to relocate the entire Khutsong community (Nieuwoudt, 2013) since these local authorities deemed it unsafe for people to reside in the area. However, after time passed, the MCLM in consultation with ProPlan, GP and the national government, agreed to relocate only inhabitants from the high-risk dolomitic zones. Thus, it can be argued that non-formal decision-making occurred as the relocation was transformed into a resettlement of individuals from the high-risk zones. In terms of the Housing Code and the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, the three tiers of governance who are actors in the Khutsong resettlement project are entitled to alleviate the conditions of people affected by disasters and who require emergency housing (Nieuwoudt, 2013:51). Housing had to be provided for the 90% of Khutsong South who were all affected by the dolomite crisis and deserved to be relocated. In contrast, in an interview, an official from the municipality reported as follows:

“Initially we had agreed to relocate the entire Khutsong community, but however, due to financial constraints, the municipality sat down as planners with the consultancy and the provincial department to review this decision; and we realised that we could only relocate those in the high-risky zones whilst in the other areas we could avert to mitigation measures that are done elsewhere in the country ...” (Interview with officials, 2015).

It is clear that this decision was taken only by a minority cohort of a few elites, whereas the community and other role-players were not actually aware of such a decision. Such a scenario indicates that agenda shaping and non-formal decision-making did occur during this period. (This scenario will be explicated further in the discussion on the third dimension.)

Furthermore, findings from the PSCM (May, 2009) shows that the PSC had agreed that individuals may choose the type of units they preferred (A, B or C). Then for a period of 2 years up to July 2011, contractors considered beneficiaries’ choices when constructing houses. However, since the larger community was not involved, the PSC’s preference, as Type C, was selected as the model for future construction of houses. The construction of Type C was considered to be cost-effective, which shortened the process, seeing that the elites forming the PSC indicated that this model was going to cut time and production costs. In this regard, the hidden power of the municipality and the consultancy influenced the direction of the project. This was done by overriding the beneficiaries’ choices of housing, thus shaping the direction regarding the construction of units in the projects. The notion that power was used by a few

over the actions of a large number of people presupposes the operation of the second dimension of power.

Furthermore, as was clear from the PSCM (October, 2009), the PSC prevailed in its exercise of the second face of power by advocating for the levelling of barriers and a technical structuration of participants, which selectively avoided involving certain groups in the society. Through such structural barriers, the powerful actors influence the production and flow of a project's information. This is done by either including or excluding certain voices, setting the terms of policy discussions, or deciding on who participates, or not (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008). The members of the PSC, particularly the MCLM officials and PPEC, evidently have been more instrumental in establishing the PSC's procedures and contexts, thus demonstrating their control of the processes for the Khutsong housing policy.

The scenario of the Khutsong Resettlement project illustrates the mobilisation of bias or the hidden exercise of power, as evidenced by the case of electrification in the project. Most of the actors understood that as soon as the units were constructed, electricity provision was to follow suit. However, due to procedural and technical decisions of the Department of Energy (DME), there was no clarity why the houses were not provided electricity at that stage. Only the Department of Electricity (DoE) was pre-informed that electricity could not be provided in blocks of 500 constructed units. The DoE had its organisational procedures and in this context was dependent on the irregular institutionalised funding from the DME. Therefore, the DoE had delay the electrification of houses until a block of 500 units was constructed (PSCM, September 2011). The MCLM's electrical engineer remarked that the DME only installed electricity once 80% of the block of 500 houses were occupied. Moreover, the municipal official responsible for electrification has seldom questioned or sought answers on whether the addendum by the DME could be relaxed, with feedback non-existent.

Electricity is one such service that saw the community rallying violently in the streets. Most respondents indicated that they protested because the MCLM failed to provide electricity (Interviewees 3, 6, 13, 14 & 15, 2013; 2, 3, 5, 12, 13, 21, 25, 27, 30 & 33, 2015). On the other hand, some indicated that they preferred to remain in the informal settlement as they had free and easy access to electricity (Interview 10, 11, 14, 15, 23 & 28, 2015; Interview with municipal official, 2015). In this regard, the structural and procedural antecedents for the processes of electrification by the DME highlighted the bias nature of the system. This meant that decisions on delivery of electricity in Khutsong could only be made within the restrictive

framework of the DME's own operations. In this way, the DME exercised power over other actors through the mentioned eschewed procedures for electrification. As a result, the PSC were forced to engage in non-decision-making on electrification although the community perceived the municipality as an obstruction to their airing of grievances on electricity delivery.

Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970) perceive power over to be visible in instances where actors are denied access to airing their opinions, or their views are taken out of the agenda. In Khutsong's policy process, the issue of terminating the contracts of some contractors and appointing backup contractors, were regular instances of conflict observed amongst key actors. Since the start of the project's construction section, there were noticeable cases where contractors underperformed (PSCM, 2008-2016; PPCE, 2008-2016), but the PSC chose not to terminate their contracts. For instance, contractor's low performance in delivering the pedestrian bridge has been on the agenda in most of the PSC meetings. However, the Committee chose not to make a binding decision on the matter. They argued that if the contract was to be terminated, a new one would be costly and unable to complete the construction in time. It would also prove difficult to recover the paid finances from the contractor (PSCM, June 2015).

A further significant power play occurred in the agenda for the termination of the main contractor's contract. It was indicated that he underperformed, and for more than 2 years there have been calls to terminate his contract (PSCM, August 2013). The PSC, however, did not resolve the matter of terminating the contract. Some members asked for stricter punitive measures such as paying a fine, whilst others did opt for termination. A number of members also accused the PPCE of being too accommodating towards the main contractor and demanded that the contract be extended. But due to fears of legal disputes and obstructing the progress of the project, the main contractor was allocated even more houses to construct. This clearly demonstrates the bias of the PSC, seeing that actors such as the PPCE and MCLM could not decide on terminating the mentioned contract. This in-action silenced the airing of issues surrounding the termination, seeing that it would lead to disputes and assumed legal battles. Furthermore, it would silence other actors' views and thus consciously reinforce an obstruction to people airing views on the termination of actors' contracts (Luke, 2005:25).

It should, however, be pointed out that private interests of capital accumulation have promoted non-decisions throughout times. In South Africa this typically takes place through regulatory mechanisms of state apparatuses such as the national government and the local municipalities.

Furthermore, the policy praxis of the housing project did reveal an overarching non-decisional power exercise by appointing backup contractors.

The Khutsong housing project commenced under the North-West Province (NWP), which was commissioned to help provide 5 500 subsidies of the housing project for the period 2009/2008 and 2008/2009 financial years, marking the first two phases of the Khutsong project of 18 000 units. However, since the Constitution's Sixteenth Amendment Act (B1 of 2009) reversed the demarcation and transferred the MCLM back to GP, NWP was obligated to hand over the project to the GP (PSCM, 2009, 2010), but this did not happen. The NWP still was supposed to honour its obligation regarding the 5 500 subsidies. Due to inflationary costs, the MCLM applied for a higher subsidy of R55 570, which was approved and allocated to the province. Surprisingly, NWP in December 2010 awarded MCLM the 5 500 subsidies in terms of the old subsidy amount (PSCM, December 2010; PPCE, December 2010). As such, this occurrence demonstrated non-decision-making by NWP, who was also unwilling to respond to the PSC's call for a meeting to transfer the project to GP. This compelled the PSC to request an intervention by the national government (PSCM, October 2012). In turn, the GP was unwilling to budget for the project since it was still under the auspices of the NWP (PSCM, October 2012).

These political power games between the two provinces caused delays in the progress of the project. From the side of the PSC, it had to avoid pertinent decisions on funding. In turn, the provinces had to choose not to make a decision on the funding of the project in time, seeing that there was visible conflict about the ownership and control of the project. This is affirmed by one local leader who explained as follows:

“[T]he progress of the project has been delayed by the not so good relationships between the two provinces, since the demarcation was resolved North West has been avoiding being a fulltime player in the project whereas Gauteng had decided to wait till the project was handed over ... this has really affected the project as they have not been good relationships between the province and municipality” (Interview 20, 2015).

Only after the national government called a meeting with the MCLM, GP and NWP, a reconciliation was reached according to which the NWP handed over the project to the GP. Such dynamics amongst the stakeholders do indicate the enduring nature of elite control in the project as the systematic participation of actors was more biased towards the interests of the NWP. This concurs with Lukes' (2005:25) assertion that the second face of power manifests

in the conscious and unconscious reinforcing of barriers to prevent airing of conflicts over policies.

Hunter (1953:30) asserts that “most of the top officials in the power structures are rarely seen, in the meeting attended by associational understructure”. This was evident in the formulation and implementation of the Khutsong project policy. The officials elected by the municipality were usually the mediators and most visible actors who were accessible to the people. The policy makers at the top level such as the Gauteng Treasury, NDoH, Gauteng Department of Housing, NWP and the national government formed a closed and invisible group of elites. This cohort were in command of major decisions about funding, inspection, and subcontracting. Moreover, the power structure has been kept intact through shared interests and obligations amongst actors and visible coercion of the other actors getting them to participate in the PSC (Hunter, 1953:6). Through tout the process, actors strived to realise individual and collective goals in the project.

The observable confrontation and interference in agenda setting through non-decision-making and mobilising bias in the Khutsong Resettlement project revealed the operation of underlying structures and the more hidden face of power, which forms the second dimension. However, this dimension does not enlighten and explain the notion of wilful compliance, actions of insurgence and the multi-directional shifts in power amongst the different project actors. The discussions on the multi-level of pluralistic decision-making and the biased agenda shaping have focused specifically on instances of zero-sum power and uni-directional dominance. In the following discussion. The focus will shift to an interpretation of multi-directional operation of power. The following section will thus identify the different mechanisms that actors can use to promote a shift from zero-sum to positive-sum power, implying a reinterpretation of dominance and resistance.

6.5 Actors (in)actions and interpretations of the Khutsong Project

The findings were drawn from interviews and a review of relevant documents and minutes of meetings for the Khutsong Resettlement project. These findings show diverse actors’ interpretations and (in)actions of the housing development. It has been established from the data that the main project actors were: the local politicians, local leaders (councillors and ward committee members), the contractors, as well as the community and MCLM officials (Housing Department, Town Planners and Local Economic Development and Planning). The following discussion, therefore, examines the conflicting interpretations by the actors in the project. For

example, the MCLM perceived the housing project as more of a risk-aversion strategy aimed at developing integrated human settlements in Khutsong, whilst the local politicians anticipated the project as a mechanism to help them gain political legitimacy by regaining lost power bases. Therefore, the latter's decisions were directed more to avoid political contestations. This approach was also common amongst the local leaders who viewed the project as a strategy to secure voter confidence and retain power in the area. The contractors, in turn, as private interest groups considered the project as a way to accumulate capital and a marketing resource. Community members for their part, held varied explanations, expectations and interests, which made them the strategic actors that resist or accept the actions of others.

6.5.1 MCLM officials' interpretations and actions

Preliminary (2013) and successive interviews (2015) with bureaucrats from the municipality's Economic Development and Planning (EDP), Housing Department (DoH), and Town and Planning Departments provided a more comprehensive picture of the nature, character and power dynamics within the project. The municipal officials, particularly from the EDP and DoH department, were the key informants during the data-collection periods. From the data provided through interviews, focus groups and documentary reviews, it was evident the MCLM officials saw the housing projects mostly from the viewpoint of risk aversion (Nieuwoudt, 2013; PSCM, 2008-2016; PPCE, 2008-2016; Interviews with officials, 2013: 2015). As indicated previously, after the increased occurrences of dolomitic sinkholes (dolines) the Carletonville Transitional Local Council at the time commissioned Intraconsult to conduct geotechnical surveys, which revealed that 90% of Khutsong was situated on a geologically highly-unstable doline area (Nieuwoudt, 2013; Interviews with officials, 2013; 2015). The municipality had to categorise Khutsong in terms of the extent of dolomite riskiness. It was decided that the entire residential area of Khutsong South needed to be relocated to a safer zone (Interviews with officials, 2013; 2015; Nieuwoudt, 2013). According to the interviews, most of the informal settlements in the south of Khutsong Proper were situated in high-risk zones and this also affected approximately 3 600 formal houses (Nieuwoudt, 2013; Interviews with officials, 2013), thus, in total nearly 18 000 households needed to be relocated. From the interviews with the MCLM officials in 2013, it was noted that the size and nature of such a project emphasised a greater need for participation amongst the MCLM bureaucrats.

An interviewee from the municipality maintained that initially the doline issue prompted a disaster warning which they reported forthwith to the NDMC:

“We declared Khutsong disaster area, and it was not our right to declare this since National Disaster Management Centre cautioned the issue of making it a disaster area ... the president said if we declare it a disaster area this will affect investment and development as everybody will run away so if possible to manage the risk rather manage. So, we decided on managing the risk and making it a priority project led the National Department of Human Settlements.” (Interview with officials, 2015).

The statements by the municipality officials indicate how non-decision-making by the local politicians were in favour of investments. However, the response above indicates that officials did feel the need to ensure the safety of their community (Interviews with officials, 2013; 2015). However, as one municipal interviewee remarked, “We declared it a disaster for we needed to access funds from the NDMC as through the normal municipal funding process there is not enough funding available for the project” (Interview with municipal officials, 2015).

These statements underline the different interests that prevailed in the initial stages of the project, and how the municipality used the dolomite crisis to establish its influence by creating the Khutsong project. The dolomite disaster was being exacerbated by drainage problems in the informal sector and dilapidated sewer pipes in Khutsong Proper. Interviewees indicated that the drainage infrastructure was too old and repairing it would be costly. Thus, the ideal option was to focus on creating a new settlement that would provide sustainable human residency, even for the informal settlers (Interviews with officials, 2015). Thus, after substantive geotechnical surveys and communication with all stakeholders including the community and national government agencies, MCLM officials had to draw up a budget to establish a more humane and sustainable settlement. This was affirmed later by media reports such as the following:

“We are going to build an integrated human settlement which will accommodate people of different incomes. We will have rental housing, bonded houses and government-subsidised housing. This project will transform Khutsong into a modern township with economic and social facilities like clinics, schools and playgrounds” (IOL news, 2009).

Municipality officials considered the housing project as a major strategy to confirm their competitiveness and influence by delivering social services and develop of a more integrated community. This is explained further through the public-choice approach, which argues that the municipality aims to induce public interests by marketing the urban context through a variety of mixes such as providing sustainable human settlements (Judge *et al.*, 1995). In the

midst of competition amongst municipalities to provide of the right mix of goods and services to the society, the relocation project offered a competitive edge to the MCLM. Therefore, the municipality considered the project not only from the vantage point of risk aversion, but also with a view to investment, expansion of economic opportunities, housing provision and city development (Interviews with officials, 2013; 2015). This impelled the municipality to cooperate with public and private interest groups to help ensure the success of the project. The reason is that it not only broadened service delivery but also increased the voter-consumer choice of inhabitants who established themselves in Khutsong.

As argued previously, large amounts of capital had been provisioned for the project. However, it turned out insufficient to relocate the entire Khutsong community, which at that time was composed of well-constructed upper- and middle-class housing, with a number of noticeable backyard dwellings, whilst *mkhukhus* (shacks) constituted the outskirts of the town's spatial formation. It was thus challenging to relocate inhabitants from the formal houses as this would mean compensating them for their private properties. As a result, the municipality opted to relocate only residents of the informal settlement as a cost-effective and risk aversion strategy (Niewoudt, 2013; PSCM, 2008-2016). Furthermore, the MCLM indicated that it was the local politicians' onus to solve the compensation and relocation regarding owners of formal houses if they were to be resettled. This was affirmed when a municipality official remarked, "We then prioritised the areas considering which areas would be first priority for relocation due to geotechnical studies ... and we resolved on prioritising people in the informal settlement." (Interview with officials, 2015). The officials thus felt they had controlled and influenced the development of the project, whilst on the other hand, they were confused about the strategy to implement for the relocation of these informal settlers to the Khutsong Ext 5. This is confirmed by the following response:

"First the challenge was we had people in the earlier years of the waiting lists... using it meant some people moving others leaving their friends nearby ... this was a challenge we wanted to relocate a portion first but also that was a challenge due to the different categories of people inhabiting the informal settlement" (Interview with officials, 2015).

In the initial phases of the project, the MCLM officials had interpreted it from the perspective of risk aversion due to the doline hazard. However, they changed their position when the housing funding became a problem in the project (PPCE, May 2016). This shifted the project focus from relocation to resettlement of mostly the residents of informal settlements and

backyard dwellers. The reason is that these inhabitants comprised the Khutsong housing backlog and were situated in high-risk zones that are prone to sinkhole formation (Interview with officials, 2013; 2015). In this way, the project promoted the ethos of the Housing Code and the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, which argues for housing provision to alleviate conditions of those in disaster areas. Reflectively, the municipality officials' rethinking and reinterpretation of the relocation to resettlement reinforced their influence (dominance) of the direction of the project. This seemed even more the case as certain politicians, local leaders and community members had already begun misrepresenting and manipulating the Khutsong crisis to their advantage. For instance, the MCLM officials stated that certain local leaders and representatives attempted to destabilise the project in order to gain political support (Interviews with officials, 2015). In light of such developments, the MCLM had to undertake various surveys and reporting to validate and rethink the objective of the project. This was necessary, seeing that different actors were seeking to influence and reinterpret the Khutsong project from conflicting societal echelons.

Moreover, the discussion with the officials revealed that the decision to relocate the informal settlement's inhabitants was not only aimed at evading compensatory costs or mitigate risks. It was also prompted by problems to acquire land for the project. In an interview, the officials stated that landowners in the area which the project targeted were not willing to sell their land, and the available land could only allow the construction of 14 854 units (Interview with officials, 2013; 2015; PSCM, 2008-2009). This affirms the findings of several works regarding the challenges of housing provision, namely that accessing well-located land is a problem – in South Africa and globally (Hassen, 2003; Pottie, 2004; Charlton & Kihato, 2006; Goebel, 2007; Othman & Mia, 2008; Burgoyne, 2008; Van Wyk, 2009; Tissington, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2011).

When asked about the influence of the demarcation on the housing project, it was noted that the project commenced prior to the demarcation debacle, but that inhabitants began linking the two issues since they felt they were being 'dumped' to the NWP. This perception is illustrated by the following statement, "You are destabilising the community ... now you are taking us to the other side, which is linked another way to the North West and creating a new community next to the North West ... it's a North-West project and you are putting us close to North West." (Interview with officials, 2015). This was also affirmed by a number of interviewees who perceived the transfer to be rezoning them under the NWP, which escalated the protests further (Interview 16, 19, 20 & 22, 2015)

From their side, the municipal officials indicated that certain local politicians began lobbying and canvassing to gain influence through the demarcation issue. On the other hand, other officials utilised the demarcation to destabilise the project by manipulating the community to believe that the transfer to NWP will deliver them only 5 500 houses instead of the entire 18 000 that were promised. This decreased the influence of the officials in the project, seeing that the demarcation process inhibited the progress of the project due to transfer hurdles such as appointment of new consultancy, confusion about role allocation, or budgeting reconciliations (Interview with officials, 2015; PSCM, 2008-2016). Responses of officials indicated further that the political dynamics underlining the demarcation did create community configurations of power and a severe mistrust between the MCLM and community members (Interview with officials, 2015). These configurations of community power resulted in even the national government yielding to the demands of the community as protests intensified (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Matebesi, 2011). This suggests shifts in power exercises to the community, which extends the Lukesian (1974; 2005) notion of binary power relations of domination.

Despite the MCLM's perception of promoting public interests, other groups within and outside the community viewed the project as an avenue to accumulate wealth and power. One official stated that during the tendering stage of the project, the MCLM had agreed on employing a single, major contractor. However, when the tender was awarded, the community's business interest groups manipulated the process and led the community members to believe that they were not going to benefit from the project. The project was halted, by community protests instigated by the local business elites who wanted to benefit from the project (Interview with municipal officials, 2015). The officials in the interviews indicated that such groups lobbied the Merafong Construction Forum (MCF) to be made community contractors since the main contractor agreed to subcontract 20% of the construction to local contractors. This promoted the capacitation of local contractors but also had a detrimental effect on the project as the members of the MCF were then creating and forming their own construction companies and awarding themselves contracts (Interview with officials, 2015; Interviewee 16, 2015).

In addition, the officials perceived the community members to be playing a major role in the project as they understood the project to be people-centred. In this regard, an official stated, "The project is for the community, with the community and by the community ... as the community has a slogan: 'Nothing for us without us ... don't decide for us, we will be part of the decision-making'" (Interview with officials, 2015). Thus, it is evident that the Khutsong

community emphasised a ‘power-to’ and ‘power-with’ exercise. According to Morriss (2002:32), ‘power to’ denotes what the community is able to do in the housing project and ‘power with’. This reflects the ability of the Khutsong members to manifest collective or coactive influence (Arendt, 1969; Miller, 1976; Townsend *et al.*, 1999; Dowding, 2011).

In addition, it was established from the interviews that the community did not only influence the project by determining participation. The community members also progressively promoted the housing development process through its ability to own the project, as one official explained:

“One of the critical roles of the community, then at that time 2009-2010, we were not yet fully adopted to Gauteng ... so, their role was to say we have been staying in impoverished situations in areas that are failing; politics do not have a say whether its Gauteng or North West, this is our project ... community had to critically safeguard the site ... to say that the battlefield is not on site it’s there ...” (Interview with officials, 2015).

The response above do not only reflect a sense of ownership or control by the community of the project, it also accentuates the collaborative ability of a community to act in safeguarding the outcome of a project. This corresponds to Dowding (2011) and Townsend *et al.* (1999) who point out that power focuses on people’s collective actions to further the interests of every group member. This sense of ownership also indicates empowerment of the community members, which has amplified the nature of power configurations in the housing project (as will be expounded later). In depth, the responses of the interviewees and the MCLM suggested that community’s control in the project is demonstrated by the informal monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in which residents involve themselves, in order to curb vandalism and corruption in a project (Interview with officials, 2015; PSCM, 2008-2016).

Furthermore, the officials found the outcome of the project influenced largely by the issue of using the waiting list to allocate houses. The problem was that certain beneficiaries could not be traced, which delayed the project unnecessary. Poor cooperation amongst the different government sectors was perceived to be a major cause of the erratic progress in the project (Interview with officials, 2015; PSCM, 2008-2016). The interviewees also indicated that contractors’ non-performance contributed to the slow progress in the project.

However, it was also established that conflicts amongst actors were inevitable. An official pointed out that the conflict was unrelated to the project and concerned other societal issues.

