Engineering a process safety culture in the chemical processing industry

Abstract

Industries where fire, explosion or releases (FERs) of hazardous chemicals may occur are administered by process safety management (PSM). Such events have the potential to cause catastrophes resulting in fatalities, facility and adjacent area damage or detrimental environmental impacts. Despite governments and institutions promulgating comprehensive standards, legal prescriptions, guidance notes and best practices since 1992, such major incidents still occur today. It has been over 26 years since PSM legislation was conceived, yet we still experience major process safety incidents where significant loss of life occurs. Analysis of past process safety incidents reveals that inadequate process safety commitment, leadership, conduct of operations and poor organisational culture have been recurring. Therefore, the research problem is that current PSM systems are deficient in addressing process safety culture in the chemical processing industry. This study endeavours to further understand how to improve and sustain process safety management in the chemical processing industry. The contribution to a new body of knowledge (BOK) sciences is to produce a practical and sustainable framework for improving process safety culture in the chemical processing industry. The literature survey consisted of reviewing existing PSM systems, occupational safety culture practices, human mind influencers and maintenance error. Publications from other high-risk high-reliability industries with catastrophic consequences were also evaluated. Delving into process safety culture systems revealed numerous human factor engineering practices and only a handful of process safety culture practices. Only two PSM systems included process safety culture, namely the Centre of Chemical Process Safety (2008) and the International Oil and Gas Producers (2008). However, there is an abundance of occupational safety culture literature available. Approaches for occupational safety culture were mainly cited as well as psychological literature that provides guidance on positively influencing human behaviours. Human factor error also impacts asset integrity; hence this was incorporated into the literature survey. High-risk high-reliability industries, specifically nuclear and civil aviation sectors, were also reviewed to provide an external view on safety culture approaches. There was also an abundance of safety culture literature available for these sectors. Thus, several safety culture approaches were uncovered, much of which resided in the occupational safety culture domain. Therefore, it is evident that our research problem exists, and that globally there is very limited guidelines into holistically managing process safety culture in the chemical processing industry.

A qualitative mixed methods approach was selected, and comprehensive verification, validation and reliability techniques were reviewed. Theory building was highlighted as an additional literature survey required to assist in the development of the process safety culture framework. All the process and occupational safety culture approaches from the literature surveyed was collated and analysed. Identified trends revealed some themes which featured repeatedly across the different safety culture approaches in the diverse environments investigated. A total of nine process safety culture (PSC) constructs were derived. These nine PSC constructs were summarised along with their associated critical aspects. A process safety culture is inferred through process safety climate assessment. Hence, the PSC constructs were transformed into the PSC elements, process safety climate attributes, which collectively intertwine to develop the process safety culture framework. The original nine PSC constructs formed twelve final PSC elements. The four quadrant focus areas, safety capital principles and the process safety culture elements were adapted and overlapped, ultimately resulting in further grouping of the process safety culture elements into four pillars. The four process safety culture pillars are [1] systems, [2] integrity, [3] people and [4] performance. This was graphically represented to incorporate all the process safety culture elements and pillars, to form the PSC framework. Sustainability aspects, discussed in Section 2.5 and Section 2.7, were incorporated into the PSC framework. Accompanying this, is the PSC implementation cycle and the PSC maturity chart. The intended research validation, as described in Chapter 3, was to pilot the process safety culture framework at a chemical processing facility. Financial impact and each PSC elements’ effective implementation were observed as the greatest challenges opposing validation. The implementation phase was estimated to require 2 to 4 years and was largely dependent on the magnitude of the chemical processing facility. The pilot phase required leadership to actively drive the PSC framework. This was estimated to require at least a year of testing, in order to perform an adequate assessment of the PSC elements and the framework. Thus, a total period, inclusive of implementation and field pilot testing, of between 3 to 5 years was estimated. Therefore, the initial intended validation approach was not viable. An alternate approach was undertaken and the proposed PSC framework, was critically reviewed by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the chemical processing industry and their feedback was incorporated. A total of ten SMEs were consulted, with combined experience in operations, engineering and process safety, exceeding 190 years. The SMEs are from three different provinces across South Africa, and are in roles across operations (production, maintenance), process engineering, behavioural transformation and process safety. Most of the SMEs consulted were very senior and

instrumental in implementing (facilitating or guiding) process safety practices/programs at a chemical processing facility. Despite the implementation and field pilot testing challenges, after consultation with these SMEs from operations, engineering and process safety at chemical processing facilities, they concur that the PSC framework is implementable and will yield positive PSC performance. However, this could not be quantified without field pilot tests. The PSC framework was updated to incorporate the builds by the SMEs. The major difference between the PSC framework revision 0 and revision 1, is the inclusion of the critical aspects of the now thirteen, previously twelve process safety culture elements. The additional PSC element is committed leadership, which although included, was diluted in the people pillar. The process flow diagram was also reviewed to better depict the relationships between the PSC pillars. This one-page high level overview greatly assists in summarising the PSC framework for ease of implementation as well as understanding. A PSC assessment tool was also suggested to support this framework. Therefore, the PSC questionnaire was developed and tailored to the PSC framework. Findings raised from the PSC questionnaire will inform the PSC implementation cycle. Thus, this will greatly complement the implementation of the framework and assist in pin-pointing the framework’s substandard process safety pillars. Leadership expectations in the form of a “how to guide” was suggested to assist in practically executing the PSC framework. Therefore, a PSC roles and accountabilities guideline was developed. Leadership was identified through all levels in a typical chemical processing business from the highest board member positions to the entry foremen level positions. The guideline also included all front-line operation personnel and other personnel with no direct reports, as process safety culture requires the participation from everyone in an organisation. Examples of other personnel include engineering, functional support and service providers. There were thus five levels of leadership. These levels included board member/executives, senior managers, plant managers, foremen and front-line operation personnel and other personnel. The PSC framework is a holistic approach to PSC, focusing on various aspects of process safety climate attributes which jointly contribute toward assessing and improving PSC in the chemical processing industry. It does not concentrate on influencing a positive PSC, but rather engineering a positive PSC practically and sustainably through systematic and continuous improvement focused initiatives.

This model however has two dependencies: [1] existence of an active Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or equivalent) PSM system and [2] it is actively driven by leadership. The overarching prerequisite of this framework, is that a chemical processing facility is in a good financial position and is able to upgrade its safety instrumented systems, implement a resource structure according to strategy and integrate digital solutions incorporating Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) and maintenance programs. This research study addressed the following two cases with a converse hypotheses: H1: There is a practical, sustainable and implementable process safety culture framework for the chemical processing industry. H1.0: There is no practical, sustainable and implementable process safety culture framework for the chemical processing industry. From the literature survey, it was also evident that our research problem exists, and that globally there is very limited guidelines into holistically managing process safety culture in the chemical processing industry. Therefore, based on this outcome, although very limited, it does appear that H1 is applicable and there is a practical, sustainable and implementable process safety culture framework for the chemical processing industry. H2: Implementation of a PSC framework will improve process safety incident case rates. H2.0: Implementation of a PSC framework will not improve process safety incident case rates. Despite the challenges experienced with the validation and reliability of the PSC framework, it has been theoretically reviewed by experienced SMEs, to assure that it will improve PSC at a chemical processing facility, albeit unquantifiable. Therefore, it does appear that H2 is applicable, and that implementation of the PSC framework will improve process safety incident case rates theoretically. Three research objectives were proposed. Two research objectives were achieved, and one research objective was partially achieved due to the H2 case explained above. A total of four recommendations are proposed for future work.