

# Intelligence practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime – a meta- theoretical and theoretical analysis

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
Graduation: June 2018

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Enter the Grey Zone (Carothers:2002)

## DECLARATION

I declare that “**Intelligence practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime – a meta-theoretical and theoretical analysis**” to be my own work, that it has not been previously submitted for any degree or examination purposes at this or any other university, and that all the sources used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. J. de V.' with a stylized flourish at the end.

Signed

Date 20/11/2017

## DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis is dedicated to Cheryl.

I would like to sincerely express my gratitude and appreciation to:

My in-laws dad Billy, ma Marianne; Tanya and Megan;

My late father Barnie (in his memory), my mother Yvonne and siblings;

My study leader Professor Andre Duvenhage for his continued support and professional academic guidance and advice as well as for opening the world of meta-science and meta-theory;

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My employer for the opportunity to link the academic world with the profession;

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Soli Deo Gloria - Thank you for life.

For anyone - whose contribution I have not acknowledged herein - my sincere apology.

Lastly; this thesis aims to contribute to the fairly young academic field of intelligence studies as to provide an understanding of intelligence theory and practices for academics, practitioners and civil society for the benefit of all in our beloved country - South Africa.

## ABSTRACT

Intelligence is a necessary function of a state, albeit secret. All countries have an intelligence service of some sort. They reflect the history, culture, scars of the past and psychology of a nation. Moreover, these services are an epitome of the political regime of the country within whom and for which it exists. In addition, after the third wave of democratisation, several countries got stuck in the proverbial 'grey zone', neither reaching the end goal, nor reversing back into their former regime type. These so-called hybrid political regimes and their respective intelligence practices are the main interest and focus of this research.

For this reason, this thesis (which is not classified, to make the research findings available to both practitioners and scholars of intelligence studies), aims to contribute to the theory and understanding of intelligence studies as a sub-field within the political science in describing, explaining and analysing intelligence practices within different political regime types. The primary aim is to place intelligence studies within a conceptualised meta-scientific framework within the field of human science and the broader science. The secondary aim of this thesis is to contribute through meta-theorising to the existing theory an understanding of intelligence practices within different regime types after transition or regime change – as then to be able to develop new theory and a deepened understanding of such practices specifically within the notion of a hybrid political regime. The third and final aim of this study is to operationalise the theoretical and meta-theoretical framework and models within the history and development of political systems and intelligence practices in South Africa and to analyse its democratic transition as to be able to place its intelligence practices within the typology of its regime type.

The conceptual framework of this research forms the basis of this study and contributes as a roadmap to the understanding of intelligence studies within political science as an interdisciplinary sub-academic field. More so, the goal of this thesis is to conceptualise, reconstruct, contextualise (interpret) and analyse the dynamics between intelligence practices within democratic, non-democratic (authoritarian and totalitarian) and hybrid political regimes as to contribute to a deeper understanding as well as development of existing typologies, concepts, models and theory. In conducting a meta-theoretical and theoretical analysis of intelligence in South Africa as a hybrid political regime, this study is also able to identify trends and tendencies over time which enables not only an understanding and explanation of existing systems and practices, but also assist in developing scenarios for a future South Africa. These scenarios can assist in improving the existing political system and intelligence practices as to create a better life for all.



## KEY TERMS

Authoritarian

Control, Oversight and Accountability

Consolidated Democracy

Democracy

Democratisation

Form of Government

Government

Human Rights

Hybrid Political Regime

Intelligence: definition, elements, purpose, typology, models and theory

Neo-Patrimonialism

Non-democratic

Oligarchy

Political Regimes/Systems

Political Regime classification and theory

Politicisation

Regime Change

Regime Change Outcomes

Rule of Law

Security State

State

State Capacity

Transition

Totalitarian

Weak/Strong State

## OPSOMMING

Al is dit geheim, bly nasionale intelligensie 'n kern en noodsaaklike funksie binne 'n staat. Alle lande beskik oor een of ander vorm van intelligensie. Die spesifieke geskiedenis, kultuur, letsels van die verlede en denke van 'n staat word ook binne intelligensie reflekteer. Meer so is die tipe intelligensie ook 'n spieëlbeeld van die land vir wie en waarvoor dit bestaan. Verder meer, na die derde demokratiseringsgolf blyk dit duidelik dat nie al die lande in politieke verandering of oorgang die doelwit bereik het van demokratiese konsolidasie nie, of selfs nog teruggekeer het na die tipe staatsvorm wat dit gehad het voor verandering. Verskeie lande het vasgesteek in die sogenaamde 'grys sone' of te wel – hibriede regerings stelsel. Hierdie hibriede politieke sisteem en die intelligensie praktyke daarbinne, vorm die hoof fokus en belangstelling van hierdie navorsing.

Vir hierdie rede is hierdie proefskrif (wat nie geklassifiseer is nie ten einde die navorsingsbevindinge wyer beskikbaar te kan stel vir intelligensie lede sowel as studente binne intelligensie studies), 'n poging om 'n bydrae te maak tot die teorie en verstaan van intelligensie studies as 'n ondergeskikte akademiese terrein binne politieke wetenskap en die groter wetenskap. Hierdie word moontlik gemaak aan die hand van die beskrywing, verklaring en analise van intelligensie praktyke binne verskillende politieke regering regimes. Die primêre doelwit is om intelligensie studies vanuit 'n konseptuele meta-wetenskaplike raamwerk te kan plaas binne die groter mens wetenskap en wetenskap. Die sekondêre doelwit van hierdie tesis is om deur middel van meta-teoretisering 'n bydrae te kan lewer tot bestaande teorie ten einde intelligensie praktyke in verskillende regerings sisteme en veranderings, te kan verstaan en ontleed. Hierdie metode verskaf die moontlikheid tot 'n dieper verstaan van sodanige praktyke soos spesifiek met betrekking tot 'n hibriede politieke regime. Die derde en laaste doelwit van hierdie studie is die toepassing of operasionalisering van die teoretiese en meta-teoretiese raamwerk en modelle op die ontwikkeling en geskiedenis van politieke sisteme en die onderskeie intelligensie praktyke binne Suid-Afrika oor verskillende tydperke van die geskiedenis tot vandag. Daarmee gepaard word die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika ontleed en geanaliseer ten einde die intelligensie praktyk binne 'n bepaalde politieke regime klassifikasie te kan plaas.

Die konsepsuele raamwerk van hierdie navorsing vorm die basis van hierdie studie en dien terselfdertyd as 'n spreekwoordelike roetekaart om intelligensie studies binne politieke wetenskap as 'n interdisiplinêre sub-akademiese terrein, te kan plaas. Verder meer is die doel van hierdie tesis om te konseptualiseer, te herkonstrueer en te verstaan om sodoende die dinamika tussen intelligensie praktyke binne 'n demokrasie, nie-demokrasie of hibriede politieke stelsel te kan analiseer en vertolk. Hiermee kan 'n dieper verklaring en begrip van bestaande tipologieë, konsepte, modelle en teorieë ontwikkel word. Deur meta-teoretiese en teoretiese analise van

intelligensie praktyke in Suid-Afrika as 'n hibriede politieke sisteem, word verskeie tendense en patrone oor tyd geïdentifiseer wat dit moontlik maak om verskeie scenario's vir 'n toekomstige Suid-Afrika te kan ontwikkel. Hierdie scenario's verskaf nie alleen 'n beter begrip en verklaring van bestaande intelligensie en politieke sisteem praktyke nie, maar kan ook 'n bydrae lewer tot die daarstelling van 'n beter lewe vir almal.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
BIIS	Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence Service
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
CCSI	Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence
CI	Crime Intelligence
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
GCDCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DG	Director-General
DI	Defence Intelligence
DIS	Department of Information and Security of the African National Congress
DONS	Department of National Security
DMI	Division Military Intelligence
GNU	Government of National Unity
IA	Intelligence Academy
JSCI	Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence
NAT	Department of National Intelligence and Security of the African National Congress
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NCC	National Communication Centre
NC	National Communication
NICOC	National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NSMS	National Security Management System
OIC	Office of Interception Centre
PASS	Pan Africanist Security Service
PSU	Presidential Support Unit
RI	Republic Intelligence
SANAI	South African National Academy for Intelligence
SASS	South African Secret Service
SB	Security Branch of the South African Police
SSA	State Security Agency
SSC	State Security Council
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
TIS	Transkei Intelligence Service
VNIS	Venda National Intelligence Service
ZAR SS	Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek Secret Service/Geheime Politi



# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGIES

*"The boundary between democratic and nondemocratic is sometimes a blurred and imperfect one, and beyond it lies a much broader range of variation in political systems."*

Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989)

## 1.1 Introduction


The purpose of this study is to analyse and explain intelligence practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime, specifically since its transition towards a democracy. As it is argued that South Africa is a non-consolidated democracy, its intelligence is also described, explained and analysed within this notion. The dark and secret world of intelligence and espionage has fascinated humankind since the beginning of time and is regarded as a secret tool of a state to achieve various outcomes. The nature of intelligence secrecy and practices, are often viewed as a necessary evil which in its cloak and dagger activities full of blackmail and espionage, is perceived to be outside the rule of law and human rights. This world is also regarded synonymous with intrigue and mystique. Even more so, in a changing world especially after the end of the Cold War - with an emphasis and focus on democracy and democratic reform, it is not uncommon to see intelligence and its practices coming more and more under the spotlight of academics, students, practitioners, journalists and even civil society.

Nonetheless, intelligence studies as observed by Kahn (2001:1), is an academic discipline which has been around for only half a century. Although fairly young academically, it has its roots deeply embedded (even though as a sub-discipline) within political science – of which the latter has a profound history and thought. This symbiotic relationship goes back to the origins of modern day intelligence in classical espionage which is often viewed as the “second oldest profession” (Andrew, 1985:1 and Polmar & Allen, 1997:IH). This study therefore denotes that an intelligence service exists because of, and as a tool of a political regime, as also argued by Classen (2005:20) who states: “It is generally accepted, when looking at intelligence from a comparative perspective, that the nature of a country’s intelligence system to a great extent reflects the nature of that society – its traditions, history, culture, thinking and political system.” This could nevertheless provide an opportunity to intelligence services - due to the secret nature of their existence and activities - to be involved in less democratic and more lawless practices. It is assumed that a country struggling with democratic transformation and which has subsequently not yet reached the stage of democratic consolidation, could be regarded as being in a hybrid stage and therefore its intelligence could specifically be vulnerable to less democratic practices. This study is an expansion of the findings of a master’s dissertation undertaken with the topic: The Intelligence Regime in South Africa 1994-2014; an analytical perspective (Van Den Berg, 2014). Within the aforementioned study, Van Den Berg concluded that South Africa could be regarded as a hybrid

political regime and its intelligence practices coincides with that of a hybrid regime type, as well. The master's study furthermore had some limitations towards the contributions of theory and theory building within both political science as well as the subfield of intelligence studies. The research within this doctoral study aims to build on the master's study in its attempt to contribute to theory building both within political science, as well as in intelligence studies, through the description, explanation and analysis of intelligence practices within South Africa as a hybrid political regime. This study also provides for the conceptualising of a meta-scientific framework to place intelligence studies within the broader field of human science. An additional opportunity arises in this research as to contribute to the understanding of intelligence through meta-theorising of existing theories and knowledge.

## 1.2 Background and motivation

This study denotes that intelligence can be described as a three tier concept. Van Den Berg (2014:32) cited Kent (1953: ix) and defines intelligence in three distinctive contexts namely; a kind of knowledge, a type of organisation and the activity pursued by the organisation. Godson (1983:5) also argues that intelligence is at once knowledge, organisation and process. This concept involves the policy-maker as client/consumer of the intelligence or knowledge product; places the intelligence producer as the organisation/structure consisting of intelligence practitioners and identifies intelligence analysis and collection, as the activity/process whereby intelligence is acquired and produced. This concept is delineated as follows:



Source: Van Den Berg (2014:32)

**Figure 1: Intelligence as a trichotomy**

The notion maintained by this study that an intelligence service exists because *of* and *for* a political regime, brings three aspects to the fore. **Firstly**, an intelligence service exists to assist in safeguarding and protecting the national security of a state. In this context Kent (1953:ix) states

that: “Intelligence, as I am writing of it, is the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare”. Bruneau (2000:12) declares that all countries have an intelligence apparatus of some scope and capability. Similarly Born and Leigh (2007b:4) affirm that the need for intelligence is a fact of life for modern governments. Bruneau (2000:15) maintains that: “Intelligence is created to defend the state. It must defend it within the context of potential enemies, and taking into consideration the instruments they have available”. In addition Caparini (2007:1) notes that: “Intelligence and security services are key components of any state, providing independent analysis of information relevant to the external and internal security of state and society and the protection of vital national interest”. These aspects of intelligence are also addressed in the South African White Paper on Intelligence (1995:1) which in addition to the role of intelligence in South Africa states that: “In the South African context the mission of the intelligence community is to provide evaluated information with the following responsibilities in mind, namely: to safeguard the constitution, uphold individual rights, promote security, stability, cooperation and development, both within South Africa and in relation to Southern Africa, achieve national prosperity and lastly to promote South Africa's ability to face foreign threats and to enhance its competitiveness in a dynamic world”. These explained functions of intelligence involve not only the concept of state, but also stateness and statehood, civil society, state bureaucracy, human rights and rule of law. Within a consolidated democracy, intelligence is required not only to protect, secure and safeguard the national security of the state, but also to protect the constitution and to uphold human rights as part of its secret functions. This is specifically of interest for South Africa on its road towards democratic consolidation, as intelligence is a vital tool (although secret) to assist the political regime to reach this goal.

The **second** aspect of the abovementioned notion focuses on the role of intelligence and the policy-maker and policy making within a political regime. Turner (2006:4) depicts intelligence as: “...policy-relevant information; collected through open and clandestine means and subjected to analysis, for the purposes of educating, enlightening, or helping decision makers in formulating and implementing national security and foreign policy.” Furthermore, Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:1) refer to intelligence as: “... information relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interest and to deal with threats from actual or potential adversaries”. Meyer (1986:6), however elucidates that: “intelligence has come to mean information that not only has been selected and collected, but also analysed, evaluated, and distributed to meet the unique policymaking needs...” The focus of intelligence as fundamental to policymaking is furthermore captured in the intelligence cycle, which is utilised to describe and explain the processes of intelligence. The cycle portrays the prominent role and position of the policy-maker (also referred to as client/consumer/user) of intelligence as both the starting point and end result of intelligence activities (Clark, 2010:10; Gill & Phythian, 2006:3; Hulnick, 2006:959-979; Krizan, 1999:8; and Lowenthal, 2009:65-67). As indicated, intelligence

should also provide the policy-maker with relevant intelligence products to be able to make and implement sound policies. The changes made within the South African intelligence legislation evidently focusses away from providing the policy-maker with intelligence and more towards the securitisation of the state, as indicative in the findings of the study of Van Den Berg (2014). This notably impacts on the ability of the South African political regime to attain the goal of democratic consolidation and contributes to conditions more favourable so as to be categorised as a hybrid political regime. It is therefore forwarded by this study that the ultimate role of an intelligence service is to provide strategic intelligence that could assist the policy-maker in making policies (both foreign and domestic), that would ultimately ensure increased democratisation with subsequent democratic practices (Van Den Berg, 2014:171).

The **third** aspect of the notion that intelligence exists for and because of the political regime, focuses on intelligence as a reflection of the specific political regime - in which it exists and functions. Almond et al (2008:12) describe the political system as a particular type of social system that is involved in the making of authoritative public decisions with institutions such as governments, parliaments and bureaucracies as central elements, and includes political parties and interest groups. In reference to the policy-makers in the intelligence process, Lowenthal (2003:139) explains that “they do more than receive intelligence; they shape it.” Furthermore, Herman (2001:3) indicates that the use of the intelligence label also varies from country to country. In similar fashion, Lowenthal (2009:313) makes it clear that virtually every nation has some type of intelligence service and explains that: “... each nation’s intelligence services are unique expressions of its history, needs and preferred government structures”. Rathmell (2002:91) adds that the organisation and practices of intelligence were shaped by the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the Cold War and states that hierarchical and bureaucratized organisational structures of most intelligence institutions came close to the Weberian bureaucratic ideal. Gill (2003:5) claims that the actual structuring of any particular state’s security intelligence agencies and the appropriate forms of control, oversight or review, will be determined finally by the particular political culture and traditions of that state.

To this extent Hutton (2007:2) elaborates on this issue and points out that governance is closely tied to the internal order and political culture of a state and as governance structures are a product of the political evolution of a state, it also bears the fruits of or scars inflicted by previous regimes. Thus, the organisation and structure of intelligence is reflective of the requirements, needs and threat perceptions of each specific political regime. Similarly, Matei and Bruneau (2011:605) assert that all countries have at least one intelligence organisation of some scale, focus and competence. They add that there are differences between intelligence services in a democracy and those operating in non-democracies. This is also evident of the intelligence structures in South Africa which epitomised the intelligence regime from the establishment of the first


intelligence service of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek in 1880 to the creation of the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) in 1969. This epitome is continued in the Cold War era up to the formation of the National Intelligence Service in 1980, past the launching in 1995 of the new intelligence dispensation with inter alia the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and South African Secret Service (SASS) and into current post-apartheid South Africa, with the inauguration of the State Security Agency (SSA) in 2009 (Van Den Berg, 2014:82-111).

The so-called “waves” and subsequent reverse waves of democratisation as outlined by Huntington (1991), transformed the nature of some political regimes in the world in so far that they emerged in some or other form of democracy. Even so, some political scientists (Alvarez et al, 1996:3-22, Przeworski, 1996:3-4 and Sartori, 1987:3-20, 182-203) have argued that democracy should be conceived as a dichotomous phenomenon - a government is either democratic - or it is not. However, regime change and the transition of more than sixty countries towards democracy did not necessarily result in reaching the end goal of democratic consolidation as some countries even reverted back to non-democratic regime types (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 1996, 1999; Morlino, 2008; Schedler, 2001; Suttner, 2004; Wigell, 2008 and Zakaria, 2002.). These regimes that did not reach democratic consolidation but rather changed into a new form of political regime type, namely that of a hybrid political regime. This situation necessitates that political regime types should be redefined in a trichotomy as to include the notion of a hybrid political regime. This also enables this inquiry to position South Africa in relation to its transition towards democratic consolidation, as also indicated in the research by Van Den Berg (2014). The study of the dynamics between intelligence and a political regime is also required, with specific focus on the type of intelligence practices within a hybrid political regime. This needs to be compared with the intelligence practices in democratic as well as nondemocratic political regime types.

### **1.3 Problem statement**

Not all democracies are regarded as consolidated, as is arguably also the case with South Africa. Some regimes have not deepened their democracy to reach democratic consolidation and thus remain unconsolidated or as a hybrid democracy. A hybrid political regime is described as a political system or a form of government that is placed firmly between democratic and non-democratic systems. This means that there is room for improvement on aspects such as: (1) the state must be functional, there must be a lively participating civil society; (2) the political society must be autonomous and; (3) there must be a functional state bureaucracy with effective rule of law. This study postulates the notion that these conditions are only partially met or even not at all within a hybrid regime. If so, it is branded as a semi-consolidated regime (Freedom House), pseudo democracy (Diamond, 2002:21-25), partial democracy (Epstein et al, 2006:551-569),

flawed democracy (Economist Intelligence Unit-Democracy Index), electoral democracy (Diamond, 2002:25), illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997:22-43) or hybrid regime (Karl, 1995:72-86). Menocal et al (2008:29) elucidate that many new regimes have ended up 'getting stuck' in transition, or reverting back to more or less former authoritarian forms of rule. They furthermore occupy a precarious middle ground between outright authoritarianism and fully-fledged democracy, and their democratic structures remain fragile. This study delineates a trichotomy of regime types and their position in a linear construct from democratic to non-democratic political regimes, as well as the position of a hybrid regime, as follows:




Source: Own construct

**Figure 2: Trichotomy of political regime types to include a hybrid regime**

As already indicated, South Africa, having not yet reached democratic consolidation since its transformation began in 1994, could be labelled as a hybrid political regime - with its intelligence mirroring the regime it serves. Furthermore, in the foreword by Matthews to the South African Ministerial Review Committee on Intelligence Report (2008:7), he asserted that with the emergence of modern democratic states, a fundamental change has occurred in the nature of intelligence as an instrument of government. In this context, Bruneau and Boraz (2007:20-21) consider South Africa's success in reaching democratic consolidation as extremely critical because the country is important in its own right and as a model for the rest of Africa (as also argued by Seegers, 2010:264). They maintain that if democratic reforms cannot be secured in South Africa, there probably is not much hope for the rest of the continent. This notion is also postulated by this study. Nevertheless, the ultimate test for democracy lies within the notion forwarded by Przeworski (1991:26): "**democracy is consolidated** when under given political and economic conditions a particular set of institutions becomes the only game in town". At the same time the added concept of Huntington's (1993:266-267): "**two-turnover test**", whereby consolidation is achieved when power could be turned over through losing and winning elections, is also regarded as a vital element of democratic consolidation by this study. It remains to be seen whether South Africa could be a model specifically within the African continent and simultaneously if its intelligence could assist its political regime in reaching democratic consolidation. An analysis of the political regime in South Africa is crucial to identifying the characteristics and typology of current intelligence practices. Nathan (2010:195) states, those intelligence agencies all over the

world have special powers according to their regime types that permit them to operate with a specific level of secrecy and to acquire confidential information through the use of intrusive measures. Politicians and intelligence officers can abuse these powers to infringe on civil liberties, harass government's opponents, favour or prejudice political parties and leaders and thereby subvert democracy. In addition, Sheldon (2004:5-6), asserts on Le Carre's dictum, that each state's intelligence service is somehow a mirror of its regime type (national soul) and that intelligence is a true reflection of the regime controlling the government. Nonetheless, political regime types and its intelligence could be demarcated as follows:



Source: Van Den Berg (2014:78)

**Figure 3: Key features of political regimes and types of intelligence services**

Albeit, the question that arises is what does it mean now and in the future for intelligence in South Africa if the country is classified as a hybrid political regime? The central question this thesis will address with its analysis of South Africa is: how do intelligence practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime differ from intelligence practices in democratic and non-democratic political regimes? This question devolves into the following research questions:

## 1.4 Research questions and study objectives

This study will answer the following research questions:

- How and where is intelligence studies demarcated from a meta-scientific perspective?
- What are the prevailing intelligence theories, concepts and practices?
- How can political regime types and regime change be interpreted and reconstructed?
- What is the history of intelligence practices and political regimes in South Africa?
- What is the current intelligence theory and practice within South Africa?
- What should be included in a working theory of intelligence practices within a trichotomous regime typology (democratic, non-democratic and hybrid)?

The primary objective of this study is to contribute towards a working theory of understanding intelligence practices within a trichotomous regime typology. More so, the goal of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of intelligence practices in a hybrid political regime such as South Africa (as a yet non-consolidated democracy), through an analysis thereof. The research questions represent the following specific study goals or objectives:

- To reconstruct and explain a meta-scientific conceptual framework for the demarcation and understanding of intelligence studies as a sub-discipline within political science, social science and the broader science;
- To provide insight into intelligence theory, concepts and practices through the construction and implementation of a meta-theoretical framework for intelligence;
- To review (reconstruct), interpret and analyse political regime theory, classification and regime change;
- To explore the history/development of intelligence and political regimes in South Africa;
- To reconstruct, examine and analyse current intelligence theory and practices in South Africa
- To conceptualise, reconstruct, contextualise (interpret) and analyse the dynamics between intelligence practices within democratic, non-democratic (authoritarian and totalitarian) and hybrid political regime types.

## 1.5 Central Theoretical Assumption

Intelligence exists for and because of a political regime and reflects the dynamics thereof. After the Third Wave of democratisation and the subsequent reverse wave, many countries did not reach the goal of deepening their democracies and attaining democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991). Likewise, democratic transition does not necessarily guarantee that a new consolidated political regime would emerge. The result of democratic transition could culminate



in a non-consolidation or de-consolidated outcome or even a hybrid political regime with the impact on its intelligence (as a vital function) in those political regimes to reflect both democratic and non-democratic characteristics and practices. To this extent, the theory and practices of intelligence in South Africa is also epitomised by the level of its democratisation; which seems to have emerged into a non-consolidated democracy or hybrid political regime (Van Den Berg, 2014). Therefore, the questions that can be asked are; would intelligence in South Africa be a reflection of the characteristics and practices of a hybrid political regime and if so, what are its characteristics? The significance of this study can be elucidated as follows:

## 1.6 Significance of the study

A search of all relevant databases revealed no registered MA or PhD studies on the topic and therefore this study contributes not only to the current discourse of political regime types but even more so, to the concept of a hybrid political regime. This study extends Van Den Berg's (2014) initial research that locates intelligence as a reflection of the political regime through the simultaneous typology of both the political regime and its intelligence practices. Within the findings of his study, Van Den Berg (2014) states that the notion of a hybrid political regime, as having elements and characteristics of both democratic and non-democratic regimes, presents a fundamental shift in the perception of South Africa's democratisation process towards its attempt to reach the goal of being a consolidated democracy. South Africa democratisation remains a model to be studied in examining the possibility of it not reaching democratic consolidation and thus be less democratic, albeit not yet transgressing into a non-democratic regime type. Where some countries during the previous democracy waves reversed back to authoritarian regime types – it seems that transgression in others is now slower and more into the **grey zone or hybrid political regime type** (Van Den Berg, 2014). This study furthermore aims to contribute to the understanding of intelligence similarly as stated by Gill (2009a:212) that a good theory of *intelligence* should, by definition, be useful *for intelligence* - as *also* the starting point of this research.

Nonetheless, the main academic contribution of this doctoral study in comparison to the initial master's study of Van den Berg (2014) is founded towards the building and creating of intelligence and political theories. The first major contribution is the construct of a meta-scientific conceptual framework for the understanding of intelligence studies as a sub-discipline within the broader science field. This study's second academic contribution will be its most significant, namely; a contribution to a deeper understanding of intelligence and its practices, through a meta-theoretical review and reconstruction of existing intelligence theories, to enable the construct of a new theory of intelligence practices within a trichotomous regime typology. A third important contribution will be to reconstruct the classification and characteristics of intelligence practices within the different


political regime types and more so the conceptualisation of intelligence in a hybrid political regime. The fourth contribution will be to evaluate, interpret and analyse the intelligence practices within the South African political context (both historical and current), as operationalisation and application of the theoretical constructs. Finally, the conceptualised theoretical contributions by this study could be useful to explain and describe intelligence practices as well as political regime dynamics, within other countries as well as to provide for future perspectives for South Africa.

## 1.7 Methodology and literature review

This study has as a research purpose both to describe and to explain and as stated in the research objectives, the methodological focus is to reconstruct, interpret and analyse. To this extent Kuhn (1970) explains in his book: "The structure of scientific revolutions" concerning paradigms, that new assumptions (paradigms/theories) require the reconstruction of prior assumptions and the re-evaluation of prior facts. Likewise, Mouton and Marais (1996:44) describes that: "The single common element in all of these types of research is the researcher's goal, which is to describe that which exists as accurately as possible." Furthermore, linking the *Verstehen* (German - to understand in a deep way) approach of Weber (1946), Neuman (2011:84) argues that the purpose of interpretive explanation is to foster understanding. In addition, Mouton and Marais (1996:8) debate, that research is not mechanical or automatic as it is directed towards the goals of understanding, gaining insight as well as explanation. Similarly, Mouton (2001:92) writes that the aim of theoretical and conceptual studies is to review and discuss the most relevant and appropriate theories, models or definitions of a particular phenomenon. This study aims to achieve the specific study objectives through description and exploration. The research design of this study in terms of ontology and epistemology follows a qualitative method in nature, based on a realist approach. It is the premises of the research approach that: "...there is a real world 'out there'..." (Poetschke, 2003:2-4). This is supported by Walsh (2011:285) who claims that intelligence research is underpinned by a positive approach that could be used to explain and interpret events for a greater understanding thereof. Although the predominant school within intelligence studies, similar to the practitioners thereof, are within a positivist approach, this study nevertheless promulgates a neo-positivist approach in stating that academic researchers are not totally neutral or objective as they all display an inherent subjective pre-belief towards the world.

This approach to the study of intelligence is further deliberated upon by Gill and Phythian (2012b:34) who state that it has its roots in a foundational ontology that the real world exists independently of our knowledge which is developed by observation and the aim to explain what "is" and not what "ought to be". Mouton and Marais (1996:20) denote that social science generally distinguishes between three methodological approaches namely; quantitative, qualitative and participatory action. This study mainly follows a qualitative approach that is described by Mouton

and Marais (1996:160) as: “For the qualitative researcher *concepts* and *constructs* are meaningful words that can be analysed in their own right to gain a greater depth of understanding of a given concept. It is a frequent occurrence that qualitative researchers will conduct an etymological analysis of a concept as part of their description of a phenomenon. Such researchers will then interpret the phenomenon on the basis of the wealth of meaning of the concept.” Likewise, Babbie (2013:25) states that qualification makes observation more explicit and easier to aggregate, compare and summarise data. Babbie (2013:22) argues that the common goal of theory and research is to describe and explain all human socio-cultural phenomena. Babbie (2013:90-92) also explains that the most common and useful purposes of social research are exploration (of a topic for a better understanding), description (of situations and events by answering questions of what, where, when and how) and explanation (explain things and answering why). Likewise, Mouton (2001:92) claims that the aim of theoretical and conceptual studies is to review and to discuss the most relevant and appropriate theories, models or definitions of a particular phenomenon. Nonetheless, doctorateness as key to this thesis is illustrated according to Trafford and Leshem (2008:134), as follows:




Source: Reproduced from Trafford and Leshem (2008:134)

Figure 4: Level of thinking and research

In addition, Trafford and Leshem (2008:33-51), reflect in their book that a doctorate represents a level of knowledge, skills and attitudes that involve intellectualising, conceptualising and contributing to knowledge – which is also the aim of this study. By this, Trafford and Leshem (2008:134) illustrate the relationships between levels of thinking (from description, through analysis and then to the conceptual) on a vertical axis as compared with the level of research (from a low to a high quality) on a horizontal axis.

All the same, the following research framework serves as a model or roadmap for the methodological approach within this study:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 5: Research framework**

In relation to the research framework above, this study establishes different viewpoints of the concept of frameworks within the literature on research methodology, which even contains contradictions, duplication and confusion of the understanding and utilisation thereof. Therefore, to enable clarity of the utilisation of paradigms or frameworks within this research, the following explanations are postulated by this study. Firstly, the notion of a *research framework* which this study regards as part of the outline and methodology of the research processes, as indicated above in Figure 5. Secondly, the concept of a *conceptual framework* or *meta-scientific framework*,

which is regarded as a paradigm that contains the world view, epistemological, ontological and methodological approaches to political science and intelligence studies within the social sciences and broader science. This framework also serves as a scientific roadmap for the rest of this study although specific concepts will be dealt with later in this study. The third concept is that of a *theoretical framework or meta-theoretical framework*; which contains the world view and approaches of the different theories of the phenomena (intelligence) under study and also includes concepts and definitions – with the aim to construct an overarching theory of intelligence as well as contributing to further theory development. The latter is derived from the conceptual framework which serves as a scientific roadmap to this study but will receive more detailed attention later in this study.

In summary, the goal is to create a meta-scientific framework for the understanding of intelligence studies as a sub-discipline within the broader political science. This would enable the conception of a meta-theoretical framework for understanding of the phenomenon of intelligence within a hybrid political regime thereby integrating theoretical and conceptual components with the methodological through deductive reasoning of theories and constructs. By this process moving from the general to the specific (Babbie, 2013:22) theory concerning important concepts and phenomena on intelligence and political regimes in general and more specifically intelligence in a hybrid political regime, a framework can be constructed as to identify, interpret and evaluate such practices within South Africa. In aiming to make the research results more accessible to scholars and practitioners within intelligence studies alike, this study *is not classified* and only overtly available sources of information are utilised and accessed.

The main technique of obtaining data (knowledge) from a qualitative study is the analysis of relevant literature at the hand of a review. This study examined it as follows: The notion of a hybrid regime is a recent phenomenon and literature on this issue with specific reference to published books, is limited. This does not restrict a study thereof as the limited books are sufficient and furthermore supplemented with a more than adequate number of scholarly and academic articles available in various journals. Core literature for this study in political science includes works such as the following: Joseph Schumpeter (1976. Capitalism, socialism and democracy); David Easton (1953. Political system); Robert Dahl (1971. Polyarchy); Larry Diamond (2002. Thinking about hybrid regimes), Samuel Huntington (1991. Democracy's Third Wave, 1993. Political order in changing societies), Joel Migdal (1988. Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World). Additional relevant literature could be found in the following books and articles within the political science domain namely: Carothers, T. (2002. The end of the transition paradigm); Diamond, L.J., Linz, J. and Lipset, S.M. (1988. Democracy in developing countries); Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (1997. Democratic experiments in Africa); Erdman, G. and Engel, U. (2006. Neo patrimonialism Revisited); Fukuyama, F. (2005. The

missing dimension of stateness); Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. (1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation); Menocal, R.M., Fritz, V. and Rakner, L. (2008. Hybrid regimes and the challenges of deepening and sustaining democracy in developing countries); Morlino, L. (2008. Hybrid regimes or regimes in transition?); Siaroff, A. (2009. Comparing political regimes); and Wigell, M. (2008 Mapping 'Hybrid Regimes'). Literature on methodology consist of the following: Babbie, E. (2013. The Practice of Social Research); Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. (2008. The practice of social research); Clauser, J. (2008. Introduction to intelligence research and analysis); Halperin, S. and Heath, O. (2012. Political research; Methods and practical skills); Kuhn, T. S. (1970. The structure of scientific revolutions); Mouton, J. and Marais, H.C. (1996. Basic concepts in the methodology of social science); and Neuman, W.L. (2011. Social research methods).

A third category of relevant literature towards intelligence and intelligence theory can be found in the following books and articles: Agrell, W. (2002. When everything is intelligence: nothing is intelligence); Bay, S. (2007. Intelligence theories); Born, H. & Caparini, M. (2007. Democratic control of intelligence services containing rogue elephants); Bruneau, T.C. & Dombroski, K. (2006. Reforming intelligence: the challenge of control in new democracies); Caparini, M. (2007. Controlling and overseeing intelligence); Gill, P. (1994. Policing politics: security intelligence and the liberal democratic state); Gill, P. (2016. Intelligence Governance and Democratisation); Gill, P., Marrin, M. & Phythian, M. (2009. Intelligence theory); Johnson, L.K. (2003a. Preface to a theory of strategic intelligence); Johnson, L.K. (2009. Handbook of intelligence studies); Kent, S. (1953. Strategic intelligence for American world policy); and Lowenthal, M.M. (2009. Intelligence: from secrets to policy).

Another category of literature that will be examined consists of primary sources within the South African domain as well as books and articles on South African intelligence. These include South African legislation, the White Paper on Intelligence of South Africa, South African Intelligence public reports, Ministerial Speeches and Commission Reports such as the Potgieter (1969 and 1970), Pikoli (*In Farson & Phythian, 2011:234-237*) and Matthews (2008) Commissions. Other primary sources include books and journals as follows: Africa, S.E. (2009. The South African intelligence services: a historical perspective, in changing intelligence dynamics; 2012. The policy evolution of the South African civilian intelligence services: 1994 to 2009 and beyond); Dombroski, K. (2007. Transforming Intelligence in South Africa); Cilliers, J. (2017. Fate of the nations – 3 scenario's for South Africa's future); Natrass, G. (2017. A short history of South Africa); Giliomee, H. and Mbenga, B. (2007. Nuwe geskiedenis van Suid Afrika); Pauw, J. (2017. The President's Keepers); Mashele, P. and Qobo, M. (2014. The fall of the ANC); Johnson, R.W. (2015. How long will South Africa Survive); Cronje, F. (2014. A time traveller's guide to our next ten years); Pretorius, F. ed. (2012a. Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika, voortye tot vandag); and Van der Waag, I.

(2015. A military history of modern South Africa). Furthermore, on the issue of data and sources on democracy and freedom ratings, there are various indexes available such as the Freedom Index from Freedom House, the Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, The Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme and the Rainbow Index published by the South African Institute for Race Relations. Finally, existing theses and dissertations relevant to this category and the research findings where applicable will also be consulted, Duvenhage, A.'s thesis: *'n transformasie van politieke instellings in oorgangstye: 'n rekonstruksie, interpretasie en evaluasie van S.P. Huntington se teoretiese bydrae* (1994) as well as Van Den Berg, M.A.'s dissertation: *The Intelligence Regime in South Africa 1994-2014; an analytical perspective*.(2014).

This research is based on the following chapter allocation.

## 1.8 Chapter division

**Chapter 1: Introduction, problem statement and research methodology:** The first chapter will serve as an introduction where the problem statement, methodology and objectives for the rest of the study will be set out.

**Chapter 2: A Meta-scientific conceptual framework for intelligence studies:** Chapter two provides a conceptual framework for intelligence studies within political science and the broader social science, as departure point that underpins this research from a meta-scientific perspective.

**Chapter 3: A Meta-theoretical framework to conceptualise intelligence theory:** This chapter will construct a meta-theoretical framework for the understanding of intelligence and the conceptualising of intelligence theory and will define, review and analyse constructs such as paradigms, theories, models, concepts, typologies and concepts, to enable the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation, thereof. It will place intelligence theories in specific traditions and paradigms.

**Chapter 4: A Conceptualisation of state, government and regime change:** Chapter four consists of a conceptualisation of state, government and regime change or transformation as well as the subsequent outcomes of such change, to enable the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation thereof.

**Chapter 5: A Conceptualisation of democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regimes:** Chapter five consists of a conceptualisation of political regime types and practices,

to enable the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of existing theory, concepts, classification and models and more so to develop and understand new theory specifically to the notion of a hybrid political system.

**Chapter 6: A theoretical framework for intelligence practices within democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime contexts:** Chapter six will deal with the exploration of democratic and non-democratic intelligence concepts and practices. It will place a theory of intelligence and its practices as part of a more comprehensive political system in the context of democratic, non-democratic or hybrid political regimes, through the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation thereof.

**Chapter 7: The history and development of South African intelligence within a political regime context:** This chapter analyses and explains the development and history of South African Intelligence in contexts of the development and history of its political regime. Intelligence structures and functions will be placed against the dynamics and characteristics of changes within the political regime, as to be able to analyse current practices. The political and intelligence theory, frameworks, models and typologies addressed in previous chapters, will be implemented to enable a description and explanation of the history and development of South African regime and intelligence practices as also linked to world events.

**Chapter 8: A historical interpretation, evaluation and future perspectives on regime/intelligence practices in South Africa:** This chapter will provide a historical reflection and interpretation of political regime and intelligence practices in South Africa. Chapter eight will aim to further an understanding of the current political regime and intelligence functions in context of South Africa's democratisation and development. The political regime and intelligence practices will be placed against the scientific framework constructs employed in the above-mentioned chapters and contributions will be synthesised and integrated. This enables the conceptualisation of current and future perspectives on political regime and intelligence practices in South Africa.

**Chapter 9: Overview and final conclusions:** The final chapter will seek to summarise the main issues addressed in the study and make some crucial points arising from the study. This chapter will review the points of departure of the study, the conceptual and meta-theoretical frameworks proposed by the study and the contribution to the theory of intelligence as reflected within the primary research goals. The central theoretical statement will be evaluated to be able to provide findings and conclusions of the study.



## CHAPTER 2: A Meta-scientific Conceptual Framework for Intelligence Studies

*"There's real poetry in the real world. Science is the poetry of reality."*

Richard Dawkins, *The Enemies of Reason*, 13 August 2007

### 2.1 Introduction

Considering that intelligence is often referred to as the oldest/second oldest profession (Andrew, 1985:1, Bay, 2007:1 and Polmar & Allen, 1997:IH), and has its roots in espionage that could be traced back to ancient soothsayers such as the Delphi oracle during the 8<sup>th</sup> century BC (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2015 and Classen, 2005:2), it is a fairly new academic study field in comparison to other major fields within the social sciences. Although intelligence is mainly practiced as a secret function within a state, it continues to develop as a sub-field of academic study, specifically within political science. This is also evident over the past five decades where it has been taken more seriously as an academic discipline outside the world of its practitioner's, as reflected upon by academics including Matey (2005:1-15) and Kahn (2001:79). All the same, intelligence similar to other fields of study requires a scientific framework or conceptual framework, to serve as a constructive guidance of its research on the one hand, as well as to assist in attaining the goal of producing knowledge for the better understanding thereof, on the other. Furthermore, as also delineated by this study most scholars/academics failed dismally in providing even some sort of scientific/conceptual framework for the study of intelligence.

This study regards this situation as an academic failure, with the lack of such a conceptual framework, which not only on the development of intelligence studies, but also more importantly, on the building and development of theory. This process as supported by this study is also postulated by Kuhn (1970) as reflected in his groundwork: 'The structure of scientific revolutions', specifically on science and paradigms. In addition to the discourse on the need for such a framework, Duvnhage (1994:57-67) argues that a framework enables the researcher to reconstruct, interpret and evaluate theoretical contributions to a specific phenomenon or problem within the specific field of study based on the norms and values of a certain scientific approach/belief. This said, this approach would also enable this study in its aim to conduct a theoretical analysis of intelligence.

Moreover, this chapter aims to address the concept of a *conceptual framework* or *meta-scientific framework* (as also introduced in chapter one). This study regards a meta-scientific framework as a paradigm that contains the world view, epistemological, ontological and methodological approaches to political science and intelligence studies as a sub study field - within the social sciences and the broader science. This framework also serves as a scientific roadmap for the rest

of this study although specific intelligence and political concepts will be dealt with in more detail within chapter three to four. However, to be able to reach the goal of this study as reflected in the title, namely to conduct a theoretical assessment of the notion of intelligence in a hybrid political regime, the conceptualisation of intelligence studies within firstly political science, social science and then science about science or meta-science, requires deliberation. This includes concepts such as scientific methodology and knowledge. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to provide a meta-scientific point of departure for this research - thereby contributing to a meta-scientific conceptual framework for intelligence as an academic field of study. This is in line as Babbie and Mouton (2001:xxIII) who explain, to stand back as researcher and enter the mode of meta-scientific thinking and begin to reflect on what we are doing in the practice of research, as also relevant to this thesis within intelligence studies and political science..


Chapter two aims to provide a conceptual framework that could serve as a scientific route map for the study of intelligence within the broader scientific domain on the one hand and to contribute to the understanding and conceptualisation of intelligence and intelligence theory on the other. It will start with an explanation of science and meta-science. This would be followed by a brief description of a meta-scientific framework for this study which includes the different levels of the scientific process, which is based on both knowledge and a process. The current discourse on intelligence as a mere practice or profession on the one hand or as an art or science on the other, would also benefit from such a framework. This chapter discusses various scientific constructs through the delineation of the scientific process and the broader dimensions of social science as well as scientific beliefs and approaches. More specifically, chapter two furthermore aims to place intelligence studies within the political science discipline and traditions. This will pave the way to examine scientific concepts within the next chapter that concern paradigms, theories, typologies, definitions and constructs within a meta-theoretical framework for intelligence studies.

## **2.2 A meta-scientific conceptual framework for intelligence studies**

The origin of the word science is derived from the Latin word *scientia* which means knowledge, from *scīre* to know (Collins Dictionary, 2017). Adding to this, the Oxford Dictionary (2015) defines science as an intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure of behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment. Science is a human invention (Neuman, 2011:9) which was built on past knowledge studying the natural world initially and later the social world. Science can be grouped into two broad categories namely; natural science (includes disciplines such as physics, biology and geology which mainly concern the environment in which human beings exist) and social science (which deals with all aspects of human life and includes disciplines such as psychology, sociology, economics and polity – see Bryman, 2012:4; Landman, 2009:11-15; Neuman, 2011:8-10 and

Mouton & Marais, 1996:145-146). However, according to Chalmers (1999:168): “a science will consist of some specific aims to arrive at knowledge of some specific kind, methods for arriving at those aims together with the standards for judging the extent to which they have been met, and specific facts and theories that represent the current state of play as far as the realization of the aim is concerned”. Bhattacharjee (2012:3) adds that: “The goal of scientific research is to discover laws and postulate theories that can explain natural or social phenomena, or in other words, build scientific knowledge”. He confirms that it is important to understand that this knowledge may be imperfect or even quite far from the truth. In addition, Walsh (2011:293) argues that fundamental research or more specific research in intelligence is about generating knowledge.

Furthermore, the following clarification provided by Mouton and Marais (1996:7) is also postulated by this study: “Social sciences research is a collaborative human activity in which social reality is studied objectively with the aim of gaining a valid understanding of it”. This also forms the nucleus of this study goal. This implies that research is an activity or process whereby knowledge is obtained through a specific scientific method. Bhattacharjee (2012:1) states that science refers to the systematic and organised acquiring of a body of knowledge, using a scientific method or process, whereby Gregor (2004:X) explains that this therefore is subject to constant review and revision. In addition, the concept of science as both knowledge process and method could be delineated as follows:




Source: Own construct

**Figure 6: The concept of science**

Nevertheless, science as a body of knowledge also focuses on three distinct orders of knowledge. The first order of knowledge is knowledge about the world within the science domain and includes natural science, religion and politics. Second order knowledge is knowledge derived from a reflection on first order knowledge and has a mother body of knowledge about a subject. An analysis of theoretical contributions is based on a third order meta-theoretical framework. As Duvenhage (1994:16) states, too many studies within the political science which focuses on second order theoretical analysis lacks a proper formulated and defined third order meta-

theoretical framework as foundation. This argument is also reflective of the current status within intelligence studies as a sub-discipline within political science and therefore this study also aims to include a meta-theoretical framework in this regard. On the concept of knowledge, Mouton (1996:7-11) distinguishes in his three world framework between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge and argues that there are three worlds, each with its own stock of knowledge. This is delineated as follows:



Source: Adapted from Mouton (2012)

**Figure 7: Three World Knowledge Framework**


Lay knowledge is the concern in the world of everyday life (World I). This knowledge is what ordinary people use to enable them to cope effectively with their daily tasks and is not acquired through rigorous and systematic testing, but through learning, experience and self-reflection on phenomena in the world of economics, the physical world, politics etc. In this world people are subject to their own decisions and actions. In the World of Science concerning scientific knowledge (World II) phenomena in World I (economics, the physical world, politics etc.) are objects of systematic and rigorous inquiry and investigation by scientists. To this extent the overriding goal of science is the search for truth. In World III – the World of Meta-science – the reflection on the nature and dynamics of science has World II as an object of critical inquiry and reflection in order to improve science and what scientists do. Moreover, where scientific knowledge and processes becomes the object or reflection of a study – the world of meta-science, is being entered into.

The concept of the study of science received attention from several academics including Thomas Kuhn (1970), who accounts to the philosophy or knowledge of science. Similarly, Paul

Feyerabend (1987) discusses the idea of incommensurability (meaning - no common mathematical measure and having its origins in Ancient Greek mathematics) of science in reference to the philosophy of science; in his publication: "*Science in a free society*". Likewise, Michael Polanyi (1958) refers to scientific knowledge in his work "*Personal Knowledge*". The classical work of Ernest Nagel (1961), "*The structure of science*" could also be included as well as Karl Popper's (1976), contributions to the discourse in his book "*The myth of the Framework*". In this context, meta-science literally means after or beyond science and uses the tools of science to study science where the object of the study is focussed on scientific knowledge and scientific activities. Hereby, meta-science as the science about science or beyond science uses rigorous methods to examine how science practices have an impact on the validity of scientific conclusions. Meta-science or science about science is a form of science which focuses on science. It is also sometimes referred to as the philosophy of science. Meta-science is not only about the nature or essence of science, but about the being of science. This also becomes the core question, namely: "What constitutes scientific knowledge and activities"? This is ultimately a reflection of researchers upon their own practices within their field of study in being critical of their own discipline's dimensions of epistemology, ontology, sociology and methodology which includes conceptual foundations, presumptions, theories, models, and paradigms. This is also applicable to intelligence studies as a science.

Moreover, Mouton's (1996:26) analogy of science towards that of a traveller on a journey, as also relevant to this study, consists of four main dimensions, namely: (1) The *traveller* or *scientist* with certain resources, who has a certain motive for undertaking the journey or research; (2) the *destination* or *research objectives/goal*; (3) the *route* or *phenomenon/aspect* of the social world to be investigated and lastly; (4) the *mode of transport* or *methodologies* to be employed. Within this explanation of science, the emphasis is on the four dimensions namely the sociological – research as a social activity, ontological - relating to the different ways of studying reality, epistemological – which focuses on the different forms of knowledge of that reality and the methodological – which focuses on the different ways of knowing that reality.

Albeit, Mouton and Marais (1996:8), added one dimension, the teleological dimension. This dimension implies research in the social sciences is an intentional and goal directed human activity with its main aim of understanding phenomena. These dimensions form the nucleus of the nucleus of science and are also applicable in the academic study of intelligence science and supported by this study and would be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. This multidimensionality of science and the scientific route travelled, could be delineated as follows:



Source: Adapted from Mouton (1996:26)

**Figure 8: The multidimensionality of science**

Although human behaviour and human beings are at most not predictable and make the study of their actions more difficult in comparison to the study of phenomena within natural science, it is nevertheless clear in many readings that politics and subsequently intelligence studies, could be studied scientifically. All the same, the concept science could be summarised as both a knowledge process and a method reflecting five dimensions namely sociological, ontological, teleological, epistemological and methodological which are all integrated even though they are separate concepts.

### 2.3 Constructing a meta-scientific conceptual framework for intelligence studies

In light of intelligence studies still being viewed as a new field of study in comparison to other disciplines such as sociology, psychology and political sciences, it requires to be located within the broader domain of science in both an effort to enhance it as a study field and to build its theory. Intelligence studies as a science needs to develop and therefore requires a paradigm as Kuhn (1970:11) argues: “Acquisition of a paradigm of the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific field”. The value of a paradigm and its purpose in research is also highlighted by Kuhn (1970:175) where he reflects that a paradigm: “... stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.” This is also relevant and of importance in the effort to place intelligence studies within political studies, the social sciences and science in the broad. Likewise, Stoker (1961:133-136 and 2010:13-15), explains that it entails a specific gaining of knowledge through a guided inquiry concerning the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of the known. He (Stoker, 1961:135)

deliberates and states that science concerns a specific consideration, description, explanation, understanding and judgement of the known or knowable. This is in terms of the discovery, understanding and theoretical version of the context of the knowable to be able to postulate a system. He (Stoker, 1961:136) continues to explain that science should gain knowledge as much as possible technically verified and technically systemised. Even so, according to this study, Kuhn's (1970:1-110) conceptual schemata or paradigm serves as a vital contribution in the understanding or sense-making of meta-science.

A need thus exists to construct a meta-scientific conceptual framework that could serve as a scientific roadmap in order to understand and explain the paradigms, theories, concepts definitions and phenomena within intelligence studies as a sub field within its discipline of political sciences, the social science and science as a whole. In this context as Neuman (2011:94) states: "In general, a scientific paradigm is a whole system of thinking. It includes basic assumptions, the important questions to be answered or puzzles to be solved, the research techniques to be used, and examples of what good scientific research looks like." All the same, Maree (2011:30) debates on the issue of the need to explicate a conceptual framework that it shows the origin of the research, or test theory or is applied to the theory in your own research strategy. The goal of providing a meta-scientific point of departure to scientific research within this study is an attempt to provide such a systematic approach through the construct of an almost overarching framework to shape and guide the description, explanation and understanding of the world we live in. Such a framework obviously influences the points of departure, approach and viewpoints of this study with specific reference to ontology, epistemology, methodology and the position of intelligence studies within the political science discipline as well as broader social sciences.

The purpose of this meta-scientific approach enhances the aspects that would enrich the research, design and scientific methodologies and techniques to link intelligence studies with the development of well-defined research, enable the facilitation of a greater body of knowledge and lastly to ultimately enhance the profession. Having stated this, an outline or more constructed delineation of such a framework for the understanding of specifically intelligence within this research, is required. As Maxwell (2005:41) states: "... a conceptual framework is something that is constructed, not found. It incorporates pieces that are borrowed from elsewhere, but the structure, the overall coherence, is something that you build, not something that exists ready-made". Alike, Leshem and Trafford (2007:102-103) argue in their research article concerning the significant role of conceptual thinking and conceptual frameworks in doctoral level research, that within doctorate research the level of thinking of candidates raised beyond descriptive and content aspects of research display increased doctorateness. They continue to state, that doctorateness emerges for researchers as the progress upwards in their thinking in coping with the different

intellectual demands from description, through analysis and interpretation and then to the conceptual.

To this extent, Jabareen (2009:41) provides the following main features relevant during the building of a conceptual framework, namely (1) It is a construct which lays out the key factors, constructs, or variables, and presumes relationships among them; (2) It provides an interpretative approach to social reality; (3) It provides understanding; (4) It is not knowledge of “hard facts” but, rather, “soft interpretation of intentions”; (5) Conceptual frameworks do not enable us to predict an outcome; (6) Conceptual frameworks can be developed and constructed through a process of analysis; and (7) The sources of data consist of many discipline-oriented theories that become the empirical data of the conceptual framework analysis that seeks to generate new interpretations for which there is a consensus within a particular field of study. Nonetheless, apart from the contributions of Kuhn (1970) and Stoker (1961) on the need for a paradigm or framework as reflected above, this study also relies on the contribution of Duvenhage (1994:17-71) in his doctoral thesis in specific reference to the construct of a meta-theoretical framework for scientific practices. In his study, he identifies five clearly distinguishable levels or contexts within the scientific process, for the practice of science, namely:

- Pre-science context – Applicable to scientists and non-scientists. This context is a pre-science belief or as stated by Stoker (2010:12) a pre-science world and life view.
- Science – Limited to the active practitioners of science. This context includes the goal of obtaining reliable and valid knowledge through acceptable scientific methods, as deduced from a specific scientific viewpoint/belief and the quest for structure and order – to attempt to know and understand the science.
- Subject discipline – The field of study as being structured into a discipline and the specific traditions, approaches and paradigms of thinking thereof.
- Theoretical context – The development and preferences of specific conceptual frameworks, typologies, models and theory, pertaining to the discipline and the phenomenon/problem under inquiry.
- Operational context - Order and structure is the focus during the inquiry to obtain reliable and valid knowledge in order to understand reality. (Duvenhage, 1994:57-59).


Moreover, Kuhn (1970:11) states that the: “Acquisition of a paradigm and of the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific field.” This is also applicable to the study field of intelligence as an academic discipline. To this extent Matey (2007:1) argues the following which is also supported by this study, namely: “The conceptual framework in which intelligence is studied must continue evolving and adapting to the new conditions and possibilities of the early twenty-first century. As more intelligence and



intelligence related material than ever before enters into the public domain, scholars of international relations must take greater account of it and study of the role of intelligence.” This is furthermore supported by Goodman (2006:1) who states that: “One consequence of this has been the large-scale growth of intelligence study and teaching academically, as reflected both in the number of courses being offered and in the jump in enrolment in such courses. As such, the public’s desire to know more is reflected accurately in its academic existence.”

The goal is that such a conceptual framework would serve as a scientific roadmap to place intelligence studies within the broader science and to be able to construct a meta-theoretical framework for the understanding of intelligence. The latter would enable a contribution to the current discourse on a paradigm for intelligence studies and the contributions to the theory of intelligence. Furthermore, the attempt by this study to compile a conceptual framework, is in line with the argument provided by Trafford and Leshem (2008:84-88), that a conceptual framework is a mirror on how you think about your research and reflects your conceptual grasp and higher thinking about the research process and that a conceptual framework introduces order in a doctoral candidate’s thinking process about the conceptual background and context of his/her research. This practice is also supported by Eisenhart (*In Underhill*, 1991:211) who states that relative to theoretical frameworks, conceptual frameworks facilitates more comprehensive ways of investigating a research problem

Therefore, intelligence as a profession and science requires to be examined within the context of a meta-scientific framework or science within science. This would enable a better understanding of intelligence studies and ultimately intelligence as a concept, which is vital to be able to describe and explain its role and functions within different political regime types – which is also the aim of this study. Nonetheless, a need exists to design and afford a conceptual framework for the understanding of intelligence studies from a meta-scientific perspective taking the concept of science as both a process and body of knowledge into account. All the same, in linking the context as explained by Duvenhage (1994:17-71) with the three world concept and multidimensionality of science of Mouton (Mouton, 1996:26); within the paradigm constructs of Kuhn (1970:1-11), and the discourse on aspects of social science of Mouton and Marais (1996:8) as well as Stoker (1961:133-136), this study postulates a conceptual framework as vital to intelligence studies and is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct as adapted from Duvnhage (1994:60), Mouton (1996:26) and Mouton (2012)

**Figure 9: A meta-scientific conceptual framework for intelligence studies**

To summarise; a meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies aims, as translated in the words of Stoker (1969:51), to have a scientific method that provides for an orderly planned working methodology or procedure as to produce systematic and verifiable knowledge. This conceptual framework as depicted in figure 9; is a construct of interrelated concepts within the meta-science and social science, with the aim to provide a guide for the understanding of intelligence studies within political science and broader social science. This conceptual framework

would therefore serve as a roadmap for the meta-theorising and understanding of intelligence within the rest of this study and specifically within the next chapter.

## **2.4 Understanding intelligence studies within a meta-scientific conceptual framework**

The different meta-scientific aspects, concepts and constructs delineated in the conceptual framework provided by this study for the understanding of intelligence studies, requires further deliberation. Although these concepts and constructs will be discussed separately, they inherently form an integrated part of a whole, and should be seen as such.


### **2.4.1 Pre-scientific context**

The five dimensions of social research as explained by Mouton and Marais (1996:8) are all represented in the following definition proposed by them: “Social sciences research is a collaborative human activity (*Sociological Dimension*) in which social reality (*Ontological Dimension*) is studied objectively (*Methodological Dimension*) with the aim (*Teleological Dimension*) of gaining a valid (*Epistemological Dimension*) understanding (also *Teleological Dimension*) of it”. These dimensions, as within the focus of a meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies, nevertheless require further deliberation.

#### **2.4.1.1 Sociological dimension**

Social research and by implication political science/intelligences studies inquiry are all a social practice and happens thus within a social context. In this context Neuman (2011:12) describes the scientific community as a social institution of people, organisations and roles with a set of norms, behaviours and attitudes that operate together. It is thus a loose collection of professionals who share training, ethical principles, values, techniques and career paths. Adding to this, Mouton (1996:41) debates that like the World of Everyday Life (as depicted in figure 7), the World of Science is part of the social world. Similarly Mouton and Marais (1996:8-9) explain that in social science and by implication also in political science, one is interested from a sociological dimension in highlighting the social nature of research as a typical human activity as praxis. Here scientists operate in a clearly defined community that appears as invisible colleges with identifiable disciplinary paradigms and networks including academic recognition through the publication of articles in accepted journals. The different viewpoints or world belief systems giving political scientists different shared paradigms within the sociological dimension of social science, do not contribute to a singular overarching approach to inquiry into the academic domain. This diversity also seems to be evident within intelligence studies as an academic domain, with different approaches to the study of intelligence, different schools of thought and even different intelligence

practices being displayed. As a case in point, Warner (*In Johnson, ed. 2007:17*) identified two distinct fields of intelligence studies. In his distinction one form of study exists on the 'outside' with no or limited access to original records; and the second form from the 'inside' where a few scholars enjoyed sanctioned access. In a similar fashion Gill (*In Gill et al, 2009a: 212*) adds that there are intelligence theories *of* and *for* intelligence. There are furthermore also vast differences between intelligence studies training and intelligence studies education as Van Den Berg (2015:162-172) argues in an article pertaining to the nexus between intelligence education and training. The sociological dimension of intelligence studies could however be depicted as follows:



Source: Adapted from Van Den Berg (2014:21)

**Figure 10: Sociological dimension of intelligence studies**

This study will however elaborate later in this research in more detail regarding the specific nature of intelligence studies as an academic sub-discipline. The focus shifts to ontology.

#### **2.4.1.2 Ontology - Study of reality or being**

The ontological dimension denotes both the beliefs and assumptions of the researcher as well as the study of the domain of social reality on what is real or not and what part to be studied. More precisely, ontology is the study of being or reality. The term ontology has its origin in philosophy ontology: the branch of philosophy which deals with the nature and the organisation of reality. The Oxford Dictionary (2015) defines it as: "The branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being", and explains that the word is derived from the Greek word 'onto' – meaning being and the word 'logos' – meaning science. Ontology is thus the study of what is and exists or what is to be or exists and how they are related. It is therefore the study of what exists and what is real. It differs from epistemology which is the study of knowledge or theories about the being. Most often the

two concepts are used in the same breath by authors when explaining social research methodologies as well as in references to intelligence studies. Ontology provides for the logic behind the methods employed by the scientist. According to Grix (2002:177-179), ontology is the starting point of all research after which epistemological and methodological positions would logically follow, as also supported by this study. Ontology addresses what the relationship is between what a researcher thinks can be researched, what is known about it (epistemology) and how it is acquired (methodology). It answers the questions what and how researchers study. Likewise, Hay (in Goodin & Tilly, 2006:80) argues that ontology relates to being, to what is, to what exists and to the constituent of reality. He explains that political ontology by extension, relates to political being, to what is politically, to what exists politically, and to the units that comprise reality. This is also relevant to intelligence studies. Ontology therefore describes our view (whether claims or assumptions) on the nature of reality, and specifically, if this is an objective reality that really exists, or only a subjective reality created in our minds.

Bearing in mind, as already stated and supported by this study that although ontology and epistemology (and methodology) as concepts are discussed separately, they are somewhat integrated as is also seen in the two main ontological approaches namely realists and the opposing anti-realists or subjectivism as also distinguished by Mouton (2002:47). Likewise, Blaikie (2007:13) describes two opposing categories about the nature of social reality namely, idealist and realist. An idealist theory assumes what we regard as the external world is just an appearance and has no independent existence apart from our thoughts and in a realist theory, both the natural and social phenomena are assumed to have an existence that is independent of the activities of the human observer. The realist's ontological approach as also supported by this study denotes a belief that although there are differences between the natural and social world, there are certain similarities and connections which justify the use of the same methods and approaches in epistemology as well as methodology in all sciences. It implies that reality is objective and measurable and independent from the researcher and therefore makes knowledge objective and measurable. Having different viewpoints on ontology does not however negate the scientific status of social research, but provides clarity towards the pre-belief system and approach of the researcher towards the subject of his/her study.

This is also relevant within the current ontology categories applied by academics within the intelligence studies field, as the latter is regarded as a sub-academic field within political science. In this context where intelligence studies is seen as a sub-field within political science (as also postulated by this study), political science explores questions about power: what it is, where it comes from, who exercises it and how it is used and legitimised. This is also applicable to the purpose of intelligence. Political scientists therefore study the processes, policies and institutions of different political systems. "Questions of ontology relevant to political research include whether

the social world is fundamentally different from the natural world; whether it is an objective reality that exists independently of us or is in important respects subjectively created” (Halperin & Heath, 2012:25). Nonetheless, Hay (in Goodin & Tilly, 2006:81-82), presents the following ontological issues on which the political analysts could formulate consequential assumptions, which are also applicable to intelligence studies, namely:

- The relationship between structure and agency, context, and conduct.
- The extent of the causal role of ideas in the determination of political outcomes.
- The extent to which social and political systems exhibit organic qualities or are reducible in all characteristics to the sum of their constituent units/parts.
- The (dualistic or dialectical) relationship between mind and body.
- The nature of the human (political) subject and its behavioural motivations.
- The extent to which causal dynamics are culturally/contextually specific.
- The respective characteristics of the objects of the natural and social sciences.
- The extent of the separation of appearance and reality—the extent to which the social and political world presents itself to us as really it is such that what is real is observable.

This study postulates that in the study of being or ontology, with the focus on social science and more specifically intelligence studies as a subfield within political science – its purpose would be to denote the scope of the domain or phenomenon under inquiry, as well as to reflect the explicit beliefs or assumptions of the researcher. This is also in line with the argument as postulated by this study, that intelligence practices and structures are a direct reflection/mirror of the political regime within which it exists. To conclude, ontology in intelligence studies as within the field of political science is then the study of what is, or what exists within this domain and what all the entities within intelligence studies and political science have in common. This study of reality which focuses on individuals, groups and entities is also within the scope of the study domain and denotes that intelligence academics study intelligence processes, organisations and policies, similar to political scientists study the processes, policies and institutions of different political systems.

This however, brings the focus on the science of knowing to the fore.

#### **2.4.1.3 Epistemology – Study of the nature and scope of knowledge**

Where ontology is the study of what one means when one says something exists, epistemology is then the study of what one means if one knows something. Epistemology is therefore the science of knowing - the study of knowledge or theories about the being. It then denotes being concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge. “The epistemological dimension of social

science research may be regarded as the key dimension of social science praxis” (Mouton & Marais, 1996:14). The Oxford Dictionary (2015) explains that the word epistemology originates from the Greek word meaning ‘knowledge’ or ‘know, or know how to do’. The meaning of the word is provided as: the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity and scope and the distinction between justified belief and opinion. Similarly, Blaikie (2007:18) argues that epistemology is a theory of knowledge, a theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge. “It is a theory of how human beings come to have knowledge of the world around them, of how we know what we know.” As supported by this study, Blaikie (2007:18) states that in social science, epistemologies offer answers to the question: ‘How can social reality be known?’ and that they make claims about which procedures produce reliable social scientific knowledge. Epistemology focuses thus on what do we study?

Nonetheless, it is usually perceived that the kind of knowledge understood within the context of epistemology or the science of knowing, is the ‘knowledge that’ instead of the “knowledge how”. Knowing *that* is regarded of more importance than the cognitive thinking process of knowing *how*. To this extent Rescher (2003:xiii) argues in his book “Epistemology: An Introduction to the theory of knowledge”, that the mission of epistemology is to clarify what the conception of knowledge involves, how it is applied, and to explain why it has the features it does. In this regard he claims that it is essential to recognize that “to know” has both a proportional and a procedural sense: “there is the intellectual matter of “knowing that something or other is the case” (*that*-knowledge) and the practical matter of knowing how to perform some action and to go about realising some end (*how-to*-knowledge), (Rescher, 2003:xiv). Knowledge claims can be regarded from an internal point of view (subject to an acceptance thereof as correct and authentic) and externally and detached (viewed without the commitment of actual acceptance and merely purported knowledge). This could be linked to knowledge also defined into *a priori* knowledge which is known independently from experience and has been arrived at by reason and *a posterior* knowledge that is known from experience and is empirical and has been arrived at afterwards. According to Rescher (2003:xvi), as also supported by this study, knowledge development is a practice that we humans pursue because we have a need for its products – as also the case with the reason why intelligence organisations exist and what they pursue. Two contrasting epistemological positions namely positivism and anti-positivism with specific sub-positions within each, are identified within political science and intelligence studies (See Grix, 2002:178; Halperin & Heath, 2012:6 and Guba & Lincoln, In Denzin & Lincoln eds.1994). Positivism is an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and anti-positivism or interpretivism, is a position which views that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action. Broadly speaking the difference between the two opposing views are that within positivism the scientist is

perceived to be neutral and objective towards the subject of study whereas within anti-positivism, the researcher explains that knowledge of the social world through interpreting the meanings which give people reasons for acting. Hereby human behaviour can be understood but not explained or predicted.

Within a positivist view of the world all variables can be controlled and actions are predictable. Neo-positivism however developed out of positivism and embraces verification of knowledge with a preference of deductive reasoning over that of induction. This philosophical discourse started in the late 1920's as the well-known Vienna Circle and focuses on the method of logical analysis within science. This study postulates as supported by Bay (2007:19), that the dominant tradition within intelligence studies remains realism and positivism – including neo-positivism. Neo-positivism or sometimes also referred to as logical positivism adapted the later viewpoint in that it postulates that research findings are probably true as the truth could be elusive. Positivism is furthermore modified to make a distinction between statements of facts and statements of value. A value judgement is more supported as a reasonable person might be able to challenge the outcome or findings of the reasons within logic. To this extent post positivism as an anti-positivist approach, as explained by Guba & Lincoln (In Denzin & Lincoln eds., 1994:110) and Pickard (2007:9-11), shares the assumption with positivism that a single reality exists that is external to the observer. Halperin and Heath (2012:6) explain that this epistemology maintains that knowledge of the social world can be obtained through interpretation of the meanings which gave people reasons for acting and that human behaviour could be understood but not explained or predicted as in generalisation or establishing existing causal relationships.

Within this belief there is no correct or incorrect method or theory. Knowledge on the phenomena under inquiry is obtained through subjective involved examination. This view of understanding the world is concerned with the subjective experiences of individuals using methods whereby they actively participate and engage the phenomenon under inquiry. Through these methods such as direct interviews, knowledge of the phenomena is obtained thereby viewing reality as socially constructed. There is within this view no real world out there.

The critical theory is also an anti-positivist tradition developed by the Frankfurt School in Germany, based on the German tradition of philosophical and political thought of Marx, Kant, Hegel and Max Weber. The critical paradigm is anti-foundational; it attacks this reality. "People are not only *in* the world but also *with* it challenge injustice in support of social action. In addition a critical theory approach adopts a more transactional and subjectivist epistemology where 'the investigator and the investigated object are assumed to be interactively linked, with the values of the investigator "... inevitably influencing the inquiry", (Guba & Lincoln, In Denzin & Lincoln eds., 1994:110). As Bhattacharjee (2012:8) explains, critical research attempts to uncover and critique



the restrictive and alienating conditions of the status quo by analysing the oppositions, conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society, and seeks to eliminate the causes of alienation and domination. In addition, Neuman (2007:44) argues that the critical approach shares many features with an interpretive approach, but it blends an objective/materialist with a constructionist view of social reality and the key feature is a desire to put knowledge into a belief that research is not value free. The researcher can decide to ignore and help those with power and authority in society, or advance social justice and empower the powerless. Within this view it is explained that the critical approach emphasises a multi layered nature of social reality. The focus here is not so much knowledge understanding, but rather an aim to change the world. This viewpoint is embedded within social change and revolutionary beliefs such as Marxism and socialism where the social order, structure and behaviour is the focal point.