Another official saw it as due to the militant nature of South African residents who feel increasingly entitled to “everything” (Interview with officials, 2015). As will be in the following sections, the prevalence of conflicts in the praxis of housing policies, corroborates Lukes’ (1974; 2005a) notion that the exercise of power in its first and second dimension manifest in observable conflict amongst different interest groups. From Khutsong, the MCLM official managed to overcome conflicts by assuming authority and control in the stakeholder relationships. This was done through rapid-response deployment of different political structures and communicating with the grieving or discontented actors. In this regard, Sager (1994:145) points out that according to a regulation approach, conflict and resolution are endemic everyday experiences of urban development, seeing that different actors endeavour to manipulate the available spaces for individual gains. In the present study, officials interpreted the housing processes as not exclusively influenced by elites but also impacted by grassroots groups of Khutsong residents. This attest to the multi-dimensional exercise of power as the community, contractors, leaders and officials all influence the outcome of a project. Fainstein (1986:257) views conflict as the necessary cause for power shifts towards ‘power to’ in which urban development policies become favorable to all interested groups concerned.

Overall, the MCLM officials’ interviews reflected the various interpretations of the project and the main issues that have contributed to its outcomes. The findings suggest that the initial interpretation of the Khutsong housing project was based on a technical understanding of the dire need to provide safety to the residents. In this regard, the project was seen to be influenced largely by the geological instability caused by doline formation. The overarching perception was that the housing project was an matter of environmental mitigation. However, with time, this focus shifted to discourses about integrated human settlements, improvements of livelihood, social transformation, service delivery, access to socio-economic opportunities and ownership (Interview with officials, 2013; 2015).

In addition, the actors such as the provincial governments, contractors, local leaders and the community members, all manipulated the programme and thereby restricted the domineering influence of the MCLM actors. Regardless of the various actors’ struggles to grasp their share of power (apprehend) power in the project, the MCLM officials felt that their decision to retranslate the project from resettlement to settlement, helped them remain powerful throughout (Interview with officials, 2015). The findings show that officials still believe the project is partly resettlement, seeing that this reprioritisation provided them total control. This position enabled them to focus on the most vulnerable aspect (resettlement), but using the

waiting list to select individuals for housing also turned the process into a settlement. In this way, the officials had access to information resources which most of the actors did not have, thereby retaining their authority and dominance in the Khutsong housing spaces. It was also highlighted that the actors such as the MCLM officials focused on varying and conflicting issues which they influence in the Khutsong project, as will be explicated subsequently.

6.5.2 Local politicians' and leaders' interpretations and actions

Interviewing the politicians provided challenges, however, the researcher managed to involve a few local politicians (councillors) and community representatives (ward committee members). Furthermore, some of the discussions on these politicians' interpretations and actions in the project were extracted from interviews with other actors and the secondary analysis of the Khutsong project reports (PCCE, 2008-2016; PSCM, 2008-2016; Niewoudt, 2013). Interviews with members of the MCLM (Interview with officials, 2013; 2015) revealed that prior to the launching of the project, the local politicians and the state requested local governments to draw up a list of housing backlogs (i.e. housing waiting list) they were facing. At the dawn of majority rule, the South African state was facing a huge housing backlog (1.5 million) and spatial disparities inherited from the previous dispensation of apartheid (Jenkins, 1999; Mafukidze, 2009; Adebayo, 2010; Tissington *et al.*, 2013).

By enacting the White Paper on Housing (HWP) of 1994, the state aimed to play a significant role in providing shelter for the poor. The South African government began implementing a state-led or a supply-side approach to housing projects, which was anchored on the policy framework of the RDP's people-centred and democratic approach to development (RSA, 1994). The RDP also involved local municipality officials as major actors in implementing local development (Ley, 2009:36). Since Khutsong was established in 1958 as a formal township for mining communities, the first fully democratic dispensation in 1994 saw the national politicians seeking to transform the mining township into a more integrated settlement. With its influence the state established the Carletonville Transitional Local Council, and later in 2002, the Merafong City Local Municipality (MCLM). The aim was to address local development issues in Merafong, which include the Khutsong Township (Niewoudt, 2013; Interviews with officials, 2015).

As was indicated previously, a geotechnical report indicated that 90% of Khutsong was situated on dolomitic risk soil, which prompted the MCLM to get the doline issue declared a disaster.

This met with opposition from the local politicians due to the negative connotation for private investments to the area. Therefore, the politicians intentionally decided that the municipality would manage the risks of the dolomite and resettle the most vulnerable households (Interview with officials, 2013; 2015). The politicians interpreted the projects from the vantage point of investment and did not 'buy into' the MCLM officials' idea of resettling the entire Khutsong. They agreed on funding the project as a presidential priority in which all the three spheres of government were supposed to play a major role in ensuring its success. This interpretation and action resonates with Marxist urban political theorising, which views the state as pivotal in maintaining capital accumulation by private groups, exploitation and polarisation of the poor (Geddes, 2009).

On the other hand, the local politicians also viewed the project as an opportunity to revitalise and expand Khutsong by the development of a new housing project. As a result, they underplayed the significance of the dolomite problem and emphasised the housing need as driving motive for the project (Interviewee 13, 24, 2015). Thus, they viewed the project as strategy to multiply their power bases through increased voter confidence. Thereby they subverted the initial decision of relocating the entire Khutsong, to only a settlement of the vulnerable who formed part of the housing waiting lists. Interviews with the MCLM officials indicated scepticism and discontent with the option chosen by political leaders.

The MCLM officials deemed it efficient for a resettlement process to select the informal settlement beneficiaries on a block-by-block basis. This provided the opportunity to resettle the entire block of informal settlements, demolish the informal structures, and rehabilitate and re-demarcate the designated area. However, the local politicians perceived this procedure as undermining their power bases. They, therefore, opted for the use of the housing list, which the interviewed officials pointed out as one of the major constraints to the progress of the project as it was planned initially (Interview with officials, 2015). The politicians saw the project as a mechanism for responsive service delivery, which would boost voter confidence and thus confirm the officials' dominance.

The municipality officials' promotion of the ideal resettlement strategy would have presented challenges foreseen by the locals politicians, as contributing to the community's resistance and contestation in the political spaces. For instance, as indicated previously, during the demarcation protests in March 2006 the public prevented other inhabitants from voting as a way to resist their subordination. By following the ideal approach, the officials would have

made the resettlement and housing process more efficient and easy to implement (Interview with officials, 2015). The officials however, chose to implement the waiting list, which has contributed to the fast-expanding informal settlements as residents transferred to the new settlement and rented their shack to others. In their ingratiation, the politicians opted for non-decision on the issue of people renting out their shacks.

In the process, the politicians assumed that the new Khutsong settlement's socio-spatial and economic dynamics would compel these informal dwellers to abandon their shacks and resettle. This manipulation was without success as this tendency is typical to townships across South Africa where informal settlements have mushroomed. From a spatial perspective, it can be construed that the local politicians wanted to address the urban-social spatial fragmentation and disparities as the legacy of colonial and apartheid eras. Therefore, they had to exercise their authority over other actors to ensure the project produces integrated and sustainable human settlements, which in turn would increase voter confidence, public satisfaction and political legitimacy (PSCM, 2008-2016; PPCE, 2008-2016; Interview with officials, 2015).

A further motive could be that the local politicians exploited the Khutsong housing project intentionally, forcing the Khutsong people to accept their transferral from the GP to the NWP. A number of respondents remarked that they knew that the local politicians were endeavouring to use the housing project getting them to accept being rezoned under the NWP (Interviewee 16, 2015). The resurgence of protests, however, indicated that local politicians failed to manipulate the Khutsong residents to accept the politicians' notion. Resistance increased and violent community protests erupted since the public believed the NWP was not financially capacitated to provide the houses. This scenario challenges the supposition by Wrong (1974:24) and Russell (1938:25) that power is the production of intended effects. In the case of Khutsong, intentionality failed and systemic power produced unintended effects (resistance), which Lukes (2005:76) considers as unintentional power since the powerful evoked differential behaviours in their subjects.

On the national political front, the 52nd National Conference of the African National Congress (ANC) held in Polokwane, Limpopo from 16-20 December 2007 led to the resignation of the then president of the ANC Mr Thabo Mbeki and his replacement by Mr Jacob Zuma. The former president Mbeki was more involved and influential in the Khutsong housing project. Through Mbeki's leadership, the NDoHS was visible throughout as major actor in the praxis of the project's policy. Interviews with officials revealed that the NDoHS which was supposed

to play a major role in monitoring and evaluating the Khutsong project, stopped attending the PSC meetings a few years after the demarcation was resolved. This indicates that although the project continued, its political support was diminished with the resignation of former president Mr Mbeki who provided state support to the housing project.

Furthermore, regarding the funding and planning of the project, the findings indicate that local politicians undermined the influence of the municipality officials. Due to the nature of the project, the MCLM planners noted that it required a capital investment of R8.5 billion, of which the NDoHS and the Gauteng Department have been providing R100 million annually, causing the completion of the entire project to take longer than 10 years (PSCM, December 2013; PPCE, December, 2013; PPCE, May 2016).

Following the ideal time frame for the completion of the project, initially, the officials and PSC members had envisioned the first phase to be completed around mid-2012 (PSCM, March 2011). However, due to the influence of the local politicians and various government structures, the plans of the officials were undermined as the 5 500 houses ended up being completed three years later.

The tendering and awarding of contracts to competent contributors could have shortened the time and led to the production of quality units. However, as was indicated, the local politicians undermined the decisions of MCLM officials who planned to select competent contractors for the project. The politicians' domination of the tendering process led to the awarding of tenders to cadres who were not experienced and competent in housing development. This contributed largely to the poor structures of the housing units and misappropriation of funds. The magnitude of the project implied that efficient and effective well-known contractors should have been appointed. The reality was, however, that political intervention in the allocation and control of the contractors hampered the roll-out of the project and contributed to misconceptions amongst community actors. Other actors observed the partisan awarding of contracts and mobilised the community to ensure that they also were allocated part of tenders in the Khutsong housing development. In this regard, the protests benefitted individual business interest groups who were awarded tenders, but it also slowed the progress in delivering the housing (Interviews with officials, 2015).

The officials decided to appoint backup contractors since the main contractors was underperforming. In the process, the local politicians undermined the influence of the

municipality and the PPCE who had agreed on appointing backup persons among the local contractors who previously had worked well in other Merafong projects (PSCM, July 2012). The local politicians influenced the appointment and appointed their selected, often grossly inexperienced, backup contractors, thus undermining the domination by MCLM officials. Moreover, the local politicians from NWP also undermined the influence of the MCLM officials and GDoH since NWP was unwilling to hand over the project to the GP. This was affirmed by interviews with municipality officials and a local leader who indicated that this held dire consequences for the project (Interview with officials, 2015; Interviewee 20, 2015; PSCM, 2012) seeing that the GP were unable to budget for the project.

To recap: This systemic power play by upper-structure interest groups negatively influenced the outcome of the project, as the local politicians strived to maintain dominance in the project and were not willing to collaborate with other role-players in its implementation. Surprisingly, due to the structured nature of power exercises, the local politicians perceived the local municipality officials as incapable of implementing and managing the project (Interview with officials, 2015). As a result, the local politicians had to engage in decisions, non-decisions and preferential resource mobilisation to undermine the local bureaucrats. The actions of the local politicians helped contribute to the slow progress in the Khutsong housing project.

In addition, findings from the interviews showed that partisan politics were also impacting the project. Local leaders and politicians destabilised the project by lobbying for the indigenisation of the process through including local contractors and hiring local members. In this regard, they influenced the community to rally behind them. A number of MCLM officials remarked that this brought about major setbacks to the project, seeing that more than 20 small contractors have emerged from the MCF, a structure to appoint subcontractors (Interview with officials, 2015). Notably, political mobilisation by local leaders have also resulted in certain leaders lobbying for control in the project themselves. This action took place through activism and protests allegedly instigated by these local leaders, and the municipality co-opted these leaders into its structures.

Interviewees pointed out that some of the community leaders or representatives ended up using the project to canvass and campaign for their parties whilst others leaked information about the project to the media (Interview with officials, 2015). While this action undermined the dominance by officials, it also destabilised the project. The shifts in power before and after co-option of local leaders into the municipality, has been reciprocated by mistrust amongst the

actors. On the one hand, the community had the perception of being exploited by the local leaders to acquire political appointments. On the other hand, the local politicians distrusted the municipality for appointing opposition candidates who helped cause instability in the project. The municipality officials in turn felt betrayed by the inclusion of local leaders who exploited their involvement in the PSC to gather important project information, which they leaked to the media and the public. These power plays have, therefore, destabilised the project and led to increased incidences of insurgence since the community had access to important project data to inform their activism.

It can be inferred from the exposition above, that the intervention of political elites in the projects caused conflicting interpretations and changed nature of the project from the initially planned resettlement to a settlement project for the vulnerable and needy. Through this focus, the local politicians marketed their role as providers and enablers in state-led housing initiatives. This led to a reconceptualisation of the project towards one that ensures the local politicians were hailed as vanguards in providing more participatory and inclusive, as well as sustainable, integrative human settlements. Regarding the power struggles between the local politicians and municipality officials, the findings showed that the officials sought to maintain their dominance through the ownership of the project's technical information. The politicians' power was encapsulated in actions to help realise the "right to adequate shelter". Their guiding motive was focused on ensuring political representation and responsiveness as a strategy to gain future political legitimacy. However, not only the interpretations and actions of the officials, local leaders and politicians played a major role in the project. The contractors' interpretation of the project also shaped its outcome, as will be explained in the following subsection.

6.5.3 Contractors' interpretations and actions

Setting up interviews with contractors was a difficulty as most of them seemed too focused and reluctant to be questioned on their interpretation of the project. Telephonic interviews were held with two subcontractors who were not willing to be disturbed and managed to answer some of the interview questions partially, however, much of their actions and interpretations of the project could be deduced from secondary reviews of the Khutsong project documents (PSCM, 2008-2016; PPCE, 2008-2016) and from interviews with other stakeholders. Interviews with the two subcontractors suggested that they had materialistic perceptions of their involvement in the project since to them being role-players meant being able to

accumulate profits (Interviewee 13 & 17, 2015). This view was reiterated by the municipal officials and the councillors who indicated that some of these local contractors were using the project for private purposes (Interview with officials 2015; Interviewee 20 & 19, 2015). Since these local contractors were part of the 20% that had to be subcontracted by the main contractors (PSCM, July 2009), they saw the housing project not only from the perspective of profiteering but also of building confidence or a reputation for future awards of tenders (Interviewee 13 & 17, 2015). In this regard, they formed a group with private interests in the project, pursuing financial gains and future tender-preneurship prospects (Interview with officials, 2015). It is thus evident that the community's considerations of the settlement were secondary in the local contractors' interpretation of the project.

The goal to form their own capital, saw the contractors implementing various strategies, which led to the sluggish nature of the project. Payment of contractors in the project was based on milestones reached (e.g. rafts, wall plates, roofing). The contractors manipulated this payment agreement to suite their financial needs. For example, they constructed several of foundations in order to claim more (Interview with officials, 2015). To illustrate the prevalence of profiteering further, officials mention that the contractors also delayed the construction of houses to benefit from the yearly increases in housing subsidies. Alluding to this tactic, an official remarked, "Contractors also need a new subsidy increment since the government announces a new subsidy quantum, they even delay construction so as to benefit from the high subsidy ... not pushing for the past ... so as to benefit from the subsidy increment ..." (Interview with officials, 2015). Another official mentioned that the contractors opted for non-performance thus exploiting the project to achieve personal goals (Interview with officials, 2015). In this way, the contractors undermined the structural influence of other actors by manipulating the construction agreement and processes to suit their personal interests.

Interviews with the contractors indicated that the nature of payment within the project was one of the major issues that contributed to the current outcome. The contractors explained that they were being paid by the main contractor who exploited them by charging administration fees and delaying their payment (Interviewee 13 & 17, 2015). This was reiterated by the MCLM official interviewees who asserted, "The main contractor had one thing on his mind: making money ... had to impose high administration fees on the community contractors" (Interview with officials, 2015). As such, the main contractor had influence or control over the subcontractors, however, the community perceived the contracts to be under the control of the

housing affairs department (Interviewee 1, 3, 4, 9, 12, 14 & 18, 2015). This perception was compounded further by the misappropriation of funds and the conspicuous consumption of luxuries by other local contractors (Interviewee, 19, 4 & 7, 2015). When they were given funds to construct houses, some of these contractors would employ cost-saving techniques, which led to the usage of inferior materials for the housing units, delivering in deficient constructions. This is in line with Pithouse (2009) and Bailey (2011) who point out that contractors often begin producing poor quality structures in order to cut operational costs, seeing that the state usually is unwilling to pay large sums.

This condition has sparked community unrests and contests as members cited cases of corruption, exploitation and non-payment among the contractors. Contractors revealed that such issues would lead to violent insurgences as the workers and their families would strategically influence protests which in most cases impacted the housing development progress. In certain cases the construction workers who felt exploited or not paid would purposely be absent from work, thus stalling the project.

The findings give numerous indications of power contestations and conflict between the contractors and the community. Some of the contractors pointed out that since the beginning of their work and that of the main contractor, there were several strikes by the community for reasons such as employment needs, non-payment of workers, housing allocation, or poor quality structures. This is noted by contractors who stated, “Working with people, especially the community, is a challenge ... sometimes you feel as if you not in control of your work ... but sometimes the community forcefully controlled our work”; and: “The community always thought like we are the one who have caused project to delay or the workers not paid, but it is not us ... we normally got paid from the main contractor (Interviewee 13, 17, 2015). The ambiguity in the contractors’ responsibilities against the control processes continually erupted in conflicts where the subcontractors were the main victims

The local contractors explained that they employed various strategies to subdue the conflicts and protests of the community members. One of the strategies involved the employment of 60% local labour and 40% from outside the region (PSCM, August 2013). Dealing with conflicts over non-payment, the contractors emphasised that they had to inform the community that they themselves were receiving late payments from the municipality. In their discussion, shifting the blame was the most probable choice. However, from their side, the municipality utilised Community Liason Officers who indicated that the delay was often because to the

contractors submitted insufficient documentation (PSCM, April 2012; PPCE, April 2012). This strategy of contestation and blaming indicates that the contractors shifted from influential to powerless with regard taking responsibility (Morriss, 2002:39; Lukes, 2005:66-67). They rather chose to hold the municipality responsible, whilst both the community viewed the contractor as worth blaming for the strikes and protests due to the non-payment of workers. Furthermore, since the contractors were mandated to allocate houses, they allowed people to occupy units that were not inspected (Interview with officials, 2015; Interviewee 7, 11, 12 & 15, 2015).

From the discussion above, it is evident that creating and accumulating capital controls the way contractors act and how they interpret the housing development process. The responses show that to these contractors, community interests were secondary to profiteering. This indicated: the contractors were sternly in control of their technical expertise in the housing project but still were rendered powerless by the funding processes since they were paid by the main contractors who were also influenced directly by the municipality's funding processes. Thus, the mistrusts and blame-gaming amongst the actors, particularly between the contractors and the municipality, have hampered the project, thus, delaying the completion. This evoked radical activism from the community, which often has mobilised against non-payment, employment and poor quality of housing units.

6.5.4 Community members' interpretations and actions

The research also sought a better understanding of the beneficiaries' perspectives and actions as role-players in the project. For this purpose, community members from the new settlement as well as Khutsong's formal housing area and informal settlement, were interviewed on their interpretation of the project. From the interviews conducted in both 2013 and 2015, most of the community interviewees seemingly understood that the housing project was mainly due to the geological instability of Khutsong. Some even mentioned to have experienced the cracking walls and 'sinking' houses. In this regard, the responses demonstrated the community members' varying interpretations of the origin of the Khutsong project. Some interviewees indicated that they were at no stage informed about the doline risk they were facing in the informal settlement (Interviewees 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 & 14, 2013; Interviewees 3, 5, 6, 10, 14 & 15, 2015). Other members who had resided a long time in the informal settlement, indicated that they were not familiar with the sinkhole problem (Interviewees 4, 7 & 8 2015) since they

migrated from other provinces. More strikingly, a woman who had lived for 20 years in Khutsong remarked that she had never heard about the dolomite issue (Interviewee 6, 2013).

The responses above from the interviewees corroborated the views of the MCLM officials that the project was also a result of the housing need or waiting list since 1994 (Interviewees 4, 7, 14, 24 & 25, 2015). A few community members linked the housing project to the demarcation crisis indicating that the national government exploited it to silence the violent protests during the demarcation debacle (Interviewees 16, 18, 21, 22, 2015). In this regard, the nature of the dynamics that have been unfolding in the project can be linked to the varying interpretations the community members presented about the project.

Responses from the interviews and focus groups made it clear that through the waiting list, beneficiaries were allocated stand numbers before the contractors began building the houses, which allowed them to monitor the progress at the allocated stand number (Interviewees 15, 18 & 19, 2013; Interviewees 2, 5, 6, 16, 21, 24 & 31, 2015). The beneficiaries were even informed when the house was completed in order to collect their keys and move in. Due to the need for adequate shelter, most respondents indicated that despite the occurrence of sinkholes they felt it a better choice to move into the new settlements (Interviewees 1 & 6, 2013). People who moved to the new settlement were from both the formal and informal areas in Khutsong.

Most beneficiaries were, however, from the informal area, which corroborates with the responses from the MCLM officials who indicated that the houses were mostly for the vulnerable inhabitants of Khutsong (informal settlement and backyard dwellers). But responses from community members indicated that people from surrounding towns and cities were also allocated houses (Interviewees 11 & 12, 2013; Interviewees 4, 7, 14, 24 & 25, 2015), and even foreigners whom they accused of bribing the MCLM officials and contractors in order to be awarded houses.

Some respondents reported that the allocation of houses was fair and that inhabitants who applied for houses in the 1990s or earlier, were awarded their houses first, and that those who applied since 2000 were still waiting (Interviewee 14, 2013; Interviewees 3, 5, 11, 22 & 33, 2015). However, most respondents felt that the Khutsong housing policy spaces were rife with corruption and maladministration as those who applied later in the 2000s received houses earlier (Interviewee, 13 & 14, 2013; Interviewees 8, 9, 12, 15, 18, 25 & 29, 2015). Thus, it appears that the municipality failed to communicate with the community members. The fact is

that the MCLM had set aside 1 500 houses to be constructed for people who applied earlier. This arrangement has been an issue for community contestations (PSCM, 2011) as even some of the earlier applicants were overlooked.

Lack of clarity on the way in which the houses were being allocated created numerous misconceptions and rumours which led to alternative interpretations of the project as people cited maladministration, corruption and incompetency (Interviewees 11, 12, 18 & 19, 2013; Interviewees 2, 11 & 26, 2015). Supporting varying actors' interpretations, interviewees from the focus group indicated that the municipality has been failing to communicate to the community the processes and issues regarding the project (Focus Group 1, 2013; Focus Group 1, 2 & 3, 2015). This was also reiterated by two young males who labelled the municipality as incompetent whilst other interviewees revealed that the municipality prevents the Khutsong members from raising contentious issues. The reason is that the meetings the municipality conducts are based on set agendas and the public is often discouraged from participating since they know that most of the issues they need may not be part of the agendas (Interviewees 28, 31 & 32, 2015).

