Rasionaliteit in geding : die probleem van epistemologiese relativisme in die wetenskapsfilosofie van M.B. Hesse
Abstract
The central problem addressed in this study is the question how relativism can be avoided in a view of science that takes the role of the social context of science seriously in the formulation and validation of scientific theories. This problem is situated against the demise of epistemological fundamentalism, objectivism and absolutism in science as displayed in the views of Rationalism, Empirism and Logical Positivism. The study focuses on the view of Mary Hesse who formulated a view which avoids the extremes of relativism and
epistemological fundamentalism. It is argued that Hesse succeeds in avoiding the extreme of relativism in at least two aspects of the way the problem of relativism is defined. The first aspect of the problem of relativism deals with a view of science in which empirical reality plays an insignificant role in the formulation and validation of scientific theories. Hesse avoids relativism through her emphasis on the limited and local nature of scientific theories which conform to the pragmatic criterion of successful prediction and control. In this regard
theories provide knowledge which is objective, progressive and accumulative. The realisation that the pragmatic criterium is itself a value, brings the second aspect of the problem to the fore. A second aspect of relativism deals with the role of values and interests in science and states that science is relativistic if it is a mere product of social values. It is argued that Hesse also avoids this aspect of relativism by showing how values and interests
are critically selected. Illegitimate values which hinder the progress of science are gradually identified and eliminated in favour of legitimate values and interests. Values and interests which are seen as legitimate at a particular stage are exposed to continued critical scrutiny. The process of critique will not arrive at any new foundation, but will continue to question every contingent basis of knowledge in science. By overcoming the problem of relativism in epistemology, insight can be gained about the functioning of reason within a social context.
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