All the same to evaluate, within intelligence studies, a neo-positivist approach is applicable as intelligence practitioners aim to make sense of the world by providing unbiased and non-partisan intelligence to the policy-maker. This study postulates a neo-positivist epistemological perspective and by linking this approach to ontology, the premises of this research approach is that: "...there is a real world 'out there'...", (Poetschke, 2003:2-4). It is furthermore argued that the real world exists independently of our knowledge which is developed by observation and the aim to explain what "is" and not what "ought to be". Normative and value driven knowledge as ideal are therefore related to an evaluation standard against what most expect to be done in practice. It involves natural rationality or common sense and logic and takes cognisance of the role of cultural norms and shared values. The focus is on the concept that the right thing to do is regarded as the best thing to do. As to summarise, neo or post positivism denotes that scientist do have biasness due to their values, culture and world belief in seeing the real world. This real world is not perfect as this biasness affects scientific objectivity. Therefore, all theories and observations are error-prone or fallible and at the same time correctable or revisable.

All the same, the understanding of social reality as the main end of the social research or likewise known as the teleological dimension, however require further attention.

#### **2.4.1.4 Teleology - goal directed research having an end or purpose**

Teleology has its root meaning in the Greek word *telos*, meaning "end," and *logos*, meaning "reason" and is by reference to some purpose, end, goal, or function (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2015). Teleology is sometimes even associated with Aristotle's concept of the nature of goodness and the development of the state, (Barker, 2012:226-229). Aristotle gives a short account of this in his Book II of the Politics (*In Saunders, ed. 1995*). According to Wang et al (*In Tolk, ed. 2012:336*) ontology, epistemology and teleology build the philosophical foundation of a discipline.

Teleology therefore focuses on the study of the purpose of the paradigm/discipline. This is also relevant in contributing to the development of intelligence studies as an academic field as well as in contributing to its theory building.

Nonetheless, as Mouton and Marais (1996:8) explain, teleology is the dimension of social research which is an intentional and goal directed human activity. The primary aim of teleology is the understanding of the phenomena under study. The aim focuses on what we want to achieve through our research. Tolk (2012:4) adds to this and describes teleology as the study of action and purpose resulting in method or how we apply knowledge. As already postulated by this study teleology, epistemology and ontology are integrated concepts that cannot stand alone or as separate entities. Thus, the teleological, epistemological and ontological orientation of a social researcher will influence the aim, goal and purpose of their respective research. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001:79), social research has as common purpose; exploration, description and explanation. These are used to “explain concepts, constructs and paradigms and to develop hypotheses with regard to specific phenomena” (Duvenhage & Combrink, 2006:65).

Even more so, this study as a theoretical and conceptual study, has as goal (as stated by Mouton, 2001:92), to review and to discuss the most relevant and appropriate theories, models or definitions of a particular phenomenon. This concept is also applicable in the attempt by this study to place intelligence studies as a sub field within political science, the social science and science in order to reflect its position within the meta-science. To conclude, ontology, epistemology and teleology are viewed by this study as integrated aspects within the pre-scientific context of social science and direct the research methodology and methods to be used for the inquiry into the phenomena under study. Within this research, the teleological purpose is forwarded as that the research findings would benefit the development of a good life for all and that the state assists to achieve this – as also based on Aristotle’s beliefs.

Social science research methodology and methods of inquiry, nevertheless, require further attention.

#### **2.4.1.5 Research methodology – method of inquiry**

Methodology refers to the conduct of inquiry and has its origins in the Greek word *methodos*, meaning a systematic method of investigation or inquiry. Mouton and Marais (1996:15) explain that the etymological meaning of the word methodology could be interpreted as the logic of implementing scientific methods in the study of reality. This inquiry deals with the methodology, methods and tools on how knowledge about the social world, politics and ultimately for the purpose of this study – intelligence is obtained. Halperin and Heath, (2012:26), claim that it is only

when the ontological and epistemological questions have been considered that one can move the consideration of methodological on the inquiry of the political world. Stanley (2012: 95) adds that ontological assumptions cannot be divorced from epistemological and methodological concerns. Similarly Johnson et al (2008:29) claim that modern political science relies heavily on knowledge obtained through the scientific process based on objective, systematic observations that could be verified or rejected using a shared set of standards and procedures, as also supported by this study.

Science has to do with understanding, describing, explaining, analysis, exploring and elaborating on theory and to obtain respective and systematically formed knowledge (Stoker, 1969:135). According to Babbie and Mouton (2008:79) social research has three common purposes, namely: exploration, description and explanation. Adding to this Neuman (2011:38-41) explains that these research types organise the purposes of research as researchers can explore a new topic, describe a social phenomenon or explain why something occurs. Although one purpose usually dominates, studies could have multiple and overlapping purposes. Exploratory methods are used to: “explain concepts, constructs and paradigms and to develop hypotheses with regard to specific phenomena” (Duvenhage & Combrink, 2006:65). The subject or phenomena being studied or investigated is usually at the beginning, under-research or little understood. This method is used when the subject or phenomena is very new, little is known or is yet unexplored with the purpose to develop preliminary ideas about it and formulate research questions for future research.

The descriptive research method seeks to describe the subject or phenomena under inquiry. The social reality or context of a situation, social setting or relationship is determined and presented in detail and a profile, classification, type, or outline steps to answer questions such as who, when, where and how (Neuman, 2011:38-39). Descriptive research paints a detailed picture of the subject using words and numbers. Much of the social research conducted for policy making is descriptive as also applicable to political science and intelligence studies specifically.

The explanatory research method on the other hand has as purpose to explain why events occur and to build, elaborate, extend or test theory (Neuman, 2011:40). In this regard Neuman continues to describe that the explanatory research approach entails the testing of theoretical predictions or principles, enriching and extending theory and supporting or refuting explanations or predictions. It explains the relationship between different principles of the subject or phenomena under inquiry. Explanatory research builds on exploratory and descriptive research. Explanatory research attempts to identify the reason things occur and thus addresses the question why of social life as it looks for causes and reasons.

There are in general two approaches to social research identified in academic literature namely: a qualitative or a quantitative approach. Grigsby (2012:30-31) explains that quantitative analysis provides for mathematical examination of political phenomena. Mathematical and statistical data, otherwise known as quantitative data, displays empirically verifiable patterns. Examples of such data within the political science domain include statistics by the World Bank, Freedom Index, and Democracy index. Babbie (2013:25) argues that it offers the advantage which numbers have over words but, at the same time, also carries the potential loss in richness of meaning. To this extent the opposite is also argued in the sense that qualitative data is richer in meaning but it is then only a purely verbal description. Nonetheless, methods within the qualitative approach provides for research and inquiry into the why and how of political phenomena under study. It entails a systematic set of methods and tools used to answer these questions. Qualitative methods include the use of field study, case studies and observation.


This brought a common mixed method approach in social research about, whereby both quantitative and qualitative research methods are employed as part of the research design and strategy. This approach is also supported by this study and utilised to some extent in collecting and analysing political science data – especially in terms of assessing democratic or non-democratic practices of the political regime, as it is clear that these two approaches have more similarities than differences. However, Babbie (2013:26) argues that one will be a stronger researcher if both approaches are used effectively and a complete understanding of a topic often requires both techniques. To this extent Corbetta (2003:50) adds that qualitative and quantitative research approaches do not merely differ in terms of procedures, but are the direct and logically consequential expression of two different epistemological visions, the methodological manifestations of two different paradigms which imply alternative conceptions of social reality, research objectives, the role of the researcher and technological instruments. The mixed method allows for the different approaches to be inter-correlated and provides the opportunity to a variety of data sources and even across broad perspectives from different paradigms as well as the ability to implement an inter-disciplinary approach in the study/inquiry/investigation into specific phenomena and is also postulated by this study – specifically for its value towards the building of intelligence studies as an academic domain.

The methodological approaches applied within the social science and more specific political science, are also reflected within intelligence studies as an academic field within politics. As discussed by Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:169-176), intelligence and social science have close connections in terms of methodological approaches as both have to obtain knowledge about phenomena in the world. This knowledge building has the aim to have a better understanding of the real world – as also postulated by this study. The difference in approaches is mainly focussed on the secret nature of intelligence. This secret nature is also discussed and explained by several

authors including Bruneau and Dombroski (2006:1), Caparini (2007:3-5), Herman (2001:6), Lowenthal (2009:2-4), Turner (2006:3-4) and Warner (in Treverton et al, 2006:2-3). However, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used within the practice of intelligence. Within the intelligence profession, analysts use a process, which according to Clark (2004:7), strictly adhere to the traditional scientific method, whereby a hypothesis is created about a specific phenomenon under observation, which is then used to make predictions. In addition Clark (2004:252) argues that many intelligence fields rely heavily on quantitative methods because the techniques are logical extensions of the general principles of scientific research.

On the other hand, Prunckun (2010:55-56) describes qualitative intelligence research as an interactive field research or documentary research. He however states, that there are indications that the mixed method approach in intelligence results in superior research in comparison with only one of the abovementioned approaches. Heuer and Pherson (2011:4) add to the discourse on methodological approaches in intelligence in their book and explain that structured analytical techniques form a methodology as a set of principles and procedures for qualitative analysis of the kinds of uncertainties that the intelligence analysts must deal with on a daily basis. Similarly, Clauser (2008:44) adds to this debate by writing that the methods in intelligence research are considered scientific because they are based on empirical evidence that can be observed and measured. Clauser (2008:44), also states that: "Like other researchers intelligence analysts pose hypotheses to explain and plan methodological approaches to study real-world problems." This is also supported by this study.

Furthermore Prunckun (2010:2) states that intelligence uses both quantitative and qualitative research methods with the approach on the study of intelligence from the focus of the analytical methods that turn information into analysis as also discussed by Clauser (2008:105-162). "This process is based on methods used in applied research rather than the James Bond like devices used by cinema heroes or in the authoritarian oppression exercised by police states" (Prunckun, 2011:2). For the purpose of deliberating on intelligence studies as a science and sub-academic discipline and as part of the meta-scientific framework; this study forwards the following methodological framework for political science and more specifically intelligence studies:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 11: Methodological framework for intelligence studies**

Nevertheless, Sherman Kent (1953:206), who is regarded as the father of intelligence analysis and inter alia established an intelligence studies journal in 1959, deliberates on intelligence methods as follows: “When the findings of the intelligence arm are regularly ignored by the consumer, and this because of consumer intuition, he should recognize two instruments by which western man has, since Aristotle, steadily enlarged his horizon of knowledge – the instruments of

reason and scientific method.” This study also supports and postulates this argument in relation to intelligence studies, reason and scientific method. The interrelationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods assist the political science researcher to obtain a better understanding of phenomena in the real world.

To summarise, the following characteristics of social science research as also relevant to intelligence studies, are postulated by this study, namely: (1) social sciences research is a *collaborative* human activity; (2) social sciences research is a study of *social reality*; (3) social sciences research aims at *understanding* social reality; (4) social sciences research is a study aimed at a *valid* understanding of social reality; and (5) social sciences research is *objective* research (Mouton, 1996:16-17).






Furthermore this research also postulates that: “We cannot know what we are capable of knowing (epistemology) until such time as we have settled on (a set of assumptions about) the nature of the context in which that knowledge must be acquired (ontology). Similarly, we cannot decide upon an appropriate set of strategies for interrogating political processes (methodology) until we have settled upon the limits of our capacity to acquire knowledge of such processes (epistemology) and, indeed, the nature of such processes themselves (ontology).” (Hay in Goodin & Tilly 2006:84).

All the same, this discussion of the pre-scientific context based on the meta-scientific conceptual framework for intelligence studies, leads into a further deliberation of Political Sciences and more specifically Intelligence Studies as a science.

## **2.5 Political science and intelligence studies as science**

Almond (1998:50-96) argues that if we were to model the history of political science in the form of a curve of scientific progress in the study of politics over the ages, it would probably begin in Greek political science, make some modest gains in the Roman centuries, not make much progress in the Middle Ages, rise a bit in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, make some substantial gains in the 19th century, and then take off in solid growth in the 20th century as political science acquires genuine professional characteristics.

This study delineates a concise overview of the history of political science, as follows:


<p>Ancient Time</p> 	<p><b>Political Philosophy, Polis-City/State</b></p> <p>Socrates (470-399 BC) – <i>Greek Philosopher/Father of Philosophy</i>  Plato (427-347 BC) – Famous Writings: <i>Republic, The Statesman and The Laws</i>  Aristotle (384-322 BC) – Father of Political Science, Famous Writings: <i>Politics I-V</i></p>
<p>Medieval</p> 	<p><b>Church/State Power</b></p> <p>St Augustine (354-430 AD) - Famous Writings: <i>City of God</i>  Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) – <i>Summa Theologica</i> and several writings</p>
<p>Renaissance</p> 	<p><b>State/Political Power</b></p> <p>Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) - <i>The Prince</i></p>
<p>Enlightenment</p> 	<p><b>Philosophy/History/Law</b></p> <p>Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – <i>Leviathan, Elements of Law, Natural and Politics</i>  Francois-Marie Voltaire (1694-1778) – <i>Customs, The spirit of Nations</i>  John Locke (1632 -1704) - <i>Two Treatises of Government</i>  Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)– <i>Economic Politics, Social Contract and Confessions</i>  David Hume (1711-1776)– <i>A Treatise of Human Nature, History of England, Political Essays</i>  Charles-Louis Montesquieu (1689-1755) – <i>The Spirit of Laws</i></p>
<p>19<sup>th</sup> Century</p> 	<p><b>Modern Political Science</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) – <i>Wissenschaft der Logik and Phenomenology of Spirit</i></li> <li>• Auguste Comte (1798-1857) – <i>Early Political Writings and a General view of Positivism</i></li> <li>• Karl Marx (1818-1883) – <i>Das Kapital</i></li> <li>• Max Weber (1864-1920) – <i>The Protestant Ethic, Politics as Vocation and Spirit Series</i></li> <li>• John Burgess (1844-1931) – <i>Political Science Quarterly</i></li> <li>• Theodore Woolsey (1846-1871) – <i>Political Science</i></li> <li>• John Robert Seeley (1834-1895) – <i>Introduced Political Science into Cambridge</i></li> <li>• Joseph Schumpeter (1838-1950) – <i>Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy</i></li> <li>• Harold Lasswell (1902-1978) – <i>Politics, Who gets What, When and How</i></li> <li>• David Easton (1917-2014) – <i>The Political System</i></li> <li>• Robert Dahl (1915-2014) – <i>Democratic Theory and Who Governs?</i></li> <li>• Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) – <i>Clash of Civilisations and Political Order in Changing Societies</i></li> <li>• Gabriel Almond (1911-2002) – <i>Civic Culture</i></li> <li>• Seymour Martin Lipset (1922-2006) – <i>Political Man</i></li> <li>• Larry Diamond, Alfred Stepan, Juan Jose Linz, Francis Fukuyama, SM Lipset, Sidney Verba, Adam Przeworski, Leonardo Morlino</li> </ul>

Source: Own construct

**Figure 12: A concise overview of the history of political science as science**



Intelligence studies from ancient times until 1945, is demarcated as follows:

Ancient Time	<b>Ancient Intelligence Writings/Manuscripts/Contributors</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Egyptian Hieroglyphs – 1000 BC</li> <li>• Syrian Clay tablets – 700</li> <li>• Sun Tzu's Sunzi Bingfa – 500</li> <li>• Thucydides' Peloponnesian War - 431</li> <li>• Arthasastra's Chanakya – 350-275</li> <li>• Plato's Academy – 386, Aristotle - 342</li> <li>• Quran and Early writings – 610</li> <li>• Tora, Pentateuch and Biblical writings – 500-600</li> <li>• Second Punic War, Hannibal – 218-201</li> <li>• Romans conquers Greece –146, Fabius Maximus, Tacitus, Diocletian, Antochius, Julius Caesar, Scipio Africanus: Speculatori, Fumatar, Agentes in Rebus, Praetorian Guard, Kataskapoi.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early Manuscripts and Quran – 610</li> <li>• Crusades – 1095, Catholic Church Inquisition - 1184</li> <li>• Mongolian Empire and Gengis Khan – 1203</li> <li>• Aztec's Pochteca - 1400</li> <li>• Feudal Japan, Shinobi and Ninja – 1440</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Italian City-States, Signals system, Secret Police and Diplomats– 1400</li> <li>• The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli - 1513</li> <li>• Henry VIII , Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, Secret police – 1490-1600</li> <li>• Johanness Trithemius, Poligraphia - 1518</li> <li>• Napoleon wars, espionage - 1797-1815</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Armand-Jean du Plessis Cardinal Richelieu, Espionage Agents – 1607</li> <li>• Oliver Cromwell, Thomas Scott, John Thurloe , Agent networks – 1650's</li> <li>• French Revolution, Maximilien Robespierre, Espionage – 1790</li> <li>• Military Attache's – 1830</li> <li>• Mainzer Information Bureau - 1833</li> <li>• European Revolution, espionage – 1848</li> <li>• Russia Intelligence analysis unit during Crimean War - 1867</li> <li>• Wilhelm Stieber, Memoir - The chancellor's spy: The revelations of the chief of Bismarck's secret service, Secret Foreign Office Political Field Police – 1866</li> <li>• French Statistical and Military Recognisance – 1870 Special Service 1873</li> <li>• British War Office Intelligence Branch – 1873</li> <li>• USA Navy and Army Intelligence – 1882 and 1885</li> <li>• German military intelligence – 1889</li> <li>• South African ZAR Secret Service – 1894/5</li> <li>• Russian Special Department Okhrana – 1900</li> <li>• British Foreign and military intelligence - 1902</li> </ul>
Industrialisation	
Military Intelligence WWI & WWII	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deciphering, Signal intelligence, Interceptions, Military Intelligence and Espionage, Intelligence cycle, Reconnaissance</li> </ul>

Source: Own construct

**Figure 13: A concise overview of the history of intelligence studies until 1945**

Albeit, modern time intelligence studies had a pronounced development since the 1950's and is delineated as follows:

<b><u>Modern Time Intelligence Writings/Contributors</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sherman Kent: Strategic Intelligence to American World Policy; The father of Intelligence Analysis</li> <li>• Herbert Meyer: Real world intelligence</li> <li>• Roy Godson: Intelligence requirements for the 1980's and for the 1990's</li> <li>• WW. Keller: The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: rise and fall of a domestic intelligence state</li> <li>• Walter Laquer: The uses and limits of intelligence</li> <li>• Christopher Andrew: Her Majesty's Secret Service</li> <li>• Michael Herman: Intelligence: power in peace and war</li> <li>• Ray Cline; Intelligence analysis</li> <li>• David Kahn: A historical theory of intelligence and The rise of intelligence</li> <li>• Uri Bar-Joseph: Intelligence intervention in politics of democratic states</li> <li>• Wilhelm Agrell: Intelligence theory</li> <li>• William Johnson: Thwarting enemies at home and abroad</li> <li>• Mark Lowenthal: Intelligence from secrets to policy</li> <li>• Peter Gill: Policing politics: security intelligence and the liberal democratic state</li> <li>• Gil Peter Gill and Mark Phythian: Intelligence in an insecure world</li> <li>• Loch Johnson: Strategic intelligence, theory of intelligence, Handbook of intelligence studies</li> <li>• Arthur Hulnick, Richard Betts, Andrew Rathmell, Jennifer Sims, Wesley Wark, Thomas Troy, Stephen Marrin: Intelligence theory</li> <li>• Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt: Silent Warfare</li> <li>• Michael Warner: Definition of intelligence and intelligence theory</li> <li>• Robert Clark: Intelligence analysis: target-centric approach</li> <li>• Jerome Clauser: Intelligence research</li> <li>• Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman: Intelligence and Strategic intelligence</li> <li>• Gregory Treverton, Seth Jones, Steven Boraz and Phillip Lipsky: Theory of Intelligence</li> <li>• Len Scott: Study of intelligence</li> <li>• Florina Matei, Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Marina Caparini: Intelligence and Democratic control</li> <li>• Thomas Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski: Reforming Intelligence</li> <li>• Lisa Kirzan, David Moore: Intelligence and Analysis</li> <li>• Jan Goldman: Intelligence Ethics</li> </ul>

Source: Own construct

**Figure 14: A concise overview of intelligence studies contributions since 1945**

In conclusion, this study supports Gill and Phythian (2012a:6) statement that: "... intelligence is, at heart, an organisational activity and, with its special features such as secrecy, can be studied as such." In addition as supported, this study also denotes that intelligence studies can claim to be a science as: "The unity of science is a matter of methodology, not of subject matter, and intelligence has accumulated knowledge, empirical data, susceptible of systematization and

formulation” (Random, 1993:1). Nonetheless, the study of intelligence, as is the case with politics is an academic study within social science and therefore requires further deliberation.

## **2.6 Discipline, sub-discipline and traditions**

The conceptual meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies as discussed and postulated by this study and depicted in Figure 9, indicates that this study field as linked to political science, needs further deliberation as an academic discipline or sub-discipline within the broader social science. The relevant traditions or study approaches also requires additional attention.

### **2.6.1 Political science as academic discipline**

The world of knowledge is divided into different scientific fields of study or branches of knowledge. This correlates with the meaning of the word discipline which entails a field of academic study – branch of knowledge or learning or scholarly instruction according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2015). The Latin root has its foundation in *discipulus* which means pupil. Based on Kuhn’s (1970) explanations, a discipline is organised around certain ways of thinking or larger theoretical frameworks that constitute academic fields. Kuhn (1970:11) furthermore argues that the sign of maturity in a scientific field is its acquisition of a paradigm. Duvenhage (1994:58) explains that it involves the understanding and knowledge of scientists towards the structuring of a specific subject field of study into a sub-discipline, discipline or inter-disciplinary study. This context is furthermore dependant on the specific traditions or paradigms’ and approaches by scientists towards the field of study. Thus it provides for the identification and characterisation of the knowledge and understanding of a scientist towards a specific aspect of reality. Additionally, the so-called Biglan Model of academic disciplines as subscribed to by Anthony Biglan (1973) identifies three dimensions within an academic discipline namely; (1) having a paradigmatic or pre-paradigmatic degree; (2) the extent to which subject matter is practically applied and (3) the involvement of living or non-living systems. In terms of the specific characteristics of a discipline or sub-discipline, Krishnan (2009:9-10) explains that it displays in having a specific objective of research; a body of specialised and accumulative knowledge; theories and concepts on specialised knowledge of a specific object of research; specific terminology; specific research methods; and an institutional form, subjects taught, academic departments and professional association.

Nonetheless, the first political science department was established in 1880, in the United States of America at the Columbia University and in 1903 the American Political Science Association was formed (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017; Grigsby, 2012:14 and Johnson et al, 2008 21-22). This development extended to Britain, Europe and the rest of the world. Political science has

broad links with other academic fields within the social sciences such as history, philosophy, sociology and law. Political science furthermore only appeared as a separate discipline at universities in the late eighteen and nineteenth centuries (Johnson et al, 2008:21). As an academic field of study it is however divided into several fields or sub-fields of studies within various higher education institutions globally. It recently seems that the broad divisions between the different domains in political science as study field are gradually integrating into a more inter-related or inter-disciplinary study field (Johnson et al, 2008:22-23). This viewpoint is also postulated by this study.

To summarise, political science as academic discipline is specifically relevant to this study within the context of intelligence studies, for the following two reasons; (1) Political science is regarded as the principal discipline wherein intelligence studies as a sub-discipline functions and; (2) when conducting scientific inquiry within subjects or phenomena within the intelligence domain – it is inevitable that those are linked to political science as intelligence exists because of and for the political regime. This brings the focus on Intelligence Studies as a sub-academic discipline.

### **2.6.2 Intelligence studies as academic sub-discipline**

The study of Intelligence has a similar pattern of development into an academic field as other fields of study whereby theory development is preceded by the professional practice thereof. The practice of intelligence as discussed by this study, is often referred to as the oldest/second oldest profession, although the academic field was slow to develop. In this context, Badie et al. (2011:2370) nonetheless wrote in the International Encyclopaedia of Political Science that today, intelligence studies is an authentic research field with its own centres and departments at colleges and universities with journals and series. Sherman Kent (1955:1-11) wrote in the first edition of *Studies in Intelligence* that intelligence has taken on the aspects of a discipline with a recognisable methodology, vocabulary, and a body of theory, doctrine and techniques.

Likewise, Goodman (2006) postulates that: “While intelligence is not a new phenomenon, the academic study of intelligence is. Intelligence as an activity has existed in one form or another for centuries. In the United Kingdom the modern intelligence establishment can trace its roots to 1909. As an academic discipline, the subject really only extends to the mid-1970’s.” Likewise, the University of Buckingham claims in an information piece regarding intelligence studies graduate programmes that intelligence studies is an important new field in political science. Rudner (2008:110 and 2009:1) states that intelligence studies as an academic discipline was initially slow to develop in universities but has recently taken on a new life in academia. Denece and Arboit (2010:731) echoed the development of intelligence studies and they state that American

Universities established intelligence courses in the 1980's and were followed by British academic institutions in the 1990's.

To this extent, Marrin (2014:14) states that intelligence studies as an academic discipline was in a formative stage from 1980 – 2000 and entered adolescence after the 2001 terrorists attacks and its literature has grown in sophistication and abstraction with additional emphasis on key intelligence concepts and theories. Be as it may, he (Marrin) states, as also postulated by this study, that intelligence studies continues to mature as an academic discipline. Equally, Johnson (2007:viii) wrote that intelligence studies has come of age and several students have enrolled in various programmes, portraying intelligence studies therefore seen as a fully-fledged equal academic study field within social science. Intelligence is predominantly being studied within international relations where it forms part of security or national security studies on the one hand; and/or within either history or political science, on the other. In terms of the inquiry of intelligence subjects or intelligence phenomena, intelligence is regarded as a secret tool of the state and it epitomises the political regime (Van Den Berg, 2014:46). As such, intelligence serves the government as its principal customer and reflects the practices, culture, politics, history, thinking and political systems of the state within which it exists (Classen, 2005:20; Gill, 2003:4-5; Gill & Phythian, 2006:1; Hutton, 2007:2 and Lowenthal, 2000:10).

Thus, this study postulates its point of departure that intelligence studies is an academic science and sub-field of study of political science. As also debated by this research, political science is regarded as the master science or oldest science and similarly it is argued that intelligence is the oldest/second oldest profession. The events of the “terror” attacks like those of 9/11 in the USA and the recent 13/11/2015 Paris attacks, contribute to changes within the intelligence profession as well as its academic world. While intelligence is known for its secret nature, the demand exists for more information sharing on threats of common interests between nations as well as to improve the intelligence profession to enable nations to deal with the different types of threats. Terrorist attacks are also a catalyst for more openness of intelligence education which has resulted in an increase in the number of courses and programmes presented at universities worldwide on the one hand, as well as for the increase of academic contributions to the intelligence study field (De Graaff, 2012:7; Denece and Arboit, 2010:745; Scott and Jackson, 2004:139). To this extent Marrin (2013:67) states that more focussed intelligence education developed and the literature on teaching intelligence has expanded even further.

Furthermore as Beer (*In* Svenson ed, 1999:143) explains, the last quarter century is experiencing an academic intelligence revolution. Intelligence studies as academic field, is not only fairly new but also the fastest growing study field within academic institutions in the USA, UK, Europe and Australia. This point is also supported and received additional attention by several academic

scholars such as Agrell (2002:3); Cristescu (2011:1-2); Ciuperca (2012:61-64); Coulthart and Crosston (2015:46-68); Denece and Arboit (2012:23-35); De Graaf (2012:6-11 and 2013:88-98); Glees (2015:281-310); Gill (2007:2 ECPR Conference Paper); Gill and Phythian (2012a:5-17 and 2012b:1-2); Goodman (2006:51-65); Kahn (2009:1); Kent (1953:3), Macartney (*In* Svenson ed 1999:11); Maddrell (2003); Marrin (2014:14); Matei (2007:4-5); Matey (2005:2); Rudner (2009:1); Scott (*In* Johnson, 2007:102); Spracher (2009:2-3) and Wark (1993:5). In addition, Marrin (2014:1) claims that intelligence studies is also useful to intelligence professionals as it forms a body of knowledge that is academic and embedded in broader studies of government and foreign policy.

Within the US, Cristescu (2011:7) explains that intelligence studies has been mostly located within political science departments, as is the case in Europe (including the UK) where it has a more historical grounding. The courses in Europe follow a more case-study based approach whereas courses in the US focus also on theoretical deliberations. Within this context intelligence studies tends to be presented within either political science, or history or international relations departments. Van Den Berg (2014:21) also delineates intelligence studies and includes security studies – which is traditionally also studied within international relations. In a study on intelligence programmes and courses, Coulthart and Crosston (2015:46) identified seventeen intelligence programmes offering twenty-six degrees; with most degrees offered after 2005. Coinciding with the development of intelligence studies as an academic discipline, an increase of international workshops, colloquiums and conferences was also evident together with the founding of professional bodies and organisations.

The foremost of these international academic bodies for Intelligence studies includes the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) with its mission to advance research, knowledge and the professional development of intelligence education. IAFIE as an international organisation has its roots in the USA and recently launched a chapter in Europe. Similarly, the Intelligence Studies Section (ISS), within the scholarly International Studies Association (ISA) – is devoted to the advancement of intelligence studies research. Professional intelligence bodies were also launched such as the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO), The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) in the USA, the International Intelligence History Association (IIHA), and the Association for Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU). Several academic and scholarly journals also saw the light since the establishment of the Journal for Intelligence Studies such as the Intelligence History Journal, the Intelligence and National Security Journal, the Journal of Strategic Security and the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

All the same, current intelligence priorities specifically in light of the so-called Third World War on Terrorism (as also referred to by the pontiff, Pope Francis in a telephonic interview with TV2000 after the Paris attacks on 13/11/2015), placed an increasing demand on the professional development of intelligence studies as an academic terrain. This progress will remain slow; mainly due to the secret nature of intelligence on the one hand and the natural resistance of intelligence professionals to theory, on the other. Evidence of this on the African continent in comparison to developments elsewhere in the world is the one academic intelligence studies institute in Zimbabwe (Van Den Berg, 2015:172). In a review of intelligence teaching practices in the UK, Goodman (2006) explains that: "... intelligence studies is one of those odd disciplines that is comfortable in a variety of academic departments, but perhaps never truly at home in any of them." This indicates the inter-disciplinary or multi-disciplinary characteristic of intelligence studies as an academic terrain as also argued by Gill and Phythian (2012a:5) who regards the term Intelligence Studies as such. Similarly Marrin (2013:69) claims that in variation to the disciplinary approach, intelligence could be studied within other academic fields such as anthropology, sociology, communications, media studies, film, literature and others. Likewise Coulthart and Crosston (2015:54) debate that the essence of what intelligence studies as a discipline is, is its bridging with history, political science, international relations, global studies and comparative politics. Equally Denece and Arboit (2010:736-7), assert that intelligence studies is based on a multi-disciplinary nature that encompasses history, political science, law, economic science and information and communication sciences.

To evaluate, this study postulates that intelligence studies is a sub-discipline within the broader political science domain, although reflecting a multi-disciplinary characteristic. Intelligence inquiry in any other academic field as part of this multi-disciplinary character, contributes to both intelligence practices as well to theoretical content, indicating a mature albeit developing field of study. The traditions or study approaches within political science need then to be examined.

### **2.6.3 Political science traditions or study approaches**

Political science as an academic discipline reflects various traditions or study approaches, as is the case within other academic study fields. As in the case with the different dimensions of social research as discussed within this study, there are several prevailing traditions or paradigms within political studies. These study approaches denote a philosophical and theoretical point of departure to conduct an inquiry into subjects/phenomena. Thereby it provides for a research focus and methodological strategy which informs the collection of data and the analysis thereof. Political scientists take many different approaches to the study of politics and there is no unanimous approach to the study of politics as all are deemed appropriate and valid. Within political science as a specific academic discipline, these traditions reflect the methodologies and approaches to

the study of political objects or phenomena. In light of this notion, this study did discuss some approaches as applicable to the pre-scientific context to the study of politics.

These dimensions of social science research (ontology, epistemology, teleology, social and methodology); as explained by Mouton and Marais, (1996:7) and discussed in this study also impact on traditions within political science either from being within a positivist point of departure or from an anti-positivist/interpretivism perspective. Nonetheless, political science as an academic discipline is not static and the traditions or different approaches to the study of politics, is part of what Almond (1988:828) states: "... a discipline on the move". These approaches are furthermore seen as a scientific way of studying objects and phenomena within an academic discipline. Marsh and Stoker *ed.* (2010:1) claim that there is no agreed approach to the study of politics and various approaches exist from the early time period of study politics until the modern day. They (Marsh & Stoker *ed.* 2010:3) continue to explain that approaches are different general ways of approaching the subject matter of political science and that each approach combines a set of attitudes, understandings and practices that define a certain way of doing political science. In addition, Johnson et al (2008:23) explain that the approach to the discipline: "... is the particular orientation that one adopts when addressing the subject". It is a predisposition to adopt a particular conceptual framework and could be explicit or implicit and could include approaches and methods from other fields to the research in political science.


Some literature refers to either the traditional or modern approaches to the study of political science. These approaches could briefly be described as follows: Firstly, the traditional approach focuses on the normative study of what politics ought to be. This approach is linked to the initial study of politics from a philosophical, historical, institutional or legal point of view. The modern approach to the study of political science is more interdisciplinary and is distinguished as either from behaviouralism or from a post- behaviouralism perspective. The first entails the study of political science from an actual behaviour approach which includes variables and correlations. The latter includes a combination of elements from both the traditionalism and behaviouralism approaches (Dooley & Patton, 2014:15). More modern day approaches include a system approach based on David Easton's (1953) explanations of political systems in political life. Easton (*In* Easton et al, 1991:275-291) discusses four traditions namely formal, traditionalism, behavioural and post-behavioural. Apart from Marsh and Stoker *ed.* (2010), several other authors also discussed various approaches to the study of politics such as Neuman (2011:90-119). Almond (1988:828-842) and Heywood (2013:12-18). Similarly, Johnson et al (2008:23-29) list and describe the following main approaches to the study of politics namely: (1) Traditional/historic approach - predominant in the early years of modern political science and concentrate on legal, historic, philosophical or institution of government; (2) Scientific/behaviouralism approach - focuses on the informal aspects of politics and how individuals behave within political institutions



and this contributes to policy-making; (3) Post-behaviouralism approach – is a combination of methods of inquiry from both the traditional and behaviourists school, (4) General Theory approach – aims to identify all critical structures and processes of society, explain their interrelationships with politics and predict a wide range of governmental outcomes; (5) Systems approach – is based on a general theory that provides a framework for analysis whereby politics of a country is depicted by the interaction between societal environment and the abstract political system which processes or converts demands and supports into outputs (This approach was initially outlined by David Easton); (6) Structural functional approach associated with Gabriel Almond - focuses on fundamental or developmental change within the system theory by specifying the activities of the political system and explaining how these functions must be performed and lastly (7) Political Economy approach – concern government and economics relations.

The traditions or approaches are historically linked to the scientific development and activities within an academic discipline as also depicted in that of political science (see figure 12) and intelligence studies (see figures 13 and 14). The different approaches to the study of political science are not always clearly explained within scholarly content and seem to exist within a complicated nexus. Therefore, a classification to be able to understand and describe the different traditions or approaches to the study of political science is required. For this purpose, this thesis specifically supports Almond (1988:828), who explains that political science has two dimensions; one methodological and the other ideological; within which all the approaches could be explained or placed. Duvenhage (1994:33) elaborates on this stance and explains that the ideological dimension is also linked to philosophy which includes traditions such as conservatism, liberalism, radicalism and reformatism. The Realism methodological tradition or approach to the study of political science came to the fore through the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes and concerns the aim of states to increase or maintain their power relative to other states. Most of these activities are focussed on the national interests of a state within the domestic or international political arena. Sub-traditions include Classical Realism (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Edmund Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Huntington), Neo-classical or Structural realism (Kenneth Waltz, Robert Art), Offensive Realism (John Mearsheimer), Defensive Realism (Robert Jervis), Rational/Liberal Realism (Hedley Bull, Barry Buzan), Post Realism (Francis Beer, Michael Shapiro) and lastly Neo-Classical Realism (Fareed Zakaria, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth).

The following diagram as adapted from Duvenhage (1994:36), encapsulates some of the mayor traditions within political science, as postulated by this study:



Source: Adapted from Duvenhage (1994:36)

Figure 15: A selection of scientific traditions/approaches within the political science discipline

This brings the focus on traditions within intelligence studies as a sub-discipline, to the fore.

#### **2.6.4 Academic traditions within intelligence studies**

This study aims to provide an introduction to the way intelligence study scholars and academics conduct their studies and research within this sub-discipline. Moreover, as the study of intelligence is situated in the main within the political science domain and thereafter International Relations, Security Studies and History, the major traditions thereof are examined. Although, as stated by this study, the practitioners of intelligence by their nature resist theory, this does not imply that there are difference in traditions and approaches between them and academics of intelligence (irrespective as from the *inside or outside*). It is however noted that practitioners hold the belief that an intelligence officer should strive to be objective, non-partisan and as neutral as possible in the conduct of intelligence practices.

However, as intelligence mirrors the political regime and exists because of and for the regime – this study denotes that this field would also be appropriate to the different traditions within political science (as also postulated in figure 15). In light of this notion, a pure positivistic neutral approach is perceived by this study (as proclaimed within a neo-positivist and realist ontology and epistemology), to be rather a quest or aim than a true reflection of existing intelligence practises. Through this approach it is acknowledged that perfect objectivity does not exist as all scientists have some or other biasness as derived from values, culture and different world view beliefs and furthermore that all observations and theories display some or other error. Nonetheless, as intelligence seeks to understand and explain phenomena in the real world to assist the policy-maker as to make and implement policies to the benefit of all, the traditions and approaches within also affect the intelligence product in reflecting any biasness.

All the same, in its interaction with other academic fields, intelligence studies reveals diverse academic traditions and research methodologies. These traditions range from realism, structuralism, post-structuralism, behaviourism, post modernism and rational choice. Matey (2005:2) has the same argument as Scott and Jackson (2004:147), that there is an implicit assumption that the study of intelligence falls within the realists field. Nonetheless, intelligence studies as argued and postulated by this study, is an academic sub- discipline of diversity or more so – multidisciplinary (see Matey, 2005:3). Within this context, similar to Almond's political science, intelligence studies is also a discipline on the move, albeit with several prevailing traditions or paradigms providing for the philosophical and theoretical basis in the study thereof. However, as the purpose of this chapter is only to explore the specific traditions within the sub-discipline of intelligence studies, the detail of each tradition will be addressed within the next chapter, which deals with a meta-theoretical framework for intelligence.

## 2.7 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to conceptualise a meta-scientific framework firstly, to place intelligence studies as an academic sub-discipline within political studies and the social sciences and secondly, to serve as a scientific roadmap in the understanding of intelligence and political theories and concepts for the rest of this research. This meta-scientific framework provides for a systematic approach to the understanding of the research dimensions within intelligence studies in order to enrich the body of knowledge and enhance the process of conducting intelligence studies. In line with the contributions of Kuhn (1970), Mouton and Marais (1996), Mouton (1996), Stoker (1961) and Duvenhage (1994:17-71) on the need for a paradigm or framework, this study conceptualises a meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies, as delineated in figure 9. This almost overarching framework serves as a guide to understand, explain, describe and explore scientific concepts and constructs within specific paradigms and traditions linked to intelligence as a sub-discipline within political science, social science and the broader science. This chapter provides for an understanding of intelligence studies within the world of science and meta-science or science about science. This contributes, as discussed to the maturity of intelligence as an academic field of study.


This chapter furthermore focused on science as both a product (a body of knowledge) and a process (the way in which knowledge is built). Within the meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies reflected in figure 9, this chapter deliberates upon several integrated and interrelated meta-scientific constructs and concepts. These include the pre-scientific context of intelligence studies within political science whereby specific constructs such as the sociological dimension, ontology, epistemology, teleology and methodology are addressed. These relate to intelligence studies taking place within a specific community of scientists (Sociological dimension), that it is about reality (Ontological dimension), that it is measured by its objective study (Methodological dimension), that it has the understanding of social reality as main end (Teleological dimension) and that it provides valid knowledge (Epistemological dimension).

The history and development of both political science and intelligence studies as academic fields of study or disciplines within the social sciences, also receive attention within this chapter. This discussion includes the context of intelligence as the second oldest profession to its contrary fairly young academic field as well as intelligence being an art, science or a profession.

Within this discussion the traditions or approaches to the study of political science and subsequently intelligence studies, also received attention in this chapter. Intelligence studies reflect political science and is at present similar to the discourse presented by Gunnell and Easton (In Easton et al, 1991:1) in that its expansion as a discipline, led to depth and diversity on the one

hand and multiple approaches and conflicting schools on the other. In the words of Gunnell and Easton (*In Easton et al, 1991:1*) as also applicable to intelligence studies alike; the present is an opportune and legitimate moment to take stock of the process of development in our knowledge and objective understanding. Lastly, as Matey (2005:2) states, the conceptual framework in which intelligence is studied, must continue to evolve and be able to adapt to new conditions and possibilities in an ever changing environment. Nevertheless, the meta-scientific concepts and constructs referred to Mouton (1996) as the World Three or the World of Meta-science (figure 7) as linked to the conceptual framework (figure 9), could be considered applicable to intelligence studies.

This overarching conceptual framework is capsulated in the following diagram:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 16: Meta-scientific constructs for intelligence studies**

Moreover, the meta-scientific framework conceptualised in this chapter serves as a scientific roadmap to construct a meta-theoretical framework to understand political and specific intelligence paradigms, theories, models, typologies, constructs and definitions to be examined within the next chapter of this study.

## CHAPTER 3: A META-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO CONCEPTUALISE INTELLIGENCE THEORY

*'A theory of intelligence ... will take intelligence back to first principles: who needs what, when and how?  
What is intelligence?'*

Gregory F. Treverton, 2006.

### 3.1 Introduction

Any academic discipline requires scientific maturity and development. Intelligence studies, although a young academic field of study reveals itself emerging as an independent sub-discipline with its own theoretical content and methodological approaches. Recent global events such as international terrorism and the appearance of non-state actors influencing national security issues resulted in a sudden awakening of this academic discipline accompanied with the need for enhancing intelligence training and education – specifically within the academic world. Laqueur (1985:3) states that from the beginning of intelligence gathering and analysis, there has been criticism of its usefulness and effectiveness. Within this context this study aims to contribute to the development of intelligence as academic field of study as well as to build its scientific knowledge and methodology. Therefore, this links this chapter to the meta-scientific framework conceptualised within the previous chapter, to enable the understanding of intelligence theory thereby linking theory and practise for the benefit of both practitioners and academics alike. This meta-scientific framework serves as a scientific roadmap for research and inquiry within this study.

Moreover, this chapter will construct a meta-theoretical framework to serve as overarching construct for the understanding of intelligence theory as conceptualised within the meta-scientific framework outlined and discussed in the previous chapter. “The need for a better understanding of both the nature of the intelligence process and its importance to national and international security policy has never been more apparent”, as argued by Scott and Jackson (2010:14). This meta-theoretical framework will define, review and analyse constructs that would serve as road markers in this scientific route map to understand intelligence. More specifically, chapter three aims to provide a map of the main theories, theoretical developments and theoretical practices within this academic field of study. It will briefly reflect on specific traditions and approaches within intelligence studies. Constructs serving as road markers that include paradigms, theories, models, concepts, typologies and definitions, are examined within this chapter as applicable to the study field of intelligence.

Chapter three also analyse and explore logic reasoning in theorising, approaches to the study of intelligence as well as the micro, meso and macro levels of theory within intelligence studies, thereafter to be followed by the meta-theoretical study of those theories within the intelligence discipline. The meta-theoretical approach of this inquiry enables the overarching understanding

of intelligence theories as to enable the construct of a theory of/for intelligence to address the inquiry and analysis into intelligence practices in South Africa as a hybrid regime – as reflective in the title of this thesis that also outlines the main purpose of this study. This necessitates further attention towards the methodology and purpose of meta-theorising as applicable to intelligence studies as being a fairly new/young academic field of study in comparison to existing fields of study within the social sciences.

### 3.2 Orientation to meta-theorising

In the words of Laqueur (1985:3): “Ever since humans first began to collect information about the powers and intentions of neighbouring clans and tribes, there have been intelligence agents and a craft – or science – of intelligence.” In this context, when science or theory is the subject of study, meta-theorising as the systematic study thereof, comes to the fore. This chapter builds on the scientific constructs discussed in the previous chapter as also delineated in the meta-scientific framework proposed by this study as reflected in Figure 9. Meta-theory implies the investigation and analysis of a theory or theories. The Merriam Webster dictionary describes meta-theorising as a theory concerned with the investigation, analysis or description of theory itself. This implies an understanding of what is known and said about intelligence as the subject of study of this thesis. According to Gill (*In Johnson ed.* 2010:43), intelligence studies to date has spent relatively little time on theorizing. Adding to this, Marrin (2014:1) states that improving intelligence studies as an academic discipline requires reinforcing best practices that exist in academia by identifying, acquiring, storing, creating and disseminating new knowledge. In light of this and the discourse that intelligence studies is a fairly young academic discipline, a meta-theoretical perspective can provide a framework whereby intelligence problems and phenomena could be investigated and researched. This provides for commonly understood content where theory and practice could be integrated in an aim to understand and explain the real world. Intelligence theories can be tested and built upon to broaden the scientific field of intelligence studies.

This practice furthermore reflects both on the dichotomous concept of science as both knowledge and process, as also discussed in this study. Nevertheless, as also postulated by this study, Wallis (2010:78) defines meta-theory as primarily the study of theory that includes the development of an overarching combination of theory as well as the development and application of theories for analysis that reveal underlying assumptions about theory and theorising. He (Wallis) continues to explain that meta-theory may be conducted in an integrative approach whereby multiple theories are combined or deconstructive approach where theories are integrated into their constituent components for analysis and recombination. Both approaches lead to the creation of meta-theory or a theory of theory. This study supports the usage of approaches in meta-theorising about intelligence theories to be able to provide for theoretical explanations or meta-theorem. Meta-

theory as the investigation and analysis of theory focuses on second-order concepts whereas theory is concerned with first-order concepts; within the third-order concepts of the academic field of intelligence studies as sub-discipline within political science. First order political science explains politics (Stanley, 2012:94), whereas second order make sense of how political scientists themselves understood and conceptualise politics as reflexive of meta-political science. Gunnel (1998:23-24) explains that second order practices however cannot be understood apart from their historical relationship to their object of inquiry. This point has extensive conceptual implications. The third order focuses on the social and political science enterprise.

Meta-practices offer interpretations and reconstructions of theory and practices. Meta-theorising is thus on a higher level of abstraction as it goes beyond a specific theory. Here the focus as discussed, is on the interrelation of a range of theories within the academic discipline of intelligence studies. Albeit, as intelligence studies is regarded as a sub-discipline within political science, it is inevitable that due to this integrated nature that meta-theorising would also concern applicable political theories. As postulated by this study, intelligence exists for and because of the political regime and is a reflection thereof. Thus the integrated disciplinary nature of intelligence studies would also be revealed through meta-theorising. This study also proposes that while intelligence theorising attempts to make sense of the intelligence world – meta-theorising attempts to make sense of intelligence theorising. Intelligence studies is furthermore in a similar predicament as that of political science as Duvenhage (1994:61-64) argues that the latter appears to reflect a somewhat low status to conceptual meta-theoretical frameworks in its academic content. Similarly, the most noted attempts made to provide such a framework for intelligence and intelligence research, could be that of Patrick Walsh (2011:283-298), *Intelligence and Intelligence analysis*; and to some extent Peter Gill and Mark Phythian (2012b:31-49), *Intelligence in an insecure world*. These frameworks are however not sufficient enough and lack the provision for the understanding of intelligence studies within other disciplines of study or even within the broader social sciences or science itself.

This argument, as postulated by this thesis, is supported by Bay (2007:1) who states that there is a lack of meta-theoretical awareness among intelligence scholars. He (Bay, 2007:16) continues to argue based on the Vocation of Science from Weber (1917) that the role of social science is to provide explicit theory and method that is fair and honest in its meta-theoretical standpoints. The latter is also supported by Duvenhage (1994:65-67). More so, Bay (2007:16), views that: "...the role of intelligence studies must be to explicitly show the entire scientific chain of thought..." and argues that "...intelligence scholars of twenty years are unaware of their meta-theoretical status and background..." This viewpoint is also postulated by this study and serves as motivation to attempt to construct such a framework in this chapter. Nevertheless, according to Ritzer (1991:247), meta-theoretical work has two roles to play in society namely; to firstly help to clarify



theories and their relationships to one another thereby improving their capacity to deal with the social world and secondly; to develop a range of tools that are helpful in understanding not only theory, but also social reality.

Three varieties of meta-theorising are defined and discussed by Ritzer (1990:3-15) namely: (1) Meta-theorising as a means of attaining a deeper understanding of theory ( $M_U$ ) that involves the study of theory in order to produce better and more profound understanding of extant theory; (2) Meta-theorising as a prelude to theory development ( $M_P$ ) that entails the study of existing theory to describe, prescribe and give direction in producing new theory and; (3) Meta-theorising as a source of perspective that overarching theory ( $M_O$ ) in which the study of theory is orientated to the goal of producing a perspective or meta-theory that overarches some part or all of the theory and provides an arrangement of constructs into a system and set of meta-theoretical assumptions and propositions. This study forwards the integrating of all three typologies in its attempt to provide a meta-theoretical framework for understanding intelligence. The conceptualising of a meta-theoretical framework for this study enables this thesis to reach the specific research objectives that state: 'To provide insight into intelligence theory, concepts and practices through the construction of a meta-theoretical framework for intelligence', as well as: 'To review (reconstruct), interpret and evaluate political regime classification and regime change'. These meta-theoretical varieties as discussed above, also serve to characterise good meta-theoretical perspectives in that they demonstrate the ability to provide a deeper understanding of theory; provide for theory development and lastly provide for overarching theoretical perspectives. Within the deeper understanding of theory, existing theoretical perspectives, concepts, constructs, typologies, models and paradigms can be analysed to be able to map the current knowledge and methodologies. Thereby, gaps can be identified in terms of current existing knowledge as well as scientific processes specifically within intelligence studies as academic terrain. Secondly, in terms of theory development, such a meta-theoretical approach provides for the facilitation of theory building within the areas of identified gaps as to produce new theory. Lastly, an overarching theoretical perspective deriving from meta-theorising, contributes to the further maturity and development of both the knowledge as well as practices within intelligence studies – not only beneficial to academics and students thereof, but also the practitioners including the policy-makers (intelligence producers and consumers).

Nonetheless, there are also different views towards the logic of reasoning of political inquiry in answering the *why* question with one claiming that social science and natural science could both use the same logic of reasoning. The opposing view argues that phenomena in social science limit the answers to the question why due to their unique nature versus phenomena within the natural science. Moreover, Blaikie (2007:8-10) describes four distinct research strategies namely induction, deduction, retroduction and abduction. The aim of induction is to establish limited

generalisation about the distribution of patterns of association amongst observed or measured characteristics of phenomena whilst abductive research strategies are more complex and produce reasons rather than causes for understanding rather than explanations. Clauser (2008:53) explains that induction occurs when one is able to postulate causal relationships and that intelligence estimates are largely the result of inductive processes.

Abduction aims to understand and describe everyday lay concepts, meanings and motives and develop and test theory. In contrast deduction constructs theories; deduces hypothesis and then tests theories to eliminate false ones and corroborate the remaining ones. Clauser (2008:55) continues by stating that in intelligence research deduction on the other hand must be used carefully with a full awareness of the limitations of the processes and potential errors in the premises. Retroductive strategies aim to discover underlying mechanisms to explain observed regularities through constructing hypothetical models thereof through experiment or observation. Babbie (2013:21-22) explains, as also discussed and illustrated by Hay (2002:30-32), that induction and deduction work together in a wheel of science. Inductive reasoning moves from the particular to the general, whereas deduction moves from the general to the specific. Thus inductive logic appears to build knowledge from the bottom up through observation of phenomena in the world that leads to the development of theories. Deductive logic is the opposite in that as a top down approach it starts with theory and a hypothesis that is applied to observations of phenomena in the world which is then either proofed or rejected.

The levels of analysis in theorising are explained by Neuman (2011:71-72) as differentiating between a micro, meso or macro level because social reality exists on many levels. He describes micro-level theory as focussing on the micro-level of social life that includes individuals and small groups whereas the meso-level theory focuses on the relations, processes and structures at the midlevel of life such as organisations, movements and communities. Macro-level theorisation focuses on the macro-level of social life that includes entire societies or even world regions. In similar fashion Babbie (2013:59) explains that macro theorising deals with whole societies, meso refers to the intermediate level such as organisations and communities and micro deals with individuals or small groups. Within political science, political scientist study at micro level theorising, individuals or citizens and public good. Meso-level theorising concerns local and national level institutions whereas macro-level theorising focuses on regional and global politics. These levels are also applicable to intelligence and this study will deliberate later in more detail concerning intelligence theory. When intelligence concepts are studied on a macro-level it should then be possible to interchange between micro-, meso- and macro levels of analysis. Therefore, intelligence as academic study field offers a unique opportunity as it reflects multi-disciplinary approaches to its theoretical content. This study postulates that such an adequate framework


could bridge the divides between micro-, meso-, and macro-level analysis in so far that profound macro theoretical statements could provide for micro theory applications.

In summary, through the process of meta-theorising, this study attempts to: firstly, attain a deeper understanding of existing theories within intelligence studies ( $M_U$ ); secondly, to assist in further theory development and the building of new intelligence theory based on the knowledge of existing theory ( $M_O$ ); and thirdly, to provide an overarching broad and general theoretical orientation of intelligence ( $M_P$ ). Furthermore, intelligence concepts are studied on a macro-level that could interchange between micro-, meso- and macro levels. In addition, the four research strategies namely: induction, deduction, retroduction and abduction are employed in a supplementary manner as to provide for a more complete understanding of political and intelligence phenomena observed in the world.

This nonetheless shifts the focus towards the scientific constructs within a meta-theoretical framework.

### **3.3 Scientific constructs within a meta-theoretical framework for intelligence**

The prefix 'meta' in general means after, about and beyond (Zhao, 1991:377). In relation to meta-theorising on intelligence theory, 'after' implies the study of what has been done, 'about' concerns where we are and 'beyond' is in reference to where we are going. A meta-theoretical framework needs to be constructed to serve as a map on the one hand and a guide on the other to this study in its quest to understand intelligence. For this reason this study postulates such a conceptual meta-theoretical framework for intelligence in line with Johnson's (2003b:1) argument in that the purpose is to provide a sense of the dimensions that a theoretical framework for intelligence must encompass as to be able to lay out what we know in such a manner as to suggest next steps in theory construction. Within the meta-science and more specifically meta-theory inquiry process, certain analytical tools assist the scientist to make sense of and understand the phenomena in the real world under study. Mouton and Marais (1996:125-151) explain and discuss these tools or central research constructs in the research process which they argue if absent – research simply cannot take place. These constructs are operationalised scientific research concepts that enable the investigation and study of meta-theory and theory as they can be determined and analysed and moreover, to conceptualise and understand intelligence within a meta-theoretical framework. They consist of concepts, statements (definitions and hypothesis), conceptual frames of reference (typologies, models and theory), and lastly, paradigm or research programme and is viewed by this study in hierarchical order, as they lead to the development of new theory – as also the aim of this doctoral thesis. This study forwards a meta-theoretical framework for the understanding of intelligence as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 17: Meta-theoretical framework for understanding intelligence**

Within this meta-theoretical framework the scientific constructs listed and more specifically that of a *paradigm* requires further examination.


### 3.3.1 Paradigms in intelligence

Within the meta-science and science, there is a relationship between meta-theory, theory and paradigm. A paradigm guides the construction of theory and meta-theory. The root meaning of the word in its Greek form *asparadeigma* means pattern, example or sample from the verb meaning exhibit, represent or expose. The purpose is to provide a type of proof with an illustration of similar occurrences. The Oxford Dictionary (2015) defines paradigm as a typical example or pattern of something. In addition the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2015) defines paradigm as a theoretical and philosophical framework of a scientific school or discipline within which

theories, laws and generalisations and the experiments performed in support of them are formulated. This implies a philosophical or theoretical framework of any kind. Paradigms according to Babbie (2013:57-58), nonetheless serve as the fundamental models or frames of reference we use to organise our observation and reasoning. Within this context this study follows the contemporary explanation offered by Kuhn (1970:57-104) that a scientific community requires a set of received beliefs to be able to practice its trade. Kuhn (1970) links a paradigm to the conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological commitments of a researcher.

These are similar to the five dimensions of social research explained and discussed by this study (Social science as a collaborative human activity - *Sociological Dimension*; in which social reality - *Ontological Dimension*; is studied objectively - *Methodological Dimension*; with the aim - *Teleological Dimension*; of gaining valid - *Epistemological Dimension* and lastly; understanding of it - *Teleological Dimension*). According to Mouton and Marais (1996:144) a scientific paradigm is the clearest manifestation of the social nature of science. A paradigm assists the scientists to determine legitimate knowledge and what knowledge is not valid. Mouton and Marais (1996:147-148) explain that a paradigm enables the research community to conduct normal science; thereby a group of scientists could commit themselves to a particular paradigm in comparison to other competing paradigms. They continue to argue that a fruitful paradigm provides for the selection of appropriate theoretical problems, the matching of facts and theory as well as the articulation and further refinement (definitions, concept) of theory or theories.

Nonetheless, the scientific construct paradigm can be understood in regards to the growth and development in sciences and as discussed by Kuhn (1970). According to him (Kuhn) the history of science has clear periods of normal science followed by a scientific revolution to return again to a period of normal science. Lakatos (1970:91-196) however builds on this notion of Kuhn and Popper and postulates a scientific research programme that stresses the concept of a series of theories instead of only a theory. His research programme consists of a hard-core (HC) at the core or centre of the model, which is surrounded by a protective belt (PB). The HC as the core contains unchangeable features and functions as the foundation and core of theory from where conceptual frameworks are formulated. Within the PB, negative heuristic (NH) and positive heuristic (PH) strategies to improve and expand on existing theory exists. Within these strategies hypothesis or propositions are adjusted to deal with anomalies either via NH or PH. Lakatos postulates the notion to solve specific research problems with relevant theories as scientific knowledge is viewed as not absolute. It builds theory irrespective of hypotheses being positive or negative. This research programme of Lakatos could be delineated as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 18: Lakatos' scientific research programmes**

In so far as the role of a paradigm/research programme in constructing theory is concerned, a paradigm is used to analyse political reality or more within intelligence studies as a discipline in sense-making. Political science and intelligence paradigms shape the views of reality. Significant paradigm occurred in the history and development of both political science as a discipline as in intelligence as a sub-discipline. More specifically these include the development of intelligence from its initial form as espionage from the beginning of mankind, to its more recent early 20<sup>th</sup> century concept of intelligence as well as other important changes ranging from ancient time until the post-cold war era as also depicted by Van Den Berg (2014:18). These include significant developments such as World Wars I and II, the Cold War and Post-Cold War, the industrial revolution, the analogue revolution, the digital revolution, the information/internet revolution and more recently the social media revolution. As stated, these paradigms shaped the views of reality as was intelligence was strongly perceived as the business of spying and counter spying; during the Cold war era unto now perceived to be more occupied with international liaison and information sharing on common threats and opportunities. Similarly, as this study argues, is the case with intelligence as academic field of study. It is evident that more recent changes in the real world such as increased globalisation and new threats and opportunities to national security of states which include international terrorism, non-state actors and global issues, provide for the possibility of yet another scientific revolution.

In this regard, Kuhn (1970:14) states successive transitions from one paradigm to another is the usual pattern of mature science. Moreover, Lahneman (2011:70) claims that adjustments needs to be made to existing intelligence communities to keep intelligence effective in light of various

threats and emerging issues. He suggests that there is a need for a revolution in intelligence affairs and claims that a particular paradigm becomes dominant because it provides the means to solve important problems facing members of a given profession and determines the rules and practices of this profession. Thus a given paradigm determines the kinds of approaches that members of a profession use and delineates the types of questions they ask when tackling problems. However, the world is constantly changing and so also politics and intelligence. “New ideologies, new technologies, new political systems, new alliances, new power centres are constantly emerging while others lose their vitality and become outmoded. Organisations are also constantly in flux, with new models for achieving results arising and being tested” (Lahneman, 2011:XX). This also implies that the world as reality also effect change, thereby also linking practice with theory. Theory represents constructs and concepts in reality and as the world changes, so does the paradigm. This influences the study of phenomena within each discipline; including intelligence studies as academic field. Paradigms therefore link the notion of science being both knowledge and process. Within this context this study furthermore postulates that existing theory cannot be refined or amended to understand the concept of intelligence in current regime typologies and requires new theory and scientific development. This study therefore aims to assist in its endeavour to examine, explore and describe intelligence from a meta-theoretical framework as to understand political and intelligence phenomena in the real world, including within South Africa – as reflected in the title of this thesis.

This study furthermore argues, that as political change and developments in the world also bring new theories and understanding of reality to the fore which could ultimately result in a paradigm shift, this is also true of the intelligence profession which is reflective of any given political regime. Therefore intelligence studies requires a higher level of theoretical abstraction and analysis ranging from the micro, meso, to the macro level of analysis as reflected within earlier discussion within meta-scientific constructs and concepts, as to ensure its scientific practices are reflective of any given paradigm. In the words of Smith (2004:510): “We construct and reconstruct our disciplines as much as we construct and reconstruct our world.” Chalmers (1999:112-113) furthermore indicated that scientists due to the way they are trained, will be unaware of and unable to articulate the precise nature of the paradigm in which they work. They are however able to articulate the prepositions involved in the existing paradigm. According to him, as also postulated by this study, the mere existence of unsolved puzzles within a paradigm does not constitute a crisis and a paradigm will always have anomalies and encounter difficulties. Babbie (2013:59) adds that ultimately, paradigms are neither false nor true but rather more or less useful and are seldom discarded altogether.

To conclude, paradigms provide for conceptual building blocks in the development of theories *of* and *for* intelligence whilst simultaneously building the academic field of study. Paradigms assist

intelligence studies with overarching meta-theoretical evaluations of intelligence theories as to provide for a coherent and comprehensive understanding thereof. This is also indicative of a mature science.

Nonetheless, although the scientific construct of a paradigm is on top of the diagram in Figure 17, this study will next give attention to the other scientific constructs, starting from the lower end of the hierarchical pyramid. The scientific construct of a concept, which serves as the foundation for theory and assists in meta-theorising and theory building thus requires further attention.

### **3.3.2 Concepts**

Concepts are the building blocks of theory (Neuman, 2011:62). According to Bryman (2012:8) concepts are the way we make sense of the social world and are as such embedded as key ingredients of theories. They are labels given to aspects of the social world that have common features. Bryman (2012:8) explains that concepts are important in the organising and meaning given to research interests; how they provide for disciplined and clearer thinking about what it is that needs to be researched and lastly; assist in organising the research findings. In addition Gerring (1999:367-384) provides eight criteria for successful concept formation in social science that are: (1) Familiarity – How familiar is the concept?; (2) Resonance – Does the chosen term resonate or ring?; (3) Parsimony – How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes?; (4) Coherence – How internally consistent are the instances and attributes?; (5) Differentiation – How differentially bounded are the instances and attributes?; (6) Depth – How many accompanying properties are shared?; (7) Theoretical Utility – How useful is the concept within a wider field of inferences? And; (8) Field Utility – How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes.

A concept as a thought or reference according to Ogden and Richards (1923:1-23), has a causal relation towards a symbol or word or phrase where it appears to have direct and indirect relations with a referent, object or thing of the real world. De Vaus (2001:25-27 and 2002:47-49) postulates the ladder of abstraction in delineating abstract concepts in order to identify the dimensions of a concept. Concepts serve three purposes according to De Vaus (2002:47-49). Firstly; concepts need to be operationalised through the development of an operational definition and measurement tools in turning abstract theoretical concepts into observable and measurable entities. Secondly; operationalisation of hypothesis to be able to establish clear definitions and thirdly; concepts serve as a framework to be able to develop measurements. The ladder of abstraction involves moving from a broad concept into a specific one. It is also moving from an abstract concept into a concrete concept. Concepts provide for the understanding of political and intelligence phenomena and enable classification, explanation and comparison between these



phenomena. Some of the more relevant concepts within political science and intelligence study applicable to this study, which will be addressed later in this chapter include; political regime, democracy, democratic consolidation, non-democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian, hybrid political regime, intelligence, secret, intelligence elements, collection, covert action, espionage, analysis, domestic collection, intelligence oversight, intelligence control, intelligence accountability, intelligence mandate, constitution, rule of law, human rights, executive, legislative, judiciary, state and government. In reference to this study as reflected in the title (Intelligence in South Africa as a hybrid political regime), the concepts of a hybrid political regime on the one hand as well as the characteristics of intelligence within such a regime on the other, requires specific attention as fairly new scientific concepts.

To conclude, this study regards concepts as the most basic building blocks of knowledge. These concepts need to be cemented into meaningful constructs such as statements, in order to become truly part of developing science although concepts are linked to denotation (imaginative) and connotation (dictionary meaning). Furthermore, concepts are symbolic constructions by means of which people make sense of and give meaning to their life worlds. Concepts are combined to form statements, definitions, or hypotheses that need further deliberation:

### 3.3.3 Statements, hypothesis and definitions

Within social science research, statements are used to provide a meaningful understanding of a research problem or phenomena to be investigated within the real world. It usually presents a proposition or question and should be measured. Mouton and Marais (1996:131) explain that statements are defined as sentences that make specific knowledge claims concerning an aspect of reality and may be either false or true. A statement therefore combines concepts to be able to describe phenomena under inquiry. The **central theoretical statement** or thesis is the central argument within research – as also applied within this study. It serves as the guiding argument constructed on phenomena or problem, under inquiry. While the research hypothesis directs the investigation in empirical research, the central theoretical statement or thesis guides inquiry in theoretical research (Mouton & Marais, 1996:192). The latter is also the case within this study. A central theoretical statement is a hypothetical proposition forwarded without proof. Propositions are statements concerned with the logical relation amongst connected concepts. This tentative and hypothetical relationship between concepts is stated in a declarative statement. Once a phenomena or problem is observed, a central theoretical statement is formulated. The central theoretical statement provides for clear and precise boundaries of what to investigate and leads into theoretical research questions. Data collected and analysed within the research process to answer the research questions as concerned with the phenomena or problem, will provide knowledge and facts to test the central theoretical statement. This could ultimately lead to, as also

the aim of this study – to the new knowledge, the contribution to existing theory and the development of new theory.

**Hypotheses** are similar to a central theoretical statement in so far as they provide for tentative propositions of observed phenomena. All the same, according to Bhattacharjee (2012:13), propositions are indirectly tested by examining the relationship between corresponding measures (variables) of the relevant concepts. The root form of the word is derived from its ancient Greek form of *hypotithenai* meaning to put under or suppose (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). The dictionary meaning is explained as either an assumption or concession made for the sake of an argument or, a tentative assumption made in order to draw out and test logical or empirical consequences. Babbie (2013:46) explains that a hypothesis is a specific testable expectation about empirical reality that follows from a more general proposition. Babbie (2013:71-72) and Mouton and Marais (1996:131-133) describe two different definitions in social science research namely theoretical (connotative) and operational definitions. They explain that within a **theoretical definition**, the relationship between a given concept and related concept as in a specific conceptual framework consisting of either a model or theory, is brought into focus. This connotes that a theoretical definition of a concept derives from the conceptual framework or theory within which it is used. Theoretical definitions in this study are as such clearly linked to the specific scientific tradition, academic discipline and paradigm as described within the meta-scientific and meta-theoretical constructs. In this context an **operational definition** provides for both the variables to be measured as well as the method to be used to measure it. An operational definition concerns the explication of the denotation of concepts as it provides for what exactly is being referred to, or what the concept indicates. Within this study, the concept of being democratic or non-democratic requires measurement.

Certain variables require identification, as well as the measuring instrument or method in order to provide relevant data to be able to build theory. An example is the 'Freedom in the World Country Ratings (Freedom index)' as applicable to this study, to measure democratic consolidation as Van Den Berg (2014:115-116) explains. Herein, democratic governance is measured by political rights and civil liberties, rated from 1 to 7. Another example as also explained by Van Den Berg (2014:123-124), is the Rainbow Index of the South African Institute of Race Relations (Jeffery, 2012:1-42) that measure and score ten policy areas argued to be crucial to freedom and the consolidation of democracy in South Africa in the periods 1994-2009 and 2009-2010.

In summary, concepts are combined to form statements, definitions, or hypotheses which postulate an argument, idea or statement which could be tested through study or experimentation. A central theoretical statement is a hypothetical proposition where a hypothesis is a statement formulated to assist in solving a problem or to understand a phenomena in the real world under

study or investigation. Furthermore, hypotheses are tested through data that are collected and then analysed to be either confirmed or refuted and therefore contribute to theory building or even the creation of new theories. This study, as a fundamentally theoretical research, applies theoretical definitions as abstract conceptualisation of intelligence and political regime concepts and phenomena.


Nonetheless, the structure of concepts into integrated statements, hypotheses or definitions; brings the scientific construct of conceptual frameworks, to the fore.

### **3.3.4 Conceptual framework: typologies, models and theories**

Individual statements are inadequate to explain and understand social phenomena and require to be combined into more complex kinds of conceptual frameworks such as typologies, models, theories, broad paradigms and even research traditions (Mouton, 1996:180). To this extent Huntington (1996:29), argues in his book *Clash of Civilisations* that: “Yet if we are to think seriously about the world, and act effectively in it, some sort of simplified map of reality, some theory, concept, model, paradigm, is necessary.” This is specifically as to prevent confusion. Typologies according to Mouton (1996:195) have a classification function within the body of knowledge as to categorising single variables. This kind of conceptual framework categorise or classify phenomena under study, in terms of the characteristics that they have in common with other phenomena. Neuman (2011:66) defines a **typology** or taxonomy as: “A theoretical classification or quasi-theory that is created by cross-classifying or combining two or more simple concepts to form a set of interrelated subtypes.” In addition, Babbie (2013:221) explains that a typology is a classification of observations in terms of their attributes on two or more variables. All academic disciplines including intelligence studies have taxonomies or classifications. Collier et al (2008:1-19) makes a distinction between descriptive and explanatory typologies. The first type contains cells which correspond to specific types or instances of a broader concept, whereas the latter concern rows and columns as explanatory variables, and the cells contain hypothesised outcomes. Clauser (2008:93-104) argues that classification is a basic step in intelligence analysis as it entails the process of assigning information into classes as to understand data. He claims that significant discoveries have been made in science as a result of the process of classification and similar discoveries can also be made in intelligence.