Furthermore, interviews with the community members indicated varying objectives for moving to the resettlement site. Most of the respondents indicated they moved because of the following basic considerations:

- improved shelter (Interviewees 13 & 14, 2013; Interviewees, 2, 3, 7, 9, 18, 21 & 24, 2015);
- safety (Interviewees 7 & 8, 2013; Interviewees 12, 15, 27 & 32, 2015);
- job opportunities (Interviewee 2, 2013; Interviewees 4, 5, 12, 15 & 21, 2015);
- better social amenities (Interviewee 3, 6, 13, 14 & 15, 2013; Interviewees 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 21, 26, 30 & 31, 2015);
- dealing with family problems (Interviewee 4, 2013); and
- more space for extended family members (Interviewees 13, 14, 15, 18 & 19, 2013; Interviewees 9, 16, 22 & 23, 2015) – usually when certain members of the family move to the new house whilst others remain in the shack or rent it out.

This movement to the new site has been largely due to the municipality's choice not to follow a proper resettlement process of the community. This led to the continued presence and growth of the informal sector. Arguably the MCLM officials intended to implement block-by-block selection and allocation of beneficiaries followed by demolishing, rehabilitation and

demarcation (Interview with officials, 2013; 2015); however, due to the pressure from the NDoHS, they ended up using the ‘controversial’ waiting list. This procedure was reinterpreted by the community, which ended up querying the severity and validity of the geological crisis and thus of the resettlement notion.

As a result, the community began asking probing questions about the nature of the resettlement. They argued that if the municipality was serious about the matter, it would ensure that the new settlement has better infrastructure and houses, to attract inhabitants. Community members thus interpreted the non-removal of people as an indication that the sinkhole crisis was not to be taken seriously (Interviewees 15, 18 & 19, 2013; Interviewees 3, 8, 11, 15, 27 & 31, 2015). The confusion and ambiguity was apparent in the actions of other role-players who were key in communicating the resettlement and the doline crisis. An interviewed community leader stated as follows:

“I agree that the mayor did inform the community about the unstable condition of the land in Khutsong. But while they preach about the dolomitic nature of the land, one local councillor extended his house. Is that not sending out the wrong signals that we are taken for granted?” (Matebezi, 2011:95).

Such variance in interpretation of the project led to mixed reactions amongst actors, some inclined to move out to the new settlement while others opted to continue residing in old Khutsong.

The community members identified various challenges they have encountered before and after occupying the settlement area. Pre-occupancy, respondents pointed out that the challenge of vandalised property (Interviewees 10, 18 & 21, 2015). This response concurs with the findings from the PSC meetings (PSCM, 2012; 2015), which reported that due to non-payments, workers were resorting to vandalising and selling building material as a retort to income challenges. Interviewees were avoiding moving to the new settlement as they perceived the new houses to be constructed poorly (Interviewees 1, 5, 11, 25 & 27, 2015). Some participants pointed out that it was meaningless leaving a shack moving to another, formal, shack (house poorly constructed). They rather preferred their original shack since they were not paying for services. Water spillage was also identified as a major problem post-occupancy, seeing that both sewer and water taps leaked and this condition was exacerbated by the failure of the municipality and contractors to take responsibility and resolve the problems (Interviewees 7, 8, 11 & 12, 2013; Interviewees 10, 33 & 35, 2015).

Furthermore, certain Khutsong community members found the new houses more unsecure than those of the informal settlement. The formal houses were constructed of a single brick layer and were thus perceived as a threat in case of natural disasters or mining tremors (Interviewees 11 & 12, 2013). This resonates with the findings by several scholars that the low-cost housing project was producing shoddy and uninhabitable structures with deficiencies (Harris *et al.*, 2003; Huchzermeyer, 2004; Napier, 2005; Charlton & Kihato, 2006; Goebel, 2007; Adebayo, 2011; Aigbavboa & Thwala, 2013; Ehebrecht, 2014). Community members mostly felt deceived into accepting housing that had already accrued debts, mainly due to high water bills as a result of contractors using water from beneficiaries' houses (Interviewees 11 & 12, 2013; Interviewees 9, 16 & 18, 2015).

On the formal housing sites, the lack of coordinated infrastructure and rendering of social amenities, opted inhabitants to remain in the informal houses and rent out their units at the new settlement, or making it available to other (extended) family members (Interviewees 18 & 19, 2013; Interviewees 6 & 16, 2015). Community members also highlighted as a problem the incomplete infrastructure projects such as tarring of roads due to the dusty area (Interviewees 6, 9 & 10, 2013; Interviewees 5, 8, 16, 23, & 27, 2015). Participants pointed out the absence of bridges and roads to connect the new settlement to the old Khutsong. This necessitated unnecessary transport costs during, for example, visits to clinics and funerals (Interviewees 11 & 12, 2013; Interviewees 15, 16 & 22, 2015).

Contrary to scholarly critique of the continued spatial fragmentation and reproduction of apartheid geographies, the Khutsong housing project has sought to integrate the RDP houses in a locale within an established community close to economic processes, transport and employment centres (e.g. Welverdiend) and the Carletonville town (Goebel, 2007; Aigbavboa & Thwala, 2013; Venter & Lochner, 2006; Bierman & Van Ryneveld, 2007; Huchzermeyer, 2009).

In the discussion with community members, the issue was prevalent of violent strikes and protests as a response to the failures or actions/in-actions of other actors. Most of the interviewees indicated that the municipality and the national government are compelled to hasten progress or action if the community engages in violent activism or struggles (Interviewees 1, 3, 7, 12, 16, 21, 26, 29, 30, 31 & 33, 2015). The response below demonstrates the point:

“We end up toyi-toying (protests) because everyone does not want to take responsibility of their actions ... we toyi-toyi because we are forced to ... when we toyi-toyi they come and try to be accountable, they will do a certain portion of their work ... they do it to make us quiet” (Interviewee 16, 2015).

The participants indicated that violence is the only understandable discourse in the Khutsong project. To this end, members stated, “We manage everything through toyi-toyi and it is the only way we address issue ... it is the only way in which the government can quicken things” (Interviewee 12, 2015). Another remarked, “When the municipality or government does not want to listen to us we burn the tyres, close all roads and ensure that everything stops till the government hears us” Interviewee 15, 2015). A member reiterated, “The municipality will not listen to us till we have started burning things and closing roads, its only then they will come and address our concerns” (Interviewee 21, 2015). It was also asserted, “Here in Khutsong we don’t allow the municipality or government to do as they wish ... we protest every time we feel we are being undermined and not listen to ... the government listens to us when they hear through newspapers and the television that people in Khutsong are striking” (Interviewee 23, 2015).

As argued previously, due to non-decision in the Khutsong project, community members found it difficult to air their grievances to the responsible parties. As a result, the members resort to violent protests, burning tires, blocking roads and obstructing progress at the construction site. This was done to force the responsible persons to come and address them. The findings also indicate members’ belief that through collective mobilisation and activism they feel more empowered to reconfigure and reorient the project dynamics, thereby exert influence themselves (Interviewees 3, 7, 12, 22 & 26, 2015). Some understood their influence from the time of demarcation when they reciprocated through actions of protests against the national government’s decision to relocate them to the NWP. Their violent responses involved the burning of libraries, councillors’ houses and preventing (through intimidation) participation in the local election. This forced the government to review its decision in favour of the Khutsong residents. Thus, from the exposition above, it is evident that, throughout history, the community has learnt to associate hyper-pluralistic power reconfigurations as solutions to their engagement with other interest groups.

The violent protests and hyper-pluralistic forms of action do indicate the nature of interpretations about entitlements, promises and claims, which has become the order of the day

for numerous South Africans. As was indicated, the community members approached the project not only from the viewpoint of possible dolomitic risk but also from the right to access adequate shelter (Interviewees 13 & 14, 2013; Interviewees, 2, 3, 7, 9, 14, 18, 21 & 24, 2015). The expressions of the Freedom Charter (1955) and Section 26 of the Bill of Rights helped induce an interpretation by actors that they have an outright entitlement to shelter. This perception is confirmed by one municipal official who stated, “Housing cuts across many societal issues and is a cornerstone and that’s why when there is any community unrests people always raise housing as an issue” (Interview with officials, 2015). Khan (2003:43) points out that housing provision is a highly politicised and contentious issue, and Ndinda *et al.* (2010) remarks that its politicised nature has often been characterised by incessant violent community protest.

It may be argued that the community members hold misconceptions of their right to adequate shelter (Evans, 2007). Moreover, the expressions and intents of the Freedom Charter and Bill of Rights are open to discursive interpretation. From the responses, it is evident that community members interpret the Freedom Chapter as suggesting that housing provision is the responsibility of the state (FCC, 2013). Therefore, all members are entitled to claim deliverance on the housing promises. Such an interpretation of entitlement and claims regarding housing provision has led some community members to construe the Khutsong project as an extension of the state’s RDP and its human settlement role. Thereby the members did not ‘buy into’ the problem of geological instability (Interviewees 15, 18, 19, 2013; Interviewees 3, 11, 15, 27 & 31, 2015). Community members have, therefore, opted not to move from the declared risk zone, the old Khutsong South, and preferred to rent out their new house units.

In this regard, the members considered various state-led actions as threats to realising their alienable “right to shelter”. Responses to actions that some viewed as a mechanism of social upliftment, and others discarded as a lucrative schema, have thus escalated into a series of protests in Khutsong. This echoes Lefebvre’s (2003:89) depiction that the urban area has become a terrain worth defending and attacking for. Thus, the community members who, in the previous socio-political dispensations have been excluded, found themselves attaining various forms of freedom (Castells, 1983:67). The reason is that the state’s policies for urban development are both enabling and constraining, conditioning and being conditioned by the community members. This especially applies to the powerless or poor, which challenge and

subvert the existing power configurations. The result is shifts in multi-directional power exercises.

Evident from discussion above, is the community members' active engagements in and interpretations of the project. These are found to be more involved in giving meaning to the project than the actions of other interest groups. Therefore, these members have learnt to appropriate the available peripheral project spaces as against the more localised and central formations of the project. Through their divergent interpretation they have managed to exploit the project to their own advantage, as it offered them opportunities of being owners of two properties, acting as landlords, securing an income, being employed and expanding family estates. Significantly, is the community members domineering perspective through a superimposed construct of investment, which has made the issue about the settlement not only about housing rights only but also of increasing their capabilities and forms of freedom. From these reciprocate actions it is evident that the exercise of power in this context, is not entirely uni-directional composed of "binary relations between actors who are assumed to have unitary interests", which is contrary to Lukes' (1974, 2005a:64) notion.

6.6 Multi-directionality and the third dimension of power

Lukes in his third dimension of power, emphasises that effective domination is realisable without the active involvement of the powerful (Lukes, 2005a). Lukes (2005a:28, 85, 143-144) views this third dimension as the capacity of actors to secure compliance to domination through the shaping of beliefs, desires, cognitions and preferences – by imposing internal constraints. For Lukes, the internalisation of constraints should promote wilful compliance and submission to the interests of the powerful. In this regard, Lukes (2005a) assumed that the shaping of actors' interpretations was going to be met with a docile and passive subjectification (subordination of the subjects) which would help promote the interests of the powerful.

However, the Khutsong case clearly challenges the application of Lukes' binary interpretation of the approach to power. As will be pointed out in the following chapter, the relationship between thought and action in more democratic spaces does not allow continued privileging of one party's intentions over another's. As a result, there is a constant reciprocation of action and thought as actors reinterpret socio-economic and political issues differently. This reinterpretation stimulates resistance to domination and the conduct of acquiescence. In this regard, the reality of interpreting actions of others provides a plausible basis for declining the

uni-directional operation of power through the supposedly imposition of the preference image of the elites or dominant over their subjects.

The Khutsong case presents a wide-angle lens to view multidirectional power shifts amongst different actors in answer to the classical question, “Who dominates who?” The findings of the present study showed clear pluralistic preferences amongst the main actors in the Khutsong project, namely the MCLM officials, local leaders and politicians, community members and contractors. The interpretations and actions inferred from the interviewees’ responses indicated that the Lukesian thesis is amiss in explaining power exercises amongst different actors. For Lukes (2005a:64, 84, 109), power can be exercised between two actors where A has power and B submits to being dominated by A. Or, power can be exercised in a pluralistic context in which actors have varying interests and domination is supposed to be either positive sum or negative sum.

More significantly, the present scenario in Khutsong refutes the Lukesian binary interpretation of power since the findings showed that all the main actors have influenced the project’s outcome. This would imply that the various actors are all exercising power, seeing that they can be held responsible for the action and inaction that has contributed to the present project outcome. This notion will be explored further in the following chapter, which will correlate the findings of the study to the major debates in the power discourses. The aim would be to reformulate how power exercises occur in the socio-political arena of the third dimension.

6.7 Conclusion

The discussion above has demonstrated the nature of the Khutsong housing project, considering the multi-level exercises of power, agenda setting and the differing interpretations of actors regarding the entire project. The chapter has indicated that in the Khutsong scenario, actors interpret the project differently and, therefore, conflicting thought processes have influenced the outcome significantly. The findings have shown that the municipality officials sought to dominate the other actors by emphasising the geological instability of the township and arguing for relocation as the solution. However, through various engagements with the other actors (municipality, local politicians, leaders and the state) the community members reinterpreted the issue of the doline risk. They viewed it as an extension of the state’s supply-driven housing initiative. Therefore, those who remained in old Khutsong decided to use the new settlement as a source of income (sub-letting) whilst the majority moved to the new settlement.

However, it was not only the officials and community members who reinterpreted the project. The contractors also perceived the project as not just about relocation but about maximizing opportunities to accumulate capital. This led them to delay the construction process, underpay and exploit workers and construct substandard structures. The local leaders and the politicians shifted their focus from the dole risk and argued for a silence on the issue of relocation as it would jeopardise investment into the township. They thus envisioned the project as expanding the township and at the same time, increasing their power base through augmented voter confidence.

It is clear from the findings that several factors contributed to such interpretations, which also resulted in reconfigurations of power dynamics as the various actors engaged in multi-level soft and hard power exercises. It was found, however, that in some instances the powerless can subvert power processes and challenge it through active engagements. This clearly demonstrates that they refuse to acquiesce with the prevailing power relations in which core actors are presumed to dominate while they submit. Notable from the discussion above, is the notion that preference shaping can be effected by the multifaceted and multi-directional interpretations of role-players' actions and inactions within a socio-economic and political context. This is contrary to the fatalistic passivity embedded in Lukes' (2005a) one-directional approach to power.

The following chapter (ch 7) will build on the discussions above in this chapter. It will concentrate on broadening the view on such multidirectional exercise of power. This will situate the present research study within the major discourses on power and housing theorising.

Chapter 7: Towards an analytical framework on power

7.1 Introduction

This chapter develops a framework to analyse power dynamics. It employs findings from the empirical study for a broader understanding of how power operates in Lukes' notion of the third dimension. Therefore, this chapter links to one of the objectives of the study which required the formulation of an analytical framework to operationalise power exercises or configurations in local development projects. This implies an understanding and explication of power as grounded on a critical view of the Lukesian perspective of power. In particular, this implies evaluating the exercise of the third dimension of power within the Khutsong Housing project.

Lukes (2005a:27) points out that 'power over' or domination can be exercised by shaping preferences, perceptions and thoughts of subjects, which results in wilful compliance or consent to subordination. Such power exercises avert observable conflict or resistance. Thus, these relationships of domination presuppose asymmetrical interactions in which actor A exercise power *over* B by getting B to act contrary to A's interests. In this sense, this power is perceived as a binary relationship, an approach that is in line with the corpus of literature on the 'power over' expression in terms of which exponents only view power from an asymmetrical relationship (Hobbes, 1651; Russell, 1938; Gramsci, 1957; Machiavelli, 1961; Dahl, 1957; 1961; Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Weber, 1978; Locke, 1979; Wrong, 1979; Foucault, 1980, 1982; Durkheim, 1982; Bourdieu, 1986; Barnes, 1986; Lukes, 1974; 2005a).

The main contributors on 'power over' argue from a uni-directional perspective in which its exercise produces powerlessness. This approach glosses over incidences of power shifts amongst actors. Lukes' third dimension of power implies that due to hegemony, the powerless wilfully consent to being subjugated. In contrast, building on findings from chapter 6, this chapter critically explicates the presence of observable conflict, agenda-shaping, and active meaning constructions as well as multi-directional power exercises within Lukes' third dimension of power.

As pointed out above, Lukes (2005a:27) argue that power in its third dimension secures the compliance of its subjects, thus subverting and avoiding any form of observable conflict. This Lukesian framework will be examined critically for a wide-lens perspective of power exercised in the third dimension. The focus will be on applying the interpretations and (in)actions of the

Khutsong housing project's different actors critically to Lukes' third dimension. Thereafter, an analytical framework will be constructed, which broadens Lukes' conceptualisation of the third dimension of power.

Against this background, the following section provides an overview of the nature of actors' relationships applied to the Lukesian framework. Thereafter, the discussion will move towards amending the mentioned Lukesian conceptualisation of the third dimension of power.

7.2 An overview of the actors' power dynamics in the housing project

Scholarly discourses on power exercises reveal that local development projects are rife with incidences of domination and subjectification, with a noticeable uni-directional flow of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Hunter, 1963; Dahl, 1957; Machiavelli, 1961; Lukes, 1974; 2005a). For Lukes (2005a:29) on the three levels of power (decision-making, agenda setting and interpretations), asymmetric power relationships are entrenched in actions of role-players in a binary relationship.

Lukes (1974; 2005a) identifies power exercises in development projects in terms of three levels. On these levels, every instance of power exercise evokes an unequal relationship, which polarises the society into two groups, namely the powerful and the powerless. Lukes envisages a situation in arenas for development policies where power exercises are assumed to be negative sum, and ultimately in the third dimension, are turned into positive-sum through the powerful ones' insidious shaping of other's preferences and cognitions. Contrary to this understanding of uni-directional dominance, the present study proposes multi-directionality in the third dimension of power as is evident in the praxis of Khutsong's local development policies.

As noted in the previous chapter, the various actors' reinterpretations and (in)actions in the housing processes produced a shift in the direction and flow of power to incorporate multi-directional power dynamics. This notion is expounded further in the discussion below. The crucial question in this regard is: How had the nature of power dynamics within the Khutsong housing project presented itself? It could be either as countervailing binary formations of domination and acquiescence, or a positive-sum relationship.

Thus, the research investigates how the three-dimensional views of power were confirmed and challenged further in the Khutsong housing case study.

7.2.1 The first dimension of power

For the Khutsong housing project, the actors' power dynamics enacted in spaces and arenas of decisions on housing policies, reaffirms Lukes (2005a) suppositions that in development projects there is real and overt conflict amongst interest groups over key issues. The powerful are the ones who prevail by influencing specific key issues over conflictual, preferential and varying issues (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 1974; 2005a). As mentioned previously, power exercises in the first dimension are presumed to be relational and asymmetrical.

The previous chapter has partially introduced the mechanisms and stratagems the various actors employed in exercising dominance or 'power over' during decision-making in the project. To recap: The decision-making arena of the housing project was influenced mostly by small interest groups such as the Gauteng Province (GP), North-West Province (NWP), the Merapong City Local Municipality (MCLM), contractors, local politicians, and community members (Interview with officials, 2015; PSCM, 2008-2016). It was significant how different actors influenced the dynamics in the project. In this regard, the actors utilised diverse resources to sway the goals of the project towards their private interests, as explained below.

The MCLM had an advantage of inside information and expertise over other actors in the housing project. The findings showed that the funding decisions of the project were normally in the hands of the state and the provincial governments. This was the case, even though the municipality played a major role in controlling the planning and implementing of decisions in the project. It was also indicated that the different interest groups specialised in influencing the housing project. When the project was launched, the municipality was influential by promoting the idea of relocation and communicating on the doline risk. However, certain values and interests informed the local development process, namely that of the Presidency and the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC). Thus, the decision was reached to focus rather on township development and underplay the Khutsong doline crisis (Niewoudt, 2013; Interview with officials, 2013; 2015). It could, therefore, be inferred that such a decision has contributed to the current nature of the project, seeing that the state has interpreted it from its perspective of investment and general housing provision. This reinterpretation clearly contributed to the low funding from the NDoHS and provincial departments.

Moreover, as was indicated, the relationships between the local (sub)contractors and the main contractor have also been a contributory factor for the slow progress in the project. The main contractor was charging excessive administrative costs and also delaying payments to the local subcontractors. This led to several strikes, which halted the project.

It can thus be inferred that the power play between the contractor and subcontractors was premised on financial control and knowledge transfer as the latter were supposed to be oriented to the construction system by the former. However, since the main contractor had total control over the building processes and the financing of the subcontractors, it was necessary to ensure that he retains control and be appraised as productive. In other words, the deferral on payment to subcontractors could be interpreted as a stratagem to discredit their ability to construct the houses. Thereby the main contractor domineered the power relationships with the subcontractors since the Project Steering Committee (PSC) had agreed that conflict amongst contractors were to be resolved amongst themselves. This exposed the subcontractors to the whims of the main contractor. Such an intention to control the actions of others had dire consequences for the progress of the project. Moreover, it was indicated how decisional power dynamics influenced the project in the PSCM's failure to terminate the contract of the main contractor who did not meet several deadlines.

The above-mentioned problems delaying the construction, translated into incidences of strikes and community unrests. Workers mobilised their communities in public protests over salary issues (see ch 6). As a counter play to these power dynamics between the contractor and subcontractors, construction workers had to resort to burglary and theft of construction items (doors, windows, taps, etc.). The strikes were employed as a stratagem to impede progress at the construction site. This is noted, for example, by a participant who reported:

“In most cases, we closed the R54 road so as to ensure no cars or traffic comes through ... this we do to support some of our community members who are workers in the construction site ... we can do it for days till the municipality and contractors promise us they will address the problem” (Interviewee 7, 2015).

Such power dynamics have primarily interfered with progress of the project. Actors' power plays in decision-making have thus been influential in moving the project forward and guaranteeing accountability from the decision-makers. Extrapolations can be made from the previous chapter by relating it to main theories on power. Following Yates (1977:83-84), it can be argued that Khutsong's response through violent protests and contestations over decisions

in the projects is an example of hyper-pluralism. Yates explains that policy outcomes in the modern era “are the product of highly fragmented and unstable problem and policy context *through* an extreme pluralism of political, administrative, and community interests ... producing a form of street fighting pluralism” (Yates, 1977:85, 34, the author’s emphasis). Judges (1995:24) asserts that this involves an immense scope of interests and a reduced capacity of local government officials’ control in policy outcomes due to increased contestations amongst actors over the policy decisions. In this regard, policy processes are perceived to occur in spaces of struggles, conflicts and protests, which handicaps the entire policy arena by various groups with conflicting interests.

From this brief exposition, it is clear that the Lukesian first dimension of power is useful as theoretical understanding of how varying actors’ conflicting decisions shaped the outcome of the housing project as a whole. However, not only does the Khutsong policy processes reveal instances of decisional power games; also noticeable is agenda shaping and mobilisation of bias within the policy arenas. As is explained in the following section, these factors had impacted strongly on the relationships and actions of key actors within the project, and thereby ultimately, its outcome.

