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dc.contributor.authorSteinmann, Rinie
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-28T07:21:21Z
dc.date.available2016-07-28T07:21:21Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationSteinmann, R. 2016. The core meaning of human dignity. Potchefstroom electronic law journal (PELJ) = Potchefstroomse elektoniese regsblad (PER), 19(1):2-32 [http://www.nwu.ac.za/p-per/index.html]en_US
dc.identifier.issn1727-3781
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10394/18095
dc.description.abstractThe concept of human dignity is relatively new in international and domestic constitutional law. Dignity is protected as a value or a right, or both, in international law and many domestic jurisdictions. It is difficult to define human dignity in a legal context, as the concept is not defined in the first international document which recognizes inherent human dignity and the protection thereof, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946) and many international (and national) documents enacted thereafter. Despite dissensus regarding the widespread use of the concept, dignity has come to display three elements in constitutional adjudication post World War Two: the ontological element which entails that human beings have equal inherent human dignity that cannot be waived or diminished; the second element being the claim that inherent human dignity has to be recognised and respected; and the limited-state claim as the third element which entails that states have a positive obligation to progressively realise human dignity through the mechanism of socio-economic rights. It is widely accepted that these elements root in Kantian moral ethics which holds that man's autonomy is based upon universal dignity, as a result of which man should never be used as a means to an end, but only as a means in himself. Kant expressed this idea through formulation of a categorical imperative, namely that everyone's inherent human dignity has to be respected and protected universally. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946), article 1(1) of the German Basic Law and section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 embody the elements of Kant's categorical imperative. As a result, the three elements are applied as a definitional term of human dignity in German and South African constitutional adjudication. Based on these elements, it can be argued that the current idea of universal inherent dignity, at least in German and South African law, comports with Kant's ideal that man should never be used as a means to an end.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectHuman dignityen_US
dc.subjectHuman rightsen_US
dc.subjectSupra-positive valuesen_US
dc.subjectKanten_US
dc.subjectCategorical imperativeen_US
dc.subjectInherent human dignityen_US
dc.subjectMoral ethicsen_US
dc.subjectPost-war rights protecting paradigmen_US
dc.subjectConstitutional rightsen_US
dc.subjectConstitutional valuesen_US
dc.subjectCruel and unusual punishmenten_US
dc.subjectSocio-economic rightsen_US
dc.subjectAssisted suicideen_US
dc.titleThe core meaning of human dignityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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