Classification provides for the revealing of relationships on the one hand and assists the researcher to identify information gaps on the other. Clauser (2008:99) adds that classify has two meanings, firstly it refers to the act of assigning specific datum to a predetermined position in a classification scheme and secondly classify relates to the act of breaking down data and organising it to related sub-classes. Constructing typologies involve high levels of abstraction and

an ideal tool to assist in this regard is the 'ladder of abstraction' of De Vaus (2001) as also discussed earlier in this study. An example of a typology within this study is Figure 15 whereby traditions and approaches within the political science discipline have been adapted from Duvenhage (1994:36). Clark (2010:88-122) also utilises a taxonomy of intelligence sources to explain and describe the different intelligence collection sources and methods within the US intelligence community. Even so, a specific example of a multidimensional typology applicable to this study is a typology of Van Den Berg (2014:79) linking different political regime types with different intelligence types measured by low or high intelligence autonomy and intelligence penetration of society on the one hand and high or low levels of human rights and rule of law, on the other. This typology is based and adapted on initial typologies of Keller (1989:17), Gill (1994:82 and 2016:43-44) and Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:3-5), and is depicted as follows:



Source: Van Den Berg (2014:79)

**Figure 19: A typology of political regimes and intelligence services**

The scientific construct of a **model** requires deliberation as it builds towards theory and theory building which are within the aim and scope of this inquiry. Mouton and Marais (1996:140) explain the following differences between a typology, a model and a theory. A typology presents no more than a static image or cross section of a specific class of events, whereas in a model an attempt is made to represent the dynamic aspects of a phenomenon by illustrating the relationships between major elements of that phenomenon in simplified form. A theory on the other hand provides for the additional step in suggesting an explanation of the systemic relationships

between phenomena. In this explanation a model is but a partial representation of a given phenomenon as it agrees in broad outline with the phenomena of which it is a model. All the same, Duvenhage (1994:49) describes a model as an analogy or metaphor. In this context models are used to describe and understand problems and phenomena of which limited knowledge is available, with an analogy with other phenomena of which more complete knowledge is available. However, Clauser (2008:43) explains that the construct of a model evolved from the physical sciences and has a particular application within intelligence research and analysis as it is an abstraction or representation of reality and enables the prediction of outcomes by manipulating only symbols rather than elements of the real world. Clark (2010:37-38 and 47-48) adds that the essence of intelligence is that all intelligence involves creating a model of the intelligence target as well as the extraction of knowledge there from to be able to conduct problem solving. He continues and defines a model as a replica or representation of an idea, an object or an actual system. It therefore offers an organised construct of thinking about complexed targets. A model in intelligence is normally conceptual and descriptive and is developed from an existing knowledge base of the intelligence target(s) and then continuously refined. In addition, Lave and March (1993:19) explain that a model is a simplified picture of a part of the real world and as a set of interrelated guesses, only has some characteristics of the world.

A model is simpler than the phenomena that it is supposed to represent or explain and different models can be constructed of the same thing in order to explain and appreciate the world. Therefore, models are maps presenting phenomena in the real world and the question arises not to prove or refute their existence, but rather to establish if they are (although limited in their representing as some characteristics are absent) considered being similar to the real world. Clauser (2008:188) argues that models in intelligence analysis are abstractions or representations of reality as they represent those critical portions of reality that are essential in decision-making and can be used to represent objects, processes or functions. Huntington (1996:30) adds that every model or map is an abstraction and will be more useful for some purposes than for others. An example of a model within this study is Lakatos' model for scientific research programmes as delineated in Figure 18. Further examples of some models within political science and intelligence studies as applicable to this study include the model of a political system of David Easton (1953), Max Weber's (1922) model for bureaucracy, that of the intelligence cycle (see Figure 2) and lastly, the model of the Gore-Tex state by Peter Gill (1994:80). However, models are maps or explanatory sketches that do not provide complete explanations of phenomena whereas theories instead constitute higher abstraction as well as comprehensive levels of explanation. Moreover, model building requires the ability to abstract from reality to a model. A model aims to present a specific phenomenon while a theory aims to explain it. The focus within this study is the conceptual model and not the mathematical or natural science model. The conceptual model collates concepts and characteristics of bigger phenomena

in the real world as to understand it and provide meaning to it. Models are also higher conceptual frameworks than typologies and assist in providing order and understanding to an aspect of reality of the phenomena under study.

All the scientific constructs discussed up to this point, culminate into **theory** or building of theory. The word theory according to the Oxford Dictionary (2014) is derived from the Greek *theōria*, meaning contemplation or speculation. Babbie (2013:70) describes a theory as a systematic explanation for observations that relate to a particular aspect of life. Neuman (2011:68) adds that theories are more than the collection of concepts and assumptions as they provide for an explanation of the nature of the connection and relation between concepts. Mouton (1996:199), supports the notion of explanatory theories in social science and provides the distinctive features as: (1) Explanatory theories explain phenomena by constructing causal models and stories, (2) These causal narratives or stories are to some extent plausible as they identify the real causal processes or mechanisms that produce certain states of affairs or events, (3) As explanatory theories are not universal laws as in the case of natural sciences, they do vary in scope from local to more general cross-national explanatory models and, (4) Explanatory theories typically explain phenomena in an open system and therefore are prediction not an essential criterion for the theories of social sciences. Neuman (2011:74-84) furthermore distinguishes between three forms of theoretical explanations, namely causal, structural and interpretative. Causal explanation is a theoretical explanation about why events occur and how things work expressed in terms of causes and effects. A structural explanation denotes a process, event or factor within an overall structure. Interpretive explanations provide for understanding and explain why events occur and how things work in terms of the socially constructed meaning and worldviews. The event, practice or relationship that requires explanation, is placed within a specific context that provides meaning. All three forms of theoretical explanations are also relevant to intelligence studies theorising. A theory thus provides a complete picture of why and how specific relationships do or do not exist. In addition, Mouton and Marais (1996:143-144) argue that a good theory has the ability to explain actual relationships between phenomena.

In conclusion, typologies serve to assist as methodological tools to construct theoretical conceptualisation of reality and is the result of a grouping process whereby prominent characteristics of a set of interrelated concepts or phenomena, are theoretically reconstructed. Classification require that: (1) phenomena be assigned in a consistent manner to categories; (2) all classes or categories be mutually exclusive; (3) the system must be complete in that all elements of data be assigned to a category and (4) every super class has at least two subclasses. In addition, models identify central problems or questions concerning the phenomenon that ought to be investigated and at the same time limit, isolate, simplify and systematise the domain that is being investigated. Models provide new language for phenomena and enable the making of

predictions. Lastly, theory is defined as a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena.

Nonetheless, the meta-theorising of Intelligence requires further attention.

### 3.4 The meta-theorising and intelligence

This thesis has at its core the design of a meso-level theory of intelligence in a hybrid political regime as also reflected in the title. The postulation of such a meso-level theory requires consideration of the broader context of intelligence on the macro-theoretical level. This approach is in line with the initial aim of this study to provide a meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies and more specifically within this chapter, to provide for meta-theorising of intelligence for the better understanding thereof. The scientific constructs discussed up to this stage (ranging from concepts, statements/hypotheses, definitions, typologies and theory), all serve as already stated, as building blocks for theory building and theory analysis. This study furthermore postulates, as Ehrman (2009:2) argues that a theory is an important building block for intellectual disciplines, whether in intelligence or any other field. He furthermore explains what a well-developed theory will offer: (1) A framework for understanding and explaining a subject; (2) A way to model expected behaviour as theory enables the building of models of how people or institutions can be expected to behave in given situations and; (3) A way to identify gaps in knowledge as by systematically describing a topic, we not only can catalogue what we know about it but also what we do not know. Gill (*In* Treverton et al. 2006:4) asserts that a distinction should be made between theories *of* and *for* intelligence to develop intelligence theory. Theories *of* intelligence are to help academics to understand it, and better explain it to students and the public. Theories *for* intelligence relate to the needs of intelligence practitioners as gatherers, analysts, and managers, along with consumers, politicians, and other executives. This viewpoint is supported by Bay (2007:5), who argues that there is no vast divide between theories *of* and theories *for* intelligence and that they overlap more often than not. He rather focuses more on the theories of intelligence as he argues that there seems to be less academic work done in this area. This stance is also postulated by this study and therefore this study deems theories *of* intelligence as more relevant than theories *for* intelligence, especially within meta-theorising on existing intelligence theories.


There are however several approaches to the study of intelligence as also explained by Van Den Berg (2014:20) which directs existing theory building within intelligence as academic study field. This study however supports the notion that these approaches should serve to integrate existing theory. The four research approaches as explained by Thomas (1988:236-239) are as follows:

Firstly, the *historical/biographical approach* referred to specific historical case-studies or chart chronological periods that include memoirs and archives. The second approach is the *functional approach* - which focuses on intelligence activities and processes. The third approach is the *structural approach* which studies intelligence agencies and organisations; and the fourth approach is the *political approach* which studies the political dimension of intelligence that includes decision making and public policy requirements. This study supports all four approaches to the study of intelligence and argues similar to Scott and Jackson (2004:144) that the best writings about intelligence incorporate all the approaches in different ways.

This phenomenon brought the study of intelligence from either a democratic or non-democratic perspective about which is also relevant to this research and would be dealt with in more detail later in this study. These traditions above are also linked to the political science traditions delineated in Figure 15, as intelligence is a defined sub-discipline within political science. Although these traditions reflect different perspectives on the theory of intelligence, they do assist in meta-theorising of intelligence. These traditions are evident in the history and development of intelligence studies as an academic sub-discipline within political science. Moreover, these traditions form part of the pre-scientific belief systems of academics as they build and contribute to intelligence theory or knowledge. As also explained and discussed in the previous chapter, the prevailing tradition within intelligence studies is within realism, although it is also a discipline on the move and continues its development and maturity. Instead of describing and discussing and analysing each specific tradition and theoretical contribution within intelligence studies, this study rather aims to integrate the various traditions within its attempt to provide a meta-theory of intelligence.

This study denotes that to be able to effectively engage in meta-theorising as to contribute to, build and provide an overarching perspective of existing intelligence theory, a selection of the dominant traditions within intelligence studies is delineated as follows:





Source: Own construct

Figure 20: A selection of the dominant scientific traditions within intelligence theory


Nonetheless, this study postulates the following conceptualised intelligence theory from a meta-theoretical approach as linked to the scientific framework of this thesis.

### 3.5 Conceptualising intelligence theory

Taking the different traditions into consideration as well as reflecting on an inquiry into existing intelligence theory, this study postulates that no universally accepted theory exists as every nation practices intelligence according to its own unique needs. This does however not negate the notion that there are a number of similarities and identifiable characteristics between the practice of intelligence in comparable and related political regime types, such as democracies and non-democracies. Moreover, this study ambitiously aims to provide a conceptualised theory of intelligence that is generally acceptable taking into consideration the notion of Betts (2007:53): “Intelligence can’t live with theory and can’t live without it”. Through the process of meta-theorising, this study attempts to firstly, attain a deeper understanding of existing theories within intelligence studies ( $M_U$ ), secondly to assist in further theory development and the building of a new intelligence theory based on the knowledge of existing theory ( $M_O$ ); and thirdly, to provide an overarching broad and general theoretical orientation of intelligence ( $M_P$ ). Being explicit of the conceptual framework and the construction of knowledge from a meta-theoretical point of view, the different academic traditions within intelligence studies as discussed in the previous chapter, forms part of this meta-theorising.

Within intelligence studies, Phythian (*In Gill et al 2009:54*) argues that the purpose of theory is to facilitate understanding of the past and present and to act as a guide to the future. In this sense a theory serves to isolate the relevant factors and highlight the relationship between them, thereby constructing a theoretical reality. Furthermore, Waltz (1979:5-10) explains that reality emerges from our selection and organisation of infinite materials with the guidance of theory. Theory is described as a depiction of the organisation of a domain and of the connections amongst its parts. The question to be asked is whether the theory is useful. Waltz furthermore claims that: “Theories do construct a reality, but one can never ever say it is *the* reality”. A theory must be constructed through simplifying. This ensures that the essential elements as well as necessary relations between cause and interdependency are indicated. However, in an attempt to conceptualise theory and theory building towards existing intelligence theory, the following concepts would serve as a guide and route map, namely, root meaning, scope, intelligence philosophy, nature, definition, purpose, and elements.

More so, this study submits the following framework to serve as a guide in intelligence meta-theorising:



Source: Own construct

Figure 21: A map for meta-theorising of intelligence theories

### 3.5.1 The root meaning of the word intelligence

Intelligence as understood in its modern day word concept has only been used since the 19<sup>th</sup> century according to Herman (1996:9). However, Van Den Berg (2014:17) explains that the concept has its original beginnings within *espionage* as also discussed earlier within this study. Laqueur (1985:3) states that: “Ever since humans first began to collect information about the powers and intentions of neighbouring clans and tribes, there have been intelligence agents and a craft – or science – of intelligence”. Nonetheless, in its root form intelligence is described as meaning ‘*the faculty of understanding, the intellect*’ or ‘*the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills*’ in the Oxford English Dictionary (1999). In its Latin form the word is derived from *intelligentia* meaning “understanding, knowledge, power of discerning, art, skill” and linked to

*intelligere* meaning “to understand, comprehend, come to know” from *inter-* “between” + *legere* “choose, pick out, read”. This also denotes to ‘read between the lines’, (Etymon Dictionary Online). The concept however developed further as Johnson (2009:19) explains into its modern day use and understanding as the knowledge and information needed to make informed decisions about statecraft.

### 3.5.2 Scope and categories of intelligence

Intelligence has numerous uses today ranging from intellect or human knowledge and understanding, business intelligence, competitive intelligence, knowledge management to artificial intelligence. Therefore, as Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:3) postulates, intelligence is not only applied by government alone but also within the public sector as competitive and business intelligence. However, government departments conduct intelligence, as linked to their area of operations, such as military intelligence within the defence department and crime intelligence within the police service, as also explained by Vitkauskas (1999:3-56). Within this context intelligence is an umbrella term covering a range of activities as described by Gill (*In* Treverton et al, 2006:6), as well as by Gill and Phythian (2012b:11). However, for the purpose of this research as well as towards a contribution to intelligence theory, this study advances that intelligence is a narrow concept linked directly to the civilian statutory intelligence functions of a government. This entails the exclusion of any other broad use of the concept, even within military intelligence or crime intelligence.

All the same, intelligence can be grouped in different ways. Generally two categories of intelligence are distinguished, namely domestic/security intelligence and foreign intelligence. Other categories of statutory intelligence usually reflected within an intelligence community include military or defence intelligence services that generate intelligence relevant for defence planning and the support of military operations and criminal intelligence services that produce intelligence on organised crime, corruption and criminal activities to aid in law enforcement. In addition, signal and communication intelligence services for the protection of government communication as well as interception of communication of targets and adversaries, also forms part of the categories of intelligence. Moreover, of specific relevance to this theory and study, is foreign and domestic intelligence, normally understood as part of the civilian yet statutory intelligence. It is also interesting to note that intelligence services rather refer to their own intelligence activities directed outside their own country as foreign intelligence and foreign collection instead of the term espionage, as to provide legitimacy for their actions.

This is because the mere nature of these activities is perceived by the countries wherein they deploy and collect, as espionage instead of foreign collection. Within this context, espionage is

perceived to be unlawful and therefore has no legal or constitutional protection. However, the intelligence activities of foreign intelligence services of other countries in one's own country are branded as espionage – being illegal and an act against the sovereignty and national security of the state, whereas one's own intelligence activities abroad within those countries - are merely legally mandated and perceived as foreign intelligence and collection rather than espionage.

This however, does not exclude the civilian intelligence, or more so intelligence to be a member of the statutory intelligence community of a state. As also explained by Herman (1996:2), intelligence has a permanent institution within most governments as a significant part of the modern state and a factor in government's success or failure. Furthermore, as explained by GCDCAF (Backgrounder, 2006:3), governments institute the different intelligence agencies or services within their respective intelligence communities according to their own specific needs, priorities and requirements. This notion is also supported by Lowenthal (2009:313) and Herman (2001:3). As already stated by this study, all countries have intelligence services of some sort or structure. Within this context Van Den Berg (2014:40-41) described the classical structure of an intelligence community as based on the British model, as consisting of the following structures:

- a foreign intelligence service (such as the British Secret Intelligence Service – SIS or MI6);
- an internal or security service (equivalent to the British Security Intelligence Service or MI5);
- a technological service for government communications (reflected in the Government Communications Headquarters – GCHQ);
- a military intelligence structure (Defence Intelligence Staff);
- a police intelligence structure (Special Branch of Scotland Yard);
- the foreign affairs/relations department (Foreign and Commonwealth); and
- a joint intelligence coordinating body (Joint Intelligence Committee – JIC).

In evaluation, this study argues that the concept intelligence purely refers to its scope within the civilian intelligence, where it forms part of specific links to concepts such as national security, national intelligence, security intelligence and even more so, the modern coined concept of national security intelligence. Therefore, this study postulates that the concept intelligence concerns the statutory intelligence environment of government and more precisely, that of civilian intelligence (Van Den Berg, 2014:17) which is mainly narrowly confined and restricted to only denote civilian intelligence. The scope of intelligence is confined to statutory intelligence and its categories defined as foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, military intelligence, crime intelligence and signal/communication intelligence.

### 3.5.3 Nature of intelligence

Regarding the nature of intelligence, Holt (1995:5-6) asserts that: "Secrets have always been part of all governments, democratic or not." He explicates that intelligence is a necessary secret. The key element or vital characteristic of intelligence according to Warner (2002:21) is its secrecy and is furthermore a secret state activity. He (Warner, *in* Treverton et al, 2006:10) furthermore expounds that apart from the secret character of intelligence information and activities, states also have secrets that require protection. Herman (2001:6) states that if intelligence has any single, defining characteristic in the eyes of government and public, it is this secrecy and the mystique it attracts. Therefore intelligence is by its nature secret as supported by Bruneau and Dombroski (2006:1), Caparini (2007:3-5) and Turner (2006:3). This notion is furthermore supported by Bruce (*In George & Kline*, 2006:399), where he claims that intelligence requires secrets and is secret. Secrecy is also part of intelligence and provides even difficulties in intelligence sharing by nations as claimed by James Walsh (2012:12) in his book related to this topic. To this extent, Schoenfeld (2010:2) clarifies in a written testimony to the US House Committee on Judiciary that: "Secrecy, like openness, is also an essential prerequisite of governance. To be effective, even many of the most mundane aspects of democratic rule, from the development of policy alternatives to the selection of personnel, must often take place behind closed doors. To proceed always under the glare of public scrutiny would cripple deliberation and render government impotent. And when one turns to the most fundamental business of democratic governance, namely, self-preservation, the imperative of secrecy becomes critical, often a matter of survival." In addition, secrecy is needed to ensure national security. To this Herman (1996:15) adds that secret intelligence is as old as government. He (Herman, 2001:6) furthermore claims as also supported by Van Den Berg (2014:30), that the single defining characteristic of intelligence is its secrecy. This study therefore concludes and postulates that the concept of secrecy remains a centre focus of intelligence as a tool of government, as it exists because of and for the political regime in which it functions.

### 3.5.4 Philosophy of intelligence

The philosophy of intelligence is founded in the notion advanced by Lowenthal (2009:11), Classen (2005:20), Bruneau (2000:15) and Godson (1983:5) that most states have their own understanding of what intelligence is and what it is for. Bay (2007:14) continues to claim that intelligence definitions are based on presumption about the world and that these definitions addresses the question why we have intelligence, why we need it, what its purpose is and how it should be used. This philosophy should guide the purpose, role and functions of intelligence as reflected in its legislation, policies and procedures. The philosophy also guides the control, oversight and accountability of intelligence which ultimately indicates its level of independency as an organization within a political regime. This is also the case in South Africa with the White Paper

for Intelligence that has its intent to provide a framework or philosophy for intelligence. This study postulates the following notion relevant to a philosophy of intelligence for South Africa namely: intelligence exists to safeguard, enhance and promote the constitutional democracy as to achieve “the good life for all”, both within South Africa, as well as in the region.

### 3.5.5 Purpose of intelligence

The purpose of intelligence from the behaviour tradition specifically focussing on warning/surprise/failure as argued by Roberta Wohlstetter in her book ‘Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision’ (1962), postulates that intelligence failures could be prevented by sufficient warning. This notion is also linked to surprise although in this context she argues that: “In short, we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbour not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones” (Wohlstetter, 1962:387). She (Wohlstetter, 1962:397-401) continues to assert that in conditions of great uncertainty people want to predict the events that they actually want to happen as human attention is usually directed by believes of what is likely to occur. In addition, Wohlstetter (1962:401) concludes with the statement that: “We have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it”. To this extent Wirtz (*In Johnson & Wirtz, 2011:112-116*) declares that there are similarities between intelligence surprise/failure in the Pearl Harbour attack and the September 9/11 attack in the USA. His discourse supports the purpose of intelligence to reduce vulnerability and uncertainty pertaining to threats to the state. Similarly, Richard Betts (1982:3-4) writes that surprise is amongst the greatest dangers a country can face and would spell the difference between success and failure. The principal cause of surprise is not the failure of intelligence but rather the unwillingness of the political leaders to believe in or re-act to intelligence. Within the similar realm of the purpose of intelligence, Hulnick (2005:593) argues: “Nothing is more important in the world of intelligence than preventing surprise.

Similarly within the behaviourist tradition the purpose of intelligence is also seen to minimise risk and uncertainty. Within this school of thought Kristian Wheaton and Michael Beerbower (2006:319-331) focus on the purpose of intelligence to reduce uncertainty as to provide the policy-maker with an advantage. They focus also on intelligence as a tool for sovereignty rather than just the state. Adding to this viewpoint, Michael Warner (2014:4) states that: “... Intelligence is a way for sovereign powers to use secret means to protect their own – and further their own interests... “. He furthermore claims that intelligence should be viewed as a reflexive activity involving complexed disproportionate and inherently unpredictable interactions and outcomes and that sovereigns transfer risks and uncertainties to people unaware of the activities of intelligence. Likewise, Thomas Quiggin (2007:IX-XI) elucidates that the role of national security intelligence is increasingly difficult due to a complex and uncertain international environment and protecting sovereignty, where growing the economy and enhancing internal social harmony are

some of the major concerns. He (Quiggin, 2007:21) furthermore claims that the role of intelligence in national security is to support the state and its interests while protecting it against threats by providing anticipatory warning. The emphasis is not on the ability of intelligence to predict but rather to anticipate through effective risk, threat and vulnerability analysis.

Nonetheless, linked to the post-behaviourist approach, the concepts of national security and the role of the state as postulated by the Copenhagen school and Barry Buzan (1991:132-138), comes to the fore. Buzan (1991:134) includes the concept of power in relation to strong and weak social political cohesion within states. Within this school of thought the purpose of intelligence is mainly focussed on protecting the national security interests of a country. Adding a further development to the concept national security, James Sheptycki (*In Gill, Marrin & Phythian, 2009:166-185*) postulates a human security as a new paradigm within the purpose of intelligence. He states that: "Whereas national security focuses on the defence of 'the state' and is organised especially around the fear of an external attack directed against the state, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from any forms of political violence and, in its broadest conception includes both freedom from fear and freedom from want." (Sheptycki *in Gill, Marrin & Phythian, 2009:171*). Within this notion of the human security paradigm, the purpose of intelligence focuses on universal human rights, rather than state sovereignty as within the realism thinking. Within the neo-realism tradition, more specifically offensive realism, John Mearsheimer (2001:31) supports the notion that great powers in the international realm ensure their survival by maximising power and pursuing hegemony based on the primary assumption that there is anarchy in the international system.

In an opposing defensive realism view as published in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz in his book: 'Theory of international politics, great powers are power-maximising in an attempt to be secure within the international system. A recurrent pattern of balancing occurs as states ally with weaker states to balance stronger states (Waltz, 1979:117-126). This results in a state from not pursuing hegemony as other states would join together in power against this state's behaviour. Also within the neo-realism tradition, Jennifer Simms (*In Gill, Marrin & Phythian, 2009a:154*) denotes that intelligence: "... purports to explain why states go to war when calculations of raw power suggest they will lose and why some states win in contests despite being militarily inferior." She explains that the policy-makers as clients of intelligence are in a competitive enterprise whereby they need to gain an advantage over rivals. In addition, decision advantages are gained by either giving one's own side superior information or purposefully degrading the information of the adversary so that his decision-making suffers. This viewpoint of intelligence has its foundation within international relations.



In a post-modernist approach to the purpose of intelligence, James Der Derian (1993:29-51) postulates that intelligence is the continuation of war by the clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another power. He claims that intelligence is making war without war and focuses specifically on surveillance. In building on this approach, Andrew Rathmell (2002:88-89) asserts that the purpose of intelligence is to produce targeted, actionable and predictive knowledge for specific consumers. He (Rathmell, 2002:99-102) continues to characterise intelligence as similar to a corporate entity exposed to incoherent thought and theory, sweeping social change and exposed to post-modernity in seeking to understand contemporary societal, political, economic and technological change. Similarly, Myriam Cavelty and Victor Mauer (2009:123) claim that the key function of intelligence organisations is to provide strategic warning to policy-makers. Society changed from a means – end rationality to a reflexive rationality and requires reflective security. They postulate that postmodernism might increase the understanding of the limitations of knowledge and lead to the establishment of a political discourse of uncertainty. “Now, the intelligence community has to understand multiple, overlapping and often contradictory narratives, a world that appears chaotic and developments that display the properties of non-linear, dynamic systems.” (Cavelty & Mauer, 2009:134).

Within the critical-realism school of thought, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian (2006:26-34) build on the concept of surveillance of Michel Foucault (1995) as described in his book ‘Discipline and Punishment’. The meaning of surveillance denotes the relationship between power and knowledge within states. They expound that surveillance and thereby intelligence concerns the relationship between certain kinds of power and certain kinds of knowledge (Gill & Phythian, 2006:29). Intelligence functions on a macro – level (national or international relations), a meso – level (concerning the workings of intelligence within an organisation) and a micro – level (referring to the individual or small groups). In addition, all societies face uncertainty, risk and insecurity that require information to reduce these and enable them to address their vulnerabilities and advance their interests. In the case of intelligence, this is done in secrecy. Linked to this, Gill and Phythian (2006:7) explain that intelligence is an umbrella term referring to the range of intelligence activities; from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination. These activities which include covert actions are conducted in secret and are aimed at maintaining or enhancing security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy.

Moreover, according to Kahn (2009:4) who argues from within the realist tradition, the roots of intelligence are biological. He (Kahn, 2009:8-9) is of the view that the fundamental ultimate purpose of intelligence is the optimising of one’s resources as an auxiliary of war in a defensive capacity. Turner (2006:4) defines the purpose of intelligence as policy-relevant information, collected through open and clandestine means and subjected to analysis, for the purposes of

educating and enlightening decision makers in formulating and implementing national security and foreign policy. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) adds to this discourse and describes the purpose of intelligence as to: (1) provide analysis relevant to national security; (2) give early warning of impending crises; (3) serve national and international crisis management through determining the intentions of current or potential opponents; (4) inform national defence planning and military operations; (5) protect secrets; and (6) may implement covert actions to influence events in favour of national interests. (DCAF, 3/2006). As also discussed by Van Den Berg (2014:24); Bruneau and Boraz (2007:6-7) and Caparini (2007:3-5) explain that intelligence serves two purposes: firstly to inform policy and secondly to support military, police or covert operations with the ultimate goal of ensuring state security. Similarly Warner (*In* Treverton et al, 2006:10) supports two viewpoints; the first that intelligence is information for decision makers and the second that defines intelligence as a secret state activity designed to understand or influence foreign entities. Johnson (2006:116) explains that the main purpose of intelligence: "... is to provide accurate, timely and comprehensive information to the president and other policy-makers to inform decision making." Similarly from within the realist tradition, Lowenthal (2009:2-4) builds upon this notion and denotes – as supported by this study - that, there are four main reasons why intelligence agencies exist, namely: (1), To avoid strategic surprise; (2) To provide long-term expertise to the policy-maker; (3) To provide the policy-maker with tailored, timely intelligence; (4) To maintain the secrecy of information.

All the same, this study summarises and postulates the purpose of intelligence as:

- To provide the policy-makers with relevant intelligence as to assist them to make and implement policies – both foreign and domestic;
- to protect the constitution and inform on unconstitutional state practices;
- to identify threats and potential threats against national security; and
- to assist in the socio-economic development and welfare of all citizens.

### **3.5.6 Definition of intelligence**

Regarding the definition of intelligence, this study supports and postulates that intelligence is an umbrella concept which at once denotes three distinctive concepts as also explained by Van Den Berg (2014:31-42). This definition serves as point of departure in that the focus is on the description of intelligence as an activity, structure and product (delineated in Figure 1) that is supported within intelligence literature (Godson, 1983:5; Johnson, 2010:05; Kent 1953: ix and Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002:1-3). As already discussed and explained, intelligence denotes at once knowledge or a product, secondly, a type of organisation or structure and lastly, an activity or process. It is often referred to as processed information whereby raw data or information is

converted into an intelligence product through the intelligence analysis processes which entails verification, reliability checks and evaluation within the context of known and unknown knowledge of the target entity or activity. In the second context intelligence entails the specific organisation, structure or unit, consisting of intelligence officers, institutes with a specific scope ranging from military, police or civilian intelligence departments. Intelligence as an activity involves the specific processes implemented or used by intelligence entities which are addressed later within this chapter. This study however denotes, as already discussed, that intelligence has secrecy as a fundamental nature, which makes it unique in comparison to other state functions.

This thesis however concludes that intelligence is a concept within the statutory context referring to civilian intelligence that could be defined as a secret organisation which produces intelligence as a product by means of intelligence processes for the policy-maker pertaining to the national security interest of the state.

### **3.5.7 Levels of intelligence**

Intelligence is defined into three levels namely strategic, operational and tactical intelligence (Clark, 2010:50-52 and McDowell, 2009:10-29). Strategic intelligence deals with long range issues on national strategic policies and international situations. Within this context it entails the highest product produced by intelligence in the form a national intelligence estimate; used to conduct strategic planning within government over a medium to long term period, as it involves forecasting or predictions. Operational intelligence on capabilities and intentions of adversaries required for specific intelligence operations and tactical intelligence referring to every day requirements of military and law enforcement agencies. The Task, Element, Level and Product (TELP) model of Mostert (2009) as described and explained by Van Den Berg (2014:33-34), illustrates these levels to the point.

Strategic intelligence has to do with planning and fore-sight whilst tactical and operational intelligence deals with the here and now – about the actions in implementing the planning. Tactical or operational intelligence refers to the intelligence required by intelligence structures to prevent and counter any threats or potential threats to the national security of the state. Strategic intelligence concerns policymaking on the national level. Within this context the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 94 of South Africa defines strategic intelligence as follows: “comprehensive, integrated and estimative intelligence on all the current and long-term aspects of national security which are of special concern to strategic decision-making and the formulation and implementation of policy and strategy at national level.” Similarly Clark (2010:49-52) denotes that strategic, operational and tactical intelligence falls within a conflict spectrum whereby they are respectively linked to actions to prevent, deter or defeat a time frame of long, short or immediate.

This study summarises the levels of intelligence as follows: Firstly, strategic intelligence concerns long term forecasting, prediction scenarios and estimates as produced in a national intelligence estimate (NIE) which points out intelligence priorities, threats and opportunities. Secondly, operational or functional intelligence entails medium term activities and products indicating trends and tendencies contained in assessments. This level builds towards strategic information but is founded on tactical intelligence which it explains in answering the so what question. Tactical intelligence or current intelligence reflects the day to day short term intelligence activities and products concerning forewarning, informing and immediate actions. This level refers to descriptive information as contained in daily briefs and factual memoranda answering the questions who, what, where, when, why and how.

### **3.5.8 Elements of intelligence**

Within a meta-theoretical analysis of intelligence, this study established, as also discussed by Van Den Berg (2014:27-29) that most academics refer to four elements of intelligence namely: Analysis, Collection, Counterintelligence and Covert Action (Born & Caparini, 2007:5; Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002:8-158; Bruneau, 2000:8-15; Lowenthal, 2009:69-178; Codevilla, 1992:4; Hastedt, 1991:6-8; Holt, 1995:54-168 and Godson, 1983: 5-18 and 2001:1-2). Similarly, DCAF (3/2006) provides the following description for the elements of intelligence: (1) Collection is the acquisition of data. It involves the use of open sources, as well as clandestine sources, such as spies, agents and defectors; (2) Analysis is the screening and collation of data and their transformation into intelligence products that help policy-makers by providing relevant and trustworthy information designed to make sense of complex situations and issues; (3) Counterintelligence focuses on preventing foreign intelligence services or other foreign-controlled groups from committing espionage, subversion and sabotage against the state. This consists of defensive measures, such as inquiries, vetting and surveillance, and offensive measures, such as conducting operations to penetrate, deceive, disrupt and manipulate these organisations and; (4) Covert Action that is the direct influencing of foreign political, military or economic conditions without this influence being attributable to the state and is similar to military action to achieve objectives that diplomacy and other policy means cannot.

The General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act (Act 11 of 2013), defines the collection of intelligence as follows: “to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse domestic and foreign intelligence (excluding foreign military intelligence), in order to identify any threat or potential threat to national security, supply intelligence relating to any such threat to any other department of State for the purpose of fulfilment of its departmental functions.” Analysis is the term used for the process of collation, analysis and evaluation of raw and all-source information and its transformation into intelligence: into warning and situation reports, analyses, assessments,


estimates, and briefings (DCAF, 2003:13). The South African intelligence legislation indicates the function of analysis in terms of; "... to correlate, evaluate and analyse..." Likewise, as explained by Godson (2001:3), the four elements of intelligence can be distinguished by function. Therefore, according to this study, these elements are not a true reflection of modern intelligence functions and require further development. This argument is mainly based on the idea that analysis and collection constitutes sub-activities within the other functions of intelligence and should not be viewed as separate elements. Within this notion, Duvenage (2011:18-20) proposes a reductive, conceptual nexus towards an all-discipline intelligence process inclusive of positive intelligence, counterintelligence and covert action which includes collection, analysis and management processes. This concept could be taken further according to this study which denotes that analysis and collection are rather specific intelligence activities conducted over a broad spectrum of intelligence domains. However, this study postulates the reconstructing of the existing elements of intelligence into the following elements of intelligence as more descriptive and relevant to modern day intelligence namely; Foreign Intelligence (Inclusive of Espionage), Domestic Intelligence, Covert Action and lastly, Counterintelligence. Each of these elements has its own specific process, products and activities.

*Foreign intelligence* is information that is relevant to external security and for warning purposes. The maintenance of external security requires knowledge of the risks, dangers, and threats as well as of the opportunities and likelihood of events and outcomes. Hence, information is needed about intentions, capabilities and activities of foreign powers, organizations, non-state groups, and their agents that represent actual or potential risks, dangers, or threats to the state and its interests abroad. This information is collected by external intelligence services to help promote and safeguard national interests, including political, economic, military, scientific, and social as well as security interests. Nonetheless, the purpose and targets of foreign intelligence and security intelligence collection functions differ. So too do the nature and extent of the risks to which they give rise. It is important that control and accountability arrangements reflect these differences. Thus, because of the intrusive nature of the powers of the internal intelligence service, and the fact that collection is executed domestically, potentially against their own citizens, the function requires strict controls to ensure that internal security and safety are appropriately balanced against the rights of individual citizens and residents. Act 39 of 1994 defines foreign intelligence as follows: "... means intelligence on any external threat or potential threat to the national interests of the Republic and its people, and intelligence regarding opportunities relevant to the protection and promotion of such national interests irrespective of whether or not it can be used in the formulation of the foreign policy of the Republic".<sup>1</sup> This study however, postulates the

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<sup>1</sup> For additional reading see Berkowitz and Goodman (2000:1-98); Clark (2010); Gill and Phythian (2012b); Holt (1995:2-108); Johnson (2007 Vol 1 and 2); Laqueur (3-37); Lowenthal (2009); Kent (1953); Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:8-10 and 11-62).

following model for foreign intelligence as adapted and reconstructed from the traditional intelligence cycle as explained by Lowenthal (2009:65-67), Hulnick (2006), Krizan (1999:7-8) and Clark (2004:12-16):




Source: Own construct

**Figure 22: Foreign intelligence as a reconstructive element of intelligence**

The second reconstructive element of intelligence is *Security intelligence*, which is information that is relevant to *internal security or domestic intelligence*. Internal security or domestic intelligence as reconstructed concepts, concern intelligence for the protection of the state, territory and society from foreign-influenced activities, such as subversion and espionage, or politically motivated violence. It is collected by internal intelligence services to help maintain public safety and ensure internal security. The General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act 11 of 2013 defines domestic intelligence as follows: "... means intelligence on any internal threat or potential threat to national security".<sup>2</sup> Within this context domestic intelligence focuses on threats and potential threats to the sovereignty of the state and its people as well as to supply the policy-maker with intelligence to be able to make and implement domestic policies to the benefit of all. All the same, internal security or domestic intelligence as reconstructed concepts, are delineated by this study, as follows:

<sup>2</sup> For further reading see Berkowitz and Goodman (2000:1-98); Clark (2011); Gill and Phythian (2012b); Shultz, Godson and Quester (1997:323-339); Holt (1995:39-108); Johnson (2007 Vol 1 and 2); Johnson (2010:3-32); Laqueur (201-232); Lowenthal (2009); Trevorton (*In* Johnson, 2010:343-358); Wirtz (*In* Johnson, 2010:59-69).



Source: Own construct

**Figure 23: Domestic intelligence as a reconstructive element of intelligence**

*Counterintelligence* as the third element of intelligence, consists of offensive and defensive measures of protection; defensively through inquiries and vetting of one's own civil servants and employees, through investigations, monitoring of known or suspected agents, and surveillance activities to detect and neutralize the foreign intelligence service presence; offensively through the collation of information about foreign intelligence services and their *modus operandi*, through recruiting agents, and initiation of operations to penetrate, disrupt, deceive and manipulate these services and related organizations to one's own advantage (DCAF, 2003:13). Prunckun (2012:23-25) also describes counterintelligence as defensive consisting of activities that contribute to deterrence and detection that would include security; and offensive counterintelligence involving detection, deception and neutralisation activities against adversaries.

The General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act 11 of 2013 defines counter-intelligence as follows: "Counter-intelligence means measures and activities conducted, instituted or taken to impede and to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign or hostile intelligence operations, to protect intelligence and any classified information, to conduct vetting investigations and to counter any threat or potential threat to national security". In cognisance of the counterintelligence cycles of Prunckun (2012:25), Brouard (2004:5) and Duvenage (2011:187), this study however proposes the reconstruction of the element of counterintelligence. Within this notion a conceptual model is required to explain and understand the functions of intelligence. In this model counterintelligence

denotes a protective circle consisting of both defensive and offensive activities, acting as a protective circle around the activities, products and structures of both domestic and foreign intelligence, which are all on the inside. This counterintelligence model protects intelligence against any threat or potential threat either as infiltration or penetration attempts or security leaks and breaches both from the inside as well as from the outside.<sup>3</sup> This study however, postulates such a reconstructed model for counterintelligence as follows:



Source: Own construct


**Figure 24: Counterintelligence as a reconstructive element of intelligence**

Lastly, *Covert action* as explained by Godson (2001:2-3), is the hidden or disguised intelligence actions that are to influence or direct events or groups in another state or territory to the benefit

<sup>3</sup> For additional reading see Redmond (*In* Johnson & Wirtz, (2011:295-306); Godson (2001:1-26; 66-119 and 184-240); Hough and Duvenage (2010:29-77); Holt (1995:109-134); Jervis (*In* Johnson & Wirtz, 2011:333-340); Johnson (2007 Vol 4); Prunckun (2012); Redmond (*In* Johnson, 2010:537-554); Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:8-10 and 99-128).



of your own policies. These activities could include propaganda, political action, paramilitary activities and intelligence aid and assistance. However, it should be noted, that although many countries use covert action, irrespective of being democratic or undemocratic, some countries like South Africa disagree with this element. In this regard the South African White Paper on Intelligence (1995) indicates the following: “Measures designed to deliberately interfere with the normal political processes in other countries and with the internal workings of parties and organisations engaged in lawful activity within South Africa, must be expressly forbidden. Intelligence agencies or those within them guilty of such breaches must be disciplined in the severest terms”.<sup>4</sup> Within the meta-theorising of intelligence this study denotes a model for covert action in the reconstructing of the elements of intelligence as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 25: Covert action as a reconstructive element of intelligence**

Finally, in the reconstructing of the elements of intelligence by this study the structure, purpose, activity and product of each of the four elements namely foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, counterintelligence and covert action could be summarised in the following table as to provide for a better understanding and interpretation of intelligence theory:

<sup>4</sup> For additional reading, see Johnson (2010: 587-607); Johnson and Wirtz, (2010:260-264); Berkowitz and Goodman (2000:124-146); Daugherty (*In* Johnson, 2010:608-628); Godson (2001:1-26; 58-65 and 120-179); Holt (1995:169-237); Johnson (2007: Vol 3); Johnson (*In* Johnson and Wirtz, 2011:265-286); Kibbe (*In* Johnson, 2010:569-586); Scott (2004:322-341); Shulsky and Schmitt (2002:75-98).

Table 1: The elements of intelligence

	FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE	DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	COVERT ACTION
<b>Structure</b> →	Foreign/External Service/Agency	Internal/National Intelligence Service/Agency	Security Service/Agency or Domestic/National Intelligence	Foreign/Internal Agency
<b>Purpose</b> →	Foreign/External threats and opportunities relevant to foreign policies and Secret Diplomacy	Internal/Domestic threats and opportunities relevant to domestic policies	Internal/Domestic threats and opportunities relevant to national security and state sovereignty	Covertly influence actions of foreign governments or entities with deniability
<b>Activity</b> →	Intelligence Liaison Intelligence Cycle Collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human Intelligence</li> <li>• Signal intelligence</li> <li>• Electronic intelligence</li> <li>• Technical Intelligence</li> <li>• Open Source Intelligence</li> <li>• Social Media Intelligence</li> <li>• Surveillance &amp; Interceptions</li> <li>• Joint intelligence Operations</li> <li>• Clandestine Operations</li> </ul> Espionage Analysis	Intelligence Liaison Intelligence Cycle Collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human Intelligence</li> <li>• Signal intelligence</li> <li>• Electronic intelligence</li> <li>• Technical Intelligence</li> <li>• Open Source Intelligence</li> <li>• Social Media Intelligence</li> <li>• Surveillance, Interceptions</li> <li>• Joint intelligence Operations</li> <li>• Clandestine Operations</li> <li>• Investigations</li> <li>• Environmental scanning</li> </ul> Analysis	<i>Defensive Counterintelligence:</i> Detect, Deter, Defend <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Physical Security</li> <li>• Information Technology Communication Security</li> <li>• Border Security</li> <li>• Personnel Security:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Vetting</li> <li>– Screening</li> <li>– Advising</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Security Investigations</li> <li>• Analysis</li> </ul> <i>Offensive Counterintelligence:</i> Identify, Investigate, Analyse, Exploit or Neutralise <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Counter Terrorism</li> <li>• Counter Espionage</li> <li>• Counter Sabotage</li> <li>• Counter Subversion</li> </ul> Countermeasures, Protect, Upgrade and Maintain Security	Agents of influence Covert Support Disinformation Propaganda Forgery Para-military Support Acts of destruction, violence and assassination Coup d'état Safe haven
<b>Product</b> →	Early Warning Descriptive Intelligence Product Intelligence Assessments Estimates, forecasting, predictions and strategic intelligence products	Early Warning Descriptive Intelligence Product Intelligence Assessments Estimates, forecasting, predictions and strategic intelligence products	Countermeasures, Protect, Upgrade and Maintain Security	Benefit to government foreign policy

Source: Own construct

### 3.6 Conclusion

In a study concerning social sciences and intelligence, Knorr (1964:75-101) establishes that social sciences provided intelligence with specific methodology and conceptualisation that allows it to identify, inquire, gather/collect, validate, process and interpret data. Social science attempts to further the understanding of complex phenomena by describing and classifying it and create abstract models in which appropriate relationships between concepts are expressed - similar to the intelligence process. He furthermore asserts that: "... modern intelligence is in fact unthinkable without social science inputs, and that professional intelligence work can and will profit from further progress in social sciences" (Knorr, 1964:93).


This chapter aims to provide a meta-theoretical framework to understand intelligence theory and intelligence practices. A meta-theoretical framework is constructed based on specific scientific constructs which ultimately serves as route map to the quest by this study in providing an understanding of intelligence theory. These constructs therefore as also relevant to and applicable to intelligence studies and intelligence theory, serve as road markers and include paradigms, traditions, theories, models, concepts, typologies and definitions. The typologies and models will be built upon in later chapters.

Moreover, chapter three addresses the different traditions within intelligence studies as well as the different approaches to the study of intelligence. This is done against the background of current and past paradigm changes within intelligence practices as well as the academic field thereof. This study submits and follows a guide in meta-theorising [Overarching perspective (M<sub>P</sub>) Deeper Understanding (M<sub>U</sub>) Theory Building – New Theory (M<sub>O</sub>) on theories] within intelligence studies to be able to postulate an overarching macro-meso level theory of intelligence that would serve to understand and explain intelligence practices in the rest of this study.

The initial meta-theorising done within this chapter serves as the point of departure to continue building and developing new intelligence and political science theories, specifically towards achieving the fundamental aim of this inquiry as reflected in the title. In its meta-theorising, this study also reflected on the different traditions and contributions of authors, practitioners and academics to intelligence theory, which assists the researcher in exploring a deeper understanding of the context within which the latter contribute to intelligence knowledge.

These different pre-belief traditions as well as the placement of intelligence studies and its development within specific scientific paradigms, further contributes to the understanding, exploration, description, evaluation and theoretical analysis of intelligence and intelligence practices. This chapter specifically aims to reconstruct and re-interpret existing intelligence

theories within the micro, meso and macro level as to provide a deeper understanding and overarching new theory of intelligence. This attempt by this study could be recapitulated as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 26: Conceptualised new reconstructed intelligence theory recapitulated**

Moreover, chapter three serves as the building block to enable the construct of a new overarching theory through the reconstruction, interpretation and evaluation of regime change and existing political regime typologies, as is the aim in the next two chapters. The conceptual meta-theoretical framework in this chapter furthermore serves as a route map to conceptualise and explore democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime concepts, characteristics, typologies and models as well as that of intelligence practices.

## CHAPTER 4: A CONCEPTUALISATION OF STATE, GOVERNMENT AND REGIME CHANGE

*“But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at the good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.”*

Aristotle *Politics*.

### 4.1 Introduction

The concepts of state, government and political regimes are most often used interchanged although each entails a specific meaning and context. It is furthermore evident that such practices often lead to misconceptions and understanding of the role and function of the ruling party and or the government of the day. The specific political regime is also linked to regime transition or change. It is furthermore vital to conceptualise and understand these related concepts as to be able to study the notion that intelligence – albeit secret - is a reflection of the political regime for which it exists. Within this context, regime change from authoritarian regime types towards democracy especially after three waves towards democratisations and three subsequent reverse waves is not a new phenomenon within the study of politics. The so-called reverse waves through which some countries reverted back to the former non-democratic regime types, were also not un-expected. Within this academic study therefore, specific attention is required towards concepts such as regime change, regime transition and democratic consolidation on the one hand, and regime typology on the other. This will enable this study to ascertain and conceptualise the notion of a hybrid political regime.

Therefore, chapter four builds on the previous chapters in terms of the conceptualised meta-theoretical framework for the understanding of intelligence as to contribute to the development of intelligence as an academic field of study as well as to build its scientific knowledge and methodology. This chapter aims to continue to link the meta-scientific framework conceptualised as depicted in Figure 9 and reflected within previous chapters to the study of regime change, democratisation, transition outcomes and regime classification, as well as relevant concepts and theory within this chapter to serve as a continuous roadmap to enable a deeper understanding of intelligence and its practises.

More so, this chapter aims to add to the building and creation of new theory through reconstructing and conceptualising existing scientific knowledge on regime change, democratic transition and more specifically regime change outcomes. This will be done against existing theory and approaches or schools of thought within political science. Therefore this chapter will firstly address political regimes within the broader concept of the state and government, where after a meta-

theoretical analysis of political regime change would follow. Chapter four will give specific attention to the concepts of democratic transition and transition outcomes such as democratic consolidation. This study aims to re-interpret and analyse relevant existing transition and democratisation knowledge and theories, as to be able to contribute to a deeper understanding as well as to conceptualise new theory on these concepts. This approach will enable this study to explore, describe and explain characteristics and practices within different political regime types in the next chapter.


## **4.2 Political regime and related concepts**

Change is the one constant in politics, and it is especially evident in the examination of political regimes (Dyck, 2003:342). Regime change takes place in all political regime types, irrespective of being democratic or non-democratic. Political regime change is therefore not only relevant to the democratisation of states. States are also not excluded from change, and are more permanent than governments or political regimes. An example of a more recent state change is the Republic of South Sudan which was created in 2011 after it gained independence from Sudan. States nevertheless could reflect several successions of governments as governments are more temporary and frequent. South Africa's parliamentary system of government is subjected to national elections every five years whereby new government officials are elected. Here change is normal as new polity are elected and others retire or resign. This is merely the change of the government of the day in reference to the newly elected government. Change of government does not necessarily impact on the basic structures of the state. To the contrary, with political regime change, the system of how a government rules and is structured to rule, changes and could result in a change of the basic structures of the state.

Regime change could replace parts of the state's administration, institutions and affects the trias politica. Regime change denotes the transition from one political system to another. Within this action the political institutions and the institutions of the state also change. Although democratisation is a major focus within political science, regime change is not narrowed to democratisation but includes different types of regimes. However, political regime change is also not a new phenomenon, although the focus shifted more towards why and how regimes change or consolidate, as the case with this study. Democratisation does however dominate regime change especially since the focus on democratic transitions within the so-called waves of democratisation as initially forwarded by Huntington (1991). More so, other forms of regime change apart from democratisation vary from a military coup d' etat, war, revolution, foreign intervention, economic sanctions or even the deconsolidation of democracy. Additional factors even include religion and arguably terrorism/extremism as recently is the case with the Islamic state or ISIL. Nonetheless, the focus within regime change or transition according to this study,

entails two specific questions as based on Laswell's (1936) concepts of who gets what when and how in politics. The first question is why regime change occurs and the second, how transition comes about. This places the focus on the reasons or pre-requisites for regime change on the one hand and the process or modes of transition on the other. This is similar to the study of regime breakdown by Gill (2000:8-42), as well as Whitehead (*In Goodin & Klingemann*, 1996:353-371), who asks in reference to comparative politics: who it is for, what it is like and how it is done. Moreover, the answer to these questions also guides the form and type of intelligence practices within a specific political regime.

Nonetheless, this study provides the following conceptual framework for regime change and democratisation, to serve as a roadmap in the understanding of theoretical concepts and processes within this chapter.



Source: Own construct

**Figure 27: Conceptualised framework for regime change**

This however, brings the concepts of state, government and political regime to the fore.

### 4.2.1 The concept of state

An analysis of regime change or transition regime also requires a brief reference to the concepts of state, government and government system as these concepts determine the type and form of a political system. It is also required to give attention to the form of government as well as stateness as relevant to a state before, during and after regime change. This is specifically relevant to this study as it is perceived that the outcome of regime change has a direct bearing on the type and form of the intelligence practices within a particular political regime. The modern term of the concept state was first used by Machiavelli in his renowned work, *The Prince*, with reference to the concept of a republic with a large population within a broad territory. Politics is often understood as the study of the state (Heywood, 2013:56) or with the dominant focus on the state (Hague & Harrop, 2007:13). Garner (1952:8) even argues that political science begins and ends with the state.

Within this context, the concept of state is different from the concept of government, although it is sometimes not used in this distinctive manner. In addition, Van Den Berg (2014:46) postulates that states practice intelligence in ways which are specific to each nation and dictated by the type of political system, ideological outlook and culture that formulate its views on national threats. Similarly Sheldon (2004:5-6) asserts, that each state's intelligence service is somehow a mirror of its regime type (national soul) and that intelligence is a true reflection of the regime controlling the government. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) provides the following meaning of a state: "... a politically organised body of people usually occupying a definite territory, especially one that is sovereign..." which originated from the Latin word *status* from the Old Latin *stare* – meaning to stand. The concept state however also connotes a political community and a system of government is sometimes used interchangeably to mean either government and or state. With a meta-theoretical approach in conceptualising the concept of state, the different connotations as reflected by political science traditions, are briefly noted. Plato already indicates as far back in his writing '*The Republic*', that the main purpose of the state is to pursue justices. In realism Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli view the concept that all states desire power. Hobbes denotes that a state should act and punish wrongdoers and those that could, are deemed as powerful whereas Machiavelli focuses on state officials attempting to weaken economic classes in gaining power so as to threaten the state. Grigsby (2009:82-83) explains that Aristotle's '*Politics*', focuses on the role of state and equality that should be reflected in the results of the decision making process of states.

Within this framework, Barrow (1993:8-9) provides the following definitions for a state as reflective within different traditions or schools of thought, namely: (1) Marxism interprets the state as an instrument of class domination whereby the state serves the interests of whatever class that has



the control over central institutions, the executive, civil, bureaucracies, armed forces and police and even the schools; (2) Structural Neo-Marxists view the state as a class struggle whereby the welfare state has to attempt to regulate and maintain social system equilibrium between competing classes; (3) The Capital Logic school conceptualises the state as an ideal collective capitalist whereby the state's main function is to provide for a general legal framework for a capitalist economy and market infra-structure where required; (4) Post Marxism employs a system analytical approach to the state whereby the state must simultaneously promote capital accumulation as well as maintain democratic legitimacy in a form of often contradictory dual system imperatives; lastly; (5) Organisational realism also a post-Marxism approach, views the state as a political organisation that seeks to fundamentally control territory and people and to maximise their autonomous institutional powers so as to promote the interests of state officials in controlling more resources, people and territory. As described, Marxist theories see politics intertwined into the economy whereby the relation between economic power and political power is emphasised and the state obviously serves the dominant "haves" in comparison to the "have not's". On the other hand, liberal conservatism political theories (mainly based on the views of Thomas Burke - seen as the father of modern conservatism), focus on the function of a state within a capitalist society and differentiates between the role of the state and concepts such as market economy, private property, rule of law and a constitutional representative government. However, the most common definition of a state is as also postulated by this study, is that of Max Weber (1919:1) who provides an empirical definition of the state which focuses on the state as a political organisation with a centralised government, which maintains the monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a given territory. A government however, is the means whereby the power of the state to legitimately use force, is conducted. Within this definition Weber focuses on the elements of the state as territory, violence and legitimacy. The state is therefore seen as a relation of men dominating men as supported by legitimate violence or use of force. Within the Weberian concept of the state, bureaucracy is a fundamental and central element for effective governance of state administration.

Effective state administration assists politicians in managing state institutions. The concept of a state is explained by Almond et al (2008:12) as a specific political system with sovereignty and legal authority over a population in a particular territory. Similarly, Heywood (2013:57-58) defines the state as a political association that exercises sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders with the purpose as a minimal state to merely lay down the conditions for an orderly existence. To this extent, Tilly (1975:70) describes the state as: "An organisation which controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state insofar as; (1) it is differentiated from other organisations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralised; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another." This is also supported by Migdal (1988:19), Poggi (1990:19-22), Linz and Stepan (1996:17-19), as well as Greffrath (2015:89). The latter

states that a sovereign state is a polity possessing an administration, of which the different parts are coordinated, it is a compulsory association which claims binding authority over all that occurs and exists within its demarcated territory, being able to do so through possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This statement is also supported by this study. The modern day generic characteristics of a state, specifically in reference to the legitimate use of violence or force against any internal or external threat of the state, also addresses the role and function of intelligence within a state according to this study – as applicable to this research. The dimension or characteristic added by this study is the issue of stateness. This includes and is in line with the argument Fukuyama (2005:1-57) addresses where he states that stateness and efficiency is part of the strength of state institutions and is included in the scope of state functions. The concept of stateness however will receive more detailed attention later in this chapter. All the same, this study summarises the modern day generic characteristics of a state as follows:

- A state territory concerning a geographic reference where the principal of sovereignty is pre-dominant;
- As having a permanent citizenry within the specific state territory;
- As having governance institutions which includes government that take and implement binding decisions on citizens;
- An institution of power within the broader society that could implement the legitimate use of violence or force against any internal or external threat of the state;
- The strength and scope of a state as indicated by stateness.

This, nonetheless brings the concept of government and the difference between government and state to the fore.

#### **4.2.2 Concept of government**

The concepts of state and government are often used interrelated or synonymously, although they are different in context. Government is a physical and narrow concept and forms part of the state whereas the latter is an abstract and broad concept. Government is an element of the state together with other elements such as population, territory and sovereignty. Government possesses no sovereignty and its power is delegated by the state which could exist without a government. Willoughby (1919:26) explains that “To exercise its powers and to discharge its functions it brings into existence an organisation or machinery of administration which, viewed as a whole, is termed as its government.” In addition the Oxford Dictionary (2014) defines government as a group of people with the authority to govern a country or state. A government consists of a bureaucracy or administrative institution of a state that executes policies in a society (Hague & Harrop, 2007:4) through a specific group of people. This group of people usually refers

to a selected citizenry who serves in government, whereas the rest of the citizenry are members of the state but not all members of government. A constitution as the fundamental law of a state, provides for the rules to which a government is structured and maintains its authority and power. A distinction is furthermore also applicable in the South African context between government officials and civil servants. An official usually refers to an elected member of government who could be appointed in different positions within national, provincial or local government and could serve in posts ranging from members of parliament, the executive (cabinet minister, deputy minister, president) or heads (director general, commissioner, chief executive officer) of government departments or institutions. In contrast civil servants or bureaucrats are regarded as employees of the state institutions with more permanent employment as officials who usually only hold office for a specific time period.

To summarise, as Van Den Berg (2014:54) explicates, government refers to the institutional processes through which collective and binding decisions are made and government functions to be rule-making, rule-application and rule adjudication, which are separated in modern governments in three specialised spheres namely: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, also referred to as the *trias politica* principal. However, how a government rules is based on the political regime or system within a state and this concept needs further examination.

### **4.2.3 Concept of political regime**

Within this study, the type of political system and the form of government are of specific relevance to be able to conceptualise a theory of intelligence practice within a hybrid political regime. It is furthermore vital to be able to distinguish between the different definitions and concepts so as to contribute to a meta-theoretical understanding and conceptualising of different states. More so, this approach enables this study to identify and provide for a typology of different political systems and intelligence practices, as also explained in the aim of this chapter. Such an approach furthermore provides for the creation of a model of different types of political regimes and different forms of government which could assist this study in order to categorise South Africa within. Nonetheless, a state may have several changes of government and political systems within its life time. As already discussed, a state is a specific territory with a people that is controlled by a government depending on its political system. Through its specific political regime, a government may change rules, laws and roles of its politics, whereas the state remains the same. In this context political system or regime is the practice of how a government runs the state and its people. It therefore provides for a set of principles and ideals for the government and more specifically the government of the day. Almond and Coleman (1960) linked David Easton's (1953) model of a political system based on input functions (political socialisation and communication) and output functions (rule making and implementation). They described the main functions of a


political system as also supported by this study as: (1) to maintain society integration by means of determining norms; (2) to adapt and change social, economic and religious systems so as to achieve goals; and (3) to protect the integrity of the political system from outside threats. A political regime or system therefore represents the entire concept of statecraft. Weak or strong states could thus be linked to the status of the political regime. In addition, Eisenstadt (1966:6) indicates the major types of activities in every political system are legislative decision-making or ultimate ruling; administrative activity; party political activity and juridical activity. Within this context Scott and Mcloughlin (2014) describe political systems as both formal and informal political processes by which decisions are made concerning the use, production and distribution of resources in a given society. Formal political institutions furthermore determine the process for electing leaders, the role and responsibilities of the legislature and executive; the organisation of political representation and the accountability and oversight of the state. The allocation of valued resources is what Lasswell (1936) argues that politics is who gets what, when and how. For a society to be orderly, the political regime provides for the making and enforcements of rules or laws which people must obey. A political system in a state also determines the form of government or state. Aristotle in ancient Greece classifies form of governments in terms of who rules, how many people rule and in whose interests they make their decisions. Even so, the differences between state, government and political regime concepts as discussed are postulated by this study as follows:

**Table 2: The differences between state, regime and government**

STATE	REGIME/POLITICAL SYSTEM	GOVERNMENT
Compulsory citizenship	Members of a social organisation (group) who are in power, Political Parties	Few elected & appointed officials Membership not compulsory
Absolute unlimited authority & Sovereignty	Sources of power: force, influence, and authority	Limited/delegated power & no sovereignty
Territory	None	None
Permanent No change	Semi – permanent Could change from and to democracy/non-democracy	Changes frequently Different types of government through e.g. elections
Abstract Concept Cannot be seen Never acts	System of rules, norms and institutions that determine how government is organised and how decisions are made	Concrete Concept Physical manifestation Acts for the state
Citizens could never go against the state as they are part of it	Could change through military interventions or negotiated settlement as is the case in SA	Citizens could go against government.
Government as state machinery	Encompasses mechanisms of government and institutions of the state	Agent of state Part of the state

Source: Van den Berg (2014:49)

However, a government reflects a specific political system as well as a specific form of governance. This study therefore draws a distinction between the form of a political system and the type of government, unlike the interlinking usage within the theory. This distinction is specifically relevant to this study as to be able to conduct conceptualising and contributing to theory building of political regime types and the deepening thereof within the meta-theoretical framework of this research. The type of the political regime or system refers briefly to either democratic or non-democratic systems of which the latter includes totalitarian and authoritarian regime types as well as the concept of a hybrid political regime as postulated by this study. Therefore this study denotes the form of government as the specific structure by which the political system is reflected within a government, such as either that of a monarchy, oligarchy, or even a dictatorship. This study furthermore views modern day government reflecting both the type of political system, as well as the form of government, as follows:



Source: Van Den Berg (2014:55)


**Figure 28: A classification of the different forms and types of government**

However, the concept of a hybrid political system and its form of government as postulated by this study is currently absent and not yet included in this classification as it will receive more detailed attention within the conceptualisation of a theory thereof in later chapters. This study furthermore concludes that the type of political systems determines the form of governments and the formal and informal political processes by which decisions are made concerning the use, production and distribution of resources within a specific state.

All the same, the concept of stateness requires further attention.

#### 4.2.4 Concept of stateness

It is also relevant to delve into the type of state before, during and more specifically after regime change in terms of its functions and effectiveness. The concept of a legitimate and sovereign state implies statehood, but does not necessarily denote effective stateness. According to Easton (1953), what the state does and how a state functions is central to what the people perceive and expect of the state in terms of its organisation and management to be able to deliver goods and services. Within regime change or transition, the effectiveness of the state to fulfil its functions could experience difficulties. Regime change could either bring the ideal effective state type on the one hand as depicted in the Weberian concept about, or the Hobbesian concept denoting statelessness or anarchy, on the other hand. The Weberian (mostly democratic) and Hobbesian (authoritarian) state concepts are depicted by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 29: Weberian and authoritarian state models**


Weber (1946:78) explains in "Politics as a Vocation" that a bureaucracy implies a strong functional state and states that: "The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate violence". Hereby the nature of the state has a bureaucracy with various institutions and territory over which it maintains order through the use of legitimate violence. However, Fukuyama (2004:21-22) in following the Weberian model of stateness, distinguishes between two dimensions of stateness namely the scope of state activities and the strength of the state. The scope of state activities refers to the different functions and goals of governments whereas strength of the state is the power of the state reflected in its ability to plan and execute policies and enforce laws transparently through institutional capacity. This is similar to Migdal (1988:19) who provides for the following definition of a state as also postulated by this study: "In

short, following Max Weber, I use an ideal-type definition of the state: it is an organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rulemaking for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way". In building on this notion, Migdal (1988:21-22) claims that in order for state to build statehood it should reflect a high capability to govern. It is then labelled as a strong state. Similarly, Huntington (2006:1) states that the most important distinction among countries is not based on their form of government, but rather their degree of government. This notion is also postulated by this study.

Nonetheless, the opposite of a strong state is a weak state with lost control and has limited capabilities to govern or rule society within a Hobbesian model of this state. Hobbes (1651) describes this state as a Leviathan or monster whereby the state has all the authority and power as to prevent lawlessness and state collapse. This strong centralised authority of the Leviathan state model hereby reflects an authoritarian or totalitarian state form. This form of state is described by Huntington (1965:417) as "... the hallmark of a society where mobilisation has outrun institutionalisation." The weak type of state is also referred to as a praetorian state (based on the concept of the Roman Praetor Guards of the Senate) "... a society which lacks law, authority, discipline and consensus, where private interests dominate public ones, where there is an absence of civic obligation and duty, where in short political institutions are weak and social forces strong" (Huntington, 1965:416). In a similar fashion to Migdal, Huntington and Fukuyama, Tilly (2007:17-20) identifies four crude regime types namely: 1) High capacity undemocratic; 2) Low-capacity undemocratic; 3) High capacity democratic; and 4) Low-capacity democratic. These four regime types are subsequently measured against two opposite variables consisting of state capacity and democracy which is then placed within a matrix as to be able to categorise states accordingly.

Within this context Tilly (2007:16) defines state capacity as: "... the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributors". In a high-capacity regime, by this standard, whenever state agents act, their actions affect citizens' resources, activities, and interpersonal connections significantly. In a low-capacity regime, state agents have much narrower effects no matter how hard they try to change things. Tilly (2007:13-14) also explains that: "... a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation. Democratisation means net movement towards broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding consultation. De-democratisation obviously then means net movement towards narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding consultation."

Alike Duvenhage (2016:2-4) develops a matrix (as adapted from an earlier model - Duvenhage, 1994:180), in an article pertaining to a trend analysis of securitisation of the South African state; whereby the form of the state (Rechtsstaat versus Authoritarian state) is measured with the degree of government or effective government (Functional versus Dysfunctional state). This model is similar to a Weberian state on the one hand and a Hobbesian state on the other. Duvenhage (2016:6) furthermore denotes that the concept of a state reflects the rule of law (as mostly democratic) in contradiction to an authoritarian state (as mostly unconstitutional). This study postulates a model for strong and weak political regime types, as measured against degree of government and form of government as based and adapted from Migdal (1988), Huntington (1965, 2006), Fukuyama (2004), Tilly (2007) and Duvenhage (1994). Degree of government is also viewed as state capacity and is measured on a scale in terms of high and low capacity, whilst form of government measures the political regime type ranging from democratic to non-democratic. This model is depicted as follows:



Source: Adapted from Migdal, Huntington, Fukuyama, Tilly and Duvenhage  
**Figure 30: Matrix of form and degree of government**

However, the notion of a hybrid political regime as postulated by this study is not yet placed within this model as it will receive specific attention later in this study. This model however is vital according to this study as it enables categorising the type of regime after regime change according to its form of government as well as degree of government. Therefore, stateness is perceived as a fundamental within regime change and its specific outcome towards consolidation. As to conclude, state capacity refers to the capabilities and effectiveness of the state to fulfil its obligations and fundamental functions to civil society through its government and political system.



The state within the rule of law maintains political freedom, personal freedom and moreover, freedom within civil society. In contradiction, the totalitarian or authoritarian state has most or all of the power and as such the institutions of the state protects the interests of the ruling party or power elite with almost no freedom in civil society. Opposition to the ruling elite is most often regarded as opposition to the state


Nonetheless, this brings the focus to democratisation or regime change.

### **4.3 Conceptualising regime change/democratisation theory**

All states are subject to political regimes change and in linking this to the meta-scientific roadmap of this study, this concept and subsequent related concepts such as the approaches to the study thereof, pre-requisites to regime change, modes of change or transition and the process or phases of regime change, requires further conceptualisation.

#### **4.3.1 Theoretical approaches or schools of thought to the study of regime change**

Within regime change and democratisation as similar to intelligence studies and political science, different schools of thought or approaches are identified. The different approaches or traditions include concepts such as cultural, institutional, rational choice and structural approaches. These approaches are even more differentiated into classical theories, modernisation theories, radical dependency theories, world-systems, historical-structural and actor-orientated approaches (Doorenspleet, 2005:53-86; Geddes *in* Boix & Stokes, 2007:317-339; Morlino, 2014:1-30 - working paper). Nonetheless, this study however identifies the following approaches/traditions as more relevant within regime change theory, namely: (1) the structural/functional approach sometimes also referred to as the modernisation approach; (2) the rational choice/strategic choice approach also referred to as the transition or agency approach; the (3) political and cultural approach and (4) alternative approach. These broadly reflected traditions/approaches within regime change and democratisation, similar to political science (Figure 15) and intelligence studies (Figure 20), also reflect different sub-approaches and theories as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 31: A Selection of the dominant scientific traditions/approaches within regime change and democratisation theory**

\* It should be noted that this selection and the classification thereof is not absolute, but merely an attempt to indicate some of the broad scientific traditions or approaches within the study of regime change and democratisation by this study.

Guo (1999:134-141) however argues that regime transition theoretical approaches are not presented in a coherent body of work and tends to diverge between different schools of thought. He categorises democratic transition literature into four theoretical approaches namely: structure-orientated, process orientated, institutional context orientated and political economy approaches. Some theorists focus on the causes of regime change, while others place their attention on the pre-requisites for democratisation such as socio-economic development, political culture and the role of civil society. Moreover, the consolidation of democracy became more relevant in recent studies. These theories on regime transition are generally classified in either actor approaches on the one hand or structural approaches on the other. Initial theoretical approaches and traditions to regime change were initially based on modernisation, but elites and institutions are newer focusses. Recently alternative approaches such as globalisation, civil society and transition and consolidation came into focus.