7.2.2 The second dimension of power

As indicated above, the power plays in the Khutsong housing project have confirmed actors’ enduring ability to influence discussible and non-discussible issues in policy arenas. Such influence reflects what can be termed as the blocking power or “non-decision-making” of an actor (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963:41). The dominant values and technical or procedural rules prevent the airing of grievances by a certain group (the powerless). The reason is that the powerful ones intentionally create and reinforce barriers on policy formulation and agreements (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, 1970; Lukes, 2005a). In this process, power is exercised in the following instance:

“A devotes his energies in creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional structures that limit the scope of the political process to public considerations of issues that are comparatively innocuous to A ... To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes from bringing to the fore any issues that might be in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A set of preferences” (Bacharach & Brats, 1962:948; also Lukes, 1974:49).

This has been evident (as was indicated in ch 6) through the actions and inactions of actors in the housing project, which inhibited other actors' preferences from impacting the housing development. The subtle or hidden manifestation of power in its second face was indicated in various forms within the Khutsong housing project. Significant for the present study, is the role of this agenda shaping in steering the Khutsong project, since it highlights one of the factors that has destabilised and curtailed the project, delaying its completion. Non-decisions such as the one mentioned above on relocation, had an unfavourable outcome in the project. This non-decision led community members to interpret the project as merely for city expansion and housing delivery. Such inaction prompted certain beneficiaries to rent out their new houses or their shack, or transferred it to relatives. This resulted in an increasing housing backlog as the informal settlement mushroomed (see ch 6). As indicated previously, this non-decision was motivated by the need to acquire funding for the project and to create investment opportunities. The state as main funder of the project had to interfere with the MCLM's decision to relocate its inhabitants in dole-risky zones. As was indicated, this led to a situation in which the municipality was faced with a continued increase of residents in risky areas. To date, the housing crisis (demand) for the poor in risky areas has not improved.

Other illustrations from chapter 6 of how power dynamics reflected the second face of power, was the issues regarding electrification of the houses, termination of contracts of the contractors, funding and the hand-over debacle. These instances and the nature of power dynamics amongst the actors impeded delivery as the community uninformed of the technical complexity of the project often had to protest against what they perceived to be failures. In this regard the funding and hand-over debacle can be mentioned. The North-West Province (NWP) was not willing to hand over the project to the Gauteng Province (GP). These signified non-decisions of agenda manipulation, which had severe implications for the progress of the project (PSCM, October 2010).

The power play in the hand-over can be explained as follows. To avoid being framed an under-resourced province, the NWP agreed on honouring its obligation to construct the 5 500 housing units, even to the extent of accepting an increase on the individual housing subsidy. To show its power, the NWP dishonoured its agreement of handing over the project to the GP and of accepting the raised housing subsidy. By this subversive strategy, the NWP tactically prevented the airing of views and community engagement on the funding of the 5 500 and on the handover. This is also demonstrated by its intentional avoidance of meetings with the MCLM

and the GP on the handover. In this way, the NWP consciously created barriers towards discussions with other actors on the Khutsong project. Such inaction (as indicated previously) caused major interruptions in the project. This condition was compounded by the GP's failure to budget for the housing project as it had a scapegoat to point out when queried on the funding. As a result, the project, which commenced early in 2003, remained stagnant until approximately 2008 (PSCM, 2008; Interview with officials, 2015). These subtle confrontations and interruptions by actors have clearly contributed to the negative outcome of the project.

Not only was the housing project impeded by the pluralistic decisional and agenda mobilisation. The varying (re)interpretations and (in)actions amongst the actors contributed largely to the delays and ineffectiveness within the project. The following subsections give a comprehensive understanding of the ways these conflicting interpretations and actions contributed to the negative outcomes of the project. This also entails new insight into the nature of power exercises within the context of local development.

7.2.3 The third dimension of power

The decision-making and mobilisation of bias within the Khutsong project is important in order to grasp the power dynamics in the housing project. This also applies to the varying interests and meanings amongst the actors. These mentioned factors in the arena of policy praxis are important components of a more comprehensive conceptualisation of power from a Lukesian perspective. These new manifestations of power dynamics are reflected in the interpretations, actions and inactions of role-players. Lukes (2005a) argues that according to the three-dimensional view of power, the actors are involved in a continuous struggle, in which victory is always certain to the powerful, whilst others become subjects in this relationship. Through this approach Lukes incorporates the decisional method of the pluralists and the elitist notion regarding reinforcement of barriers in agenda setting. In this way, he aims to reframe how power plays occur in development processes. Lukes adds that 'power over' is also noticeable in instances where the powerful successfully inculcate their values and consent in others to the extent that the latter wilfully accept these values and interests as theirs.

Lukes (2005a) identifies various mechanisms that the powerful utilise to promote their interests and ideologies in policy arenas. Of interests to him is the exercise of power over others. However, it should be noted that there are various ways in which power is exercised or created, as expounded briefly by referring to various theorists on power. Following Dahl (1957), power

is created through influencing key policy or decisions; Bachrach and Baratz (1963) focus on mobilisation of bias, Lukes (1974; 2005a; also see Foucault, 1980) notion of knowledge production or construction. Additionally, Haugaard (2003:88) suggests that power can also be established “through Parson’s system consensus on system goals; Luhmann’ trust in system reproduction; Barnes’ reinforcement of knowledge rings of reference; Giddens’ structuration of social action; Clegg’s networks of relationships; Arendt’s concerted action and Weber’s coercions”.

In particular, the present study moves away from Lukes’ abstract conceptualisation of power to a more concrete empirical explication of how power operates at a local level. The aim is to substantiate his third dimension of power as the study findings have indicated that the shaping of preferences, perceptions and thought is not a mere binary domination game. It rather entails an interplay of multi-faceted power games impacting the project’s outcome. The domination in Khutsong is volatile, thus the object of analysis in the study can only be descriptions of the power dynamism.

Lukes (2005a) understands latent conflict as predominant in the exercise of power in the third dimension. To him the operation of power on this dimensional level would have been successful in averting and obliterating any visible struggle, leaving just a potential of conflict which he deems may not realise. He explains it as follows:

“In summary, the three-dimensional view of power involves a thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus of the first two views as too individualistic and allows for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions. This, moreover, can occur in the absence of actual, observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted- though there remains here an implicit reference to potential conflict. This potential, however, may never in fact be actualized” (Lukes, 2005a:28).

Lukes envisages a situation in which actors will only pose latent conflict. This would entail the existing ambiguities between the *subjective* interests of the powerful and the *real* interests of their subordinates. Of importance in the third dimension of power is how the powerful are able to persuade the less powerful to embrace or conspire wilfully against their domination, by adopting the interests of the powerful as their own (Heyward, 2007). It is also this crafty and cunning workings of power by the powerful that shapes subjects’ cognitions, preferences and perceptions, which brings the powerless to accept being dominated.


In this way, Lukes (2005a) focuses on the explicit machinations which the powerful employ to influence the choices and behaviours of their subjects. Actors internalise and get used to the ideals or interests of the powerful to such an extent that they assume these to be their real interests. Contrary to Lukes' view, the present study argues for instances of multi-directional dominance within the third face of power. This study also reinterprets the third face to include instances of overt conflict and active interpretation or communicative action amongst role-players as important in shaping the direction of the flow in power exercises. This moves the focus to the role of agency to shape the nature and orientation of power exercises.

It was found that in the Khutsong housing project, the Lukesian perspective to power is characterised by decision-making (first dimension of power) and non-decisions (second dimension of power). However, the case study presents the multi-directional and volatile, often conflicting, interpretations shaping perceptions, cognitions and preferences of actors (the third dimension of power), which differs from the way Lukes describes it. This justifies the need to reinterpret Lukes' third dimension of power. The following section critically engage the Lukesian third dimension of power with a view to amend its conceptualisation of power dynamics.

7.2.3.1 Domination and resistance

Lukes (2005a:143-144) argues that power in the third dimension entails “the capacity to secure compliance to domination through the shaping of beliefs and desires, by imposing internal constraints under historically changing circumstances”. This presupposes that in all instances in power relationships there is willing compliance from the dominated, seeing that they would have internalised and adopted the values or interests of the powerful. Thus, power flows in a uni-directional way, as Figure 7.1 below indicates.

Figure 7.1: Lukes' third dimension of power



Contrary to Lukes' uni-directional perspective of domination, evidence from the study indicates that the outcome of the Khutsong housing project has largely entailed an interplay of various actors' power configurations. It is clear that from the onset of the project, the powerful (i.e. the municipality) sought to instil its values of a risk-free, hazard-free society by engaging in various community meetings, workshops and distributing leaflets to alert the inhabitants of Khutsong to the detrimental effects of doline hazards on their settlements (Nieuwoudt, 2013). In this regard, MCLM officials sought to shape the preferences of the Khutsong South community getting them to 'buy into' the need for relocating to safer settlements. The internalisation of the need to relocate was supposed to ensure that residents consent to relocation. This motive also guided the promises of the state to ensure safe, adequate housing, and may have helped promote ideals of sustainable settlements accepted by the actors. Moreover, such an internalisation of the dolomite issue consciously aimed to reinforce the need for accessing safe shelter, thus creating an awareness amongst the community members about the necessity to relocate. Stating it differently, the initial shaping of the members' preference for the project was premised on the information of geological instability as well as the democratic promises for adequate shelter for everyone.

From the community's side, perceptions of earlier housing promised in the Freedom Charter and the ANC's manifesto pre-1994 was widely embraced by the Khutsong residents. They perceived the project as largely resulting from the housing need or waiting lists. In this process, the state's interests in promoting access to adequate shelter shaped the cognitions of the Khutsong residents. Therefore, the community members were driven to protest violently against the contractors or municipality when they felt a threat to realising this right (see ch 6). These interpretations and actions had both positive and negative effects on the project. Positively, the shaping of interests in housing meant that the people could fulfil a significant function to monitor and evaluate the project. However, as was pointed out, this led to protests as individuals accepted the intended housing delivery as part of their 'real interests', which they were not willing to see captured by different actors.

Furthermore, the state and the NDMC intentionally managed to shift the focus of the housing project from a reaction to sinkhole hazards to creating sustainable human settlements, thus undermining the MCLM officials' dominance over the project. The state in the new dispensation has been interested throughout to redress the spatial formations of apartheid. The state's aim is to ensure the new settlements have access to adequate forms of shelter close to

areas of economic opportunity through Breaking New Ground (BNG) housing policies (DoH, 2004; Huchzermeyer, 2006; Urban-Econo, 2008; Bradlow, 2011; Bailey, 2011; Tissington, 2011; Ntema, 2011; Sikota, 2015). In the process, the state and local politicians had imparted the ideals of housing need as their influence over the project and thus were able to exercise ‘power over’ other actors.

In the power dynamics, the contradictions between the interests and interpretations of the MCLM, the state, contractors, local politicians and the community members had a bearing on the inactions of the various actors in the project (as indicated in ch 6). In such a context, Lukes argues that power in its third dimension can be operationalised by closely examining the “contradictions between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude”, which relates to “socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed be manifested by individuals’ inaction” (1974:23, 25). Thus, the powerful in Khutsong were unsuccessful in their attempt to pattern the cognitions of the community members and other actors. Seeing that the object and nature of the project was reinterpreted, this made it difficult to enforce a specific agenda.

The present study took into consideration the highly politicised and aggressive activism of Khutsong (Ndaba & Maphumalo, 2005; CDE, 2007; Bishop, 2009; Mazembo, 2011). Contrary to Lukes’ (2005a) view of the third dimension, the Khutsong case study posits an interplay of multiple actors’ interpretations in the reconfiguration of power games, thereby producing multi-directional and dynamic power formations. Lukes presupposes that in power relationships there is an element of willing compliance from the dominated (internalising the values or interests of the powerful). However, the Khutsong case study indicated that power can also involve instances of resistance and insurgency. In this regard, the present study goes beyond dominance and resistance to incorporate the volatile and multi-directional power exercises by different actors in a policy arena.

Lukes (2005a) indicates that in this third dimension, there is no possibility of overt conflict, rather latent conflict as the powerless are indoctrinated by the ideals and interests of the powerful to the extent of consenting to domination. Hegemonic power induces unitary interests and preferences that appear to be the choices of the powerless. However, it is merely the interests of the powerful induced through mechanisms such as information control and social processes like socialisation (Lukes, 2005a:64). On the other hand, as the empirical study of the

Khutsong housing project pointed out: in the third face of power, as is the case in any power relationship, there is a potentiality of resistance.

Foucault says,

“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’ In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault, 1977:194).

Therefore, power produces and creates an individual who can be identified as a subject or an object of subjectification. Yet also power should be seen as not merely imposing constraints or creating passivity, but also as a force that allows the inert construction of change through resistance. As was indicated by findings from the Khutsong case study, power is a contested terrain, a struggle to determine interpretations and outcomes, which can be multiple, conflicting and volatile. Thus, power exercises in Khutsong were found to be highly dynamic. In contexts of local level development the power players are easily identifiable and those who feel dominated are able to identify the instigators and thus react to exercised power. Thus, individual actors either resist or accept the fragmentation of reality through the shaping of their truth domains. As a result, in every power relationship, resistance is an inherent action, waiting for individual activation, as Foucault explains:

“Even when the power relation is completely out of balance, when it can truly be claimed that one side has ‘total power’ over the other, a power can be exercised over the other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing himself, of leaping out the window, or of killing the other person. This means that in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power relations at all” (Foucault, 1997:292).

In this sense, Foucault highlights the lopsided and volatility in power, seeing that there is room for action (contestations) or inaction (acceptance) amongst those subjected to power exercises. Thus, the present study found that in local-level initiatives such as the Khutsong housing project, actors apply varying interpretations to reconfigure the power spaces to multi-directional dynamism. Contrary to Lukes’ who argues for binary relationships, the Khutsong case study demonstrates that through attaching different meanings and interpretations to the housing projects, the actors can challenge power exercises and reconfigure power dynamics.

Lukes (1974; 2005a) overlooks instances in which the so called ‘powerless’ challenge impositions by utilising various mechanisms to reform or reinterpret policy initiatives to their advantage.

This notion is more in line with Foucault, who points out that in the operations regarding discourses of normality or disciplinary power (false consciousness) there is always the possibility of reactions, counter-hegemonic forces and appropriations of power spaces (1982:220). Thus, as indicated in the Khutsong case study, it is clear that in power dynamics every action by a given actor can be reinterpreted and challenged through varying constructions of meanings by various actors. The reason is that unlike Lukes’ uni-directional view, “power is everywhere” (Foucault, 1978:93) and every actor in a power relationship is constituted of power through regimes of truth, which is also challenged or subjectified through negotiations and counter-actions by social actors. Therefore, as was evident of the Khutsong policy spaces, there is room for action and counter-actions in any power play. As the Khutsong case study demonstrated, even the powerless have power, which can only be unleashed in their varying reinterpretations. These different views reconfigure power exercises as being volatile (fluidity), with a dynamic structure and multi-directionality. As an example: to neutralise the other actors’ decisions and actions in the housing project, the community members often resorted to reinterpretations and protests as their power apparatus to destabilise the project. Thus, protests as counteraction can be considered stratagems employed to demonstrate the community members’ power, with which they ‘own’ the project.

In this regard, power exercises are dialectical as it involve domination as well as stratagems of actors to counter the domination (Clegg, 1989; Ewick & Silbey, 2002). The idea of the insidious workings of power to effect a tenable consent, prevents hegemony from being porous and eroded by counter exertions of power (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000). Such exertions entail multi-directional reciprocation by agency (re-)interpretations of power exercises. In this regard, Ewick and Silbey (2002) points out that the arena of policy practice may allow for concerted action in the form of resistance. Hindess (1996:97) argues that hegemonic relationships are often unstable and reversible since they are rampant with struggles for resistance and subversion. Scott (2014:232) states it as follows:

“In every relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a perpetual reversal. At every moment the relationship of power may become a confrontation

between two adversaries...it would not be possible for power relationships to exist without points of insubordination which by definition, are a means of escape.”

This notion resonates with Foucault’s adage, “As soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility for resistance” (Foucault, 1988:83; Heller, 1996:102). For he notes that at the core of every power relationships there is an insubordination aimed at articulating and appropriating the power relations to steer it towards achieving other goals. As was evident in Khutsong, the insubordination of the various actors, particularly that of the community members, made them reinterpret the housing project from different perspectives: entrepreneurial and housing provision. In this sense, they undermined and eroded the dominance of the local politicians and the MCLM. Such reinterpretation has entitled them with power to influence the course of the project. To these actors, the project has become a worthwhile economic asset. Therefore, they are willing to turn it into a terrain for struggle and appropriation in order access these spaces.

Lefebvre (1947) explains that the urban spatial formations are rife with mundane forms of everyday resistance. In the same vein, Scott (1985:290) in his treatise *Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance* argues that the so-called powerless or subordinate are able to counteract the exertions of the powerful through a range of resilient and coordinated forms of resistance such as refusing tax and levies, or to pay rent, in order to bring about transformation in the power relationship. In Khutsong, the actors (esp. community members) also engaged in various forms of covert resistance and visible appropriation as a way to shift the power balance in their favour. Much of the resistance in Khutsong has been through violent protests, which, as participants indicated, have been effective in tilting the power balance to serve their interests.

7.2.3.2 Violence as power?

However, this raises a crucial question: Can violence or protests be interpreted as an exercise of power? According to Arendt (1969), violence is totally “incapable of creating *power* for (power and violence) where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent” (2002:14, author’s own emphasis). According to her view, instances of protests and violent struggle such as those which the Khutsong residents have predicated as means to assert their power, cannot be equated to exercises of *power*. For her, violence is merely a force that is a means to an end.

In contrast, other theorists such as Mann (1986) and Foucault (1980), do characterise violence as a form of power. The mentioned acts of protests in Khutsong’s housing policy arena, could

be considered an exercise of power for, as Hawley (1963:422) points out, “Every social act is an exercise of power, every social relationship is a power equation, and every social group or system is an organization of power.” Thus, the violent protest in Khutsong are significant when searching for motifs of power as community members act in concert and in the process reconfigure the housing project to their advantage.

Such reconfigurations are evident from the various interpretations and (in)actions of the key actors within the Khutsong project, which have largely impacted the process of housing development. As a result, the project has not been largely politicised through tactical obstruction as in the case with the demarcation issue. As will be indicated, there was fecund constructions of meanings and power engagements by several interest groups within the project that impacted on each other. Therefore, the provision of housing has been a contentious issue characterised by both incessant violence and insubordination while actors endeavoured to manipulate the project toward individual gain.

7.2.3.3 Reciprocity, fluidity and power reconfiguration

In Khutsong, the pluralistic nature of the housing project engendered multiple interests and preferences, which opened up spaces for the interplay of various power positions influencing the outcome of the project. In chapter 6, it was indicated that arenas of housing policy praxis are influenced highly by continual interaction amongst a plurality of role-players. Findings from the PSCM (2008-2016) and PPCE (2008-2016) showed that these policy arenas are constituted by different groups, namely the MCLM, provincial and national departments, councillors, contractors, ward committee members, CLO, and community members. This pluralistic composition of the policy process is based on democratisation. This principle implies participatory development in which the affected actors are included in the process of formulating and implementing a project.

This above-mention inclusion is represented in the RDP and BNG housing policy frameworks, which sought to uphold values of people-centred housing development and to foster democratisation (RSA, 1994; Bond, 2000; Ndinda, 2002; DoH, 2004; Tissington, 2010, 2011). Housing development in South Africa is perceived as a collective process, implying that it involves the participation of different interest groups and regimes in the entire policy praxis. Judges (1995) argues that such a plurality is based on democratic values of participation in

which power is seen to be spread amongst the different groups who influence specific policy alternatives.

In such a context, the different groups of actors are perceived as having conflicting (not unitary) interests and preferences (Judges, 1995). Applied to the case study, the various actors in the Khutsong housing process had unique interests or preferences which they strived to realise by their involvement in the project. These conflicting interests are summarised in Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1: Countervailing interests in the Khutsong Settlement Project

Actor(s)	Preferences/objectives	Source(s) of information
MCLM officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk aversion • City integration • Housing provision • Service delivery • Expanding economic opportunities • Poverty reduction 	Interviews with officials (2013; 2015); Nieuwoudt (2013) PSCM (2008-2016) PPCE (2008-2016)
Local politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investments • Housing provision • Expanding Khutsong • Integrated and sustainable human settlements • Voter confidence and popularity/satisfaction • Service delivery • Controlling housing development 	Interviews with Officials (2013; 2015) PSCM (2008-2016) PPCE (2008-2016) Nieuwoudt (2013) Interviewees (13, 24, 2015).
Local Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanding power bases • Campaigning purposes • Popularity • Increasing housing access 	Interview with municipal officials (2015) Interviewees (16, 19 & 2015) PSCM (2008-2016)
Community members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Housing provision • Electricity provision • Employment • Social amenities • Livelihood changes • Investment 	Interview with municipal officials (2013;2015); Interviewees (1, 2, 3, 6, 13, 14 & 15, 2013; 1, 2, 5, 8, 9,12, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29,30, 31, 35 & 37)
Contractors and business people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profit maximisation • Housing development • Reputation building 	Interview with municipal officials (2015) PSCM (2008-2016) PPCE (2008-2016) Interviewees (13, 17, 19, 20)

From table 7.1 above it can be inferred that the spaces regarding Khutsong housing policy expressed varying interests. Notably, housing provision or accessibility were common interests shared by all the relevant actors. For the purposes of this discussion, it is accepted that the differential preferences steering the actors' interpretation of the Khutsong housing development, either restricted or augmented productivity in the project. Chapter 6 indicated how the interpretations and actions of the various actors have contributed to the present state of the project. Since the project was launched in 2003 up to date (2016), only the first phase of the housing project has been completed (5 500 units). The initial phase of the project was supposed to have reached completion in 2012. However, due to various mentioned countervailing forces, the project took longer than expected (PSCM, March 2011; PPCE, May 2016).

The volatile interfacing between the varying interests and the project objectives widely contributed to the delay in the completion of the project. As such, the interplay of incongruent goals and pluralistic interpretations had a severe impact on the outcome of the Khutsong housing project. For instance, the MCLM officials perceived the project from a risk-aversion perspective because for them the urgency was ensuring that the residents are relocated. In contrast, the state and the provincial government perceived it as strategic opportunity for investment and integrated human settlement, thus downplaying the doline risk (Matebezi, 2011; Niewoudt, 2013). As a result, the project was low on the local politicians' agenda. This low priority is also evident in the funding process, which (as pointed out in ch 6) slowed the progress of the project. Findings from the PSCM (December 2013) and the PPCE (December, 2013 & May 2016) show that a total of R100 million was allocated to the housing project yearly, however, the entire project needed approximately R8.5 billion to complete all the phases. Clearly the under-funding also contributed to the negative outcomes. By viewing the project's objective as merely providing integrated sustainable housing, it relaxed the process of establishing a budget or funding for the resettlement.

This relaxation of the process, was also observed in the NWP's deferment of funding. This can be attributed to the perception that this would be a typical housing project. The decision-makers, therefore, did not consider the dolomite crisis as urgent enough do require decisions on the budget for the project. Similarly, it can be inferred that the NWP had interpreted the Khutsong project as an avenue to broaden its power-base, but also for building confidence that they could honour their mandate of service delivery. This dualistic interpretation prompted the

NWP to accept the PSC's increase wilfully, bringing the housing subsidy to R55 570, but which the NWP later failed to honour (PSCM, December 2010; PPCE, December 2010). This stalled the progress on the housing development as the NWP had to provide funding, but operated on the old subsidy, which was not aligned to the MCLM's housing development plans.

Throughout the process, the conflicting interpretations and interests thus impacted negatively on the Khutsong housing project. The contractors considered the project as a mechanism to build their capital. Therefore, as indicated by MCLM officials, the contractors had to construct a raft of foundations in order to claim more payment from the municipality. In certain instances, the contractors would opt for non-performance or halt the construction process, awaiting the yearly subsidy increases. The contractors understood the project in terms of, private interests (profit accumulation), an individualised perspective which clearly contributed to the derailing of the housing development. Inevitably, this led to the construction of poor quality housing units as contractors tried to maximise gains from the allocations they received from the municipality. This casts suspicion on the allocation of state funds for the construction of low-cost housing structures. The reason is that housing developers typically begin to procure and utilise undergrade materials in a bid to cut costs.

Furthermore, as indicated, the local politicians downplayed the significance of the doline issue, which caused conflicting and confused interpretations about the project amongst the community members. Most of the members of the Khutsong Extension 1, 2 & 3 came from the informal settlement. Thus, they considered the Khutsong housing project from the angle of their right to be provided adequate shelter, as stipulated in the Constitution under Section 26(1). As a result, community members perceived the project as addressing the housing backlog or basic needs, a problem inherited from the apartheid government. The findings thus clearly show that inhabitants were mostly interested in realising their perceived constitutional right to access adequate shelter.

Tomlinson (1998:142) points out that in South Africa the ruling party made promises to the electorate that, once in power, they would provide RDP houses to the poor. This also resonated in the development and democratic aspirations of the Freedom Charter in which adequate safe and secure housing provision "for all" was envisioned as a goal for the new dispensation in South Africa (Kearis *et al.*, 1997). The community members were not only interested in adequate shelter but also in an ingratiated feeling of citizenship and inclusion in Khutsong and largely in South Africa. It was found that the interviewees understood the Khutsong housing

project as a means to legitimise their citizenship and advance democratisation. They, therefore, felt justified to benefit from the current housing-provision policies. The reason is clear: the previous dispensation had deprived them of access to adequate shelter and thus relegated them to the peripheries of the urban spatial formations (see ch 6). Therefore, most of the respondents were willing to move to the new Khutsong settlement regardless of the doline risks. The location of the new settlement presented most community members with opportunities they could not find easily in their former settlements. This finding is in line with Khan (2003), Kellet and Moore (2008), Burgoyne (2008) and Luyenge (2011), who indicate that providing shelter to the poor citizens instils a sense of belonging (inclusion), security and legitimation (citizenship) within a given locale.

Furthermore, it can be noted that some members viewed the housing project objectively as an opportunistic way forward to increase their livelihood. A number of Khutsong stakeholders' involvement was underlined by their inherent opportunistic interpretation of the project. Some community members working for the construction companies, vandalised the structures to acquire income for their families since they as breadwinners were seldom paid in time (PSCM, 2008-2016). In a sense, the workers' vandalising of the housing units suggests overheated perceptions, which also undermined the progress of the project. The effect was that certain houses could not be occupied as the material was missing (doors, taps, metres, windows, etc.). This also led to community strikes, which further destabilised the project (PSCM, 2013; 2015).


Moreover, as was indicated, other beneficiaries of the RDP houses found ways to increase their income base by renting out the new housing units to family members who were also enticed to put their names on the housing lists. Thus, progress in the project has been stalled by continually expanding informal settlements. This was partly because some beneficiaries opted to remain in the shacks while renting out their RDP houses. Or they transferred their shacks to family members who took advantage of the housing need and also placed their names on the list for future housing.

It is clear from the discussion above that the Khutsong housing project has largely been redefined by conflicting constructions of meaning as attached by the various actors. Evidently, an interplay of multifaceted interpretations shape preferences, cognitions and actions of role-players within the project. Actors' relative accounts or narratives of meaning (interpretations) led to crafty manipulations of the project as all the role-players sought to benefit from the housing development process. These relativised interpretations of the project by the actors

provide a better understanding of how such conflicting interests can shape the direction of power in programmes of development policies.

Lukes (2005a:50) indicates that when studying power there is need to “examine how people react to opportunities – or more precisely perceived opportunities – when these occur, to escape from subordinate positions in hierarchical systems”. The Khutsong case presents the dynamism in power relationships, seeing that multiple actors have interpreted and acted on opportunistic spaces in the housing project, thereby negating uni-directional domination by small powerful groups. The housing project spaces are thus reconfigured to allow the interplay of all actors. Contrary to Lukes’ view of the third dimension, the housing project presents a transformational shift in the patterning of configurations in local power dynamics. This dynamism is depicted in Figure 7.2 below.

Figure 7.2: The third dimension in the case study



It was found that the varying and opportunistic interpretations amongst actors in the Khutsong housing project contributed to the volatile interrelations and dynamisms in power positions amongst actors. In Khutsong, as noted previously, the outcome of the project is not mostly the result of domination but more of the input from different role-players’ interpretations of the

entire process. In Figure 7.2 above, “Interpretation” refers also to Lukes’ design of perceptions, cognitions and preferences. The ability of actors to influence other’s “interpretations” is, therefore, multi-directional, and dynamic. Lukes (2005a:143-144) indicates that power in its third dimension means imposing internal constraints so that actor B consents to being dominated by actor A. In contrast, the Khutsong housing project indicates that actors in power dynamics, through varying interpretations, are able to shape these “interpretations” in such a way that there is no uni-directional dominance, but more of a dynamic and multi-directional power exercise.

Thus, as was indicated previously, the Lukesian third dimension of power over-emphasises asymmetric and binary power relationships. In this regard it fails to explain instances where different actors’ actions and interpretations can shape interpretations leading to the reconfiguration of power towards more dynamic and multi-directional positive-sum relations. Against this background, the following section formulates an analytical framework to help understand the multi-directional configuration of power exercises in development projects on local level.

7.4 Towards an analytical framework for power at local level

The focus was on the power plays amongst the different key actors in the project and their interpretations of the entire process. This clearly shows the need for a broadened understanding and illumination of Lukes’ third dimension of power. According to Lukes’ design, power in this dimension is exercised *over* others who are expected to accept and understand their subordination wilfully. Lukes proposed his view regarding the third dimension of power as corrective on the deficiencies within Dahl’s decisional approach and Bachrach and Baratz’s construct of agenda shaping. Lukes criticised these two perspective for over-concentrating on behaviour. In his theory, he incorporates the mechanisms in which “potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions” (Lukes, 2005a:28).

As was indicated, Lukes views power also as exercised in instances where conflict is pacified or not actualised. Thus, power can also produce latent conflict, as there will be asymmetries and contradictions between the real interests of the powerful and those whom they dominate (Lukes, 1974:25). The third dimension of power allows for the manipulation of actors without any visible conflict, by shaping the interpretations of the dominated parties. However, this

raises the question: Is this the case in all situations of power exercises? The Khutsong case study clearly indicated that the powerless do not necessarily accept dominance or subjectification passively. They rather actively interpret the social dynamics, which lead to a more volatile and multi-directional flow of power in the project under discussion.

To elucidate, it must be remembered that South African citizens embrace a democratic ethos, which allows different individuals to operate within the sphere of equality. Thus, the issue of the housing project has been replete with notions of democracy, freedom and rights. This state of affairs is evident through the following broad remarks by interviewees that Khutsong is part of the democratic South Africa and that they have the right to participate in the housing project, which also implied that they may hold those in power accountable. Even the municipal officials made it clear that the community members were more active as key holders and also by demanding accountability in the housing process. Such active engagement by actors, whom Lukes would have deemed powerless, can be predicated on their interpretation of the political context (democracy). In Khutsong, the notion of democracy became radicalised to the extent that actors could not accept domination which aim to shape their preferences, perceptions and thoughts anymore. This reinterpretation led to a more volatile power situation. This is illustrated in the varying interpretations amongst the actors as noted in chapter 6. These findings show that actors in the Khutsong project have actively reinterpreted the housing process, regardless of the powerful one's attempts to inculcate and impart their own model of values and interests for the project.

Lukes (2005a) emphasises instances in which the powerful successfully manage to avert conflict by manipulating the powerless into accepting dominance. However, as was indicated, previously, the actors in Khutsong's policy praxis, based on their active interpretations and engagement, reciprocated with modalities of power that resisted the powerful. In this regard, the findings from the present study have indicated that the powerless ones in Khutsong resisted the working of power by attributing differing meanings to the project, which also controlled the outcome of the project.

Paramount in reaching consent or wilful dominance, for Lukes (1974; 2005a), is the ability of actors to influence other's perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things (*status quo*). According to him, this occurs in a situation of multiple interests where the powerful impose internal constraints on the actions of

the powerless. This fosters unitary subjective interests, or what has been termed “false consciousness” or hegemony (Marx & Engels, 1997; Gramsci, 1971).

Regarding hegemony, Lukes (1974; 2005a) points out that the powerful endeavour to dominate the discourse and the ideologies of discursive construction (creating its own social reality) in the society. This implies tactically forcing the powerless to succumb to domination by accepting the status quo. In this sense, hegemonic power obstructs the formation of visible conflict as it cunningly shapes cognition towards consensus on what are deemed ‘real interests’ (subjective interests). Lukes elucidates, “Opposed to what would benefit them and to fail to want what they would, but for such power, recognize to be in their real interests” (Lukes, 2005a:64). The hegemonic power induces people (powerless) to embrace choices of others (powerful) as theirs. However, the question remains: Can the powerful effectively shape the cognitions of their subordinates to the extent that the latter merely concede to domination? This notion is critiqued below by referring to the findings of the case study.

The findings have shown how the different actors have interpreted the Khutsong project by deviating from the dominant discourse on doline risk to an individualised understanding of the process. The various actors’ understandings can be summarised as follows:

- The MCLM officials understood it initially objectively as risk aversion and later reinterpreted it as a settlement project.
- The local politicians, in order to maintain their domineering influence, undermined the position of the MCLM officials and reinterpreted the project as a stratagem to deliver housing and expanding voter confidence.
- The contractors reduced it to a profiteering opportunity.
- The community members reinterpreted it mostly from the angle of housing provision and an entrepreneurial opportunity.

It is noticeable how the conflicting meanings the actors attached to the project affected its outcome, making the process more volatile and steered in various directions. This makes it clear that there is a limit to preference shaping in societal or development praxis.

An over-emphasis on hegemonic power limits the role of agency in social construction. The findings of the present study show that regardless of the MCLM’s initial idea that the project was based strongly on risk aversion, several competing discourses creating their own reality, meant that the project was reinterpreted by different actors. As a result, actors had to reconstruct

their understanding of the project from the dominant discourse of dolomite risk. This reconstruction also contributed to instances of subjectification, or power exercises that steered the discourse in different directions. Justification of subjectification is made void through agency. For Lukes (1974; 2005a), agency is important in his conceptualisation of power, as he explains:

“To use the vocabulary of power in the context of social relationships is to speak of human agents, separately or together, in groups or organizations, through action or inaction, significantly affecting the thoughts or actions of others (specifically, in a manner contrary to their interests). In speaking thus, one assumes that, although agents operate within structurally determined limits, they nonetheless have a certain relative autonomy and could have acted differently. The future, though it is not entirely open, is not entirely closed either (and, indeed, the degree of its openness is itself structurally determined). In short, within a system characterized by total structural determinism, there would be no place for power” (Lukes, 2005a:56).

This statement must be understood in terms of his overall approach to dominance, which the present study critiqued as lacking empirical analytical force. The exercise of power is largely influenced by agency. Lukes refers to agents’ relative autonomy, which implies that to a certain extent, they have the power to interpret social dynamics from their own perspective. This aligns well with how the different actors in Khutsong have managed to attribute their meanings to the housing project. Therefore, it is not only the dominant or powerful such as the state and the MCLM who have the ability to define and construct reality. The powerless such as the community members, can also define development processes at local level.

The above-mentioned reinterpretation is made possible mostly alike what Habermas (1984; 1987) terms “communicative action”. For Habermas (1984) it is through democracy and its ambit of unconstrained discursivities that people engage in communicative or rationalised construction and reconstruction of meanings. According to Habermas (1984:10), this reinterpretation occurs when unconstrained individuals engage in deliberations to validate different societal claims. Such deliberations are largely permissible when “the structure of communication itself produces no constraints if and only if, for all possible participants, there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to choose and to apply speech-acts” (Thompson & Held 1982:123).

The unconstrained nature of engagements by individuals in democratic contexts is viewed in this study as a mere precondition for the conflicting interpretations embraced by the Khutsong actors. Contrary to Habermas' view, the present study argues that these varying and conflicting interpretations by actors in unconstrained contexts shifted and reconfigured power positions in Khutsong to be more dynamic and multi-directional. The Khutsong case study reveals that agency in a democratic context should not be reduced to passive recipients of ideological hegemony but rather as active agents with the ability to construct rationally and attach meanings to societal issues, as the actors in the housing project have done.

Instances of binary power relationships have been undermined by more violent and incessant pluralistic contestations amongst actors. The volatile and violent behaviour of actors, which is supposed to be overtly noticeable in the first and second dimensions of power, do only become apparent in the third dimension of power as actors struggle to control the project by opportunistically occupying spaces. The findings indicate that in the third dimension, power plays in the Khutsong housing process are not aligned with the Lukesian binary and asymmetric relations, which generate false consciousness and consent. Instead, actors in Khutsong have often dissented through mechanisms such as violent protests, sit-ins, burglaries, and strikes. Lukes (2005a) maintains that potential conflict in this third dimension is constrained through the ideological hegemonic counter-warfare by the powerful. However, in Khutsong, the actors, particularly the community members, have challenged the production of passivity and quiescence by interpretive reconstruction of their own realities, and by violent actions.

For Sharp (1973:12), power exercises are only possible through the wilful consenting of the subject to the powerful ones. In this regard, the exercise of the third dimension of power by the MCLM officials hinged on the civil obedience and cooperation of the community members. However, these members have revolted often in many instances in the new dispensation. Notably between 2005-2009 they protested violently against being demarcated as part of the NWP, which they interpreted as a move towards impoverishment (Interviews with officials, 2013; 2015; Ndaba & Maphumalo, 2005; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; CDE, 2007; Philp, 2009; Bishop, 2009; Kirshner & Phokela, 2010, Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Mazembo, 2011, 2012). In response, they burnt down libraries, houses, barricaded roads and destroyed large amounts of infrastructure, and even avoided co-residents from voting in order to outmanoeuvre the government into reversing its demarcation decision.

This makes it clear that the culture of protests in Khutsong began as a way to address social problems by the vulnerable and powerless, but later became ingrained social behaviour and mechanisms to challenge the exercising of power. Although there may not have been a direct relationship between the demarcation debacle and the housing project, some of the interviewees perceived that the government was trying to promote quiescence through the Khutsong settlement project. The national politicians did not manage to exercise their influence over the Khutsong residents by getting them to accept the demarcation decision through manipulations of housing development. Instead, as argued previously, the community protested violently for more than four years. From the reinterpretation amongst each other they perceived that the NWP would be unable to honour its obligation to build them the desired housing units since this province did not have the financial resources. These protests ended in 2010 when the local politicians realised that the community was not consenting to its schemas of manipulation, and eventually reviewed its demarcation decision.

These mentioned action and the community's active interpretation of the demarcation issue leading to a resounding victory, has transfigured the nature of power dynamics in Khutsong. Violent protest, struggles and strikes have become a strategy employed by the community to increase their command over given interests. This is illustrated when some of the community members stated the only modus operandi when urgency is needed is through violent strikes and protests. The majority of interviewees indicated that violent protest action is their only way to demonstrate their power or influence in community issues. Violent protests have become a mechanism the community members employ regularly when they perceive the municipality is underperforming or engaging in non-decisions.

Thus, strikes and protests have become another avenue for understanding power shifts amongst actors in the Khutsong housing project. In this regard, Lukes asserts that "the powerful are the ones we can judge or hold to be responsible for significant outcomes ... to the extent that they fail to address remediable problems" (Lukes, 2005a:66-67; Heyward & Ryan, 2012:10). Applied to the case study, the powerful such as the MCLM and local politicians were able to make important social changes but chose not to do so (in-action). However, Lukes does not argue further and postulates what happens when the powerful are indeed blamed or if blaming them does reconfigure the power exercises, as was shown in the case of Khutsong.

Contrary to Lukes' view, the key actors' interpretations of the housing project presented modalities in which power becomes productive and a positive sum for all the actors. This can be explicated as follows:

- The national politicians exploited the shift from relocation based on risk aversion to merely an integrated human settlement project, as a way to achieve political legitimacy and popularity.
- The MCLM officials embraced and advanced the same reinterpretation towards settlements, to reinforce their dominance.
- The contractors' intentional focus on the housing settlements was to accumulate capital.
- The community members intentionally interpreted and acted in favour of the project as an entrepreneurial opportunity.

Lukes' over-emphasis on binary relationships did not take into account contexts such as Khutsong. In this case, the shaping of cognitions and preferences by the powerful is rationally and discursively interpreted through the various perspectives of actors who manipulate the attempts at domineering to their advantage.

The findings of the present study have highlighted the need to shift the understanding of power exercises in the third dimension from simple unimodal binary relationships, to multi-directional exercises of power. It is clear that the influence of the interpretations and (in) actions in Khutsong cannot be explained through Lukes' unidirectional model.

Thus, contrary to Lukes (1974) who argues that power can be exercised between two actors, where A has power and B does not, the findings have indicated that "power may sometimes favour, or at least not disfavour, the interests of those who are subject to it" (Lukes, 2005a:84). Regardless of the constraining power (dominance), Lukes conceded that power can be positive sum. He elaborates that there are "manifold ways in which power over others can be productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity" (Lukes, 2005a:109). However, Lukes (2005a) limits his discussion to uni-directional domination, or 'power over', which involves the exercise of power in environments or contexts of contradictory interests. Clegg (1989) indicates that although Lukes may have considered the productive and transformative nature of power, he still recedes to a design of unidirectional and binary formations of power.

The Khutsong housing project presents a more elaborate understanding of power in which various actors assume or exercise power through their agency and structural forces. Following

Giddens (1979; 1982) in his structuration theory, social systems or structures enable or constrain agency whilst agency often draw from their mundane practices and interpretations or strategies to achieve interests over the structures. This resonates with Lukes' statement:

“Social life can only properly be understood as an interplay of power and structure, a web of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and structured, to make choices and pursue strategies within given limits, which in consequence expand and contract over time” (2005a:68-69).

Evidence from the Khutsong scenario suggests that community members were willing to use structures as referential points (democratic systems, right to participation, etc.) when interpreting the project. Conversely, actors such as the MCLM officials were to a large extent constrained in their actions due to the political and economic structural arrangements of South African society. The actions of the various actors were thus impinged by structural systems. However, as noted in the analytical schema, power exercises are also influenced by the availability of resources and the perception of owning these resources.

Furthermore, Lukes' (2005a) envisages that power in the third dimension successfully manages to shape the cognition and preferences of the subordinates and induces wilful compliance. In contrast, the present study has revealed that such exercises of power can only be successful through consent. This implies that power relationships are influenced by the consent of the subordinates. For example, in Khutsong the MCLM's domination was undermined by local politicians who were unwilling to accept the project as a relocation, but rather a resettlement. From their side, the community members intentionally did not consent to the idea that the project was as a result of the geological instability of Khutsong South. They rather reinterpreted it as a social project of housing delivery. As a result, some of them contextualised the housing project and thereby attached entrepreneurial meanings to it.

Drawing from the exposition above, it can be argued that these reinterpretations by the community had a huge impact on the power dynamics within the project. The community members began to further their own interests such as income generation and shelter provision. They even utilised violent protests as counter-hegemonic strategies which were notably influential in undermining the dominance of officials and the agenda of local politicians. Power in this sense is intertwined as explained below:

- The officials could not challenge the interpretations of the local politicians and community since it would compromise the power base of the politicians.
- The MCLM officials attempted to induce willing compliance in other actors by emphasising the riskiness of Khutsong South and the dire need of a relocation. However, they did not succeed as other actors had differing interpretations, which led to a reinterpretation of the project as being a settlement.
- The contractors underlined the multi-directionality by interpreting the project from the perspective of financial gain. Thus they delayed the completion of the construction and produced shoddy structures, which ultimately undermined the power of the local politicians and the officials.
- The community members believed that the contractors were intentionally constructing poor units, underpaying their employees and delaying the realisation of their right to shelter, which prompted several strikes (e.g. 3 May, 2 August 2012).

As seen from this brief outline, the Khutsong case study is a striking example of power shifts and multi-directionality in power relationships.

As stated previously, power also means ascribing accountability to the powerful. The Khutsong case study clearly shows that in the socio-economic and local development policy praxis it is difficult to argue that a single role-player is able to dominate the entire process. The question of *Who dominates who?* Can be answered as: *Simply everyone but it depends!* As the pluralistic context of Khutsong has revealed, domination is dynamic and fluid. The reason is that it can be exercised by different interest groups since all actors, through diverse interpretations, strive for dominance in the power play. This is in line with the assertion of Nietzsche *et al.* (1968) that the wish for power pervades all aspects of human behaviour and “we need to see all life, not just human life, as united by a common striving for power” (Sprinks, 2003:134). In this regard, in Khutsong, the role-players amongst themselves, contractors, officials, local politicians and community members, all engaged in an interplay of differential strategies of domination. Thus, the Khutsong case study corroborates Bentley and Murphy’s (2006:294) critique of Lukes that he overlooks instances where power is multiplayer and intertwined. On the notion of the mechanisms which the powerless utilise to move from *dupes* (or subjects) to *dominators* (powerful), the present study has indicated that active engagement and reinterpretations are the antecedents to power shifts and to realise true consciousness amongst actors.

This study also reformulated the third face of power to include instances of overt conflict and active interpretation or communicative action amongst actors. This dynamic is important in shaping the volatile and multi-directional direction of power exercises. Thus, the focus is anew on the active role of agency to shape the nature and orientation of power exercises.

To recap: In the Khutsong housing project, the Lukesian perspective to power is characterised by decision-making (first dimension of power), and non-decisions (second dimension of power). However, the multi-directional and fluid interpretations shaping the perceptions, cognitions and preferences of actors (the third dimension of power) in the case study differ from Lukes' description. This justifies reinterpreting Lukes' third dimension of power. Figure 7.3 below presents an analytical schema of power exercises within Lukes' third dimension as expanded by the present study.