However, within the conceptual framework of this study, meta-theorising of regime change and democratisation as to provide for an overarching and deepened understanding thereof, requires a brief examination of different theoretical approaches or schools of thought – as was also the case with political science and intelligence studies in the previous chapters. Structural approaches conversely include a variety of theories that focus on economic, social and international factors in democratisation; whereas actor based approaches as the dominant approach, focus on actors within political leaders and civil society. Actor orientated theorists argue that regime transitions are shaped by what the elite or principal political actors do, as well as when and how they act and therefore democracy is produced by human beings (Doorenspleet, 2005:2-3).

The structural approaches assume that economic development, political culture, class conflict, social structures and culture are pre-requisites of democracy and can explain the outcome of specific transitions. In this context Lipset (1959:69-105) argues economic development and political legitimacy are social pre-requisites for democracy. In similar fashion, Almond and Verba (1963) examine civic or political culture and democracy. Other political theorist within this school of thought include Rustow's (1970) transitions which requires specific economic and social pre-conditions where political elite factions bring about democratisation. Similarly, Dahl (1961) also postulates that certain social and political factors are a pre-requisite for democratisation. Both O'Donnell (1979) and Schmitter (1974:85-131) describe a connection between socio-economic and political structures with a specific focus on economic development and class conflict as principal variables in explaining the collapse of democracy. They also brought attention to the notion of uncertainty in the outcome of transition. The emphasis is on the role of social classes and linked to this, Moore (1966) identifies three social classes relevant to democratisation namely the peasants, upper class and bourgeoisie. He furthermore states that the type of revolution in a country determines the type of regime and states: "No bourgeois, no democracy" (Moore

1966:18). Unlike the strategic view, this theory argues that democratisation starts from below, not from above.

The institutional approach or the structural functional approach as sometimes referred to, focusses on the role of institutions on the formation of policies and preferences of political actors in regime change and democratisation. The focus is on how the regime institutionalises during transition. This approach focusses on the legislature, the executive and the judiciary or also referred to as the *trias politica* as well as political parties. The study of institutions could be traced as far back as historical institutionalism of Plato's '*Republic*' where he discussed the ideal state and Aristotle who studied the city-states. More modern day theorists include Arthur Bentley and Harold Laski. Other literature within this approach includes Bryce's '*Modern Democracy*' (1921) and Sartori's '*Party and party systems*' (1976). Almond and Coleman (1960) also studied the structure and function of political systems from this approach. This approach developed into new institutionalism whereby the importance of the state and its institutional structures are highlighted as reflected in the works of Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985). Their work as well as that of Rueschemeyer, Stephen and Stephen (1992), indicate the interaction between state, class and transnational power structures in promoting or preventing democratic change. Hereby the structure of international politics, the access to resources of classes or social groups and the type of political regime contribute to either democratisation or de-democratisation.

The strategic choice approaches to transition however concentrate on the interaction of elite strategic choices as explanations for the failure or success of democratisation (Guo, 1999:136). After their initial structural approach O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) moved to this approach with their focus on pacts or elite orientated agreements and subsequently formed the foundation of 'transitology'. Whereas they (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986) followed democratisation from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, Linz and Stepan (1978) examined the opposite process of democratic regime breakdown. According to Doorenspleet (2005:6), actor-orientated regime transition theorists view change not to be determined by structural factors but rather shaped by what principal actors do – whether they are part of the previous regime, opposition or civil society – as well as by when and how they act. This view is also postulated by this study. Within the actor-orientated approach the behaviour and choices of individual decision-makers are analysed within this approach and that four aspects influence the success of democratisation.

These are based on Di Palma (1990:8-9), Linz and Stepan (1978) and Karl (1991:172) and are described as: (1) the particular democratic rules and institutions chosen; (2) the mode of decision-making – pacts and negotiations or unilateral action; (3) the type of alliances and coalitions forged and lastly; (4) the timing imposed on tasks and stages of transition. Certain choices are beneficial to transition and others not. Przeworski (1991:67-79) describes the political actors as hardliners and moderates whereas O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) refer to hardliners and soft liners. This

is also referred to the so-called “hawks” and “doves” description, as used during the US war in Vietnam where the doves were opposed to war which the hawks supported. Mainwaring et al (1992:299) and Karl (1991:173) also focus on the political regime and opposition actors; whereas the latter states that mass actors and this bottom-up approach to democratisation provide no stable results. In addition Di Palma (1990) analyses democratic crafting pertaining to agreements between ruling and opposition elites.

The cultural approach, on the contrary, aims to understand society specific political phenomena within the assumption as also supported by this study; that different cultures and societies express different behaviours influencing their respective politics. Political systems are studied according to their own structures and cultures. This approach is associated with the works of Almond and Verba (1963) *‘The civic culture’* which was later built upon by Inglehart (1988) in his *‘The renaissance of political culture’*. Inglehart examines cultural variables within political science concepts such as political preferences, interpersonal trust and life satisfaction. Other contributors in this approach include Lijphart, Diamond, Fukuyama and Putnam. Lijphart (1999) distinguishes between mass political culture and elite political culture and explains that culture has an independent life of its own that influences politics. The cultural approach also came to the fore with Huntington (1968) in his book *‘Political order in changing societies’*, but more so in his 1996 classical work *‘Clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order’*. Initially emerging as one of the first modernisation theorists, Huntington describes regime change and transition in terms of economics, social cultural and external factors in three waves of democratisation.

Nonetheless, another new approach to regime change and democratisation is the Alternative approach. As indicated by academic inquiry research and historic developments, regime change and democratisation is a dynamic process. There is thus a need to explain democratisation holistically and this alternative approach as Grugel (2002:64-65) argues and as also supported by this study. According to him this framework can be used for the analysis of consolidation and transition and has the advantage of incorporating a substantive understanding of democracy. The alternative approach entails the state, civil society and global order or globalisation as Grugel (2002:68-139) explains. The state is the embodiment of political power and is central to democratisation and involves institutional change on the form of state, addressing who has control over state policies and functional transformation on what the state does and its responsibilities (Grugel, 2002:66). The relationship between state and society is essential to democratisation as explained by academics such as Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992). Democratisation requires equilibrium in power between state and civil society as also depicted by this study in Figure 29. As also viewed by Huntington (1991), democratisation emerges as a global trend. Within this dimension, international factors such as global communications, global coalitions and global networks influence democratisation processes and democratic consolidation. In a similar fashion, Burnell (2004:114-116) explains that economic relations, state relations and civil society

approaches are also relevant in examining regime change and democratisation. In addition Hariss, Stokke and Torngquist (2004) argue in their book *'Politicising Democracy'* that political authority is increasingly diffused among state market and civil society actors at local, national, regional and global scales. According to them formal global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the United Nations, The World Bank and Regional Development Banks exercise considerable power over states and people and many states undergo transformation in favour of market liberalisation and regionalisation.

Nonetheless, as this study mainly finds itself within the functional/structural school of thought it does not thereby attempt to negate, ignore or neglect the other approaches. This study does however not denote that this brief attempt here within to explore and explain these approaches, are clear cut or confined to exact classification. However, it should be noted that these approaches or schools of thought are more diverse, interlinked and seemingly complex than discussed. This study merely attempts to address it as such within a broader context and not as exact. It furthermore does not attempt to provide a comprehensive and in-depth detailed analysis of each relevant source, rather than a brief and broad overview of existing trends and traditions within this specific field of study, as relevant to the main aim of this study as indicated in the title of this thesis. As is the case with most theory development, some of the scientists develop and grow in their own approaches and are not confined to a specific tradition. More so, as reflected within the meta-theoretical framework of this study as well as the meta-scientific approach to intelligence studies that requires a multi-disciplinary approach (as postulated in chapter two), an integrated and holistic approach to the different schools of thought, is postulated.

Therefore, in line with the thinking of Lakatos (1978:35) who argues that there is no single correct research strategy in researching political phenomena and that each strategy contributes research practices by its own specific strengths, this study postulates that an overarching integrated and multi-disciplinary approach should be taken towards the study of specific phenomena. Thus this study views such an approach also relevant to research within political science and more specifically relevant to the sub-field of intelligence studies. Such a view and approach will enable this research to reach its main aim as reflected in the title of this thesis. In addition Lakatos explains that theory is evaluated on the grounds of the comprehensiveness of the explanations it advances as well as the extent to which it provides for future research. This notion is supported by this study which regards each of the different schools of thought as useful and relevant in providing scientific explanations towards the understanding of sometimes diverse and complex political phenomena. Not only is this beneficial to the explanation of such phenomena, but also contributes to the development of new theory, especially from an overarching meta-theoretical perspective. This will furthermore enable this study to inquire on intelligence practices within different regime types.


As to summarise, there are diverse schools of thought or approaches and sub-approaches to the study of regime change and democratisation that all contributes to an overarching and deepened understanding of theory and practices: Firstly; the structural/functional approach sometimes also referred to as the modernisation approach; secondly; the rational choice/strategic choice approach also referred to as the transition or agency approach; fourthly the political and cultural approach; and lastly alternative approaches range from functional/structural, elite actor base and alternative approach.

However, the focus on pre-requisites to regime change also comes to the fore.

#### **4.3.2 Pre-requisites to regime change or democratisation**

As discussed within the diverse approaches to the study of regime change the concept of having pre-requisites or pre-conditions to democratisation, offers various viewpoints. The initial stance within the structural approach, Lipset, Moore, Rueschemeyer, Stephen and Stephen to name a few, was focussed on development as a vital dimension. In contradiction, Rustow, Di Palma, Linz, O' Donnell, Schmitter and others within the Elite/Actor approach supported the willingness of political elites to change as one of the preconditions required. Pre-conditions to regime change or democratisation within the literature furthermore ranges from urbanisation, economic growth (Boix, 2003; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997), a strong middle class modernisation (Moore, 1966) and civil society (Lipset, 1959), higher income (Lijphart, 1971), higher education and literacy (Lipset, 1959) to social and cultural dimensions (Almond & Verba, 1963 and 1989; Putnam, 1993; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001) and even capitalism (Almond, 1991). Nonetheless, these dimensions and various others as identified within the inquiry into democratisation by this study, become of lesser importance with specifically the contributions made by Huntington (1991) in his discussions of the three waves of democratisation.

Within his contribution it is evident that various countries made the transition towards democratisation without displaying any of these pre-conditions mentioned. Therefore, without disputing or negating the correlation between pre-requisites or pre-conditions for democratisation, this study however denotes in the words of Huntington (1991:38) who states that; "The causes of democratisation differ substantially from one place to another and from one time to another." In his argument as supported by this study, no single factor is necessary or sufficient to explain the development of democracy in all or in a single country; as it is a result of a combination of causes. More so, Huntington (1996:5) states, as also postulated by this study that within those countries which lack pre-conditions, democratisation is not impossible but is rather likely to be more difficult. Regime change therefore happens due to mixed causes. The most prominent pre-conditions or pre-requisites of regime change and democratisation are delineated by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 32: Pre-conditions to democratisation**

The modes of transition which focus on how a regime change, needs specific deliberation.

#### 4.3.3 Modes of transition or regime change

Regime transition as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:6) describe, is the interval between one political regime and another and are delimited on the one side by the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and on the other side by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative. Within the focus on regime transition and apart from the question why it happens, a more relevant question would be on how it happens. This brings the focus to the diverse modes of democratic transition or regime change. These modes are also referred to as the different paths to democratic transition. Democratisation literature also differs on the importance or role of the different modes of transition, similar to the relevance of pre-conditions to transition, as discussed above. The different modes of transition do however require attention in so far as their relevance to effecting democratisation in an attempt to enable this study to contribute to meta-theorising of existing democratisation theories and to provide for theory building. The different breakdowns of states in transition between 2000 and 2014 as described by Diamond (2015:145) includes the following: military coup, executive degradation, monarchical coup, democratisation decline, electoral fraud



and executive abuse, unconstitutional assumption of power by opposition and breakdown of the electoral process.

Modes of democratic transition as identified within democracy theory, ranges from violent and non-violent interventions such as political liberation or revolution and coup d'etat and even state collapse, to external forces such as intervention, war and conquests. To this extent, Rustow (1970), who is regarded as the father of transitology, addresses the gradual change from an oligarchy to democracy through consensus by the elite. In a similar fashion, O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) focus on transition brought about by negotiations, as opposed to revolution or violent change. They also claim that liberalisation of an authoritarian regime is a necessary stage before transition. Mainwaring (1989:4-6) however explains that political liberalisation is not the exclusive actor to splits within authoritarian coalitions as focus should also be given to the impact of opposition actors in general as well as mass mobilisation. In contrast Huntington (1984:212) also indicates that democratic regimes have seldom been instituted by mass popular action. Mainwaring (1989) however continues to argue that liberalisation does not always lead to a democratic transition as it is sometimes aborted and leads to renewed repression. Nonetheless, as Rustow (1970:346) states, the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence. However, Ethier (1990:5-6) identifies three democratic transition modes, firstly; transition by external forces or conquests, foreign intervention, war and economic sanctions; his seminal work; secondly from violent interventions such as civil war, revolution and coup d'etat; and thirdly; evolutionary transition due to internal crisis of the political regime.


Within 'The third wave of democratisation' Huntington (1991) identifies five factors from which the third wave of democratisation is derived, namely: (1) a deepening legitimacy problem of authoritarian regimes and poor economic performance or military failure; (2) global economic growth and modernisation, urbanisation, higher education standards, rising middle class and civic expectations; (3) changes in the Catholic church that opposes authoritarianism; (4) with the emphasis on human rights and democracy by external actor's such as the European Union; and lastly, (5) snowballing or diffusion whereby democratisation in a region causes other countries to democratise. Huntington (*In Diamond et al*, 1997:8-9) adds that threats to third wave democracies is likely to come from political erosion, electoral victory of anti-democratic parties or from executive arrogation whereby the chief executive concentrates power in his/her own hands or sub-ordinates and could even rule by decree in a bounded strongman form. The latter is similar to the neo-patrimonial rule in Africa as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:63-66) describe. On the other hand, Munck and Leff (1997:346-357), delineate modes of transition in some South American and East European cases as follows: (1) Reform from below where the impetus for change comes from outside the incumbent elite; (2) Reform through transaction whereby the incumbent elite forced the opposition to advance its agenda through negotiations; (3) Reform through extrication or 'negotiated revolution' in that the old rulers and counter-elites sought change and the incumbents

forced the opposition to bargain; (4) Reform through rupture that focusses on a rapid break from the incumbent rule in an almost 'velvet revolution' by counter-elites or opposition and lastly; (5) Revolution from above where the ruling elite lacked pressure from strong opposition and external events shifted the internal power balance and prompted a pre-emptive opening from above. These modes as discussed are based on accommodation (1), confrontation (5) and a combination of confrontation and accommodation (2-4). In a similar fashion Linz (1978:35) distinguishes between transitions by reforma and transitions by rupture. The first refers to transformation or negotiations by the power elite while the latter refers to transition through revolution or authoritarian regime collapse.

In addition, Stepan (*In* O'Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986:64-66) identifies eight paths to regime change or transition. Warfare and conquest plays an integral part in the first three paths namely: internal restoration after external conquest; internal reformulation and externally monitored installation. Within the next paths, socio-political forces through international and economic forces as well as political blocs play a role in contrast to external military forces. These include re-democratisation initiated from within authoritarian regimes drawn from civilianised political leadership, the military as government or the military as institution. Opposing forces are central in the final category of society led regime transition, party pact; organised violent revolt by democratic opposition and Marxist led revolutionary war. These paths therefore focus on warfare or foreign conquest; the relinquishment of power by authoritarian rulers and the transition through the actions of opposition forces. Likewise Stradiotto and Guo (2010:16-20) devise four transition categories inclusive of the theoretical contributions of various scholars within the democratisation field of study. These categories are: (1) conversion or elite led reform/liberalisation, inclusive of transformation (Huntington), transaction (Share/Mainwaring; Gill), reforma (Linz), pact (Karl and Schmitter), reform through extrication and reform from above (Munck and Leff); (2) cooperative joint action by government and opposition, consisting of transplacement, extrication (Gill), transaction (Gill), pact or reform from below (Munck and Leff); (3) collapse where the opposition take the lead and the regime collapse or is overthrown through revolution or coup 'd'etat, inclusive of replacement (Huntington; Gill), ruptura (Linz), breakdown/collapse (Share/Mainwaring), revolution/imposition (Karl and Schmitter) and reform through rupture (Munck and Leff); and lastly; (4) foreign intervention with military interference from a dominant external power, consisting of intervention (Huntington) and imposition (Karl and Schmitter).

Moreover, Cheeseman (2015:96) identifies African transition trajectories in the following categories; mode of transition from above; mode of transition from below and stalemate that includes externally managed transitions, externally triggered transitions, domestic triggered transitions as well as negotiated modes of transition with South Africa's compromise as the only example in Africa. Furthermore, as Cheeseman (2015:111) claims: "... political transitions are fluid and conditions on the ground are subject to rapid change". Therefore, this study denotes that a

more recent phenomenon, such as terrorism acts (Dyck, 2003:350), as an internal and external regime change mode. As an internal mode, terrorism contributes to regime failure or collapse. As an external mode, counter terrorism is used by international actors and countries as a reason to impose regime change. Evident of this is the Nigerian originated Boko Haram (renamed as the Islamic State West Africa) active in the West Africa region; the Somalia based al Shabaab active in the East Africa region and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. International actors such as the UN, EU and countries like the USA, UK, and France furthermore impose regime change through economic sanctions, military intervention and elite support, as part of their counterterrorism strategies as is the case in Libya and Syria. In addition, the activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as an actor for international terrorism, contribute to regime change with their proclamation of a caliphate in Syrian and Iraq territories. All the same, within this context this study postulates the different paths and modes of regime change, as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 33: Violent and non-violent internal and external regime change modes**

To conclude, the different modes of transition indicate the different paths to democratisation or even de-democratisation of regimes either from external or from internal actors and actions. Some modes offer greater opportunity than others to ensure democratic consolidation as viable. A country's road towards democracy is not necessarily ensured by the specific mode.

The different modes of transition bring the specific phases or process of regime change to the fore.

#### 4.3.4 Regime change process or phases

Part of the question of how a regime changes, brings the focus on the process of democratisation. Classical transitology theory indicates that democratisation occurs in sequence of stages ranging from an opening through political liberalisation, followed by the breakthrough or transition towards democracy and concluded with democratic consolidation, although a slow process (Carothers, 2002:7). In a similar approach, Rakner et al (2007:7) explain that democratisation could be understood in three phases; (1) the liberations phase entailing the crumbling of the authoritarian regime; (2) a transition phase whereby the first elections are held; and (3) a consolidation phase where firmly established democratic practices are expected. However, although described as a linear process, this is not the case and the stages could overlap as indicated by Carothers (2002) and Rustow (1970:345).

To this extent Rustow (1970:350-361) describes four phases, namely: (1) Background Condition – where the majority in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservation as to which political community they belong; (2) Preparatory phase – as the start of the democratisation process itself with a prolonged and inclusive political struggle within social classes; (3) Decision phase – reflecting negotiations and compromise between members as well as more politically active classes and lastly; (4) Habitation phase – where actors and participants have to live with the competitive process of democracy.


Likewise, Huntington (1991:113 - 114) distinguishes in similar fashion to Linz (1978) and Shane and Mainwaring (1986) between: (1) transformation (reforma – Linz or transaction – Shane and Mainwaring), where the elites in power took the lead in bringing democracy about; (2) replacement (ruptura – Linz or breakdown/collapse – Shane and Mainwaring), where opposition elites bring democracy about; (3) transplacement or ruptforma (extrication – Shane and Mainwaring), where democracy occurs as a result of a joint action between elites in power and within the opposition; and (4) interventions, where democracy is brought about by outside powers. In addition, Hood (2004:25) claims that two phases of democratisation are of importance namely transition and consolidation. Moreover, Siaroff (2009:276-284) promulgates a more detailed model for regime change that is also supported by this study.

This model indicates different periods and processes of regime change towards democratic consolidation and starts with a stable autocratic oligarchy. This period is followed with a regime breakdown period of change with a decision to transform, then a period as the democratic transition. Thereafter a period for the founding of free and fair elections that is followed by a period as unconsolidated democracy moving through a process of democratic consolidation to ultimately end up as a consolidated democracy.

However, in taking the cyclic approach by Huntington (1991) towards democratisation as waves with an accompanied reverse wave of de-democratisation into consideration, this study proposes that transition towards democracy does not necessarily ensure that a democracy matures and ends up in a democratic consolidation phase. Furthermore, as is also evident from the history and development of existing democracies, regime change is a constant and the outcome of regime transition could include consolidation, regime reverse or even regime collapse/breakdown. Therefore an effort to reconstructing and deepening the understanding of existing theory as well as taking the contributions of transition scholars as discussed into account, this study postulates a regime change/democratisation model depicted as a dynamic continuous coil to reflect three stages that include preconditions, transition modes and transition outcomes.

The Pre-Transition phase refers to the initial regime break away from the existing political order and includes the different preconditions or prerequisites as depicted in Figure 30. The Transition phase however refers to the initial phase following the regime break away that is inter alia reflected in the first free, fair and contested elections, the establishment of the rule of law, commitment and mechanisms to ensure human rights and apart from initiating a democratic government and the establishment of constitutionality. This phase includes the different internal and external modes of democratisation as discussed and depicted in Figure 33. More so, of the three phases of democratisation depicted in this model above, this study regards the Post-Transition Phase as more relevant and important specifically as it is indicative of regime transition outcomes as either a successful or unsuccessful transition.

This three stage model as forwarded by this study, reflecting a pre-transition phase, a transition phase and a post-transition phase, is delineated as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 34: Reconstructing regime change phases**

However, regime change outcomes are specifically relevant to this study and need attention.

#### 4.4 Regime transition/democratisation outcomes

Several transition outcomes could be expected that could include a consolidated democracy, de-democratisation or reversal; being stuck in the grey zone as an unconsolidated democracy/hybrid democracy or even experiencing state collapse or decay with another regime breakdown looming. These require more specific attention.

##### 4.4.1 Democratic consolidation

The post-transition phase entails several outcomes of the democratisation phase. A consolidated democracy is in place according to Haynes (2012:2), when political elites, political parties/groups and the mass of ordinary people accept the formal rules and informal understandings that determine political outcomes namely: who gets what, where, when and how. Moreover, a consolidated democracy is characterised by normative limits and established patterns of distribution. Rustow (1970:358) refers to the consolidation phase as the habituation phase where the competitive process of democracy comes into play on all the actors involved in addressing

competition for offices as well as resolving conflicts and addressing future uncertainties. To this extent, Stradiotto and Guo (2010:15) explain that democratic consolidation is typified as a 'safe zone' for the democracy where the likelihood of reversion to authoritarian rule is almost zero.

The focus is however on what democratic consolidation means. Linz and Stepan (1996:14) list three minimal conditions before a consolidated democracy can exist namely: (1) a state or stateness should exist; (2) democratic consolidation should be brought to completion; and (3) the regime can only be called democratic if the rulers govern democratically. In a narrow definition combining behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional dimension, they (Linz & Stepan, 1996:14-15) define a consolidated democracy as a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rulers and patterned incentives and disincentives has become "the only game in town". They however postulate the following working definition for a consolidated democracy: behaviourally when no significant national, social, political or institutional actor spends significant resources attempting to create a non-democratic regime; attitudinally when a majority of the public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life and that the support for anti-system alternatives is isolated and small: and constitutionally when government and non-government forces alike are subject to resolution of conflict within the bounds of specific laws and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz and Stepan, 1996:15).

Furthermore, five additional interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions for a democracy to be present are explained, namely: (1) conditions must exist for the development of free and lively civil society; (2) there must be a relatively autonomous political society; (3) throughout the territory of the state all actors including government must be subjected to the rule of law that protects individual freedom and associational life; (4) there must be a usable state bureaucracy; and (5) there must be an institutionalised economic society inclusive of a market economy and not a command economy (Linz & Stepan, 1996:15-21). Likewise, Schneider and Schmitter (2004:62) forward the following formal definition for democratic consolidation: "Regime consolidation consists in transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions that have emerged during the uncertain struggles of the transition into institutions, that is, into relationships that are reliably known, regularly practiced and normatively accepted by those persons or collectivities defined as the participants/citizens/subjects of such institutions; and in such a way that the ensuing channels of access, patterns of inclusion, resources for action, and norms about decision making conform to one overriding standard: that of citizenship." In addition Gill (2000:235) provides the following explanation: "The notion of consolidation refers to the embedding of democratic procedures into the infrastructure as a whole so that the system is secure and is generally seen as the appropriate way of organising political life."

Even so, Diamond (1999:74) argues that although democratic regimes vary in the depth and nature of the challenges that they face, there are three generic tasks that all new and fragile democracies must be able to handle to be able to become consolidated. These are firstly democratic deepening whereby the formal structures of democracy are made more liberal, accountable, representative and accessible – thus more democratic. Secondly is political institutionalisation, as fundamental to the building of a political culture of democracy and enhancing the legitimacy of the democratic system (Diamond, 1999:75). This includes the strengthening of bureaucracy that is capable, professional and democratic. Thirdly, regime performance regarded as a crucial variable affecting development and internalisation about legitimacy as the more successful a regime is in its performance of giving the people what they want, the more deeply rooted its legitimacy tends to be (Diamond, 1999:77).

To this extent Diamond (1999:91) adds that democracy presumes the notion of a *Rechtsstaat* – a state bound by law, thereby initiating law and order. Diamond (1999:69) furthermore devised a three by two table to assess progress towards consolidation by depicting the levels of elite, organisation and the mass public and the dimensions of norms or beliefs and behaviour. When all the six factors show substantial normative commitment to democracy and behaviour compliance within its rules and limits, a democracy is consolidated. Moreover, Przeworski (1991:26) claims, as also postulated by this study that: “Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions of a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town when no one can imagine acting outside democratic institutions when all losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.” He adds that a democracy is consolidated when it becomes self-enforcing and provides for compliance and that institutions matter.

Similarly, Huntington (1991:266-267) promulgates a so-called ‘two-turn over’ test for democratic consolidation whereby the party or group that takes the power in the initial elections during transition, loses a subsequent election and turn power over to those election winners and when those election winners turn over power to the winners of a later election. The first turnover has a more symbolical significance, whereas the second shows that two major political groups in a society are sufficiently committed to democracy by handing over power after a defeat as well as that both elites and the public engage within a democratic system where if things go wrong, the rulers are changed and not the political regime. O’ Donnell (1996:12-13) provides the following definition of a consolidated democracy: “(1) alternation in power between former rivals; (2) continued widespread support and stability during times of extreme economic hardship; (3) successful defeat and punishment of a handful of strategically placed rebels; (4) regime stability in the face of a radical restructuring of the party system; and (5) the absence of a politically significant anti-system, party or social movement.”



Likewise, there are various indexes available, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicator project, the Freedom Index, the Democracy Index, the Index of Economic Freedom Rainbow Index that provides for international recognised measurement of the democratic status of countries worldwide; including South Africa as relevant to this study. The Worldwide Governance Indicator is a World Bank project (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index>) that reports on six dimensions of governance for 215 economies over the period 1996-2014. These dimensions include voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law and lastly control of corruption. The Freedom Index has been published annually since 1992 by Freedom House and is recognised and used as a measure of democracy. Freedom House divides democratic governance into two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. Each dimension is rated from 1 to 7. The lower the number, the more democratic the regime whereas the higher the number, the more authoritarian the regime. Using these two indicators, Freedom House divides the countries into Free (1.0-2.5), Partly Free (3.0-5.0), and Not Free (5.5-7.0), as indicated in their 2016 report (<https://freedomhouse.org/sites>).

Furthermore, the Democracy Index is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) that measures democracy in countries along five different categories namely: (1) electoral process and pluralism; (2) civil liberties; (3) functioning of government; (4) political participation ; and (5) political culture. The Index was first produced in 2006, with updates in 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2015. Their ratings categorise countries into full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes, ([www.eiu.com/democracy2015](http://www.eiu.com/democracy2015)). The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation furthermore publish an annual report 'The Index of Economic Freedom' which focuses on four key aspects of the economic environment over which governments typically exercise policy control namely: rule of law; government size; regulatory efficiency and market openness (<http://www.heritage.org/index>). In assessing conditions in these four categories, the Index measures ten specific components of economic freedom, each of which is graded on a scale from 0 to 100. Scores on these ten components of economic freedom, which are calculated from a number of sub-variables, are equally weighted and averaged to produce an overall economic freedom score for each economy. More so, apart from a report from the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) on South Africa (Calland & Graham, 2005), the Rainbow Index of the South African Institute of Race Relations listed 'ten pillars' of democracy to score South Africa's democratic consolidation from 1994 until 2010. These pillars are listed as Democratic Governance; Rule of Law; Individual Rights and Responsibilities; Racial Goodwill; Effective Governance; Growth-Focused Policies; Scope for Free Enterprise; Liberation of the Poor and Good Citizenship (Jeffery, 2012:2).


Nonetheless, for the transition phase to be labelled as successful, a country should end up as a consolidated democracy. As these indexes reveal the required criteria for a country to be labelled

as a consolidated democracy, these criteria should also be taken into account in defining such a democracy. This study is of the opinion that reference to democracy should entail two points of departure; firstly that these criteria are present and secondly that such a democracy is viewed as consolidated. This study furthermore advances the notion of a narrow minimalistic definition of democracy in following a Schumpeterian, Huntington, Dahl and Diamond tradition; in contradiction to the broad and numerous definitions of democracy presented in some literature depicting fast and numerous different types of democracies. Therefore this study in particular denotes that political regime types should only be distinguished as democratic, non-democratic or as a hybrid political regime – of which the latter concept will receive more specific attention in the next chapter.

Within such an approach a country in regime transition towards democracy could end up in several different outcomes which are not necessarily that of a consolidated democracy. If this is the case, such a country could therefore not be labelled as a consolidated democracy or more over – being democratic. Thus, a country within regime transition is perceived by this study as exactly that of being in transition. This is however not a long-term and extended typology but merely a reflection of the specific stage where such a country is placed during its regime change. It is only possible and just to place countries that are in the pre-transition and post-transition phase within a specific political regime category, thereby excluding those specifically during the transition phase.

In this regard this study postulates a model for a consolidated democracy, depicting the criteria as based on the various indexes and earlier discussions within this study. This model assists this study to characterise specific regime types according to these criteria as well as enables conceptualisation and theory building within the meta-scientific framework; as to contribute to a deeper understanding of intelligence practices. This study argues that only when the final stage of regime change is reached, could one determine the outcome as to place a country as either democratic, non-democratic or as a hybrid political regime. Such a point of view excludes the broad and numerous definitions and typologies for democracy and regime types as countries in regime change are to be viewed as in transition and not democracies or non-democracies because they have not yet reached the post-transition phase where the specific regime transition outcome, is depicted.

This model is furthermore linked to the input/output model of Easton and follows the notion that a democracy is a political system *of* the people; *by* the people; *for* the people and is delineated by this study. This model will furthermore assist this study to identify the characteristics present within a specific political regime so as to be able to place it within the appropriate classification. It will also contribute to the conceptualising and theory building of intelligence practices within a hybrid political regime, as reflected in the title of this thesis. This model is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 35: A conceptualised model of criteria for a consolidated democracy**

#### 4.4.2 De-democratisation or reversal

In terms of de-democratisation or the reversal of democratic consolidation, Dyck (2003:342-343) rightfully claims that: "Throughout history, the most likely result of a non-democratic breakdown has been another non-democratic regime, not the establishment of a democratic regime." Similarly, Gill (2000:43) also claims that the breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not always lead to a democratic outcome. Moreover, Huntington (1991) brought the attention to democratisation occurring through history in what he describes as three waves to democratisation and explains that each of these waves was followed by a reversed wave namely: (1) First wave of democratisation (1828-1926); (2) First reverse wave (1922-1942); (3) Second wave of democratisation (1943-1962); (4) Second reverse wave (1958-1975) as well as; (5) Third wave of democratisation (1975 - ?). To this extent, Huntington (1991:17-18) continues and describes several factors why democratisation might produce a reverse wave or de-democratisation namely: (1) the weakness of democratic values among key elite groups and the general public; (2) severe economic setbacks, which intensified social conflict and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could be imposed only by authoritarian governments; (3) social and political polarisation, often produced by leftist governments seeking the rapid introduction of major social and economic reforms; (4) the determination of conservative middle-class and upper-class groups

to exclude populist and leftist movements and lower-class groups from political power; (5) the breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism or insurgency; (6) intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign power; and (7) "reverse snowballing" triggered by the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other countries.

Huntington (1991:18-20) furthermore explains that the overwhelming transitions from democracy to authoritarian were produced by those in power or close to power. Other factors include foreign actor involvement, military coups or executive coups by stating martial law or declaring a state of emergency. For Diamond (*In Diamond et al, 1997:xviii*) the opposite of democratic consolidation is democratic breakdowns that feature the erosion of democratic legitimacy and the rise of disloyal and semi-disloyal actors. In a later article Diamond (2015:142-144) claims that there is a drastic decline in democratic consolidation since 2006 culminating in democratic breakdown and the deepening of authoritarianism. Between 1974 and the end of 2014, 29 percent of all democracies broke down and since 2000 there were 25 breakdowns (Diamond, 2015:142).

In addition, Tilly (2007:14-15) defines de-democratisation as the movement towards narrower, more unequal, less protected as well as less binding consultation. Four partly independent dimensions of variation among regimes are identified whereby an upward movement on the four dimensions is determined as democratisation whilst a downward movement is seen as de-democratisation. These dimensions are described as follows: (1) Breadth - From a small segment of the population enjoying extensive rights to very wide political inclusion of people under the state's jurisdiction; (2) Equality - From great inequality among and within categories of citizens to extensive equality; (3) Protection - From little, too much protection against the state's arbitrary action; and (4) Mutually binding consultation - From non-binding and/or extremely asymmetrical to mutually binding.

All the same, it is thus clear as also postulated by this study, that de-democratisation is a result of a lack of deepening of democracy within political institutions and civil society and a lack of regime performance. De-democratisation is present when the 'two-turn over' test of Huntington fails and when the power elite and other actors, have a clear non- commitment to Przeworski's definition of a consolidated democracy whereby democracy is the only game in town. This is specifically relevant to the three reverse waves of democratisation as explained by Huntington (1991). More so, de-democratisation in its essence refers to non-democratic outcomes or a reverse back to authoritarianism or even totalitarianism. This furthermore entails that a regime is not in transition but has moved back into a consolidated non-democracy and is indicative of a failed consolidated democratic outcome

#### 4.4.3 State decay, failure or collapse

One of the possible worst outcomes according to this study of regime transition or democratisation is political decay that could eventually lead to state failure and even state collapse. A critical dimension in a consolidated democracy as discussed by this study is effective stateness or governance. In some measure Fukuyama (2004:17) states that state-building is a crucial issue today and that: "Weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world's most serious problems, from poverty and Aids to drug trafficking and terrorism." In addition Fukuyama (2014:506-507) argues that political development and state capacity are subject to decay and therefore an effective modern government must find the appropriate balance between a strong and capable state and institutions of law, and accountability that restrain the state on the one hand and force it on the other, to act in the broad interests of citizens. Dysfunction occurs because actors act in their own self-interests as to gain financially as well as to promote their own careers.

Three pillars to democracy are however identified by Fukuyama (2014:8-9), which is also supported by this study namely: (1) a strong state; (2) rule of law; and (3) democratic accountability, which are absent within a failed or collapsed state. Linked to this, Dyck (2003:344) claims that apart from economic and social causes, corruption and institutional failure are the most common explanations of regime breakdown. These trends are thus evident of state decay. The challenge however for new democracies is to enable and develop the capability and means to deliver goods to the people as well as to ensure their welfare and security. In this regard, Diamond (2015:142-147) notes an accelerated rate of democratic breakdown and counted twenty five breakdowns from democracies in the world since 2000 that occurred through the subtle and incremental degradation of democratic rights and procedures that push democratic systems away from consolidation. Thirteen major breakdowns occurred from abuse of power and desecration of democratic institutions and practices by the democratically elected rulers. Furthermore, democratic failure resulted from a long secular process of system deterioration and executive strangulation of political rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law.

Nonetheless, based on the works of Migdal (1988) and Huntington (1968 and 1996), Greffrath (2015:145) designates three dimensions of state dysfunction in his thesis namely the internal, intermediate and external dimensions. Accordingly each dimension possesses a level of application on societal, institutional or international level. He provides for the following definition of a dysfunctional state: "A dysfunctional state represents a fundamental deviation from the ideal-typical Weberian conception of state, the dysfunctional attributes of which manifest in societal, institutional and international contexts that: (i) may be represented according to a typology of dysfunction, incorporating differentiated graduations; (ii) is often encountered as a postcolonial phenomenon; (iii) is essentially characterised by a deficiency in its capability to predominate as an autonomous, legitimate and authoritative political institution; (iv) is therefore not authentically

(positively) sovereign in either domestic or international spheres; and (v) as a result is incapable and/or unwilling to fulfil the functions of state in the public interest and for the public good” Greffrath (2015:217).

Likewise, Geldenhuys (1998, 1999 & 2001), explains that apart from state collapse, soft and weak states are also linked to state failure. A soft state is described as one experiencing endemic corruption in high places with the abuse of public office and position for private gain, whereas a weak state is one with insufficient political and societal consensus to eliminate the use of violence and thus displaying high levels of political violence. Within this context a soft state could be viewed as within state decay, whereas a weak state more towards state failure. The worst of scenario however is that of state collapse indicating severe failure of state capacity and power.

In a discussion document applied to South Africa, Duvenhage (2014a and 2014b:13) affirms that radical social and economic transformation, a weak state and institutional and political decay, the securitisation of the state as well as labour and socio-economic trends, provide for a dynamic change/transformation situation (punctuated equilibrium). This punctuated equilibrium provides for either a consolidated democracy as an outcome on the one hand, or for a democratic, on the other. Variables identified include: (1) a weak state, political decay and securitisation; (2) a reconstruction of the political spectrum; (3) socio-economic and labour trends; and (4) radical socio-economic ideas. States fail or are successful over these entire dimensions but a weak state could provide for the state to slide into state failure due to decay and its inability to deliver on goals to provide for the needs of citizens that in itself could ultimately cause state collapse.

Likewise, Rotberg (2003:2) claims that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, according to their performances and effectiveness in delivering the most crucial political goods. Hereby strong states could also be distinguished from weak states, failed states and collapsed states as depicted in Figure 30 of this study. He (Rotberg, 2003:5-7), furthermore argues that the more poorly weak states perform, the weaker they become and the more that weakness will tend towards failure or failing and subsequently a failed state is no longer able or willing to perform its fundamental task of delivering needed political goods effectively to its citizens.

A failed state is described by Rotberg (2003:5) as tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested by wary factions and in most failed states government forces battle against one or more armed rivals that are revolting. Such a state also faces a variety of civil unrest and communal dissent directed at the state. The enduring character of the violence and not necessarily the intensity thereof, identifies a failed state. A failed state cannot control its borders and loses authority over sections of its territory. According to Rotberg (2003:6-9) failed states display growing criminal violence, have the political elite that prey on their own constituents and fail to provide even limited quantities of essential political goods. A failed state furthermore exhibits

flawed institutions with a noticeable absent democratic debate. Although the military is one of the only bureaucracies to function within a failed state, it is often highly politicised. Infra-structure such as waterworks, transport networks and roads and communication systems deteriorate together with sectors such as public health and education and corruption flourishes. A failed state ultimately loses its legitimacy. Current examples include Syria and the Central African Republic.

In contrast to a failed state as explained by Rotberg (2003:9), a collapsed state is described as a rare and extreme version of a failed state where political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated to the rule of the strong and the state exhibits a vacuum of authority. "It is a mere geographical expression; a black hole into which a failed polity is fallen" (Rotberg, 2003:9). In similar fashion Zartman (1995:1) describes that it is not an anarchy but rather a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup or riot as it refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order has fallen and requires to be reconstituted in either a new or old form. It is therefore a reflection of the collapse of the old order, where the state as legitimate functioning order is gone for a period of time. In modern day state collapse as indicative of Africa, Zartman (1995:1) claims that it is not a matter of civilisation decay as society carries on even when ideology, regime and order change.

However, as Zartman (1995:2) argues: "State collapse, as a current phenomenon, is much more, narrow, and identifiable, a political cause and effect with social and economic implications, and one that represents a significant anomaly". He (Zartman, 1995:5) continues to define state collapse as meaning that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed and it is paralysed and inoperative as the decision-making centre, laws are not made, order is not preserved and social cohesion is not enhanced. The state lost its symbol of identity and legitimacy and fails as a territory to provide security. Ultimately, a collapsed state loses its right to rule. State collapse is therefore the breakdown of good governance, law and order. In similar fashion Geldenhuys (2001:11) argues that state collapse is the most severe form of state degeneration.

All the same, Lambach, Johais and Bayer (2015:1308) provide the following framework as postulated and adapted by this study, to identify cases of state collapse in the international system:

**Table 3: Indicators for state collapse**


RULE MAKING	MEANS OF VIOLENCE	TAXATION
<b>FIRST – LEVEL INDICATORS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cessation of the work of the High Court</li> <li>• No formal legislation</li> <li>• Government or parliament leaves the capital</li> <li>• Legitimacy in decay</li> <li>• Loose right to rule</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>De jure</i> dissolution of the security forces</li> <li>• Security forces do not control the whole capital</li> <li>• Loses control over state agents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No official government budget is declared</li> <li>• Central bank ceases work</li> <li>• More financial burden on constituents</li> <li>• Dependant on international aid</li> </ul>
<b>SECONDARY INDICATORS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Massive corruption</li> <li>• Laws are rarely enforced</li> <li>• Widespread legal pluralism</li> <li>• Infighting in ruling elite</li> <li>• Defensive politics</li> <li>• Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security forces becomes <i>de facto</i> private militias</li> <li>• Security forces control only small parts of the country</li> <li>• Private non-state actors control large portions of the country</li> <li>• Civil disobedience and revolt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No organised fiscal administration</li> <li>• Taxation by non-state actors</li> <li>• Tax ratio below 8%</li> <li>• Financial and economic decay</li> </ul>

**Source: Adapted from Lambach, Johais and Bayer (2015:1308)**

Nonetheless, Zartman (1995:10) distinguishes identifiable signposts that could serve as warning for countries on the slippery road of state decay, failure and ultimately collapse. These are as follows: (1) Power devolves to the periphery when the centre fights amongst itself and provides opportunity for future warlords to grab power over the countryside; (2) Power withers in the centre as government loses its power base as they no longer give attention to the needs of its social base; (3) Government malfunctions by avoiding necessary difficult choices leading to a governing crisis because of decisional avoidance; (4) Incumbents practice defensive politics; and lastly (5) when the centre loses control over its own state agents. To this extent a weak state as discussed earlier in this study that exhibits an un-consolidated democracy as a form of government as well as a weak degree of government, could decline and eventually end up away from an ideal state model – to that of a collapsed state (See Figure 30).

This study also postulates that state decay, state failure and state collapse could be delineated in a progressive linear model that is depicted as follows:





Source: Own construct

**Figure 36: From an ideal state to state collapse**

To summarise, state decay and state failure is viewed as a progressive linear process where state collapse is the end result. Furthermore, the means of the state in terms of legitimacy, sovereignty, territory and ultimately the right to rule, its capability to deliver political goods and ensure safety and prosperity to citizens; are in decay, failure or ultimately collapsed. A new political order needs to be constituted.

#### 4.4.4 Unconsolidated democracy or hybrid

After the third wave of democratisations many countries remained unconsolidated as hybrid regimes. These countries, initially on the road towards transition or democratisation, failed to achieve the end objective of democratic consolidation in the post-transition phase. As Menocal et al (2008:29-40) explain, there are many new regimes that have ended up 'getting stuck' in transition and they have come to occupy a precarious middle ground between outright authoritarianism and fully-fledged democracy and as such have fragile democratic structures. Likewise, Carothers (2002:9-10) explains that these countries in transition have entered a grey zone that have some attributes of democratic political life but yet suffer serious democratic deficits that include low levels of public confidence in state institutions and poor institutional performance by the state. In addition Levitsky and Way (2002:51) argue that these unconsolidated regimes are

incomplete forms of democracy and is particularly evident in Africa and the former Soviet Union, as either authoritarian or hybrid states.

Moreover, Morlino (2008:1) claims that instances where even minimal democracies reverted all the way back to stable authoritarian regimes during transition, are much less frequent and instead are regimes characterised by transition uncertainty - that is hybrid regimes – becoming much more frequent. Hybrid regimes are furthermore not just part of the process of a country to move towards democratic consolidation as this study also supports the notion that democratisation is not a mere linear process. Similarly, Diamond (2002:24) argues that virtually all hybrid political regimes in the world today are quite deliberately *pseudo democratic*. They describe themselves as a democratic political system but do not offer their citizens the advantages of a democracy. This study however postulates that it is rather a type of regime also based on Diamond (2002:23) that states that these countries fall into the political grey zone where they are stuck between a fully-fledged democracy and outright dictatorships and even more so: “... are likely to remain there for a very long time”. Hybrid regimes, although labelled as a new concept, are however not new and exist in several places all over the world as limited, pseudo or partial democracies.

In addition, Diamond (2015:146-147) argues that it is not easy to answer to the conundrum of how to classify regimes in the grey zone. He explains that what is beyond argument is that these regimes experience a significant erosion in electoral fairness, political pluralism and civic space for opposition or dissent that is a result of abusive executives intent upon concentrating their personal power and entrenching ruling-party hegemony. The main features or characteristic of a hybrid regime is that it oscillates between democracy and authoritarianism - displaying democratic procedures and an authoritarian nature. This indicates the characteristics of a hybrid regime as in the middle between both a democracy and a non-democracy, as also discussed by Van Den Berg (2014:62). The size and power of the elite in the tri-politica (Executive, Judiciary and Legislative) and security sector is different in each system, as well as in comparison to the size and control of the state over the civil society (See Figure 29 of this chapter). This has the subsequent effect that a hybrid regime is always oscillating between democracy and non-democracy and is never stagnant. However, the concept of a hybrid political regime as also reflected within the chapter of this thesis, is only addressed here in context of regime change outcome, but will receive more detailed attention within the conceptualising of political regime theory, as is the aim of the next chapter.

Nonetheless, the different outcomes of regime change bring the attention to regime typology.

## **4.5 Reconstructing political regime typology**

Typologies or classifications are important scientific constructs that assist in the understanding of politics and government. It furthermore enables the possibility to draw comparisons between different practices as to be able to determine the systems of rule. This contributes to a deeper understanding of political phenomena to be able to conduct systematic and methodological analysis thereof. In history, states were affected by numerous changes that also impacted on regime typology. However, over time different typologies were used to classify political regimes. Political typology is furthermore not a new construct. To this extent Huntington (1991:8) claims, as also supported by this study, that: “Political regimes will never fit perfectly into intellectually defined boxes, and any system of classification has to accept the existence of ambiguous, borderline, and mixed cases.” Similarly, as also supported by this study, Diamond (2002:21) asserts that it is a never ending dialogue on how to think about and classify regimes. This study therefore briefly addresses the development of political regime typology.

### **4.5.1 Classical regime typology**

The typology of political regimes or systems could be traced back in time to the establishment of city-states in ancient Greece (Aristotle) to modern day typologies, especially after the third wave of democratisation. This classification clearly indicates that political regimes are diverse with different characteristics. Aristotle's makes a clear distinction between form of government (Kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, polity and democracy); who and how many rule (one, few or citizens as a whole); as well as in whose interests they rule (the common good, the ruler or their own good).

### **4.5.2 Cold War Era regime typology**

Although each state is unique with its own culture, history, economy and political system, classification thereof assists in identifying similar countries, different systems and as stated, the comparisons between countries. It however assists to examine the specific history and development of each country separately and more specifically to identify and analyse any transition or change in transition from one regime system to another. This is evident with the development of the “Three World Typology” utilised after WWII to classify political systems after the appearance of new forms of regimes. This typology initially started as the First and Second World order and lasted during the Cold War, to compare the political and ideological base of the countries referred to as the Western and Eastern Blocs (Heywood, 2013:269-270).

The typology was furthermore developed by adding the Third World concept derived from Sauvy who compares the different worlds with pre-revolutionary France as the term Third World in

reference to the exploited masses, with the First World reflecting the nobility (First World) and the Second World as the clergy (Kesselman, Kriegler & Joseph, 2013:25). With this addition the typology, the socio-economic dimension was added resulting in the division of the political world into three distinctive categories namely: (1) an industrialised capitalist democratic 'First World' encompassing western democratic regimes in Europe and the USA; (2) a largely industrialised communist non-democratic 'Second World' that entails the Soviet Union and allies as well as other communist regimes such as the PRC; and (3) a less-developing and unstable non-aligned 'Third World' consisting of mainly African, Asian and Latin-American countries. The ideological based divisions mainly focussed on the USA dominated western bloc against the Soviet dominated eastern bloc with less attention to the non-aligned rest of the world. This typology specifically lost its flavour with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and subsequently the end of the Cold War making the East - West Bloc division obsolete. The Three World Typology could be delineated as follows:

**Table 4: Three World regime typology**

<b><i>DIMENSIONS</i></b>	<b>FIRST WORLD</b>	<b>SECOND WORLD</b>	<b>THIRD WORLD</b>
Ideological	Capitalists	Communists	Non-aligned
Economic	Industrial/Developed	Fairly Industrial/Developed	Under-developed
Political	Democratic	Non-democratic	Un-stable Authoritarian Oligarchy Military Dictator
Geo-political	West Bloc Europe/USA	East Bloc Soviet Union/PRC	Africa/Latin- America/Asia

**Source: Own construct**

#### **4.5.3 Post-Cold War regime typology**


With the subsequent waves of democratisation and the end of the Cold War making existing classification redundant, a new typology was required to enable the classification of different regime types, especially for those that underwent regime change into new political orders. In addition, Dahl (1971:1-7), although in a much later classification than Aristotle, also reflects on polyarchy. In his classification two dimensions are defined in contrast namely contestation and participation. Basic civil liberties is included in his explanation of open and closed democracies which is portrayed as either a polyarchy (rule by few - inclusive hegemony) on the one hand, or an oligarchy (rule by many – closed hegemony) on the other. Within this context and similar to Aristotle, Heywood (2013:271) describes the following most commonly used criteria as parameters to regime classification namely: (1) Who Rules – Only an elite body or the entire

population?; (2) How is compliance achieved – through threat, force, bargaining or compromise?; (3) Is power centralised or fragmented – what kinds of checks and balances operate?; (4) How is power acquired and transferred – an open, competitive or monolithic regime?; (5) What is the balance between the state and individual – the distribution of rights and responsibilities between government and citizens?; (6) What is the level of material development – how affluent is society and how equally is wealth distributed?; (7) How is economic life organised – market orientated or central and what is the role of government?; and (8) How stable is the regime – can it survive over time and what is its ability to cope and respond to new demands and challenges?

In addition, on the issue of political regime typology, Diamond (2002:21) debates that the conceptual issue to be examined more closely is the challenge to explain and identify: "... what democracy is ... and is not". He states that there is no consensus on what constitutes democracy and we still struggle to classify ambiguous regimes. Furthermore, in the words of Dahl (1998: 1) and as supported by this study: "Today democracy is the dominating form of government in the world, its rivals have either disappeared, turned into eccentric survival, or retreated from the field to hunker down in their last strongholds". Therefore this study denotes that democratisation and the outcome of the process as either consolidated democracies; un-consolidated democracies, decayed or failed states and so-called hybrid regimes, specifically after the third wave of transition, clearly necessitates a relevant typology of regime types. Moreover, to be able to reconstruct of regime typology for contemporary application within political science and related fields of academic study, this study proposes the following; Firstly; that the different schools of thought and approaches to the study of transition needs to be considered in conceptualising applicable typologies ; and Secondly that regime change theory (inclusive of the pre-requisites to regime change, the different modes of transition and transition outcomes) also be included in such a conceptualisation. This entails the clear distinction between what should be regarded as democratic in order to determine what is also not democratic.

Indicative of such a classification of modern day political systems currently in the world is the latest index from Freedom House for 2015, 'Democracy in an age of anxiety'. This index identifies four types of regimes based on a range of indicators with their own categories. These regime types are classified as full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. Similarly, Hague and Harrop (2007:7) postulate that in today's world, governments could be classified as liberal democracies, authoritarian regimes or illiberal democracies. The latter refers to hybrid regime as the concept under examination within this study. As discussed, it is clear that these three regime types appear in the modern political world. These could also be described as consolidated democracies, non-democracies and those that are caught in the grey zone between democracies and non-democracies – classified as hybrid regimes (See Figure 2 as constructed by this study; "Trichotomy of Political Regime types to include a Hybrid regime"). This study therefore postulates a trichotomous typology for modern day political regimes

consisting of: (1) Consolidated Democracies; (2) Consolidated Non-democracies – inclusive of Authoritarian and Totalitarian regimes; and lastly (3) Hybrid political regimes. Even so, such a typology would also have a direct bearing on the type of intelligence practices present within each different regime type. Nevertheless, such a typology classifying political regimes as conceptualised by this study that will receive more detailed attention in the next chapter, is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 37: Classification of political regime types**


#### 4.6 Conclusion

The road towards democracy as indicated by history and comparative studies is however not an even or smooth road. This chapter aims to link the meta-scientific framework conceptualised within previous chapters to the study of regime change, democratisation, transition outcomes as well as political regime classification. Moreover, chapter four aims to conceptualise, reconstruct and contribute to the existing schools of thought, approaches as well as theory on regime change and transition, to continue to serve as a meta-theoretical and conceptualised roadmap to enable a deeper understanding of political phenomenon to be able to examine and understand intelligence and its practises.

Specific concepts such as state, government, regime change, transition pre-requisites, and transition modes are examined and addressed within this chapter. Attention is furthermore given to democratic transition and more so the different outcomes in failing to reach consolidation.

This attempt will furthermore enable this study to contribute to a meta-theorising of existing theories towards political regime classification as to provide for a new theory and theory building of the concept of a hybrid political regime in reference to many new regimes that have ended up 'getting stuck' in their road towards democratic consolidation. This is specifically relevant to the next chapter which aims to conceptualise political regimes within a democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political classification framework.

However, the main concepts and theoretical contributions to conceptualising, reconstructing and re-interpreting different political concepts such as state, government, political regime, regime change, transition outcomes and political regime typology as examined and conceptualised in chapter four, could be summarised in the following diagram:



Source: Own construct

Figure 38: A recapitulation of conceptualisation regime change outcomes and intelligence typology

This chapter also aims to reconstruct and re-interpret existing regime change and transition theories within the micro, meso and macro level, as to provide a deeper understanding and overarching new theory of political regime practices and characteristics as to be able to address the intelligence practices within. This enables the classification of different intelligence practices as epitomised by the different political regime types to enable the conceptualising of such practices in a hybrid political regime, as is the purpose of the next chapters.

This approach will enable this study to explore, describe and explain the characteristics and practices within different political regime types, as is the aim of the next chapter.



## CHAPTER 5: CONCEPTUALISING DEMOCRATIC, NON-DEMOCRATIC AND HYBRID POLITICAL REGIMES

*“... theory is evaluated... on the grounds of the comprehensiveness of the explanations it advances as well as the extent to which it provides for future research...”*

Imre Lakatos (1978).

### 5.1 Introduction

The three waves of democratisation and subsequent regime changes into diverse outcomes clearly direct the type of political regime that a state establishes, be it democratic or non-democratic. A fairly new phenomenon however is the non-consolidation of several countries in their transition towards democratic consolidation. More so as is found where the development of states in transition that are stuck in the so-called grey zone, where they subsequently end up as a hybrid political regime – neither as a consolidated democracy, nor as a consolidated non-democracy. Moreover, this trend where countries remain stuck within democratisation for lengthy periods of time into so-called hybrid political regimes requires further academic inquiry, as is also the purpose of this study. Furthermore, it is also relevant as reflected in the title and the aim of this study to explore, describe and explain characteristics and practices within democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime types, as to be able to operationalise the conceptualised theory within the South African context.


This chapter therefore aims to deal with an examination of current regime types as to identify and explore democratic and non-democratic intelligence practices within. Moreover, chapter five aims to conceptualise, reconstruct and re-interpret political regime theory from a trichotomous approach as to specifically include hybrid political regime types. Hence, as indicated within the meta-scientific framework for this study, this chapter builds on the conceptualisation of regime change and transition outcomes as investigated in the previous chapter. Such a conceptual framework approach enables further inquiry into and a deepened understanding of democratic and non-democratic concepts and practices as to contribute to existing theory and to develop new theory, specifically regarding the notion of a hybrid political regime that oscillates between a democracy and non-democracy.

Chapter five furthermore aims to give specific attention to the degree of governance and form of government within democracies, non-democracies and hybrid political regime types so as to be able to explore and examine the functions and practices within each. This necessitates further examining of the characteristics of specific political regime types as to be able to conceptualise intelligence theory in the context of these democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regimes, as is the aim of the next chapter. Furthermore, this chapter will assist this study in

achieving its main objective (as reflected in the title) to study intelligence in South Africa as a hybrid political regime, which will receive further attention within the next chapters.

## 5.2 Conceptualising political regime types and practices

In linking the conceptualising of political regime theory to the meta-scientific framework of this study, the following conceptual framework serves as a roadmap for this chapter, specifically in conceptualising the characteristics and practices within a hybrid political regime – as also reflected in the title of this thesis. This conceptual framework could be depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 39: A conceptual framework for the conceptualisation, reconstruction and re-interpretation of regime types and practices**

As discussed in the previous chapter and indicated in Figure 37, this study postulates a trichotomous typology to classify both the political regime that includes the notion of a hybrid political regime - it is furthermore necessary to explore and discuss how political regime types and their respective practices could be measured. This will enable this study to reconstruct, re-interpret and conceptualise a theory for practices within democratic, non-democratic and hybrid

regime types in order to contribute to a deepened understanding of intelligence theory as well as to develop new theory.

Albeit, the specific outcome of regime change or transition clearly determines the characteristics and specific practices within the political regime in terms of the form of government as well as the degree of governance, of which the latter is the most important political distinction among countries according to Huntington (1968:1). This brings the focus specifically on the capacity of the state to deliver goods and services to the people.

### **5.2.1 State capacity and degree of government**

Each political regime also displays different characteristics in its organisation and function to deliver on these goods and services within their bureaucracy or institutions. State capacity concerns the manner in which governments administrate. Thus it implies that which and what government is able to deliver through its public administration. It is furthermore, according to this study, also linked to the making of policy as well as then the implementation of those policies. Are these policies in the interests of citizens or not and are they effective in their outcomes – are the questions. Nonetheless, the concept of effective government or governance as linked to state capacity, also focusses on the institutions of the state which Buzan (1983:54) defines as the entire machinery of government, including its legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate.

Huntington (1968:1) furthermore asserts that the differences between regimes are in their efficiency or deficiency towards consensus, community, legitimacy, organisation, effectiveness and stability. This is supported by this study and as Van Den Berg (2014:66) also depicted, the size of the control of the trias politica as well as security, differs in different political regimes. This is furthermore indicated in the control of the state over civil society as depicted in the Weberian and Authoritarian state model in Figure 29 of this study. This model clearly indicates the size and control of government institutions involved in governing civil society. As already discussed, government is the means through which state power is implemented and distributed. This is indicative of the Weberian model of bureaucracy whereby it characterises the authority of the state over citizens and all actions within its territory through an administration and legal order. However, some political regimes therefore differ in terms of the power and authority of the state over civil society and the legitimate and effective functioning of state institutions in delivering goods and services to the people.

Moreover, the criteria discussed in the previous chapter used by various indexes (e.g. Worldwide Governance Indicator project, the Freedom Index, the Democracy Index, the Index of Economic Freedom and the Rainbow Index) and international institutions such as the World Bank and UN,

addresses the issue of good governance or effective government which include concepts such as the rule of law and legitimacy, human rights, accountability, independent judiciary, security sector reform, political stability, absence of violence, government effectiveness, control of corruption, government size and political participation.

Likewise, the UNDP (2014:5-9) indicated in a discussion paper on governance in practice should include areas such as: (1) Effective, responsive and accountable state institutions with a capacity or ability form and implement policy; (2) Openness and transparency – public access to information. Informed citizens and the private sector are better able to engage in developing policy; they are better collaborators and partners with government on service delivery, and also better able to hold governments to account, leading to improved development outcomes and transparency in budget, expenditure and procurement processes lead to increases in service delivery; (3) Addressing corruption and curbing illicit financial flows. Anti-corruption and wider transparency and accountability policies are associated with improved development outcomes such as education, health and water; (4) Justice and the Rule of Law. The rule of law is a principle of governance and is critical for sustainable development and countries adhering to the rule of law have higher levels of growth and investment through the protection of property rights. It promotes equity, gender equality, and inclusion and helps prevent and mitigate violent crime, resolve grievances, and protect citizens; (5) Participation in decision-making. Participation in policy development and the design of development interventions by communities and the society at large, in any society or community, enhances trust between those who decide, those who implement the decisions, and the population at large; and (6) Curbing violence and combating transnational organized crime. A state's ability to address these issues relies, at least in part, upon integrated service delivery from a range of public institutions, including through the provision of health, social and justice services.

Nonetheless, as Linz and Stepan (1996:2) state: "Without a state, there can be no citizenship, without citizenship, there could be no democracy." An effective state is crucial for state building and development. Likewise, Walder (1995:89) denotes that the survival and functioning of a political system in the modern world depends on four basic state capacities: (1) the extractive capacity - to mobilize financial resources from the society in the national interests of a country; (2) the steering capacity - to guide national socioeconomic development; (3) the legitimating capacity - to dominate by using symbols and creating consensus; and (4) the coercive capacity - to dominate by the use or threat of force. To this extent Tilly (2007:16) defines state capacity as the degree to which state agents interventions in existing non-state actors alter existing distribution of resources, activities and interpersonal connections.


High capacity states as also explained by Rotberg (2003:2-4) provide public goods and services such as security, health and medical care and infrastructure for human development whilst low

capacity states are limited in their ability to provide these goods. In addition, Buzan (1983:66-67) makes a distinction between weak and strong states and their application or focus on national security. Weak and strong states and their institutions are not based on the power they have (military and economic power within a region, international or as a super power), but rather linked to the class or category to which a state is classified. Strong states and their institutions focus more on national security in terms of protecting the components from outside threats and interference whereas the weak state has a high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government. Furthermore, Buzan (1983:58-59) asserts that governments can easily exploit the linkage between their own security and that of the state as to increase their own leverage over domestic politics and to increase their powers against domestic opponents.

Furthermore, Fukuyama (2004:92) claims that: "Since the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order". For Migdal (1988:264), a strong state has a high capability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and use resources in a determined way. A weak state thus stands in contradiction to this definition. Similarly, Rotberg (2003:2-3) maintains that a strong state indicates in its performance that it is effective in delivering crucial political goods to citizens that encompass expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions. In contrast, a weak state indicates its lack of performance and effectiveness to deliver on such goods to its citizens. Likewise, Geldenhuys (1999&2001) elucidates that within a weak state, state services are bound to suffer due to widespread corruption, political and bureaucratic incompetence, insufficient expertise and the serious lack of money as particularly evident in some African countries.

Equally, Duvenhage (2016:6) asserts (as supported by this study), that the Weberian state is the strong effective functional state in contradiction to the authoritarian or Hobbesian weak dysfunctional state concept. This variable or concept of weak and strong state is measured by its degree of government; as depicted in Figure 29 and in the matrix (Figure 30) of this study. All the same, the degree of government variable indicates the effectiveness of government and is viewed similarly to the concept of state capacity by this study and is furthermore based upon the discussions of Migdal (1988), Huntington (1965, 2006), Fukuyama (2004), Tilly (2007) and Duvenhage (1994 and 2016); as well as the various indexes (Worldwide Governance Indicator project, the Freedom Index, the Democracy Index and the Index of Economic Freedom Rainbow), as also discussed in the previous chapter.

The degree of government or state capacity variable is depicted by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 40: Degree of government/state capacity**

The form of government variable in the matrix depicted in Figure 30 requires further attention.


### 5.2.2 Form of government

Whereas degree of government or state capacity refers to effectiveness of government to govern, form of government refers to the specific form and system by which a state is controlled and organised. There are various systems integrated within a regime that include a social system, legal system, cultural system and economics. To this extent, Heywood (2013:272) also affirms that regimes are characterised not so much by particular economic, political or cultural factors as by the way in which these interlock in practice. One of the enduring questions in political science concerns how to classify political systems or regimes. As also discussed by this study, the typology of political regimes also underwent change and development since the classical classification of Aristotle which measures the number of people that rule against the objectives of government. Likewise, Huntington (1965) indicates that the degree of government is more important than the form of government although Huntington (1991:28) acknowledges that the latter is also relevant in terms of the crucial distinctions between democracy and dictatorship. Furthermore, Dahl (1963:7) argues that: “Whether one likes it or not, virtually no one is completely beyond the reach of some kind of political system. Equally, Easton (1965:57) claims that: “A political system is a set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of the social behaviour through which values are authority allocated for a society”. More so, Almond (*In Almond & Coleman, 1960:7*) promulgates the following definition of a political system as: “... that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaption (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion.

The political system is the legitimate, order maintaining or transforming system in the society.” Almond (*In Almond & Coleman, 1960:7-8*) adds that the political system has three sets of main properties namely: (1) comprehensiveness - that includes input and output functions and all political structures; (2) interdependence – a change in one subset of interactions like electoral reforms, produces change in all other subsets like in the function of parliament and cabinet; and (3) boundaries – there are points where other systems end and the political system begins. In similar fashion, Almond (*In Almond & Coleman, 1960:4-5*) adds that political systems differ radically in scale, structure and culture and as such different forms of government then display their own characteristics and size. These characteristics can range from contested elections and electoral behaviour to the extent that the executive applies political power. Characteristics such as political rights/human rights and civil liberties also come to the fore. Furthermore, some political systems even display certain sub-forms such as a praetorian form, patrimonialism and even neo-patrimonialism, which also require attention. Nonetheless, apart from the well-known features of contestation and inclusiveness, Dahl (1982:10-11) lists the following criteria for a political system: “(1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. (2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. (3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. (4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage. (5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the prevailing ideology. (6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. (7) To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interests groups.”

In addition, according to Dahl (1982:11), countries can be classified according to the extent to which their political institutions approximate these criteria that define specific regime types. Equally, Heywood (2013:271) prioritises a set of criteria on which the classification of a political system could be based, namely: Who rules? How is compliance achieved? Is government power centralised? How is power acquired and transferred? What is the balance between the state and the individual? What is the level of material development? How is economic life organised? And, how stable is a regime? However, this study also supports Almond (*In Almond & Coleman, 1960:11*) that argues that all political systems have four characteristics in common that could also be used for comparison namely: (1) All political systems have political structures that could also be used to compare each other according to the degree and form of structural specialisation; (2) The same functions are performed in all political systems although their structure, style and frequency could differ, which could also be used for comparison; (3) All political systems are multifunctional and lastly; (4) All political systems are mixed systems in terms of cultures and

structures. Apart from these characteristics the size and power of the trias politica (executive, judiciary and legislative) as well as how the political regime structures its government, is also relevant within the feature of the form of a government. However, the most relevant characteristics of a political regime discussed as well as the measuring criteria listed in the indexes such as the Worldwide Governance Indicator Project, the Freedom Index, the Democracy Index and the Rainbow Index as relevant to the form of government, are delineated by this study as follows:




Source: Own construct

**Figure 41: Features and characteristics of form of government**

This constitutes the variable of Form of Government in the matrix discussed and depicted in Figure 30 of this study. This matrix is useful to measure and categorise regime types for the purposes of this study. However, although normally dominant as democracy and non-democracy regime types, this study postulates the notion of a threefold typology of form of government as indicated in Figure 2, namely; democratic, hybrid and non-democratic regime types. The latter is further sub-divided into authoritarian regimes on the one hand and totalitarian regimes on the other. This matrix also makes provision for the regime change outcomes discussed and forwarded by this study to include democratisation or regime transition towards democracy as a 'new democracy' on the one hand and state failure as such, on the other. In addition this study deems it appropriate to further adapt the matrix of Form of Government and State capacity/Degree of Government, to include the notion of a hybrid political regime. As discussed in the previous chapter, the notion of a hybrid political regime accommodates those countries that 'entered the



grey zone' and got stuck during their transition towards democratic consolidation. Moreover, this enables this study not only to measure the different regime types, but also serves to place and categorise their respective intelligence practices. The concept of a hybrid is central to this study and will receive more detailed attention later in this chapter. Even so, this study proposes the adaption of the matrix developed to measure political regimes and depicted in Figure 30; as to include the notion of a hybrid political regime, as follows:



Source: Adapted construct

**Figure 42: Adapted matrix of state capacity and form of government**

These forms of government however, require further attention.

### 5.3 Conceptualising democratic political regime practices

This study aims to conceptualise democracy as a political regime practice within the framework of its definition, nature, forms and types, principles, features and characteristics, as follows:

#### 5.3.1 Defining democracy

There are numerous definitions for a democratic political system or regime within the theory. This study however follows the minimalistic, narrow and more focussed approach to definitions as opposed to a maximum wide and comprehensive approach. Minimalism is described in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as a technique that is characterised by extreme sparseness and simplicity as indicated within the Schumpeterian tradition. Within this context, Schumpeter

(2003:269) defines democracy as: "... that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". Similarly within this tradition, Huntington (1993:70) defines a democratic political system as: "... democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates clearly compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote".

In addition, Dahl (1971:2-9) uses the concept polyarchy to describe democracy in terms of contestation and participation. Equally, Przeworski (1991:10) defines democracy as: "... a system in which parties lose elections." In adding to these definitions, Lipset and Lakin (2004:19) define a democratic political system as: "An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair and competitive elections, for their chief executive and national legislature." Likewise, Diamond and Morlino (2004:21) claim that a minimal definition for democracy include four criteria namely: (1) universal adult suffrage; (2) recurring free, competitive and fair elections; (3) have more than one serious political party; and (4) have alternative sources of information.