Figure 7.3: A reinterpretation of the third dimension of power




Figure 7.3 above indicates that power exercises in local development contexts are largely predicated on the interpretations and actions of various key role-players occupying spaces within a given time. The third dimension of power is not necessarily one-directional, closed or implies domination. Where certain assumptions are met, the third dimension of power or attempts to create hegemony, remain contested and unsettled. It remains a struggle in interpretation, cognitions, meanings, labelling, perceptions, who is to blame, what is the cause and preferences – a continual process running over time.

Where action is taken on this loosely defined and fluid interpretative environment, this action again influences the role-players and their interpretations, thus the situation remains dynamic. As a result, the actors' interpretations of development processes are a function of the environment or context in which they find themselves. To capture this notion best, the study utilises two main assumptions. These assumptions are considered as integral in the reformulation of power games to incorporate the influence of varying interests, leading to a volatile, multi-directional flow of power in contexts of local development.

Assumption 1: *Radical internalised democracy*

The findings of the study showed that abstract theorising of power does not apply to a type of local-level context where actors are able to identify more easily those who assume power or want to impact their interests. It was argued that South Africans, particularly the residents of Khutsong, are well knowledgeable of the democratic political dispensation in which they live. This prior knowledge has shaped actors' cognitions that guide their behaviours and actions in the housing project. In Khutsong, democracy became radicalised to the extent that actors could not accept domination attempting to shape their preferences, perceptions and thoughts anymore, thus leading to a more volatile power situation.

Nabers (2010) points out that contestations and struggles are inherent features of democratic contexts. These forms of activist conduct, activated by unconstrained communication, is promoted through a democratic ethos. Thus, acts of violence are considered legitimised behaviour in radical democratic spaces. In the same vein, as noted by Holston (2008), in South Africa claims and perceptions of entitlement over housing as a basic necessity have led to 'insurgent citizenship'. Actors who feel undermined and fail to benefit from housing policy processes engage in violent protests and aggressive litigations. As was indicated, in a radicalised democracy there is a multi-faceted interplay of actors with diverse interests. Through their differing interpretations these actors may reconfigure power plays in such a development context. Therefore, an empirical analysis of local of power exercises cannot be based entirely on abstract theories.

The present study found that the powerful ones' hegemonic influences in radicalised democratic spaces at a local level will not reproduce wilful acceptance of subjective interests. Lukes, as is the case with the majority of theorists on power, has been preoccupied with the question whether dominance is legitimatised or accepted. This is noticeable from the following exposition by Clegg and Haugaard:

“In Lukes, actors consider power legitimate because they do not know what their real interests are. In Foucault they consider their objectification as subjects as legitimate because it is derived from some locally perceived concept of truth. In Gramsci, the subaltern classes accept bourgeois domination because they have internalized the latter's interpretative horizon and in Bourdieu, symbolic violence makes people 'misrecognize' reality. In all these versions of power

and domination actors view social relations as legitimate due to some kind of cognitive shortcoming” (2009:420).

These are highly abstracted conceptualisations of power which are deficient (as indicated throughout the study) to explain dynamic power relationships involving multiple actors. It is argued that in democratic (radical) spaces, actors actively reinterpret and attach meanings to processes of development policy, which can lead to shifts in power configurations. Agency allows actors to exercise their rational choice in their differing interpretations and actions in Khutsong. Thus, it must be stressed: power is not intrinsic to its wielders but is predicated on the consent of the subordinates. Sharp (1973:12) notes that any powerful person’s power or its exercise “depends intimately upon the obedience and cooperation of the subjects”. Therefore, subjectification is hinged entirely on the wilful acquiescence of the powerless. However, such passive consent is extremely difficult to induce in a radicalised democracy were actors are able to reinterpret actively and violently counter act any power exercises and bend it to their benefit.

Assumption 2: *Local level with role-players identifiable*

The varying interpretations and multi-directional power exercises discussed in this chapter is noticeable in development processes at local level where actors continually interact and are able to identify each other. Khutsong, as noted in the study, is a highly-politicised community noted for its violence and protests against the powerful. Since, the demarcation debacle there has been increased concerted actions and actors’ engagements in Khutsong. Their reinterpretation of the power play enabled actors to identify those who have influence over them. Therefore, since the issue of demarcation, Khutsong’s inhabitants were able to ply social processes to their advantage by violent exercises that challenged the power of the visible powerful actors. Thus, in development contexts at local level, as in the present case study, power players are easily identifiable and those who feel dominated are able to identify the instigators, reinterpret their course of actions and strategically react against such power exercises.

In light of the above, the fragmentation of reality by shaping domains of truth can either be resisted or accepted by individual actors. Thereby, local power dynamics can be actualised into potential for resistance by different actors who would have interpreted these spaces to their own advantage. This implies that power relationships in contexts of local development are fluid and permeable through active reengagements and interpretations by multiple actors. This

implies a shift from binary power relationships towards the more dynamic and multi-directional power exercises, which are argued for in the present study.

The empirical examination has contributed to an understanding of how the abstract third dimensional view can be attested as not highly uni-directional as Lukes presupposed. The third power dimension rather involves a more volatile and dynamic, multifaceted shaping of the interpretations by different actors in local processes of development policies. The findings showed multiple interpretations and actions to realise varying individualised group interests. In this regard, the analysis of power exercises amongst actors in the Khutsong housing project have expanded the asymmetrical and binary configurations of power in the Lukesian perspective. The aim was to incorporate more fluid, dynamic and multi-directional power shifts. These power shifts were emanated largely from the varying interpretations and meanings that different actors attached to the Khutsong project. Thus, it was found that through the differing interpretations and active engagements by actors in the Khutsong case study, power has shifted from binary relationships to multi-directionality.

7.5 Conclusion

Power is a contested terrain rife with actions amongst actors in a bid to influence its configurations towards achieving individualised interests. The struggle amongst actors in the Khutsong context focused mainly on the reinterpretations and determinations of preferential policy outcomes. Contrary to Lukes' understanding of power, evidence from Khutsong has presented a broadening of the third dimension of power. Through agency's active interpretation of its context, this third dimension can incorporate instances of multi-directional and dynamic power exercises. This reformulation of the third dimension of power was found to be predicated on the two above-mentioned assumptions, namely the presence of a more *radicalised democratic context* and a development process at local level *with more identifiable actors*.

From the findings of the study, it has been indicated how the different actors have interpreted the Khutsong settlement project deviating from the dominant discourse on doline risk, to an individualised understanding of the process.

It was noted how radical democratic spaces promote unconstrained actions and reinterpretations of development processes, which largely influenced the housing project's outcomes. Furthermore, the localised nature of the Khutsong scenario allows for continued interactions amongst actors. In due time, these actors are able to identify the instigators of the

challenges they have been encountering. This will enable actors to resist and reinterpret the socio-economic and political praxis actively to their advantage. As indicated, this makes the power relations more fluid and reconfigure it as instances of multiplayer and multi-directional power exercises.

Thus, the present study contributed to the shift from abstract conceptualisations of power by offering an empirical study that reformulated Lukes' third dimension successfully. This has broadened the understanding of how power over can translate into a positive-sum relationship and even a win-win relationship amongst different actors. It was indicated that every power relationship or dominance is entrenched with possibilities of resistance, which can only be accentuated when actors have reinterpreted their subordination as an obstruction to achieving their varying interests and preferences. The actors in the Khutsong context, as in any power relationship, were concerned with capturing or benefitting from the process, which explains how the housing process was prolonged and destabilised, thus preventing it from achieving its set goals within specified time.

Of importance is how the powerless are able to resist and transform themselves from being passive and consenting objects in housing power relationships to exercising influence over other actors. This is due to the differing interests and interpretations, which actors inertly have and only become operational through their active engagements and reinterpretations of social processes.

The following chapter (ch 8) will present a summary of the study's findings, in relation to practice and theory, and offer recommendations for future studies.

Chapter 8: Conclusions and recommendations

8.1 Introduction

This chapter offers a brief summary of the present study's major findings on key issues or objectives of the study. Thereafter, it makes recommendations for both the theory and practice of housing and power dynamics. In particular, the recommendations focus on stratagems that can be implemented to help make housing development processes more effective. This chapter also summarises the thesis of the study on how actors' conflictual interpretations, actions and inactions have contributed to the shoddy, disjointed nature of the constructions as well as the low productivity of the Khutsong housing project. Multi-directional and dynamic power plays amongst the different actors was found to introduce fluid constructions of meanings, which have strongly shaped the direction and outcome of the project.

In this regard, the study argued for a reinterpretation of the Lukesian third dimension of power to include instances in which power shifts occur amongst multiple actors to counter shaping of preferences and perceptions. Such power shifts move beyond the widely accepted binary formations in power theories to more intertwined and multiplayer exercises of power. Thus this chapter presents the core argument and contribution of the study in the context of understanding power shifts amongst actors.

Thus, the focus will be on the findings as presented in chapter 6, which confirmed the presence of power exercises within Lukes' third dimension of power, amongst the key actors. In this regard, the chapter focuses briefly on the major actors in the Khutsong housing project and indicates how power plays and conflicting interpretations amongst actors influenced the outcome of the project. This is followed by a summary of the core arguments presented in chapter 7 on reciprocation, dynamism, fluidity and multi-directional power plays. Furthermore, as argued previously, to understand the nature of power dynamics in the Khutsong project, the researcher formulated a framework for the reinterpretation of Lukes' third dimension of power. This dimension is expanded to include contexts and instances in which the cunning operations of hegemonic power is challenged by differing interpretations and multi-directional shifts of dominance. The chapter will also point out the limitations of the study.

8.2 Background and research questions

In Chapter 1, the main objective of the study was stated, namely to develop a deeper understanding of how power relationships amongst actors displayed in their differing interpretations, actions and inactions, have contributed to the outcomes of the Khutsong project. Furthermore, the study investigated how the Lukesian framework could be utilised the best to help understand and examine the power exercises within the Khutsong housing project. The aim was to assess and reinterpret Lukes' third dimension of power in line with the nature of power dynamics that manifested amongst actors in the Khutsong housing project. Thus the research sought to use the conflictual interpretations and expectations amongst actors as theoretical basis to expand the uni-directional power perspective of Lukes. This delivered a more nuanced approach that also took account of multi-directional and fluid power relationships amongst key interest groups in localised spaces of development policy.

The main problem that the research sought to address was:

Determine how, in the major Khutsong housing project, role-players engage with socio-political power dynamics, and thereby influence the outcome of the project.

In this regard, the study sought to contribute to knowledge on how power dynamics impacts local development projects such as housing. It was noted that the outcome of the project differs completely from the initially expected, or well-founded understanding of the project by the various actors. In this light, the thesis investigated empirically how power plays amongst actors through differing interpretations and expectations, reshaped the outcome of the Khutsong project beyond what the initial main actors had perceived or conceptualised as the main goal. To reach the mentioned aim, the following objectives were formulated to guide the study:

1. To analyse the current sociological theories on power dynamics in human relations.
2. To analyse applicable urban political theories.
3. To examine the approaches in provision of housing specifically related to the case study.
4. To critically analyse and examine the power relationships and dynamics amongst the role players within the Khutsong housing project and how that impact on the outcome of the housing project.

5. To present an analytical framework for the understanding of power dynamics related to local projects.
6. To make conclusions and also suggest recommendations on power dynamics amongst key role players in housing provision systems.

These objectives directed the nature of the epistemological and ontological orientations that were followed in the study. To achieve these objectives, the researcher employed an interpretivist approach through a case-study design of Khutsong. For this research, the participants were purposively selected (typical and snowball) and data was gathered through in-depth structured interviews, focus groups, document reviews and observations. The following section presents the main findings of the study.

8.3 Main findings of the study

On the question, “Who dominates whom in Khutsong?” Lukes (2005a) would have indicated that it is the powerful actors through their ability to shape the cognitions, preferences and perceptions of the powerless so that they wilfully consent to being dominated. However, evidence from the findings (chs 6 and 7) indicated pluralistic and radicalised contexts of Khutsong’s different actors. It was found that their conflicting interpretations and diverse expectations influenced their actions or inactions in the praxis of housing policies. This caused the power relations to be fluid, dynamic and multi-directional. Such an occurrence is contrary to Lukes (2005a), who indicated that power exercises are uni-directional and negative-sum.

The present study has rather argued for a broader understanding of the insidious operationalisation of the third dimension of power that induce compliance in the powerless. This dimension was applied to more volatile and dynamic power relations, which are shaped mostly by multiple interest groups’ reinterpretations of the localised development policy processes. This dynamism has been depicted in Figure 7.2: the exercises of third-dimensional power in pluralistic and contested spaces such as housing development initiatives. The study posited that the third dimension of power is not necessarily closed as envisaged by Lukes (1974; 2005a). Rather it is permeable to varying interpretations by actors, which counteracts the hegemonic strategies by the powerful to induce compliance amongst the subjects (conscious or unconscious).

The study has established that the third dimension of power can include instances of fluidity, dynamisms and multi-directional power exercises only when two assumptions are met:

- It requires the presence of a radically *internalised democracy*.
- Power has to occur in *local-level context* where role-players are identifiable (See Fig. 7.3).

The study revealed that the internalisations and radicalisation of democratic ethos pervades most spaces of local development in South Africa, as in Khutsong. In this context, actors have internalised contestations over rights and entitlements as part of acceptable behaviour in unconstrained socio-economic and political arenas. Thus, as was argued, the actors, particularly the community members, have dissented from being dominated by other actors whom they feel are impeding the realisation of their collective and diverse interests.

Radicalised democracy, as evidenced from the Khutsong case study, has often been synonymous with protracted and incessant violence by actors who have interpreted such actions as tactical power play. They employ insurgence as a stratagem forcing the dominant ones to accede to promoting the realisation of community members' interests. Therefore, the study has argued that the internalisation of radicalised democracy has prompted the rise in the culture of violent protests as actors signify their exercise of power through active conflict and insurgence.

Furthermore, the localised nature of development policy processes makes it necessary to understand power exercises in a broader sense, beyond the Lukesian third dimension of power. It was found that actors in local development arenas can interact daily amongst each other and thus will easily identify the instigators or obstructers hindering them from realising their goals. Thus, as was indicated, the study expands the third dimensional view of Lukes to incorporate multi-directional power exercises. This is because the actors in the power relationships are able to identify the 'deemable' powerful and can counteract against their 'whims' of dominance. This counter-action takes place through reinterpretations and by attaching (often new) meanings to processes of developmental policy. Power plays in such local development processes thus are caught up in contestations of interpretations, cognitions and new meanings. The actors loosely define the dynamic nature of development praxis amidst volatile power relationships. In other words, the differing interpretations and meanings that actors attribute to the development process are predicated on the socio-economic and political context (at local level) in which they find themselves.

The study investigated the manifestation of Lukes' first dimension of power through the pluralistic nature of decision-making. However, contrary to Lukes' presuppositions, it was found that in the Khutsong case study, pluralistic contestations over decision-making were highly volatile, characterised by violent mobilisations, strikes and protests. In this process, actors sought to challenge decisions and influence outcomes. The second dimension of power plays in Khutsong occurred through non-decisions and the mobilisation of bias, with key issues of policies in the hands of small groups of elites. However, as noted, their power to influence policy preferences was challenged by other actors through differing interpretations and the actions of other role-players, thus enacting the third dimension of power.

The study found that the rational and active interpretations amongst actors reconfigure the third dimensional perspective to incorporate multi-directionality. In this regard, it was noted that every exercise of power has a potential for resistances (Lefebvre, 1947; Foucault, 1980; Clegg, 1989; Hindess, 1996; Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000; Ewick & Silbey, 2002; Scott, 1985; 2014). The findings showed that the actors within the Khutsong housing scenario resist and subvert the uni-directional domineering power exercises by the domineering few. This is accomplished through the diverse reinterpretations of the projects and through activist stratagems such as violent strikes and protests. This refutes Lukes' (1974:2005a) view that the insidious operation of power in intentional and unintentional preference shaping does produce willing consent to domination. In contrast, the Khutsong case study has illustrated clearly that power exercises within the third dimension are subjected to reconceptualisation by the other actors, who reinterpret the project, thus shifting power relationships away from binary and uni-directional orientation.

The study's empirical examinations have illuminated how abstract conceptualisation of hegemony in the third dimension of power does not necessarily function uni-directional, but involves more fluid, dynamic interpretations and the mentioned multi-directional flow of power amongst different actors in the praxis of development policy. Through these dynamisms, power exercises amongst actors in the Khutsong housing project have moved beyond the asymmetrical and binary configurations of power in the Lukesian perspective, to incorporate more volatile, unsettled multi-directional power shifts. The findings indicate that power shifts amongst the MLCM, local politicians, contractors and community members have been largely predicated on the active engagement of these actors in the housing policy processes. In this sense, power exercises in spaces of local development policy are dependent on actors to reinterpret and actively engage in the various power plays.

The following section outlines the contributions of the present research to both theory and the practice of power and housing provision.

8.4 Contribution of the study

Arguably, the current study does not merely entail a theoretical explication of power dynamics in development policy spaces. It has proposed a construct to enhance scholarly understandings of power dynamics in local development processes. The focus also was on ways the praxis of local policies are influenced by the subtle and often banal configurations of power amongst its actors. Thus, the current Khutsong study has been significant in both theory and practice, as is discussed below.

8.4.1 Contributions to theory

From a theoretical angle, housing provision has been overly policy-oriented (Bengtsson & Kemeny, 1995; Kemeny, 1992, 1999; Allen, 2005; Huchzermeyer, 2000; Khan & Thring, 2003; Tomlinson, 2006). Researchers in housing studies have seldom considered how housing delivery can be influenced by an interplay of power dynamics amongst the various actors (Bengtsson, 2009). Power studies in housing delivery have often been dominated by macro-level (Brennan & Israel, 2008) understanding of how power impacts housing. However, it was indicated through the Khutsong housing project that the local and micro-level political interfaces can reshape and reconfigure the processes of housing development, just as the case is with any development initiative.

Studies are limited on the effects of micro-level power exercises on development outcomes. When scholars do consider the micro-level or localised power dynamics, they often focus entirely on ways processes such as empowerment, capacity building and civic engagement often produce power (Gaventa, 1980; Beaver & Cohen, 2004; Brennan & Israel, 2008). In contrast, the current thesis, based on findings from the Khutsong housing project, has indicated that power in development projects can be influenced by the diverse interpretations and actions of the various actors in local processes. To date, the effects of localised power plays amongst actors have not really been considered a topic for intellectual research, for example, envisioning factors that can hamper the success of development processes.

Kemeny (1992:20) states that researchers need to start investigating the housing policy process from the more “fundamental prior questions concerning the grounds of knowledge of housing

studies: questions which have rarely, if ever, been addressed by housing researchers”. This can be deemed a call for more prominent theoretical examinations of housing delivery processes through power theorising. Kemeny (1995; 2001) thus advocates for a more direct analysis of power dynamics in housing research.

For such an analysis, the present study utilised Lukes’ treatise *Power: A radical view* to explicate how diverse actors’ interpretations and active engagements in housing development can help reconfigure power in terms of more fluid, dynamic and multi-directional power relationships. The Khutsong account has critiqued the hegemonic shaping of cognitions and preferences prevalent in Lukes’ the third dimension of power. The findings of the present study showed that the powerless not only consider exercises of power legitimate as their interests are manipulated. Through different actors’ active engagement in social reinterpretation in local development processes, power shifts occur that are more volatile and multi-directional. Thereby, the present study has expanded the Lukesian power discourse by incorporating instances in which power exercises can not only be asymmetric and binary and only favour the dominant group. Furthermore, it has broadened the empirical application of the Lukesian power theory, as it has moved from the macro examination of power towards a more localised analysis of power plays in development contexts. Power examinations in the first (Dahl, 1961) and second dimensions (Hunter, 1961) concentrate on the local level yet Lukes in his third dimension has overly focused on the macro level. Thus by examining power dynamics in localised spaces the current study can be argued to have enlarged the theoretical application of Lukes’ *PRV*. Through the Khutsong case study it is evinced that the local and micro-level power interfaces can help reshape and reconfigure our understanding of the operationalisation of power in local developmental policy praxis.

The present study shifts the understanding of power beyond the hegemonic stratagems by the powerful to promote elite capture of the processes. In the localised and more democratically radicalised context of Khutsong, such hegemony is challenged and subverted by the interplay of the different actors’ interpretations of the housing policy processes.

8.4.2 Contributions to practice

Most urban political dynamics are permeated with social struggles over access to opportunities embedded in social services and provision of commodities (Castells, 1977) such as housing. In South Africa, as indicated in chapter 4, there is an imbalance between housing delivery and

supply as people increasingly find themselves living in inadequate forms of shelter and thus need interventions for more sustainable housing. Much of the growing urban housing backlog is influenced by disjointed-modernisation thus producing an intractable challenge of housing delivery. As a result, housing provision emerged as a major context of protests presently in South Africa (Ballard *et al.*, 2006; Khan, 2003; Ramovha, 2012; Muchadenyika, 2015). The reason is that role-players in local communities feel entitled to claim access to adequate housing as the realisation of their alienable right.

The processes of South African housing policies have been based mostly on a discrepancy between policy intents and practice. Therefore, the Khutsong case is of practical importance as it provides evidence that localised housing policy outcomes are influenced by the diverse and multi-directional power plays amongst actors. This is because housing challenges are pointed out as a result of disjointed modernisation, amongst other factors, which shape the success of the praxis of housing and development processes. According to Onukwugha (cited by Onukwugha, 2000:6), the major challenges or problems in housing delivery are not due to the allocation system or co-ordination subsystem; the challenge lies within the housing delivery process as such.

The current study is significant as it adds to the on-going debate on the practical issues affecting housing delivery in South Africa. The findings of the case study indicated issues of multiplayer and dynamic interpretations of project spaces by a number of actors. This provides an understanding of the power processes that occur when policies are tabled and implemented. Such an understanding can help prepare the developers and other actors to incorporate such action when they review the factors that impact socio-economic and political processes. Thus the present study has revealed the underlying diverse interpretations and multi-directional power exercises that are integral in shaping the outcome of projects – aspects that developmental practitioners do not often take into account.

Against this background, the following section points out the limitations of the study.