To summarise, in the words of Schmitter and Karl (*In* Diamond & Plattner, 2009:4): "Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives".

### **5.3.2 Nature of a democratic political regime**

The nature of the concept of a democratic political regime, is derived from the Greek roots of the word *Demokratia* – *demos* meaning the people and *kratos* meaning authority/'rule' (Jackson & Jackson, 1997:76). It is therefore the rule of the people, by the people for the people, as conceptualised by this study in the model for a consolidated democracy delineated in Figure 35.


### **5.3.3 Democratic political regime forms and types**

For clarification purposes this study makes a distinction between form and type of government. Form of government refers to the broad form of political system whereas type of government includes the structure of those governments in answering the question how they rule. Form of government focusses on the political participation of citizens. Two basic forms of democracy are identified within the academic literature namely Direct or Classical democracy on the one hand and Indirect or Representative form, on the other. A Direct democracy is based on the ancient rule in Athens and is described as an unmediated and continuous participation of citizens in the

task of government as a system of popular self-government (Heywood, 2013:92), of which Switzerland is a modern day example. Most commonly citizen's participation centre on voting.

Albeit, Beramendi ed. et al (2008:9-10), describe in the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Handbook '*Direct Democracy*' four separate mechanisms or applications for direct democracy namely: (1) Referendums - as a legally binding procedure and direct vote by a governing body or citizens on a specific political, constitutional or legislative issue; (2) Citizens initiatives - is also a legally binding process to allow the electorate to vote on a political, constitutional or legislative measure proposed by a number of citizens and not by a political authority or government through the gathering of signatures in support of a proposal; (3) Agenda initiatives – a procedure without a popular vote whereby a particular issue is placed on the agenda of a parliament or legislative assembly specified through a minimum number of signatures by the legislature; and lastly (4) Recall – is a procedure that allows the electorate to vote on whether to end the term of office of an elected official in public office through signatures. Other forms of political participation include protests, rallies, boycotts and demonstrations. Verba and Nie (1972:1) declare, that where few participate in decisions there is little democracy and the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is.


Albeit, indirect or representative democracy refers to a limited and restricted form of government as the public do not exercise power themselves as they select those who will rule on their behalf for a restricted time period (Heywood, 2013:92), such as the case in the USA and France. A representative democracy is sometimes referred to as a republic usually with a president as the elected head of state. Heywood (2013:92) adds that the strength of a representative democratic system includes the following: (1) It offers a practicable form of democracy; (2) Ordinary citizens are not burdened with political decision-making; (3) It allows government in the hands of those with better education, expertise and experience; and (4) It maintains stability and encourages compromise by citizens. Equally, Diamond (1999:10) adds that an electoral democracy has universal suffrage and competitive multi-party elections. Democratic political regime types appear in different variants that include a presidential system, a parliamentary system, a constitutional monarchy, mixed system and a liberal or constitutional democracy system. The key aspect within the different systems is the role, power and function of the trias politica or legislative, judiciary and executive. Heywood (2013:288-293) explains that within a *presidential democratic system*, the president is the formal head of state and in some cases also the head of government. The executive power is in the hands of the president and his cabinet as voted by the electorate and therefore the executive does not answer to the legislative branch of government. As the electorate vote for the president for a specific term and as such, the legislative cannot remove the president from office. The weakness of this system is the power of the president which could expose authoritarian tendencies. A presidential government system as an indirect/representative democracy and is delineated by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 43: Presidential democratic system of governance**

A *parliamentary democracy* entails a legislative body that occupies the key position in a government. Within this system parliament chooses the chief executive and the cabinet is also formed from members of parliament. Such a parliamentary system is delineated as follows:




Source: Own construct

**Figure 44: Parliamentary democratic system of governance**

The executive is at all times accountable to parliament who in turn is elected through the vote of the electorate. Most liberal democracies have some or other form of parliamentary system. The weakness of this system is that the majority vote in parliament controls policy-making and could restrict certain individual rights. In some cases the chief executive is a prime-minister as head of government with a president as head of state as a mere figurehead and in other instances the prime-minister could occupy both positions (Heywood, 2013:305-329). A *constitutional monarchy* is defined as a system of government in which a monarch as head of state shares the power within a constitutionally organised government. Britain, Belgium, Cambodia and Netherlands are examples of such systems (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). A *mixed system* displays a combination of the different types of democratic political regimes. A *liberal democratic government or constitutional political system* however entails that the constitution serves as the point of departure for the legislative, judiciary and executive. Such a political system is constitutionally bound. Danziger (2009:167) defines the concept of a liberal democracy as a

political system where the citizens enjoy not only electoral democracy but more extensive political rights and civil liberties regarding participation, personal freedoms and opposition.

Moreover, Diamond (1999:10) defines a liberal democracy as a: "... civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive officers are filled through regular, competitive multiparty elections with universal suffrage". This study however adds the principle whereby all are bound by the constitution. Although the majority rules within democratic principles, a constitution protects the rights of minorities as based on human rights and the rule of law, as also is the case in South Africa as reflected in the Bill of Rights Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa Constitution Act of 1996:1245-1267). A constitutional democratic system is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 45: Constitutional democratic system of governance**

To conclude, as relevant to the current political system in South Africa, this study summarises a liberal democratic type of government as a representative system whereby elected officials represent the people in the executive and legislative based on a constitution as supreme law, human rights and the rule of law.

#### **5.3.4 Fundamental principle, features and characteristics of a democratic political system.**

As already discussed, the root form of the word democracy implies rule by the people, this concept implies two principal elements as part of the political system namely the system of rule and government on the one hand and on the other people or individuals as civil society. This argument is supported by Linz (1997:118), who wrote a heading that states: "No State, No Rechtsstaat, No Democracy" and by Almond and Verba (1989:124), who explain that the balanced involvement and commitment of citizens in politics: "... is needed for a successful democracy... ". This study therefore suggests that these two elements be regarded as the fundamental principles of a

democratic political system as also depicted in the model of a Weberian state (Figure 29) as based on rule of law and freedom/civil liberties.

Political system or political regime is the form of government and system of rule. However, the concept of a democratic political regime entails several characteristics or features whereby any other type of government can be evaluated upon. These characteristics of a democratic government as also supported by this study are defined as a: “Representative and limited government operating through law provides an accepted framework for political competition. Regular elections based on near universal suffrage are free and fair. Individual rights including freedom of expression and association are respected” (Hague & Harrop, 2013:8). To this extent, Diamond (2004:1) described four key elements of a democracy during a lecture “*What is Democracy?*” namely:

- A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections;
- The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life;
- Protection of the human rights of all citizens and lastly;
- A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.

In addition, Diamond and Morlino (2004:22-23) explain that democracy has eight dimensions of quality namely: (1) Rule of law; (2) Participation; (3) Competition; (4) Vertical accountability; (5) Horizontal accountability; (6) Freedom; (7) Equality; and (8) Responsiveness. Grugel (2002:68) adds some characteristics of a democratic state which includes: territorial integrity, rule of law, minimum use of sanctioned violence against its own citizens, elected and representative government formally controlled by constitutional channels of accountability, a complex impartial bureaucracy, multiple centres of power, formal channels of access to decision-making and commitment to social and economic justice. Likewise, the UN General Assembly adopted the following essential elements of a democracy which is declared as follows: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and of expression and opinion, and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic free elections by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the people, as well as a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, transparency and accountability in public administration, and free, independent and pluralistic media (UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/59/201, 2005:1-2). In addition Van Den Berg (2014:57) lists the following as crucial elements within a liberal democracy:

- A clear distinction between State and Civil society;

- Regular free and fair contested elections through which political leaders are appointed;
- Accountability of political leaders;
- Adherence to the Rule of Law; and
- Freedom and Human Rights.

A constitutional state is a Rechtsstaat with the rule of law, human rights and freedom for its citizens that presumes good effective governance through state bureaucracy and institutions. It furthermore implies that the executive, legislative and judiciary as well as the security institutions - which include intelligence – are balanced and managed according to the principles of the constitution. Other features or characteristics relevant to this study are the indices of various indexes used to measure and indicate democracy and/or non-democracy. These include Polity IV, Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit's indexes. Freedom House (<http://www.freedomhouse>) measures freedom based on political rights and civil liberties, through checklists. The political rights checklist measures Electoral Process; Political Pluralism and Participation; Functioning of Government; and Political Rights Questions. The civil liberties checklist consists of: Freedom of Expression and Belief; Associational and Organizational Rights; Rule of Law; Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. Data from these two checklists are combined into country status ratings ranging from free, partly free, and not free.

Likewise, Polity IV (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>) measures political regime characteristics and transitions through a ten-point democracy scale by coding the competitiveness of political participation (1-3), the competitiveness of executive recruitment (1-2), the openness of executive recruitment (1), and the constraints on the chief executive (1-4). Autocracy is measured by negative versions of the same indices. The two scales are combined into a single democracy-autocracy score varying from -10 to +10. In addition as discussed, the Economist Intelligence Unit (<http://www.economist.com/markets/rankings>) measures: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Countries are rated for each of those categories and scored as: full democracies (overall scores from 8 to 10), flawed democracies (6 to 7.9), hybrid regimes (4 to 5.9), and authoritarian regimes (less than 4).


All the same, Diamond (1999:11-12) listed eleven components of a constitutional democracy as also linked to the criteria discussed that is used by Freedom House in their ratings of countries.

These components are also postulated by this study and are as follows:

- Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies with elected officials with the military subordinate to this authority;

- The constitution, independent judiciary, parliament and other accountable measures constrain the power of the executive;
- Party alternation in government and uncertain electoral outcomes with significant opposition vote with universal suffrage and participation are presumed;
- Cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority and previous disadvantaged majority groups are not prohibited to participate in the political process or to practice their culture and speak their language;
- Citizens have freedom from and join diverse independent associations and movements to express and represent their interests and values;
- Independent media and alternative sources of information that allows unfettered citizen access;
- Individual freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition;
- Political equality under law for all citizens;
- Independent non-discriminatory judiciary which protect individual and group liberties;
- Citizens are protected by the rule of law from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture from the state or organised non-state or anti-state forces; and lastly
- Democracy requires a constitution that is supreme.

However, this study depicts a constitutional democratic political regime as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 46: A model for a constitutional democratic political regime**

This brings the focus on non-democratic political systems and their features and practices.



## **5.4 Conceptualising non-democratic political regime practices**

Likewise in conceptualising democratic political regime practices, non-democratic political regime practices are also examined within the framework of its definition, nature, forms and types, principles, features and characteristics.

### **5.4.1 Defining non-democracies**

In comparison to the root form of the word democratic meaning rule by the people, the non-prefix to the word non-democracy implies not or non-adherence to the rule by the people or more so non adherence to the principles and practices of democracy. It furthermore implies that it does not meet all the criteria of a democracy. This is in line with the argument of Linz (2000:49) that one of the easiest ways to define a concept is to say what it is not. He argues furthermore, as also supported by this study, that non-democratic political systems share at least one characteristic, that of not being as described within the definition of democracy (Linz, 2000:51). However, this study furthermore postulates the notion that these regime types share another characteristic with democratic regime types in so far as that both are viewed to be consolidated for purposes of this research. In addition, the main feature of democracy is reflected in the freedom of choice by the people as to select or remove governing representatives through free and fair contested elections. This is notably absent within non-democracies. This brings attention to the forms of non-democracies.

### **5.4.2 Forms of non-democracies - authoritarian and totalitarian**

However, non-democracies are divided by this study into two separate forms as indicated within the regime typology, namely: authoritarian political regimes on the one hand and totalitarian political regimes, on the other. The Oxford Dictionary (2014) defines authoritarian as enforcing strict obedience to authority at the expense of personal freedom. Authoritarianism is a government from above which emphasizes the claim of authority over those of individual liberty (Heywood, 2013:277). Polity IV (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>) describes autocracies as regimes which restrict or suppress competitive political participation, in which the chief executive is chosen from within the political elite, and, once in office, leaders face few institutional constraints on their power. Likewise, Linz (2000:159) defines authoritarian regimes as: "Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones." An autocratic political regime could also be defined in line with the notion what they are not.

The concept totalitarian is defined in the Oxford Dictionary (2014) as: “Relating to a system of government that is centralized and dictatorial and requires complete subservience to the state.” According to Heywood (2013:269), totalitarianism differs from authoritarianism in so far as that it seeks to politicise every aspect of social and personal existence as an all-encompassing system of political rule based on pervasive ideological manipulation and terror”. It is sometimes referred to as fascism as explained by Brooker (2000:8) in reference to Mussolini’s description of: “... everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State”. State communism or Bolshevism and Nazism or National Socialism as totalitarianism, is included by Arendt (1973:419). She adds that the goal of this form of government is: “... the permanent domination of each single individual and every sphere of life”, (Arendt, 1973:326). National domination is only a prelude for the ultimate goal of world domination as Arendt (1973:392) states: “The struggle for total domination of the total population of the earth, the elimination of every non totalitarian reality, is inherent in the totalitarian regimes themselves ...” To this extent this study supports the definition forwarded by Scruton (2006:146) with the focus on the absence of authority constraints and control namely: “Totalitarian government is a government of centralised power structure, which is neither limited by law nor self-limited by a constitution, and which extends into every aspect of social life”.

#### **5.4.3 Nature and types of non-democracies**

The nature of an autocratic political system is forwarded by this study as a political system which is not in adherence to the minimalistic definitions of a democracy as discussed in this research and postulated by Dahl (1971), Huntington (1993), Przeworski (1991) and Diamond (2004), as political regimes that lack universal suffrage, free, fair and competitive elections, do not have more than one serious political part and the rule of law and human rights are restricted. Furthermore, the nature of a totalitarian political regime lies in it as an extreme version of authoritarianism where total political control by the state over the individual is unrestricted, un-controlled and against the concepts of rule of law and human rights.

According to Geddes (1999:122), different types of authoritarian regimes differ as much from each other as what they differ from democracy. Although similar to other regimes in that politics in authoritarian regimes involves factionalism, competition and struggle, it is competition that takes on different forms with different outcomes. Huntington (1991:110) claims that the regimes that moved to and toward democracy in the third wave generally fell into three groups: one-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships. Nonetheless, in following Huntington, Geddes (1999:122-123 and 2003:50--53) describes authoritarian regime types as personalist, military and single-party types. She explains that in military regimes a group of officers decide who rules and exercises influence over policy whereas in single-party regimes, access to political office and control over policy is dominated by one party – even with the existence of other parties.

Personalist regimes differ as access to the political office depends on the discretion of an individual leader which could include a dictator. This leader controls the military, state apparatus and the main political party – if there is one and such a regime type could even include patrimonial rule (Geddes, 2003:60).

To this extent Hadenius and Teorell (2006:5) add monarchies as a type of autocracy as those regimes in which a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice or the constitution. In their adapted version of Geddes' typology, Hadenius and Teorell (2006:5-8) classify party regimes into three types namely: (1) The no-party regime has elections but all parties are prohibited with competition only amongst individual candidates; (2) One-party regimes has only one party that takes part in elections as any other are forbidden; and (3) Limited multi-party regimes holds parliamentary or presidential elections in which some candidates are able to participate independently from the ruling regime and even if opposition parties voluntarily refrain from participating in elections. Elections are not free and fair. Equally, Huntington (*In* Huntington & Moore, 1970:5-38) describes authoritarian politics as a one party system that is either revolutionary in nature, exclusionary or an established one party system which evolved from a revolutionary system. This party is the only effective party as other parties have little effect on the course of events.

Nonetheless, a theocracy is also added as a minor type of authoritarian regime type by Hadenius and Teorell (2006:8) and is described as where the decisive political power lies in the hands of religious elite. Moreover, Bratton and Van De Walle (1994:458) place neo-patrimonialism as a personalist authoritarian political regime type that they argue is a distinctive hallmark of African regimes. They describe this regime as where the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather than ideology and law. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and bureaucratic office for personal wealth and status rather than for public service. Personal favours include public sector jobs and contracts, licences and projects within society. In return for these rewards all decisions are referred upwards and political support is mobilised to patrons.

This type of system also focuses on the role of the cadre or member of the party in power in reference to preferential treatment and employment. Within cadre deployment party loyalists are deployed within government institutions as to implement and extend party policies on the one hand as well as to create reporting lines to and from party leaders, on the other. Senior or top officials are sometimes bypassed through this system either due to their lower position to other cadres in the department or because they are not regarded as party loyalists. In building of this concept, Erdman and Engel (2006:18) define neo-patrimonialism as a mixture of two partly interwoven types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. They explain that: "Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled,

political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm... Neo-patrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or “modern” stateness.” (Erdman and Engel, 2006:18).

However, the focus here is on the autocratic style of the party leader or power elite and the prevention of political participation in policy making by citizens labelled as not loyal to the party. Power is situated within the realm of the ruler who makes decisions and is so accepted by the loyal supporters. Power is not shared and the ruler benefits and reaps the results of this system. Furthermore, power remains in the hands of a small elite or even the leader. As depicted in Figure 29 of this study, the state controls and rules over civil society of which the latter has limited freedom. The freedom of choice to contest or create political parties as opposition to the ruling party is either restricted and limited or even non-existent. Examples of authoritarian states include Cuba, Venezuela, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Within the initial theoretical discussions on totalitarianism, a distinction was made between Fascism, Nazism and the Communist Bolshevism with the later inclusion of Chinese Maoism (Brooker, 2000:11 and Linz, 2000:25-32) to reflect mainly ideological based personalist dictatorships. Linz (2000:30) adds the concept of neo-totalitarianism not as a new typology but rather to describe and explain totalitarianism and transition or regime change within such states specifically after the end of the Cold War era. The concept of sultanistic regimes that are also explained as a totalitarian regime type, is described by Linz (2000:150-155) as where loyalty to the leader is based on a mixture of fear and rewards by his collaborators and where the ruler exercises power at his own discretion without restraint or encumbered by any rules, ideology or value system. Within this system the value system or ideology is projected as the supreme law and citizens must abide unconditionally. Rulers however implement autonomous laws to further their own political goals that are not necessarily in the interests or to the benefit of the people. The control and authority of government extends to civil society in that public lives have limited or even no freedom. This is depicted by this study in Figure 29. Civil society is small and state organs and institutions are big specifically in comparison to democracies and even non-democracies. Ideology remains everything.

Originally described by Weber, the lack of constraint within authoritarian regimes distinguishes sultanistic regimes from patrimonialism. Although there were changes within the former Soviet Union after the demise of the Cold war, Schapiro (1972:117) argues that totalitarianism’s main focus as an ever-present total control regime over the individual, still remains and therefore does not make this regime type obsolete – even for modern times today. This study postulates that several regimes today could be classified as such is the case in North Korea, The People’s Republic of China, Iraq and even political systems within the Muslim Extremist Caliphate ISIL.

To conclude, non-democratic forms of government denote the opposite to democratic forms founded on the principle of a form or type of government which is by the people, of the people and for the people. Within such non-democratic forms of government the people are ruled by few and even dictators or ideology. Violence is often used as a legitimate tool to control and rule and to eliminate any possible opposition to the state, leader or ideology. Citizens enjoy limited or restricted freedom, liberty or equality. Political participation is restricted and civil society is dominated by rule and control from the power elite. Whereas the constitution is supreme law in a liberal democracy, the leader or political party is considered to be the supreme law and sometimes even acts above the law.

#### **5.4.4 Fundamental principles, characteristics and features of non-democratic political systems**

The fundamental principles of non-democratic political systems are central in an Aristotelian classification of political regime types as also reflected in the classical diagram of Dahl (1971:7), both which define a democracy or polyarchy as rule by many in contrast or opposition to an oligarchy, which implies rule by few - as indicative of a small elite group which has all the power, control and authority; even over most of civil society. Order and control is valued over liberty and individual freedom. Policies are dictated and forced upon citizens that have limited political participation in decision-making. Mobilisation of the masses is the order of the day rather than political participation. The difference between authoritarian and totalitarian political regimes in this regard is that the latter presumes total power over the individual by the leader of government which is in most cases a dictator. Totalitarian as discussed is: "All within the state, none outside the state, and none against the state". In this concept the state is all.

As many regimes in the real world according to Geddes (2003:72-73) have characteristics of more than one regime type and move from one category to another over time. The predominant characteristics however prevail in order to characterise such a regime. Geddes nonetheless describes the features of authoritarian regimes as:

- a military regime is governed by an officer or retired officer with the support of the military establishment which includes senior officers in senior government positions;
- in single party regimes, the party has some influence over policy and control most access to political power and government jobs and display functioning local-level organisations, whereas; and
- in a personalist regime type, the leader marginalises and influences others and the party and has consolidated control over policy and recruitment.

However, regarding regime change and the survival of these types of authoritarian regimes, Geddes (2003:69) explains that military regimes do not survive long and are more quickly destabilised by poor economic performance and are more likely to end in negotiations to be followed by a competitive form of government. On the other hand, personalist regimes are more likely to end when the dictator dies or in popular uprising, rebellion, armed insurgency, invasion or other kinds of violence and more likely to be followed by a new form of authoritarianism, whereas single party regimes last on average the longest. In addition, Linz (2000:159 and 1964:255) and Linz and Stepan (1996:48-49) describe the features of authoritarian regimes as:

- Pluralism: having limited political pluralism;
- Ideology: with distinctive mentalities or ideology;
- Mobilisation: without intensive political mobilization; and
- Leadership: in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power and has some autonomy over state careers and the military.

Moreover, the measurements as discussed and used by the various indexes to measure freedom, democracy and non-democracy are also to be included as part of the characteristics of authoritarian political systems. Likewise, as also postulated by this study, although authoritarian states are perceived to be consolidated political regimes, they are not consolidated democracies and do not adhere to the set of criteria for a consolidated democracy as described by Diamond (1999:11-12), nor to the various indices measuring democracy as discussed in this study.

A totalitarian political regime shares the characteristic of being regarded as a consolidated political system with that of authoritarian and democratic systems. Another feature shared with authoritarian political regimes is its non-adherence to the principles of the rule of law, human rights and freedom. According to Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965:22), totalitarian political regimes all possess the following features namely:

- An elaborate ideology as official doctrine characterised and projected to a perfect final state of mankind, covering all vital aspects of existence to which all in society must adhere;
- A single mass party led by a dictator and that is hierarchal and oligarchic and superior to government;
- A system of terror effective through the party and control of the secret police directed against enemies of the regime not supporting the party and its leaders;
- A technological and near complete monopoly of control by the party and government of mass media;
- Similar monopoly over the effective use of all weapons of armed combat; and

- Central control and direction of the entire economy through bureaucratic coordination of corporate entities, associations and group activities.


Schapiro (1972) discusses similar features in his book *Totalitarianism* as so-called contours which include the leader, the subjugation of the legal order, control over private morality, continuous mobilisation and legitimacy based on mass support that are all rested on the three pillars named as (1) ideology; (2) party; and (3) the administrative machinery of the state. Similarly, Gill (1998:52) describes that Stalinism or totalitarianism consists of the following features:

- A formalised highly centralised directive economic system that is characterised by mass mobilisation and heavy industrial development;
- a social structure with a dominance of rank, status and hierarchy;
- a cultural and intellectual sphere meant to serve the political aims of the leadership;
- a personal dictatorship resting on the use of terror as an instrument of rule;
- all spheres of life are politicised and within the scope of the state;
- centralised authority; and
- the initial revolutionary ethos is superseded by a conservative status quo.

Likewise, Linz (2000:70) argues that a system is considered totalitarian when the following characteristics apply:

- There is a monistic centre of power as a political creation;
- an exclusive autonomous elaborate ideology that goes beyond any definition of boundaries to provide some ultimate interpretation of social reality; and
- citizen participation and active mobilisation for political and social collective tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded and channelled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups.

Nonetheless, a model for non-democratic political regimes which reflects both authoritarian and totalitarian systems is depicted by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 47: A model for non-democratic political regimes**

### 5.5 Conceptualising practices within new democracies and in failed states

New democracies are perceived by the conceptual framework of this study, as political regimes in transition or within democratisation from non-democratic systems towards the end goal of democratic consolidation. As discussed in the previous chapter, these regimes as such, are still in a process of change and reform; they display features of both their former regime as well as that of a democracy. Moreover, as discussed by this study, a failed state is not an effective and efficient functioning state and it could be argued if it should be labelled as a state. Nonetheless, within the description and explanation provided by this study of a failed state, security and the intelligence sector as machinery of the political regime, cease to function nationally. This study furthermore denotes that a failed state is neither a consolidated democratic nor a non-democratic regime as such and its regime features are linked to the little governance that remains. Within this vacuum where there is a breakdown of sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial control, intelligence functions cease to exist and private and rogue intelligence structures feature. In addition, Lowenthal (2014:340) argues that different failed states display different attributes in varying degrees. He lists the attributes of failed states as:

- the state is no longer deemed legitimate by its own people;
- a faltering economy and collapsed public service;
- factionalism of popular and significant groups;
- various social factors or crisis that leads to displacement of the population; and
- a largely independent security apparatus with suspension of basic rights



These states, as Lowenthal (2014:341) furthermore asserts, are a magnet for groups that would prefer to operate in an area where there is little law enforcement - terrorists, criminals, narcotics dealers, human traffickers, and even WMD proliferators. This however, shifts the focus to the notion of hybrid political system as postulated by and central to this study.

## **5.6 Conceptualising practices within a hybrid political regime**

This study aims to conceptualise hybrid political regime practices within a similar framework as applied to democratic and non-democratic political regime practices. For this purpose the definition, nature, forms and types, principles, features and characteristics of hybrid political regimes is addressed as follows:

### **5.6.1 Defining a hybrid political regime**

The term hybrid regimes found its way to political regime types after the waves of democratisation or transition with the phenomenon where some countries did not reach either democratic consolidation or revert back to a non-democratic regime type. In some instances it includes countries that de-democratise. As discussed in this study and explained by Carothers (2002:2) these political regime types entered the grey zone where they are stuck. In addition Diamond (2002:23) argues that they will remain there for a long time. Van Den Berg (2014:62) explains that a hybrid regime is in the middle between a democracy and a non-democracy. Nonetheless, different terminologies are used to define this type of state ranging from pseudo democracies (Diamond, 2002:21-25); partial democracies (Epstein et al, 2006:551-569); illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 1997:22-43); democracies with adjectives (Collier & Levitsky, 1997:430-451); electoral democracies (Diamond, 2002:25); defective democracies (Merkel, 2004:33-58 and Bogaards, 2009:399-423); competitive authoritarianisms (Levitsky & Way, 2002:51-65). Various indexes define this type of regime as either flawed democracies or hybrid regimes (Intelligence Unit-Democracy Index), semi-consolidated regimes which are partly free (Freedom House) and autocracies (Polity IV).

Moreover, Karl (1995:72-86) and Morlino (2008:1-16) prefer the concept of a hybrid political regime, as also postulated by this study, as better suited to describe this type of political system. The word hybrid already denotes a fusion, amalgam or a mix of some sorts. The Cambridge dictionary defines it as: "something that is a mixture of two very different things". Morlino (2008:3) describes a hybrid regime as a form of government effectively trapped between a non-democratic set-up and a democratic one. While it no longer belongs to some kind of non-democracy, they still bear traces of that regime and do not yet form a complete democracy. Menocal, Fritz and Rakner (2008:29-40) explain hybrid regimes as to have come to occupy the precarious middle ground between outright authoritarianism and fully fledged democracy with fragile democratic

structures. Equally, Karl (1995:73) defines a hybrid political system as a peculiar mix of autocratic and democratic features.

Likewise, Gilbert and Mohseni (2011:281) define hybrid regimes as non-democratic, non-authoritarian regimes to be conceptualised on their own. Similarly, Linde (2009:1) explains that hybrid regimes as a new political system, are where formal democratic institutions such as multi-party elections, co-exist with a political reality characterised by authoritarian practices and frequent abuses of state resources. Morlino (2011:56) defines a hybrid regime as: "... a set of institutions that have been persistent, be they stable or unstable, for about a decade, have been preceded by an authoritarianism, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy and are characterized by the break-up of limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but the absence of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy." However, as these types of regimes are not stable in having both democratic and non-democratic features at interplay at any given moment (Diamond, 2002:33 and Levitsky & Way, 2002:59), hybrid regimes are also postulated by this study to oscillate between democracy and non-democracy.

### **5.6.2 Nature of a hybrid political regime**

As a hybrid political regime as defined above displays both democratic and non-democratic features, this study denotes that the nature of such a regime is three-fold, namely:

- It reflects flawed democratic regime features in the principle of rule by the people;
- similarly a hybrid political regime displays flawed non-democratic regime features in context of rule by few; and
- a hybrid political regime oscillates between democratic and non-democratic principles.

### **5.6.3 Forms and types of hybrid political regimes**

This study views a hybrid political system as a mix between democracy and non-democracy that continuously oscillates between these two regime types. It would therefore display mixed forms of political systems with flaws and missing features ranging from representative or direct democracies. These governments even appear as republics with different sizes and forms of the executive, judiciary and legislative and even with or without a constitution. A hybrid political system could simultaneously display forms of non-democratic governments ranging from personalist, military, single-party, sultanistic, theocracy, monarchy, dictatorships and even neo-patrimonial forms.

Many different types of hybrid political regimes are described within the theory. Merkel (2004:49-50) explains that there are four types of defective democracies namely:

- Exclusive democracy – segments of adult citizens are excluded from the civil right of universal suffrage;
- Domain democracy – if the military, guerrillas, militia, entrepreneurs, landlords or multinational corporations take certain political domains out of the hands of democratically elected representatives;
- Illiberal democracy – as an incomplete and damaged constitutional state the executive and legislative control of the state are only weakly limited by the judiciary; and
- Delegative authority - the legislature and judiciary have limited control over the executive branch.

If transition from authoritarian rule does not end up as a democracy, it could produce either a liberalised authoritarian regime or ‘dictablanda’ on the one hand; or a restrictive illiberal democracy or ‘democradura’ on the other (Diamond, 2002:24).

Likewise Bogaards (2009:399-223), describes a defective democracy in contrast to an electoral authoritarian regime as hybrid political regime types. Ekman (2009:26) follows a more pragmatic approach and defines three types of hybrid political regimes; post authoritarian hybrid political regimes, post-communist hybrid political regimes and post-democratic hybrid political regimes. Collier and Levitsky (1997:431-440) mentioned that hundreds of subtypes have appeared that include authoritarian democracy, neo-patrimonial democracy, military-dominated democracy and proto-democracy. These regimes are diminished subtypes with missing attributes such as full suffrage, full contestation, civil liberties and elected government.

This study nonetheless postulates that there are no subtypes of hybrid regimes. This study argues, that in a linear typology approach to regime types (as indicated in Figure 2 of this study), an imaginative line divides hybrid political regimes into two different dominant features but not necessarily two types. On the one hand more democratic features are displayed, while on the other more non-democratic features are present.

However, it is vital to note that a hybrid political regime is not regarded as rigid or stagnant as it is argued that it continuously oscillates between the two sides and could sometimes display less democratic features and more non-democratic, or the reverse, more democratic with less non-democratic characteristics. All the same, as postulated by this research, a hybrid political regime type will also oscillate between typical democratic and non-democratic regime types – due to its inherent nature.

#### 5.6.4 Fundamental principles, features and characteristics of hybrid political regimes

As a hybrid regime is a political system that oscillates between democracy and non-democracy, it displays diminished and flawed human rights and adherence to the rule of law and its government will also be defective in its rule of the people. A hybrid political regime is a permanent feature and as discussed in this study, hybrid regimes are not regarded as states in transition. After transition and getting stuck in the grey zone, they however retain as Morlino (2009:280) describes, some authoritarian or traditional features. At the same time they acquire some of the characteristic institutions and procedures of democracy and whilst they may also have a set of institutions going down the inverse path with some key elements of democracy being lost and authoritarian characteristics acquired (Morlino, 2009:280).

The features and characteristics of hybrid political regimes are in the first instance inadequate and flawed if measured against those for a consolidated democracy and secondly similarly diminished if measured or compared to those of a consolidated non-democracy. Menocal, Fritz and Rakner (2008:30) describe hybrid regimes as: "... ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits."

Some general characteristics supported by this study and forwarded by Menocal, Fritz and Rakner (2008:33-36) are:

- Presidentialism and governmental accountability – populist politics, unaccountable delegative/strong-man leadership and opaque decision-making processes;
- Levels of credibility and trust for formal institutions, - lack of trust and credibility;
- Political participation – shallow political participation outside elections and weak governmental accountability;
- Rules of the game – contested with formal and informal institutions co-existing in non-complimentary ways as well as perceived to be biased and unfair;
- Corruption and clientelism – driven by personal interests and own gains by public officials with high levels of corruption;
- Popular expectations and state capacity – weak state capacity although demands for inclusive decision-making, better services and accountability increase with more prospects for instability; and lastly;
- Elite reversals – political elites induce reversals rather than by processes from below such as presidential term extensions justified as requirements to strengthen state capacity.

Diamond (2002:24) adds that such regimes lack an arena of contestation sufficiently open, free, and fair so that the ruling party can readily be turned out of power.

Similarly, Morlino (2008:5) describes five dimensions of a hybrid regime namely:

- the degree of political pluralism, - concerns mainly the political actors who determine the regime and its policies;
- the ideology - ideological justification behind the regime;
- the degree of participation and political mobilisation - regarding political society;
- the presence and composition of the group that exercises power; and
- the presence of ambiguous and ill-defined rules - the nature of the rules and procedures adopted.

In addition Ekman (2009:7-31) summarises the characteristics by which states could be identified that fit the hybrid regime profile as follows:

- Not too flawed elections which have the potential to make a difference;
- Significant levels of corruption including in the judicial and electoral arenas;
- Vital components of democratic quality such as checks and balances and government accountability, are lacking;
- Problematic press freedom situation with a desire to control the media, particularly television;
- Poor civil liberties including limits on freedom of expression and the freedom to form organisations and trade unions; and
- Problematic rule of law with a lack of judicial independence.

Moreover, Sakwa (*In Stewart et al*, 2012:5) argues that neo-patrimonialism is a distinct feature of hybrid regimes and that: "... hybrid regimes and neo-patrimonialism are juxtaposed here on the theoretical level." Erdman and Engel (2006:18) add that neo-patrimonial rule takes place within the frame work of and a claim to legal rational bureaucracy and modern stateness where formal structures and rules exist although in practice, the separation of public and private spheres is not always observed. To this extent Bratton and Van de Walle (1994:458-463) explain that in neo-patrimonial regimes the chief executive maintains authority through patronage rather than ideology law and the relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system. Neo-patrimonial regime types are also characterised by a rapid turnover of political personnel as rulers regularly rotate office-holders. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and bureaucratic office for personal wealth and status rather than for public service. Personal favours include public sector jobs and contracts, licences and projects within society. In return for these rewards all decisions are referred upwards and

political support is mobilised to patrons. This type of system also focuses on the role of the cadre or member of the party in power in reference to preferential treatment and employment.

The politicised bureaucracy is also evident from an apparent lack of the current ruling party to be able to make a clear cut distinction between the main party in power and government. Within this anomaly, the ruling party sees itself as government and thereby neglects the role and function of other parties as represented within the legislative. This furthermore implies that no clear distinction is made between party policies and government policies and those bureaucracies are often aligned and tasked to meet party policy objectives. Another feature or characteristic which this study denotes to a hybrid political regime is the concept of a one party dominant system. Suttner (2006:277) defines such a notion as a political organisation that has successfully won consecutive elections and whose future defeat cannot be envisaged or is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The significance of such an electoral dominance is perceived by this study as severely hampering democratic consolidation, especially the concept of Huntington's two turn over test – win an election – lose an election. This clearly indicates a flawed democracy or more likely, a hybrid political regime. This is especially detrimental when the state bureaucracy is highly politicised and influence by party policy, party politics, succession struggles and factions within.

According to an explanation of the South African Political Dictionary, Cadre deployment entails the appointment by government at the behest of the governing part of party-political loyalist to an institution as means of circumventing public reporting lines and bringing that institution under the control of the party as opposed to the state. This type of action impedes the action and activities of a Weberian style of bureaucracy whereby government policies are of priority above that of political parties. This is in opposition to the explanation of the business dictionary of a bureaucracy namely: 'A system of administration distinguished by its (1) clear hierarchy of authority, (2) rigid division of labour, (3) written and inflexible rules. This dualistic system provides for disparity and confusion as to when the Weberian style of bureaucracy or the party politicised system, is to be followed and impacts severely of effective leadership and service delivery. Cadre deployment also affects the soul of leadership in ethics and morality as evident where the intelligence service department members should uphold the constitution, be non-partisan and protect the country as a whole.

In addition, in an article referring to South Africa oscillating between a democracy and authoritarian regime, Gossel (2016:1) postulates the following characteristics of a hybrid regime, as also supported by this study, namely:

- Populist politics, unaccountable leadership and opaque decision-making processes;
- Strong democratic institutions associated with elections;

- Weak institutions that lack credibility;
- Weak political participation beyond elections with limited government accountability, which leads to public frustration with delivery and institutions;
- Conflict between formal institutions and informal practises;
- Formal institutions suffer from a trust deficit. Informal practices, including presidentialism, clientelism, and corruption, are entrenched and can take precedence;
- Weak state capacity. State decision-making is bloated with public-sector participants;
- The state is unable to respond adequately to democratic pressures because it lacks the necessary institutional and administrative capacity; and
- Political change is driven by the political elite rather than by the electorate.

Furthermore, this study denotes that such a hybrid political system reflects a mafia state. Naim (2012:3) describes a mafia state as a fusion between government officials and criminals working together. He (Naim, 2012:1), explains that: “In mafia states, government officials enrich themselves and their families and friends while exploiting the money, muscle, political influence, and global connections of criminal syndicates to cement and expand their own power. Indeed, top positions in some of the world's most profitable illicit enterprises are no longer filled only by professional criminals; they now include senior government officials, legislators, spy chiefs, heads of police departments, military officers, and, in some extreme cases, even heads of state or their family members.” Linked to this phenomenon is the concept of state capture. To this extent Edwards (2017:9) argues that in societies characterised by the principle of the separation of powers, groups or individuals within the formal state structure can and do capture the state, change rules and draft policies to protect their own interests or further their own agenda. It is therefore implied that government institutions are manipulated to serve the private interests and involve all three sectors of the trias politica. Martin and Solomon (2016:22) explain that state efficiency is undermined due to the direct relationship between corruption and state capture where the state is paying more than it is supposed to for goods and services. This creates a weak and inefficient state due to the poor quality of services and public goods delivered by patronage networks.

Nonetheless, a hybrid political regime is also perceived to display democratic features and characteristics. However, according to this study, the scope and depth of these features may vary at any given time because this regime type oscillates between democratic and non-democratic features. The democratic features displayed by a hybrid political regime as postulated by this research, ranges from rule of law; human rights; freedom and liberty; media freedom; free, fair and contested elections, territorial integrity and accountability. As such a regime type ended ‘getting stuck in the grey zone’ during its transition towards democratic consolidation, several democratic characteristics implemented during the initial transition phase, will remain. Although

contestation is promoted and in existence, the effectiveness of elections is hampered by the dominance of one party which remains and strives to remain in power. Other features include a bureaucracy aiming to deliver goods and services efficiently and effectively to the people, but simultaneously competing with a highly politicised segment within, which ultimately serves party ideals. Civil society appears also to be a separate entity as required within a democracy, but is likewise under constant pressure as to serve the interests of the dominant ruling party.

A hybrid political regime is not a regime in transition. This study denotes that a hybrid political regime is an end-state of regime change and existed for some time within the world. Moreover, this study denotes that hybrid political regimes are not necessarily failed democracies or failed authoritarian states, but rather a political regime type of its own with its own unique features and characteristics and could even be regarded in this sense, as being consolidated. As such, it is suggested that such systems can be considered as consolidated as they will remain in existence for some time to come, even if they depict features of instability. These types of political systems feature strong democratic features but is characterised by non-democratic practices. To this extent this study perceives hybrid political regime types in the words of Hale (*In Brown*, 2011, 23-24) to be numerous, enduring and distinctive and the last two features makes the case for hybrid political regimes to be treated in a category of their own.


Even more so, hybrid political regimes is viewed as stable longevity regimes even though it is not regarded as a strong state and display inherent weak state capacity features. This longevity is in contradiction to what Huntington (1991:137) initially argues in his discussion of the third wave of democratisation in that it is plausible that some countries emerging from this wave will be a 'halfway house' that will not last. Albeit, the discourse and study of a hybrid political regime type is still new and additional research will contribute to the aim of this study as to not only conceptualise it as a regime category, but also to describe, explain and explore the feature and practices thereof. Central to this model is the depiction of a consolidated hybrid political regime in the shape and form of an amoeba. This concept is derived by this study from Gill (2016:61) who uses an amoeba as a metaphor on suggestion from Farson, in explaining the expansion of intelligence and security. This metaphor of an amoeba is found to be very useful and applicable to this study in building on an earlier model of a hybrid political regime by Van Den Berg (2014:62). This concept is applied in a reconstructed model for a hybrid political regime as depicted in Figure 48. An amoeba as a single cell organism, as explained by Gill (2016:61); can alter its shape by extending and retracting its pseudo pods. A hybrid political regime is perceived as a single system which reflects the characteristics of both democratic and non-democratic systems and oscillates between these two systems. It is thus not rigid in form and is constantly altering between more or less non-democratic features on the one side and more or less democratic features on the other.



In ancient Greek the word amoeba is derived from 'amiba' meaning change. An amoeba also reflects the hybrid political regime as having no definite form albeit consists of a mass of protoplasm. In addition is the movement of this one-cell organism observed in its almost tentacle or finger-like lobes or pseudopodia. It reflects something indefinite in shape or perpetually changing (Webster Dictionary). In linking amoeba to a hybrid political regime type, this study emphasises the changing form of this system as it moves between two different elements. To be more precise, this is applicable to the oscillation of a hybrid regime between democratic and non-democratic political regime types. To this extent the pseudopodia reflects the location of the hybrid political regime within democracy on the one hand and non-democracy at the other. These pseudopodia or lobes will also change in size and location over time depending on the political practices of the regime.

Moreover, oscillate is often described as movement back and forth or to and from. This fluctuation within the notion of a hybrid political regime is according to this study, not in rhythm or frequency. It is however suggested that this movement is irregular and linked to mayor changes within the policies and practices of the ruling elite. Although this study denotes the movement to and from democratic and non-democratic practices, this oscillation rather reflects the movement of the amoeba. This movement is not in a specific constant pattern and neither in rapid succession. It rather displays slow irregular and sometimes minute differences in form whilst oscillating. This brings a dynamic feature to the specific form or place of a hybrid political regime at any given time. Small differences will be observed during short intervals, whereas more specific changes could be present over longer time periods. More specifically is the notion that although hybrid political regimes are defined as oscillating between democratic and non-democratic features and characteristics, this study suggests that such regimes will differ as to the movement, size and subsequent exact location of the amoeba. This is equally applicable in depicting a specific political regime between significant policy changes or political actions. Furthermore, a central point or equilibrium is also postulated to be absent within this model as the main focus is on movement or oscillation. This however does not imply that this type of regime does not reflect order and stability. In practices the type or form of regime structures within a hybrid political regime could reflect less intervention or politicisation into government institutions and civil society or even changes from patrimonial to neo-patrimonial forms of rule. Likewise it is postulated that the actions and practices of the regime or party in power at any given time, will determine when and where democratic features will oscillate to be less democratic, or non-democratic features will appear to be more democratic. These changes will specifically be evident in the capacity of the state as well as specific form or degree of government.


Nonetheless, within this context, this study postulates a model for a hybrid political regime, as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 48: A conceptualised amoeba model for a hybrid political regime

More so, as also discussed in this chapter, a hybrid political regime is also viewed as a consolidated regime type and is therefore also labelled as such. Even so, the matrix delineated in Figure 42 measuring State Capacity/Degree of Government and Form of Government, is adapted to also display the notion of a hybrid political regime as an amoeba as follows:



Source: Adapted construct

**Figure 49: Adapted matrix of state capacity and form of government**

This matrix will enable this study to conceptualise and understand intelligence typology and practices within democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regimes.

In conclusion, this study denotes that a hybrid political regime is an enduring regime that constantly changes and oscillates between consolidated democracy and authoritarian political regime types having characteristics and features of both.

## 5.7 Conclusion

On the road towards democratic consolidation, a few regimes got stuck in the proverbial grey zone and ended up as a mixed political system or hybrid political regime type. These regimes as indicated in this chapter are neither consolidated nor consolidated non-democracies. Although the concept hybrid political regime is fairly new, the existence of such states is not new. Chapter

five followed the conceptualised meta-theoretical framework of this study which served as a guide to conceptualise and build overarching macro-meso level theorising as to enable a deeper understanding of intelligence theory as well as to build new theory through reconstructing, interpreting and evaluating existing regime change, democratisation and intelligence theory.


Moreover, this chapter conceptualised, reconstructed and reinterpreted the existing dichotomous political regime typology of democratic and non-democratic regime types as to include the notion of a hybrid political regime. Thereby this chapter enabled this study to explore and explain the characteristics and practices within each political regime type including those of a hybrid political regime as also linked to the meta-scientific and meta-theoretical framework of this study. Concepts, typologies and models forwarded and postulated within this chapter furthermore assist in the understanding of existing theory, developing new theory and to provide an overarching theory of intelligence practices within different political regime types.

The conceptual framework of this study as applied to a trichotomous political regime typology enables further inquiry into and a deepened understanding of democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime definitions, concept and models as to contribute to existing theory and to develop new theory, specifically regarding the notion of a hybrid political regime. Chapter five furthermore conceptualised a hybrid political regime as a consolidated regime type that oscillates between a democracy and non-democracy and therefore constantly changes in having more democratic or more non-democratic features and practices. This approach enabled this study to operationalise the theoretical models as also aligned to the meta-theoretical framework. This chapter is especially relevant and central to the main aim of this thesis in analysing intelligence in South Africa which is denoted as a hybrid political regime.

Even so, the conceptualising of a hybrid political regime as a mixed political regime within this chapter enabled the examination of intelligence practices within such regimes. This furthermore allowed for the identification of specific measurements and indices in identifying and classifying political regime types and their respective intelligence practices in the next chapter. This build on the matrix discussed in this chapter as to measure State Capacity and Form of Government as not only a useful tool for political regime types and their practices, but also to identify and explain intelligence practices within these regimes, as is the aim of the next chapter.

However, the main concepts and theoretical contributions to conceptualising, reconstructing and re-interpreting political regime classification, their theory, practices and features examined in chapter five, could be summarised as follows:

**CONCEPTUALISING DEMOCRATIC, NON-DEMOCRATIC AND HYBRID POLITICAL REGIMES**



Source: Own construct

**Figure 50: A recapitulation of conceptualising democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regimes**

This approach enabled this study to explore, describe and explain intelligence practices within different political regime types, as is the aim of the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 6: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES WITHIN DEMOCRATIC, NON-DEMOCRATIC AND HYBRID POLITICAL REGIME CONTEXTS**

*“For the conceptual framework of intelligence studies to advance further, it is essential to make a clearer distinction than is usually made at present between the roles of intelligence communities in authoritarian and democratic regimes.”*

Christopher Andrew (2004).

### **6.1 Introduction**


As established throughout the history and development of states, intelligence (although secret) remains a core and central institution which functions within all states as to maintain safety, security and development. As such and as postulated by this study, intelligence therefore exists because of and for a specific political regime and is thus an epitome thereof. Regime change or transition outcomes also determine the type of intelligence practices in a state, albeit to be less or more democratic. However, the secret nature of intelligence could contribute to democratic or non-democratic practices that could be used against the political good of citizens by an intelligence regime as to protect and enhance the interests of the power elite, instead of for the benefit and good of all.

Chapter six aims to examine intelligence types and practices within current regime types, as conceptualised in the previous chapter. More so, this chapter aims to conceptualise, reconstruct and re-interpret political regime theory from a trichotomous approach as to specifically include intelligence practices within the notion of a hybrid political regime. Therefore, as also indicated within the meta-scientific framework for this study, this chapter builds on the conceptualisation of regime change and transition outcomes as investigated in the previous chapter. Such a conceptual framework approach enables further inquiry into and a deepened understanding of democratic and non-democratic intelligence concepts, types and models, as to contribute to existing theory and to develop new theory, specifically in democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime types.

This chapter also aims to give specific attention to the degree of government/state capacity as measured against the variable form of government, as to be able to explore and examine the types, functions and practices of intelligence within each regime type. This necessitates further examining of the characteristics and features of intelligence in specific political regime types as to be able to conceptualise intelligence theory in the context of these democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regimes. Moreover, chapter six will assist this study in achieving its main objective (as reflected in the title) to study intelligence in South Africa as a hybrid political regime, which will receive specific attention in the next chapters.

## 6.2 Conceptualising intelligence types

In linking the conceptualising of intelligence theory to the meta-scientific framework of this study, the following conceptual framework serves as a roadmap for this chapter, specifically in conceptualising the intelligence type, characteristics and practices within a hybrid political regime. This conceptual framework could be depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 51: A conceptual framework for the conceptualisation, reconstruction and re-interpretation of intelligence types and practices**

Nonetheless, all states have intelligence of some sort. In view of the type of political regime in different states and the notion that intelligence is a reflection of that system, the typology or classification of intelligence requires further attention. Such a typology would enable the identification of what type of intelligence service a state employs on the one hand, while on the other, it could assist in drawing some conclusions about the nature of the state within which it functions. Within this context, the modern state and its intelligence services wields enormous potential to use or abuse coercive power against its citizens. The control of secret information

even makes intelligence services more powerful. Intelligence services can be classified by the degree of power they possess. However, as stated by Andrew (2004:176), for the conceptual framework of intelligence studies to advance further, it is essential to make a clearer distinction between the roles of intelligence in authoritarian and democratic regimes. Albeit, as stated in the notion forwarded by this study that intelligence is an epitome or archetype of the political regime within which it functions and exists, specific attention is required regarding the concept of intelligence in a hybrid regime, is also required. This in turn requires further attention be paid to intelligence typologies.


### **6.2.1 Intelligence typology - Keller**

A classical typology for intelligence agencies is initially forwarded by Keller (1989:11-23) as present in a state. He forwards three ideal types of intelligence as specifically determined by the high, medium or low autonomy of intelligence services from executive control on the one hand and insularity of intelligence from external observation, on the other. These three types or models are described as: an Independent Security State, a Political Police and a Bureau for Domestic Intelligence. The first model, the Bureau for Domestic Intelligence is to meet but not exceed a minimum standard of domestic intelligence activity as to sufficiently maintain the security interests of the state (Keller, 1989:11-12). Within this model, intelligence activities are consistent with established constitutional norms and legal system requirements and this service draws limited and specified powers from a charter or authorizing legislation. This intelligence service does not conduct aggressive or disruptive intelligence operations against citizens or domestic groups and the primary function is the gathering of information related to criminal prosecution of persons and groups that pose a threat to internal security. Such a service is furthermore responsive to the legislative process and higher executive authority.

In a variation of the first model, a political police as second model, permits intelligence activities that exceed the minimum standard necessary to protect the security interests of the state. As Keller (1989:12-13) asserts, this service has a greater degree of autonomy from the policy-making process of democratic institutions and performs more insulated activities away from judicial scrutiny and legislative oversight. A political police is also not precisely specified by statute and is more responsive to the power elite or regime in power that have captured the governance machinery. The political police engage in aggressive intelligence action directed against the enemies of ruling elites and also gather political intelligence that is neither authorized by nor conducted in relation to specific legislation. This service focusses on adversaries of the present regime in an attempt to subvert them. The privileged position of this service with the government furthermore insulates it from oversight mechanisms.



In contrast, an independent security state service as described in Model 3 by Keller (1989:12-14), is characterised by an absence of outside controls over its activities. It is furthermore distinguished from the political police because its goals and methods may not coincide with those of political elites or decision makers. Within this model the primary function of the independent security state is to investigate and neutralize ideological enemies of the state, as identified by the agency itself through aggressive and hostile intelligence activities without outside control or oversight. “It can be said to constitute a security state within the state” (Keller, 1989:13). Nevertheless, these models of the agency of internal security described by Keller (1989:20) can be distinguished from one another by their relation to the state and the mode of intelligence activity each undertakes, as depicted in the following diagram:



Source: Reproduced from Keller (1989:20)

Figure 52: Keller’s intelligence typology

### 6.2.2 Intelligence typology - Williams

All the same, Williams (*In Williams & Deletant, 2001:3-9*) builds on and adapts the typology forwarded by Keller as to include intelligence in a liberal democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarian regime. He provides the following explanation to the different intelligence types:

- A bureau of domestic intelligence, the desired agency for a liberal democracy, channels its resources into the acquisition of information that could assist the exposure and prosecution of serious threats to the country’s security; operates according to clear, strict guidelines; and

refrains from direct coercion of fellow citizens. The service is kept in line by someone of cabinet rank and must also undergo external inspection.

- A political police, who can exist in a decaying democracy or under authoritarianism, is simultaneously insulated from outside oversight but more likely to be drawn into the intrigues of power cliques in the government or a significant political party. Tasking from these sources rarely follows routine guidelines and may compel the agency to gather information on, and then harass citizens in opposing parties or groups who present no threat to the country's security.
- Finally, an independent security state is beyond manipulation and pursues its own agenda of observation and intimidation. Its resources, operations and targets are concealed from even the most powerful members of the political élite, who may find themselves under surveillance.

Williams (*In Williams & Deletant, 2001:3-9*), furthermore adds factors in the mode of operations undertaken by these services. This typology as adapted by Williams is depicted as follows:


Type of internal security apparatus	Mode of intelligence operations	Autonomy of policy formulation	Insularity of programme implementation
Bureau of domestic intelligence	Passive: collects and analyses information	Low: subject to democratic policy process	Low (ministerial): responsive to legislature, courts, higher exec. authority
Political police	Aggressive: adds hostile intelligence to above	Moderate: Policies and goals in common with political elite	Moderate (mixed): penetrated by political elites and selected others with shared goals
Independent security state	Disruptive: operates covert and formal domestic counter-intelligence programmes	High: independent security policies may or may not coincide with goals of other state actors	High (discretionary): records, methods, and programmes known only to security personnel

Source: Williams (2001:9)

**Figure 53: Types of intelligence services – Williams**

### 6.2.3 The Gore-Tex state and intelligence classification - Gill

In his intelligence typology model based on the typology of Keller, Gill (1994:70-80) explores the nature of the relationship among security intelligence, the state and society. He creates a model for the modern state and its security intelligence services and forms a typology by which it is possible to classify and compare the services. He then explains the control mechanisms that society and the state can leverage against the services, and how the services try to minimize outside control and scrutiny. Within this model the concept of the Gore-Tex (weak or strong – as a characteristic of a similar named fabric) state is used to reflect that a state consists of multiple levels with different goals and values as well as to depict the relationship between security services, state and society through the level of autonomy that a service enjoys. The nature of the Gore-Tex state (weak or strong) furthermore reflects the mandate, structure and accountability of the intelligence community. This autonomy is also reflected on the level of executive or judicial control of the intelligence regime on the one hand and the concept of penetration that refers to the ability of intelligence to gather information and exercise power, on the other. The different levels of the state are identified: the first level – intelligence community; the second level - executive body; the third level - legislative and judiciary bodies; and the fourth level - civil society. The state is also discussed ranging from a polyarchical state, a national security state and a garrison state. The model of the Gore-Tex state (Gill, 1994:80) is depicted as follows:



Source: Reproduced from Gill (1994:80)

Figure 54: The Gore-Tex state model

The typology of intelligence agencies is applied within the different layers in this model. In the core of the model, intelligence, relates to the other “layers” in terms of autonomy (dotted line), representing the degree to which intelligence is influenced by state and society, and penetration, representing the degree to which intelligence influences state and society. Depending on these degrees of autonomy and penetration, the ideal types of security intelligence agencies are classified similar to Keller and Williams, namely; an independent security state, political police, and domestic intelligence bureau. The innermost layer, the secret state, contains the security intelligence services. The next layer, the executive branch, contains both the political executive and the permanent bureaucracy. This generally consists of the office of the head of state and the various ministries or departments of the state. The next level, other state agencies, contains the legislative and judiciary branches and other bodies that operate independently of the executive branch. The outermost layer is outside the state, it is society made up of the citizens of the state.

The security intelligence services strive to conduct espionage and maintain secrecy. In this model, Gill (1994:80) explains that it could be applied to all types of states and that the secret state is specifically at the centre and cannot be penetrated by any outer layer of the state or society. It does not however prevent the secret state or intelligence regime to penetrate outwards into the rest of the state or society. The level of autonomy that the services enjoy in a specific state shows the relationship between security intelligence services, the state and society. This autonomy could furthermore be measured by examining how much of the intelligence services activities is not controlled or regulated by statute or by any formal executive or judicial policy instrument. In addition security intelligence services may use their ability to control information to protect or even increase their level of autonomy. Autonomy also incorporates those processes by which secret state agencies resist the encroachment of other state agencies and citizens, while the second covers the variety of techniques by which the secret state carries out its surveillance and supervision of other agencies and society in general. Autonomy is thus shorthand for agencies’ bureaucratic power within their parent states. This has two dimensions: firstly, the extent to which they are subject (or not) to direction and control by ruling groups and, secondly, to oversight by external institutions, including assemblies, citizens and media. The concept penetration describes the ability of security intelligence services to gather information and exercise power within a particular context of law and rules which facilitate the state’s efforts to maintain security and order. Likewise, penetration also summarizes two key dimensions of security intelligence: information gathering and what security policies (arrest, disruption, rendition etc.) are conducted. Combining the variables of autonomy and penetration provides for a typology of security intelligence agencies. These enable the plotting of the location of agencies and thus compare them or note shifts in time. Gill’s (1994:82) typology for intelligence services as linked to the Gore-Tex state concept is depicted as follows:

PENETRATION				
AUTONOMY		High	Medium	Low
	High	A Independent Security	B	C
	Medium	D	E Political Police	F
	Low	G	H	I Domestic Intelligence Bureau


Source: Reproduced from Gill (1994:82)

**Figure 55: Gill's typology of intelligence agencies**

This model gives nine possible classifications for security intelligence services. Box A holds the Independent Security State that is autonomous from the rest of the state and penetrates deeply into the state and society in a strong Gore-Tex state. On the opposite side, the Domestic Intelligence Bureau in Box I, is subject to strong control and limited penetration into society and a weak Gore-Tex state. In between these two ends the Political Police, in Box E, displaying a stronger Gore-Tex state than the Domestic Intelligence Bureau, but weaker than the Independent Security State.

#### **6.2.4 Intelligence typology - Bruneau and Dombroski**


While the typology of Gill may be useful, Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:5-6), argue that it is limited in its ability to compare and contrast relative changes in security agencies over time and they therefore propose a more accurate graphical depiction that accounts for change in the independent variables of autonomy and penetration of society. Bruneau and Dombroski debate, that for effective comparative analysis, a pair of graphs should be used that indicates the relative position of both states and their intelligence organisations over time. For this purpose they maintain that there is a correlation between the type of security intelligence apparatus and the classification of a state regime and that this relationship can be more easily compared in a graph rather than by simply using discrete boxes. Therefore, rather than adopt Gill's classification of regime types (polyarchal state, national security state, and garrison state); Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:6), prefer to use the more generally accepted classifications of democracy, authoritarian regime, and totalitarian state. In their first graph, state classification is measured against a high or low emphasis on national security in comparison to low or high internal threat perception. This graph is depicted as follows:



Source: Reproduced from Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:6)

**Figure 56: Regime classification - Bruneau and Dombroski**

However, Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:5) argue that an intelligence typology is more accurately depicted in a graph that provides for the three general categories developed by Keller and Gill, but can also be used to rank and compare intelligence agencies by accounting for change in the independent variables of autonomy from control and penetration of the state and society. Their graph for intelligence classification is depicted as follows:




Source: Reproduced from Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:5)

**Figure 57: Types of security intelligence services - Bruneau and Dombroski**

### 6.2.5 Intelligence typology adaption - Gill

The typology of the intelligence services is adapted by Gill (2016:41-51) to show a more flexible form of classifying agencies that may be used for tracking changes over time. This typology is furthermore aligned with the regime types of Tilly (2007:18-19), as already discussed, that measures state capacity and democracy ranging from high capacity democratic and high capacity un-democratic, to low capacity democratic and low capacity undemocratic. The variable penetration is similar to state capacity and autonomy as a surrogate for democracy. Democracy is then replaced with accountability. In this typology four instead of three general types of security intelligence services are indicated; the independent security state, security state, political police and the domestic intelligence bureau.



Source: Reproduced from Gill (2016:44)

**Figure 58: Typology of security intelligence agencies – Gill Adapted**

In this graph, Gill makes a distinction between the Security State Intelligence that has no democratic control and has power to not only gather information as widely as resources permit, but also has broader allowed actions that include powers of arrest, to imprison and possibly kill people on the one hand and an Independent Security State Intelligence that is not only immune from external oversight but also develops its own policies and practices independent from the ruling group (including even determining state policy), on the other. Agencies towards the lower left of the graph are essentially defensive and become more aggressive/offensive as they move up the graph (Gill 2009c, in Andrew, Aldrich & Wark, 2009:476-477 and Gill, 2016:41-51). Gill (2016:42) argues that penetration is synonymous with capacity and refers to the gathering of information and exercise of enforcement power by intelligence whereas autonomy is synonymous with democracy and entails the extent to which agencies were independent from influence when

determining their policies and practices. The capacity variable includes the capacity of intelligence to monitor state and society as well as to take necessary action (Gill, 2016:43). Through this adaption the independency/democracy variable includes the control and accountability of intelligence as a necessary condition for democratic governance.

#### **6.2.6 Typology for intelligence services in the African Continent – Africa and Kwadjo**

Africa and Kwadjo (2009:3-4), provide the following typologies for intelligence services on the African continent that could also be relevant in the analysis of intelligence, namely:


- Intelligence agencies as an offshoot of policing structures, embodied in the phenomenon of security police, which characterised the colonial period;
- Intelligence agencies as executive instruments usually located in Presidential offices, a favoured organisation form in the immediate post-colonial period;
- Incursions into domestic intelligence matters by the military which reflected the power struggles between police and military. This usually involved ascendancy of the latter over the former, which inserted a military ethos into the intelligence system and;
- Establishment of more or less autonomous intelligence structures separate from the military or police and established by legislation, not by executive decision.

#### **6.2.7 Reconstructing and re-interpreting intelligence typologies**

For this purpose as explained and depicted in Figure 19 of this study; Van Den Berg (2014:79) initially adapted a typology for intelligence services as initially based on Keller (1989:17), Williams (*In Williams & Deletant, 2001:3-9*), Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:3-5) and Gill (1994:82 and 2016:43-44) in order to accommodate the notion of a hybrid political regime. Van Den Berg (2014:76-79) adds a Political Intelligence Agency/Service and places it within the concept of a Hybrid Political Regime Type. He furthermore describes this type of intelligence as reflecting both democratic and un-democratic intelligence practices with a tendency to be more autonomous. This service is inherently politicised and serves the political elite and party in power rather than focussing on the protection of the constitution, the welfare of the people or the state as a whole.

In addition, Van Den Berg (2014:77-78) postulates a macro-level framework of state, political regime and type of intelligence. This framework is relevant as it depicts intelligence in context of the political environment in which it exists that, as discussed, determines the activities, priorities and operations of the intelligence community, or of any state department. This framework is depicted as follows:






Source: reproduced from Van Den Berg (2014:78)

**Figure 59: A framework for states, political regimes and types of intelligence services**

In this framework, the dimension of a state as postulated and discussed within this thesis, is reflected. Within the state as concept, the different types of political regimes within are indicated as based on a trichotomous typology – a notion also forwarded by this research. These include the concept of a hybrid political regime as also central to the research aim of this study. More so, the types of intelligence services and some of their pre-dominant characteristics are depicted in relation to the specific regime type wherein they function as well as for whom they serve. This macro-level framework consisting of state, political regime and type of intelligence – provides a broad overview for more detail conceptualising and constructing of specific models, thereby also contributing to an understanding of intelligence practices within different regime types. A typology enables the measuring of phenomena as to be able to categorise them within a specific framework. This constructed framework enables this study to conceptualise and develop a measuring tool for this purpose as well as to be able to place intelligence practices within South

Africa accordingly – as is also the main objective of this study. Intelligence as within the notion postulated by this study, exists because of and for the political regime. This does however not imply that there should not be a clear divide between the policy-maker and intelligence. This distinction is vital especially in determining the type of intelligence practices that could be expected in either democratic, non-democratic or hybrid regime types. That intelligence exists as a secret tool of the state in order to supply the policy-maker with information to make and implement policies to the benefit of all citizens is not the issue here. If the intelligence service cannot distinguish between the role of the policy-maker and itself in the policy-making process, this becomes an issue. To this extent, Lowenthal (2009:5) explicates that nothing prevents the policy-maker rejecting intelligence or using their own. However, intelligence and policy must not cross the so-called divide into the policy making process as depicted in the following diagram:



Source: Reproduced from Lowenthal (2009:5)

**Figure 60: Policy versus intelligence: The Great Divide**

In similar fashion Bar-Joseph (1995:30) explains that the intelligence professional accepts that the intelligence product is a means to an end that should be usable to the policy makers as produced in accordance to their needs. It is their prerogative to either use it or not. The intelligence professionals should similarly maintain a divide between policy-making and intelligence although they simultaneously serve the policy-maker. He explains that there are four approaches to the intelligence-politics spectrum which he placed on a continuum that is depicted as follows:



Construct: Reproduced from Bar-Joseph (1995:30)

**Figure 61: Separation between intelligence and politics: A continuum of four approaches**

Nevertheless, as also supported by this thesis and reflected in the Code of Conduct for intelligence officers as contained in the White Paper for Intelligence (1995) and as Gill (2003:9) argues, intelligence services should strive to be effective, politically neutral or non-partisan, adhere to a professional ethic and operate within their legal mandates, in accordance with the constitutional-legal norms and democratic practices of the state.

Albeit, similar to a matrix measuring political regime types, conceptualising a matrix for intelligence requires further attention.

### 6.3 Measuring intelligence practices within political regimes

A measuring model for the comparative analysis for regime types and intelligence practices has already been discussed, in reference to Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:5-6) that propose a pair of graphs (Figures 56 and 57) as well as the typology of Gill (2016:44) in Figure 58. These measuring models however do not reflect on the notion of a hybrid regime as discussed within this study. Nonetheless, to be able to measure political regimes as well as intelligence practices, Van Den Berg (2014, 78-79) initially promulgates the incorporation and adaption of the two graphs by Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:5-6) as well as the initial typology of Gill (1994:82) into one model that could simultaneously be used to analyse the political regime as well as the intelligence services as depicted in Figure 19. He (Van Den Berg) added the notion of a hybrid political system as well as a typology for intelligence within such a regime type.

The variable 'Rule of Law' is placed in comparison to the 'Autonomy of Intelligence', which on its own is referring to accountability, control and oversight and 'Human Rights' is placed in comparison to the 'Penetration of Society' by intelligence. A political regime is measured through the identification of the level of Rule of Law and Human Rights and a political spectrum ranging between democracy and non-democracy and intelligence is measured according to its penetration of society which could infringe on human rights and its autonomy, which has an effect on the rule of law. To this extent Gill (2016:45-46) suggests key criteria to compare intelligence as linked to measurement of intelligence in a democracy and the Freedom House and World Bank

indices in two tables. This thesis supports the criteria as depicted in two tables forwarded by Gill as they are helpful in even identifying a hybrid political regime because it is oscillating between both democratic and non-democratic practices. The accountability of intelligence in a democracy is depicted as follows:

**Table 5: Intelligence democracy/accountability**

	<b>AUTHORITARIAN SECURITY STATE INTELLIGENCE</b>	<b>DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE BUREAU</b>
Law/Rules (RES)	Rules governing operations emanate from internal executive decrees, military orders or party directives	Mandate and organisation of agencies including rules for the acquisition, processing, protection and use of personal data is incorporated in legislation
Control (ORG)	Those setting rules are not elected but hold key positions in military or ruling party (through internal promotion and appointment)	Elected ministers establish national security policies, appoint agency heads and, in agreement with legislatures, determine budgets
Recruitment (ORG)	Loyalty to the regime will be sole criterion for recruitment	Recruitment of intelligence officials by merit from all sectors of society
Training (ORG)	Training emphasise technical skills in the context of the ruling party ideology and overriding importance of state and regime security	Training emphasise technical skills in the context of law and rules including respect for freedom of expression, association, movement
Information Collection (PRO)	Solely internal authorisation of covert information gathering and covert action, more self-authorisation by operatives	Law establishes procedures for authorisation by people outside of agencies for use of covert information gathering and covert action
Oversight (RELS)	No arrangement for external monitoring of agencies other than political control by the ruling party	Some combination of legislative, judicial and/or expert bodies monitor the effectiveness and propriety of agencies
Public Involvement (RELS)	Complete state secrecy, any civil society and media interest repressed, individual researchers silenced.	Active civil society and informed media make use of limited transparency to support public debate on intelligence issues.

**Source: Reproduced Gill (2016:45)**

Intelligence in a democracy in the first table is linked to accountability which is placed in categories of intelligence systems as linked to resources (RES), organisational (ORG), processes (PRO) and relationships (RELS). The accountability or intelligence democracy of an authoritarian Security State Intelligence is then categorised next to that of a Democratic Intelligence Bureau. Likewise, Gill (2016:46) explains the criteria of the Security State Intelligence capacity or penetration placed in the second table next to the features of a Democratic Intelligence Bureau. These criteria are again based on the institutional and legislative literature of intelligence democratisation as well as the broader criteria used by Freedom House and the World Bank.