8.5 Limitations of the study

The current research, as with any study of academic value, has its limitations. This can be inferred from a few factors in the study that have influenced the research and need to be re-emphasised. The following factors are argued to be the limitations of the present study:

a. *Methodological limitations*

- The study utilised snowball sampling, which may not really have saturated the perspectives of actors on how their actions and interpretations influenced the direction and outcome of the housing project. Some important key actors were not able to participate in the study.
- The use of the localised case study of Khutsong as such may imply a limitation of the study. The reason is that it is not possible to generalise the findings to other contexts due to the different contextual and conflictual dynamics, which may only be limited to Khutsong.
- It was difficult to access local politicians (the state, mayor) during the field work. This is due largely to the bureaucratic and technical structures of accessibility, which made certain high-level political actors difficult to approach for participation in the study. Furthermore, since the project commenced early in 2000, it was a challenge to involve some of the local politicians who had participated in the project before. The reason was that these individuals were either deceased, relocated, or no longer incumbents of positions of influence and therefore could not easily be traced.

b. *Theoretical limitations*

- The Khutsong case study lends itself to specific conclusions with regard to power. Other communities may offer different interpretations. Thus, the theoretical approach of the present study may not fit the dynamics of other communities.
- This research moved beyond decision-making in housing. The usefulness of the argumentation in this study for other housing projects, will depend on the specific power interest of those studies. This implies that the present study is not necessarily a model for other researchers in this field to follow.
- The study only focused on power at local (micro-) level. As a result, the findings cannot be generalised to meso- and macro-levels.
- The theoretical interpretation of this thesis seems to be relevant especially for a radicalised democratic environment.

8.6 Recommendations and implications for future research

Recommendations provided in this section are derived from the current study of housing and power relationships. The recommendations are meant to render advice for the management of

housing delivery. As a result, those power dynamics will be controlled properly to ensure positive project outcomes and that clear goals are achieved in related development goals.

Firstly, the present study has indicated how influential the diverse interpretations and actions of actors are in processes of the housing policy in Khutsong. It is important to focus on policy alternatives that can be implemented to ensure successful housing provision. However, such a discourse is also influenced by how various actors are perceived as pivotal in propelling the direction of housing developments. There is need to ensure that all the relevant role-players are given the opportunity to participate in development projects. This need was emphasised by interviewees who pointed out that only selected individuals were allowed to discuss major issues with the Merafong City Local Municipality (MCLM) and its Project Steering Committee (PSC). Community members felt that there closed spaces of involvement in the housing project, which led them to use violence as a stratagem to claim entrance and participation in these local spaces.

Secondly, as indicated by the participants, the need is that housing projects and the provision of bulk services should be synchronised so that beneficiaries do not have to access shelter in areas where there are no amenities. The synchronisation of services and the housing development will ensure concerted effort towards the production of sustainable and integrated human settlements. Some respondents indicated they were reluctant to move to the RDP or low-cost houses, which showed evidence of uncoordinated efforts towards housing provision, as houses were constructed and social amenities installed only much later.

Thirdly, from the findings of the study, it should be re-emphasised and publicly attested by politicians that the notion of free housing provision for every poor citizen is highly unviable. The state needs to develop mechanisms for auditing housing needs. This will help them reallocate houses through policy channels that avoid the individualised profiteering appropriations or the opportunistic understandings of housing needs.

Fourthly, the conflictual actions by different spheres of governments were apparent in the praxis of housing development polices. Therefore, the present study proposes that local housing developments should be the function of local municipalities (i.e. local government). Much of the challenges in the Khutsong housing project could have been averted if housing had been left under control of the MCLM. There is need for reconceptualisation and legislative preserve

of the local government tiers, seeing that the main actors in the housing delivery processes are from areas which fall under their jurisdiction.

Fifthly, in the process of awarding tenders, it is proposed that the government shift from partisan ‘tender-preneurship’ to more merit-based criteria. Most of the contractors who were awarded developmental projects have extremely limited experiences and scant veritable successful projects they have implemented effectively. Tender-awarding processes should thus be more rigorous to allow for a thorough scrutiny of tender applicants and thus avoid instances in which actors with individualistic agendas opportunistically exploit and misappropriate funding meant for the construction of major development projects. It is further proposed that tender-awarding processes be based on experiences and achieved production rather than on mere cadreship or partisanship. Contracts should be given to well-resourced and experienced role-players in housing provision.

Sixthly, a transit area should be created when housing developments are meant for the relocation and resettlement of individuals in a given geographical space. From the findings it was noted that the housing development was impacted by the failure to relocate and rehabilitate the residence from informal settlements. The provision of a transit area as a buffer zone ensures efficiency and effectiveness in relocations and resettlements. This will also avoid the continued escalation of unmanageable housing needs.

Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it is clear that development actors should understand how power dynamics impact on housing delivery systems. It is necessary to grasp the fact that the context and nature of power relationships amongst actors impacts on housing policy outcomes. Therefore, housing processes should be largely interpreted within the socio-economic and political milieu in which they occur at local level. The reason is that different contexts influence how actors actively engage with social processes negatively or positively.

After proposing the recommendations emanating from the study, the following indicate the areas for future studies:

- There is need for more localised studies on power exercises amongst actors in development processes in order to examine how hegemony is resisted and remodified overtly by actors in multi-directional power relationships.
- Political challenges facing actors in housing and related development projects should be understood and examined.

- Empirical studies should be undertaken on the interplay of multiplayer power dimensions to grasp the conceptualisation of power in localised development processes.
- Continuous studies are needed on ways in which differing interpretations shape and influence the direction of major developmental projects.

8.7 Conclusion

The question was posed, “Who dominates whom in the Khutsong housing project?” To answer this question, the study investigated the shaping of preferences, cognitions and perception in the Khutsong project. Underlying the power relations, the findings revealed diverse interpretations from a plurality of actors, producing more volatile and multi-directional power exercises. The study has found that such diverse interpretations amongst actors in the Khutsong housing project reflect actions and inactions entailing a reconfiguration of power discourses towards more positive sum and multi-actor dominance.

Notable from the study has been that actors had differing interpretations, which shaped the directions and outcome of the project:

- The MCLM officials understood the project initially with the object to avert risk of the doline hazard, and later reinterpreted it as a settlement project.
- The local politicians undermined the domination by the officials and interpreted the project as a stratagem for building voter confidence and political legitimisation.
- The contractors perceived it through a profiteering and opportunistic lens.
- The community members reinterpreted it mostly from the angle of housing provision and entrepreneurial opportunities.

These diverse interpretations have produced reciprocity in actions and inactions as actors sought to appropriate the housing development spaces in order to achieve private interests. The study has noted from the Khutsong case study, that power reconfigurations according to the Lukesian third dimension are only effectual in more radicalised democratic settings. This also applies when power processes occur in localised contexts where the actors are able to identify each other.

The diverse (re)interpretations by actors in the Khutsong project have revealed the limits of the operation of hegemony. The reason is that actors can actively reinterpret the praxis of policies to their benefit. Power examinations in the study has affirmed the existence of the pluralistic decision-making (first dimension) and the agenda setting (second dimension) as the housing

policy praxis was shaped by contestations and struggles for influence by the different actors (third dimension).

This chapter has also offered recommendations and options for future studies. Most strikingly the fluidity, dynamism and multi-directional power exercises is an area that is seemingly new to power theorising. In this regard, the current thesis makes a significant contribution by indicating how power in the third dimension can be reconfigured in local development contexts.

9 References

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
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Appendix 1. Ethics Clearance Letter for the Study



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Ethics Committee

Tel +27 18 299 4849
Email Ethics@nwu.ac.za

ETHICS APPROVAL OF PROJECT

The North-West University Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (NWU-RERC) hereby approves your project as indicated below. This implies that the NWU-RERC grants its permission that provided the special conditions specified below are met and pending any other authorisation that may be necessary, the project may be initiated, using the ethics number below.

Project title: Housing Provision Systems and Power Dynamics: The Case of Khutsong																														
Project Leader: Prof J Zaيمان																														
Student: G Mupambwa																														
Ethics number: <table border="1"><tr><td>N</td><td>W</td><td>U</td><td>-</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>-</td><td>1</td><td>4</td><td>-</td><td>A</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">Institution</td><td colspan="5">Project Number</td><td colspan="2">Year</td><td colspan="5">Status</td></tr></table> <small>Status: S = Submission, R = Re-Submission, P = Provisional Authorisation, A = Authorisation</small>	N	W	U	-	0	0	1	1	3	-	1	4	-	A	7	Institution			Project Number					Year		Status				
N	W	U	-	0	0	1	1	3	-	1	4	-	A	7																
Institution			Project Number					Year		Status																				
Approval date: 2014-06-23																														
Expiry date: 2019-06-22																														

Special conditions of the approval (if any): None

General conditions:

While this ethics approval is subject to all declarations, undertakings and agreements incorporated and signed in the application form, please note the following:

- The project leader (principle investigator) must report in the prescribed format to the NWU-RERC:
 - annually (or as otherwise requested) on the progress of the project,
 - without any delay in case of any adverse event (or any matter that interrupts sound ethical principles) during the course of the project.
- The approval applies strictly to the protocol as stipulated in the application form. Would any changes to the protocol be deemed necessary during the course of the project, the project leader must apply for approval of these changes at the NWU-RERC. Would there be deviated from the project protocol without the necessary approval of such changes, the ethics approval is immediately and automatically forfeited.
- The date of approval indicates the first date that the project may be started. Would the project have to continue after the expiry date, a new application must be made to the NWU-RERC and new approval received before or on the expiry date.
- In the interest of ethical responsibility the NWU-RERC retains the right to:
 - request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project;
 - withdraw or postpone approval if:
 - any unethical principles or practices of the project are revealed or suspected,
 - it becomes apparent that any relevant information was withheld from the NWU-RERC or that information has been false or misrepresented,
 - the required annual report and reporting of adverse events was not done timely and accurately,
 - new institutional rules, national legislation or international conventions deem it necessary.


The Ethics Committee would like to remain at your service as scientist and researcher, and wishes you well with your project. Please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Committee for any further enquiries or requests for assistance.

Yours sincerely



Prof Amanda Lourens
Chair NWU Research Ethics Regulatory Committee (RERC)

Appendix 2. Authorization Letter September 2013



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The Manager
Human Settlement and Land Development
Merafong City Local Municipality
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12 September 2013

Dear Sir/Madam

FORMAL REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS

We as part of the School of Social and Government Studies at the North-West University are conducting a research on the Khutsong resettlement programme. The research intends to help in addressing the housing crisis facing the nation and the global world at large. It is the objective of the study to contribute to the theoretical and practical knowledge bodies that shape the current human settlement policies and stratagems. The study is based on the assumption that the current resettlement mechanism can be a means to achieve developmental and participative local government that advances the notions of transparency and accountability in our participatory democracy. It is also the view of the study that the resettlement project has taken longer than thought, hence the research also seeks to understand and investigate the challenges in successfully relocating residents of the informal settlement. The study further investigates the perceptions of the citizens and of the local government officials on the resettlement project.

The research thus tries to evaluate the resettlement project as a tool that can be used to address problematic issues of housing in present day South Africa. The focus shall be on the allocation of housing, relocation administration, citizen participation and the challenges incurred or occurring during the relocation process.

It is therefore against this background that we hereby kindly request permission to have interviews with yourself and/or staff responsible for the project. We are available on the following dates to conduct the interviews: 16 September, 3 and 8 October 2013.

Note that this research will be guided by strict ethical principles and respondents and participants will be guaranteed their right to anonymity, privacy and confidentiality. In addition, a research report will be made available to your Municipality upon request on completion of study.

Hoping that this request will be favourably considered.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours sincerely



Prof. S.J. Zaaiman
School Director

Appendix 3. Authorisation Letter February 2015



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITHI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA
NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT
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School of Social and Government Studies

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Email Johan.Zaaiman@nwu.ac.za

The Manager
Human Settlement and Land Development
Merafong City Local Municipality
PO Box 3
Carletonville
2500

19 February 2015

Dear Sir

FORMAL REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS

We as part of the School of Social and Government Studies at the North-West University are conducting a research project on the Khutsong resettlement programme. The research intends to help in addressing the housing crisis facing the nation and the global world at large. It is the objective of the study to contribute to the theoretical and practical knowledge bodies that shape the current human settlement policies and stratagems. The study is based on the assumption that the current resettlement mechanism can be a means to achieve developmental and participative local government that advances the notions of transparency and accountability in our participatory democracy. It is also the view of the study that the resettlement project has taken longer than thought, hence the research also seeks to understand and investigate the challenges in successfully relocating residents of the informal settlement. The study further investigates the perceptions of the citizens and of the local government officials on the resettlement project.

The research thus tries to evaluate the resettlement project as a tool that can be used to address problematic issues of housing in present day South Africa. The focus shall be on the allocation of housing, relocation administration, citizen participation and the challenges incurred or occurring during the relocation process.

It is therefore against this background that we hereby kindly request permission for the doctoral student, Mr. Gift Mupambwa, to have interviews with officials responsible for the project. He is available for interviews from 9 March to 15 April 2015.

Note that this research will be guided by strict ethical principles and respondents and participants will be guaranteed their right to anonymity, privacy and confidentiality. In addition, a research report will be made available to your Municipality upon request on completion of the study.

Hoping that this request will be favourably considered.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Zaaiman'.

Prof. S. Zaaiman
School Director and supervisor

Appendix 4. Proof of Language Editing

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I hereby confirm that the PhD thesis by Mr Gift Mupambwa was edited and groomed to the best of my ability within the available timeframe; this included recommendations to improve the language and logical structure and reconstructive editing to enhance the presentation.

Rev Claude Vosloo
Language and knowledge practitioner and consultant

Home of Creativity/Kreatiwiteitshuis
<http://homeofcreativity.co.za/info>

ID: 590806 5146 085
South African Translator's Institute reference no: 100 2432
Associate Member of PEG (Professional Editor's Group)

Home of Creativity ULTD 

Don't think outside the box, reinvent the box

Appendix 5. Interview Guide for Community members



Semi-structured interviews for community members

My name is Gift Mupambwa (24660248) and I am currently doing PhD in Sociology at the North West University, South Africa. As part of my PhD research, I am conducting semi-structured interviews that investigate the stakeholder relationships within the Khutsong Housing project. I am looking at the relationships amongst stakeholders, project processes, power or political issues and the impact of these dynamics on the formulation and implementation of the entire housing project in Khutsong by the Merafong Municipality. It is in this regard, that I seek to know more about your experience as a stakeholder within Khutsong settlement project. I will appreciate if you could participate in this interview. Any information obtained in connection with this study that can be identified with you will remain confidential. In any written reports or publications, no one will be identified. Please note that this study was ethically approved by the NWU and the ethics number is NWU-0011314A7. If you have any queries please contact the supervisor of this PhD study, Prof. S.J. Zaaiman at 018-2991627.

a. Introduction and biographical data

- 1) Are you in a position to freely discuss the Khutsong settlement project?
- 2) Do you understand the confidentiality of the research?
- 3) What is your position in the community?
- 4) Where do you work?
- 5) How long have you been staying in Khutsong?
- 6) Are you willing to share a personal opinion about the settlement project?

b. Khutsong settlement project actors?

- 7) Is your work related to the Khutsong settlement project?
- 8) Where in your view did the Khutsong settlement project originate?
- 9) Who were the main actors in the initial phase of the settlement project?
- 10) How did the demarcation issue impact on the settlement project?
 - 1) Was there any linkage between the housing project and the demarcation matter?
 - 2) For instance did the national government initially hope the housing project would persuade Khutsong to accept the demarcation matter?
- 11) Who were the key actors in the settlement project after the demarcation matter was resolved?
- 12) Who in the settlement project decides on:
 - a. Decision-making
 - b. Planning
 - c. Allocation of housing funds
 - d. Appointment of contractors
 - e. Management of contractors
 - f. Allocation of homes
- 13) Who are the groups of people involved in the current project?
- 14) Which segments of the community are the main beneficiaries of the project?
- 15) What role do you think the community plays?
 - 1) Is there significant community involvement in the affairs of the project?
- 16) What major decisions have occurred in the project?
 - 1) who made these decisions?
- 17) What decisions do you generally make with regards to the Khutsong housing project?
 - 2) If none, why do you not make decisions?
 - 3) If not so, why do you take responsibility of the decisions of other actors?
- 18) In your opinion, which stakeholders influence(ed) the outcome of project?

- a) How are they influencing the outcome of the project?
 - b) What mechanisms do they use to influence the housing process?
 - c) How are their decisions affecting on the housing project?
- 19) How does the housing project fit into the creation of power relationships in Khutsong?
- 1) What is your understanding of power?
- 20) Do you think the influence of various actors in the housing project has had an impact in the progress of project?
- 21) In your opinion as a community member, do feel you had any control over the Khutsong settlement agenda?
- c. Objectives of the Khutsong settlement project**
- 22) What is in your view the objectives of the settlement project?
- 1) Service delivery
 - 2) Expansion of economic opportunities
 - 3) Resettlement
 - 4) City integration
 - 5) Housing provision
 - 6) Mitigate environmental risks
 - 7) Other
- d. Progress and challenges of the Khutsong settlement project**
- 23) Can you describe the project?
- 1) What is the overall progress made so far in terms of :
 - 1. Desired outcomes
 - 2. General outcomes
 - 3. Other
 - 2) What you have learnt so far?
- 24) What were the challenges that the settlement project encountered in:
- a. its initial phases,
 - b. its building phases,
 - c. house allocation,
 - d. taking up of residence,
 - e. establishment of new community life?
- 25) From the challenges you have mentioned, which ones do you think were the major drawback to the project as a community member?
- e. Role of stakeholders in Khutsong settlement project**
- 26) How do you generally contribute to the agenda of the project?
- 27) What was the role of the municipality in this project in contrast to the responsibility of other levels of government?
- 28) Did the municipality satisfactorily deal with problems that the settlement project encountered? (give possible problems)
- 29) How would you describe your relationships with:
- a) Municipality
 - b) Contractors
 - c) Local leaders
 - d) Other community members
 - e) Other
- 30) Do you generally have the confidence to share ideas in the entire Khutsong settlement project process with other stakeholders?
- 1. If yes, what was that confidence based on?
 - 2. If not, what constricted you?
- 31) Has there been any form of conflict in your relationship with the following actors in relation to the implementation of the Khutsong housing?
- a) Municipality
 - b) Construction Workers
 - c) Contractors
 - d) Local leaders

- e) Other
- 32) If so, what was the nature of the conflict?
 - a) Who were the main actors in the conflict?
 - b) How were they involved?
 - c) Has this relationship changed at all?
 - d) If it changed, when?
- 33) Do you think the local government's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 34) Do you think community leaders' actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 35) Do you think the community's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 36) Do you think contractors' actions in the implementation of the project had any role in the conflict?

f. Operationalisation of settlement project

- 37) How do these different actors meet to facilitate the implementation of this housing programme?
 - 1. Who initiates the process?
 - 2. Who brings the various groups of people together?
 - 3. Is there a well-established procedure to do this?
- 38) Does anyone besides the municipality have a say in the Khutsong housing project?
- 39) How would you describe the nature of interaction that generally occurs in Khutsong housing project?
 - 1. Are all the stakeholders included in the implementation of the project?
 - 2. Do you feel included?
- 40) The town planners would have preferred that only residents of the informal settlements in Khutsong be moved to the new housing settlement. However, the council later decided to use the housing list. What is your view on this?
- 41) What challenges are you encountering in the utilisation of the waiting list?
- 42) It appears that some community members move to the new houses but do not demolish the informal structures. They rent it or give it to a relative. What is your opinion on this?

g. Environmental factors on settlement project

- 43) At some time the town planners had initially viewed the housing project as a resettlement of the whole Khutsong due to dolomite. Is it your opinion that this was the original goal of the project?
 - a) What measures were put in place to ensure the community is aware of the dolomite risk?
 - b) How do you view the idea of the project now moving from a resettlement of the entire Khutsong settlement to now a new settlement for the residents of the informal houses?

h. Contribution of settlement project

- 44) In your opinion, what is the effect of this current housing project to the community with regards to:
 - 1) Expansion of economic opportunities
 - 2) Service delivery
 - 3) Public participation
 - 4) City integration
 - 5) Poverty reduction
 - 6) Housing provision
 - 7) Other
- 45) How is the project changing the social dynamics in Khutsong, with regards to:
 - a) The family
 - b) Place of women in the community
 - c) Place of children in the community
 - d) Place of the elderly in the community
 - e) The youth in the community

46) What is the nature of the relationship between the informal settlement (if any) and those associated with new settlement in Khutsong?

i. Recommendations

47) If you had a piece of advice to give about the nature of relationships in the Khutsong housing project implementation, what would that be?

48) What do you think should be done to ensure that future housing projects are successful

j. General

49) Is there anything else about this major settlement project that you think would be important for a researcher to know?

I would also like to interview any other person who has influenced the current Khutsong housing project. Would you be able to suggest any other person, I could contact who had an active or influential role in the project?

Appendix 6. Interview Guide for Municipal Officials



Semi-structured interviews with Merafong Municipality Officials

My name is Gift Mupambwa (24660248) and I am currently doing PhD in Sociology at the North West University, South Africa. As part of my PhD research, I am conducting semi-structured interviews that investigate the stakeholder relationships within the Khutsong Housing project (Ext. 5). I am looking at the relationships amongst stakeholders, project processes, power or political issues and the impact of these dynamics on the formulation and implementation of the entire housing project in Khutsong by the Merafong Municipality. It is in this regard, that I am targeting officials from the Merafong Municipality to be the interview respondents of this study. I will appreciate if you could participate in this interview. Any information obtained in connection with this study that can be identified with you will remain confidential. In any written reports or publications, no one will be identified. Please note that this study was ethically approved by the NWU and the ethics number is NWU-0011314A7. If you have any queries please contact the supervisor of this PhD study, Prof. S.J. Zaaiman at 018-2991627.

a. Introduction and biographical data

- 1) Are you in a position to freely discuss the Khutsong settlement project?
- 2) Do you understand the confidentiality of the research?
- 3) What is your position in the municipality?
- 4) How long have you been working here?
- 5) To what department/team do you belong?
- 6) Did it change over the years?
- 7) Are you willing to share a personal opinion about the settlement project?

b. Khutsong settlement project actors?

- 8) Were your work related to the Khutsong settlement project?
- 9) Where in your view did the Khutsong settlement project originate?
- 10) Who were the main actors in the initial phase of the settlement project?
- 11) How did the demarcation issue influence the settlement project?
 - 1) Was there any linkage between the housing project and the demarcation matter?
 - 2) For instance did the national government initially hope the housing project would persuade Khutsong to accept the demarcation matter?
- 12) Who were the main actors in the settlement project after the demarcation matter was resolved?
- 13) Who are the groups of people involved in the current project?
- 14) Which segments of the community are the main beneficiaries of the project?
- 15) What role do you think the community plays?
 - 1) Is there significant community involvement in the affairs of the project?
- 16) What major decisions have occurred in the project?
 - 1) who made these decisions?
- 17) What decisions do you generally make with regards to the Khutsong housing project?
 - 1) If not, why do you not make decisions in the project?
 - 2) If not so, why do you take responsibility for the decisions of others?
- 18) Who in the settlement project decides on:
 - 1) Decision-making
 - 2) Planning
 - 3) Allocation of housing funds
 - 4) Appointment of contractors
 - 5) Management of contractors
 - 6) Allocation of homes
- 19) In your opinion, which stakeholders influence(ed) the outcome of project?