Nonetheless, Intelligence capacity/penetration as compared between an Authoritarian State, Security State and a Democratic Intelligence Bureau is delineated in the following table:

**Table 6: Intelligence capacity/penetration**


	<b>AUTHORITARIAN SECURITY STATE INTELLIGENCE</b>	<b>DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE BUREAU</b>
Resources (RES)	Significant finance and personnel is available but much will be deployed inefficiently or corruptly	Adequate financial and professional resources
Targeting (PRO)	Those perceive to be 'enemies' dissenters or troublesome researchers	Those perceived to be threats to national security within the context of legislative authority and published policy
Information Handling (PRO)	Processing may be effective if appropriate technology available but integrity threatened by wasteful duplication, inter-agency rivalry and political abuse	Processing effectively and protecting the integrity of information gathered. Inter-agency rivalries reduced by joint training and procedures
Analysis (PRO)	Little investment in analytical techniques. Foreign analysis skewed by ideological priorities so predictive failures likely	Analysis leads to timely warning, facilitating prevention of 'surprise'; minimal predictive failures
Impact (RELS)	Dissent and opposition to the regime may be minimised for a long time	Intelligence enhances the customer's relative advantage by minimising political violence, maintaining political stability and advancing national interests
Cooperation (RELS)	Mainly with agencies in similar authoritarian regimes but more widely in the case of specific shared economic or ideological interests	Maintenance of effective partnerships with other national and foreign allied intelligence agencies in accordance with shared interests
Public Perception (RELS)	Fear and suspicion	Maintenance of customer and public trust though latter remain wary

**Source: Reproduced Gill (2016:46)**

In similar fashion the abbreviations in the first column in the table are aligned to intelligence system features as resources (RES), organisational (ORG), processes (PRO) and relationships (RELS). The key criteria of table five and six are linked to the characteristics in the conceptualised macro-level framework consisting of state, political regime and type of intelligence depicted in Figure 57, as well as the two graphs of Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:5-6) and the initial typology of Gill (1994:82), are combined with the criteria of the Freedom Index, Democracy Index and World Bank. These are furthermore aligned with the criteria discussed and explained in this

research relating to different political regime types as to be able to conceptualise the measurement of intelligence practices and different political regime types.

Albeit, the model constructed and postulated by this study (in line with the matrix postulated in Figure 42), whereby Form and Degree of Government are applied to measure regime types, it is again reconstructed and adapted by this study as to include intelligence practises. The variable degree of government is synonymous with capacity/penetration as used by Gill (2016:42) in his measurement, whereas form of government is synonymous with autonomy/democracy. The measurements for intelligence practices as aligned with the measurement of form of government and state capacity is delineated as follows:



Source: Adapted construct

**Figure 62: Intelligence practices measured in relations to form of government and degree of governance**

Moreover, this adapted matrix includes the classification of modern day political regimes consisting of: (1) Consolidated Democracies; (2) Consolidated Non-democracies – inclusive of Authoritarian and Totalitarian regimes and lastly; (3) Hybrid political regimes as well as a typology for intelligence practices as postulated by this study.

Democratic Intelligence replaces the initial classification of a Domestic Intelligence Bureau as to include all the elements of intelligence (Foreign Intelligence/Espionage, Domestic Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Covert Action) as discussed and explained by this study and depicted in

table 1. In similar fashion to the notion of a hybrid regime depicted as an amoeba, this study also depicts a Political Intelligence Service in the same form. However, as Leigh (In Born, Johnson and Leigh eds, 2005:5) claims that there are common concerns towards intelligence practices in that there is a need to establish mechanisms to prevent its political abuse while providing for effective governance of intelligence, upholding the rule of law and ensuring the proportionate use of exceptional powers in order to protect civil rights.

The classification of intelligence practices is however also adapted to the following, namely:

- Democratic Intelligence – within a Democratic Political Regime;
- Political Intelligence – within a Hybrid Political Regime and;
- Non-democratic Political Regime - a Political Police in Authoritarian systems and an Independent State Security within a Totalitarian system;
- New Democracy – a Newly Reformed Intelligence; and lastly
- Rogue Private non statutory intelligence within a Failed State.

Likewise Born and Caparini (2007:3) argue that intelligence as a vital component of a state is required to operate efficiently and effectively, to be accountable and to be under firm control of elected authorities as with any other public sector activity. In addition, as also supported by this study, Bruneau and Boraz (2007:14-18) explain that the control and effectiveness provides for a comparative study of intelligence. They describe control of intelligence as the sum of two parts that include direction on the one hand and oversight, on the other. The type of control of intelligence within a specific political regime will thereby determine how effective intelligence practices are. Likewise Born (2002:4) argues that oversight sets broad guidelines for the government and its agencies and as a concept of 'good governance'; includes a whole system of democratic management of the security sector. In addition, control refers to instruct, rule or management. These concepts as linked to the capacity/penetration and democracy/autonomy, requires further examination.

### **6.3.1 Intelligence control**

Control of intelligence according to Bruneau and Boraz (2007:14), consists of the direction or civilian guidance given to a nation's intelligence community with respect to its overall mission that is typically embodied in a national security strategy. To this extent Caparini (In Born & Caparini, 2007:8-10) explains that control has two key variants namely that of political or executive control through executive direction to an agency on the one hand and administrative control which refers to internal supervision and management of a bureaucratic institution through its internal rules and



regulations. The executive branch is responsible for tasking and directing intelligence as contained within a national security concept through directives and policies.

In addition as Vitkauskas (1999:10-24) explains, the national security threat perception either domestically or internationally by a political regime, determines the mandate and tasks of intelligence. This study furthermore argues that the size and power of intelligence is also directly linked to such a perception. If a political regime perceives minimal threats, a smaller intelligence structure will be initiated whereas a direct broad threat perception will demand a broad and extended intelligence structure to be able to deal with all the intelligence requirements of the government. There is a delicate balance between ensuring proper control of intelligence and preventing political manipulation as too little executive control provides for intelligence opportunities to become a law unto itself, whereas with too much executive control there is a risk that intelligence may be used for purposes of domestic politics and even discrediting of political opponents (Leigh, *In Born, Johnson & Leigh eds*, 2005:5-6).

In a working paper the *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces* (GCDCAF, 2002:14-15) explains that an intelligence community requires a legal framework in which to operate. Such a framework that is reflected in a statutory regulating system, must define the areas of responsibility, structures, functions, mechanisms for accountability, coordination and control of the work or practices of intelligence. Such a system could be divided into laws, executive orders, directives and ministerial or agency regulations and should ideally be defined within the constitution of a country. In the case of South African intelligence, such guidance, control and accountability is provided by the Constitution (1996), the White Paper on Intelligence (1995) and several Acts which will be discussed later. Caparini (*In Born & Caparini*, 2007:11) adds, as also supported by this study, that self-accountability through the commitment of professional standards and ethics that include the training and education of personnel, peer pressure, the integrity of senior management and a professional code of conduct for officers, remains one of the strongest mechanisms for accountability in a secret service. Although in most instances, intelligence budgets are not transparent due to the secret nature of its functions, intelligence is part of the public sector that is financially accountable to the legislative and Auditor General. Intelligence budgets are generally also controlled through public sector financial rules and regulations. To this extent Born and Mesevage (Born & Wills, 2012:14) add that audit institutions provide independent external checks on the conduct of intelligence and monitor financial aspects, assess that record keeping is accurate, that internal controls on expenditure functions properly and that financial expenditures comply with prevailing regulations. This also assists legislators and the executive to make informed decisions how best to structure intelligence service budgets and priorities. Intelligence coordination as also discussed by Vitkauskas (1999:34-35) is also part of intelligence control as it oversees taskings and requests from the client to intelligence structures on the one hand and receives the production of intelligence on those requests from the intelligence structures



on the other. Intelligence coordination also provides for the determination of intelligence priorities for the direction and focus of intelligence services as well as for to provide the government as client with strategic intelligence, as is with the establishment of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) in South Africa, (Van Den Berg, 2014:100). This process can also measure the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence services.

### 6.3.2 Intelligence oversight

Bruneau and Boraz (2007:14) define intelligence oversight as the processes to review all aspects of an intelligence community that include organisation, budget, personnel, management and operational legal framework. Caparini (*In Born & Caparini, 2007:9*) adds that oversight of intelligence aims to determine the efficiency of intelligence or its capacity to successfully fulfil its mandate. This is synonymous with the mechanisms which evaluate the degree of governance of a political regime. Albeit, Born and Mesevage (Born & Wills, 2012:7) as also supported by this study, describe the main purpose of oversight as to hold intelligence services to account for their policies and actions in terms of legality, propriety, effectiveness and efficiency. They furthermore explain that the process by which an oversight body holds an intelligence service accountable has three phases, namely:


- The oversight body collects information about the intelligence service;
- The oversight body engages in dialogue with the intelligence service based on the collected information; and
- The oversight body issues findings and recommendations to the intelligence service.

To this extent Caparini (*In Born & Caparini, 2007:10-17*) explains a three-part framework towards accountability as also applicable to intelligence, namely:

- Horizontal accountability – implies co-equal relationships among independent state agencies and the judiciary, legislative and executive;
- Vertical accountability – concerns the relations among those unequal in their power relations such as between senior officials and their subordinates as well as efforts of citizens, media and civil society to keep public officials accountable. The process could be top-down or bottom-up; and
- Third dimension accountability – accounts for the role of international actors, foreign governments, intergovernmental organisations and international non-governmental organisations holding state institutional actors to account.

Likewise, and as also postulated by this study, Born and Leigh (2007:15) and the *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces* (GCDCAF, 2006:2) identify the following type of

oversight for intelligence services, namely; internal by intelligence, direct by the executive, parliamentary oversight by the legislative, and civil society groups; media, think-tanks and research institutes. Also part of civil society is the restraint of the use of the special powers of intelligence services through special tribunals, independent ombudsman and commissioners/inspector-generals. Albeit, intelligence oversight and control is depicted by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 63: Intelligence oversight and control**

The focus however shifts to conceptualise the different intelligence practices within the depicted political regime types as to be able to understand intelligence within a hybrid political regime.

#### **6.4 Conceptualising a theory for intelligence practices in a democratic political regime**

Effective democratic governance upholds the rule of law and ensures the protection of human rights as linked to the trias politica (executive, legislative and judiciary). Intelligence has a vital role and function in democratic political systems as stated by Quiggin (2007), Turner (2006), Johnson (2006) and Lowenthal (2009) in so far as national security is concerned as to protect the state against threats. It is however required to conceptualise a theory for intelligence practices in a democratic political regime as also within the aim and focus of this study.

#### **6.4.1 Intelligence practices within a democratic political regime**

The main purpose of intelligence is to provide the policy-maker with intelligence to be able to formulate and implement policies for the good of all. To this extent Caparini (*In Born & Caparini, 2007:3*) argues that a fundamental precept of democratic theory is securing and maintaining public consent for the activities of the state. Therefore intelligence agencies must be seen to perform their functions similar to any other public sector in a democracy, with the expected effectiveness, efficiency, sound management and value for money. Nonetheless, this study postulates that intelligence practices within a democratic political regime requires adherence to the rule of law and human rights as characteristics of a democracy.

#### **6.4.2 Type of intelligence in a democratic political regime**

The Bureau of Domestic Intelligence as an intelligence service in a consolidated democracy in the typology of Keller (1989:17) as also discussed by Gill (1994:82), Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:3-5) and Van Den Berg (2014:76-79), is referred to as the ideal type of intelligence. This study however adapted the concept of a Bureau for Domestic Intelligence as it excludes foreign intelligence collection, espionage and covert actions as critical functions of intelligence together with counter-intelligence and domestic intelligence. This concept is adapted to Democratic Intelligence as to include all the elements of intelligence within a consolidated democratic political regime to be viewed as legitimate and constitutionally bound. This does however not suggest that covert action and espionage activities are regarded as legal within the country which it is conducted, as those are regarded in most cases as illegal foreign intelligence activities. Intelligence however is secret by nature and exists for and because of the regime.

#### **6.4.3 Purpose and definition of democratic intelligence**

The purpose of intelligence in a consolidated democracy according to this study as linked to the discussions on the theory of intelligence is as follows:

- Provide the policy-makers with relevant intelligence as to assist them to make and implement policies – both foreign and domestic;
- Protect the constitution and inform on unconstitutional state practices;
- Identify threats and potential threats against national security;
- Assist in the socio-economic development and welfare of all citizens;
- Adhere to democratic oversight and control; and lastly
- Adhere to the democratic principles of human rights and the rule of law.

All the same, as also supported by this thesis, the White Paper on Intelligence (1995) provides the following purpose of intelligence:

- To provide the policy-makers, timeous, critical and sometimes unique information to warn them of potential risks and dangers. This allows the policy-makers to face the unknown and best reduce their uncertainty when critical decisions have to be made;
- To identify opportunities in the international environment, through assessing real or potential competitors' intentions and capabilities. This competition may involve the political, military, technological, scientific and economic spheres, particularly the field of trade; and
- To assist good governance, through providing honest critical intelligence that highlights the weaknesses and errors of government. As guardians of peace, democracy and the constitution, intelligence services should tell government what they ought to know and not what they want to know.

Based on the earlier discussions of intelligence and democracy, this study defines Democratic Intelligence as follows: A secret tool of a consolidated democratic political regime which produces intelligence products through democratic accountable and constitutionally bound processes for the policy-makers as to serve, protect and promote the national interests of the state including civil society. This implies a well-defined and described national strategy framework whereby the necessary guidance and direction it provides is for intelligence to act and fulfil their required tasks and functions as to serve the national interests of the state.

#### **6.4.4 Characteristics and features of democratic intelligence**

This notion forwarded by this study that an intelligence service exists because of and for a political regime and is therefore an epitome thereof, implies that the characteristics and features of a Democratic Intelligence service or agency within a consolidated democracy would inherently reflect the features and characteristics of that political regime. Democratic Intelligence is seen as the ideal type and its features and characteristics should reflect it as such. In comparing intelligence in a consolidated democracy with other intelligence services discussed and outlined in Figure 44, Democratic Intelligence is both restricted in its independency as well as penetration into society as it functions within an assumed effective and efficient democratic regime which displays a high level of democracy and a high degree of effective governance. As explained by Van Den Berg (2014:77) such a service has limited special powers derived from a legal charter or statute and is not involved in aggressive operations against its citizens. The functions, structure, budget and processes of intelligence in a consolidated democracy, are ideally mandated within a constitution and regulated within legislation, directives and policies. Even more so, intelligence in a consolidated democracy is guided by a philosophy or national strategy in terms of scope and


direction. Other key criteria to be included for intelligence accountability as described by Gill (2016:45) and supported by this study include:

- The recruitment of intelligence officers on merit from all sectors of society;
- Training emphasis on the rule of law and freedom of expression; and
- Active civil society and informed media with at least limited transparency for public debate on intelligence issues.

This entails that Democratic Intelligence exists and functions within a legislative and accountable framework. However, in linking to the recruitment and employment of intelligence officers is the issue of non-partisan and serving the interests of the government of the day, irrespective of which political party is in power. Intelligence in a democracy as the ideal type should not interfere within the political regime similar to the non-interference of the political regime within intelligence. In analysing the tendency of intelligence to interfere with politics and the tendency of politics to intervene in intelligence, Bar-Joseph (1995:70-72) identifies intelligence in a democracy to represent the ideal type of relationship. This furthermore necessitates that the political level does not intervene in professional intelligence affairs, and intelligence is politically neutral. Interference within politics by intelligence is an undesirable action due to their professionalism and ethical standard. This adds the prominence of a code of conduct for all officers where their allegiance is to the constitution and not to a specific political party. Apart from finding a balance between the need for secrecy on the one hand and the protection of the rule of law on the other, intelligence in a democracy also requires a sound system of checks and balances, as Winkler and Mevik (In Born, Johnson and Leigh, 2005: IX-X) argue and as also supported by this study. Furthermore, as discussed by Caparini (In Born & Caparini, 2007), Born and Leigh (2005), Born and Mesevage (In Born & Wills, 2012), Bruneau and Dombroski (2004) and Gill (2016); oversight and control mechanisms in a democracy include the following; (1) Legislative oversight by parliament; (2) Executive control and accountability of the executive to the legislative; (3) Civil Society control and accountability by the media, oversight bodies and special tribunals; (4) The Judiciary through national courts; (5) International bodies and Non-Government Organisations; and lastly (6) Self-accountability and internal processes by intelligence itself.

These measures ensure that intelligence acts in a lawful way as expected from an institution or organ of the state which is bound by the rule of law and human rights. Such a service is as efficient, effective and professional in fulfilling its legislative mandate and role within the national security realm and scope of the state. It should however be noted that although this typology defines intelligence practices within consolidated democracies, some of the old democracies lack several of these features as also explained by Bruneau and Boraz (2007), Gill (2016:47), Born and Caparini (2007:195-214) and other academics. Those countries unfortunately only rectify and

adjust to more democratic practices when severe intelligence failures are exposed, instead of taking similar steps to democratic reform of their intelligence as is the case with countries in regime change towards newly established democracies. This practice provides challenges towards a common understanding and explanation of the features of intelligence within a consolidated democracy, as the ideal type. Moreover, intelligence as embedded within a consolidated democracy as political regime type exists with limited independency under the executive, legislative, judiciary and civil society in terms of control, oversight and accountability. Nonetheless, as Gill and Phythian (2006:155) argue: “Since intelligence cannot be dis-invented, and current practices are dominated by realistic ethics, perhaps the most we can strive for is harm minimization: we need to regulate the ‘second oldest profession’ in such a way as to minimize the harm it does to producers, consumers and citizens.” This study however postulates the following model of Democratic Intelligence and its practices as an ideal type for intelligence as linked to the model of a consolidated democracy in Figure 46, is delineated as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 64: A model for democratic intelligence within a consolidated democracy**

This brings the attention to intelligence practices within non-democracies to the fore.

## **6.5 Conceptualising theory for intelligence practices in non-democratic systems**

Intelligence also exist in non-democratic political systems and requires similar deliberation as with intelligence practices in democracies discussed above.

### **6.5.1 Types of intelligence in non-democratic political regimes**

This study denotes two intelligence types within Non-Democratic Political Regimes, as also depicted in Figure 44, namely, a Political Police in Authoritarian systems on the one hand and an Independent State Security within a Totalitarian system, on the other. These intelligence types as reconstructed and adapted from Keller (1989:17), Gill (1994:82 and 2016:41-51) and Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:5-6), are closely linked to the type of political regime that they serve and wherein they exist.

### **6.5.2 Purpose and definition of intelligence in non-democratic political regimes**

The primary purpose of intelligence in an authoritarian political regime is closely linked to the characteristics and features of that government. To this extent Andregg and Gill (2014:489) argue that the sole objective of intelligence agencies is the preservation of the regime and suppression of the opposition. This implies that a Political Police Intelligence type focusses on the national strategy of the authoritarian state regarding perceived enemies of the state, which guides the mandate and actions of intelligence. Therefore, intelligence practices of a Political Police Intelligence are centralised on perceived domestic or internal threats to the regime, according to Bruneau (2000:25), Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:2), Caparini (*In* Born & Caparini, 2007:6) and Born and Leigh (2007a, *In* Johnson, 2007:144) who in turn explain that it includes: "... to be involved in repressive activities; process information on individuals on the basis of race, political ideology, religion, or membership of a trade union or exert influence over the political situation and media". In totalitarian political regimes the Independent State Security is, according to Gill (1994:82), autonomous from the government and the rest of the state machinery while penetrating deeply into social life for information and counter activities in support of the political regime. In addition, Born and Leigh (2007a, *In* Johnson, 2007:144) describe that the security and intelligence services have broad mandates and sweeping powers used to protect dictatorial regimes against rebellions from their own people through the suppressing of political opposition, preventing any kind of demonstrations and eliminating any opposition in politics, media, labour or civil society. This type of intelligence furthermore intervenes deeply in the political and daily life of citizens.

This study defines Political Police Intelligence as follows: A secret tool of a consolidated authoritarian political regime which conducts intelligence activities domestically and abroad and produces intelligence products within limited regulated oversight and accountability in order to

serve, protect and promote the interests of the ruling party against any opposition or perceived threats. Independent State Security Intelligence within a totalitarian political regime is defined by this study as: A secret autonomous and self – accountable intelligence organisation which conducts unrestricted intelligence activities to serve and manipulate the interests and ideology of the dictator as well as those within the organisation against any perceived inclusive opposition or enemies of the state or any state machinery and civil society.


### **6.5.3 Features and characteristics of intelligence in non-democratic political regimes**

Control of intelligence is within the ruling party without any independent oversight (Andregg and Gill, 2014:489). The size and power of intelligence within authoritarian regimes is large and its scope is very broad as almost anything is defined as a state secret and is mostly monopolised by the military without any role for civilians (Bruneau, 2000:25). Caparini (*In* Born & Caparini, 2007:6) adds that intelligence in authoritarian regimes focuses internally towards any political opponents and critics of the party or regime. Likewise GCDCAF (2003:60) states that intelligence in authoritarian regimes, function outside the rule of law and are involved in human rights abuses against their own citizens. These services are not constitutionally bound with limited control, oversight and accountability. Activities include the suppression and control of the media and active involvement in domestic politics. This study denotes that the specific features of each type of authoritarian regime, be it personalist, military or single-party; will also determine which specific characteristics would be present in any given time. To this extent, Van Den Berg (2014:77) elucidates that Political Police Intelligence in an authoritarian political regime is a type of security intelligence that responds almost exclusively to the political elites or party in power in its focus on internal political opposition and in this process gathers aggressive countering operations against such opposition. Likewise, Godson (2001:250) claims that these types of services are almost synonymous with security services and are directed primarily at the local population with little or no distinction between enemies at home or enemies abroad. In addition, Born and Jensen (Born & Caparini, 2007:258) claim that intelligence as the tool of centralised power under authoritarian rule, is characterised by opaque cultures of cronyism, corruption and repression with impunity. These services are not constitutionally mandated or instituted by legislation and usually function by special presidential decree as Gill (2016:45-46) explains that rules governing intelligence operations emanate from internal executive decrees, military orders or part directives. Loyalty and partisan to the ruling party is part of recruitment and employment criteria and as such implies that these services are highly politicised. Intelligence in authoritarian regimes is also seen by the public with fear and suspicion (Gill, 2016:46).

Gill (2016:42) describes an independent security intelligence state as the situation in which intelligence has extensive resources and conducts widespread surveillance with almost no control or oversight. In some instances these services control the direction of government as linked to a



specific ideology. This service represses civil society and the media and enjoys the benefits of complete state secrecy (Gill, 2016:45). The elements of intelligence that are more paramount within non-democracies are security and counterintelligence according to Godson (2001:250). He explains that few totalitarian rulers accepted the modern concept of sovereign equality and rather adhere to the notion that a particular system is the only correct way of organising society and impose that on their neighbours. Thereby, covert political action is a routine weapon of intelligence in totalitarian regimes employed for the survival of these regimes (Godson, 2001:251). Similar to authoritarian regimes, intelligence in totalitarian regimes is internally focused and targets many areas of civil society with extensive structures and broad mandates. In addition, Winkler (2002:8) argues that in totalitarian states and dictatorships, human rights and the rule of law as basic principles are ignored. Similarly, Van Den Berg (2014:77) explains that intelligence services are characterised in determining its own goals, keeps its funding hidden from governmental policy processes and authorises its own targets and countering activities. This service strongly follows a specific ideology and even supports this in other countries as was the case within the Soviet Union which supported the extension of communism in various countries all over the world including in South and Southern Africa. As this service mirrors the features and characteristics of a totalitarian regime, all spheres of life are viewed within the scope of the state which implies that intelligence has total power and impedes on the freedom of the individual. All the same, intelligence practices in non-democratic political regimes (authoritarian and totalitarian systems) as linked to the model postulated by this study in Figure 47, are depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 65: A model for intelligence practices in non-democratic political regimes**

This however brings the focus to new democracies and failed states as transition outcomes.

## **6.6 Conceptualising intelligence practices within new democracies and in failed states**

Before this study continues to conceptualise a theory for intelligence practices within a hybrid political regime, intelligence practices in newly formed democracies as well as those in failed state situations (See Figure 44), which measures these practices in relation to form of government and degree of governance, require similar attention as democracies and non-democracies.

### **6.6.1 Intelligence practices in new democracies**

This study denotes that the respective intelligence services of new democracies or regimes within democratic transition, mirrors the features of their former regimes as well as that expected from democracies. To this extent Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:1) claim that civilian control of intelligence services is probably the most problematic issue for these services in light of their former key element of control and human rights abuses. New democracies and their subsequent labelled *newly reformed intelligence* (see Figure 44), are still in a process of creating and establishing democratic control and oversight mechanisms and processes in contrast to those of well-established or consolidated democracies. The challenges and processes faced by these regimes received attention from various academics, especially after the waves of democracy and the end of the cold war as discussed by Bruneau (2000:1-36); Bruneau and Boraz (2007); Bruneau and Dombroski (2004 and 2006); Caparini (2014:498-502, and *In Born & Caparini*, 2007); Gill (1994 and 2016) and Gill and Andregg (2014:487-497), Matei (2011:656-691) and Matei and Bruneau (2011:602-630), to name a few. This study therefore denotes that intelligence practices within newly established non-consolidated democracies (labelled as newly reformed intelligence) will therefore display the features of democratic intelligence but with remnants of their former political regime type as also discussed within features of intelligence in non-democracies.

### **6.6.2 Intelligence practices in failed states**

Intelligence in failed states is labelled as *private rogue non-statutory intelligence* by this study in its reconstruction and re-interpretation of intelligence practices within different political regime types. This shifts the focus to a hybrid political system and its intelligence practices.

## **6.7 Conceptualising a theory for intelligence practices within a hybrid political regime**

This study postulates a trichotomous typology for political regimes inclusive of democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime types. As a hybrid political regime is also denotes as a regime change outcome on the one hand and is the main focus of this study on the other, further

examination and more detailed deliberation on intelligence practices within this system, is also required.

### **6.7.1 Type of intelligence in a hybrid political regime**

Having a typology of intelligence in a hybrid regime is a fairly new and unexploited notion, (Van Den Berg, 2014:74). He (Van Den Berg, 2014:76) suggests a Political Intelligence Service as an intelligence type in a hybrid intelligence regime. This intelligence type as indicated in Figures 37 and 44 of this study, is based on the initial intelligence typology of Keller (1989:17), Gill (1994:82 and 2016-43-46) and Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:3-50) which did not address or include the notion of a hybrid political regime nor its intelligence. This political intelligence service is a mixture between a democratic intelligence service in a democracy on the one hand and the non-democratic authoritarian political police type and totalitarian state security, on the other.

### **6.7.2 Purpose and definition of intelligence in a hybrid political regime**

Intelligence as postulated by this study is a mirror of the political regime for which and in which it exists and therefore reflects characteristics and features of such a regime. As a hybrid regime is a mixture between democratic and non-democratic features and practices and oscillates between the two, this would also be the case with its intelligence practices. Where a democracy's national strategy is based upon democratic principles and the role of intelligence is to uphold the constitution and protect the state and its people against any threats, the focus of intelligence in non-democracies is in contradiction to the welfare of the people it intends to serve and protect the regime in power, be it the party or its leader. This study supports the explanation of Van Den Berg (2014:74) that the purpose of intelligence in a hybrid political system is less democratic and more supportive of the political party in power which leads to a situation of politicised intelligence and focusses more on the protection of the political regime and specifically the power elite, rather than the constitution and the welfare of the people.

This study postulates the following definition for a political intelligence service: A secret tool of a hybrid political regime which oscillates between less or more democratic practices and conducts intelligence activities that includes covert action, domestically and abroad and produces intelligence products within limited or not regulated oversight and accountability in order to serve, protect and promote the interests of the ruling party or government leader against any perceived opposition or implied threat. This involves a national strategy framework that sometimes serves the national interests of the state but other times those of the political elite.

### 6.7.3 Features and characteristics of intelligence practices within a hybrid political regime


In light of the features and characteristics of a hybrid regime discussed by this study, it is postulated that intelligence practices will mirror the regime and display similar features. To this extent, intelligence practices in a hybrid regime will be either more democratic on the one hand or more non-democratic on the other, depending on how far the deepening of democracy and its institutions were during the initial transition period before the political regime got stuck in the grey zone. The measurement of effective and efficient intelligence as discussed by this study lies within state capacity and form of government of which control, oversight and accountability are the indices. These mechanisms include a regulated mandate, role and functions and legislation, directives and procedures for the control, accountability and oversight of intelligence practices. It should however be noted that this intelligence type reflects both features and characteristics of democracies and non-democracies that fluctuate over time. Very few countries have a legislative mandate for intelligence and most agencies have no legal existence whatsoever (Hutchful, *In Africa & Kwadjo eds* 2009) and can therefore display a mix of both effective as well as in-effective mechanisms and procedures. If the national strategy of the regime is focussed at a given time on perceived internal/domestic threats against the existence and power of the ruling party or its leader, it is evident that the intelligence structures will be used as a political tool - albeit secret – for the benefit of the power elite and party. Furthermore, such intelligence services are burdened with political appointments and cadre deployment, as Fukuyama (2014) states that dysfunction occurs because agents act self-interestedly in elevating money into own accounts or promoting their own careers. In addition, this study denotes that where governments are unwilling and unable to abide by the rule of law and principles of human rights, the bureaucracies and institutions within such as intelligence and security, will follow suit. Other features that could be reminiscing of an authoritarian past could include factors as described by Nathan (2012:49) that:

- The intelligence services and members of the executive can abuse these powers and capabilities to undermine the security of individuals and subvert the democratic process;
- Human rights could be violated in contravention of the law;
- Interference in lawful political activities;
- The favour or prejudice of a political party or leader;
- The intimidation of opponents of government;
- The creation of a climate of fear;
- The manipulation of intelligence in order to influence government decision making and public opinion; and lastly
- Intelligence can also abuse intelligence funds and methods for personal gain. This is specifically viable in times of elections and contestation whereby the intelligence could

implement covert action domestically as to counter activities of any opposition as well as to be involved in operations to enhance and protect the ruling elite.

All the same, as intelligence is a reflection or epitome of the political regime because of and for which it exists, intelligence in a hybrid political regime reflects similar features. To this extent as is the case within a hybrid political regime, intelligence practices in a conceptualised model, appears similar. Central to such a model is also the notion of intelligence in the form of an amoeba, as is the case with the hybrid political regime. More so, as the amoeba is a single cell organism with pseudopodia, constantly changing shape, so is intelligence within a hybrid political regime. This intelligence, categorised as Political Intelligence, furthermore also oscillates between non-democratic and democratic intelligence practices. Likewise, the pseudopodia will also change in size and location as it is constantly moving from and to democratic and non-democratic intelligence practices. As is the case within hybrid political regime types, intelligence changes are also linked to stages or phases of policy changes and are sometimes not immediately visible as it gradually moves over time. Equally, this movement or changes are irregular. Intelligence in different hybrid political regimes will furthermore reflect similarities but will overall be different – as depending on the democratic and non-democratic practices at given moments in those regimes. The control, oversight and accountability of intelligence in a hybrid political regime will also be reflected by the movement of the pseudopodia with non-democratic and democratic practices. This intelligence form is furthermore postulated as a fixed typology as is the case with the concept of a consolidated hybrid political regime type. These types of Political Intelligence are furthermore highly politicised and display similar characteristics and features as within neo-patrimonialism. This study postulates that two opposing systems are evident with such services namely a bureaucratic Weberian structure based on legislation, directives, policies and operating procedures on the one hand and party loyalist and cadres protecting and enhancing the policies of the party in power on the other hand. These two systems are in obvious contradiction and are directly linked to the intelligence practices oscillating between democratic and non-democratic practices. Depending on the interests and needs of the power elite, intelligence practitioners within these services as cadres, are furthermore obliged to serve the interests of these elites rather than that of the broader population. Likewise, national strategy and threat perceptions within these services are also focussed on the policy and perceived threats projected by the power elite and focus more on opponents and non-loyalists to the regime than real threats. Intelligence as a secret tool of the state is aligned to serve, protect and promote the interests and well-being of the power elite as opposing to that of civil society. These services are furthermore prone to be misused in conducting non-democratic unaccountable secret/covert activities to the benefit of few.

All the same, a model for a Political Intelligence Service in an oscillating hybrid political regime type depicted in Figure 48, is similar to the regime for which and wherein it exists and is thus also delineated by this study as an amoeba, as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 66: A conceptualised model for political intelligence within a hybrid political regime

The predominant role of intelligence is regime security and as Hutchful (*In Africa* & Kwadjo, 2009) explains: "... the role of many intelligence organisations has been little different from political police." These practices are in line with what Hutton (2007:2) explains as where intelligence often becomes an essential tool of oppression and control in authoritarian, undemocratic, dictatorial or autocratic regimes and the general trend seems to be that the more insecure a regime or ruling party, the greater the domestic role of intelligence services. Bruneau and Dombroski (2004:2) argue that the politicisation of the bureaucracy is a common problem during reform.

Moreover, this study argues that Intelligence practices in a hybrid system are highly politicised and as Van Den Berg (2014:75) indicates that intelligence in a hybrid regime is constantly involved in processes of restructuring. Any disagreement or differences towards intelligence practices can be viewed as being disloyal to the party and the country per implication as the distinction between party in power and government is quite blurred. In addition, these intelligence practices include political interferences into the appointments to and functions of regulating and oversight bodies – if there are any. Other features can include less transparency with more secretive practices including secret budgets and even more direct involvement in corruption. More so, intelligence practices in a hybrid political regime are also mostly centralised as to be able to rule and control opposing parties, forces and civil society, whilst serving the needs and interests of a selected few under limited or no control, oversight and accountability. This type of intelligence practice is however similar to the regime in which it exists in so far as it will remain a hybrid until subjected to reform during regime change.


## **6.8 Conclusion**

Democratic consolidation is not a linear or progressive process and neither is the goal of democratic intelligence. More so, is the capacity and form of intelligence - as a secret tool of the state - often not clear and ideal in terms of penetration, autonomy, oversight, control and accountability. The purpose of democratic intelligence as linked to form of government, rule of law, human rights, degree of government and ultimately state capacity, is to assist government through its secret actions, to deliver goods and services effectively and professionally to all people. However, as indicated in this chapter, intelligence practices within the notion of a hybrid political regime reflects simultaneously democratic and non-democratic practices. Therefore this chapter examined the notion as also postulated by this study, that a specific type of political regime epitomises the type of intelligence practices within; as indicated and linked to the meta-scientific framework of this study and the meta-theoretical content addressed in previous chapters.

Moreover, chapter six conceptualised, re-interpreted and reconstructed existing intelligence typologies towards a trichotomous modern day classification that enabled this study to also

classify democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime types in both the regime types as well as the intelligence practices of countries. Furthermore, in linking the theory, concepts, typologies and models of political regime types as explored, explained and examined in the previous chapters with intelligence theory, this study is able to contribute within a meta—theoretical and theoretical approach, towards conceptualisation, reconstruction and interpretation of existing theory as to contribute to the both the understanding and development of new theory – as is also the aim of this study.

Within this context, chapter six specifically contributed towards new theory of intelligence within democratic, non-democratic and hybrid regime types and is postulated as follows:




Source: Own construct

**Figure 67: Conceptualised classification of political regime and intelligence types**

Likewise, the definitions, concepts, typology and models this chapter addressed, also enabled the development of a measuring tool or matrix towards intelligence in different regime types in plotting them within regimes on the one hand as well as to measure their penetration/capacity and democracy/autonomy, on the other. This chapter assisted this study to operationalise the conceptual intelligence and political theory within a meta-theoretical approach applied to a country.

Albeit, the main theoretical and meta-theoretical contributions to conceptualising, reconstructing and re-interpreting intelligence concepts, classification, and models so as to understand and explain intelligence practices and features as examined in chapter six, could be summarised as follows:





Source: Own construct

**Figure 68: A recapitulation of conceptualising democratic, non-democratic and hybrid intelligence types, models and practices**

Albeit, this chapter assisted the operationalisation of the notion of intelligence in South Africa as a hybrid political regime as indicated in the initial findings of Van Den Berg's (2014) research and also reflected in the title of this thesis. This concept will receive specific attention in the next chapters.

## CHAPTER 7: THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE WITHIN A POLITICAL REGIME CONTEXT

*"Good intelligence, as another contemporary put it, was often 'the mother of prevention'. The unsavoury activities intelligence work involved on the early modern scene were thus seen as vital to the arts of government. A neglect of them could lead 'a Prince [to] lose his Crown or life'."*

Allan Marshal, 1994

### 7.1 Introduction


This study postulates that an intelligence service is a reflection or epitome of the political regime within which it exists. It is also relevant to understand intelligence practices within the history and development of the political regime. To this extent Matey (2007:1) asserts: "Definitions of intelligence cannot be appreciated without a sense of the past; that sense of the past must call attention both to things that must be overcome, and aspects of established intelligence practice that must be preserved or acknowledged as essential elements of continuity". This is even more so evident in the roots or ancient roots of intelligence in espionage and diplomacy. This is supported by Beer (*In Amelang*, 2006:183) who declares that intelligence has two principal roots: one diplomatic - seeking information about the policy-making of other states, actually or potentially inimical to that state or group of states; and the other is military-operational - securing knowledge of the capabilities, intentions and movements of other armed forces. All said, this chapter will assist the research objectives within this thesis against the notion of this study that intelligence exists because of and for a political regime and is as such an epitome thereof.

Nonetheless, the development and history of intelligence practices within South Africa will be placed against the dynamics and changes within the international political arena, regional politics and the domestic situation within South Africa over time, as to be able to analyse current practices in the next chapter. The conceptualised and reconstructed political and intelligence theory in previous chapters will enable the linking of the history and development addressed in this chapter to specific intelligence practices and regime types. This chapter enters the phase where the conceptualised theory within theoretical and research frameworks of this study, is implemented and operationalised. Moreover, chapter seven intends to place the early historical developments in South Africa against developments internationally which had a direct bearing on the nature of and development of the political regimes in the country as well as its intelligence practices. The evolution of intelligence from knowledge, information into its current understanding, is vital to the understanding and conceptualising thereof. The development of intelligence practices is not stagnant and has similar features worldwide, which this study aims to address. This study specifically aims to describe, explain and explore the formal intelligence practices from earlier times, through both World Wars, following the end of the Cold War and more specific from the post-apartheid era to the present political regime in South Africa.

The history and development of political regimes furthermore reflects on the type and form of intelligence practices and serves as a guide for an evaluation of current practices in comparison to different time periods. This enables a deeper understanding and explanation of the classification of intelligence services and political regime types so as to measure state capacity and form of government against autonomy and penetration of intelligence service as to identify and locate democratic and non-democratic practices. The research objective of chapter seven operationalises the theoretical and meta-theoretical analysis of the intelligence practices within South Africa in the next chapter, as the main aim of this study.

## 7.2 The historic development of political regimes and intelligence practices in South Africa: early times to WWI

The following conceptual framework serves as a roadmap for this chapter as based on the meta-scientific framework of this study, specifically in describing, explaining and exploring the development and history of intelligence practices within political regime types in South Africa:



Source: Own construct

Figure 69: A framework for the conceptualisation of the history and development of intelligence practices and political regime types in South Africa.

### 7.2.1 The early history of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1400-1860

All the same, it took several years and numerous political situations for South Africa to achieve the status as a state and thereby to be a sovereign entity. The early years of South Africa's beginnings found its roots in a borderless continent characterised with the mobilisation of different people. Although linked to developments in the rest of the world, the history and development of intelligence in Africa and more specifically South Africa is very much founded on the actions of imperialistic notions and activities of European countries in Africa which eventually resulted in colonising the continent on the one hand and the interplay of its own people domestically, on the other. The foundations of the society of modern day South Africa, has its roots in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century when different groups of people came into contact with each other (de Villiers, *in Pretorius ed.* 2012:39). The initial rule or political hierarchy were all based as patrimonial systems on chiefdoms, chiefs and headman as well as in some cases, that of a kingdom. The first inhabitants on the southern tip of Africa were the Khoikhoi – initially small scale nomadic sheep and cattle farmers, scattered over vast areas. As Giliomee and Mbhenga (2007:19-21) explain, the Khoikhoi did not have a permanent military structure nor military leaders although they were involved in several battles mostly over cattle theft with neighbouring Khoikhoi. The Khoikhoi furthermore employed some of the San people – renowned as hunters - as soldiers - and hunters to spy on other tribes, focussed to either steal or loot livestock, specifically cattle. Nonetheless, their existence was soon to change with the European's explorations for a sea route to India whereby trade was established between the local inhabitants and the sailors.

This eventually culminated in the establishment of an outpost in the Cape to assist in supplying fresh produce and livestock by the Dutch Vereenigde Oosindische Compagne (VOC - Dutch East India Company) under command of Jan van Riebeeck who arrived on 6 April 1652 (Oakes *ed.*, 1988, 36-37; Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007, 41-43 and De Villiers *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012: 41-42). The arrival and settlement was not at the beginning an initiative to lay claim to the land and colonise it, but rather to merely utilise it as a provision station for passing ships (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:36 and Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:47). Their permanent establishment and later building of a fort for self-defence brought similar trends, as in other countries, whereby intelligence activities – although not yet formalised, focussed on immediate military needs and requirements for the safety of citizens. Most practices were based on reconnaissance and scouting, with the latter linked to the concept of spying. Moreover, the arrival and gradual occupation of land by Europeans and subsequent interaction with local people, followed a similar pattern as on the rest of the African continent.


However, other relevant developments also shaped the political landscape of a future South Africa. These include the free burghers or 'freemen'; settlers and the emergence of the trekboers on the one hand and the simultaneous gradual movement and occupation of the inland territory

by the Nguni and Sotho speaking indigenous people (Oakes ed., 1988:62-67; Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:33-39, 47-84 and De Villiers, *in* Pretorius ed., 2012:43-44). The first French settlers also known as the Huguenots arrived in the Cape from 1688 to 1729, followed by a small number of German settlers in the late 1800's (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:46). Trekboers were migrating livestock farmers that received authorisation in 1714 from the then Cape government structure to expand farm land on a loan system more inland and beyond the initial area of settlement and proved to be the impetus for so-called unsystematic colonisation of the land and later became permanent farm owners (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:62-66). During that time period the Cape Garrison, as the military component at the Cape, was small and did not have enough manpower to assist all in either protection or security. As a measure of resolve, a commando system consisting of field-cornet's/'veldkornets' and commandeered citizenry was inaugurated to supplement the military inadequacies (De Villiers *in* Pretorius ed., 2012:49 and Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:60), which paved the way for a future practice in South African communities.

Nonetheless, the Nguni and Sotho speaking indigenous people were involved in segmentation whereby one group split into two and continued to expand its society and diffusion whereby individual political and economic power was obtained from one group above another (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:33-35). Accordingly the different clans that occupied the areas known today as Eastern Cape (including some areas in the Western Cape) – occupied by the South-Nguni or Xhosa clans and in the Kwazulu-Natal area the North-Nguni or Zulu. To the north of the country the Sotho-Tswana clans settled. Most of the Nguni initially stayed in small communities and chiefdoms but later through the 18<sup>th</sup> century emerged in more dominant groups that conquered and incorporated other smaller groups (Oakes ed., 1988:65). Tension was rife and an uneasy peace remained between the different groups which resulted in the consolidation into larger chiefdoms. Severe drought and competition for water sources and grazing culminated in continuous cattle raiding and dominance between groups. Out of this situation the Zulu kingdom gained central stage together with the Xhosa. During this time period as Peires (2007:1) explains, the Zulu had an *amabutho* system of calling up active men into the impi or army units and developed a separate unit to act as scouts or spies and the skills were handed over from father to son. The Zulu had a professional *corps of spies*, recruited and trained from father to son and the Zulu King, Shaka, had spies in outlying chieftaincies and foreign neighbourhoods (Van Den Berg, 2014:83-84). Although within a military structure, this unit is regarded by this study as the first non-statutory formalisation of intelligence in South Africa. The Xhosa on the other hand, followed a similar pattern as the Khoikhoi and Cape garrison in that they had no formal structure or unit for intelligence functions, although they made use of reconnaissance and scouting during their several skirmishes with neighbouring communities including the free burghers and VOC members.

The political power in the Cape however changed hands from the Dutch when the Netherlands was briefly under French control in January 1795 during the French war. During this period the


British Empire temporally took command of the Cape on behalf of the Dutch in 1795, until a new Batavian government in Netherlands, regained the control back with the signing of Peace Accord of Amiens in Europe on 25 March 1802. This control did not last long either as the British Empire sent an attack force to invade the Cape during January 1806 which overpowered the Dutch and culminated in the colonisation of the region (De Villiers *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:60-62 and Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:79). This action had a profound effect in shaping the future political regimes in South Arica, as it was only the beginning of a politically dominated interaction of Britain over the people of the country. All the same, the flags of different foreign powers flown over the Cape, were as follows:



**Figure 70: Flags flown over the Cape 1652-1875**

By this time, although the basic features of a political hierarchical order were present, some distinctions were blurred in practices in terms of the position of burghers versus company members and slaves with complete legal subordination to those of local indigenous people like the Khoikhoi which were excluded from any rights and privileges. Conflict arose between the different groups resulting in several clashes that include the wars fought by the rising Zulu Kingdom and the subsequent 'Mfecane' known as the period of crushing, scattering of forced migration and dispersal that constituted warfare and domination among the indigenous people. It is often referred to as a holocaust between Nguni and Sotho people that set a chain reaction of bloodshed and devastation with catastrophic repercussions.


The trekboers on the outskirts of the Cape and its magisterial districts (Drosdy) of Swellendam, Graaff-Reinett and Stellenbosch were under the authority of 'heemrade' or local councils and the field-cornets in contrast to the South and North Nguni people (Zulu and Xhosa) which continued to function under patrimonial systems consisting of kings and chiefs and the Khoikhoi under chiefs. The situation in the Cape Colony was not totally acceptable for many trekboers and farmers and ultimately paved the way for the migration of approximately 2300 families in 1835-6 into the interior (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:108) – this was later to be named the Great Trek. As explained by Van Den Berg (2014:84), the Voortrekkers felt a growing dissatisfaction and alienation from British imperialism and migrated north. Nonetheless, the political regime type and intelligence practices during this period are depicted by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 71: Regime typology and intelligence practices in South Africa: 1400 – 1860

Several small republics and independent regions existed which were later either incorporated into the British colonies or into the two Boer Republics. These include Griekwaland-Wes, Griekwaland-East, Stellaland, Goosen, Zululand and Pondoland. Between 1858 and 1860, several other smaller independent areas such as Winburg, Ohrigstad/Lydenburg, Potchefstroom, and Schoemansdal/Soutpansberg were later incorporated with the two Boer Republics to form the Zuid Afrikaansche Republic - South African Republic (ZAR). Other incorporated areas over time include Graaf Reinet, Adam Kokslan/Phillipolis, Kliprivier, Lydenburg, Utrecht, Klein Vrystaat, Upingtonia/Lydensrust and Verenigde State van Stellaland (Grobler, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:175). The urge for independence and self-determination of the trekboers, subsequently led to the establishment of independent Boer Republics after gaining recognition through conventions namely the Zuid Afrischaanse Republiek (ZAR) in 1852 and in 1854 the Republic of the Free State. The British however continued their colonisation through the annexation of Natal in 1843 which was originally declared as the Republic of Natalia in 1839 and it became a separate colony from the Cape in 1849 (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:78-79). The flags and coats of arms of the Colonies of the Cape (1875) and Natal as well as the two Boer Republics are depicted as follows:



**Figure 72: Flags and coat of arms of the Boer republics and British colonies**

As Grobler (*In Pretorius ed.*, 2012:154-165) explains, few Khoikhoi and San communities remained in the Cape area. Similarly the Griekwa, Nama in Namakwaland and Korana in the northwest of the land including Griekwaland-West, were also placed under British control through annexation in 1880. The Xhosa lost the ninth war (1878-1879) to the British Cape Colony that placed the area of Transkei inclusive of Pondoland, Thembuland, and Griekwaland – East; under administration. Equally, the Northern Nguni speaking people inclusive of the Swazi and Zulu, did not escape colonisation. Zululand was annexed by Britain 1887 after several skirmishes and battles. One exception was the Sotho kingdom that gained recognition albeit under British rule, in



1868 as a Basotho protectorate. The Pedi occupied an area known today as Mpumalanga and Limpopo and had an initial agreement with the Voortrekkers in 1845 that unfortunately ended in 1878 where the British brought an end to any independence. The Tswana and more specifically the Barolong had a history of initial cooperation with the Voortrekkers and Boers that ended with conflict with the Bakgatla en Bakwena. The remaining Batlhaping in the current Northwest area were also placed under British rule together with the Griekwa in 1880. In 1885 the British acknowledged Betsjoanaland as a protectorate for the Tswana, but in 1895 integrated the area into the Cape Colony. The Ndebele community with their queen Modjadji in Limpopo also failed to ensure independence and were also placed under the rule of the Boers in the 1890's. Lastly, the Venda in the Soutpansberg/Schoemansdal area remained fairly independent from 1867 until the ZAR took control by military force in 1898 (Grobler, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:154-165). This set the main features for a future apartheid South Africa based on segregation, which was only to change when all citizens received equal status and the right to vote in the new South Africa in 1994. The most significant events in world politics and within South Africa as well as that of intelligence practices, is chronologically delineated in the following table:

**Table 7: Significant political and intelligence events in South Africa: 1400–1860**

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1400–1860	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
<b>1400</b> Nation States in Europe Portuguese Sea Explores <b>1488</b> Dias visits Cape <b>1498</b> Da Gama rounds Cape <b>1500</b> Demise of Portuguese by Spain <b>1600-1700's</b> Imperialism and the Colonisation Of Africa <b>1618-1648</b> Thirty Year War <b>1648</b> Peace of Westphalia <b>1650</b> Dutch VOC <b>1853</b> France II Empire <b>1854-1856</b> Crimean War <b>1790</b> French Revolution <b>1800</b> Batavian Republic	<b>1500</b> Khoikhoi settle in Cape area <b>1600</b> Nguni and Sotho settle <b>1652</b> Dutch VOC station Cape <b>1688</b> Huguenot Settlers <b>1714</b> Trekboers started <b>1795</b> Cape from Dutch to French to British <b>1795-1870</b> Mfecane <b>1800</b> German Settlers <b>1802</b> Dutch Bavarian Cape Control <b>1806</b> British second Occupation of Cape <b>1814</b> Cape a formal British Colony <b>1820</b> British Settlers <b>1834</b> Slaves free <b>1835</b> Great Trek <b>1839</b>	Physical Intelligence- to observe and see Spies, Couriers, Messengers, Diplomats Codes, Encryptions, Secret Writing, Typewriter, Balloons, Signals, Scouts & Reconnaissance <b>1500-1600</b> Henry VIII Secret Police Sir Francis Walsingham Agent network England Queen Elizabeth I John Thurloe Secretary of State <b>1700</b> British and French Secret Funds <b>1703</b> Black Chamber deciphering Britain <b>1790</b> French Espionage <b>1804</b> France – Surete Intelligence <b>1850</b> Austro-Hungary Evidenzbureau Military Intelligence <b>1854</b> British War Office Topographical and Statistics department <b>1856</b> Russian Military Intelligence Evaluation Unit

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1400–1860	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
	Republic of Natalia <b>1843</b> British annexed Natalia <b>1847</b> British Immigrants Natal <b>1851</b> Indian sugar cane labourers in Natal <b>1852</b> Sand River Convention Transvaal <b>1854</b> Bloemfontein Convention Free State <b>1860</b> ZAR	<b>1860</b> Germany Section 111b General Staff Military Intelligence

Source: Own construct

To summarise, as described by this study, various people were present in the country with each displaying their own political rule, clearly indicating that South Africa was not yet by any means close to being a sovereign entity. Political rule and structure gradually developed in the early history in South Africa and consisted of various non-integrated entities that made up the country – more as a geographical designated area than a state or unitary political entity. Apart from the mostly patrimonial chiefdoms and kings, political regime types in the colonies and republics were typically imperialistic, monarchies and autocracies. However, the British rule did bring about a firmer autocratic view of governments role in establishing law and order and the government itself was a deliberate autocracy in which all civil and military power was concentrated in the hands of the Governor alone to ensure direct and absolute imperial control, unhampered by local councils or legislatures. Albeit that the black community was subjected to minority rule in both the two Boer Republics as well as in the two British Colonies of the Cape and Natal (Grobler, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:153) and limited suffrage were common. Van Den Berg (2014:83) indicates that early intelligence activities, as was the case within other communities, were mainly centred on scouting and reconnaissance of either potential enemies or possible victims of crime and theft.

The exception was the first statutory intelligence structure within the political system in the then ZAR, which requires further attention.

### 7.2.2 The ZAR and intelligence developments: 1860 – 1902

The ZAR political structure in 1885, consisted of the Volksraad (House of Assembly) and a president that was voted in through referendum. The republic had a written constitution which even included the role of the church within the state as well as more specifically, limited suffrage. MW Pretorius was simultaneously the President of the Free State Republic as well as that of the ZAR (Grobler, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:171). During this time, as discussed by Heywood (2011:3-

4), territorially-based political units all over the world were beginning to have a more clearly identified national character. Nonetheless, as Van Den Berg (2014:84-85) explains that more formalised intelligence activities, linked to military actions, were to follow especially after the discovery of diamonds and the annexing by the British Empire of the Kimberley area in 1876 and the ZAR in 1877. On 12 April 1877 the ZAR ceased to exist as a proclamation was read out informing burghers that the British officially annexed the country (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:194). These events brought the First Anglo-Boer War about which lasted until 1881, with a humiliating loss to the British Empire – regarded as the superpower of the world at that time. Nonetheless, intelligence as Van Den Berg (2014:84) claims, was still restricted to small scale and mostly the uncoordinated utilisation of scouts by both sides of the war. This was bound to change with the discovery of goldfields in 1886, the need for deep-level mining and the resulted influx of English-speaking immigrants or foreigners (known as “Uitlanders”) to the goldfields and their accompanied political demands for equal rights, brought about a changed political climate within the ZAR.

This study denotes that the national security threats to the ZAR at that time that were instrumental in the establishment of the first institutionalised statutory intelligence structure in Southern Africa and Africa, can be attributed to three aspects, namely firstly; the looming threat of British imperialism and the aims of Cecil John Rhodes from the Cape Colony, to extend the British imperialism from Cape to Cairo (Kamffer, 1999:71-72); secondly, the need to investigate disturbing indications of clandestine activities of “Uitlanders” in Johannesburg (Van Den Bergh, 1974:1) that includes funding and support from the British to destabilise the political and economic situation in the ZAR (Giliomee 2012a, *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:231) and lastly, the sporadic instability and skirmishes between Boers and the local indigenous people. The latter was more effectively addressed through military intervention through the commando system. The first two aspects directly influenced the allocation of a secret fund in the Volksraad and the authorisation to establish a secret police. The then State Secretary Dr WJ Leyds and the State Attorney Advocate Ewald Esselen both played leading roles in the establishment and formation of the ZAR Geheime Dienst or South African Republic Secret Service. As explained by Van Den Berg (2014:88), the latter should get the recognition as the father of intelligence in South Africa.

The main purpose of the ZAR Secret Service was to obtain information on the activities and sentiments of foreigners working in the Witwatersrand area, as well as weapon shipment for their support in an attempt to overthrow the Kruger regime; obviously with the support of Britain through Rhodes’s assistance. (Van Den Berg, 2014:85). This secret service was officially inaugurated on 30 December 1895 within the detective branch of the then ZAR Police which functioned under Commissioner G. J. van Niekerk (Kamffer, 1999:52-55, 92). This happened a day before the Jameson Raid on the Transvaal Republic by Leander Starr Jameson and his Rhodesian and Bechuanaland policemen over the New Year weekend of 1895-96, which was effectively

countered but contributed to the increase of animosity between Brit and Boer (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:207-209 & Van Den Berg, 2014:86-87).

Upon the later resignation of Esselen, J.C. Smuts was appointed State Attorney during June 1898 and took command and control of both the detective unit and secret service upon which he placed the latter within his office. He subsequently appointed T.A.P. Kruger (son of President Kruger) as a Secretary with the Secret Service with administrative responsibility (Kamffer, 1999:101-125). Smuts ensured that more funds be made available as to increase the efforts of the service in assisting in the safety and security of the Republic (Van Den Bergh, 1974).

The secret service was bound by the Police Act of 1885 and was constituted through authorisation of the Volksraad and furthermore had rules and regulations (Van Den Bergh, 1973:650). The secret service made use of typical intelligence tradecraft ranging from codenames and codes, cut-outs and human intelligence/agents (Kamffer, 1999:399). During October 1898 the ZAR declared war against the British Empire and the Second Anglo Boer War commenced (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:223). The secret service had approximately one hundred members in its duty (Kamffer, 1999:409-413). Moreover, the secret service functioned in three areas during the war, namely: (1) the home front; (2) the battle front and; (3) behind enemy lines (Van Den Bergh, 1974 and Kamffer, 1999:382).

On the home front, a section of the service remained in Pretoria and the Johannesburg area as to continue to monitor the large number of British subjects and Uitlanders due to the key positions they held in the commercial world and public service. At the battle front the agents of the secret service functioned beside scouts of the Boer Commando's to obtain tactical military intelligence for the Boer officers in charge. Behind enemy lines the agents were deployed beyond the then borders of the ZAR in areas within the colonies as well as far as Mozambique. As a result of this practice the foreign branch of the secret service was born (Kamffer, 1999:400). The service was also responsible for counterintelligence operations against the British military intelligence division and was required to identify both the spies and their specific activities (Kamffer, 1999:403). Secret Service members wore a pin for identification (Van Den Berg, 2014:87) in a concealed manner with the inscription *Geheime Politi ZAR* (Kamffer, 1999:114; 125). This pin clearly indicates the insignia of the Secret Service as based on the Coat of Arms of the ZAR and is depicted together with the first head of statutory intelligence:




**Figure 73: State attorney Ewald Esselen and the ZAR secret service identification pin**

In contrast, the Directorate Military Intelligence of the British forces allocated 18 officers to serve in the Division Intelligence during the period 1896 -1899 (Kamffer, 1999:403). The British forces also made extensive use of Boers and Colonialists called Joiners; as well as those who gave up arms – known as Hensoppers and a number of black people as informants to supply them with information of Boer tactics, resources and deployment (Kamffer, 1999:389 and Pretorius, 2012a). The role of the human agent was thus significantly developed during this war in addition to the existing utilisation of scouting and reconnaissance practices. However, Van Den Bergh (1974) observes that the Scout Corps of the Boer Commando became more relevant as the war evolved which resulted in the steady withdrawal of the secret service agents to their headquarters in Pretoria until the British invasion of Pretoria on 5 June 1900. Equally, the role of agents was gradually taken over by the more appropriate military structures that included the Reconnaissance Corps of Danie Theron consisting of about two hundred men. They established themselves so well that they became the eyes and ears of the Commando's (Pretorius 2012b, *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:242).

In addition, in the latter part of the Second Anglo-Boer War, General L. Botha, gave an instruction to Captain J.J. Naude to provide information on the activities of the British (Kamffer, 1999:386-388) in Pretoria. Naude established a Geheime Dienst Kommissie (Secret Service Commission) consisting of about ten members. However, as Van Den Berg (2014:89) explains, this Commission did not replace the Secret Service and it did not have any official status but was however effective in penetrating the British military intelligence structure in Pretoria where a list was obtained with all the names of Boer spies used by the British (Kamffer, 1999: 386-387). The Commission was also dissolved at the end of the war in 1902 with the surrender of the ZAR (Van Der Waag, 2015:9-58).

The political regime of the ZAR and its Secret Service is graphically depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 74: The ZAR political regime and the Secret Service in 1898

Nonetheless, the significant events in this time period are depicted in the following table:

Table 8: Significant political and intelligence events: 1860 – 1910

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1860 – 1910	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
<b>1861</b> Abraham Lincoln US President <b>1861-1865</b> US Civil War <b>1862</b> Prussia ruled by Parliament <b>1864</b> Geneva Convention <b>1869</b> Suez Canal Opens <b>1870-1871</b> Franco Prussian war	<b>1860</b> ZAR <b>1877</b> Britain Annex Transvaal <b>1881</b> British defeated at Amajuba ZAR Partial Independence <b>1883</b> Paul Kruger President <b>1884</b> ZAR Full Independence	<b>1860</b> Photography <b>1860</b> German Section IIIb Military <b>1866</b> German Secret Field Police <b>1867</b> Prussian Intelligence Bureau <b>1870</b> France Statistical Military Reconnaissance <b>1871</b> France Deuxieme Bureau Army

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1860 – 1910	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
End of France II Empire and beginning of Third Republic <b>1874</b> Britain Colonize Ghana <b>1876</b> Bell Invents Telephone <b>1878</b> Walvis Bay proclaimed British territory <b>1881</b> Portugal in Angola France in Brazzaville and Tunisia <b>1884</b> British Colonial Office Britain in South Coast New-Guinea and Germans North East France in Guinea Germany in German South West Africa, Togo and Cameroon <b>1885</b> Belgium in Congo, Britain in Botswana, Germany in Tanzania, France in Central Africa and Madagascar <b>1886</b> Britain in Zanzibar <b>1887</b> Italy in Eritrea <b>1888</b> Brazil a Republic <b>1893</b> Women vote Australia <b>1900</b> France in Chad <b>1902</b> Britain in Nyasaland/Malawi <b>1902</b> France in Niger <b>1905</b> France in CAR <b>1907</b> British Dominion Office	<b>1885</b> ZAR Constitution <b>1886</b> Gold Witwatersrand <b>1890</b> Second Volksraad for Foreigners <b>1895</b> Secret Service ZAR <b>1898</b> ZAR Declare War British <b>1900</b> Commando Scout Corps Secret Service Commission <b>1902</b> End of War Peace Treaty of Vereeniging British Colonies in South Africa	<b>1873</b> British Intelligence Branch <b>1881</b> Japan Kemei Tai Army Intelligence <b>1881</b> Russia Okhrana Political Secret Police <b>1883</b> US Office of Navy Intelligence <b>1885</b> US Bureau of Military Information Army Intelligence <b>1887</b> British Naval Intelligence <b>1908</b> US Bureau of Investigations (FBI) <b>1909</b> British MO-6 (MI6) Foreign Intelligence Other Intelligence Developments: Mail Interception Typewriter Deciphering Encryptions Morse-code Scouts & Reconnaissance Espionage Networks Aerial Photographs Telegraph, telephone & Wire tapping Counterintelligence Double Agents Agents/Informants/Spies Secret Budgets Telescope Surveillance Covert Operations

Source: Own construct


To summarise, the perceived national threat perspective and the looming instability within the then ZAR, culminated in the establishment of the first statutory intelligence structure in South Africa - having its roots deeply established within a police unit, similar to the origins of most intelligence services in the rest of the world (Van Den Berg, 2015:164). In addition, the secret service supplied information for the Volksraad to use in their decision-making through the office of the Secretary and Commissioner of Police (Kamffer, 1999:401). It thus became clear that the secret service collected information of political, economic and military value both internally and externally; as well as conducted counterintelligence. The war subsequently allowed for the



development and formalisation of military intelligence through the establishment of the Bicycle Corps. The latter was so effective in its military intelligence role in that Captain Danie Theron is regarded as the father of the later established Army Intelligence Corps in South Africa (Kamffer, 1999:385), and that it set the tone for future military intelligence structures. Nevertheless, the ZAR became obsolete in 1902 with its transfer into a British Colony and simultaneously as Van Den Bergh (1974) explicates: “After the fall of Pretoria ... De Geheime Dienst disappeared as a unit and, perhaps with poetic justice, died as it was born, in obscurity”. This brought the era of the Union of South Africa and its intelligence practices to the fore.


### 7.2.3 The Union of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1910 - WWI

The former Boer Republics of the ZAR – renamed as Transvaal Colony and the Free State – Renamed as Orange River Colony; received colony status whilst the Colonies of the Cape and Natal, maintained theirs. After the Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902, several conventions up to 1909, were instituted to address unification of the four colonies. The flags of the Boer Republics changed as well and are depicted as follows:



**Figure 75: Orange River Colony flag and Transvaal colony flag 1902-1910**


The parliaments of all the four colonies approved a new concept constitution (excluding universal suffrage) in 1909, which the Westminster Parliament of Britain constituted as the Act of South Africa, enabling official formation of the Union of South Africa on 31 May 1910 (Scher, *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:256-259). The coat of arms, flag and parliament logo of the union as follows:



**Figure 76: Union of South Africa coat of arms, flag and the parliament logo**



The Union was founded as a constitutional monarchy within a unitary system and a bicameral parliament with a House of Assembly as an elected Lower House and a Senate as an Upper House, under an elected President. The British Crown was represented by a Governor-General with the Union President in his Council. Shortly thereafter, the Union Defence Force Act 13 of 1912 provided the terms for the establishment of a Union Defence Force (UDF) without any specific provisions for an intelligence structure (Potgieter, 1970:37-38). The intelligence functions of the colonies were handled by the British Crown and continued as such with the outbreak of the First World War even with the establishment of an intelligence sub-branch at the Defence Headquarters in December 1917 (Van Der Waag, 2015:140). Under command of Major Johann Leipoldt the unit focussed on the internal threat perceived as 'native' unrests, industrial and labour strikes and the operations of enemy agents on the other. The war ended on 11 November 1918 and at the Balfour Declaration of the 1926 Imperial conference, Britain agreed that all its dominions be seen as equal in status (Scher, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:261-262 and Giliomee 2012b, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:293). In 1930, Britain's Governor-General became a High Commissioner, as representative of the Crown and with the Westminster Statute of 1931, the sovereignty of the Union of South Africa was ensured (Scher, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:264 and Giliomee 2012c, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:293). The political regime of the Union of South Africa as a dominion of Britain and the intelligence practices is delineated as follow:



Source: Own construct

Figure 77: The Union political regime and intelligence practices 1910 - WWI

Nonetheless, the most significant events for this period are delineated in the following table:

**Table 9: Significant political and intelligence events: 1910 – WWI**

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1910 - WWI	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
<b>1911</b> Britain in Northern Rhodesia <b>1912</b> France in Morocco <b>1914</b> WWI starts with assassination of Archduke Ferdinand Germany in Belgium Austria Hungary declares war Serbia Britain declares war Germany Germany war France and Russia France in Togo <b>1915</b> Italy declares war Austria Hungary SA UDF to Swakopmund and Britain in South West Africa <b>1916</b> Germany declares war Portugal <b>1917</b> Russian Revolution Greece declares war US declares war Germany <b>1918</b> Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicates <b>1918/9</b> End of WWI <b>1919</b> Treaty of Versailles, League of Nations British in British East Africa, British Cameroon, Tanganyika territory, Kenya, Somalia and Bechuanaland/Botswana France in French Cameroon <b>1923</b> Britain in Southern Rhodesia <b>1921-1926</b> Commonwealth Conferences <b>1923</b> France in Algeria <b>1926</b> Balfour Declaration Portugal in Angola and Mozambique <b>1929</b> Great Depression	<b>1909</b> Conferences between Colonies to discuss Union Constitution of Union SA with limited suffrage for citizens Integration of Colonies <b>31 May 1910</b> Union of SA Prime Minister Louis Botha <b>1912</b> UDF established <b>1912</b> Predecessor to ANC formed <b>1913</b> Natives Land Act <b>1914</b> SA joins Britain in war <b>1917</b> Sub-branch Military Intelligence <b>1919-1924</b> JC Smuts Prime Minister <b>1920</b> South African Native National Congress (SANNC) <b>1921</b> South African Communist Party <b>1923</b> African National Congress (ANC) <b>1924-1936</b> JBM Hertzog Prime Minister <b>1928</b> New Flag <b>1931</b> Independent Dominion British High Commissioner in SA <b>1936</b> Native Trust and Land Act	Physical Intelligence Verbal Intelligence Military Intelligence Units Signal Intelligence Radio Communication Radio Interception Sabotage Psychological Warfare HUMINT <b>1911</b> British MO-5 (MI6) Security Counterintelligence <b>1917</b> Cheka - Russia <b>1919</b> British GCHQ

Source: Own construct

In summary, within the articles of the Treaty of Vereeniging agreement, the former Boer Republics and British Colonies received support to institute a constitution and to grant only a limited vote to citizens. Self-governance seems to be perceived as a viable option instead of following a strong British Imperialistic rule (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007: 229). Britain followed a sort of indirect rule

via a Governor-General and gave the colonies autonomy to vote for their own prime-minister respectively. Even so, World War I is regarded as a strategic intelligence failure as intelligence services could neither predict the outbreak of the war nor the type of trench warfare to follow. The intelligence needs of the Union were met by the then already established British Security Service (O' Brien, 2011:14) and the British Military Department. The future political dispensation was set for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and its dominance of the political landscape in South Africa. Even so, the world was on the brink of another world war with the start of WWII.

### **7.3 The historic development of political regimes and intelligence practices in South Africa: WWII – 1989 Negotiations NIS**

The period from WWII until negotiations in 1989 saw South Africa developed into a more structured uniformed political system and more clearly outlined borders accompanied with the concept of a unitary sovereign state. Likewise the intelligence practices also changed and developed in similar fashion as also linked to the international world. This period is as follows:

#### **7.3.1 The Union of South Africa and intelligence developments: WWII-1961**

During WWII which lasted from 1939 to 1945, civilian intelligence remained on the backburner in South Africa for some time as the presence of institutionalised military intelligence dominated this function (Van Den Berg, 2015:164). General Smuts was again appointed as Prime-minister and was not only serving as Prime-minister but also as Foreign Minister, Minister of Defence as well as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:295). Smuts furthermore dismissed a non-partisan bureaucracy and brought all government departments in line with a policy in support of the war effort which resulted in the vague distinctions between the party in power and government functions (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:301 and Giliomee 2012c, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:307). This situation seems to be prevalent in South African political regimes. Furthermore, as Van Der Waag (2015:179-180) explains, the South African Police in liaison with the military intelligence, was responsible to monitor Nazi Germany activities in South Africa. Internal security and more specifically information and intelligence related to internal security remained more within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Police under Colonel JJ Coetzee. The Special Branch of the South African Police was established in 1947 and followed in the footsteps of the CID, mainly with an internal security function through their focus on the collection of tactical intelligence. In the 1950's this branch was more commonly referred to as the Special Branch - SB (Van Den Berg, 2014:90), later to be known as the Security Branch. The SB, with H. J. du Plooy as head, became the de facto security and intelligence advisor to the Union Government during the 1950's. Intelligence was gathered mainly about political opponents of apartheid, and aimed at achieving short and medium term objectives such as detentions, prosecutions and imprisonments (Africa 2006:74 and Potgieter, 1970:8). A formal military


intelligence directorate was also established in 1940 initially under Lieutenant-colonel FT Newman and later professor EG Malherbe as the head (Van Der Waag, 2015:180 and Potgieter, 1970:7). This structure incorporated and upgraded the earlier military intelligence section formed in 1939 as part of the UDF under command of Colonel BW Thwaites. This new military intelligence structure was mainly responsible for information liaison with the press, internal security, local censorship and propaganda.

The British MI5 liaison officer in South Africa at that time was Major WHA Webster with his deputy Major Luke and focussed on counterespionage and counter sabotage issues (Fedorowich, 2005:219). Internal intelligence threats during WWII include German espionage, subversion and propaganda as well as pro-German supporters and organisations. Other priorities comprise several nationalist Afrikaner organisations which were against support of and the involvement in the war. The war support to Britain provided additional impetus to an anti-British sentiment and self-preservation of an Afrikaner people which culminated in the establishment of several organisations like the Ossewa Brandwag (OB-‘Ox-wagon Sentinel’) as a semi-military structure supporting Germany’s war efforts and the Nuwe Orde (New Order) which supported Afrikaner socialism (Giliomee, 2012c *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:306). The actions taken internally in countering these activities according to Fokkens (2012:120), incorporate that the Union Government subject political opponents and suspects to detainment, imprisonment (even without trial), confiscating private letters, tapping telephones, detaining citizens; all under the War Measures Act. After the war, one of the immediate actions of the new government was to change the culture of the Defence force more in favour of Afrikaners as to downscale the British influences and traditions. This action also followed suit into the rest of the public administration.

On the political front, the strive for an independent republic increased which provided additional stimulus to Afrikaner Nationalism (Giliomee, 2012c *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:293-307). Segregation of the different people in South Africa including limited suffrage to citizens remained high on the political agenda with an increase in urbanisation. The United Nations (UN) was established after the end of WWII in 1945 as to promote international co-operation and peace between different nations. Two superpowers emerged, namely the US and Soviet Union as opposing forces that eventually triggered the Cold War. Smuts also played a vital role in writing the pre-amble of the UN Charter in 1945 (Nattrass, 2017:163). Afrikaner Nationalism came more strongly to the fore, especially assisting the National Party to come into power in 1948 with a new prime-minister DF Malan, to replace the ousted General Smuts (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:367, Van Der Waag, 2015:219-220 and Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:309-311). JG Strydom succeeded Malan as Prime-Minister in 1954 and upon his death in 1958. Dr Hendrik Verwoerd followed in his footsteps (Giliomee & Mbhenga, 2007:313). The impetus for independence as well as segregation remained high on the political agenda. Furthermore as Van Der Waag (2015:238) explains, a consolidation of the defence legislation begins which culminated into a new Defence Act in 1957 – changing the name

of the UDF to that of the South African Defence Force (SADF). During a period that the rest of Africa started with an 'uhuru' (freedom) movement towards independency from colonialism; South Africa under Verwoerd in contradiction; continued to promote a policy for independent states and self-governing territories within the country as to accommodate different ethnic groups within (Scher, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:332-337). In 1959 the government abolished the posts of four (albeit white) representatives in parliament, representing the non-white vote. Black voters were forced to rather accept political independency within the newly propagated homelands (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:324).

The Cold War brought assistance to national resistance movements, insurgency groups and revolutionaries in Africa by the Soviet Union. Various opposition groups such as the African National Congress (ANC – origins 1912), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC-established 1960), the Azanian Peoples Movement (AZAPO – 1978) the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA – 1970's) and the South African Communist Party (SACP – founded 1921 and banned in 1950), amongst others, were involved. Their strategy also changed in 1960 from defiance and non-violence campaigns to an armed struggle and sabotage through armed structures such as the ANC – Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) (Van Der Waag, 2015:249). These actions would also later change the security apparatus and its focus within South Africa. The political and intelligence systems in South Africa up to 1961, is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 78: The Union political regime and intelligence practices WWII - 1960**

Albeit, the most significant events for this time period are delineated in the following table:

**Table 10: Significant Political and Intelligence Events WWII - 1960**

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS WWI-1960	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
<b>1939 – WWII</b> <b>1940</b> Churchill Prime Minister UK <b>1944</b> D-day <b>1945</b> Germany surrenders US Atomic bombs Japan Potsdam Conference Cold War starts UN formed <b>1946</b> Italy abolish monarchy <b>1947</b> India and Ghana independency League of Nations <b>1948</b> Korea Independency Israeli state established Berlin Blockade <b>1949</b> Revolution People's Republic of China NATO Treaty West Germany and East Germany Indonesia independence <b>1950</b> Korean War <b>1951</b> Libya independent <b>1952</b> Elizabeth new Queen UK <b>1953</b> Kenyan rebellion Egypt republic under military rule <b>1955</b> Warsaw Pact <b>1956</b> Hungarian revolt Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia independency <b>1957</b> MPLA & FNLA formed Angola <b>1958</b> Guinea independence <b>1959</b> Castro president in Cuba North and South Vietnam war <b>1960</b> Congo, Cameroon, Togo, Mali, Senegal, Madagascar, Somalia, Niger, Chad, Ivory Coast, CAR, DRC, Gabon and independency SWAPO formed SWA	<b>1939</b> Support to Britain WWII <b>1940</b> Military Intelligence structure <b>1945</b> Smuts wrote UN pre-amble <b>1947</b> Special Branch in SAP <b>1948</b> NP election victory <b>1950</b> SACP banned <b>1951</b> Bantu Authorities Act Separate Registration of Voters Ban on mixed marriages Segregation <b>1952</b> "Pass" Act Defiance Campaign <b>1955</b> Freedom Charter <b>1955</b> Treason Trail <b>1954</b> Strijdom Prime Minister <b>1957</b> SADF Bus boycotts Union Jack replaced by Union Flag <b>1958</b> Verwoerd Prime Minister Segregation acts <b>1958</b> Police more independency <b>1959</b> Mining strike Anti-pass actions PAC Self-government for Black's policy <b>1960</b> No Black voter representation White Referendum for independence MK – Armed struggle Sharpeville State of Emergency	Covert Action Double agent operations Counterespionage Analogue revolution Intelligence Cycle Intelligence Analysis Cryptology and decipher Intelligence as academic study Electronic interceptions Image Intelligence IMINT Electronic Intelligence Elint Satellite Intelligence Satint Intelligence Communities; Civil, Military and Police <b>1934</b> Russian NKVD <b>1940</b> British Security Coordination <b>1941</b> US Intelligence Coordination <b>1942</b> US OSS <b>1943</b> Russian MVD & MGB <b>1944</b> France SDECE & DST <b>1945</b> MI6 Britain <b>1945</b> Polish Intelligence <b>1946</b> US Central Intelligence Group <b>1947</b> CIA & Security Council <b>1949</b> Mossad & Shin Bet <b>1950</b> Aman Israel <b>1952</b> Australian intelligence <b>1954</b> KGB

**Source: Own construct**

To conclude, although South Africa escaped the interests and competition between the USSR and USA in terms of military aid and support to new regimes in Africa, its racial policy brought

severe critique and opposition from the rest of the Commonwealth (Van Der Waag, 2015:217). The Cold War Era brought a struggle for power and domination in the world as well as within the African continent by the East and West, to the fore (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:333-4). The Defence policy was influenced by a strong West alliance against the East and communism as an internal and external threat, similarly as was the case in the US and other European countries (Van Der Waag, 2015:240). Furthermore, and more importantly to note and as Van Der Waag (2015:225) explains, South Africa had no security/intelligence service and the UK, despite having no security liaison officer in the Union, at the time, was opposed to the creation of any such a service as it was seen that such a services may be used by the Nationalists against parliamentary opposition and members of the British community, as well as to oppress black races. The 1958 Police Act that provided for counterinsurgency operations and activities also paved the way for South Africa to become a police security state. This is supported by Van Der Waag (2015:214) who claims that South Africa gradually moved down the path to 'garrison statehood'. All the same, the political regime changed dramatically in 1961 with a declaration of independence of South Africa, from the Imperial British Crown.

### 7.3.2 The Republic of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1961-1965

On 31 May 1961 South Africa left the Commonwealth and became a parliamentary republic (Nattrass, 2017:188). Significantly, this is the same date the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed in 1902 signalling the end of the second Anglo-Boer War, and equally the same date in 1910 that the Union of South Africa was inaugurated. The Constitution of 1961 provided for a Westminster type of political system with a parliament and a Prime Minister as head of government within a cabinet, as executive. The former British Crown was replaced with a ceremonial State President (Scher, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:337-339). Similar to the former Union, Parliament consisted of an upper house – the Senate, and a lower house – House of Assembly. All the same, the coat of arms, flag and parliament logo of the Republic of South Africa, is depicted as follows:




**Figure 79: The Republic of South Africa coat of arms, flag and the parliament logo**

The members elected in 1958 in the Union, continued in the new republic as representatives. Likewise, as with the Union, no Black votes were represented and limited votes by Coloureds.



The country consisted of four provinces representing the former colonies, each under an administrator. CR Swart was the first State President and Verwoerd the Prime Minister. The then Prime Minister Verwoerd appointed B.J. Vorster as Minister of Justice and he believed that security of the state was a priority and proceeded to push through a series of laws designed to crush any resistance to government policy. Some of these included the detaining of someone for 90 days without trial (Nattrass, 2017:189 and Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:340). More so, as Oakes *ed.*, (1988:412) explains, Minister Vorster promoted General Hendrik Van Den Bergh as the new head of the security police. These two had a relationship dating back to their detainee period during the WWII at Koffiefontein due to their membership of the Ossewabrandwag (OB). Van Den Bergh was the OB counterintelligence head (Van Der Waag, 2015:182). However, as Oakes *ed.*, (1988:412) claims, “Vorster used the political machinery at his disposal to create vast new powers for the Security Police which, armed with real teeth, were at last able to come to grips with the perceived ‘revolutionary’ threat of the black opposition movements.” Likewise, as Van Den Berg (2014:92-93) discusses, Genl. Van Den Bergh established the Republic Intelligence (RI) unit to counter any internal political resistance. The State Security Committee was also formed as a central intelligence coordinating structure in 1963 (Potgieter, 1970:10). The political system and intelligence structures in the early years of the republic, is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 80: The Republic of South Africa's political regime and intelligence practices 1961-1965**



In conclusion, this initial post-colonial era marked the sovereign identity, people and territory of South Africa as an independent recognised state, albeit with limited suffrage. South Africa joined numerous other countries that were also decolonised. The national security threat perception in South Africa, as much as in London and Washington, was still however being influenced by the threat of communism and communist inspired insurgency in Africa (Van Der Waag, 2015:251-252). However, during this time period Nelson Mandela and other co-accused MK-ANC members were arrested for sabotage in what became known as the Rivonia trial (Scher, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:342). Much of the successes claimed by the then South African government in countering the revolutionary threat in the early 1960's could be ascribed to the effectiveness of the Republic Intelligence and Special Branch. This was to change with the appearance of the second established statutory intelligence structure on a similar pattern as well as in the footsteps of the ZAR Secret Service.

### 7.3.3 The Republic of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1966 – 1978

The said relationship between Vorster and Van Den Bergh was strengthened after the assassination of Verwoerd in 1966 when Verwoerd became Prime Minister and the latter was appointed as his chief security advisor or Secretary for State Security. In addition Oakes *ed.*, (1988:412) states: "Together, these two loomed larger than life over the security apparatus of the state for nearly two decades...." As explained by Potgieter (1970:47), O'Brien (2011:26) and Van Den Berg (2014:93-94), Gen. Van Den Bergh received an instruction from Prime Minister Vorster to set up the Bureau for State Security; labelled by the media as BOSS. This department had no executive powers as such powers remained within the Department of Military intelligence (DMI) and the Special Branch (SB) of which both had an executive mandate. Clause 2 of the 1969 Public Service Amendment Act stipulated that the staff members of the Bureau are controlled by the Prime Minister and not the Public Services Commission. BOSS was officially gazetted on 16 May 1969 through Proclamation No. 808 of 1969 of the State President. This action was also supported in Section 20 of the then Constitution of South Africa (Act 32 of 1961). Likewise both services also utilised the coat of arms of the state as an emblem as depicted as follows:



Buro vir Staatsveiligheid

Bureau for State Security

**Figure 81: Emblem of the Bureau for State Security of the Republic of South Africa**

The establishment of the Bureau was only formalised later with the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act No 64 of 1972. Nonetheless, the functions and mandate of the Bureau for State Security as stipulated in Section 2 of this Act, states the following: “(a) to collect, evaluate, correlate and interpret national security intelligence for the purpose of – (i) detecting and identifying any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic; (ii) advising the Minister to any such threat; (b) to collect departmental intelligence at the request of any interested department of State, and without delay to evaluate and transmit such intelligence and any other intelligence at the disposal of the Bureau and which constitutes departmental intelligence, to the department concerned; (c) to prepare and interpret, for consideration of the Council, a national intelligence estimate relating to any threat to the security of the Republic, and in this regard to advise the Council of any other intelligence at its disposal which may have an influence on any State policy relating to the combat of any such threat; (d) to formulate, for approval by the Council, a policy relating to national security intelligence, and, after consultation with the departments of State entrusted with any aspects of the maintenance of the security of the Republic, to co-ordinate the flow of security intelligence between such departments; (e) to make recommendations to the Council on intelligence priorities.” According to Mostert (2017), the Bureau did engage in some form of covert action and had shielded members within Division Z. These members operated under command of Van Den Bergh and their activities include efforts to manipulate the extra parliamentary political scene inside and outside the country. These actions however, did not include violence and or political assassinations. As Mostert (2017) explains, most members of the RI were transferred as well as other specially chosen members from other departments including some members from Foreign Affairs and so-called civilians from outside state institutions. The initial offices was at Wachthuis (Skinner street, Pretoria), but later in Concilium as well as part of the DMI offices in Alphen. In addition, the staff compliment of the Bureau never exceeded one and a half thousand members (Mostert, 2017).

Nevertheless, the Bureau became, as Oakes *ed.*, (1988:412) claims, the paramount coordinator of all state intelligence and counterintelligence activities. According to Mostert (2017), an important change from tactical reporting or descriptive intelligence towards strategic intelligence took place in the middle 70’s, with the first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced under the auspices of the Bureau but with inputs from Foreign Affairs, DMI and the SB. During 1978, Act 104 of 1978, was added to legislation as to regulate the administration of the Bureau. According to Giliomee and Mbenga (2007:341), South Africa was flooded with numerous police spies and informants during the middle sixties that placed a constraint on any opposition to government. South Africa was nevertheless seen as a police state (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:349). Furthermore, similar to the origins of many other intelligence services at that time in the world, this service had its heritage within the Special Branch of the Police; noteworthy also similar to the first statutory intelligence service in South Africa – the ZAR Secret Service situated within the ZARP Detective Branch.

South Africa underwent a more dramatic change in its national security perception and entered the era of greater securitisation. On the political side the development of the homeland policy started to gain momentum whilst South Africa was more economically isolated from the rest of the world. The flags and coats of arms of the homelands (with the exception of Kangwane that used the Swaziland flag), are depicted as follows:





Figure 82: The coat of arms and national flags of the homelands

The Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970 provided for Blacks to no longer be able to obtain citizenship in South Africa but had to identify themselves in an ethnic group associated homeland (Nattrass, 2017:199-200). These homelands had different recognition within the country as well as within the international world. Within these homelands only Venda, Transkei and Bophuthatswana had a separate intelligence apparatus namely the Venda National Intelligence Service (VIS), the Transkei Intelligence Service (TIS) and the Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence Service (BIIS), respectively. However, Portugal underwent dramatic political regime change in 1974 that ultimately brought the decolonisation of Mozambique and Angola in 1975. Both countries subsequently suffered severe internal conflict between different forces trying to gain power (Van Der Waag, 2015:256-264; Du Pisani *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:356-368; Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:359-362 and Oakes *ed.*, 1988, 434-439). The conflict in Angola specifically brought the SADF into play and South Africa became entangled in a “Border War” which lasted into the late 1980’s.

At the same time in 1978, as Van Den Berg (2014:94-95) explains, the ‘Information Scandal’ (where covert funds were used to influence perceptions of South Africa overseas by purchasing media outlets and publications); led to the end of Vorster’s premiership as well as the resignation of Van Den Bergh as head of BOSS. The latter was replaced by his deputy Alec van Wyk and BOSS also underwent a name change on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September 1978 - the name of the Bureau of State Security was changed to that of the Department of National Security (DONS) with Proclamation no R260 of 1978 (National Intelligence Service, 1994:15). Although the Security Council existed, it rarely met during before this time. The changes in the security threat perception however also affected the structure and practices of security and intelligence. The era of the so-called “Total Onslaught” (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:453-456) was entered into against the background of the heightened Cold War and increased threat of world domination by communists. Within this context, the 1977 White Paper on Defence, outlined a comprehensive strategy which called for the marshalling of all state resources to combat revolutionary warfare while simultaneously engaging in substantive domestic reforms (Van Der Waag, 2015:251). This strategic response as Van Der Waag (2015:251-252) explains, is based on the works of French general Andre Beaufre (counter revolutionary warfare expert); American Colonel JJ McCuen and political scientist Samuel Huntington. This formed the basis for the ‘total onslaught’ concept within South Africa’s national security strategy as involving all levels and functions of the state structure. This furthermore culminated in the establishment in 1978 of a comprehensive National Security Management System (NSMS) under the leadership of the new Prime Minister PW Botha (former Defence Minister). The NSMS involved the coordination of the national strategy on all levels of government through regional, district and local Joint Management Centres and every government department on national and provincial level took part (Van Der Waag, 2015:153). The state coordinated this national strategy in four principal areas, namely politics; diplomacy; economics and military based on direct military action and indirect non-military action. Even so, the structure


of the NSMS which later became a shadow government system, is delineated by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 83: National Security Management System (NSMS)

Within the changes in BOSS due to the Information scandal, a former Minister of Defence as new President and the NSMS receiving more prominence, the DMI became the dominant intelligence structure and South Africa transformed to a more militarised society which also included the broadening of compulsory military conscription for all white males in the country. Through this strategy, the military and more specifically military intelligence (DMI) gradually gained more recognition for its role as an intelligence structure. The implementation of NSMS, according to Van Der Waag (2015:277) brought two governments to the fore while the state was militarised and the security forces politicised. The South African political system and its intelligence practices during this time period, is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 84: The Republic of South Africa's political regime and intelligence practices 1978**

To summarise, the formation of the Bureau for State Security albeit without powers of arrest, place intelligence practices primarily within its mandate during this time period and the military and police intelligence moved to the background. Amidst the height of the Cold War, the communist threat gradually influenced the national threat perception and subsequent legislation as to counter this threat. This era also saw the greater involvement of South Africa's military in neighbouring countries, including Angola in the war against communism. The Apartheid policy

culminated in the creation and independence of several homeland territories, while limited suffrage remained in the greater South Africa. These actions placed the country on a road towards economic and political isolation from the international world. However, the political system and intelligence practices gradually started to take a deeper turn into securitisation.

#### **7.3.4 The Republic of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1978 – 1989**

Within the political situation in South Africa, the Apartheid policy remained on track with the independence of Venda in 1979 and that of Ciskei in 1981. Nonetheless, during this time period one could almost depict South Africa as two separate state entities according to Giliomee (2012d *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:390). One state is a so-called 'inner state' under control of senior government officials and Afrikaner pressure groups and the 'outer state' consisting of the heads of the security forces, business leaders and the leaders of the homelands. In contrast to his predecessor, PW Botha continued to institute several political changes since he became Prime Minister. The Presidents Council was established in 1989, consisting of Coloured, Indian and a Chinese representatives (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:468).

In May 1982 the President's Council presented its proposals for the reform of government structures, recommending the three-tier parliamentary system. The Senate therefore became redundant and was dissolved under constitutional amendments. The legislature consisted as one chamber or unicameral parliament. In addition the posts of Prime Minister and the symbolic State President were discarded and replaced by a new post combining Head of State and Government, into that of an executive presidency under a State President. Another change brought about was that all members of the executive remain elected members of Parliament, except for the State President. The last Prime-Minister became the first executive State President.

Furthermore, a new Constitution was introduced in 1984 with a tri-cameral legislature each with a Speaker and consisting of the existing House of Assembly for whites, established a House of Representatives for Coloured representatives and a House of Delegates for Indians. Blacks however continued to be excluded (Giliomee, 2012d, *in Pretorius ed.*, 2012:399-400). This tri-cameral parliament based on race and cultural groups made a distinction between own affairs and general national affairs. The latter still had the majority vote based on a voter list making provision for white minority power. The State President is also to be elected by the three chambers but the concealed power to the House of Assembly ensured that the existing majority party has the controlling voting power. Own affairs bills were passed by the House of each group and bills related to general affairs, needed to be passed by all three houses. The exception was that the State President could still refer bills to the President's Council (which is appointed by the State President), where the majority party had the control if any bill was not passed (Oakes *ed.*,

1988:468). Limited representation of Blacks in local municipality districts also followed (Van Der Waag, 2015:275).

This situation could be depicted as follows:

**Table 11: The NSM as parallel governing structure**

SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL REGIME	NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM	INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Executive: President State Security Council Cabinet  Parliament/Legislative  Provincial Administration SANDF Command Regions  Regional Administration Magistrate Districts  Municipal and Local Administration  <div style="text-align: center;">↓</div> Voter/Elective, Homelands and South-West Africa	NSMS JMC Executive  NSMS Committee's  12 x JMC  Sub – JMC  Local - JMC	DMI SANDF SB – SAP BOSS/DONS JIC

**Source: Own construct**

Nonetheless, the order and stability brought about by the initial government system reforms were short lived as the extra parliamentary groups aimed to make the country ungovernable through various mass action campaigns which included increased guerrilla tactics such as bombings, sabotage and attacks on civilians. In reaction the government announced a state of emergency in 1985 – the first time since 1960 (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:478). South Africa was still involved in external military action in South West Africa and Angola against the communist threat, which slowly spread to the involvement of the SADF internally in the fight against terrorism. Several



homelands also established intelligence structures such as the Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence Service which was established in 1982. The DMI and SB however were the intelligence services on the forefront and the military specifically had more influence due to the total onslaught strategy and the implementation of the NSMS.


Nonetheless, once again DONS underwent a name change on the 1st April 1979 to that of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Dr Neil Barnard (a professor at the University of Orange Free State) appointed as Director General on 1 June 1980 (NIS, 1994:15). The coat of arms and flag of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is as follows:



**Figure 85: The coat of arms and flag of the National Intelligence Service (NIS)**

Against all odds, President Botha agreed in 1988 that the NIS take the lead in initial secret discussions with the ANC including with the then jailed Nelson Mandela (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:393-394 and Giliomee, 2012e, *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:413-414). These discussions did not mean that the NIS embraced the ANC as a friend, but reflected the NIS analysis of that that the ANC is a major factor in a future South Africa which could not be ignored (Mostert, 2017). The NIS had the viewpoint of rather than to concentrate on what was seen as the enemy, to move away and focus on all factors affecting stability in the country. President PW Botha suffered a stroke late 1989 and FW de Klerk was elected new State President on 14 September of that year (Van Der Waag, 2015:414). The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989 and this furthermore paved the road for further change in the world as well as in South Africa.

All the same, the political regime and intelligence developments during 1989, is delineated as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 86: The Republic of South Africa's political regime and intelligence practices 1989**

The most significant political and intelligence events, developments and practices within South Africa and the world during the period 1961 – 1989, are depicted as follows:

**Table 12: Significant political and intelligence events 1961-1989**

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1961 – 1993	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
<b>1961</b> Heightened Cold War Berlin Wall erected Portugal loses Goa India Independence Man in space Hydrogen Bomb UN Condemn apartheid 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis <b>1963</b> Trade sanctions 1964 PLO Formed	<b>1961</b> Declared Republic New Constitution Armed struggle - MK State of Emergency Increased Apartheid policies Sharpeville Albert Luthuli Nobel Prize Boycotts, strikes Withdrawal Commonwealth <b>1962</b> Poqo uprising Sabotage Acts Robben Island prison ANC & PAC banned	Analogue revolution Intelligence theory Electronic interceptions Image Intelligence IMINT Electronic Intelligence Elint Satellite Intelligence Satint Spy Planes Spy satellites Increased espionage Economic intelligencer Strategic intelligence Covert Action Intelligence Analysis Computer Revolution Open source Information

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1961 – 1993	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
<b>1965</b> South Rhodesia declared independent <b>1967</b> 6 day War Israel <b>1968</b> Russia invades Czechoslovakia <b>1968</b> Moon landing <b>1971</b> Idi Amin Uganda <b>1972</b> Munich Olympic attacks Watergate <b>1973</b> Oil Crisis Greece a republic Yom Kippur war Israel Chile Pinochet <b>1974</b> Coups Ethiopia <b>1975</b> Angola Mozambique <b>1976</b> Argentina under military <b>1977</b> Coups Pakistan Coups in CAR Emperor Bokasi I <b>1979</b> Energy Crisis Iran Ayatollah Khomeini Soviet invasion Afghanistan <b>1981</b> Russian and Cuban withdrawal Zimbabwe <b>1982</b> Canada Independent <b>1984</b> Economic sanctions <b>1985</b> Nigeria Coups <b>1986</b> Australia Independence New Zealand <b>1989</b> Namibia	<b>1963</b> 90 Day Act Rivonia trial <b>1966</b> Verwoerd assassinated Vorster Prime-Minister <b>1976</b> Soweto uprising Total Onslaught Strategy Transkei <b>1977</b> Biko dies in detention Bophuthatswana <b>1978</b> NSMS Nuclear bomb development <b>1979</b> PW Botha Prime-Minister later State President Venda <b>1980</b> Zimbabwe Independence <b>1981</b> Ciskei (Six limited self-government areas Gazankulu, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Qwa-Qwa and KwaNqwanu) <b>1983</b> New Constitution Tricameral parliament United Democratic Front - UDF <b>1984</b> Nkomati Accord <b>1985</b> State of Emergency COSATU <b>1988</b> NIS talks ANC <b>1989</b> FW De Klerk State President Berlin Wall Fall	Intelligence Liaison <b>1961</b> National Reconnaissance Office US NRO <b>1965</b> US Secret Service <b>1964</b> Republic Intelligence SAP SB <b>1969</b> BOSS <b>1978</b> DONS <b>1979</b> NIS Homeland intelligence ANC NAT/DIS PAC PAC

Source: Own construct

To conclude, Van Der Waag (2015:246-247) explains the wider conflict in the Southern African region based on three layers as follows: (1) a civil rights struggle against fundamentally unjust political systems – most notably apartheid; (2) wars of national liberation and; 3) the global ideological struggle of the Cold War. This period initially started with the NSMS that became a parallel governing structure and due to their effective and professional training in management

and leadership, the military representatives within these structures gave the military intelligence the more prominent role within South Africa's national security sector. This period also features increased internal conflict and protest with violent actions the order of the day. For a short time period the country entered the domain of a totalitarian security state.

All the same, South Africa boasted one of the most effective intelligence gathering systems in the world and the best in Africa due to a vast national and international network which enabled the police and military to crush many ANC campaigns directed against the government during the 1980's (Oakes *ed.*, 1988:447).

However, the NIS, DMI and SB had several differences in approach to the security situation. As Mostert (2017) explains, the few pragmatists within the NIS submitted the notion that apartheid could no longer be sustained and the country headed for a disaster that should be addressed in pro-active ways and it did not have an alternative model for a post-apartheid future in mind. The NIS slowly moved to the fore in comparison to the roles of the military and police intelligence structure. Significant world events such as the end of the Cold War provided impetus to President FW de Klerk in 1990 to unbanned the ANC, PAC and SACP together with the release of Nelson Mandela (Giliomee, 2012e, *in* Pretorius *ed.*, 2012:415-416). These actions categorises South Africa back as an authoritarian state with similar intelligence practices.

However, the new prominent role of the NIS in relation to that of the military and police, assist in placing South Africa on a road towards a negotiated settlement and democratic transition.

## **7.4 The historic development of political regimes and intelligence practices in South Africa: 1990 - 2017**

The period from 1990 indicated the end of "Apartheid" in South Africa and displayed the formation of a New Democracy as a transition outcome. Moreover, this period reflects the development of the political regime as well as its intelligence practices up to 2017 – as also the main aim and focus of this study. This period is as follows:

### **7.4.1 The negotiations and intelligence developments in South Africa: 1990 – 1993**

Several discussions and agreements between the Government and the ANC followed which placed South Africa on the road towards democratisation. These include the Groote Schuur Minute in May 1990 and the Pretoria Minute in August 1990; followed by the DF Malan Agreement in February 1991 (Giliomee & Mbenga; 2007:403); which resulted in a National Peace Accord signed during the National Peace Convention on 14 September 1991. Although most political role

players signed the accord, the PAC, Azapo Conservative Party, Herstigte Nasionale Party and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) did not sign.


In December 1991 the first plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa I (CODESA) began. In early 1992, CODESA II resumed negotiations – but collapsed during May that year (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:403-404 and De Jager, 2015:96-97), mainly due to initial differences in viewpoints between the different participants. In September 1992 a Record of Understanding was reached between the ANC and the Government (De Jager, 2015:98) which led to a Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF). The latter took the approach of majority consensus thereby putting pressure on all interested stakeholders to participate, rather than to be left out in the cold.

The most important outcomes of this process were the concept of a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to co-exist alongside the Government, an independent electoral commission and independent media commission. In addition, an interim constitution for South Africa was agreed upon on 18 November 1993, to be followed by a transitional government and ultimately democratic elections on 27 April 1994. The TEC consisted of seven sub-councils, namely: law and order; stability and security; finance; foreign affairs; regional authorities; status of woman and intelligence. The TEC Act (151 of 1993) furthermore provided for this council to act parallel to the NP Government from January 1994 until the elections. By this time the NSMS was replaced with the National Coordinating Mechanism (NCM) and the SSC replaced by the National Security Committee (NSC) under a new Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs (CCSA) (Van Den Berg, 2014:88-89).

Theo Alant was appointed as Deputy Minister for the NIS in the office of the President. President De Klerk later transferred the portfolio of intelligence from the executive control in the Office of the State President, to the Minister of Justice under a Deputy-Minister for administration purposes. The TEC act furthermore provided for the Sub-Council on Intelligence (SCI) to create a national intelligence capacity for the new democratic dispensation. In addition, Van Den Berg (2014:99) explains that participants included the NIS, ANC - DIS, Transkei Intelligence Service (TIS), the Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence Service (BIIS), the Venda National Intelligence Service (VIS) and later the Pan-Africanist Security Service (PASS) of the PAC.

Nonetheless, as Africa argues, these intelligence services continued to serve their principals with information during this critical period although bound by political agreement to craft a single intelligence framework for a future democratic South Africa (Africa, 2006:83 and Transitional Executive Council Act, 1993).

The political regime and intelligence developments during the TEC in 1993, are depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 87: South Africa's political regime and intelligence practices 1993 - TEC**

Nonetheless, the last act passed by the Tricameral Parliament in 1993 was the interim constitution which takes effect on the day of the first democratic elections and institute the Government of National Unity (GNU).

#### 7.4.2 The New South Africa and intelligence developments: 1994-1999

The political system during the GNU consisted of a parliament with two houses which simultaneously served as Constitutional Assembly (tasked to finalise a new constitution by 1996). As Graham (*In De Jager, 2015:98-99*) explains, the GNU would exist for five years. The National Assembly, as the lower house comprises 400 members elected from national and provincial lists from parties. The Senate existed as an upper house, with ten nominated members from each of the nine provinces. The interim constitution also brought an end to the homelands which were to be re-integrated into the broader South Africa and the country would have a three tier government structure, namely national, provincial and local government consisting of nine provinces. Election for a new democratic South Africa took place over three days from 26 – 28 April 1994. The ANC became the majority party with Nelson Mandela as President and Thabo Mbeki as a Deputy President together with former State President De Klerk as the other Deputy President.


A new national flag was adopted for South Africa to replace the old republic flag that was used from 1928 to 27 April 1994. The flag symbolizes the convergence of diverse elements within South African society into unity and is depicted as follows:



**Figure 88: New National South African Flag**

All the same, the Interim Constitution of 1993 made provision for the establishment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) on 27 April 1994; in transforming non-statutory forces (APLA, MK and Inkatha Self-defence Units) together with the former SADF and military units of the TBVC states into one entity (Van Der Waag, 2012:284) and subsequently the creation of a Defence Intelligence (DI) unit. Likewise the SAP was transformed towards a civilian character into the new South African Police Service. The intelligence function within the SAPS resorted under a newly established Crime Intelligence (CI) Unit responsible to manage crime intelligence and analyse crime information, as well as provide technical support for investigations and crime prevention operations. The State Security Council became the new Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence (CCSI) after 1994 (Van Den Berg, 2014:99). Moreover, the NIS remained as intelligence service into the first year of the new democratic South Africa whilst the Intelligence Sub-Committee in a Super Working Group (consisting of DIS, NIS, BIIS, PASS, VIS and TIS), continued to work on a future intelligence dispensation.

The political regime and intelligence developments at the beginning of the GNU, is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 89: South Africa's political regime and intelligence practices 1994 - GNU**

The intelligence changes came into effect on 1 January 1995. As Van Den Berg (2014:101) describes, several Acts were to take effect namely: “the Intelligence Services Act (No 38 of 1994) which proposed the amalgamation of the statutory and non-statutory intelligence services into two civilian intelligence departments; the National Strategic Intelligence Act (No 39 of 1994) which established the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) and set out the mandate and functions of intelligence in relation to domestic intelligence, foreign intelligence (excluding foreign military intelligence), crime intelligence and foreign and domestic military intelligence. Lastly the Committee of Members of Parliament and Inspector-General of Intelligence Act (No 40 of 1994) provided for the establishment of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) consisting of members of parliament and the appointment of the Inspectors-Generals of Intelligence.”

The new civilian intelligence community integrated the NIS, ANC-DIS, TIS, BIIS, VIS and the PAC-PASS. The ANC DIS existed under the banner of the ANC and MK similar to the PAC PASS under the PAC and APLA; whereas the BIIS had its own emblem, as follows:





**Figure 90: ANC DIS, PAC PASS and BIIS emblems**


The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) was established as a domestic intelligence service and the South African Secret Service (SASS) as a foreign intelligence service with the National Communication Centre (NCC) as a technical service. These are initially placed under Joe Nhlanhla as Deputy Minister of Intelligence responsible within the Justice Ministry with Dullah Omar as Minister and Sizakele Sigxashe, (former senior leader of the ANC's DIS) as Director-General of the NIA, with Mike Louw (former Director-General NIS) the first Director-General of the SASS (Van Den Berg, 2014:101-102). The National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) replaced the Heads of Combined Services Committee and served to coordinate and produce the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) as a strategic intelligence product. An Inspector General of Intelligence (IGI) was also created in order to determine the compliance of the intelligence community within its legislative framework and to investigate complaints. Furthermore, a Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) consisting of various political party representatives was also established to serve as an oversight committee in Parliament. The JSCI also reported to the President via the Legislative.

The emblems of the SASS, NIA, NCC and IGI, are as follows:



**Figure 91: Emblems of SASS, NIA, NCC and the IGI**

Within the final constitution, the Senate as upper house in parliament was replaced in 1997 by a National Council of Provinces (NCOP) consisting of ten delegates from each province. This NCOP is to represent the provincial governments through indirect elections by voters. Albeit, the political system and civilian intelligence structure at the end of the GNU is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 92: South Africa's political regime and intelligence practices 1999 - GNU**

In summary, the end of Apartheid saw South Africa's new beginnings in its transition towards democratic consolidation which started as a newly established liberal democracy which implies that the constitution is the supreme law. Universal suffrage in a unitary South Africa was also a predominant feature. Noteworthy however was that during the initial period of transition, the NIS still remained as the intelligence service in the new South Africa until the establishment of a new democratic transformed intelligence a year later. The new intelligence dispensation was properly legislated and constitutionally bound, with accompanied democratic control, oversight and accountability. Nonetheless, at the end of this era, the National Party under Deputy President De Klerk did not last the GNU as they withdrew in 1996 - because the ANC refused to entrench a power-sharing cabinet in the final constitution of 1996 (Nattrass, 2017:225). This opened the way for a new constitution and new government to succeed the initial power-sharing model of the GNU. The next national elections brought several intelligence changes about although the political regime remained almost the same.

#### 7.4.3 The New South Africa and intelligence developments: 1999- 2008

Limited political changes in 1999 included a new president Thabo Mbeki and his deputy Jacob Zuma (until he was asked to step down in 2005) and 18 ministerial appointments to different government departments including a minister in the presidency. The ANC remains as majority party in government with 66.35 per cent of the 1999 vote and in 2004 with a further consolidation of its earlier gains increasing its majority to 69.69 per cent (The Independent Electoral

Commission). After Zuma took over as president of the ANC during the Polokwane conference, Mbeki was forced to resign as State President and was replaced on 25 September 2008 by Kgalema Motlanthe as so-called 'caretaker' President. All the same, several changes took place within the intelligence that Africa (2012:98-122) referred to as the second wave of restructuring. She postulates the first wave as starting with the newly established transformed intelligence in 1994. The second wave changes however saw the intelligence community expand and included several amendments to the original intelligence legislation accompanied with several commissions of inquiry. The amendments culminated in; (1) the creation of a full position of Minister of Intelligence Service; (2) the combination of Inspector-General of intelligence into one position with a clearer mandate; (3) the exclusion of the Minister as part of NICOC; (4) the establishment of the Intelligence Services Council on Conditions of Service (ISCCS); (5) the creation of a separate training institution under the Minister - The South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI); (6) the establishment of the Electronic Communication Security (Pty) Ltd to provide government with a security-communication capability; (7) the establishment of the Office of Interception Centre (OIC) which regulates interception of communications and lastly; (8) a Presidential Support Unit (PSU) that is instituted in the Presidency to provide advice on strategies for conflict prevention, management and resolution (Van Den Berg, 2014:105). The emblems of SANAI and the Electronic Communication Security (Pty) Ltd, are as follows:




**Figure 93: Emblems of SANAI and the Electronic Communication Security (PTY) Ltd**

In addition, a new Coat of Arms for South Africa is introduced on 27 April 2000 to replace the one in use since 1960 and in 2007 Parliament also replaced its emblem used since the Union of South Africa, both depicted as follows:



**Figure 94: The New coat of arms and parliament logo of South Africa**

Albeit, the political system remained the same but the changed civilian intelligence structure during this time period is delineated as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 95: South Africa's political regime and intelligence practices 1999 -2008**

To summarise, a new government was elected signalling the end of the rainbow nation power-sharing period and entering the so-called democratic period due to the second free, fair, democratically contested elections – albeit again won by the ANC. This period is furthermore seen as the starting point of South Africa as a so-called developmental state that culminated in several attempts to address social and economic imbalances through national strategies such as Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. Nonetheless, during this period South Africa also experienced the broadening of the structures and mandate of the intelligence services that slowly started a process of intelligence politicisation. Apart from increased cadre deployment, intelligence services started to intervene in the politics through interventions into factions in the ruling party, as well as politics starting to intervene into intelligence. This period is furthermore marked with several commissions of inquiry into intelligence activities and functions like the Pikoli (1996) and Matthews (2008) Commissions. 2008 brought the end of the second wave of intelligence restructuring and started drastic changes to come within the third wave of intelligence restructuring.

#### **7.4.4 South Africa and intelligence developments: 2009 – 2017**

Jacob Zuma was inaugurated as President of South Africa on 9 May 2009 and Kgalema Motlanthe as his deputy (Independent Electoral Commission) with a majority ANC vote of 65.9%. This era began with the fourth Parliament of the new democratic South Africa since 1994. Zuma


announced several changes to current government departments. He extended the Ministers to 38 and appointed several deputy-ministers. Although no definite changes are made within the political structure within the legislature and executive, the intelligence dispensation was not left the same. The initial concept of national security is changed almost similar to the apartheid era into a state security perception. Initial changes to intelligence started with the change in name of the Minister of Intelligence to that of State Security. As Van Den Berg (2014:108-109) argues, the name change away from national intelligence to that of state security, brought about a perception in the public domain that the centralisation of the resources of the civilian intelligence community is a precursor to an era of greater authoritarianism and a departure from the founding principles of the new intelligence dispensation. The name change of the civilian intelligence services is abruptly followed by the creation of the State Security Agency (SSA) through a presidential proclamation (Proclamation No R59 of 2009) incorporating existing civilian intelligence structures into a new 'super' structure. It should however be noted that most intelligence services in authoritarian states and more so Southern African countries, are similarly instituted by presidential degree's and function with limited legislation, oversight and control. The changes within intelligence coincides with extensive media coverage on reported clashes and differences between the Minister and his top three officials during 2011 that led to the subsequent resignation of the Director General of the new SSA and both the Head of the former NIA and SASS. The emblem of the newly created State Security Agency (SSA) replaces all those of the former structures and is depicted as follows:



**Figure 96: Emblem of the State Security Agency**

Dennis Dlomo (Advisor to the Minister) was appointed acting Director General from January 2012 until August 2013, following which Ambassador Gladys Sonto Kudjoe is appointed as his successor (Van Den Berg, 2014:109). The political regime remains the same as in 2008 but the amended civilian intelligence structure changing in 2009. The role of NICOC and its chair is also downscaled under the ministry and not a lot of attention is given to long periods without the appointment of an Inspector General for intelligence. The General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act (Act no 11 of 2013), as approved by Parliament in August 2013, officially legislated the SSA. Nonetheless, the ANC again remains the majority party in power after the 2014 elections with a reduced 62 percent of the vote with Jacob Zuma once more as President and Cyril Ramaphosa as Deputy President. The political system remains unchanged although the intelligence ministry received a Deputy Minister for State Security on 25 May 2014 through the appointment of ENN

Molekane as incumbent. She is joined by a new Minister of State Security, David Mahlobo, as successor to Cwele. After the resignation of Kudjoe as Director General, Arthur Fraser was appointed on 26 September 2016 as her successor. During this time period increased media reports include allegations of SSA staff being deployed at Luthuli House as the ANC headquarters to assist in the ANC 'Project Veritas' which is the selection process of prospective members of parliament (Van Den Berg, 2014:138). The intelligence structure in 2009, is depicted as follows:



Source: Van Den Berg (2014:109)

**Figure 97: The State Security Agency of 2009**

Nonetheless, SSA is still undergoing restructuring since 2009 and recent changes include the replacement of the two Director General positions as the heads for the domestic and the foreign branch and the subsequent creation of seven deputies underneath the director-general (Stone, City Press, 2017). Accordingly each branch still has sixteen general managers reporting to a deputy. The structure remains basically the same as depicted in figure 93. The latest appointment is that of a new Inspector General, Dr S Dintwe on 15 March 2017. The so-called Spy Cables leaked to the investigative unit of Aljazeera in 2015 shows an organogram of the SSA from their own documentation. This structure depicts seven main structures consisting of Domestic Intelligence, Counter Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence, Intelligence Analysis, Communication Services, Corporate Services and the Intelligence Academy; each with its own units. These add a counter intelligence and intelligence academy structure to the structure depicted in figure 97. During October 2017, yet another cabinet reshuffle followed whereby advocate Bongani Bongo succeeded Mahlobo whom was moved to head the Energy Ministry. All the same, the main international events as linked to specific events in South Africa and developments in intelligence, is depicted by this study as follows:



**Table 13: Significant political and intelligence events in the new democratic South Africa  
1994 – 2017**

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1994 - 2017	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
<b>1993</b> World Trade Centre bomb <b>1993</b> Eritrea <b>1994</b> Rwanda Genocide <b>1991-2003</b> Gulf War <b>1996</b> Taliban Afghanistan Space Station Algeria Conflict Congo & CAR wars <b>1997</b> Hong Kong to China PRC <b>1998</b> Belfast agreement Kosovo War Several East European Countries Independence from Russian Federation <b>2001</b> China part of WTO Iraq War 9/11 <b>2002</b> East Timor Independence Boko Haram Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon <b>2003</b> Libyan war <b>2004</b> Al Qaeda Spain bombings <b>2005</b> Al Qaeda London bombs <b>2006</b> Montenegro Serbia North Korea nuclear tests Al Shabaab Somalia & Kenia <b>2007</b> Gaza strip conflict <b>2008</b> Al Qaeda Mumbai attacks <b>2009</b> BRICS <b>2010</b> Arab Spring Soccer World Cup South Africa <b>2011</b> South Sudan Libya – Gaddafi killed Bin Laden killed Egypt Revolt <b>2013</b> Seleka CAR	<b>1993</b> Final Negotiations TEC Interim Constitution <b>1994</b> Democratic Elections GNU Defence Intelligence Crime Intelligence <b>1995</b> New civilian intelligence community, NIA, SASS, NCC, NICOC Rugby World Cup SA <b>1996</b> New Constitution Parliament Changes NCOP NP withdraw GNU <b>1999</b> 2 <sup>nd</sup> Democratic elections Mbeki President <b>2002</b> African Union launched Durban <b>2004</b> Civil Unrest <b>2005</b> Zuma to resign as deputy president <b>2008</b> Mbeki to resign Motlanthe as President Service delivery protest <b>2009</b> 3d Democratic elections ANC majority Zuma President Motlanthe Deputy President SSA Cabinet re-shuffle & Intelligence changed to state security <b>2012</b> Civil unrest increases Cabinet re-shuffle Marikana SAPS miner shooting <b>2013</b> Cabinet re-shuffle <b>2014</b> 4 <sup>th</sup> Democratic Elections ANC majority Zuma re-elected Ramaphosa Deputy President New Intelligence minister Deputy Minister State Security Cabinet re-shuffle <b>2015</b> Spy Cable leaks Aljazeera Civil & Student protests Cabinet re-shuffle <b>2016</b> New DG SSA	Intelligence theory Intelligence Studies Joint Intelligence Operations Global intelligence Threats Internet Revolution Pagers Personal Computers GPS Spy satellite World Wide Web Measurement and Signature Intelligence MASINT Open source Intelligence OSINT Social media Intelligence SOCMINT International Terrorism Mass Surveillance Mass electronic interceptions Drones Intelligence Oversight and Accountability Non-state actor intelligence Cyber Security Nano Technology Artificial intelligence Intelligence analysis Software Cellular Phones

INTERNATIONAL ARENA	SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS 1994 - 2017	INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES
M23 South Sudan War <b>2014</b> Crimnea annexed by RF Syrian War ISIL <b>2015</b> ISIL attacks France ISIS Libya, Tunisia, Bengazi <b>2016</b> ISIL attacks Germany Niger Delta conflict	Civil & student protests Cabinet re-shuffle <b>2017</b> New Inspector general Intelligence Civil unrest & protest Political killings councillors Cabinet re-shuffle	

Source: Own construct

This study briefly summarises this era as follows: President Zuma made twelve cabinet reshuffles to date, involving several changes to prominent ministry' which impacts negatively on the financial market and economy. Within the political arena the concept of South Africa as a social developmental state gained impetus after Jacob Zuma became president of the ANC. Equally, this era can be earmarked as entering the second phase of the ANC National Democratic Revolution (NDR) whereby the focus moves from the first stage political power consolidation towards socio-economic freedom and transformation. This study postulates that the inability of the government to effectively address social demands on the national budget, as well as effective management of the fiscus and accompanied increased corruption and ineffective state owned enterprises, led to international rating agencies downgrading South Africa to junk status. Fitch specifically rates the country in 'full' junk regarding local and foreign currency debt, Standard and Poor places the foreign currency in junk and local currency one notch above and Moody's locates South Africa one notch above junk in both currencies. In 2016 the President was ruled by the Constitutional Court to have been violating the Constitution in his actions against a report from the Public Protector relating to large scale spending on upgrades to his Nkandla homestead. In addition, the President survived eight attempts in parliament to forward a vote of no-confidence in his ability to lead the country. The consecutive election wins of the ANC also indicates a prevailing era of 'one party dominance' within the South African state. State corruption and patronage within events such as the 'Guptagate' state capture allegations seem to be the pre-dominant focus during this period of time.

Within the intelligence sector, South Africa changed its national intelligence system into a state security dispensation which is reminiscent to the Bureau of State Security within the Apartheid regime. More so, during this time the intelligence structure is furthermore exposed to continuous restructuring and change of leadership. Several security breaches, information leaks, misappropriation of funds allegations, theft, and crime and corruption incidents also appear within




the media as relating to the State Security Agency (SSA) and some of its members. Allegations of the involvement of the SSA in factions within the ruling party as well as its continued politicisation in favour of party policies rather than government policies, also seems to be recurrent. All the same, South Africa seems to be gradually moving deeper into a neo-patrimonial praetorian political system, with its intelligence practices an epitome thereof.

## **7.5. Conclusion**

Chapter seven attempted to operationalise the conceptualised concepts, models and theory of this thesis as linked to the meta-theoretical framework of this study. This chapter therefore focussed on descriptive and explorative approaches as to enable the evaluation and interpretation of intelligence and regime practices, as is the aim of the next chapter and also reflected in the title of this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter aimed to place the history and development of South Africa's intelligence agencies within the different regimes throughout time. Moreover, it placed these practices within the country, against significant political and intelligence developments, in the international arena. For this purpose chapter seven briefly described and explored the history of political systems and rule, since the arrival of early mankind - inclusive of the indigenous people as well as foreign settlers - in pre-colonial South Africa. The history and development of the different political systems in the early territories, republics and colonies are explored, inclusive of the 'Mfecane'. Thereafter, the focus was on events during the Union of South Africa, through the two world wars up to the declaration of independence of the Republic of South Africa. The specific historical political events are described in context of the threat perception of that time. Political events and intelligence developments in the Republic of South Africa during the Cold War era are clearly indicated and researched. Attention is also given to the time period that led to a negotiated settlement in 1993, which culminated in the creation of a new democratic political and intelligence dispensation in 1994 within South Africa. More so, chapter seven also gave specific attention to changes within the political systems and intelligence from South Africa's democratic transition and intelligence reform up to the post-transition period. More specific focus was given to recent and current political practices as to enable the further operationalising of the theoretical and meta-theoretical conceptualisation of this research in the rest of this thesis.

This chapter builds upon the historic and political systems explored within the country as to specifically be able to describe and compare the development of South African intelligence as linked to the central notion postulated by this study in that intelligence is a reflection of the political regime it presents, as it exists because of and for that regime. This methodology ensured an explanation of the different intelligence structures and systems from the appearance of non-statutory structures through the development of the first statutory intelligence until the existing intelligence practices as to enable an evaluation of democratic and non-democratic features and characteristics. This furthermore assisted to measure and categorise state capacity and

intelligence penetration against form of government and intelligence autonomy over different time periods, to date. More so, the research in this chapter will enable further operationalising of the theoretical contributions as indicated in the conceptual framework of this study in order to reach the main goal in the next chapter as also reflected in the title of this thesis. Nonetheless, the main contributions to the history and development of South African intelligence in context to its political regime over different time periods examined in this chapter and as linked to the conceptual framework of this study, are summarised as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 98: Recapitalising the history and development of intelligence in South Africa within its political regime context**

This shifts the attention of this study to the evaluation and interpretation of political regime and intelligence practices in South Africa, as is the aim of the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 8: A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION, EVALUATION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON REGIME/INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES IN SOUTH AFRICA

*“spying and surveillance are at least as old as civilization itself. The rise of city states and empires [...] meant that each needed to know not only the disposition and morale of their enemy, but also the loyalty and general sentiment of their own population.”*

Keith Laidler, 2008

### 8.1 Introduction

Control and oversight of intelligence is not a new phenomenon in the world although it receives more attention and emphasis in modern times, especially within newly established democracies. This coincides with the transition and deepening of democracy within such regimes. Intelligence also develops over time and could be linked to Huntington’s (1991) three waves of democratisation. To this extent, new democracies are in a much more favourable position as to ensure democratic intelligence practices within their democratic political regimes. In addition, South Africa is specifically of relevance as Bruneau and Boraz (2007:20-21) argue: “Success in South Africa is extremely critical because the country is important in its own right and as a model for the rest of Africa. If reforms cannot be secured in South Africa, there probably isn’t much hope for the rest of the continent.” Therefore chapter eight aims to evaluate and analyse intelligence within South Africa within the context of the political regime types and the democratisation process. This chapter builds on the conceptual framework of this study in its attempt to operationalise the theoretical and research frameworks in the previous chapters.

Chapter eight specifically builds on the previous chapter as it evaluates and interprets intelligence structures and practices in South Africa as linked to the political regime type within specific historic periods of time. This enables this study to evaluate and analyse present intelligence practices within the current political regime; as also reflected in the title of this thesis. In addition, this chapter aims to evaluate and analyse intelligence practices in South Africa from the first statutory intelligence structure established before the first wave of democratisation, through the World War’s and second wave of democratisation; past the Cold War era and third wave of democratisation and up to the present time.


More specifically, this chapter intends to apply the matrix constructed and postulated in this study as a measurement for intelligence practices as aligned with the measurement of form of government and state capacity over different time periods. This measurement also provides for an evaluation of capacity/penetration and autonomy/democracy of intelligence practices within different regime time periods. Chapter eight therefore aims to further an understanding of

intelligence practices, oversight and control within the current political regime in South Africa as linked to the scientific framework of this study as applied in the previous chapters.

This enables this study to provide a roadmap for the way forward in terms of South Africa's democratisation and intelligence practices. This chapter aims to build on existing scenarios to assist in understanding a future South Africa and its intelligence practices. As postulated by this study, intelligence mirrors the political regime and will therefore reflect less or more democratic practices depending on the nature and activities of the regime wherein and for whom it exists.

## 8.2 An evaluation and analysis of political regimes and intelligence practices in South Africa: early times to WWI


In line with the meta-scientific framework of this study, the following conceptual framework serves as a research guide for this chapter specifically in the evaluation and analysis of intelligence practices as linked to specific political regimes. This will enable this study to conceptualise the current intelligence practices within South Africa, as is also the main aim of this thesis.



Source: Own construct

Figure 99: A framework for the evaluation and analysis of intelligence in South Africa

Notwithstanding, the different regime types and intelligence practices in South Africa from pre-colonial times to present, will be measured against the form of government and intelligence autonomy against state capacity as well as the penetration of intelligence, as discussed and delineated in a matrix constructed by this study and depicted in Figure 58. Within this measurement state capacity/intelligence penetration is measured as either weak or strong and form of government/s to be able to address intelligence practices within the notion forwarded by this study of a hybrid political regime, a postulated regime type is included within this matrix. This approach enables this research to clearly place political regime and intelligence practices and structures within either democratic, non-democratic, new democracies or within a failed state. It also assists this study in categorising intelligence types in South Africa, as either democratic, newly reformed, political intelligence, political police, state security or even as private rogue intelligence. Even so, this matrix is repeated here for additional emphasises and postulation:




**Repeated Figure 58: Intelligence practices measured in relation to form of government and state capacity**

The political regime type will be classified against the typology, models, theory and meta-theory conceptualised and postulated within this study and likewise the classification of the type of intelligence form and intelligence practices. In addition to the matrix above, this study will also examine state capacity and form of government against the different findings of several internationally accepted democracy indices inclusive of the Freedom Index and the Democracy Index as well as the ratings of Standard & Poor; Moody's and Fitch. Furthermore, an evaluation

and analysis of the political regime at any given time using the abovementioned measurements will enable this study to draw a comparative study of the intelligence practices within the country at the same time period. Simultaneously, the measurement of the autonomy or independency of an intelligence service as discussed in a previous chapter is also relevant in terms of the specific levels and presence of oversight, control and accountability mechanisms as in relation to the rule of law, human rights and freedom.

For this purpose and as reflected upon in the research conducted by Van Den Berg (2014:126-127), the measuring of the interference of intelligence into politics and/or the interference of politics into intelligence as elucidated by Bar-Joseph (1995:70), is also deemed appropriate in assessing the specific typology of an intelligence service. As discussed by Van Den Berg (2014:127), this measurement of Bar-Joseph as expounded in a graph, depicts four relationship outcomes namely: (1) the ideal type relationship where the political level does not intervene in professional intelligence affairs, and intelligence is politically neutral on their part and where intelligence perceives interference with politics as an undesirable action due to a high level of professionalism and ethics; (2) strong leaders preferring to be their own intelligence analysts and compelling their own intelligence organisations to accept their opinion; (3) situations in which there is insufficient political control of the intelligence services and an insufficient level of professionalism within the intelligence service and lastly; (4) represent the worst of both worlds where there is mutual distrust between intelligence and the political echelon, which results in parochial alignments between intelligence officers and policy-makers and the negligence of the service to national interests. This graph is depicted as follows:



Source: Reproduced from Bar-Joseph (1995:70) in Van Den Berg (2014:127)

**Figure 100: Politics and intelligence intervention**

All the same, the evaluation and analysis of this study is focused more specifically towards the period after the inauguration of the new South Africa up until the date of this study, although the early beginnings of South Africa as a state will also receive brief attention. For this reason the development of early political regimes and intelligence structures comes to the fore.

### **8.2.1 An evaluation and analysis of intelligence in South Africa: 1400-1860**

The time period before South Africa achieved the status as a sovereign state reflects the same beginnings as most other states on the African continent and its roots are found - as previously discussed, in a borderless continent, characterised with the mobilisation of different people. The non-state actor intelligence and political regime structures began in the different people occupying the land and reflected specific tribe or clan regime types ranging from structured kingdoms and chieftains to loosely organised headman. This pattern is also evident within intelligence practices which basically found its roots within espionage, reconnaissance and scouting for security and perceived threat perceptions, mostly present as an activity within defence practices which were similarly loosely structured.

The exception as explained by this study is the two units of spies created by the Zulu before and during the time of the Mfecane. Within the actions and activities of European countries following their footprint and existence in Africa as part of their imperialistic and colonising strategies, a similar pattern of loosely structured scouting and reconnaissance activities appeared within defence and military and policing units. These include a similar focus on defence and security of the refreshment station personnel, the free burghers and the settlers who arrived later on. Most practices were based on reconnaissance and scouting, with the latter linked to the concept of spying.

In conclusion, in linking the interpretation and evaluation of political systems and/or rule as well as intelligence practices to the meta-theoretical and theoretical concepts, typologies and models of this thesis, it is clear that no definite overarching regime type for the whole country and subsequently also no overarching form of intelligence existed. Subsequently, the specific categorising of these practices in terms of the matrix depicted in Figure 58 for this purpose is therefore not possible. Political regime and intelligence practices and activities are thus placed as neither democratic, nor as non-democratic. Equally, this study can also not measure or place politics and intelligence intervention with the graph of Bar-Joseph (Figure 100) for this time period as no statutory intelligence system existed. Nonetheless, this does not restrict the identification and description of specific trends, tendencies or features in relation to political and intelligence practices.


The first settlers consisting of French (Huguenots) and Germans brought with them a strong Protestant and Calvinistic belief that was integrated into the Dutch and English bureaucracy within the Cape garrison and the later developed magistrate districts. Later on, British rule brought a more firm autocratic view of government's role in establishing law and order. As chapter seven explains, commando systems supplemented the existing rule as consisting of commandeered citizenry with field cornets in charge, whom in many cases, acted as local authority in the outskirts of the initial settlement. In addition, the Zulu and Xhosa functioned under patrimonial systems consisting of kings and chiefs and the case of the Khoikhoi, just chiefs.

The overall tendency displayed in terms of political rule was that of patrimonial kingdom or chiefdoms and headman within the different entities present. The trekboers, farmers, free burghers, slaves and some indigenous people were under this loosely organised and inadequate administration. Intelligence practices in the early times in South Africa, with the exception of the formalised Zulu impi – albeit – non-statutory, focused mainly on scouting, reconnaissance and spying for security and survival purposes. Nonetheless, the political regime type and intelligence practices reflecting the various groups could not be placed within the matrix depicted in Figure 58, as no specific state and its political system or any statutory intelligence structure existed. To conclude, in linking the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical context of this study in an operationalised application to this historical period, basic features of political hierarchy and intelligence practices were present, although one could not yet refer to a sovereign South African state or entity.

### **8.2.2 Evaluating and analysing the ZAR and intelligence developments: 1860 – 1902**

Political rule and structure gradually developed into more geographically designated areas inclusive of several other small republics and independent regions which were later either incorporated into the British colonies or into the two Boer Republics. The characteristics of the two colonies and republics during this time period reflect similar administrative and legislative practices as the developments in the rest of the world and are not exclusive to a developing South Africa. The political regime types during this time period which took place against the background of what Huntington (1991) states as the first wave of democratisation were typically imperialistic, monarchies and autocracies. As the ZAR was the only republic, colony or territory with a statutory intelligence structure, this study focussed attention to this phenomenon. This event, as already explicated by this research, is also historically significant as it is the beginning of formalised statutory intelligence in South Africa. Nonetheless, even though this period is synonymous with the first wave of democratisation, the political regime of the ZAR does not meet the minimum requirements of a democracy and lacks inclusive universal suffrage and democratic representation for all people, in the legislative. This places the ZAR as an authoritarian regime as discussed in the theory and models by this study and also depicted in Figure 47, as follows:






Source: Own construct based on Figure 47

**Figure 101: The ZAR as an authoritarian political regime**


All the same, the intelligence practices remained focussed on scouting and reconnaissance with the only institutionalised and regulated intelligence practices evident in the ZAR Secret Service. The latter started similar to other countries at that time with its origins within the police and more specifically the detective branch. This action as well as the need for intelligence during the subsequent South African or Anglo-Boer wars also served as an impetus to the creation of specific intelligence structures within the then British Empire. The ZAR Secret Service reported directly to the executive and was under control of the State Attorney. For administrative purposes a Secretary was placed within the office of the latter, although the Commissioner of Police was not totally excluded as this unit functioned within structures under his control. Even though the ZAR was bound to a written constitution, it reflects the characteristics of an autocracy and likewise with similar trends evident within the intelligence structure that, although constituted by the 1885 Police Act as approved by the Volksraad, had limited legislative and civilian oversight, control or accountability. The intelligence function during annexation and the subsequent Anglo-Boer War, mainly focussed on the military units within the Commando's which consisted of couriers, scouts and reconnaissance. However, all the functional intelligence units, be it the Secret Service or within the Commandos, became obsolete and disappeared after the 'fall of Pretoria' and the subsequent colonisation of South Africa by Britain in 1902. Nonetheless, the Secret Service of the ZAR reflects the political regime typology of that republic as evaluated and depicted in Figure 101. Therefore, in line with the conceptualised intelligence models and meta-theoretical context of this study, the ZAR Secret Service is categorised as an intelligence service within an authoritarian political regime by an evaluation and analysis of this study and initially depicted in Figure 65. This is as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 65

Figure 102: The ZAR Secret Service as authoritarian intelligence

Albeit, in measuring the political intelligence practices of the ZAR and its Secret Service, this study places it marginally within that of a non-democracy authoritarian political system as a political police intelligence service, (as also argued by Van Den Berg, 2014:128-129); depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 103: Measuring the ZAR and its Secret Service


Furthermore, in terms of the measurement of political and intelligence interventions according to the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995), this study places it within block one, with a low political interference into the intelligence and a low interference of intelligence into politics, at that specific moment in time.

In conclusion, as linked to the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical constructs, paradigms and models of this research, this historic period in the broader South Africa, the political systems reflect continued patrimonial, British colonial imperialism and to some extent nationalistic authoritarian style republics with limited suffrage and participation of people. These developments are evaluated to be in line with similar developments in the rest of the world and more specific upon the African continent. In addition, although not part of the first wave of democratisation, the two Boer Republics are evaluated as being ahead at that time in comparison to several other sovereign states in the rest of the world, in so far as their written constitutions are concerned. Equally, intelligence developments in the rest of South Africa, with the exception of the institutionalised ZAR Secret Service before the war and the later military intelligence structures of the Bicycle Corps during the war, continued to reflect ad hoc reconnaissance, scouting and spying for security and protection purposes. Even so, intelligence within the Secret Service as well as the then Secret Commission, developed the concept of human intelligence, the recruitment and handling of agents as well as infiltration and penetration operations directed against the adversaries and identified enemies of the then state. This thesis explicates that these developments were on par if not ahead of similar developments in the rest of the world and even indicated an edge and advantage over other countries that lagged behind and only institutionalised statutory intelligence structures at a later time period.

### **8.2.3 An evaluation and analysis of the Union of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1910 - WWI**

The first formal unification of South Africa into a unitary state with a specific political system appeared after the Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902. This process initially involved dividing the country into four British Colonies of the Transvaal, Orange River, Cape and Natal. Although each colony had its own parliament and prime minister, each functioned under a British Governor-General and did not reflect universal suffrage for all citizens. Instead of opting for a strong British imperialistic system, indirect rule was perceived as a viable option under a constitution. South Africa's unification as one territorial entity was built upon with the official formation of the Union of South Africa albeit as a British colony under the authority of a Governor-General. It reflected a political regime comprising of a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Limited universal suffrage was notably present. After WWI the only notable change came in 1931 where the Union of South Africa as a British colony was changed into the status of a dominion with greater self-rule – which led to more own-responsibility for domestic or internal affairs.

Nonetheless, as a dominion of the British Crown, the Union of South Africa continued to function as a unitary state with a constitutional monarchy and indirect voter representation for black citizens and no vote for woman. This era however enforced greater segregation within society as also reflected within the political system. It is however postulated by this study that this constitutional monarchy is not a democracy and had the characteristics and practices of an authoritarian regime. This study therefore places the Union of South Africa at this time period as an authoritarian political regime as based on the theoretical models constructed in this study and depicted in Figure 47. This is portrayed as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 47

**Figure 104: The Union of South Africa as an authoritarian political regime**

All the same, as a defined intelligence structure apart from that of the British Crown was not present within the Union at this time and the functions were mainly liaison and restricted, the intelligence system could not be measured or placed within the matrix postulated for this purpose. Similarly, due to this reason, this study cannot effectively measure the intervention of politics into intelligence or the intervention of intelligence into politics as depicted in the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995) – designed for this purpose.

### **8.3 The evaluation and analysis of political regimes and intelligence practices in South Africa: WWII – 1989 negotiations NIS**


#### **8.3.1 The Union of South Africa and intelligence developments: WWII-1961**

The South African Union supported Britain in WWII which began in 1939. Notably as this study indicates, General Smuts did not only serve as Prime Minister, but also as Foreign Minister,

Minister of Defence as well as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He furthermore dismissed a non-partisan bureaucracy and brought all government departments in line with a policy in support of the war effort. This effort specifically resulted in no clear distinction between the political party in power and that of government functions. Through this strategy all pro-German support and anti-war actions were restricted and individuals and organisations were arrested, jailed or detained. This era was also marked with an intensified strive for an independent state although segregation or apartheid as a policy also became obvious and the effects thereof in several legislations was accompanied by limited or no suffrage to the people of South Africa. Internal resistance politics also increased as evident in the formalisation of several resistance movements and the intensifying of an armed struggle in view of an anti-apartheid strategy. The national threat perception followed that of the British Crown as far as external threats were concerned. To this extent the Union of South Africa was obliged to support the British and Allied Forces in their war efforts against Germany. Apart from the focus on the British war effort, the political regime slowly began moving towards Afrikaner Nationalism and possible independency. In linking the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical context of this research to the historical political developments in the Union of South Africa for this period, this study again categorises and locates it as an authoritarian political regime, as also depicted in Figure 104 of this chapter.

As already asserted, the British Crown firstly controlled intelligence regarding external threats or potential threats within the Union of South Africa as to serve its own world interests. Secondly and more importantly to note, as supported by this study and explained by Van Der Waag (2015:225) who explains that the UK was opposed to the creation of any intelligence service as the then head of MI5 (sir Percy Sillitoe) stated that such a service might be used against employment against parliamentary opposition and members of the British community, as well as against black opposition. However, intelligence structures which were formed adhere to the internal intelligence needs of the Union, albeit within the police and military structures. These units were initially not well organised but gradually took on a more professional and effective role in specifically addressing any perceived or real domestic threat to the Union. In this regard, the Police Act of 1958 provided the newly instituted South African Police Service (SAP) with a mandate to conduct internal counterinsurgency operations and activities. Within the intelligence sphere, information and intelligence related to internal security was initially the responsibility of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the South African Police but later allocated within the newly established Special Branch or also to be known as the Security Branch.


Nevertheless, in linking the evaluation and interpretation of intelligence practices during the latter part of the Union of South Africa within the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical constructs, typologies and models of this study, these are categorised and placed within an authoritarian system as political police intelligence, which are depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 65

Figure 105: Authoritarian Intelligence practices in the Union of South Africa

However, the political system and intelligence practices are measured and placed within the matrix postulated by this study as an authoritarian political regime with political police intelligence practices. It is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 106: Measuring intelligence in the Union of South Africa: WWII – 1960


Nevertheless, the measurement of political and intelligence interventions according to the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995), places the intervention of intelligence into politics and politics into intelligence similar to the previous historic period as in block one, indicating a low political interference into the intelligence and a low interference of intelligence into politics, at that specific moment in time. This is noted against the backdrop of a strong political intervention which appeared in other government institutions and departments which sought to centralise all efforts in support of the British war effort.

To summarise, the Union of South Africa depicted the features and characteristics of an authoritarian regime based upon its foundation and control by initially the British Empire and later indirectly under the British Crown. More so, the people of the Union furthermore enjoyed limited universal suffrage and restricted political participation which was even more limited within the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism and the prospects of an independent future Apartheid state. However, the end of WWII was also accompanied with the start of the Cold War Era on the one hand and the second wave of democratisation on the other. Within this context South Africa moved closer to independence from Britain albeit not through democratisation. The Union nevertheless started to slowly take over and increased its own control for information and intelligence requirements in opposition to initial British responsibilities. These entail the gradual and increased involvement of intelligence structures and more specifically the then mandated SAP within domestic or internal political events. At the same time the military intelligence structure within the Union Defence Force focussed more on liaison as the British still remained responsible for any external intelligence in relation to the war effort. This situation continued until after the end of the war, although some officers were deployed during the war under British command and were involved in intelligence activities – albeit on behalf of and for the British forces. However, it was due to change shortly thereafter with transformation of the UDF and the subsequent creation of the SADF. The SADF in particular had its own unit responsible for strategic military intelligence although the Special Branch of the SAP was the leading intelligence structure. Initial interference into the bureaucracy to support the war effort and the later increased counterinsurgency operations and activities of the South African Union against resistant movements and actors against apartheid, clearly placed the country and its intelligence within that of an authoritarian political regime. Moreover, this paved the way for a future South Africa to become a police security state or likewise as Van Der Waag (2015:214) claims, South Africa gradually moved down the path to ‘garrison statehood’.