- a) How are they influencing the outcome of the project?
 - b) What mechanisms do they use to influence the housing process?
 - c) How are their actions affecting on the housing project?
- 20) How does the housing project fit into the creation of power relationships in Khutsong?
- 1) What is your understanding of power?
- 21) Do you think the influence of various actors in the housing project has had an impact in the progress of project?
- 22) In your opinion as an actor in the project, do feel you had any control over the Khutsong settlement agenda?
- c. Objectives of the Khutsong settlement project**
- 23) What is in your view the objectives of the settlement project?
- 1) Service delivery
 - 2) Expansion of economic opportunities
 - 3) Resettlement
 - 4) City integration
 - 5) Housing provision
 - 6) Mitigate environmental risks
 - 7) Other
- d. Progress and challenges of the Khutsong settlement project**
- 24) Can you describe the project?
- 1) What is the overall progress you have made so far in terms of:
 - 1) Desired outcomes
 - 2) General outcomes
 - 3) Other
 - 2) What you have learnt so far?
- 25) What were the challenges that the settlement project encountered in:
- a. its initial phases,
 - b. its building phases,
 - c. house allocation,
 - d. taking up of residence,
 - e. establishment of new community life?
- 26) From the challenges you have mentioned, which ones do you think were the major drawback to the project as a municipality?
- e. Role of municipality in Khutsong settlement project**
- 27) What was the role of the municipality in this project in contrast to the responsibility of other levels of government?
- 28) Did the municipality dealt satisfactorily with problems that the settlement project encountered? (give possible problems)
- 29) How would you describe your relationships with:
- f) Community
 - g) Contractors
 - h) Local leaders
 - i) Trade unions
 - j) Other
- 30) Has there been any form of conflict in your relationship with the following actors in relation to the implementation of the Khutsong housing?
- f) Community
 - g) Construction Workers
 - h) Contractors
 - i) Local leaders
 - j) Other
- 31) If so, what was the nature of the conflict?
- e) Who were the main actors in the conflict?
 - f) How were they involved?
 - g) Has this relationship changed at all?

- h) If it changed, when?
- 32) Do you think the local government's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 33) Do you think local community's actions in the implementation of projects had any role to play in the conflict?
- 34) Do you think local community leaders' actions in the implementation of project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 35) Do you think contractors' actions in the implementation of the project had any role in the conflict?

f. Operationalisation of settlement project

- 36) How do these different actors meet to facilitate the implementation of this housing programme?
 - a) Who initiates the process? Who brings the various groups of people together?
 - b) Is there a well-established procedure to do this?
 - c) How are the contractors allocated?
 - d) How are strikes and other tensions dealt with?
- 37) How is the Khutsong project planned?
 - 1) Entire project
 - 2) Need analysis
 - 3) Other
- 38) Does anyone besides the municipality and contractor have a say in the Khutsong housing project?
- 39) How would you describe the nature of interaction that generally occurs in Khutsong housing project?
 - 1) Are all the stakeholders included in the implementation of the project?
 - 2) Do you feel included?
- 40) The town planners would have preferred that only residents of the informal settlements in Khutsong be moved to the new housing settlement. However, the council later decided to use the housing list. What is your view on this?
- 41) What challenges are you encountering in the utilisation of the waiting list?
- 42) It appears that some community members move to the new houses but do not demolish the informal structures. They rent it or give it to a relative. What is your opinion on this?

g. Environmental factors on settlement project

- 43) At some time the town planners had initially viewed the housing project as a resettlement of the whole Khutsong due to dolomite. Is it your opinion that this was the original goal of the project?
 - c) How was the dolomite risk determined?
 - d) What measures were put in place to ensure the residents were aware of the dolomite risks?
 - e) Did the municipality plan to resettle the whole community?
 - f) How did the project shift from resettlement to a settlement?

h. Contribution of settlement project

- 44) In your opinion, what is the effect of this current housing project to Merafong with regards to:
 - 8) Expansion of economic opportunities
 - 9) Risk mitigation
 - 10) Service delivery
 - 11) Public participation
 - 12) Housing provision
 - 13) City integration
 - 14) Livelihood changes
 - 15) Other
- 45) How is the project changing the social dynamics in Khutsong, with regards to:
 - f) The family
 - g) Place of women in the community
 - h) Place of children in the community
 - i) Place of the elderly in the community

j) The youth in the community

46) What is the nature of the relationship between the informal settlement (if any) and those associated with new settlement in Khutsong?

47) Do you think the policy of providing free housing to every homeless is sustainable?

i. Recommendations

48) If you had a piece of advice to share about the nature of relationships in the Khutsong housing project implementation, what would that be?

49) What do you think should be done to ensure that future housing projects are successful

j. General

50) Is there anything else about this major settlement project that you think would be important for a researcher to know

I would also like to interview any other person who has influenced the current Khutsong housing project. Would you be able to suggest any other person, I could contact who had an active or influential role in the project?

Appendix 7. Interview Guide for Contractors



Semi-structured interviews with housing contractors

My name is Gift Mupambwa (24660248) and I am currently doing PhD in Sociology at the North West University (NWU), South Africa. As part of my PhD research, I am conducting semi-structured interviews that investigate the stakeholder relationships within the Khutsong Housing project. I am looking at the relationships amongst stakeholders, project processes, power or political issues and the impact of these dynamics on the formulation and implementation of the entire housing project in Khutsong by the Merafong Municipality. It is in this regard, that I seek to know more about your experience as a stakeholder within Khutsong settlement project. I will appreciate if you could participate in this interview. Any information obtained in connection with this study that can be identified with you will remain confidential. In any written reports or publications, no one will be identified. Please note that this study was ethically approved by the NWU and the ethics number is NWU-0011314A7. If you have any queries please contact the supervisor of this PhD study, Prof. S.J. Zaaiman at 018-2991627.

a. Introduction and biographical data

- 1) Are you in a position to freely discuss the Khutsong settlement project?
- 2) Do you understand the confidentiality of the research?
- 3) What is your position in the project?
- 4) How long have you been in this position?
- 5) Are you willing to share a personal opinion about the settlement project?

b. Khutsong settlement project actors?

- 6) Can you talk me through the history of the Khutsong housing project from when you first heard about it up until now as a contractor?
- 7) Who were the main actors in the initial phase of the settlement project?
- 8) Who in the settlement project decides on:
 - a. Allocation of housing funds
 - b. Appointment of contractors
 - c. Management of contractors
- 9) Who are the groups of people involved in the current project?
- 10) Which segments of the community are the main beneficiaries of the project?
- 11) What role do you think the community plays?
- 12) Is there significant community participation in the affairs of the project?
- 13) What major decisions have occurred in the project, who made these decisions?
- 14) What decisions do you generally make with regards to the Khutsong housing project?
 - 2) If not, why do you not make decisions?
 - 3) If not so, why do you take responsibility for the decisions of other actors?
- 15) In your opinion, which stakeholders influence(ed) the outcome of project?
 - d) How are they influencing the outcome of the project?
 - e) What mechanisms do they use to influence the housing process?
 - f) How are their actions affecting on the housing project?
- 16) How does the housing project fit into the creation of power relationships in Khutsong?
 - 1) What is your understanding of power?
- 17) In your opinion as an actor in the project, do feel you had any control over the Khutsong settlement agenda?
- 18) What do you think the expectations of other stakeholder are with regards to the project?

c. Objectives of the Khutsong settlement project

- 19) What is in your view the objectives of the settlement project?
 - 8) Service delivery
 - 9) Expansion of economic opportunities

- 10) Resettlement
- 11) City integration
- 12) Housing provision
- 13) Mitigate environmental risks
- 14) Other

d. Progress and challenges of the Khutsong settlement project

- 20) Can you describe the project?
 - 1) What is the overall progress you have made so far in terms of:
 - 1. Desired outcomes
 - 2. General outcomes
 - 3. Other
 - 2) What you have learnt so far?
- 21) What are the challenges that the settlement project encountered in the:
 - f. Tender process ,
 - g. Allocation of the project,
 - h. Site establishment,
 - i. Project meetings,
 - j. Recruitment of workers
 - k. Construction of the houses
 - l. DoHS inspection
 - m. Hand over to municipality
 - n. Other
- 22) From the challenges you have mentioned, which ones do you think were the major drawback to the project as a contractor?
- 23) In your opinion, as a contractor if the project profitable?
 - a. If not, what is hindering the realisations of profits?
 - b. If yes, what is enhancing the creation of profits?

e. Role of stakeholders in Khutsong settlement project

- 24) What is the role of the municipality in this project in contrast to the responsibility of other levels of government?
- 25) Did the municipality satisfactorily deal with problems that the settlement project encountered? (give possible problems)
- 26) How would you describe your relationships with:
 - a. Community
 - b. Municipality
 - c. Construction Workers
 - d. Other contractors
 - e. Local leaders
 - f. Trade unions
 - g. Other
- 27) How do you contribute as a contractor to the agenda of the project?
- 28) Do you generally have the confidence to share ideas in the entire Khutsong settlement project process with other stakeholders?
 - 3. If yes, what was that confidence based on?
 - 4. If not, what constricted you?
- 29) Has there been any form of conflict in your relationship with the following actors in relation to the implementation of the Khutsong housing?
 - a. Community
 - b. Municipality
 - c. Construction Workers
 - d. Other contractors
 - e. Local leaders
 - f. Trade unions
 - g. Other
- 30) If so, what was the nature of the conflict?

- k) Who were the main actors in the conflict?
 - l) How were they involved?
 - m) Has this relationship changed at all?
 - n) If it changed, when?
- 31) Do you think the local government's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 32) Do you think community leaders' actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 33) Do you think local community's action in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 34) Do you think your participation in the implementation of the project had any role in the conflict?
- f. Operationalisation of settlement project**
- 35) How do these different actors meet to facilitate the implementation of this housing programme?
- 4. Who initiates the process?
 - 5. Who brings the various groups of people together?
 - 6. Is there a well-established procedure to do this?
 - 7. How are strikes and other conflicts dealt with?
- 36) Does anyone besides the local government have a say in the Khutsong housing project?
- 37) How would you describe the nature of interaction that generally occurs in Khutsong housing project?
- 1. Are all the stakeholders included in the implementation of the project?
 - 2. Do you feel included?
- g. Environmental factors on settlement project**
- 38) At some time the town planners had initially viewed the housing project as a resettlement of the whole Khutsong due to dolomite. Is it your opinion that this was the original goal of the project?
- g) How was the dolomite risk determined?
 - h) What measures are you putting in place as a contractor to ensure the current housing structure are risks protected from risks?
- h. Contribution of settlement project**
- 39) In your opinion, what is the effect of this current housing project to Merafong with regards to:
- 16) Service delivery
 - 17) Public participation
 - 18) Economic opportunities
 - 19) Infrastructure development
 - 20) City integration
 - 21) Housing provision
 - 22) Other
- 40) How is the project changing the social dynamics in Khutsong, with regards to:
- k) The family
 - l) Place of women in the community
 - m) Place of children in the community
 - n) Place of the elderly in the community
 - o) The youth in the community
- 41) What is nature of the relationship between the informal settlement residents (if any) and the new settlement residents in Khutsong?
- 42) Do you think the policy of providing free housing to every homeless is sustainable?
- i. Recommendations**
- 43) If you had a piece of advice to share about the nature of relationships in the Khutsong housing project implementation, what would that be?
- 44) What do you think should be done to ensure that future housing projects are successful?
- j. General**
- 45) Is there anything else about this major settlement project that you think would be important for a researcher to know?

I would also like to interview any other person who has influenced the current Khutsong housing project. Would you be able to suggest any other person, I could contact who had an active or influential role in the project?

Appendix 8. Interview Guide for Contractors



Semi-structured interviews with Khutsong Councillors and community leaders

My name is Gift Mupambwa (24660248) and I am currently doing PhD in Sociology at the North West University, South Africa. As part of my PhD research, I am conducting semi-structured interviews that investigate the stakeholder relationships within the Khutsong Housing project. I am looking at the relationships amongst stakeholders, project processes, power or political issues and the impact of these dynamics on the formulation and implementation of the entire housing project in Khutsong by the Merafong Municipality. It is in this regard, that I seek to know more about your experience as a stakeholder within Khutsong settlement project. I will appreciate if you could participate in this interview. Any information obtained in connection with this study that can be identified with you will remain confidential. In any written reports or publications, no one will be identified. Please note that this study was ethically approved by the NWU and the ethics number is NWU-0011314A7. If you have any queries please contact the supervisor of this PhD study, Prof. S.J. Zaaiman at 018-2991627.

a. Introduction and biographical data

- 1) Are you in a position to freely discuss the Khutsong settlement project?
- 2) Do you understand the confidentiality of the research?
- 3) What is your position in the community?
- 4) How long have you been in this position?
- 5) How long have you been staying in Khutsong?
- 6) Are you willing to share a personal opinion about the settlement project?

b. Khutsong settlement project actors?

- 7) Is your work related to the Khutsong settlement project?
- 8) Where in your view did the Khutsong settlement project originate?
- 9) Who were the main actors in the initial phase of the settlement project?
- 10) How did the demarcation issue impact on the settlement project?
 - 4) Was there any linkage between the housing project and the demarcation matter?
 - 5) For instance did the national government initially hope the housing project would persuade Khutsong to accept the demarcation matter?
- 11) Who were the key actors in the settlement project after the demarcation matter was resolved?
- 12) Who in the settlement project decides on:
 - a. Decision-making
 - b. Planning
 - c. Allocation of housing funds
 - d. Appointment of contractors
 - e. Management of contractors
 - f. Allocation of homes
- 13) Who are the groups of people involved in the current project?
- 14) Which segments of the community are the main beneficiaries of the project?
- 15) What role do you think the community plays?
 - 1) Is there significant community participation in the affairs of the project?
- 16) What major decisions have occurred in the project and who made these decisions?
- 17) What decisions do you generally make with regards to the Khutsong housing project?
 - 1) If none, why do you not make decisions?
 - 2) If not so, why do you take responsibility of the decisions of other actors?
- 18) In your opinion, which stakeholders influence(ed) the outcome of project?
 - g) How are they influencing the outcome of the project?
 - h) What mechanisms do they use to influence the housing process?

- i) How are their decisions affecting on the housing project?
- 19) How does the housing project fit into the creation of power relationships in Khutsong?
 - 1) What is your understanding of power?
- 20) In your opinion as an actor in the project, do feel you had any control over the Khutsong settlement agenda?

c. Objectives of the Khutsong settlement project

- 21) What is in your view the objectives of the settlement project?
 - 1) Service delivery
 - 2) Expansion of economic opportunities
 - 3) Resettlement
 - 4) City integration
 - 5) Housing provision
 - 6) Mitigate environmental risks
 - 7) Other

d. Progress and challenges of the Khutsong settlement project

- 22) Can you describe the project?
 - 1) What is the overall progress you have made so far in terms of:
 - 4. Desired outcomes
 - 5. General outcomes
 - 6. Other
 - 2) What you have learnt so far?
- 23) What were the challenges that the settlement project encountered in:
 - o. its initial phases,
 - p. its building phases,
 - q. house allocation,
 - r. taking up of residence,
 - s. establishment of new community life?
- 24) From the challenges you have mentioned, which ones do you think were the major drawback to the project as a local leader?

e. Role of stakeholders in Khutsong settlement project

- 25) What was the role of the municipality in this project in contrast to the responsibility of other levels of government?
- 26) Did the municipality satisfactorily deal with problems that the settlement project encountered? (give possible problems)
- 27) How would you describe your relationships with:
 - o) Community
 - p) Contractors
 - q) Other local leaders
 - r) Municipality
 - s) Other
- 28) Do you generally have the confidence to share ideas in the entire Khutsong settlement project process with other stakeholders?
 - 5. If yes, what was that confidence based on?
 - 6. If not, what constricted you?
- 29) Has there been any form of conflict in your relationship with the following actors in relation to the implementation of the Khutsong housing?
 - k) Municipality
 - l) Construction Workers
 - m) Contractors
 - n) Community
 - o) Other
- 30) If so, what was the nature of the conflict?
 - a) Who were the main actors in the conflict?
 - b) How were they involved?
 - c) Has this relationship changed at all?

- d) If it changed, when?
 - 31) Do you think the local government's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
 - 32) Do you think community leaders' actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
 - 33) Do you think local community's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
 - 34) Do you think contractors' actions in the implementation of the project had any role in the conflict?
- f. Operationalisation of settlement project**
- 35) How do these different actors meet to facilitate the implementation of this housing programme?
 - a) Who initiates the process?
 - b) Who brings the various groups of people together?
 - c) Is there a well-established procedure to do this?
 - 36) How is the Khutsong housing project planned?
 - 4) Entire project
 - 5) Need analysis
 - 6) Other
 - 37) Does anyone besides the municipality have a say in the Khutsong housing project?
 - 38) How would you describe the nature of interaction that generally occurs in Khutsong housing project?
 - 8. Are all the stakeholders included in the implementation of the project?
 - 9. Do you feel included?
 - 39) The town planners would have preferred that only residents of the informal settlements in Khutsong be moved to the new housing settlement. However, the council later decided to use the housing list. What is your view on this?
 - 40) What challenges are you encountering in the utilisation of the waiting list?
 - 41) It appears that some community members move to the new houses but do not demolish the informal structures. They rent it or give it to a relative. What is your opinion on this?
- g. Environmental factors on settlement project**
- 42) At some time the town planners had initially viewed the housing project as a resettlement of the whole Khutsong due to dolomite. Is it your opinion that this was the original goal of the project?
 - i) How was the dolomite risk determined?
 - j) What measures were put in place to ensure the community was aware of the dolomite risk?
 - k) Did the municipality plan to resettle the whole community?
 - l) How did the project move from resettlement to a settlement?
- h. Contribution of settlement project**
- 43) In your opinion, what is the effect of this current housing project to Merafong with regards to:
 - 23) Economic opportunities
 - 24) Service delivery
 - 25) Public participation
 - 26) Poverty reduction
 - 27) Housing provision
 - 28) City integration
 - 29) Other
 - 44) How is the project changing the social dynamics in Khutsong, with regards to:
 - p) The family
 - q) Place of women in the community
 - r) Place of children in the community
 - s) Place of the elderly in the community
 - t) The youth in the community
 - 45) What is the nature of the relationship between the informal settlement (if any) and those associated with new settlement in Khutsong?

46) Do you think the policy of providing free housing to every homeless is sustainable?

i. Recommendations

47) If you had a piece of advice to share about the nature of relationships in the Khutsong housing project implementation, what would that be?

48) What do you think should be done to ensure that future housing projects are successful

j. General

49) Is there anything else about this major settlement project that you think would be important for a researcher to know?

I would also like to interview any other person who has influenced the current Khutsong housing project. Would you be able to suggest any other person, I could contact who had an active or influential role in the project?

Appendix 9. Focus Group Guide for Participants



Focus Group Guide for Participants

My name is Gift Mupambwa (24660248) and I am currently doing PhD in Sociology at the North West University, South Africa. As part of my PhD research, I am conducting semi-structured interviews that investigate the stakeholder relationships within the Khutsong Housing project. I am looking at the relationships amongst stakeholders, project processes, power or political issues and the impact of these dynamics on the formulation and implementation of the entire housing project in Khutsong by the Merafong Municipality. It is in this regard, that I seek to know more about your experience as a stakeholder within Khutsong settlement project. I will appreciate if you could participate in this interview. Any information obtained in connection with this study that can be identified with you will remain confidential. In any written reports or publications, no one will be identified. Please note that this study was ethically approved by the NWU and the ethics number is NWU-0011314A7. If you have any queries please contact the supervisor of this PhD study, Prof. S.J. Zaaiman at 018-2991627.

a. Introduction and biographical data

- 1) Are you in a position to freely discuss the Khutsong settlement project?
- 2) Do you understand the confidentiality of the research?
- 3) What is your position in the community?
- 4) How long have you been staying in Khutsong?
- 5) Are you willing to share a personal opinion about the settlement project?
- 6) Is your work related to the Khutsong settlement project?
- 7) Where in your view did the Khutsong settlement project originate?
- 8) Who were the main actors in the initial phase of the settlement project?
- 9) How did the demarcation issue impact on the settlement project?
- 10) Who were the key actors in the settlement project after the demarcation matter was resolved?
- 11) Who in the settlement project decides the following; decisions-making, planning, funding, appointment and management of contractors, allocation of housing.
- 12) Who are the groups of people involved in the current project?
- 13) Which segments of the community are the main beneficiaries of the project?
- 14) What role do you think the community plays?
- 15) What major decisions have occurred in the project?
- 16) What decisions do you generally make with regards to the Khutsong housing project?
- 17) In your opinion, which stakeholders influence(ed) the outcome of project?
- 18) How does the housing project fit into the creation of power relationships in Khutsong?
- 19) Do you think the influence of various actors in the housing project has had an impact in the progress of project?
- 20) In your opinion as a community member, do you feel you had any control over the Khutsong settlement agenda?
- 21) What is in your view the objectives of the settlement project?
- 22) Can you describe the project (overall progress, desired outcomes and current achievements)?
- 23) What were the challenges that the settlement project encountered throughout the project?

- 24) From the challenges you have mentioned, which ones do you think were the major drawback to the project as a community member?
- 25) How do you generally contribute to the agenda of the project?
- 26) What was the role of the municipality in this project in contrast to the responsibility of other levels of government?
- 27) Did the municipality satisfactorily deal with problems that the settlement project encountered? (give possible problems)
- 28) How would you describe your relationships with other actors in the project?
- 29) Do you generally have the confidence to share ideas in the entire Khutsong settlement project process with other stakeholders?
- 30) Has there been any form of conflict in your relationship with the following actors in relation to the implementation of the Khutsong housing?
- 31) If so, what was the nature of the conflict?
- 32) Do you think the local government's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 33) Do you think community leaders' actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 34) Do you think the community's actions in the implementation of the project had any role to play in the conflict?
- 35) Do you think contractors' actions in the implementation of the project had any role in the conflict?
- 36) How do these different actors meet to facilitate the implementation of this housing programme?
- 37) Does anyone besides the municipality have a say in the Khutsong housing project?
- 38) How would you describe the nature of interaction that generally occurs in Khutsong housing project?
- 39) The town planners would have preferred that only residents of the informal settlements in Khutsong be moved to the new housing settlement. However, the council later decided to use the housing list. What is your view on this?
- 40) What challenges are you encountering in the utilisation of the waiting list?
- 41) It appears that some community members move to the new houses but do not demolish the informal structures. They rent it or give it to a relative. What is your opinion on this?
- 42) At some time the town planners had initially viewed the housing project as a resettlement of the whole Khutsong due to dolomite. Is it your opinion that this was the original goal of the project?
- 43) In your opinion, what is the effect of this current housing project to the community?
- 44) How is the project changing the social dynamics in Khutsong?
- 45) What is the nature of the relationship between the informal settlement (if any) and those associated with new settlement in Khutsong?
- 46) If you had a piece of advice to give about the nature of relationships in the Khutsong housing project implementation, what would that be?
- 47) What do you think should be done to ensure that future housing projects are successful
- 48) Is there anything else about this major settlement project that you think would be important for the researcher to know?