### **8.3.2 The Republic of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1961- Republic Intelligence**

The intent to create a republic at this time was not specifically linked to or due to the second wave of democratisation that peaked after the end of WWII. The aim rather focussed on nationalism and independency from the British Crown within a time when de-colonisation was also taking

place in scattered moves upon the African continent. Again the newly declared republic started its political system within a constitution although, not as supreme law and neither as a constitutional democracy. The political system rather reflects a Westminster type consisting of a bi-cameral parliament, a Prime Minister as head of government and the replacement of the former British Crown with a ceremonial State President. Apartheid policy and separate development gradually moved into the creation of several homelands. The political system continued to build upon limited universal suffrage with no voter representation or participation for blacks within the national government structure. The South African government rather adopted an anti-communism approach and sided with the so-called West against the East during the Cold War. This strategy also provided for the implementation of several policies and accompanied legislation as part of the pursuit and protection of nationalism. ANY black opposition towards the apartheid policy was easily labelled as a 'revolutionary' threat and subsequently dealt with by the power of the regime. The political system of the Republic of South Africa had limited features of a democracy but rather displayed more authoritarian style characteristics. In linking the interpretation and evaluation thereof it is similarly placed for this time period as the Union of South Africa and based on the theoretical models constructed in this study as an authoritarian political regime and delineated as follows:




Source: Own construct based on Figure 47

**Figure 107: The Republic of South Africa as an authoritarian political regime: 1961**

Against the background of the external threats posed by the Cold War, an increased effort was also made to counter the internally perceived communist threat and associated anti-apartheid actions. Furthermore, the political system and intelligence entered into a proverbial grey area in interactions between the policy-maker and the then Security Branch in oppressing initial resistance to the Apartheid regime. Together with the creation of the Republic Intelligence within




the Security Branch and the formation of a State Security Council, South Africa gradually moved deeper into the characteristics displayed by a police state and political police intelligence. Intelligence functioned within limited control, oversight and accountability. This study therefore categorises the intelligence practices against the theory and models postulated as Political Police Intelligence:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 65

**Figure 108: Authoritarian intelligence practices in the Republic of South Africa: 1961**

Against the measurement of the political regime and the intelligence during this time, it is categorised as Political Police Intelligence and is placed by this study as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 109: Measuring intelligence in the Republic of South Africa: 1961 – SB & RI**


In using the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995) as a measurement tool for politics and intelligence intervention, one could highlight a high intervention of politics into intelligence and an increased display of the intervention of intelligence into politics, albeit with a low borderline.

To summarise, this study explicates that neither the first and second wave of democratisation, nor decolonisation on the African continent had any direct bearing or contribution to the independence declaration of South Africa as a republic or its form of government. The more significant events which influence this action, as this study asserts, are: (1) the end of WWII and South Africa's participation therein in support of Britain; (2) the rise of Afrikaner nationalism; and (3) the quest for an autonomous territory – specifically due to the colonisation of the former Boer republics. Within the intelligence environment, the increased opposition to segregation accompanied with the start of the Cold War and the augmentation of communism as threat to national security, order and stability, provided the necessary impetus to increase domestic and internal intelligence activities against these threats. This situation as well as the implementation of several acts in support thereof, presents the Republic Intelligence and Special Branch with a successful and effective advantage in implementing restriction and countermeasures against all internal perceived threats. These events furthermore serve as a platform and basis for similar and even more authoritarian actions by intelligence structures within the domestic terrain of South Africa.

### **8.3.3 The Republic of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1966 – 1978 BOSS**

The third wave of democratisation was entered into which lasted until the 1990's. Even though several countries in Africa became de-colonised; South Africa did not as yet, participate in democratisation and continued on the road of separate development for the citizens of the country. The threat of communism drew closer to home with the subsequent support of Russia into neighbouring countries in their separate conflicts to gain political power. Universal suffrage was not on the map. The apartheid policy was strengthened during this time period followed by the independence of several homeland territories and the subsequent (although limited) creation of their own intelligence structures. Due to its continued apartheid policy, South Africa also became increasingly isolated from the rest of the world. This was followed by more internal resistance to apartheid and the increase of violence. Nevertheless, the political system of South Africa for this time period remains authoritarian as depicted in Figure 107 of this chapter. The national security threat perception increased its focus on communism based on the ideology followed by Western countries in the Cold War as well as the internal opposition to government Apartheid policies and draconian laws. In 1966, as this study explained, the head of the Special Branch and Republic Intelligence, General Van Den Bergh, became Chief Security Advisor as well as later head of the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), setting the road towards a police security state. The Bureau had the upper hand in the coordination of state intelligence and


counterintelligence activities, even with the SADF becoming entangled in several cross border conflicts. Nonetheless, intelligence practices of South Africa remained a political police depicted below:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 65

**Figure 110: Authoritarian intelligence practices in the Republic of South Africa: 1961-1978**

All the same, the South African political and intelligence practices during this period is measured and placed deeper into an authoritarian regime reflecting a political police intelligence (as also placed by Van Den Berg, 2014:129), with limited control, oversight and accountability, as follows:




Source: Own construct

**Figure 111: Measuring intelligence in the Republic of South Africa: 1961 – 1978**

In applying the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995) to measure politics and intelligence intervention, this system also depicted a high level of involvement of politics into intelligence and likewise a high level of intelligence involvement into specifically domestic politics.

#### 8.3.4 The Republic of South Africa and intelligence developments: 1978 – 1989 NIS

1978 was earmarked as the end of Vorster's premiership, as well as the beginning of the 'total onslaught' concept. The implementation of the NSMS and the increased threat perception brought about by the 'total onslaught' strategy, ultimately culminating into the militarisation and politicisation of the security forces. Even though a three-tier parliamentary system and Presidents Council was established, the changes to the constitution still excluded universal suffrage. Blacks only had voting rights within the homeland territories. The Prime Minister's post was combined with that of the State President into an executive President. Opposition to the Apartheid policy increased both internationally and domestically with the accompanied violence in the form of bombings, attacks and sabotage. This forced the government to institute a state of emergency – as this study described, the first time since 1960. South Africa is initially evaluated as an authoritarian state which displayed features of a praetorian oligarchy. The securocrats flourished within the administration and with the domination of the military over the security apparatus, the country rather resembled a security state with a security state intelligence structure. This situation placed South Africa as a militarised security state as a borderline totalitarian regime, away from an authoritarian political regime. This period is therefore categorised and depicted by this study against the theories and models postulated in this research, as similar to that of a totalitarian regime, as follows:




Source: Own construct based on Figure 47

**Figure 112: The Republic of South Africa as a totalitarian political regime: 1978-1989**

All the same, this brings the measurement of politics and intelligence intervention as depicted in the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995) to the fore. The activities of the police and military within the internal political affairs of the country displayed by the NSMS, as well as the subsequent transformation of the BOSS into the Department of National Security (DONS), indicated a high level of political intervention in intelligence and a high level of intervention of intelligence, into politics. This places South Africa, albeit not very deep into and also for a short period, within block two.

Within the intelligence sector the DMI rose to the fore with the SB in its shadow. More so, the transformation of the BOSS into the NIS did not prevent or initially change the militarisation of the state. Likewise, although as discussed in this study, the NIS was not involved in any assassinations or direct attacks, their involvement in the domestic political affairs cannot be disputed. The same goes for the transformation of BOSS into the Department of National Security (DONS). Thus, for a short period of time South Africa moved away from an authoritarian state with political police intelligence into the domain of a security state with security state intelligence practices due to limited control and oversight as well as direct interference within politics and politics manipulating the intelligence. It is depicted as follows:




Source: Own construct based on Figure 65

**Figure 113: State Security intelligence practices in the Republic of South Africa: 1978-1989**

The most significant event during this time is the establishment of the National Security Management System (NSMS) which became a shadow government system and gradually provided for the military intelligence to move to the forefront. In taking the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical context of this study into account events such as the 'Total Strategy'

policy and the militarisation of the administration, it subsequently led to the placement of South Africa within the measurement of its political system and intelligence during this time period – albeit for a short time, as a state security intelligence structure within a totalitarian type of political regime. This is as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 114: Measuring intelligence in the Republic of South Africa: 1978 – 1989**

In summary, the implementation of the NSMS as a shadow government structure and the subsequent domination of military intelligence as the predominant intelligence structure, placed South Africa within the domain of a security state. Within the conceptualised and reconstructed democratisation theory in this study, the country reflects non adherence to the rule by the people or more so non adherence to the principles and practices of democracy. It furthermore implies that it does not meet all the criteria of a democracy. The accompanied declared state of emergencies to counter internal unrest and violence and the subsequent deployment of the defence force, albeit in support of the police nevertheless contributed to this evaluation. South Africa was on the brink of further internal violence and instability that would be countered with more extreme totalitarian style actions. These factors also contributed to increased international political pressure and economic sanctions, isolating the country further away from any potential development. Events soon took a turn for the better as this period ended with South Africa starting on its road towards democratic transition through a peaceful negotiated settlement. As indicated within the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical contributions of this research and more specifically the factors contributing to political regime change, the future for South Africa at this time is postulated as: (1) To plunge into radical revolutionary transformation; (2) To take more steps deeper into that of a militarised security or praetorian state; or (3) Make a U-turn away from

the direction of the 'Total Strategy' policy towards a more peaceful settlement. Fortunately, the latter was the direction the country took.

#### **8.4 The evaluation and analysis of political regimes and intelligence practices in South Africa: 1990 - 2017**


An evaluation of the political regime and intelligence practices in South Africa in the period 1990 to 2017 is also of significance as to be able to place intelligence within the country as a hybrid political regime as also reflected in the title of this dissertation. This is as follows:

##### **8.4.1 The negotiations and intelligence developments in South Africa: 1990 – TEC**

This era marks the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequently brought an end to the Cold War. South Africa eventually entered into a transition towards democratisation as it merged at the end of the third wave. The initial changes and transformation brought about by President De Klerk which began with the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of several resistance movements brought several parties to the table which culminated into a negotiated settlement. In this initial era the stronghold of the military was also broken and South Africa moved away from a security state, back into the authoritarian regime type. However, even though several policies were changed, the country still resembled a strong authoritarian state and maintained its segregation policies and support of the homelands. Universal suffrage and political participation in the broader South Africa was still the order of the day. Within this context, the freedom Index rating for South Africa in 1988 indicated a less democratic, non-free and more authoritarian state. In the period 1990 to 1993, South Africa is rated from a non-free state to partly free and less authoritarian regime (Freedom Index, 1988-1993). Nonetheless, even though negotiations set the country towards democratisation, the Apartheid government remained in power, albeit with the parallel inputs from the TEC. The constitution was not yet amended and neither many of the segregation acts. The country continued to experience sporadic violence and radicalisation, even though some were directed against opposing organisations and groups as to government. The several negotiating forums and interventions assisted the country towards a new political dispensation. Nevertheless, South Africa is viewed to enter into the pre-transition phase within regime change, as postulated by this study and delineated in Figure 34. The political system is again categorised as an authoritarian political system as depicted in Figure 107, although closer towards transition or new democracy.

The most significant change within the security and intelligence sector during this time, according to this study, is the restriction of political intervention into politics. The NSMS was disbanded and the strong position of the military and military and police intelligence replaced by the greater prominence given to the NIS and its role in the road towards a peaceful negotiated settlement.


More control was placed on the functions and role of both the DMI and the SB which also restricted the intervention of intelligence into politics. The implementation of the TEC and its role in joint governance also placed more control and accountability on all intelligence organisations, inclusive of the non-statutory organisations. Several discussions followed as to transform the security and intelligence sector. The intelligence practices also made a dramatic turnaround away from state security back into political police intelligence, depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 65

**Figure 115: Authoritarian intelligence practices in the Republic of South Africa: 1961-1978**

This subsequently placed intelligence in South Africa away from state security and back into that of a political police intelligence and is displayed as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 116: Measuring intelligence in the Republic of South Africa: 1990 - 1993**




In taking the measurement of politics and intelligence intervention as depicted in the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995) into consideration, the intervention of intelligence into politics is measured as low. However, regarding the intervention of politics into intelligence, the measurement indicates high levels of intervention according to this research. The reason for this is attributed to both the involvement of members of the TEC (inclusive of non-statutory opposition organisations as well as their intelligence and military wings), as well as the South African government in the control and regulating of the intelligence and security forces. These actions include the start of radical transformation within the security sector. Thus this period is measured as displaying a low intervention of intelligence into politics but a high intervention of politics into intelligence.

To summarise, South Africa entered into the prospects of regime change. The theoretical models indicating the features and characteristics of intelligence and political regime types as linked to democratisation or transition clearly indicate that South Africa took a new direction. This study postulates this stage as the regime breakdown period of change with a decision to transform. Within the regime change theory this period reflects negotiations and compromise between different entities as well as the common will to democratise and change. The lesser prominence given to the role of military intelligence as well as the Security Branch and the subsequent lead of the NIS within the intelligence community and its involvement and enhancement of a negotiated settlement as solution for a better future South Africa, is notable. The several changes and gradual transformation of the role, function and practices of the intelligence and security sector during this period turned the direction further away from totalitarian and also within the authoritarian domain, towards almost borderline political police – much closer towards a new democracy or even democratic intelligence. To some extent, much of the new direction towards negotiations is accredited to the secret work of the NIS – although it sometimes does not get the credit that it deserves. South Africa entered democratisation based on where democracy occurs as a result of a joint action between elites in power and within the opposition. Nonetheless, South Africa is for this period, considered a model for other countries as it joined the third wave of democratisation through a negotiated settlement without the direct involvement and participation of any international role-players. Inclusive of this model is the initial power-sharing role of the Government of National Unity (GNU) which had to take South Africa into democratic transition.

#### **8.4.2 The New South Africa and intelligence developments: 1994-1999 democratic transition**

Within the conceptualised and reconstructed regime change theory in this study, South Africa clearly entered the transition phase as also depicted in Figure 34. As postulated by this study this phase concerns the following: (1) The regime break away from its previous regime type; (2) The implementation of the first free, fair and contested elections; (3) The establishment of the rule of


law; and commitment and mechanisms to ensure human rights and apart from initiating a democratic government and the establishment of constitutionality. South Africa could be labelled as a new democracy during this period when it held its first democratic elections in 1994. The Government of National Unity functioned initially under a new interim constitution followed by a new constitution that provided for universal suffrage to all with human rights and rule of law. South Africa dissolved all homeland territories and all citizens were part of a new bicameral parliament. The constitution was accepted as the supreme law which classified South Africa, albeit a new democracy - as a constitutional democracy. In addition the Freedom Index rating for South Africa from 1993 - 1995 indicates a partly-free state in a transition towards democracy and from 1996 - 1999 rated within the 'Free' category. This period lasted until arguably 1999 with the start of the second free democratic elections and a new constitution. In the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical context of this study, South Africa is defined as a liberal democratic type of government with a representative system whereby elected officials represent the people in the executive and legislative based on a constitution as supreme law. The political regime of the new South Africa is categorised against the theory and models postulated by this study for the first time as that of a constitutional democracy as depicted in Figure 46, as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 46

**Figure 117: The New South Africa as a constitutional democracy: 1994 - 1999**


However, noteworthy within the intelligence practices specifically during the first year of the GNU in 1994, is the fact that the National Intelligence Services remains the civilian intelligence service. At the same time planning was conducted within the former TEC Super-working Group for Intelligence for a new civilian intelligence dispensation. Within the conceptualised meta-theoretical context of this study, intelligence practices for 1994 in South Africa are delineated as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 64

**Figure 118: Democratic intelligence in the New South Africa: 1994**

The new intelligence dispensation in South Africa successfully came into being on 1 January 1995 and displayed a successfully reformed democratic civilian intelligence community consisting of the amalgamation of several non-statutory intelligence structures and some services of the former homelands and the NIS, which is based on the Constitution and properly legislated and served as a model for other countries. This is portrayed as follows:




Source: Own construct based on Figure 64

**Figure 119: Democratic intelligence in the new South Africa: 1995 - 1999**

The measurement of politics and intelligence intervention of the new reformed intelligence in South Africa according to the measurement graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995), portrays the ideal type of relationship namely where the political level does not intervene in professional intelligence affairs, and intelligence is politically neutral. On their part intelligence perceive

interference with politics as an undesirable action due to a high level of professionalism and ethics. This places the country firmly in block one.

Nonetheless, an evaluation and assessment of the political regime and intelligence practices from 1994 – 1999 places South Africa within that of a new democracy with a newly reformed democratic intelligence. This is also the first time in the history of South Africa's intelligence practices that the country was directly linked to be democratic – albeit newly reformed, this is viewed as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 120: Measuring intelligence in the new South Africa: 1994 – 1999**

In conclusion, during the transition phase the Intelligence dispensation changed drastically and moved from being classified as political police intelligence into newly democratically established or reforming intelligence. This process officially started with the inauguration of the newly established intelligence dispensation considered to be constitutionally bound within a philosophy guiding its mandate and practices as reflected in the White Paper for Intelligence. The control, oversight and accountability measures discussed in this thesis and delineated in Figure 63, are also applicable. To this extent, South Africa reflects the ideal system of oversight and control which range over a broad spectrum and includes measures within the service, the legislative, executive, and public, Inspector General, Auditor General, academics and the media. The new intelligence community was also initially placed with a Deputy Minister within the Department of Justice. The separation between the policymaker and intelligence was initially also clearer, especially with the creation of a coordinating body responsible for products to and from the client

– thereby also providing national intelligence priorities. The national threat perception moved away from the ‘total onslaught’ towards development, peace and protection of the constitution. The code of conduct, and constitutionally bound intelligence activities, was observed within all practices.


#### **8.4.3 The new South Africa and intelligence developments: 1999 – 2008**

The May 1999 elections could be argued to mark the end of South Africa's transition to democracy as a country. South Africa, although not a consolidated democracy, was rated by the Freedom Index for the period 1999 - 2008 as Free. Nonetheless, the political landscape experienced several challenges including the initial resignation of a Deputy President and later the replacement of a president with an interim president. EIU Democracy Index categorised South Africa in 2004 the first country on the flawed democracy and in 2008 down a number under the same category.

The political system remained that of a constitutional system as depicted in Figure 117, albeit a newly elected government without power-sharing as based on the new 1996 Constitution. Intelligence in this era took place within the second wave of intelligence restructuring as Africa (2012:98-122) explains with several legislative amendments of which the most significant led to the creation of a broader based civilian intelligence community under a separate full minister of intelligence. All the same, as Van Den Berg (2014:133) argues, intelligence in South Africa made a remarkable transformation towards a bureau of domestic intelligence. The country at this time remains a model to other countries in terms of its liberal constitution, Bill of Rights, intelligence legislation, oversight, control and accountability measurements.

In taking the measurement of politics and intelligence intervention as depicted in the graph (Figure 100) of Bar-Joseph (1995) into consideration, the intervention of intelligence into politics and politics into intelligence are both still measured as low.

All the same, the evaluation and assessment of the political regime and intelligence practices in South Africa for the period 1999 – 2008 places the country as having an ideal type democratic Intelligence within a Democracy. This implies that intelligence is placed within the category of democracy away from reforming intelligence, delineated as follows:



Source: Own construct

Figure 121: Measuring intelligence in democratic South Africa: 1999 – 2008

#### 8.4.4 South Africa and intelligence developments: 2009 – 2017

South Africa began facing several challenges in its goal of reaching democratic consolidation with the ANC winning the fourth democratic elections under the leadership of Jacob Zuma in 2009. The latter, as Nattrass (2017:236) explains, started the decade as a sacked Deputy President and ended it as an elected president. The ANC won the 2014 national election again, although losing some votes and Zuma continued as President. During this time period however, South Africa is capitulated to the political decisions, in-fighting and whims of the ruling party which have a dire effect on all government institutions as well as the policy-making process. The inability of the ruling party to successfully transform from a liberation movement to a political party became more prevalent. This resulted in a further inability to distinguish between the scope, role and function of government and that of the ruling party and with a disregard of minority rights and politics. South Africa started this period with what seems to have become a trend in most of the countries on the African and the region with the appearance of non-democratic characteristics and featuring patrimonialism. As the Human Rights Watch's *2012 World Report* indicates, corruption, social and economic inequalities, the weakening of state institutions by partisan appointments and one-party dominance are all evident within South Africa. This era is furthermore dominated by the ruling ANC party that sees the proverbial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow as lying in a national democratic revolution (NDR) and ambitious new forms of social engineering (Jeffery, 2012:42). Furthermore, in contrast with the reconciliation presidency of Mandela in

protecting cultures, a lot of tension in the form of social media racism, political slandering, civil unrest, unconstitutional actions, patronage and even politically motivated murders appear almost as common.

All the same, this study postulates that the ANC had three major strategy waves, the first since its inauguration until 1994 – “Get into Power”; the second from 1994 until 2009 – “Consolidated Power” and the third from then ongoing – “Remain in Power at all Cost”. These strategies clearly define the different policy thinking and actions displayed by the organisation. The first speaks for itself whilst the second refers to the aftermath of freedom and liberation where the ANC (and to some extent the tripartite alliance), positioned itself as the only true liberators of South Africa. All other resistance movements were either ignored or neglected. Within this context one party-dominant rule came to the fore. The third strategy could even be linked to the repeated mantra of President Zuma since 2016; namely that the ANC will rule until Jesus comes.

Cadre deployment is another significant factor linked to the third strategy wave according to this study. Cadre deployment is accompanied within the concept of the transformation of South Africa as part of the vision of the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution (NDR) policy. It specifically entails the deployment of cadres in government departments and institutions and the direct influencing of civil society to support ANC policy. This action went beyond the initial amalgamation of different groups as well as the affirmative action policy into a more direct involvement of the ANC in deploying their members in an effort to enforce its policies within all these sectors. Loyalty and patriotism to the party became more relevant than qualifications, skills and experience. This is furthermore evident, as also supported by Joubert (*In Pretorius ed.*, 2012:393), within government departments, municipal councils and the security services. In addition also evident with senior appointments in the judiciary, the intelligence services, the SABC, parastatals such as Eskom, Transnet and SAA, the Land Bank and even within several Chapter 9 institutions. Within the conceptualised theory of this study it is denoted that this is typical of neo-patrimonial regimes where authority is maintained through patronage and loyalty, rather than a formal political and administrative system.

The successive election poll wins of the ANC is not a reflection of a one-party state, but rather that of one-party dominance. The detrimental issue is as also discussed by Van Den Berg (2014:121-122), that situation inevitably indicates that South Africa’s democracy fails Huntington’s “two turn over test” and is not on the road towards democratic consolidation. One-party dominance contributes to a decline of civil liberties as well as the effective functioning of government and culminates in a low score for electoral processes. The party-dominant system inhibits fair competition and access to resources. In the end the political playing field is not regarded as even (De Jager, *In De Jager*, 2015:145-171). This furthermore hampers the deepening of democracy. This is more so evident in the perception of the ANC that if it is replaced

by any other party at the polls, it is regime change and linked to forces involved in subversion. This is voiced by the Secretary General of the ANC who said in 2014 that they needed to be vigilant and see through the anarchy and people who are out there in a programme of regime change. The issue of regime change is furthermore escalated into the national threat perception. This is then forwarded that there is a direct threat to the sovereignty and well-being of the state. The statement by the Minister of State Security that "forces seek to undermine our advances and attempts to bring regime change about" is evident of this view (Mahlobo, 2017 ANC 5<sup>th</sup> National Conference) as well as that intelligence is addressing the threat and that: "We do that work quietly because at the end of the day South Africa should never be a failed state. Our duty is to protect its sovereignty". This is a typical feature of a hybrid political system as postulated by this study in that such regimes lack an arena of contestation, are sufficiently open, free, and fair so that the ruling party can readily be turned out of power.

Nonetheless, further political and economic instability was brought about by several cabinet reshuffles. Since Zuma became president in 2009, he undertook 12 Cabinet reshuffles (1x 2009, 1x 2010, 1x 2011, 1x 2012, 1x 2013, 1x 2014, 3x 2015 and 3x 2017) The following changes were made: one change to the deputy presidency, 126 changes to the national executive, 67 changes within ministerial positions and 64 in deputy minister positions. The national executive consists of 35 ministers and 37 deputy ministers in comparison to 2009, where there were 33 ministers and 29 deputy ministers. These reshuffles are also viewed as hampering good governance and effective leadership. In adding to the political turbulence and as a first, President Zuma had to face a vote of no confidence. These escalated into seven open votes and one secret ballot, all of which he all won even though with waning support. This not only tainted his presidency and image, but also restrained a deepening of democracy in the country. Corruption is an additional stumbling block for effective leadership and governance. In a SABC news cast (SABC, 14 May 2017, 21:16) Minister Radebe (Minister for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency) stated that corruption as an epidemic and enemy to good governance, obstructs government's efforts to render adequate services to citizens. Within this context the President also lost an appeal to the High Court in South Africa to drop all seven hundred corruption charges brought against him in the arms deal scandal. Both the ANC and politicised institutions are in a predicament as how to handle this verdict. Likewise this study indicated within its meta-theoretical and theoretical conceptualisation of political regime types that neo-patrimonial regimes are also characterised by a rapid turnover of political personnel as rulers regularly rotate office-holders.

Furthermore, the Secretary General of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), Malusi Mpumlwana, claimed that South Africa is just inches away from becoming a mafia state. According to this report this takes place as follows: (1) Securing control over state wealth through the capture of state-owned companies by chronically weakening their governance and operational structures; (2) Securing control over the public service by weeding out skilled professionals;



(3) Securing access to rent seeking opportunities by shaking down regulations to their advantage, and to the disadvantage of South Africans; (4) Securing control over the country's fiscal sovereignty; (5) Securing control over strategic procurement opportunities by intentionally weakening key technical institutions and formal executive processes; (6) Securing a loyal intelligence and security apparatus; and (7) Securing parallel governance and decision making structures that undermine the executive (The South African Council of Churches; "Unburdening Panel Process", May 2017). Likewise, in several newspaper articles South Africa is alleged to display features of a mafia state (Maharaj, 2017, Daily Maverick; McKaiser, 2017, Mail & Guardian and Masoga, 2017, Sunday Independent). Masoga (2017) asserts that a democratic mafia state is an inverted system of democracy whereby top government leaders collaborate secretly with notorious mafia corporates and syndicates. All ultra-powerful mafia syndicates worldwide are surreptitiously steered and commanded by respective family patriarchs. The methods and actions as also evident in South Africa are; (1) to subvert and exploit the rule of law solely to create illicit financial and material advantages for both the political elite and the mafia; (2) to exempt the mafia bosses and their criminal associates from the apprehensive reach of the law enforcement agencies and; (3) to severely paralyse the efficacy and credibility of governance structures so that the mafia can become virtually untouchable and invincible.

More so, the current government is accused of being involved in so-called state capture detailing the benefits to politicians, friends and companies. This is addressed in various academic reports including the 2017 Public Affairs Research Institute (Pari) report 'Betrayal of the Promise: How the nation is being stolen'. This report documents how the Zuma-centred power elite has built and consolidated this symbiotic relationship between the constitutional state and the shadow state in order to execute the silent coup. At the nexus of this symbiosis are a handful of the same individuals and companies connected in one way or another to the Gupta- Zuma family network. The latter includes revelations of the stirring of racial tensions in the nation as a campaign waged by the renowned Bell Pottinger Company on behalf of the Gupta owned Oakbay Investment Company as well as Gupta linked protection actions and an incriminating report by the auditing firm KMPG against SARS.


The manner that this is strategically coordinated constitutes the shadow state. The shadow state is not only the space for extra-legal action facilitated by criminal networks, but also where key security and intelligence actions are coordinated. This state form is closely linked to neo-patrimonialism describe by Erdman and Engel (2006:18) as a mixture of two partly interwoven types of domination that co-exist namely; patrimonial and legal rational bureaucratic domination, as also discussed within the constructed models for political regime types within this study. In similar fashion, Lodge (2014:1) explains neo-patrimonialism is instated within the ANC as ruling party in three ways namely; (1) such political habits have a long history within the ANC but were restricted during its years in exile and have begun to resurface now that the armed struggle is

over; (2) it relates to the party's historical ties to criminal networks and pressures arising from the transition to majority rule and contemporary electoral politics; and (3) it is a reflection of broader tendencies within South African political and economic life. According to him (Lodge) and as supported by this research, all three factors are found to have played a role in the rise of neo-patrimonial politics, and it is the confluence of these trends that explains why these dynamics have taken such a strong hold on the party.

Equally, the current factions and different groupings involved in the succession race for a new president of the majority party, also impact on government institutions service delivery and the actions of the broader civil society. This disparity and conflict resulted in numerous allegations of a dysfunctional movement. These actions which are due to the political influence and politicisation of society bring further disability and order which attributed to the downgrade of South Africa to junk status by several major credit agencies. The Fragile States Index (FSI) for 2017 also lists the country as the most worsened economy for a country not in an active conflict or civil war. In addition media freedom during this time period is downgraded to partially free away from the previous position of free (Freedom of the Press). The Democracy Index rated South Africa since 2010 as a flawed democracy and it is gradually moving down the positions on the list (Democracy Index 2010-2016).

All said, as Van Den Berg (2014:125) denotes, South Africa did not reach democratic consolidation after more than twenty years of democratisation and as indicated in this study in the words of Carothers (2002:9) “***They have entered a political grey zone***”. In linking the conceptualised meta-theoretical and theoretical context of this study in this period, this study clearly denotes that South Africa did not reach democratic consolidation, nor is it a democracy. The political system in South Africa displays characteristics and elements of both democratic and undemocratic practices as also supported by Gossel (2016:1) who argues that the country oscillates between democracy and autocracy. Similarly the SA Monitor (2015:1) indicates that the country shifted towards a hybrid regime with weak democratic as well as non-democratic institutions. This study postulates that South Africa is not a consolidated democracy, neither did it reverse back to that of an authoritarian regime but as it got stuck in its transition, it should rather be classified as a hybrid political regime.

Based on the theory and models discussed and explained within this study, South Africa is placed as a hybrid political regime from 2009, which is depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 48

Figure 122: South Africa as a hybrid political regime: 2009 - 2017

Within the intelligence environment several drastic changes took place of which some closely resemble the intelligence practices of the apartheid regime. The first is the gradual move away from an all-inclusive human threat perception to that of a threat to state security. Within this concept intelligence had a name change to State Security which was applied to both the ministry as well as the institutions. All the existing civilian intelligence agencies were integrated into - albeit an ongoing restructuring – a new department created similar to the former BOSS by a Presidential Proclamation. Legislation only followed almost four years later with an amendment act. The ministry was broadened with the addition of a deputy minister and the minister was replaced by a new appointee David Mahlobo who was often labelled by the media as the right hand of the President and even the shadow Prime Minister (Huffington Post, 2017/09/26). Oversight systems in South Africa are failing with the parliamentary JSCI failing to frequently publish annual reports (Mail & Guardian, 2014/04/04) and lengthy delays in the appointment of a chair. This is also evident in the initial delay in appointing an IG as well as the IG being reluctant to investigate serious allegations against intelligence even though it has the mandate and responsibility. The intelligence service is furthermore frequently questioned regarding fruitless expenditure, overspending, cost cutting violations and unaccounted expenditure (Prince, Beeld, 2014). It is claimed that the SSA had spent more than R1.5 billion in irregular expenditure over the past five years. The SSA had also frequently received qualified audit reports since 2012. Corruption is also apparent including allegations against the current Director General of the SSA and a former head of the National Intelligence Agency.

Other issues within the intelligence domain include the links that the newly appointed Public Prosecutor has with the SSA – of which she was a former member – as well as her biasness in this regard (Star 2017) and the alleged existence of a covert intelligence unit driving political operations on behalf of the President (Huffington Post, 2017/08/14 and 2017/09/17, News 24, 2017/01/11). It is furthermore claimed that the theft of R17 million in foreign currencies from the SSA headquarters in December 2015 was used to fund this units covert activities. The Inspector General was asked by the Democratic Alliance (DA) to investigate this matter (Politicsweb, 2017/09/08). This unit is allegedly targeting political opponents within the ruling party. This is supported by the Secretary General of the ANC who said that state institutions hacked his private emails and listened in on phone calls (New Age, 2017/09/05) as well as the Deputy-President who claimed to have been targeted in a smear campaign (Citizen, 2017/10/04). It is claimed that the SSA is used as a proxy to settle internal battles within the ruling party (Africa Confidential, 2016). South Africa is furthermore entering an increased state of securitisation (Duvenhage, 2016) that includes the intercepting of meta-data, SMS's and the monitoring of at least 70000 cell phones.

To this extent the Minister of State Security remarked that 'we are monitoring everything' (City Press, 2017/01/15; Huffington Post, 2017/08/30). The involvement of the SSA in the deployment of electronic devices in parliament to block cellular phone receptions also became controversial as it is a direct threat to the democracy of South Africa (BusinessTech, 2015/02/17). In addition the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concerns about unlawful surveillance practices inclusive of mass interception of communications by the NC (ITWeb, 2016/04/01). Linked to this is the warning by the Minister of State Security of regime change threats by foreign governments and other forces (Politicsweb, 2016/02/24 and Pretoria News, 2017/05/17). The SSA is also placed in disconcerting parallels with the habits of the BRICS countries against NGO's operating in their countries. According to this action as the Minister of State Security stated, that there were citizens and NGO's collaborating with external forces to undermine and destabilise South Africa and that they are just security agents that are being used in covert operations (Daily Maverick, 2016/05/03). According to the Minister, the ANC has invoked the concept of a 'colour revolution' against offensive external forces with a regime change agenda at its core – this is in reference to non-governmental organisations or foreign forces involved in revolutions such as the Arab Spring - Maghreb, Orange Revolution - Ukraine and hybrid revolution in Yemen and Syria (Huffington Post, 2017/07/06).

This increased threat perception contributes to South Africa experiencing an increase of securitisation. In addition, the Minister for Safety and Security responsible for the police requested the assistance of the SANDF in fighting crime and gangsters in the country. This will be the first time that the SANDF will be deployed in this manner within the new South Africa (EWN, 2017/10/15). The increased politicisation of intelligence also came to the fore in the replacement of Pravin Gordhan as Minister of Finance due to an alleged intelligence briefing to the President. Intelligence is being accused of either being partisan to ANC factional battles or being misled by politicians. Intelligence and the security apparatus are also claimed to be involved in state capture as indicated in reports by the SACC (Van Dalsen, 2017). Former Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils argues that intelligence services has become a toll for Luthuli House and the President with officers not working for the state but for the ANC (News24, 2014/04/15). As also discussed by this study, other activities include the vetting of ANC MP's by intelligence through Project Veritas (Mail & Guardian, 2014/03/28) as well as the involvement in the creation of a workers union linked to the Marikana shooting (Daily Maverick, 2016/06/20). This furthermore includes nepotism with claims that children of ministers and politically connected people are employed by the SSA (News24, 2014/08/31). During 2015 the SSA was involved in a serious leakage of information when the investigative unit of Aljazeera received several classified documents regarding the clandestine activities of the agency (Mail & Guardian, 2015/02/26). This is still under investigation.


Nevertheless, within the third wave of intelligence restructuring and transformation (Africa, 2012:98-122), as Van Den Berg (2104:136) claims, the creation of the SSA and the subsequent integration of all the civilian intelligence services into one department, reflects a growing securitisation of the South African state and that the security of the state has displaced that of the individual, undermining the core principals as acknowledged within the White Paper on Intelligence and South African Constitution. Thereby the intelligence regime revealed a tendency to be less democratic. The initial success of the amalgamation in integrating different intelligence units into one, failed dismally

according to this study if it is compared with cadre deployment and the subsequent politicisation of intelligence. This is supplemented with the concept of national security altered into state security together with the centralisation of all intelligence functions under a ministry. South Africa had three different intelligence ministers since 2009 including the latest cabinet reshuffle on 2017/10/17 where David Mahlobo was replaced by adv. Bongani Bongo.

Equally, Pauw (2017:308) reveals in his new book "The president's keepers" which the SSA intends to cease and desist from further distribution, that the SSA forms part of the militia in protecting the President against any prosecution or wrongdoings in his alleged corrupt deals and actions. More so, most of the aforementioned information researched by this study in recent years, are substantiated in this publication. Likewise, Pauw asserts that the information in the book is obtained from reliable and well placed information sources not only within the SSA, but also other government institutions. The book launch also create numerous legal attempts to gag the author and the contents as allegedly in contravention of intelligence legislation. Even so, Pauw (2017) argues that president Zuma created a state within the state with a felonious band of cronies, thieves, derelicts, conspirators, fraudsters, insurrectionists, and vagrants involved in a grand scale of corruption and plundering with no consequences. The President is implicated in tax evasion and serious corruption and state capture deals together with the Gupta family. Pauw (2017) equally reveals the relationships of a former wife of the president who is also a presidential hopeful, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, with cigarette smugglers and crime syndicates. He also claims that government institutions are deliberately imploded as to be able to plunder and capture the state and this includes institutions such as crime intelligence, the revenue services and the SSA.

The current head of the SSA is furthermore implicated by Pauw (2017:13-59), (also revealed in an earlier City Press article), in several corruption and fraud activities within other institutions but more specifically within the department he heads. These include, apart from the misappropriation of funds and patronage to family and friends, the illegal and unconstitutional running of a secret principal agent network system as an alternative covert shadow intelligence agency. This structure is principally used for personal information collection and protection as well as to advance further dubious dealings which include the augmentation of corruption and the continued misappropriation of funds. Through these activities it is alleged that the misappropriation of more than 1.5 billion rand took place over a three year period. At the time of this research no definite legal actions were forthcoming in disproving any information revealed.


Therefore, in measuring the intelligence practices South Africa from 2009 to date (2017) against the theory and models within this study, intelligence in South Africa is evaluated and categorised as a Political Intelligence Service and depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct based on Figure 66

Figure 123: Intelligence practices in South Africa as a Political Intelligence Service: 2009 - 2017

South Africa seems to be the only country categorised as a democracy which has a minister of intelligence as well as that ascribed to the title of state security for both the organisation and minister. This type of action is usually associated with that of an authoritarian state. The political intervention into intelligence and the intervention of intelligence according to the graph (Figure 97) of Bar-Joseph (1995) specifically for this time period is placed by this study within block number 4 of mutual intervention that is also both high as representing the worst of both worlds where there is mutual distrust between intelligence and the political echelon, which results in parochial alignments between intelligence officers and policy-makers and the negligence of the service to national interests. Intelligence practices since 2009 reflects that of a hybrid intelligence structure – it oscillates between democratic and non-democratic practices. Likewise is the measurement of intelligence practices and the political regime within the matrix postulated by this study is that of a Political Intelligence within a Hybrid political regime and is depicted as follows:




Source: Own construct

**Figure 124: Political intelligence in South Africa as a Hybrid Political Regime: 2009 - 2017**

In summary, this study explains that a hybrid political regime is similar to an amoeba as it constantly changes shape. For this specific time period the detailed characteristics of South Africa still displays more democratic than non-democratic practices and for this reason this study denotes that only certain characteristics of a non-democratic authoritarian regime are present. These are specifically towards the role and functions of the current majority party and its national executive committee (NEC) – as its highest decision-making body. The ANC as the dominant party and its NEC is similar to the party position in an authoritarian regime although its practices are within a constitutional democracy. Within the notion that intelligence practices reflects the




nature of the political regime as supported by this study, the following statement made in 2008 by Matthews Phosa (Senior ANC member), captures the essence of South Africa as a hybrid political regime with similar intelligence practices: “The president of the country takes guidelines, mandates and instructions from the ANC. There is only one centre of power and that is the highest decision-making structure of the ANC. The NEC, including the President of the ANC, in effect becomes the representative of the majority of voters between elections. Its task therefore is to instruct the executive and legislative organ of government on issues of policy. The elected ANC structures hold the ultimate power in this situation and all structures and leaders of the governing party will account to them. The President and his or her Cabinet accounts to the NEC of the ANC, as any other structure of Government does” (<https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za>). As described by this study, the third wave strategy of the ruling party – namely to rule until kingdom comes at all costs, accompanied by its embedment into state institutions through cadre deployment and its attempt to influence and control civil society - as to promote, enhance and impose its policies, resulting in South Africa to be categorised as a hybrid political regime is specifically depicted as follows:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 125: Political practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime: 2009 - 2017**

Likewise, this study denotes that as the intelligence regime is a reflection of the political system, the intelligence practices by the Political Intelligence is also postulated in the following model:



Source: Own construct

**Figure 126: Intelligence practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime: 2009 - 2017**

It is furthermore postulated that this trend will remain. However, the evaluation and assessment of intelligence practices and regime types in South Africa will also enable this study to identify any trends or tendencies over time. Moreover, the question that comes to the fore in taking a review of the evaluation and assessment of intelligence and the political regime in South Africa over different time periods that requires further attention by this study is: 'What does the future hold for the political regime and intelligence practices in South Africa?'

## 8.5 Intelligence practices and regime types in a future South Africa

Although the future cannot be predicted due to uncertainty, this study views scenario development as a crucial tool for future perspectives for South Africa. Scenarios usually indicate possible, probable and desirable outcomes and if they are based on trends of the past, may be helpful in assisting strategic long-term planning and action – specifically in addressing non-democratic regime and intelligence practices if the desired outcome is that of a consolidated democracy. The following selected scenarios are briefly discussed as relevant to South Africa.

### 8.5.1 Cronje scenarios

Cronje (2014:153-219) provides the following four scenarios; (1) the wide road – the trend highways lead into a future where citizens are free and have become more prosperous; (2) the narrow road – the trend highways lead to a future where citizens are more prosperous but have

little freedom; (3) the rocky road – the trend highways lead into a future where citizens are much poorer and have little freedom and (4); the toll road – the trend highways lead to a future where many citizens are poor but free. In suggesting which of these scenarios are the most plausible Cronje (2014:228) explains that in taking the butterfly effect into account – it means any of them could materialise as the future is inherently uncertain. This study observes that these scenarios lack the concept or notion of South Africa neither being a consolidated democracy, nor reverting back to authoritarianism, but rather displays the features and characteristics of a hybrid political regime. Therefore this study rather denotes a combination and adaption of scenarios three and four as a tolled rocky road where this roads leads to a future where some citizens are prosperous but the majority remain poor and all enjoy less freedom. The power elite enjoy wealth, freedom and prosperity within a neo-patrimonial mafia type state.

### **8.5.2 Johnson scenarios (2015)**

Johnson (2015:244) explains, as supported by this thesis that regime change is inevitable if the ANC continues with its current failure of governance. Nonetheless, he (Johnson, 2015:226-230) postulates two scenarios for a future South Africa in relation to the increasingly dire state of the South African economy under ANC rule and the possible involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Scenario One: Accepting the bailout – within this scenario the ruling party is split in two with those *for* or *against* the bailout and those who decide to support the *for*, form a type of coalition with other parties as to manage the bailout. Fierce resistance and opposition is expected from non-bailout supporters. Scenario Two: ANC refusal for an IMF bailout – most ruling party members oppose such a bailout. This so-called Mugabe option is not based on an economic reasoning but rather psychological and political decisions. It will however resemble a public confession to economic failure by the government and soul searching into inter alia the National Democratic Revolution policy. The country stands to lose its economic sovereignty. This study recognises the difficulties that the government faces in its economic policies and perceives both these scenarios as viable possibilities within the notion of a hybrid political regime.

### **8.5.3 Mashele & Qobo scenarios (2014 & 2017)**

In their explanation, Mashele and Qobo (2014:180-209) forward the following fundamentals that require attention if South Africa is to experience a different kind of politics cleansed of current impurities. These are described as; (1) the need to eliminate the myth of the ANC in order to allow citizens for a more creative way of thinking about change beyond the ANC; (2) to ensure a regularity of shifting political allegiances between political parties on the basis of the depth of their leadership, the strength of their values and the quality of their proposed governing programme; (3) the need to explore different political alternatives which could potentially be vehicles for

political change; and (4) ordinary citizens are the ones who can bring about the change they desire. These fundamentals require that power is with the people and not the power elite and the free choice at the ballot. Progressive change beyond the liberation movement is required. Linked to these four options is what confronts South Africans today: Option One – live the status quo which is ANC rule and continue to hope for it to cleanse itself from impurities and then lead the citizens to the Utopia envisaged in the national democratic revolution; Option Two – the official opposition or DA to notch hefty electoral gains in 2019 against a disgruntled ANC and displaying a diverse support base. Option three – the launch of a new political party Agang SA. Unfortunately one man/woman personified parties in South Africa have historically not done well; Option four – the EFF as alternative. However the EFF is projected as a very dangerous party for South Africa and it appears as a band of anarchist who are prepared to tear the country apart. In the second edition of their book, Mashele and Qobo (2017) argue that the ANC is still falling and that we are witnessing the end of liberation politics which expresses itself through the death of a liberation movement. They furthermore forward three options for South Africans namely: (1) vote for the EFF; (2) vote for the DA; and (3) the formation of a new political party. This study supports the latter option for South Africa but however denotes that if such a new party is not formed from within the ANC or any liberation movement, it will be faced with the same predicament of limited support as Cope and Agang SA. Likewise, these scenarios are not inclusive of the notion of a hybrid political regime wherein the current activities and turmoil are being accommodated and perceived as oscillating between democratic and non-democratic practices.

#### **8.5.4 Cilliers scenarios**

In similar fashion Cilliers (2017:76-103) postulates three scenarios for the immediate future and beyond, namely; Bafana Bafana; Nation Divided and Mandela Magic. Bafana Bafana scenario – the ANC elect a mix of traditionalists and reformers of leaders to participate in the 2019 elections but the conflicted team talks left and walks right. It is a future of more of the same where South Africans expect less from government, withdraw from participation and become less active in the political economy. The Nation Divided scenario is a worst case where a grouping in the ANC take over the reins from Zuma and frustrates any prosecution of the former president and is committed to fiscal populism. Additional measures are taken for land distribution. The traditionalists in the ANC will remain the dominant group. A split in the ANC could occur that reduces the ANC's vote to below 50%. The Mandela Magic involves the rapid transition to a new leadership in the ANC dominated by a reformist group following a modernist policy agenda. Key amongst the required measurements is agreement among labour, business and government on a range of confidence building measures and leadership. There is improved government effectiveness and the economy is growing fast. Within these scenarios this research denotes that a combination between scenario one and two are more feasible and some of these characteristics and features are also reflected


within the notion of a hybrid political regime. Nevertheless, this study incorporates scenarios one and two as both present the activities and practices that could be present within the notion of a hybrid political regime. Scenario three, the Mandela Magic, is deemed the least viable as this requires South Africa to reach democratic consolidation – a possibility perceived as only for the distant future.

### 8.5.5 Duvenhage scenarios

Duvenhage (2016:23-24) provides four scenarios specifically for the security establishment inclusive of intelligence, in a future South Africa. In Scenario One; Democratic Consolidation – an internal intelligence bureau functioning within the context of democratic values; Scenario Two: Political involvement and interference – direct political interference and political police with a trend towards a police state; Scenario Three: A police state as an authoritarian regime and state security as the main purpose and; Scenario Four: A corrupt neo-patrimonial state with the undermining of government institutions to serve the interests of the power elite. This study supports the possibility of a combination of scenarios three and four as they reflects the characteristics and features of a hybrid political regime and the intelligence practices within as postulated by this research.

### 8.5.6 Van Den Berg scenarios

All the same, Van Den Berg (2014:163-171) also postulates four scenarios for a trajectory of South Africa's democratisation road. These scenarios are depicted as follow:



Source: Van Den Berg (2014:163)

Figure 127: Scenario matrix for South Africa's future democratisation

Scenario I: Eagle – is the ideal preferred option. The eagle symbolises democratic consolidation where democracy is the only game in town. Political regime and intelligence practices are characterised by a constitutional bound democracy with rule of law, human rights, accountability and freedom. Scenario II: Phoenix. The Phoenix symbolises the possible rise towards the goal of democratic consolidation on the one hand or the possibility of going back into the ashes of non-democratic regimes, such as an authoritarian regime. This is a reflection of a hybrid political regime and its intelligence oscillating between democratic and non-democratic regimes whilst displaying characteristics of both. Scenario III: Vulture – this scenario symbolises an authoritarian regime where the political elite are the only feeders of an underdeveloped country. The intelligence characteristics are typically those of police intelligence. Scenario IV: Black Swan - this symbolises the unknown although it is linked to the possibility of an Arab Spring in South Africa based on increased mobilisation of the masses. This is also the worst-case scenario depicting a South Africa that ends up as a failed state with a self-serving political regime and intelligence service.

## **8.6 Conclusion**

All countries in the world display a specific political regime type. Even so, all countries have an intelligence structure of some sort – be it democratic or non-democratic. South Africa is not excluded. Within this context chapter eight builds on the previous chapters of this study in its attempt to evaluate and analyse the intelligence practices as linked to political regime types over different time periods in South Africa. More so, this chapter aims to provide an understanding and explanation of the development of intelligence and political regime practices as to be able to explain current structures and activities. This also enables an understanding of practices in South Africa in relation to Southern Africa, Africa and the rest of the world. Therefore this chapter operationalises the theory and models conceptualised in this study on South Africa.

For this purpose, chapter eight measured and subsequently categorised and placed intelligence practices and political regimes types in South Africa according to state capacity/intelligence penetration against the variable of degree of government/intelligence autonomy using a matrix conceptualised. The politicisation of intelligence into politics and the interference of politics into intelligence is also measured against the graph postulated by Bar-Joseph as to be able to place it against the concepts of control, oversight and accountability.

This chapter clearly places the different intelligence practices and political regime types from initially an authoritarian model, for a short time period as a state security model back into an authoritarian model as to start its road towards democratic consolidation as a new democracy. Unfortunately regime transition is sometimes a lengthy and bumpy road. South Africa also did not

escape this factor and as this chapter indicates, only experienced being categorised as a democratic political regime with democratic intelligence practices for a short period of time before it got stuck in the grey zone. This chapter indicates that although South Africa did not reverse back to an authoritarian state, it neither reached democratic consolidation. Therefore the conceptualising of different models in understanding intelligence and political practices in different political regimes – being democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political systems assists this chapter in the evaluation and analysis of South Africa over different time periods. In addition, is the application of the political regime classification as well as that of the intelligence typology as conceptualised within this research within this chapter which aims to contribute to the meta-theoretical and conceptual framework of this study is captured.

All the same, South Africa is more than often viewed as a model for Africa, specifically since its transformation towards democracy. This however places a predicament on the country that got stuck in the grey zone or as postulated by this research, ended up as a consolidated hybrid regime. Therefore this study also attempts to explore different scenarios for a future South Africa as to be able to understand, discuss and explain different possible outcomes as based on trends and activities of the past. Chapter eight indicates that as intelligence mirrors the political regime, it reflects the specific practices of the regime and for whom it exists. Finally, this chapter aims to reach the main goal of this study as reflected in the title: Intelligence Practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime; a meta-theoretical and theoretical analysis.

Nevertheless, chapter eight paves the way for the next chapter, which aims to summarise the main aspects covered in this thesis, as well as intends to forward conclusions of the research findings and make subsequent recommendations towards intelligence and political regime practices in South Africa in its main purpose as stipulated in the White Paper for Intelligence namely to Safeguard the Constitution and ensure a better life for all.

## CHAPTER 9: OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

*Our story of the future begins and ends with a paradox: The same global trends suggesting a dark and difficult near future, despite the progress of recent decades, also bear within them opportunities for choices that yield more hopeful, secure futures.*

Gregory Treverton 2017:2

This final chapter of this thesis aims to summarise the main aims addressed in this study. The point of departure focuses on three contributions of this research, namely: (1) The conceptualisation of a meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies; (2) A meta-theoretical framework for intelligence theory; and (3) Operationalising theory and theory testing on South Africa. Through this effort this chapter reviews the conceptual and meta-theoretical framework this study proposes as well as reflects on the research aims. The central theoretical statement is evaluated as to provide findings and conclusions within this thesis. This approach simultaneously addresses the overall contributions of this research.

### 9.1 Introduction

Intelligence is and remains a secret tool of the state which can be used either to the advantage or disadvantage of the citizens it seeks to protect. Moreover, this study clearly establishes that intelligence exists because of and for the political regime in which it exists. It furthermore epitomises that regime and as such bears the specific culture, psychology, scars and unique practices of the country for which it has to serve. Likewise, any political regime changes also influence the type of intelligence practices within a country which either is democratic or non-democratic. Intelligence as a vital function within a state serves the government of the day with its purpose as to foremost protect the constitution, assist the policy-maker in policy-making and implementation and protect the national security interests of the country against foreign or hostile intelligence threats.

Albeit, the three waves of democratisation and the subsequent reverse waves also affects the typology of political regimes, especially those who got stuck in the 'grey zone'. After transition or democratisation, these countries neither ended up as consolidated democracies; nor did they reverse back to the type of regime they were when they started their political change. This phenomena as elucidated in this research, is not new and existed since the first wave of democratisation. These countries represent and reflect rather permanent features and characteristics which include some stability and order in their state form. Furthermore, although this type of political regime existed for some time, the attempt to classify it within existing political typologies is new. Therefore, this study investigated this phenomenon by not only focusing on the specific political regime type, but also to examine and explore its specific intelligence practices.



Lastly, it is perceived that South Africa did not reach democratic consolidation after its initial political regime change which began after entering the pre-transition phase in the early 90's, thereby joining the third wave of democratisation, albeit as latecomer. Even so, after much international acclamation and attention, the country was proclaimed as a new democracy after the second free and fair democratic elections in 1999. Nonetheless, thereafter it seems that South Africa, which is regarded as a model of democratisation for the world and specifically the African continent, neither made any progress towards democratic consolidation, nor regressed to an authoritarian political system. South Africa also got stuck in the 'grey 'zone' or more so, it is labelled as a hybrid political regime – the notion postulated by this study.

Equally, the intelligence practices within South Africa which also mirrors the political system, was also subjected to security sector reform simultaneously with the transition towards democratic consolidation. In this regard the new intelligence dispensation, although only implemented one year into the new South Africa, displayed the ideal type of intelligence with democratic control, oversight and accountability and more specifically sound legislated mandates that is overall constitutionally bound. All the same, several subsequent policy changes which include changes in structures and mandates, seems to have gradually moved the civilian intelligence away from democratic into what is perceived non-democratic practices. Intelligence furthermore exemplifies South Africa's political regime resulting in as reflected in the title of this thesis, namely: Intelligence in South Africa as a hybrid political regime.

Nonetheless, the main aim of this research requires further attention.

## **9.2 Meeting the research objectives**

The central theoretical statement of this study is captured in the following questions: 'Is intelligence in South Africa a reflection of the characteristics and practices of a hybrid political regime and if so, what are its characteristics?' This central assumption devolves into the following specific study goals and objectives, given again for elucidation purposes:

1. To reconstruct and explain a meta-scientific conceptual framework for the demarcation and understanding of intelligence studies as a sub-discipline within political science, social science and the broader science;
2. To provide insight into intelligence theory, concepts and practices through the construction and implementation of a meta-theoretical framework for intelligence;
3. To review (reconstruct), interpret and analyse political regime theory, classification and regime change;

4. To conceptualise, reconstruct, contextualise (interpret) and analyse the dynamics between intelligence practices within democratic, non-democratic (authoritarian and totalitarian) and hybrid political regime types;
5. To explore the history/development of intelligence and political regimes in South Africa;
6. To reconstruct, examine and analyse current intelligence theory and practices in South Africa.


The meeting of these research objectives are discussed as follows:

### **9.2.1 The conceptualisation of a meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies**

This research indicated that intelligence studies is a fairly young academic discipline even though the practice thereof is as old as the beginning of polity. It is furthermore perceived due to global events such as international terrorism and cyber security; as the fastest growing academic field of study with numerous post-graduate courses and the accompanied new trend of graduate or first degree courses. Furthermore, these events as well as the increased use of the concept of intelligence within a broad array of other subjects such as business intelligence and competitive intelligence further compels a deepened understanding of national security intelligence and more so the study field thereof. Albeit, the study of this academic field it seems furthermore is not clearly defined and located within the science or meta-science and lacks a proper meta-scientific framework.

Within this point of departure this thesis aimed to address the construct of conceptual framework or meta-scientific framework as specific to intelligence studies within chapter two. Within this context a meta-scientific framework is viewed as a paradigm that contains the world view, epistemological, ontological and methodological approaches to political science and more specifically intelligence studies as a sub-field of study within the social sciences and the broader science. This framework subsequently serves as a scientific roadmap for not only this study, but other research within intelligence studies in line with what Babbie and Mouton (2001:xxIII) assert as to stand back as researcher and enter the mode of meta-scientific thinking and begin to reflect on what we are doing in the practice of research. In addition to conceptualising and postulating a paradigm for intelligence studies, this research specifically attempts to address what is perceived as maturity in the development of intelligence studies as postulated by Kuhn (1970). This conceptual paradigm, as also supported by this research, serves as a vital contribution in the understanding or sense-making of meta-science in specific relation to intelligence studies.

The overarching conceptual framework constructed by this study as vital to intelligence studies, is again repeated below for ease of reference and additional emphasis:



**Repeated Figure 9: A meta-scientific conceptual framework for intelligence studies**


Science as both knowledge and methodology requires in what Stoker (1961) explains as the gaining of knowledge through a guided inquiry concerning the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of the known. Such an overarching conceptual meta-scientific framework serves thus as a scientific roadmap in order to understand and explain the paradigms, theories, concepts definitions and phenomena within intelligence studies as a sub field within its discipline of political sciences, the social science and science as a whole. In addition, within the meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies as reflected in figure 9, several integrated and interrelated meta-scientific constructs and concepts were addressed that included the pre-scientific context of intelligence studies within political science whereby specific constructs such as the sociological dimension, ontology, epistemology,

teleology and methodology, are addressed. As this study expounds, the purpose of this meta-scientific approach enhances the aspects that would enrich the research, design and scientific methodologies and techniques to link intelligence studies with the development of well-defined research, enabling the facilitation of a greater body of knowledge and lastly to ultimately enhance the profession. It therefore contributes to both the theory and practice of intelligence. This study postulates that a combination of theory, research and practice forms the basis for learning, improvement and contribution to the body of knowledge of the subject under study. Such an approach could thus also assist to improve current intelligence practices specifically relevant to South Africa but also applicable to other countries, as to be more democratic than non-democratic.

To summarise, an overarching conceptualised meta-scientific framework for intelligence studies reveals that this academic study field takes place within a specific community of scientists (Sociological dimension), that it is about reality (Ontological dimension), that it is measured by its objective study (Methodological dimension), that it has the understanding of social reality as main end goal (Teleological dimension) and that it provides valid knowledge (Epistemological dimension). This study furthermore postulates that intelligence studies is a sub-discipline within the broader political science domain, although reflecting a multi-disciplinary characteristic. Intelligence inquiry in any other academic field as part of this multi-disciplinary character, contributes to both intelligence practices as well to theoretical content, indicating a mature albeit developing field of study.


### **9.2.2 A meta-theoretical framework for intelligence theory**

Meta-theory implies the investigation and analysis of a theory or theories on micro, meso and/or macro levels within intelligence studies, as also linked to other academic disciplines. A meta-theoretical approach to any research or inquiry enables the overarching understanding of intelligence theories and practices. Moreover, as indicated and discussed in chapter two of this thesis, meta-theorising entails: (1) Meta-theorising as a means of attaining a deeper understanding of theory ( $M_U$ ) that involves the study of theory in order to produce better and more profound understanding of extant theory; (2) Meta-theorising as a prelude to theory development ( $M_P$ ) that entails the study of existing theory to describe, prescribe and give direction in producing new theory and; (3) Meta-theorising as a source of perspective that overarching theory ( $M_O$ ) in which the study of theory is orientated to the goal of producing a perspective or meta-theory that overarches some part or all of the theory and provides an arrangement of constructs into a system and set of meta-theoretical assumptions and propositions. Such a conceptualised meta-theoretical framework for the understanding of intelligence as constructed and postulated within this study, is again repeated below for easy reference and additional emphasis:



**Repeated Figure 17: Meta-theoretical framework for understanding intelligence**


This approach enabled this study to conceptualise, reconstruct and reinterpret relevant intelligence concepts in relation to political science and even more so serves as a route map to conceptualise and explore democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regime concepts, characteristics, typologies and models as well as that of intelligence practices. Intelligence studies was placed against the different schools of thought or the approaches to the study thereof. Equally this research was able to conceptualise and reconstruct existing intelligence theory where it specifically contributed in a deepened understanding of the existing elements or functions of intelligence as more relevant and applicable to modern day political regime activities. Within this context this study proposed the reconstructing of the elements of intelligence away from the constructs of analysis, collection, counterintelligence and covert action as rather foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, counterintelligence and covert action. For this purpose and as to reflect upon and emphasise the conceptualised, reconstructed and re-interpreted intelligence theory within this research, Figure 26 is again depicted below:



**Repeated Figure 26: Conceptualised new reconstructed intelligence theory recapitulated**


Nonetheless, this study gave specific attention to the conceptualisation of current political regime and intelligence services typologies as also linked to democratisation and regime change theory. More specifically this study focused on regime change outcomes as to determine the type and form of government and intelligence and their respective practices as displayed within the post-transition phase. Within this context this study identified the lack of a typology which accommodates both political regime types as well as their intelligence practices as well as classified political regime types according to regime change outcomes. In this regard, as also explored and discussed within this thesis, the three waves of democratisation within the world clearly indicates that some countries within each wave, neither reached democratic consolidation, nor reversed back to their former non-democratic regime type. More so, none of the more recent political regime typologies made provision for the notion of a hybrid political regime as to be able to accommodate and reflect on those countries that got stuck in the 'grey zone'.

For this purpose this research developed and proposes the following conceptualised and reconstructed typology for political regime types and intelligence services as initially delineated in Figure 67 of this study and repeated for additional emphasis and elucidation below.




**Repeated Figure 67: Conceptualised classification of political regime and intelligence types**

These typologies, constructs and associated definitions provided this study with the opportunity to conceptualise and develop different models within the political science and intelligence theory as to interpret, explore and explain different intelligence practices within different political regime types. Moreover, this approach enabled this study to explain and describe all the different features and characteristics of each model as to be able to compare it to existing intelligence and regime practices. This study postulates a model for a liberal democratic political regime within Figure 46 of this study and likewise non-democratic political systems including authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are displayed in Figure 47. These models are again depicted below for additional emphasis:




**Repeated Figure 46: A model for a constitutional democratic political regime**




Repeated Figure 47: A model for non-democratic political regimes

A further contribution of this study is the development of models to describe, explain and explore different intelligence typologies as also based on the different regime typologies described above. For this purpose this study postulates the following models, namely, intelligence in a democracy and intelligence in non-democracies, which are again repeated below as to emphasise and recapitulate:



Repeated Figure 64: A model for democratic intelligence within a consolidated democracy







**Repeated Figure 65: a model for intelligence practices in non-democratic political regimes**

Within the notion of a hybrid political regime, this research also conceptualised and constructed a model depicting the main features and difference of a hybrid political regime and simultaneously a model depicting intelligence practices within such a regime. The concept of a hybrid regime is explained by this study as a mixture between democratic and non-democratic features and practices and oscillates between the two as is also the case with its intelligence practices.

These models are depicted in the following models below:




Repeated Figure 48: A conceptualised amoeba model for a hybrid political regime



Repeated Figure 66: A conceptualised model for political intelligence within a hybrid political regime

The central notion of this thesis is that an intelligence service is an epitome of the political regime type in which it functions, as it exists for and because of the regime, could be tested against the developed meta-theoretical and theoretical context through the operationalisation thereof on South Africa. For this purpose this study developed a measuring matrix as to be able to locate intelligence practices within the different regime types. Within this matrix, degree of governance and autonomy of the intelligence service is measured against state capacity and intelligence independence. This matrix is useful as it can be used to as measuring tool over a period of time in a specific country, but also to measure intelligence practices within political regime types, in other countries. This matrix is repeated below again for emphasis:



**Repeated Figure 62: Intelligence practices measured in relations to form of government and degree of governance**


This brings the overview and focus on the operationalising of the meta-theoretical and theoretical context of this research.

### 9.2.3 Operationalising theory and theory testing on South Africa

This research followed a framework designed in this thesis in operationalising the meta-theoretical and theoretical contributions of this study on South Africa as reflected in the title. Within this approach this enquiry explored and reinterpreted the development and history of intelligence practices in South Africa within different political regime types, as reflected over time. This study contributed in comparing these political and intelligence practices since early pre-colonial times


in South Africa; up to the present regime as of the date of this study. Not only were the intelligence and political regime practices and types compared over the different periods, but also placed into context of significant global political and intelligence events. The meta-theoretical and theoretical constructs, typologies and models developed in this study, enabled this research also to locate and categorise regime and intelligence practices further enabling the construct, development and building of future scenarios for South Africa.

Furthermore, the meta-theoretical and theoretical contributions as operationalised within this study, enabled a deepened understanding of current intelligence and political regime practices, not only in South Africa, but also for comparative and specific case studies in other countries in the world. Within this context this study established that the current political and intelligence practices in South Africa clearly reflects that of a Political Police Intelligence within a hybrid political regime. Furthermore, as this study denotes that a hybrid political regime is similar to an amoeba as it constantly changes shape and therefore constantly oscillated between democratic or non-democratic characteristics and features, its intelligence practices will reflect similar tendencies. These features are delineated and repeated in this overview as follows:



**Repeated Figure 125: Political practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime: 2009 - 2017**

The intelligence practices for South Africa is evaluated and conceptualised as follows:



**Repeated Figure 126: Intelligence practices in South Africa as a hybrid political regime:  
2009 - 2017**

In summary, it is the preposition of this study that all the entire research objectives had been met and thus subsequently addressed all the specific research questions. Furthermore this study asserts that the central theoretical statement in this research was also clearly forthcoming, as specifically reflected in the findings of this thesis.

### 9.3 Future studies

In postulating the notion that several political regimes in transition towards democratisation got stuck in the “grey zone” and neither reached democratic consolidation nor regressed into non-democratic regime types and are therefore categorised as hybrid political regimes which in its nature oscillates between democratic and non-democratic practices, requires further operationalisation with regard to other countries. This further research will contribute to existing meta-theoretical and theoretical development and deepening of understanding, not only of political sciences, but moreover towards intelligence studies as academic field as well as its secret practices. Albeit, additional research will also enable comparative studies and contribute to the testing and building of the conceptualisation and findings within this research. Future studies will also be helpful in reflecting back on the current time period of this study and provide additional impetus to the measuring tools and conceptualised models. Such studies also continuous the discourse on the practices of political regimes and their respective intelligence, within the public domain.

## 9.4 Recommendations

This study is not classified and took specific precautions as not to use any possible classified information. However, this study in its research managed to read several classified documents which were leaked into the open as contained in the Al Jazeera Spy cable leaks. As this study is thus not classified, it is recommended that the conceptualised theory and findings herein, be available not only for practitioners, academics and students, but more so for civil society so as to gain some insight and a deepened understanding of the secret world of intelligence organisations and its practices. This will ultimately assist in ensuring more democratic practices than non-democratic practices.


## 9.5 Conclusions

This study denotes that South Africa is a hybrid political regime and reflects similar intelligence practices which oscillates between democratic and non-democratic features and characteristics. In addition this study projected some scenarios as to understand and explain future perspectives for South Africa and its political and intelligence practices. Nonetheless, within this study, five possible outcomes is postulated for regime change as also depicted in the matrix (Figure 62), measuring form of government/intelligence autonomy and state capacity/intelligence penetration. The different outcomes are also postulated as different scenarios for a future South Africa as linked to the theory and models explained and described within this study. However, in a different approach to the scenarios explained, a specific scenario is projected as the most probable for a future South Africa. This is based on the evaluation and assessment of the history and development of both intelligence practices and political regimes in the country over different time periods. This study denotes that a clear trend is visible which could assist in such a projection. The outcomes are listed as non-democratic, democratic, new democracy, failed state or a hybrid political regime and the characteristics and features of each are as described and explained within the theory and models contained in this thesis.

Democratic, non-democratic and hybrid political regimes are postulated as having one characteristic in common – that of consolidation. Furthermore as already discussed, South Africa is currently categorised as a hybrid political regime with a political intelligence since 2009. Within the trend identified in this study, South Africa's regime change appears in phases of approximately fifty years. This serves as impetus for this study to place the country for at least another thirty years within the outcome or possible scenario of a hybrid political regime with a political intelligence structure. This is because a hybrid political system is described as an amoeba which oscillates between the different characteristics displayed in both that of a democracy on the one hand and those of a non-democracy on the other. It is therefore foreseen that different features and characteristics will have different prominence over this predicted period in time. This research



furthermore supports the notion that a hybrid political regime is not a new state form and has been around since the first wave of democratisation although it only recently started gaining more attention within the political science. This type of regime is also viewed by this study as a consolidated type and therefore also brings some order and stability to a country – as is also the case in South Africa. This study however postulates that it is highly unlikely that South Africa will experience any drastic regime change in the immediate future. The trends in the political regime types and intelligence practices in South Africa from the past into the future are depicted in the following adapted graph from Van Den Berg (2014:126):



**Figure 128: South African regime type from 1890 – 2029**

However, it is implied that South Africa will not experience any deepening of democracy that could lead to democratic consolidation, nor will it revert back to an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, under ANC rule as postulated by this study, neo-patrimonialism as instituted within the organisation, will remain rife. Although, it has its own history, scars and battles of the past, its culture, traditions, people, neighbours and challenges – South Africa is not viewed totally different to existing political regime and intelligence practices in Southern Africa and Africa. This hybrid form of government is regarded as common throughout the rest of Africa, Central Europe and South America. This study therefore postulates that South Africa will remain stuck in the proverbial 'grey zone' for at least the next two decades.



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